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THIE 


PICTORIAL  HISTORY 

OF 

THE  GREAT  CIVIL  WAR: 

^riiyin,  j^amluvt  and  ^mdts. 

FiyLBRACINGr 

FULL  AND  AUTHENTIC  ACCCOUNTS 

OF 

ITS  BATTLES  BY  LAND  AND  SEA, 


GRAPHIC  de:scriptions  of  heroic  dl:eds  achieved  by  armies  and 

INDIVIDUALS;  NARRATIVES  OF  PERSONAL  ADVENTURE;  THRILLING 
INCIDENTS;  DARING  EXPLOITS;  WONDERFUL  ESCAPES;  LIFE 
IN  (AMP,  FIELD,  AND  HOSPITAL;  ADVENTURES 
AT  SEA;  BLOCKADE  LIFE,  Etc.,  Etc. 

c;oNu:^iNiMGi- 

CAREFULLY  PREPARED  BIOGRAPHIES 

OF 

Ihe  leading  Generals  and  Nairal  Commanders  of  both  the  North  and  the  South, 

BY 

John  Laird  Wilson, 

Special  Correspondent  of  the  New  York  Herald. 


EMBELLISHED  WITH  NUMEROUS  FINE  STEEL-PLATE  ENGRAVINGS  OF  BATTLE-SCENES, 
AND  WITH  PORTRAITS  OF  A HUNDRED  LEADING  GENERALS. 


PUBLISHED  BY 

THE  TT^TIOISr^IL.  ETJELISEIIIsra-  GO., 

Philadelphia,  Pa. ; Chicago,  111. ; St.  Louis,  Mo. ; and  Atlanta,  Ga. 


Copyright,  1878,  by  John  Laird  Wilson. 


Copyright,  1881,  by  J. 


R.  JONKS. 


PREFACE. 


IN  oflfering  to  the  public  a new  History  of  the  Great  Civil  War,  a few  words  of 
explanation  are  necessary.  Of  histories,  general  and  special,  relating  to  the 
late  struggle  a number  have  been  published,  but  they  were  nearly  all  written  at  a 
’ period  so  close  to  the  war  that  the  writers  were  unconsciously  biassed  by  the  strong 
feelings  which  they  shared  in  common  with  their  fellow-citizens  during  the  occur- 
rence of  the  events  they  relate.  Time  had  not  softened  their  prejudices  sufficiently 
to  enable  them  to  write  with  the  judicial  calmness  necessary  to  the  proper  treat- 
ment of  such  a subject.  It  is  hoped  that  in  the  long  years  that  have  elapsed  since 
the  return  of  peace  enough  has  been  made  plain,  and  sufficient  calmness  has  been 
gained,  to  enable  the  writer  to  prepare  a history  which  shall  do  impartial  justice 
to  the  struggle  itself  and  to  the  actors  engaged  in  it. 

It  has  been  my  aim  to  present  a continuous  narrative  covering  the  entire  area 
of  operations,  both  military  and  naval,  and  free  from  those  interruptions  which  in 
general  history  are  unavoidable.  I have  endeavored  to  carry  the  reader  with  me 
over  sea  and  land,  wherever  the  sounds  of  war  were  heard,  and  to  present  to  him  in 
a series  of  vivid  and  faithful  pictures  the  events  which  marked  the  progress  of  the 
great  struggle.  Of  the  movements  of  the  hostile  forces,  and  of  the  commanders 
under  whom  at  different  times  and  at  different  places  these  movements  were 
made,  I have  expressed  my  opinion  with  great  freedom,  awarding  praise  or 
^ blame  as  truth  or  justice  seemed  to  call  for  the  one  or  the  other.  I do  not  expect 
^ that  my  judgments  will  find  favor  from  all  classes  of  readers,  but  I know  that 
^ they  are  the  judgments  of  an  unbiassed  mind,  solicitous  for  the  truth  and  con- 
I strained  only  by  the  irresistible  logic  of  facts. 

^ My  information  I have  drawn  from  sources  too  numerous  to  be  mentioned  in 
^ Retail.  Contemporary  magazines  and  pamphlets,  private  letters  and  documents 
of  various  kinds  which  have  been  kindly  placed  at  my  disposal, — all  have  been 
consulted  with  more  or  less  profit.  In  cases  of  doubt,  where  testimony  was  absent 
or  confiicting,  I have  corresponded  with  some  of  the  principal  leaders  in  the 


IV 


PREFACE. 


strife ; and  the  information  thus  derived  from  both  Northern  and  Southern  sources 
has  been  to  me  of  incalculable  value.  Of  the  results  of  the  labors  of  others  in 
the  same  field,  it  is  hardly  necessary  to  say,  I have  taken  full  advantage.  To  the 
exhaustive  history  of  the  war  by  Dr.  Lossing,  and  to  the  scarcely  less  exhaustive, 
but  in  some  respects  more  philosophical,  work  of  Dr.  Draper,  I confess  myself 
under  great  obligations.  I have  perused  with  profit  and  with  pleasure  Prof.  Wil- 
liam Swinton’s  **  Decisive  Battles  of  the  War and  in  his  “ Campaigns  of  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  ” I have  found  much  with  which  to  illumine  and  adorn 
these  pages.  Of  the  ‘‘  History  of  the  Civil  War  in  America,^’  by  the  Comte  de 
Paris,  so  far  as  it  has  advanced,  I cannot  speak  too  highly ; and  in  the  preparation 
of  some  of  the  earlier  chapters  of  this  work  I have  found  it  a useful  book  of 
reference.  In  terms  of  similar  praise  I desire  to  speak  of  the  “ Memoirs  of  Gen- 
eral Sherman  ” and  of  Badeau's  “ Military  Life  of  General  Grant.”  From  among 
the  many  other  works  which  I have  consulted  with  advantage,  and  to  which  I 
cannot  refuse  to  admit  my  indebtedness,  I would  mention  the  “ Bebellion  Kecord,” 
'‘The  Great  Civil  War”  by  Tomes  and  Smith,  “Grant  and  his  Campaigns”  by 
Dr.  Henry  Copp^e,  Tenney’s  “Military  and  Naval  History  of  the  Rebellion,” 

“ The  Battle  of  Gettysburg  ” by  Samuel  P.  Bates,  Pollard’s  “ Lost  Cause,”  and 
“ Chancellorsville  ” by  Hotchkiss  and  Allan. 

As  it  is,  this  work  is  now  given  to  the  public ; and  if  it  shall  be  found  that, 
while  doing  reasonable  justice  to  all  the  parties  concerned,  I have  in  any  degree 
been  able  to  render  such  disastrous  struggles  impossible  for  the  future,  I shall  feel , 
that  the  hours  spent  over  these  pages  have  not  been  spent  in  vain. 


J.  L.  W. 


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PICTORIAL  HISTORY 


OF 

THE  GKEAT  CIYIL  WAR. 


CHAPTER  I. 

The  Aim  and  Object  of  this  History. — The  Causes  of  the  War. — State  Eights. — The  Tariff  and  Slavery. — Diverg- 
ing Interests  of  North  and  South. — Effect  of  the  Abolition  of  Slavery  in  the  British  Colonies  on  American 
Sentiment. — The  Missouri  Compromise. — The  Fugitive  Slave  Bill. — Repeal  of  the  Missouri  Compromise. — 
Formation  of  the  Republican  Party. — Kansas  Struggle. — Triumph  of  the  Anti-Slavery  Party. — The  Campaign 
of  1856. — Buchanan  elected  President. — The  Kansas-Nebraska  Struggle. — Buchanan’s  Unfortunate  Admin- 
istration.—The  Dred  Scott  Decision. — The  John  Brown  Raid. — The  Sale  of  Arms  to  the  South. — Secession  and 
Organization  of  the  Confederacy. — Election  and  Inauguration  of  President  Lincoln. — His  Address. — The  Firing 
upon  Fort  Sumter. 

In  many  respects  the  American  Civil 
War  was  the  most  momentous  struggle 
that  ever  marked  the  history  of  the 
world.  Not  only  did  it  employ  larger 
armies  and  fleets  than  were  ever  called 
for  by  other  combatants;  not  only  did 
it  exceed  the  immortal  campaigns  of 
Frederick  and  Napoleon  in  the  magni- 
tude and  brilliancy  of  its  operations; 
not  only  did  its  theatre  comprise  an 
area  larger  than  the  whole  continent  of 
Europe,  embracing  as  many  varieties  of 
climate,  and  presenting  as  many  natural 
obstacles  to  be  overcome ; not  only  did  it 
inaugurate  a new  era  and  a new  mode 
of  warfare, — but  it  also  served  to  develop 
the  strength  and  resources  of  the  coun- 
try it  was  supposed  to  be  wasting,  and 
to  make  plain  to  the  world  the  true 
character,  the  immense  resources,  and 
the  especial  genius  for  war  of  the  Amer- 
ican people,  and  to  offer  a convincing 


proof  of  the  imperishable  nature  of  free 
institutions  when  entrusted  to  the  keep- 
ing of  a race  of  men  trained  to  under- 
stand and  value  them — men  willing  and 
resolved  to  maintain  them  even  at  the 
cost  of  their  lives.  The  magnitude  and 
grandeur  of  the  events  of  this  great 
struggle  give  to  them  a picturesqueness, 
so  to  speak,  which  must  make  a faithful 
account  of  them  deeply  interesting  to 
our  people. 

To  write  the  history  of  such  a struggle 
must  be  no  easy  task,  for  while  lauding 
the  glory  of  the  conqueror  the  virtues 
of  the  vanquished  must  not  be  for- 
gotten. In  such  a task  passion  and 
prejudice,  sectional  pride  and  intoler- 
ance of  opposition,  have  no  place;  the 
faithful  historian  must  record  events  as 
they  occurred.  Such  a task  we  propose 
to  ourselves  in  the  work  now  before  us. 

In  the  following  pages  it  will  be  our 


6 


CAUSES  OF  THE  WAR. 


aim  and  endeavor  to  carry  the  reader 
with  us,  as  we  follow  the  contending 
armies  and  mark  the  progress  of  the 
conflict ; to  halt,  from  time  to  time,  as 
the  embattled  hosts  confront  each  other, 
listening  to  the  roar  of  battle  and  wit- 
nessing the  wild  work  of  war — the  de- 
vastation of  fields,  the  desolation  of 
homes,  the  carnage,  the  slaughter,  the 
tortured  agony  of  the  wounded,  and  the 
ghastly  features  of  the  dead ; to  rejoice 
with  the  triumphant  defenders  of  the 
right,  without  being  ungenerous  to  the 
erring  and  the  vanquished  ; and  finally, 
to  point  out  the  blessed  results  which 
flowed  out  of  the  terrible  struggle,  not 
to  the  United  States  alone,  but  to  all 
nations  and  to  all  peoples. 

Preliminary  to  this,  however,  and  in 
order  to  enable  the  reader  intelligently 
to  .follow  us  in  our  descriptions  of  the 
different  battle  scenes,  it  is  necessary 
to  recount  briefly,  but  clearly  and  im- 
partially, the  remote  and  proximate 
causes  of  the  rebellion  and  the  events 
which  immediately  preceded  the  out- 
break of  hostilities.  The  antao^onism 
between  North  and  South  which  came 

1860  ^ December,  1860,  in 

the  secession  of  South  Carolina 
from  the  Union  was  not  new.  It  was 
old  almost  as  the  Union  itself.  It  had 
its  roots  deep  down  in  the  nation’s  his- 
tory. It  might  be  interesting,  if  it  lay 
within  the  scope  of  this  work,  to  show 
how  much  of  this  antagonism  was  due 
to  race,  how  much  was  due  to  climate, 
how  much  was  due  to  interest,  and 
the  pursuits  of  life.  In  all  these  par- 
ticulars, it  could  be  easily  shown,  there 
was  difference  between  North  and 


South.  But  to  enter  into  these  details 
with  any  degree  of  fulness  would  be 
foreign  to  our  plan.  From  the  very 
commencement  of  our  national  history 
difference  of  opinion  prevailed  as  to  the 
nature  of  the  bond  which  held  the 
States  together.  It  was  held  by  one 
class  of  statesmen,  that  the  Federal 
Union  was  a league  or  confederation 
which  might  be  dissolved  at  will  by 
any  of  the  States.  It  was  held  by  an- 
other class  of  statesmen  that  the  Fed- 
eral Union  constituted  a nation,  with 
a national  government,  and  that  no 
one  State  could  secede  from  the  Union 
without  .the  consent  of  all  the  others. 
This  was  the  radical  difference  out  of 
which  ultimately  grew  tlie  rebellion. 

It  was  not  until  certain  material  ques- 
tions arose  that  any  serious  j^ractical 
point  was  given  to  this  difference  of 
opinion.  In  course  of  time  such  ques- 
tions did  arise.  Chief  among  these  * 
were  those  which  related  to  the  tariff 
and  to  slavery.  The  South,  which  de- 
pended on  the  products  of  the  soil,  de- 
manded free  trade.  The  North,  which 
derived  its  wealth  from  the  manufac- 
turing industries,  called  for  protection. 
And  while  great  statesmen  advocated 
these  conflicting  views,  Congress  wit- 
nessed many  a stormy  scene.  The  ques- 
tion, however,  which  was  a permanent 
source  of  division,  and  on  which  agree- 
ment was  found  to  be  impossible,  was 
that  of  slavery. 

At  the  time  of  the  formation  of  the 
Union,  slavery  was  more  or  less  common 
in  all  the  States.  It  was  more  common 
in  the  South  than  in  the  North,  but  it 
existed  in  all  the  States.  The  invention 


THE  MISSOUKI  COMPROMISE, 


7 


of  the  cotton-gin  by  Whitney,  in  1793, 
rendering,  as  it  did,  the  cultivation  of 
cotton  the  leading  branch  of  Southern 
industry,  largely  increased  the  demand 
for  slave  labor.  While  slavery,  for  a 
variety  of  reasons,  had  ceased  to  be  a 
source  of  v^ealth  in  the  North,  and  was 
gradually  dying  out,  it  had  become  a 
source  of  great  wealth  to  the  Southern 
planters  and  a conspicuous  feature  of 
Southern  life.  In  the  year  1860,  the 
negro  population  of  the  Southern  States 
had  increased  to  about  four  millions. 
In  the  North,  slavery  had  completely 
died  out,  and  in  the  States  of  the  North- 
west, which  were  now  being  rapidly 
fdled  up  with  free  immigrants,  it  never 
found  a place.  Slavery  was  thus  found 
to  be  a root  of  bitterness.  It  deter- 
mined and  rendered  permanent  the  nat- 
ural antagonism  between  North  and 
South.  Year  by  year  the  gulf  was 
Avidening;  and  it  became  more  and  more 
apparent  that  if  the  South  were  not  to 
l)e  allowed  to  maintain  its  peculiar  and 
favorite  institution,  and  would  not  be 
permitted  to  secede,  a gigantic  civil 
Avar  Avas  one  of  the  certainties  of  the 
not  distant  future. 

The  slavery  question,  as  we  have 
said,  was  a cause  of  division  from  the 
beginning  of  our  history.  The  anti- 
[ la  very  agitation  in  England,  and  the 
passing  of  the  memorable  law  in  1807, 
cabolishing  the  slave  trade  in  the  Britisli 
colonies,  had  naturally  enough  a pow- 
erful influence  on  this  side  of  the  At- 
lantic. It  helped  to  determine  the  pur- 
pose of  the  North,  and  it  infused  neAV 
life  into  all  those  who  were  in  favor  of 
abolition.  It  was  not,  however,  until 


about  the  year  1820  that  the  real  po- 
litical struggle  began.  With  the  famous 
Missouri  Compromise  began  that  polit- 
ical contest  out  of  which  grew  the  civil 
war.  It  was  the  first  of  a series  of 
steps  which  led  up  to  the  act  of  seces- 
sion and  the  firing  on  Fort  Sumter.  The 
Missouri  Compromise,  it  was  supposed, 
was  a complete  and  satisfactory  settle- 
ment of  the  dispute  between  the  North 
and  the  South.  It  turned  out  to  be  a 
great  source  of  trouble.  Its  history  is 
as  follows  : Missouri  formed  part  of  the 
Louisiana  purchase.  After  the  organ- 
ization of  the  ‘‘  Territory  of  Orleans,” 
in  1803,  Missouri  formed  part  of  the 
“District  of  Louisiana.”  Later  it  took 
the  name  of  “ Missouri  Territory.”  The 
State  of  Missouri  was  a part  of  that 
Teri’itory.  In  1820,  Missouri  applied 
to  Congress  for  admission  into  the  Union 
as  a State.  It  was  proposed  that  the 
application  be  granted  only  on  condi- 
tion that  slaA^ery  be  prohibited  in  the 
new  State.  The  pro-slaA^ery  party  were 
indignant.  Both  in  and  out  of  Congress 
party  feeling  ran  high.  The  discussion, 
which  was  conducted  with  great  bitter- 
ness, resulted  in  what  was  called  a com- 
promise.  It  Avas  agreed  that  slavery  be 
allowed  in  Missouri,  but  prohibited  in 
all  the  territory  of  the  United  States 
north  and  AA^est  of  the  northern  bound- 
ary of  Arkansas.  On  these  terms  Mis- 
souri entered  the  Union  as  a State. 
The  compromise,  from  which  so  much 
Avas  expected,  settled  nothing.  The 
Southern  people  continued  to  feel  and 
act  as  if  they  had  been  hindered  in  the 
exercise  of  their  rights.  In  1850, 
they  succeeded  in  passing  the 


8 


CAUSES  OF  THE  WAR. 


Fugitive  Slave  Bill,  whicli  enabled  mas- 
ters to  recover  their  slaves  who  might 
have  escaped  to  a free  State.  This  act 
gave  gi*eat  umbrage  to  the  North.  In 
1854  the  South  gained  another 
triumph  by  the  repeal  of  the  Mis- 
souri Compromise.  This  act,  which  had 
for  its  object  the  organization  of  a ter- 
ritorial government  in  Kansas  and  Ne- 
braska, pi’ovided  that  the  people  of  the 
Territories  should  be  at  liberty  to  adopt 
or  exclude  slavery,  as  they  thought  lit. 
State  Bights  were  thus  again  in  the  as- 
cendant; and  the  Southern  planters  were 
left  at  li])erty  to  establish  their  favor- 
ite institutions  all  over  the  Southwest. 
At  this  juncture  was  formed  the  Be- 
publican  party — a 'party  whose  princi- 
pal doctrine  was  opposition  to  the  ex- 
tension of  slavery.  The  organization  of 
the  Bepublican  party  made  it  plain  to 
all  the  world  that  the  struggle  between 
the  South  and  the  North — between  the 
pro-slavery  party  on  the  one  hand  and 
the  anti-slavery  party  on  the  other — 
meant  war  to  the  knife.  A truce  was 
now  no  longer  possible. 

These  preliminary  remarks  would  be 
incomplete  without  a passing  reference 
to  what  is  known  as  the  Kansas  struggle. 
Kansas,  like  Missouri,  originally  formed 
part  of  that  immense  territory  which 
went  by  the  name  of  Louisiana.  It  will 
be  remembered  by  the  reader  that  the 
Missouri  Compromise  left  the  south- 
western provinces  open  for  the  introduc- 
tion of  slavery.  The  repeal  of  that  act  by 
Mr.  Douglas’s  bill  did  not  destroy  the 
hopes  of  the  southern  planters  with  re- 
gard to  Kansas.  From  the  date  of  the 
Missouri  Compromise  it  had  been  the 


battle-ground  of  the  two  contending 
parties.  Both  the  pro-slavery  party 
and  the  anti-slavery  party  did  their 
best  to  colonize  it.  From  the  East  and 
the  Northwest  freemen  poured  into  the 
new  territory,  and  emigrant  aid  soci- 
eties” were  formed  in  all  the  Free 
States  to  lend  the  freemen  a helping 
hand.  The  South  was  not  less  indus- 
trious in  its  elforts.  “ Border  ruffians,” 
as  they  were  called,  rushed  in  from  the 
neighboring  State  of  Missouri,  and  a 
reign  of  violence  ensued  almost  if  not 
entirely  unparalleled  in  the  history  of 
the  country.  The  Kansas  struggle,  as 
can  easily  be  imagined,  deeply  embit- 
tered feeling  on  both  sides,  and  had 
a powerful  influence  in  hastening  the 
“irrepressible  conflict.”  At  last,  after 
some  years  of  weary  fighting,  the  anti- 
slavery party  triumphed,  and  Kansas 
was  admitted  a free  State  30th  January, 
1861.  While  this  struggle  was  at  its 
height,  took  place  the  presidential  elec- 
tion of  1856.  It  was  one  of  the 
keenest  contests  in  the  history  of 
the  country.  Mr.  Fremont,  the  Bepub- 
lican candidate,  polled  a large  number 
of  votes;  but  the  Democrats  carried 
the  day,  and  Mr.  Buchanan,  a warm 
friend  of  the  South,  came  into  power. 
The  election  of  a Democratic  president 
was  more  an  apparent  than  a real  gain 
to  the  South.  Mr.  Buchanan,  with  all 
his  immense  influence,  could  not  hinder 
the  admission  of  Kansas  as  a free  State ; 
and  the  settlement  of  the  Kansas  diffi- 
culty was  justly  regarded  as  an  anti- 
slavery triumph.  “ The  Kansas-Nebras- 
ka  struggle,”  as  Dr.  Draper  well  jmts 
it,  “ marks  an  epoch  in  the  great  contro- 


BUCHANAN’S  ADMINISTRATION. 


9 


versy  between  the  North  and  the  South. 
It  closes  the  period  of  parliamentary  or 
congressional  debate  between  them,  and 
introduces  one  of  violence  and  open 
war.  The  South  clearly  perceived  that 
nothing  more  was  to  be  hoped  for  from 
peaceful  measures,  and  that,  if  it  were 
its  intention  to  perpetuate  or  even  to 
protect  African  slavery,  it  could  do  so 
only  by  force.” 

The  history  of  the  next  four  years  is 
the  history  of  a war  of  opposing  views 
and  conflicting  aims.  The  South  was 
becoming  more  embittered,  the  North 
more  resolute.  The  Buchanan  admin- 
istration was  in  fact  a great  misfortune 
to  the  country.  Of  all  the  public  men 
of  his  time,  he  was  perhaps  least  fitted 
for  the  stern  duties  which  devolved  up- 
on the  chief  of  the  State.  Men  like 
Cromwell  or  Napoleon  or  General  Jack- 
son  would  have  been  equal  to  the  sit- 
uation ; but  Buchanan  was  neither  a 
Cromwell  nor  a Napoleon,  nor  is  he  to 
be  mentioned  in  the  same  breath  with 
General  Jackson.  Admirably  adapted 
for  the  high  position  in  times  of  peace, 
he  was  altogether  unequal  to  the  stirring 
times  in  which  he  found  himself.  A 
strong  hand  would  have  seized  the  helm 
and  acted  with  decision.  The  prospect 
(J  war  unnerved  him;  he  hesitated,  and 
the  vessel  floated  to  destruction.  His 
term  of  office  was  marked  by  four  great 
events — the  Dred  Scott  decision  in 
18') 7 ; tile  John  Brown  laid  in  the 
fall  of  1850;  the  sale  of  arms  to 
the  South,  and  the  oi-ganization  and  re- 
tirement from  the  Union  of  the  Southern 
Confederacy.  The  Dred  Scott  decision 
was  very  properly  regarded  in  tlie 


North  as  the  virtual  establishment  of 
slavery  throughout  all  the  States  of  the 
Union,  and  converting  it  from  a local 
into  a national  institution.  Accoixlimr 
to  the  decision  given  by  Judge  Tanev 
of  the  Supreme  Court  in  this  case,  a 
slave  owner  might  carry  his  slaves  with 
him  into  any  State  of  the  Union.  Some 
of  the  Northern  States  resented  this 
decision  by  yiassing  Personal  Liberty 
Laws,”  declaring  freedom  to  every 
slave  who  came  within  their  borders. 
The  bitter  feelings  engendered  on  both 
sides  by  the  Dred  Scott  affair  were  ag- 
gravated by  the  John  Brown  I'aid.  It 
was  no  doubt  a foolish  affair,  which 
never  had  the  appi’oval  of  any  large  or 
influential  section  of  the  Northern  peo- 
ple ; but  it  was  felt  by  the  South  to  be 
a demonstration  of  Northern  sentiment, 
and  it  was  treated  accordingly.  The 
execution  of  Brown  and  his  associates 
was  no  doubt  justified  by  the  law  of 
the  land,  but  it  was  nevertheless  a gi’eat 
blunder.  It  exalted  a foolish  filibus- 
tering raid  into  the  character  of  a cru- 
sade for  liberty,  and  it  transformed  a 
crazy  old  man  into  a hero  and  a martyr. 
Blood  had  now  been  shed,  and  recon- 
ciliation had  become  impossible. 

In  the  midst  of  the  heat  and  excite- 
ment occasioned  by  the  Dred  Scott  de- 
cision and  the  John  Brown  raid,  the 
South  was  secretly  and  busily  ])re])ar- 
ing  for  war.  Through  the  indifference 
of  the  government  at  Washington,  and 
through  the  treachery  of  the  secretary 
of  war,  lai’ge  stores  of  arms  and  am- 
munition were  transferred  to  the  South; 
and  while  the  North  was  dreaming  of 
war  only  as  a prol)ability,  the  South 


10 


CAUSES  OF  THE  WAR. 


t 


was  armed  to  the  teeth.  Such  was  the 
condition  of  things  North  and  South 
when  the  time  came  to  nominate  a can- 
didate for  the  presidency  in  the  spring 
of  1860.  The  people  were  di- 
vided into  four  parties.  Each 
party  had  its  own  candidate,  and  each 
candidate  had  his  own  platform.  The 
candidates  were  Breckenridge,  of  the 
Southern  Democracy ; Douglas,  of  the 
Northern  Democracy ; Lincoln,  of  the 
Kepublican  party;  and  Bell,  of  the 
Union  Constitutional  party.  On  the 
platform  that  “there  is  no  law  for 
slavery  in  the  Territories,  and  no 
power  to  enact  one ; and  that  Congress 
is  bound  to  prohibit  it  in  or  exclude 
it  fi’om  every  Federal  Territory,”  the 
Bepublicans  carried  the  day.  The  elec- 
Nov.  Lincoln  on  the  6th  of  No- 

vember,  1860,  crushed  the  hopes 
of  the  South.  It  was  the  signal  for 
secession.  South  Carolina  was  the  first 
to  move.  At  a special  convention,  held 
Dec.  on  the  20th  of  December,  I860-, 
20*  her  connection  with  the  Union 
was  dissolved  by  an  unanimous  vote. 
The  example  of  South  Carolina  was 
promptly  followed  by  Mississippi,  Ala- 
bama, Florida,  Georgia,  and  Louisiana, 
and  later  by  Texas.  As  Buchanan  held 
the  opinion  that  neither  he  nor  Con- 
gress had  the  right  to  coerce  a State 
into  submission,  nothing  was  done 
to  hinder  the  progress  of  seces- 
sion. On  the  4th  of  February,  1861,  a 
Feb.  convention  of  the  seceded  States 
4*  was  held  at  Montgomery,  Alaba- 
ma; and  there  a constitution  was  adopt- 
ed and  a government  organized,  under 
the  name  of  the  Confederate  States  of 


America.  Jefferson  Davis,  late  United 
States  senator  from  Mississippi,  was 
elected  president,  and  Alexander  H. 
Stephens  of  Georgia  vice-president. 
The  seceders  took  possession  of  all  the 
forts,  arsenals,  custom-houses,  ships, 
and  all  other  Federal  property  within 
their  boundaries.  In  the  South,  in  the 
possession  of  the  United  States  there 
remained  only  Fort  Sumter,  in  Charles- 
ton Harbor,  Fort  Pickens,  near  Pensa- 
cola, and  the  forts  off  the  southern 
extremity  of  Florida. 

On  Marcli  4th,  1861,  Abraham  Lin- 
coln was  inaugurated.  In  his  ad-  j^jar. 
di  •ess,  the  president  declared  it  to  4. 
be  his  duty  to  “hold,  occupy  and  pos- 
sess the  places  and  property  ” belong- 
ing to  the  Federal  government  in  the 
South.  This  was  accepted  by  the  South- 
ern leaders  as  a declaration  of  war. 
Several  of  the  southern-born  officers  in 
the  United  Stares  army  and  navy,  who 
had  not  yet  declared  themselves,  now 
entered  the  Confederate  service.  With- 
out delay,  General  Beauregard  was 
placed  at  the  head  of  the  forces,  about 
four  thousand  men,  who  were  already 
investing  Fort  Sumter,  in  Charleston 
Harbor.  Fort  Sumter  Avas  held  by  a 
garrison  of  about  eighty  men  under 
Major  Anderson,  whose  name  will  be 
memorable  in  American  history.  At 
the  time  of  the  secession  of  South  Caro- 
lina, in  December,  1860,  Anderson  was 
stationed  at  Fort  Moultrie,  but  for 
greater  security  he  removed  to  Fort 
Sumter.  It  was  known  that  the  garri- 
son was  reduced  to  great  straits,  and 
must  soon  surrender,  unless  supplies 
and  reinforcements  came  from  Washing- 


CHARLESTON  HARBOR. 


11 


ton.  It  was  believed  that  the  president 
and  his  advisers  were  disposed  to  with- 
'draw  the  garrison.  Early  in  April, 
however,  it  became  known  that  the 
government  had  decided  to  send  a fleet 
with  supplies  to  Major  Anderson  and 
his  garrison.  Beauregard  received  in- 
structions from  the  authorities  at  Mont- 
gomery to  demand  the  surrender  of  the 
fort;  and,  if  his  demand  was  not  com- 


plied with,  he  was  to  reduce  it  by 
force.  On  the  afternoon  of  the  April 
11th  of  April,  18^1,  the  demand 
to  surrender  was  made.  Major  Ander- 
son refused  to  comply.  Early  on  the 
following  morning  the  threat  which 
was  made  was  carried  out,  and  Are  was 
opened  on  Fort  Sumter  by  the  Confed- 
erate land  batteries.  The  American 
Civil  War  had  commenced. 


CHAPTER  II. 

Charleston  Harbor  — Fort'Sumter, — Gardiner  and  Floyd, — Major  Anderson. — Adjutant-General  Cooper. — Evidence 
of  Conspiracy. — Transfer  of  Arms  from  Northern  to  Southern  Arsenals. — Jefferson  Davis’  “Little  Bill,” — 
Captain  Foster's  Workmen. — General  Scott  becoming  alarmed. — Conspirators  in  the  Cabinet. — Anderson 
moves  from  Fort  Moultrie  into  Fort  Sumter. — Great  Excitement  ail  over  the  Country. — Indignation  in  the 
South. — Kesignation  of  Floyd. — Action  of  the  Secession  Convention. — Castle  Pinckney  and  Fort  Moultrie 
occupied  by  the  Secessionists. — Seizure  of  the  Custom  House  and  Post-Office. — The  Southern  Commissioners 
in  Washington. — Their  Extraordinary  Demands  Defused. — President  Buchanan  Aroused. — More  Energy  on 
the  part  of  the  Government. — The  Star  of  the  West. — Preparations  for  Attacking  Fort  Sumter, — The  Star  of 
the  West  seen  in  the  Outer  Harbor — Fired  upon — Compelled  to  Betire. — Anderson  called  upon  to  Surrender 
Fort  Sumter. — Secession  Spreading. — The  Peace  Conference. — Election  of  Lincoln. — His  Journey  to  Wash- 
ington.— His  Life  in  Danger, — His  Inauguration. — His  Address. — Anderson  more  Hopeful. — Disappointment. — 
Lincoln  “Putting  His  Foot  Down  Firmly.” — The  Belief  Squadron. — Anderson  again  called  upon  to  Surrender 
the  Fort. — His  Beply. — The  First  Shot. — The  Bombardment. — The  Belief  Squadron  Sighted. — Hope. — The 
Garrison  Deduced  to  Extremities. — Bed-Hot  Shot. — Fort  Sumter  in  Flames. — The  Last  Three  Cartridges. — 
The  Flag  Staff  Shot  Down. — The  notorious  Wigfall. — Wigfall’s  Deception  Discovered. — Anderson  Indignant. — 
Surrenders  on  his  own  Terms. — Anderson  and  his  Men  safe  on  board  the  Baltic. 


Before  the  close  of  1860,  public  at- 
tendon  was  centered  on  Charles- 
ton Harbor.  It  was  here  that  the 
first  indications  of  actual  war  were  re- 
vealed. The  harbor  of  Charleston  is 
one  of  the  finest  on  the  South  Atlantic 
seaboard.  During  the  years  of  peace 
and  prosperity,  great  care  had  been 
taken  of  it  by  the  State  and  Federal 
authorities ; and  when  South  Carolina, 
yielding  to  the  fierce  impulses  of  reiiel- 
lion,  took  the  bold  step  of  retiring 


from  the  Union,  it  was  one  of  the  best 
guarded  harbors  in  the  States.  It  had 
the  advantage  of  four  powerful  fort- 
resses— Castle  Pinckney,  Fort  Moul- 
trie, Fort  Johnson,  and  Fort  Sumter- 
Castle  Pinckney  was  situated  upon  the 
soutliern  extremity  of  a tract  of  marshy 
land  known  as,  Shute’s  Folly  Island, 
and  was  near  the  city  of  Charleston. 
Fort  Moultrie  stood  on  Sullivan’s  Island, 
distant  from  Charleston  between  three 
and  four  miles,  and  not  far  removed 


12 


FORT  SUMTER. 


from  the  famous  little  palmetto-log  fort 
of  that  name,  made  memorable  during 
the  War  of  Independence  by  its  heroic 
defiance  of  the  British  fleet  in  1776. 
Fort  Johnson  stood  on  James  Island,  and 
to  the  west  of  Fort  Sumter.  As  a forti- 
fication it  was  of  comparatively  little 
account.  Fort  Sumter  was  by  far  the 
lai’gest  and  most  important  of  these 
strongholds.  Its  position  gave  it  an 
immense  advantage  over  all  the  others. 
It  was  built  in  the  middle  of  the  en- 
trance to  the  harbor  prope  ■;  and  its 
walls  of  defiance  towered  up  on  the 
southwestern  edge  of  the  ship  channel. 
Fort  Sumter  was  about  three  and  a half 
miles  from  the  city.  A truncated  pen- 
tagonal in  form,  its  walls  were  of  solid 
brick  and  concrete  masonry.  The  island 
on  which  the  fort  was  erected  rested  on 
a mud  bank.  The  materials  of  which 
the  island  was  composed  were  chips  of 
granite  from  the  quarries  of  New  Eng- 
land. In  the  conveyance  of  these  ma- 
terials and  in  the  construction  of  the 
island  ten  years  were  consumed,  and 
the  actual  cost  amounted  to  over  half 
a million  of  dollars.  The  fort  itself  cost 
another  half  million.  The  walls,  which 
were  sixty  feet  high  and  from  eight  to 
twelve  feet  thick,  were  pierced  for  three 
tiers  of  guns  on  the  north,  east  and  west 
sides.  The  two  lower  tiers  were  under 
bomb-proof  casemates.  The  first  tier 
was  intended  for  forty-two-pounder 
Paixhans,  the  other  two  were  intended 
for  eight  and  ten-inch  columbiads. 
The  full  complement  of  guns  was  one 
hundred  and  forty,  but  when  the  war 
broke  out  there  were  only  seventy-five 
guns  in  the  work. 


In  1860  Colonel  Gardiner  was  com- 
mander in  Charleston  Harbor.  A va- 
riety of  circumstances  encouraged  the 
belief  that  Gardiner  was  in  league  with 
the  enemy.  The  strange  conduct  of 
War  Secretary  Floyd  and  the  cunning 
efforts  of  Jefferson  Davis  to  secure  arms 
for  the  South,  had  created  a spirit  of 
watchfulness,  and  Gardiner  havins:  re- 
vealed  an  inordinate  amount  of  anxiety 
to  have  his  supply  of  ammunition  in- 
creased, incurred  the  displeasure  of  the 
government  and  was  removed.  The  va- 
cant place  was  filled  without  delay  by 
Major  Eobert  Anderson,  a native  of  Ken- 
tucky, and  an  oificer  who  had  won  some 
distinction  in  the  Mexican  campaigns. 
On  the  20th  November  Anderson 
arrived  and  assumed  the  com-  20. 
mand,  his  head-quarters  being  at  Fort 
Moultrie.  It  would  have  been  strange 
if  a man  of  his  discernment  had  been 
deceived  by  the  peculiar  state  of  things 
which  prevailed  all  around  him.  An- 
derson was  not  deceived.  On  the  23d 
of  November  he  wrote  to  Adju- 
tant-General  Cooper,  describing  23. 
the  situation.  In  that  letter  he  uses 
the  following  remarkable  words : “That 
there  is,”  he  says,  “a  settled  determina- 
tion to  leave  the  Union  and  to  obtain 
possession  of  this  fort  is  apparent  to 
all.”  All  the  forts  in  the  harbor,  he 
assured  General  Cooper,  were  in  a 
wretched  condition,  Foi*t  Moultrie  par- 
ticularly inviting  attack  by  its  weak- 
ness. “ Fort  Sumter  and  Castle  Pinck- 
ney,” he  went  on  to  say,  “must  be  gar- 
risoned immediately,  if  the  government 
determines  to  keep  command  of  this 
harbor.”  Major  Anderson’s  letter  to 


SALE  OF  AKMS  TO  THE  SOUTH. 


13 


General  Cooper,  which  contained  much 
more  to  the  same  effect,  must  ever  be 
legarded  as  one  of  the  most  impoibant 
official  documents  connected  with  the 
early  history  of  the  Civil  War. 

Anderson  did  not  know — did  not 
even  suspect — that  the  ears  to  which 
he  addressed  his  appeals  were  deaf,  and 
that  the  heart  which  he  hoped  to  touch 
was  callous,  by  reason  of  rank  treason. 
Adjutant-General  Cooper,  who  w'as  a 
native  of  the  State  of  New  York,  but 
who  had  married  a sister  of  Senator 
Ma-on  of  Virginia,  was  already  sold  to 
the  Confederate  cause.  At  the  very 
moment  that  Major  Anderson  was  writ- 
ing his  memorable  letter.  Cooper  was 
making  use  of  his  position  to  obtain 
and  communicate  valuable  information 
to  the  autliorities  at  Southern  head- 
quarters. Three  months  later,  he  left 
his  office  at  Washington,  hastened  to 
Montgomery,  Alabama,  and  was  made 
adjutant -general  of  the  Confederate 
forces,  then  busily  preparing  for  war. 
Cooper,  howevei',  was  not  alone  in  his 
iniquity.  The  national  capital  had  be- 
come a hotbed  of  treachery.  Weak, 
undecided,  and  in  the  last  months  of 
his  four  years  of  office,  the  president 
would  do  nothing.  The  people  of  the 
North  little  imagined  that  the  entire 
machinery  of  the  government  at  Wash- 
ington had  been  worked  for  an  entire 
year  in  the  interests  of  the  Southern 
Doc.  malcontents.  On  the  31st  of  De- 
cember.  Senator  Wilson  of  Mas- 
sachusetts offered  a resolution  in  the 
Senate,  asking  the  secretary  of  war  to 
furnish  information  concerning  the  dis- 
position  of  arms  manufactured  in  the 


national  armories  or  purchased  for  the 
use  of  the  government  during  the  past 
year.  Mr.  Holt  tvas  now  at  the  head 
of  the  War  Department,  and  the  need- 
ed information  was  not  long  delayed. 
From  the  report  submitted  to  the  Sen- 
ate, it  appeared  that  as  early  as 
the  2Dth  of  December,  1859,  Sec-  ^ 
retary  Floyd  had  ordered  the  transfer 
of  seventy-five  thousand  percussion  mus- 
kets, forty  thousand  muskets  altered 
to  percussion,  and  ten  thousand  percus- 
sion rifles  from  the  armory  at  Spring- 
field,  Massachusetts,  and  the  arsenals  at 
Watervliet,  New  York,  and  Watertown, 
Massachusetts,  to  the  arsenals  at  Fay- 
etteville in  North  Carolina,  Charleston 
in  South  Carolina,  Augusta  in  Georgia, 
Mount  Vernon  in  Alabama,  and  Baton 
Rouge  in  Louisiana.  These  arms,  it 
appeared,  were  distributed  in  the 
spring  of  1860.  Only  eleven  days 
after  this  order  had  been  issued  by 
Floyd,  Jefferson  Davis  introduced  into 
the  Senate  a bill  “ to  authorize  the  sale 
of  public  arms  to  the  sevei*al  States 
and  Territories,  and  to  regulate  the  ap- 
pointment of  superintendents  of  the 
national  armories.”  The  real  object  of 
this  bill  was  not  at  first  or  at  all  gen- 
erally perceived.  It  was  not  until  the 
Senate  was  asked  by  Davis,  on  Feb. 
the  ’21st  of  February,  to  take  up  21. 
what  he  called  a little  bill,”  which  he 
hoped  would  ‘‘excite  no  discussion,”  that 
treachery  began  to  be  suspected.  On 
the  23d,  two  days  afterward,  Mr.  Feb. 
Fessenden,  senator  from  Maine,  23. 
asked  for  some  explanations  on  the  sub- 
ject. Davis  was  i-eady  with  his  reply. 
“The  secretary  of  war,”  he  said,  “ had 


14 


FORT  SUMTER. 


recommended  an  increase  of  the  appro- 
priation for  arming  the  militia  of  the 
country,  and  he  thought  it  best  for  vol- 
unteers to  have  arms  made  by  the 
government,  so  that  in  case  of  war  the 
weapons  would  all  be  uniform.”  Fessen- 
den offered  an  amendment,  but  the  bill 
was  canicd  by  a strict  party  vote.  It 
was  smothered,  however,  in  the  House 
of  Kepresentatives.  The  southerners 
were  not  to  be  driven  from  their  pur- 
pose. An  old  law,  bearing  the  date  of 
March  3d,  1825,  authorized  the  secre- 
tary of  war  to  sell  arms,  ammunition, 
and  other  military  stores  which  were 
no  longer  suitable  for  the  public  ser- 
vice. Under  cover  of  this  law,  Floyd 
sold  to  States  and  individuals  over  thir- 
ty-one thousand  muskets,  altered  from 
flint  to  percussion,  for  two  dollars  and 
fifty  cents  each.  On  the  very  day  Major 
Anderson  addressed  the  letter  pre- 
viously mentioned  to  Adjutant-General 
Cooper,  Floyd  sold  ten  thousand  of 
these  muskets  to  G.  B.  Lamar  of  Geor- 
gia; and,  some  eight  days  before,  he 
had  sold  five  thousand  of  them  to  the 
State  of  Virginia.  It  was  openly  boast- 
ed by  a Southern  newspaper  that  during 
the  year  which  preceded  the  outbreak 
of  hostilities,  one  hundred  and  thirty- 
five  thousand  four  hundred  and  thirty 
muskets  had  been  quietly  transferred 
from  the  northern  arsenal  at  Springfield 
alone  to  the  Southern  States ; and  Sec- 
retary Floyd  was  thanked  for  the  fore- 
sight he  had  displayed  in  thus  disarm- 
ing the  North  and  equipping  the  South 
for  the  emergency.  A similar  boast 
was  made  by  a prominent  Virginian, 
'who  declared  that,  what  with  the  arms 


distributed  by  the  Federal  government 
to  the  States  in  preceding  years  and 
those  purchased  by  the  States  and  by 
private  citizens,  the  South  entered  upon 
the  war  with  one  hundred  and  fifty 
thousand  small  arms  of  the  most  ap- 
proved modern  pattern,  and  the  best  in 
the  world.  According  to  a statement 
made  by  General  Scott,  Khode  Island, 
Delaware,  and  Texas  liad  not  dsawn,  at 
the  close  of  1860,  their  annual  quota  of 
arms,  and  Massachusetts,  Tennessee,  and 
Kentucky  had  drawn  only  in  part; 
while  Virginia,  South  Carolina,  Geor- 
gia, Florida,  Alabama,  Louisiana,  Mis- 
sissippi, and  Kansas  were,  by  order  of 
the  secretary  of  war,  supplied  with 
their  quotas  for  1861  in  advance.  For 
some  reason,  possibly  as  a blind,  partial 
advances  had  also  been  made  to  Penn- 
sylvania and  Maryland.  This,  however, 
did  not  exhaust  the  demands  of  the 
South,  nor  the  intentions  of  the  secretary 
of  war.  On  the  20th  of  Decern-  pec. 
ber,  I860;  Floyd  ordered  forty  20. 
columbiads  and  four  thirty-two  pound- 
ers to  be  sent  immediately  from  the 
arsenal  at  Pittsburgh,  Pennsylvania,  to 
the  unfinished  fort  on  Ship  Island,  off 
the  coast  of  Mississippi ; and  seventy- 
one  columbiads  and  seven  thirty-two- 
pounders  were  ordered  to  be  sent  from 
the  same  arsenal  to  the  embryo  fort  at 
Galveston,  which  could  not  be  ready 
for  its  armament  in  less  than  five  years. 
Th’s  bold  attempt  was  happily  frus- 
trated by  the  vigilance  and  prompt  ac- 
tion of  the  people  of  Pittsburg.  FloyM 
ho  )ii  afterwards  fled  to  Virginia,  and  the 
order  was  countermanded  by  his  suc- 
cessor, Joseph  Holt. 


EFFORTS  AT  REINFORCEMENT. 


15 


Such  being  the  state  of  things  general- 
ly, it  is  not  difficult  to  understand  the 
despei  ate  situation  in  which  Anderson 
was  placed.  From  such  men  as  Floyd 
and  Cooper  he  had  certainly  small  hope 
of  succor.  The  reply  given  to  his  letter 
was  worthy  of  men  who  had  been  work- 
ing so  zealously  in  the  interests  of  the 
South.  It  was  contained  in  fewer  than 
a dozen  lines,  and  permission  was  given 
him  to  send  a few  workmen  to  repair 
Castle  Pinckney.  In  the  future,  he 
was  told,  he  was  to  be  careful  to  ad- 
dress all  communications  to  the  ad- 
jutant-general’s office  or  to  the  secretary 
of  war.  Anderson,  as  we  have  seen, 
had  his  head-quarters  in  Fort  Moultrie. 
It  became  daily  more  manifest  that, 
unless  some  unexpected  aid  arrived,  he 
would  be  entirely  at  the  mercy  of  the 
enemy.  He  had  abundant  evidence  that 
the  Carolinians  regarded  the  forts  as 
their  own,  and  that  they  were  making 
vigorous  preparations  to  get  ready  for 
the  attack.  In  a conference  which  he 
had  with  some  of  the  leadins^  citizens 
of  Charleston,  he  was  assured  that  the 
forts  “ must  be  theirs  after  secession.” 
Secretary  Floyd  was  still  playing  into 
the  hands  of  the  enemy.  One  of  his 
latest  orders  to  Anderson  was  that  he 
should  deliver  over  any  of  Captain 
Foster’s  workmen,  should  a demand  be 
made  for  them.”  The  avowed  reason 
for  this  order  was  that  “they  had  been 
enrolled  into  the  service  of  the  State.” 
The  actual  reason  was  that  the  conspir- 
ators might  have  the  benefit  of  the  ex- 
perience of  men  who  thoroughly  under- 
stood the  forts.  Anderson  felt  that  his 
position  was  becoming  daily  more  des- 


perate. His  communications  to  the  gov- 
ernment were  frequent,  and  his  calls 
for  help  were  urgent.  To  his  entreaties 
were  now  added  the  recommendations 
of  General  Scott,  who  had  become 
fully  alive  to  the  perils  of  the  situa- 
tion. While  Anderson  was  informing: 
the  government  that  “ Fort  Sumter  was 
certain  to  be  attacked  on  an  eai'ly  da}’, 
and  that  if  Fort  Sumter  was  lost  all 
was  lost,”  the  commander-in-chief  of 
the  army  urged  the  president  to  “rein- 
force the  forts  on  the  coasts  of  the 
slave-labor  States.”  On  the  31st  oct, 
of  October,  he  asked  permission 
to  admonish  the  commanders  of  south- 
ern forts  to  be  on  their  guard  against 
surprise  or  sudden  assault.  All  was  in 
vain.  It  seemed  as  if  nothing  could 
arouse  the  government  to  a sense  of 
the  imminence  of  the  danger.  General 
Scott’s  advice  was  unheeded;  his  re- 
quest was  disregarded ; and  Anderson 
was  advised  to  be  prudent — to  avoid 
any  attempt  which  might  seem  like 
forcing  hostilities,  but  “to  hold  posses- 
sion of  the  forts,  and,  if  attacked,  to 
defend  himself  to  the  last  extremity.” 
Poor  comfort,  certainly,  in  the  circum- 
stances ! After  long  and  vexatious  de- 
lays, and  after  a treacherous  attempt 
had  been  made  by  Floyd  to  weaken 
the  garrison  at  Fortress  Monroe,  under 
the  guise  of  strengthening  the  forts  at 
Charleston,  the  authorities  began  to 
feel  that  the  situation  was  critical. 
The  president,  however,  was  weak  as 
water;  the  Cabinet  was  full  of  conspir- 
ators; and  so  resistance  was  made  in 
every  conceivable  way  to  prompt  and 
effective  action.  At  this  moment  Gen- 


16 


FORT  SUMTER. 


eral  Cass,  who  will  ever  be  honorably 
mentioned  in  American  history  for  the 
bold  stand  he  made  at  this  particular 
juncture,  urged  the  president  to  order 
reinforcements  to  be  sent  at  once,  not 
only  to  Charleston  but  to  other  menaced 
points.  His  advice  was  not  taken,  and 
be  retired  from  the  Cabinet. 

During  the  night  of  December  2G, 
Dec.  Anderson,  with  his  small  garri- 
20.  son,  moved  into  Fort  Sumter.  Of 
his  own  volition,  Anderson  undertook 
the  responsibility  of  abandoning  the 
weaker  and  of  occupying  the  stronger 
fort.  As  commander  of  all  the  forts, 
he  had  a perfect  right  to  do  so.  It  was 
a difficult  task  to  perform,  but  it  was 
done  wdth  skill  and  caution,  and  with 
complete  success.  His  first  care  was 
bestowed  on  the  women  and  children. 
It  was  given  out  that  they  were  to  be 
removed  to  Fort  Johnson,  because  he 
\Hshed  the  helpless  ones,  with  sufficient 
food,  to  be  in  a place  of  safety.  The 
stratagem  was  successful.  The  susj:)!- 
cions  of  the  people  of  Charleston  were 
disarmed.  Anderson’s  course  was  ap- 
proved of  as  wise  and  prudent.  Secret 
instructions  had  been  given  that  the 
women  and  children  w^ere  not  to  be 
landed  at  Fort  Johnson,  but,  at  a given 
signal,  to  join  the  remainder  of  the  gar- 
rison and  enter  Fort  Sumter.  The  eve- 
ning twilight  was  just  passing  away, 
and  the  full-orbed  moon  had  scarcely 
taken  her  place  as  Queen  of  the  Night 
when  the  evacuation  began.  At  the 
proper  time  the  signal  was  given,  and 
the  vessels  containing  the  women  and 
children  moved  away  from  before  Fort 
Johnson,  the  entire  garrison  being  | 


quickly  and  without  any  mishap  landed 
at  Fort  Sumter.  At  eight  o’clock  the 
same  evening,  Anderson  wrote  to  the 
adjutant-general,  ^‘I  have  the  honor  to 
report  that  I have  just  completed,  by 
the  blessing  of  God,  the  removal  to  this 
fort  of  all  my  garrison,  except  the  sur- 
geon, four  North  Carolina  officers,  and 
seven  men.”  Long,  however,  before 
this  letter  arrived,  the  intelligence  had 
passed  along  the  wires ; and  while 
dismay,  indignation,  wrath  filled  the 
minds  of  all  conspirators,  the  hearts  of 
loyal  men  everywhere  were  thrilled 
with  delight.  Of  course  Secretary 
Floyd  was  indignant.  A telegraphic 
message  was  sent  to  Anderson,  asking 
him  to  explain.  The  reply  was  prompt 
and  to  the  point.  ‘‘  The  report  quoted,” 
said  Anderson,  “is  correct.  I aban- 
doned Fort  Moultrie  because  I was  cer- 
tain that,  if  attacked,  my  men  must 
have  been  sacrificed,  and  the  command 
of  the  harbor  lost.  I spiked  the  guns 
and  destroyed  the  carriages,  to  keep 
the  guns  from  being  turned  against  us. 
If  attacked,  the  garrison  would  never 
have  surrendered  without  a fight.” 

Excitement  now  ran  hio^h.  The  con- 
spirators  at  Charleston  and  at  Washing- 
ton were  filled  with  rage.  Floyd  de- 
clared that  “ the  solemn  pledges  of  the 
government  had  been  violated,”  and 
demanded  permission  of  the  president 
to  withdraw  the  garrison  from  Charles- 
ton Harbor.  The  president  refused, 
and  Floyd  resigned.  Postmaster-Gen- 
eral Holt  assumed  the  duties  of  the 
War  Office,  and  telegraphed  to  Ander- 
son without  delay  that  his  movement 
in  transferring  the  garrison  from  Moul- 


EXCITEMENT  IN  CHARLESTON. 


17 


trie  to  Sumter  was  in  every  way  ad- 
mirable, alike  for  its  humanity  and 
patriotism,  as  for  its  soldiership.”  In 
all  parts  of  the  loyal  North,  Anderson’s 
conduct  was  warmly  and  loudly  ap- 
proved ; and  five  days  after  the  flag 
had  been  raised  over  Fort  Sumter,  the 
Legislature  of  Nebraska,  two  thousand 
miles  away,  greeted  him  by  telegraph 
with  a ‘‘Happy  New  Year.”  Praise 
of  Anderson  was  on  every  lip;  and  it  is 
not  too  much  to  say  that  no  public  ser- 
vant ever  received  more  spontaneous 
praise  from  a grateful  people. 

Anderson’s  position,  from  the  mo- 
ment he  entered  Fort  Sumter  with  his  lit- 
tle band,  was  one  of  extreme  peril.  The 
brief  visit  made  to  him  at  this  period 
by  his  heroic  wife,  who  brought  to  him 
his  old  and  faithful  servant,  Peter  Hart, 
forms  one  of  the  most  agreeable  episodes 
in  the  early  history  of  the  war.  The 
people  of  Charleston  became  wild  with 
rage  when  they  learned  what  had  hap- 
pened. The  fire  and  smoke  which  they 
saw  arising  from  the  burning  material 
in  Fort  Moultrie,  on  the  morning  of 
Dec.  the  27th,  avas  to  them  a mystery, 
2L  which  was  quickly  dispelled  by 
the  arrival  of  some  workmen  from  the 
neighborhood  of  the  abandoned  fort. 
The  truth  was  out.  Anderson  was  safe 
with  his  garrison,  including  even  the 
women  and  children,  in  Fort  Sumter. 
What  was  to  be  done  ? The  cry  for 
immediate  action  was  loud  and  general. 
Some  of  the  more  excited  of  the  multi- 
tude wished  to  be  led  immediately  to 
the  attack  of  Fort  Sumter.  Governor 
Pickens  was  at  once  requested  by  the 
South  Carolina  Convention  to  take  pos- 


session of  Forts  Moultrie  and  Johnson 
and  Castle  Pinckney.  The  order  was 
speedily  given.  Meanwhile  the  public 
squares  of  Charleston  were  filled  with 
armed  men.  An  excited  populace 
thronged  the  streets.  The  Citadel 
Academy,  the  great  military  school  of 
the  State,  opening  as  it  did  on  one  of 
the  squares,  was  made  the  place  of  ren- 
dezvous. The  government  arsenal,  con- 
taining some  seventy  thousand  stands 
of  arms  and  a vast  amount  of  militaiy 
stores  taken  from  Massachusetts  and 
New  York,  was  seized  in  the  name  of 
the  State.  Within  three  hours  after  the 
old  banner  of  the  republic  had  been 
raised  over  Fort  Sumter,  two  armed 
steamers,  the  General  Clinch  and  the 
Nina,  with  about  four  hundred  men  on 
board,  left  the  city  for  the  purpose  of 
taking  possession  of  Castle  Pinckney  and 
Fort  Moultrie.  One  half  of  these,  led  by 
Colonel  J.  J.  Pettigrew,  made  for  Castle 
Pinckney.  A landing  was  easily  effect- 
ed. The  garrison,  the  commander  of 
which  fled  to  Fort  Sumter,  made  but 
little  resistance.  On  entering  the  fort, 
it  was  found  that  it  was  worthless  alike 
for  attack  or  defence.  The  guns  were 
spiked,  the  carriages  were  ruined,  the 
ammunition  removed,  and  the  flag-staff 
laid  prostrate.  A palmetto  flag  was 
brought  from  one  of  the  steamers,  and 
Pettigrew  unfurled  it  over  the  Castle. 
It  was  the  first  secession  flag  which 
waved  over  a national  fortification.  The 
remainder  of  the  troops,  about  two  hun- 
dred and  twenty-five  in  number,  under 
the  command  of  Colonel  Wilmot  G. 
DeSaussure,  proceeded  towards  Fort 
Moultrie.  Of  course  there  was  no  re- 


18 


rOET  SUMTER. 


sistance.  The  sentinel,  following  instruc- 
tions, surrendered  tlie  fort  at  once.  Here 
again  the  palmetto  flag  was  raised ; but 
as  the  darkness  rendered  it  invisible, 
the  ascent  of  three  rockets  intimated 
to  the  people  of  Charleston  that  the  ex- 
pedition had  been  a success.  Ander- 
Gon’s  position  was  one  of  peculiar  deli- 
cacy. He  might  have  opened  fire  upon 
the  insurgents  when  they  landed  on 
Sullivan’s  Island;  and  a few  shots  from 
the  guns  at  Fort  Sumter  would  have 
been  sufficient  to  drive  DeSaussure  and 
his  men  out  among  the  sand-hills.  But 
his  hands  were  tied.  He  could  not 
open  fire  without  incurring  grave  re- 
sponsibilities. It  was  well,  as  the  result 
proved,  that  he  acted  as  he  did.  On 
the  same  day  that  Fort  Moultrie  was 
seized,  Anderson  had.  the  further  humil- 
iation to  learn  that  the  revenue  emitter 
William  Aiken,  then  lying  in  Chailes- 
ten  Harbor,  had  been  surrendered  to 
the  insurgents  by  its  faithless  command- 
er, N.  L.  Coste.  His  suboi*dinate  offi- 
cers, l)ehaving  like  true  men,  I'efused  to  | 
follo^v  him,  and  at  once  reported  them-  | 
selves  for  duty  at  Washington.  This  ; 
was  the  defection  of  a naval  officer  [ 
who  had  been  born  in  the  slave-labor 
States. 

On  the  afternoon  of  the  2 7th,  Governor  i 
Pickens  sent  a message  to  Anderson, 
requiring  him  to  leave  Sumter  and  re- 
turn to  Moultrie.  Anderson  refused. 
On  the  day  following,  he  sent  his  post- 
adjutant to  Fort  Moultrie  to  ascertain 
from  the  commander  there  by  what 
authority  he  and  armed  men  were  in 
that  fort  of  the  United  States.  The  I 
answer  was,  By  the  authority  of  the  | 


sovereign  State  of  South  Carolina,  and 
by  command  of  her  government.” 

Governor  Pickens  henceforth  treated 
Anderson  as  a'public  enemy  within  the 
domain  of  South  Carolina.  It  was  bold- 
ly declared  by  the  Charleston  press  that 
the  ‘folding  of  Fort  Sumter  by  United 
States  troops  was  an  invasion  of  South 
Carolina.”  In  a letter  written  to  Adju- 
tant-General Cooper  on  the  28th,  Dec, 
Anderson  expressed  regret  at  the  28. 
course  the  governor  had  taken.  ‘‘He 
knows,”  he  said,  “ how  entirely  the  city 
of  Charleston  is  in  my  power.  I can 
cut  his  communication  off  from  the  sea, 
and  thereby  prevent  his  reception  of 
supplies,  and  close  the  harbor,  even  at 
night,  by  destroying  the  light-houses. 
These  things,  of  course,  I would  never 
do,  unless  compelled  to  do  so  in  self- 
defence.”  On  the  same  day  the  South 
Carolina  authorities  seized  the  custom- 
house and  the  post-office.  For  three 
weary  months  more,  until  the  close  of 
Buchanan’s  administration,  Anderson 
and  his  little  band  remained  locked  up 
in  Fort  Sumter,  not  permitted  to  fire  a 
shot,  although  he  knew  the  insurgents 
were  gathering  by  thousands  in  Charles- 
ton, and  saw  daily  fortifications  rising 
up  a’*ound  him,  and  other  works  intend- 
ed for  his  destruction.  So  much  self- 
denial  has  rarely  been  exercised. 

During  the  interval  from  the  close  of 
December,  1860,  to  the  first  week  of 
April,  1861,  the  struggle  was  going  on; 
but  the  fighting  was  done  in  Washing- 
ton rather  than  in  Charleston  Harbor. 
The  secession  contaffion  continued  to 

o 

spread;  a great  defalcation  had  been 
discovered  in  the  Indian  trust  fund  of 


SOUTH  CAROLINA  COMMISSIONERS. 


19 


$830,000,  and  Thompson,  secretary  of 
the  interior,  and  Floyd,  secretary  of 
war,  were  openly  charged  as  accomplices 
in  the  fraud,  if  not  for  personal  advan- 
tage, at  any  rate  for  the  advancement 
of  southern  interests ; but  the  most  im- 
portant event  of  that  period  was  the 

aiTival  in  W ashin^ton  of  the  “ commis- 
® . I 

sioners  ” from  South  Carolina,  Messrs. 

I]!ec.  Barnwell,  Adams,  and  Orr.  On 
the  28th  of  December,  1860,  they 
addressed  a formal  diplomatic  note  to  i 
the  president,  claiming  that  they  were 
authorized  and  empowered  to  treat  with 
the  government  of  the  United  States 
for  the  delivery  of  the  forts,  magazines, 
light-houses,  and  their  real  estate,  with  | 
their  appurtenances,  in  the  limits  of  I 
South  Carolina;  and  also  for  an  appor-  | 
tionment  of  the  public  debt,  as  well  as 
for  a division  of  all  other  propei  ty  held 
by  the  government  of  the  United  States 
as  agent  of  the  confederated  States  of  | 
which  South  Carolina  was  recently  a 
member.  In  brief,  they  claimed  to  act 
as  plenipotentiaries  having  the  right  to 
negotiate  as  to  all  measures  and  ar- 
rangements proper  to  be  made  and 
adopted  in  the  existing  relations  of  the 
parties.  They  furnished  the  president 
with  a copy  of  the  Ordinance  of  Seces- 
sion. They  loudly  complained  of  Ander- 
son’s conduct  in  transferring  his  garri- 
son from  Moultrie  to  Sumter — an  event, 
they  said,  which  had  seriously  altered 
the  condition  of  affairs  under  which 
they  came.  They  urged  the  president 
to  withdraw  immediately  all  the  na- 
tional troops  from  Charleston  Harboi’, 
as,  under  present  circumstances,  they 
were  “a  standing  menace,”  rendering 


negotiations  impossible,  and  threaten- 
ing to  bring  to  a bloody  issue  ques- 
tions which  ought  to  be  settled  with 
temperance  and  judgment.”  The  letter 
was  felt  to  be  arrogant  and  insulting  in 
the  last  degree.  The  president,  in  his 
reply,  was  firm ; but  he  was  can-  j)ec, 
tious,  perhaps,  to  a fault.  He 
referred  them  to  his  Message  for  a defi- 
nition of  his  policy,  to  the  instructions 
given  to  Major  Anderson,  to  the  fact 
that  the  South  Carolinians  had  al- 
ready committed  an  act  of  w^ar  by  seiz- 
ing two  forts  and  by  supplanting  the 
old  flag  of  the  Union.  “It  is  under  all 
these  circumstances  that  I am  urged  to 
immediately  withdraw  the  troops  from 
the  harbor  of  Charleston,  and  am  in- 
formed that  without  this  negotiation 
is  impossible.  This  I cannot  do;  this 
I will  not  c/o.”  To  this  the  com- 
missioners  replied  by  a letter 
more  arrogant  and  more  insulting  than 
the  first.  It  concluded  as  fob  jan, 
low^s  : “ By  your  course  you  have  B 
probably  rendered  civil  war  inevitable. 
Be  it  so.  If  you  choose  to  force  this 
issue  upon  us,  the  State  of  South  Caro- 
lina will  accept  it,  and,  relying  upon 
Him  who  is  the  God  of  Justice  as  well 
as  Lord  of  Hosts,  will  endeavor  to  per- 
form the  great  duty  which  lies  before 
her  bravely  and  thoroughly.”  This  let- 
ter was  returned  to  the  “ commission- 
ers,” endorsed  with  these  words,  “ This 
paper,  just  presented  to  the  president, 
is  of  such  a character  that  he  declines 
to  receive  it.” 

The  year  1861  opened  gloomily  on 
the  land,  and  perhaps  New  Year’s  Day 
never  was  so  dull.  On  the  5th  of  Jan- 


20 


FORT  SUMTER. 


nary  the  “commissioners,”  crestfallen 
and  enraged,  left  Washington.  War, 
it  was  now  felt,  was  all  but  inevitable. 
The  loyal  people  of  the  North,  however, 
began  to  have  more  faith  in  the  govern- 
ment. Under  wiser  and  more  patriotic 
counsellors,  the  president  seemed  to 
have  gathered  courage.  It  was  resolved 
to  strengthen  the  garrisons  of  the  forts 
on  the  coasts  of  the  slave-labor  States, 
and  particularly  those  in  the  forts  of 
Charleston  Harbor.  With  this  end  in  | 
view,  it  was  agreed  to  send  south  the  | 
steam-corvette  Brooklyn,  which  had  | 
just  ariaved  at  Norfolk  after  a three  | 
years  cruise.  It  is  said  that  the  secre- 
tary of  the  navy  refused  to  give  the 
order,  and  that  the  president  yielded. 
Under  the  influence  of  General  Scott 
and  Secretary  Holt,  the  president  was 
aroused  again,  and  orders  were  given  ; 
that  the  Brooklyn  should  be  ready  to  j 
start  at  a moment’s  notice.  The  secret  , 
was  betrayed.  Information  was  re- 
ceived that  the  Virginians  were  pre- 
pared to  seize  any  vessel  which  might 
attempt  to  leave  Norfolk  with  troops. 
It  was  reported  at  the  same  time  that 
the  lights  of  the  shore-beacons  in 
Charleston  Harbor  were  extinguished,  I 
and  that  the  channel  buoys  had  been 
removed.  The  order  was,  in  conse-  , 
cpience,  countermanded.  There  was  | 
treachery  committed  by  some  one.  | 
General  Scott  and  Secretary  Holt  con-  | 
tinned  to  urge  the  president.  If  the 
Brooklyn  could  not  be  sent,  some  other 
means  must  be  adopted  to  accomplish 
the  end  in  view.  The  Star  of  the  West, 
Captain  John  McGowan,  a well-known 
merchant  steamer,  was  chartered  by  the 


government  and  quickly  laden  with 
supplies.  To  prevent  suspicion,  she 
w'as  cleared  for  New  Orleans  and  Ha- 
vana. At  sundown  on  the  5 th  jan, 
of  January  she  left  her  wharf  at 
New  York,  and  when  well  down  the 
bay  she  took  on  boai  d,  under  cover  of 
the  night,  four  officers  and  two  hundred 
and  fifty  artillerists  and  marines,  with 
their  arms  and  ammunition.  At  nine 
o'clock  the  same  evening  she  crossed 
the  bar  at  Sandy  Hook,  and  proceeded 
to  sea.  Government  purposes  were  des- 
tined once  more  to  be  disturbed,  and 
the  fates  seemed  to  stand  in  the  way  of 
the  mission  of  the  Star  of  the  West. 
Intelligence  was  received  from  Ander- 
son that  he  regarded  his  position  as  se- 
cure, and  that  the  insurgents  had  erect- 
ed at  the  mouth  of  Charleston  Harbor 
powerful  batteries,  which  made  it  un- 
safe for  an  unarmed  vessel  to  enter. 
In  consequence  of  this  intelligence,  the 
order  for  the  sailing  of  the  Star  of  the 
West  was  countermanded.  It  was  too 
late ; the  vessel  was  well  on  her  voy- 
age. 

Meanwhile  every  preparation  was  be- 
ing made  by  the  insurgents  for  an  early 
attack  on  Fort  Sumter.  Every  able- 
bodied  man  in  Charleston,  liable  to  do 
military  duty,  was  put  under  arms. 
Fort  Moultrie  was  strengthened.  Fort 
Johnson  was  garrisoned  by  a company 
of  the  Charleston  Bifles.  New  batteries 
were  hurried  forward,  commanding  the 
ship  channel  and  bearing  heavily  on 
Fort  Sumter.  No  boat  was  allowed  to 
approach  the  whai*f-head  except  by  per- 
mission. The  city  was  placed  under 
military  control ; lookout  boats  scouted 


THE  STAR  OF  THE  WEST. 


21 


the  outer  harbor  at  night;  the  tele- 
graph was  placed  under  the  strictest 
surveillance,  and  Anderson  for  the  first 
time  found  him?e^f  cut  off  from  all 
communication  with  his  govern  uient. 
Vhe  news  that  the  commissioners  ” 
had  completely  failed  in  their  mission 
had  roused  the  people  to  the  highest 
pitch  of  furious  excitement;  and  the 
wildest  language  was  used  and  the 
wildest  schemes  for  revenge  were  sug- 
gested and  encouraged. 

On  the  morning  of  the  9th  of  January 
Jan.  West  was  seen  by 

the  imprisoned  garrison  of  Fort 
Sumter,  coming  over  the  bar  and  mak- 
ing her  way  toward  the  fort.  It  was  a 
gladsome  sight  to  Anderson  and  his 
little  company;  for  now,  as  we  have 
seen.  Fort  Sumter  was  completely  iso- 
lated. Anderson,  however,  had  no 
means  of  knowing  whether  his  appeals 
for  supplies  and  reinforcements  had 
reached  the  government,  or  whether 
they  had  been  heeded.  The  appear- 
ance of  this  vessel  inspired  hope ; but 
it  was  hope  clouded  by  despair,  for  An- 
derson knew  well  the  'difficulties  which 
lay  in  her  way  before  she  could  bring 
him  any  relief.  Having  reached  the  bar 
and  found  all  the  lights  extinguished, 
the  Star  of  the  West  extinguished  her 
own,  and  lay  there  until  the  morning. 
As  the  day  broke  she  w^as  sighted  by  the 
scouting  steamer  General  Clinch,  which 
at  once  burned  colored  lights  as  sig- 
nals, and  ran  for  the  inner  harbor. 
McGowan  ordered  all  his  men  below, 
and  steered  after  the  little  steamer,  hoj)- 
ing  that  the  Star  of  the  West  might  be 
regarded  as  a mere  merchant  vessel. 

lOG 


It  was  a vain  hope.  The  authorities  at 
Charleston  were  well  informed.  The 
name  of  the  vessel  was  known,  nor 
was  the  object  of  her  visit  any  secret. 
Thompson,  secretary  of  tlie  interior,  a 
man  whose  character  was  afterwards 
fully  revealed,  had  telegraphed  to  one  of 
his  friends,  “The  Star  of  the  West  is 
coming  with  reinforcements.”  It  is  said 
that  Thompson  ordered  another  de- 
spatch to  be  sent,  in  these  words, 
“Blow  the  Star  of  the  West  out  of  the 
water.”  This  despatch  was  prudently 
withheld.  The  General  Clinch  was 
moving  on,  about  two  miles  ahead,  the 
Star  of  the  West  following.  When  the 
latter  was  a little  short  of  two  miles 
from  Fort  Moultrie  and  about  the  same 
distance  from  Fort  Sumter,  a masked 
battery  on  Morris  Island,  from  which  a 
palmetto  hag  was  hying,  opened  hre; 
and  a shot  came  ricochetting  across  her 
bow.  The  national  hrg  was  hj  ing  over 
the  Star  of  the  West  at  the  time  the 
hrst  shot  was  hred.  Quick  as  lightning 
McGowan  hoisted,  in  addition,  a large 
American  ensign.  It  was  no  use ; these 
emblems  were  no  longer  respected.  The 
shot  from  Morris  Island  fell  thick  and 
fast.  Several  balls  passed  clear  over 
the  steamer;  one  passed  between  the 
smoke-stack  and  the  walking-beam  ; 
one  struck  the  ship  just  abaft  the  fore- 
rigging, and  stove  in  the  planking ; and 
“one,”  said  the  captain,  “came  within 
an  ace  of  carrying  away  our  rudder.” 
Some  shots  were  hred  from  Fort  Moul- 
trie, but  without  producing  any  serious 
damage.  During  the  few  minutes  this 
hrino  lasted,  McGowan  saw  moving  out 
from  Fort  Moultrie  two  steam-tugs,  one 


22 


FORT  SUMTER. 


of  them  with  an  armed  schooner  in 
tow.  The  purpose  was  unmistakable. 
McGowan  perceived  that  his  position 
was  one  of  imminent  peril.  Hemmed  in 
by  the  forts  and  about  to  be  overhauled 
by  an  armed  vessel,  his  own  unarmed, 
there  was  no  prospect  for  him,  if  he 
persevered  in  his  course,  but  capture  or 
destruction.  After  seventeen  shots  had 
been  fired  at  the  Star  of  the  West,  the 
captain  steered  the  vessel  around,  put 
to  sea,  and  returned  to  New  Yoi*k.  It 
was  only  seven  days  since  she  had 
cleared  from  the  same  harbor.  It  was 
in  some  respects  an  inglorious  voyage ; 
yet  it  cannot  be  said  that  the  captain  or 
his  crew  were  to  blame.  If  there  was 
fault  or  guilt  anywhere,  it  lay  with  the 
government.  It  would  have  certainly 
been  a nobler  and  more  dignified  poli- 
cy to  send  a war  vessel  to  reinforce 
h'ort  Sumter.  Such  a course  would  no 
doubt  have  been  resented  by  the  South, 
and  it  might  have  given  a different 
shape  to  the  “ irrepressible  conflict ; ” 
ibut  it  might  also  have  been  better  for 
all  .concerned.  Anderson’s  conduct  in 
the  matter  is  above  all  reproach.  He 
was  ignorant  of  the  character  of  the 
vessel  when  he  first  saw  her  in  the  har- 
bor. He  was  equally  ignorant  of  her 
<ermnd.  When  the  first  shot  was  fired 
he  took  her  to  be  a relief  ship.  When 
the  ^old  ensign  was  raised  aloft,  there 
was  no  longer  any  mystery.  The  na- 
tional flag  had  been  dishonored.  His 
guns  were  shotted;  his  men  desired 
him  to  open  fire;  but  his  instructions 
were  peremptory — he  had  not  been  at- 
tacked. Anderson’s  self-restraint  and 
long-suffering  patience  are  to  be  com- 


mended; but  less  caution  and  more 
daring,  whatever  might  have  been  the 
result  otherwise,  would  not  have  es- 
tranged from  him  the  sympathy  of  his 
countrymen,  or  lost  him  any  of  his  well- 
won  laurels. 

Undeniably  the  firing  upon  the  Star  of 
the  West  was  an  act  of  war.  It  touched 
every  principle  which  was  involved  in 
the  assault  made  at  a later  date  on  Fort 
Sumter.  The  national  flag  Avas  Avantonly 
insulted.  It  Avas  so  regarded  by  An- 
derson, Avho  promptly  sent  a letter  un- 
der a flag  of  truce,  borne  by  Lieutenant 
Hale,  asking  Governor  Pickens  AA^hether 
the  outrage  had  been  committed  under 
his  orders.  He  notified  the  governor 
that  if  this  act  AA^as  not  disclaimed,  he 
Avould  regard  it  as  a cause  of  Avar,  and 
should  not,  after  a reasonable  time  Avas 
allowed  for  the  return  of  his  messen- 
ger, permit  any  vessel  to  pass  within 
range  of  his  guns.  He  Avas  anxious  to 
aA^oid,  as  far  as  was  possible,  the  shed- 
ding of  blood  ; but  he  asked  the  gov- 
ernor to  take  note  of  his  decision,  for 
the  good  of  all  concerned.  Governor 
Pickens  refused  to  make  any  apology. 
It  Avas  the  act  of  South  Carolina;  and 
he  assured  Anderson  that  any  attempt 
to  reinforce  Fort  Sumter  would  be  stub- 
bornly resisted.  He  left  him  to  decide 
for  himself  Avhether  he  Avould  carry  out 
his  threat  in  regard  to  intercepting  ves- 
sels, and  stated  that  he  would  regard 
such  action  as  an  attempt  to  ‘Gmpose 
on  the  State  the  conditions  of  a con- 
quered people.”  Anderson  felt  that 
the  responsibility  Avas  graA^e ; and,  ob- 
taining a promise  from  the  governor 
that  his  messeng^er  Avould  not  be  hin- 

O 


SECESSION  SPREADING. 


23 


(lered,  he  sent  Lieutenant  Talbot  to 
Washington,  as  the  bearer  of  messages 
in  which  the  whole  subject  was  sub- 
mitted to  the  government.  Talbot  was 
the  first  to  carry  north  the  full  tidings 
of  the  outrage.  His  report,  as  was  to 
have  been  expected,  created  the  wildest 
excitement  in  all  the  free-labor  States. 
Two  days  after  the  attack  on  the.  Star 
of  the  West,  Governor  Pickens  sent  his 
secretary  of  state,  McGrath,  and  secre- 
tary of  war,  J amison,  to  make  a formal 
demand  on  Major  Anderson  for  the  im- 
mediate surrender  of  Fort  Sumter  to 
the  authorities  of  South  Carolina.  An- 
derson’s answer  was  firm  and  decided. 
“ No,”  said  he,  sooner  than  suffer  such 
humiliation,  I would  fire  the  magazine 
and  blow  fort  and  garrison  in  the  air.” 
The  commissioners  returned  to  the  gov- 
ernor impressed  with  the  conviction 
that  only  starvation  or  assault  could 
reduce  the  fortress.  Preparations  for 
attack  were,  therefore,  carried  on  with 
energy. 

The  action  of  Governor  Pickens  was 
approved  by  the  State  Legislature, 
which  learned  with  pride  and  pleasure 
of  the  successful  resistance  made  by  the 
troops  of  the  State  to  the  reinforcement 
of  Fort  Sumter.  The  newspapers  howled 
with  delight.  Said  one  of  them,  “ The 
expulsion  of  the  Star  of  the  West  from 
Charleston  Harbor  yesterday  morning 
Jan.  was  the  opening  of  the  ball  of  the 
10.  revolution.”  The  article  referred 
to  concluded  with  these  words,  ^‘If  the 
red  seal  of  blood  be  still  wanting  to 
the  parchment  of  ^our  liberties,  and 
blood  they  want,  blood  they  shall  have, 
and  blood  enough  to  stamp  it  all  in 


red.”  In  this  trying  position,  shut  out 
from  his  friends,  without  hope  of  suc- 
cor, and  surrounded  by  these  hostile 
elements,  we  must  leave  Anderson  for 
a space. 

It  is  not  a part  of  our  plan  to  follow 
out  and  describe  all  the  minute  details 
which  occurred  in  the  interval  between 
the  assault  on  the  Star  of  the  West  and 
the  fatal  firing  on  Fort  Sumter.  Some 
facts,  however,  it  is  impossible  to  omit 
without  disturbing  the  continuity  of 
the  narrative.  From  week  to  week 
public  indignation  was  waxing  fiercer 
in  the  North,  while  in  the  South  the 
secession  sentiment  grew  stronger  and 
took  more  practical  shape.  Before  the 
2d  day  of  February,  six  States  peb. 
of  the  Union  had  followed  the  2. 
example  of  South  Carolina,  having 
passed  ordinances  of  secession  and  ap- 
j^ointed  delegates  to  a general  conven- 
tion : Mississippi  on  the  9th  of  January, 
Florida  on  the  lOth,  Alabama  on  the 
1 1th,  Georgia  on  the  19th,  Louisiana 
on  the  26th,  and  Texas  on  the  1st  of 
February.  On  the  4th  of  Feb-  peb. 
ruary,  1861,  the  delegates  of  the  L 
seceded  States  met  in  general  Congress 
at  IMontgomery,  Alabama.  In  the  pei), 
course  of  a few  days,  a provision- 
al  government  was  formed  and  a Consti- 
tution agreed  upon,  after  tlie  adoption 
of  which,  the  Congress  proceeded  at 
once  to  the  election  of  a provisional 
president  and  vice-president.  On  the 
18th  Jefferson  Davis  of  Missis-  pe|), 
sippi  was  inaugurated  president, 
and  Alexander  H.  Stephens  of  Georgia 
vice-president  of  the  “Confederate 
States  of  America.”  The  Confederacy 


34 


FORT  SUMTER. 


lost  no  time  in  seizin o*  all  the  forts  and 

O 

arsenals  in  their  respective  States.  The 
South  was  becoming  more  and  more  a 
unit,  and,  in  spite  of  differences  of  opin- 
ion here  and  there,  it  was  evident  that 
the  great  North,  realizing  its  duty  and 
becoming  conscious  of  its  strength,  was 
about  to  rise  in  its  might  and  majesty. 
The  debates  in  Congress  in  the  early 
weeks  of  the  year  were  protracted  and 
keen;  and  they  were  conducted  with 
great  ability.  The  atmosphere  of  Wash- 
ington became  too  hot  for  the  conspira- 
tors; and  they  departed  in  great  num- 
bers to  fling  themselves  into  the  South- 
ern cause.  Love  of  the  Union  lingered 
in  many  hearts.  On  the  4th  of 
February,  a convention  known  as 
the  Peace  Congress  or  Conference  assem- 
bled in  Willard's  Hotel,  Washington. 
In  this  Congress  twenty-one  of  the  States 
were  represented — fourteen  of  the  free 
and  seven  of  the  slave-labor  States. 
It  was  all  in  vain.  In  spite  of  the 
hopes  which  it  created,  it  resulted  in 
complete  failure.  Such  was  the  state  of 
things  generally  when  a new  man  was 
about  to  appear  on  the  scene — a man 
wLo  had  not  hitherto  figured  greatly  in 
the  political  arena,  but  who  wull  ever 
be  remembered  as  the  saviour  of  his 
country  and  one  of  the  world’s  greatest 
heroes. 

On  the  1 4th  of  February,  Abraham 
Lincoln  of  Illinois  and  Hannibal 
Hamlin  of  Maine  were  declared 
duly  elected  president  and  vice-presi- 
dent of  the  United  States,  for  four 
years  commencing  on  the  4th  of  March, 
1861. 

Lincoln  bade  farewell  to  his  friends 


and  fellow-citizens  in  Springfield  on  the 
1 1th,  and  set  out  for  Washington,  peb. 
His  progress  was  one  continued  H. 
ovation.  Everywhere  throughout  his 
long  joumey  of  many  hundreds  of  miles, 
in  Illinois,  Indiana,  Ohio,  New  York, 
New  Jersey,  Pennsylvania,  Delaware, 
Maryland,  he  was  greeted  with  demon- 
strations of  the  most  profound  respect. 
During  the  course  of  his  journey,  he 
was  frequently  called  upon  to  address 
the  assembled  multitudes.  His  words 
were  always  well  chosen,  generally 
hopeful  and  encouraging,  but  some- 
times tinged  with  sadness,  as  if  he  felt 
the  terrible  responsibility  which  rested 
upon  his  individual  shoulders.  He  was 
studiously  noncommittal,  yet  there  was 
a firmness  in  his  utterances  which  left 
the  public  in  no  doubt  that  he  was  a 
man  of  strong  will  and  decided  charac- 
ter. He  was  in  Philadelphia  on  Wash- 
ington’s Birthday.  In  the  course  pebi 
of  a short  address,  speaking  of  22i 
the  principle  of  liberty  embodied  in  the 
Declaration  of  Independence,  he  said, 
“If  this  country  cannot  be  saved  with- 
out giving  up  this  principle,  I would 
rather  be  assassinated  on  this  spot  than 
surrender  it.”  At  Trenton,  while  ex- 
pressing himself  in  favor  of  peace,  he 
said,  “The  man  does  not  live  who  is 
more  in  favor  of  peace  than  I am — no 
one  will  do  more  to  preserve  it ; but  it 
may  be  necessary  to  put  the  foot  down 
firmly.”  The  feelings  entertained  re^ 
garding  him  by  the  slave-holding  oil 
garchy  of  the  South  may  best  be  under- 
stood  from  the  fact  that  by  some  ol 
them  it  was  resolved  that  he  should 
never  reach  the  national  capital  alive. 


LINCOLN’S  INAUGURAL  ADDRESS. 


25 


The  secret  oozed  out,  and  the  conspira- 
tors, for  the  time  being,  were  foiled. 
At  Baltimore,  it  is  now  understood,  ar- 
rangements were  made  for  the  assassi- 
nation of  the  president  elect ; and  there 
is  every  reason  to  believe  that  but  for 
the  timely  discovery  made  by  Lincoln’s 
friends  and  their  subsequent  watchful- 
ness, the  plot  might  have  succeeded. 
As  it  was,  he  and  his  party  reached 
Washington  in  safety. 

Monday,  the  4th  of  March,  will  long 
Mar#  remembered  in  the  national 
capital,  and,  indeed,  throughout 
the  length  and  breadth  of  the  republic. 
On  that  day  Abraham  Lincoln  was  in- 
augurated sixteenth  president  of  the 
United  States  of  America.  The  inau- 
guration ceremonies  were  performed 
quietly,  and  the  day,  contrary  to  the 
expectations  of  many,  passed  olf  with- 
out disturbance.  It  was  known  that  a 
conspiracy  existed,  having  for  its  object 
the  capture  of  the  city  and  the  person 
of  the  president,  and  the  placing  in  the 
executive  chair  some  one  devoted  to 
Southern  interests;  but  General  Scott 
had  taken  ample  precautions,  and  the 
project  failed.  The  inaugural  address, 
which  was  impatiently  awaited,  gave 
abundant  satisfaction  to  the  adherents  of 
the  Union  cause.  It  was  an  able  and  ex- 
haustive document.  The  president  stood 
firm  on  the  Constitution.  The  union  of 
the  States  he  said  was  perpetual.  It  was 
older  than  the  Constitution.  It  pre- 
ceded the  Declaration  of  Independence 
in  1776.  It  was  formed,  in  fact,  by  the 
Articles  of  Association  in  1774.  It 
was  not  competent,  therefore,  for  any 
one  State  or  for  a number  of  States  to 


retire  from  the  Union  at  will.  He  held 
that  in  view  of  the  Constitution  and  the 
laws  the  Union  was  not  broken.  He 
would  take  care  that  the  law  should  be 
executed  in  all  the  States.  He  would 
avoid  violence,  unless  it  was  forced  up- 
on the  national  authority.  He  would 
not  interfere  with  slavery  in  the  South. 
In  accordance  with  the  trust  rej^osed  in 
him,  he  would  feel  it  to  be  his  duty  to 
“ hold,  occupy  and  possess  the  property 
and  places  belonging  to  the  govern- 
ment.” Addressing  his  dissatisfied  fel- 
low-countrymen, he  said,  ‘AYe  are  not 
enemies,  but  friends.  AVe  must  not  be 
enemies.  Though  passion  may  have 
strained,  it  must  not  break  our  bonds 
of  affection.  The  mystic  cords  of  mem- 
ory, stretching  from  every  battle-field 
and  patriot  grave  to  every  living  heart 
and  hearthstone  all  over  this  broad  land, 
will  yet  swell  the  chorus  of  the  Union, 
when  again  touched,  as  surely  they  will 
be,  by  the  better  angels  of  our  nature.” 
These  are  thoughts  that  breathe,  words 
that  burn.  There  was  a man  now  at 
the  helm  of  the  ship  of  state. 

Anderson  could  not  Ions:  be  left  un- 
heeded  now.  The  attention  of  the  pres- 
ident and  his  cabinet  was  first  called  to 
the  condition  of  public  affairs.  Matters 
had  come  to  a wretched  pass.  The 
treasury  was  empty,  and  had  to  be  at- 
tended to.  The  army  and  navy  were 
found  to  be  comparatively  useless. 
There  were  but  sixteen  thousand  men 
in  all,  and  these  were  mostly  in  the 
AVest.  Sixteen  forts  had  fallen  into 
the  hands  of  the  Confederates.  Of  the 
southern  forts,  only  Fortress  Monroe, 
Forts  Jefferson,  Taylor,  and  Pickens 


26 


rOET  SUMTEK. 


remained  to  the  government.  Fort 
Sumter,  of  course,  was  not  yet  lost; 
but  for  government  use  it  was  not  now 
available. 

On  the  day  of  inauguration  a letter 
was  received  from  Anderson,  of  a rather 
discouraging  kind.  He  could  not  see 
how  any  effective  assistance  could  be 
rendered  him  by  a force  of  less  than 
twenty  thousand  good,  well-disciplined 
men.”  This  letter  was  laid  before  the 
president  and  his  cabinet  on  the  follow- 
ing day.  The  government  was  not  in 
a position  to  send  any  such  aid — all  the 
more  that  it  was  wanted  at  once  or  not 
at  all.  It  was  suggested  that  Ander- 
son should  be  advised  to  make  terms 
with  the  enemy  and  provide  for  his 
own  safety  and  for  that  of  the  garrison. 
Tlie  president  was  urged  to  adopt  this 
course,  for  the  sake  of  peace ; and  for  a 
time  it  was  the  hope  and  belief  of  the 
South  that  this  would  be  his  final 
conclusion.  Better  counsels  prevailed. 
Gustavus  G.  Fox  had  suo:2:ested  a feasi- 
ble  plan  for  the  relief  of  Fort  Sumter. 
He  urged  the  president  to  take  imme- 
diate action,  as  any  attempt  to  succor 
Anderson  must  be  made  before  the 
middle  of  April.  At  last  the  president 
did  ‘^put  down  his  foot  firmly.”  Fox 
was  sent  for;  preparations,  in  spite  of 
some  official  hindrances,  were  hurried 
April  forward,  and  on  the  9th  April 
he  sailed  with  two  hundred  re- 
cruits in  the  steamer  Baltic,  commanded 
by  Captain  Fletcher.  The  relief  squad- 
ron consisted  of  the  Baltic,  the  United 
States  sloops  - of  - war  Powhatan,  Paw- 
nee, and  Pocahontas,  with  the  cutter 
Harriet  Lane,  the  tugs  Yankee,  Uncle 


Ben,  and  Freeborn.  The  order  was  to 
rendezvous  off  Charleston.  The  expe- 
dition might  have  had  better  luck  if  it 
had  been  sent  at  an  earlier  day.  As  it 
was,  some  of  the  vessels  came  to  grief. 
Only  the  Baltic,  the  Pawnee,  and  the 
Harriet  Lane  succeeded  in  reaching  the 
place  of  meeting. 

Events  had  taken  place  in  Charleston 
Harbor  before  the  arrival  of  the  relief 
ships  which  had  not  been  calculated  upon 
by  the  government  at  Washington.  As 
soon  as  it  became  known  that  an  attempt 
was  to  be  made  to  sustain  Major  Ander- 
son and  his  garrison,  all  communication 
between  the  people  and  the  fort  was  at 
once  stopped.  On  the  arrival  of  the  Fed- 
eral messenger,  announcing  the  intelli- 
gence, Beauregard  telegraphed  to  the 
Confederate  secretary  of  war,  Leroy  P. 
Walker.  “An  authorized  messen^cer,” 
wrote  Beauregard,  “ has  just  informed 
Governor  Pickens  and  myself  that  provis- 
ions will  be  sent  to  Fort  Sumter  peace- 
ably, or  otherwise  by  force.”  The  sec- 
retary’s reply  was  to  the  effect  that  if 
Beauregard  had  no  doubt  of  the  author- 
ized character  of  the  agent,  to  demand 
the  surrender  of  Fort  Sumter,  and  in 
case  of  refusal  to  proceed  to  reduce  it. 
“ The  demand  will  be  made  to-morrow 
at  twelve  o’clock,”  was  Beauregard’s 
answer.  On  the  11th  of  April,  April 
about  two  o’clock  in  the  after- 
noon,  Beauregard  sent  Colonel  James 
Chesnut,  Colonel  Chisholm,  and  Captain 
Stephen  D.  Lee,  with  a letter  to  Ander- 
son, demanding  the  surrender  of  the 
fort.  Anderson  svas  not  taken  by  sur- 
prise. He  had  been  expecting  some 
such  demand.  In  his  reply  to  Beaure- 


PEEPARING  TO  OPEN  FIRE. 


27 


gard,  Avliicli  he  handed  to  the  aids,  he 
said  that  “his  sense  of  honor  and  his 
obligations  to  his  government  would 
not  allow  him  to  comply.”  To  the  gen- 
^tlemen  themselves,  however,  he  made 
no  secret  of  the  fact  that  the  condition 
of  his  supplies  was  such  that  ho  could 
only  hold  out  a few  days  more.  These 
latter  words  were  immediately  commu- 
nicated by  Beauregard  to  Walker,  who 
without  delay  telegraphed  back  to 
Beauregard  that  if  Anderson  would 
state  the  time  when  he  would  evacuate, 
and  if  he  would  agree  meanwhile  not 
to  use  his  guns  against  them,  unless 
theirs  were  used  against  Fort  Sumter, 
they  would  wait,  and  thus  the  useless 
effusion  of  blood  would  be  avoided. 
To  this  proposal,  Avhich  was  conveyed 
to  him  by  Boger  A.  Pryor  and  the 
three  gentlemen  above  named,  Ander- 
son agreed,  stipulating  that  he  would 
leave  the  fort  by  noon  of  the  15th, 
should  he  not  before  that  time  “receive 
contrary  instructions  from  his  govern- 
ment or  additional  supplies.” 

Here  let  it  be  remembered  that  An- 
derson had  no  knowledge  of  what  his 
government  had  been  doing  for  him 
for  some  days.  That  they  intended 
to  send  him  assistance  and  supplies 
he  was  sure;  but  as  the  authorities 
at  Charleston  had  prevented  hl's  spe- 
cial messenger,  Talbot,  who  had  been 
to  Washington,  from  returning  to  the 
fort,  he  knew  nothing  of  the  mission  of 
Fox  or  of  the  fact  that  a squadron  had 
sailed  to  his  assistance.  In  this  respect 
his  adversaries  had  the  advantage.  Of 
the  sailing  of  the  squadron  intended  to 
relieve  Anderson  they  were  fully  aware, 


and  its  appearance  in  Charleston  waters 
had  been  awaited  with  considerable 
anxiety.  On  the  evening  of  the  11th, 
and  even  before  the  aids  left  with  the 
message  to  Anderson,  the  Harriet  Lane 
and  the  Pawnee  had  been  sighted  by 
scouts  outside  the  harbor,  and  Beaure- 
gard had  been  notified  of  the  fact.  His 
aids  were  therefore  invested  with  dis- 
cretionary authority.  If  not  satisfied 
with  Anderson’s  reply,  they  were  to  act 
as  they  thought  fit.  Before  leaving  the 
fort,  and  after  a few  minutes’  consulta- 
tion, they  addressed  a note  to  Anderson, 
saying,  “ By  authority  of  Brigadier- 
General  Beauregard,  commanding  the 
provisional  forces  of  the  Confederate 
States,  we  have  the  honor  to  notify  you 
that  he  will  open  the  fire  of  his  bat- 
teries on  Fort  Sumter  in  an  hour  from 
this  time.”  This  note  is  dated  April 
12,3.20  A.M.  They  immediately  April 
left  the  fort.  Anderson  accepted  1^* 
the  situation.  The  flag  was  raised,  the 
postern  was  closed,  the  sentinels  were 
withdrawn,  and  the  men  were  ordered 
not  to  leave  the  bomb-proofs  until  they 
received  further  instructions. 

It  was  known  in  Charleston  on  the 
evening  of  the  11th  that  the  bombard- 
ment was  about  to  beAn.  From  an 

O 

early  hour,  therefore,  the  streets  ^vere 
crowded  ; and  what  with  the  roll  of 
the  drum,  the  marching  of  armed  men, 
the  tramp  of  horses  and  the  rumbling 
of  wagons,  the  utmost  excitement  pre- 
vailed. All  was  still  within  Fort 
Sumter.  The  passing  minutes  of  that 
hour  were  counted  one  by  one.  At 
twenty  minutes  past  three  o’clock,  pre- 
cisely one  hour  from  the  receipt  of  the 


28 


FORT  SUMTER. 


last  letter  by  Anderson,  the  dull  boom- 
ing of  a gun  was  beard  on  James  Island, 
and  from  a signal  battery  there  a shell 
caine  whizzing  through  the  darkness 
and  exploded  over  Fort  Sumter.  It 
was  the  signal  gun.  Immediately  there- 
after, from  all  the  batteries  around,  a 
deadly  tire  was  opened.  Full  thirty 
heavy  guns  and  mortars  opened  their 
throats  at  once.  The  extent  of  the  en- 
emy’s fire  greatly  surprised  the  gana- 
son.  The  most  destructive  work  was 
being  done  by  a batteiy  on  Sullivan’s 
Island,  of  which  formerly  they  had  no 
knowledge.  This  battery  had  been 
masked  by  brushwood  and  other  mate- 
rials. It  was  constructed  with  great 
skill,  and  heavily  mounted,  showing  sev- 
enteen mortars  throwing  ten-inch  shells, 
and  thirty-three  heavy  cannons,  most 
of  which  were  columbiads.  The  firing 
was  maintained  with  vigor;  and  the 
shots  from  some  of  tliose  powerful  guns 
struck  the  walls  of  Fort  Sumter  with  a 
‘‘terrific  crash,”  as  the  defenders  said, 
some  of  the  shells  burstim>:  inside  the 
fort.  For  t^vo  lioiirs  this  firing  contin- 
ued, Fort  Sumter  remaining  silent  as 
the  grave.  At  half-jiast  six  the  men 
were  summoned  to  breakfast,  which 
they  ate  “leisurely  and  calmly,”  as  if 
undisturbed  by  the  terrible  uproar 
around  them. 

It  was  now  broad  daylight.  Break- 
fast over,  Anderson  arranged  the  officers 
and  men,  about  eighty  in  all,  into  three 
reliefs.  The  first  was  under  the  com- 
mand of  Captain  Doubleday,  the  second 
was  under  Surgeon  Crawford,  and  the 
third  under  Lieutenant  Snyder.  The 
garrison  labored  under  many  serious 


disadvantages.  They  had  plenty  of 
powder,  but  few  cartridges.  They  had 
no  scales  for  weighing  the  powder,  and 
only  some  six  needles  for  sewing  cart- 
ridge bags.  They  were  also  without 
instruments  for  sighting  the  guns.  The 
first  gun  Avas  fired  at  seven  o’clock  in 
the  morning,  by  Captain  Doubleday.  It 
was  followed  immediately  by  a general 
firing  from  the  fort  on  all  the  principal 
attacking  batteries.  For  four  hours  the 
firing  was  kept  up  so  vigorously  by 
Fort  Sumter  that  the  enemy  for  a time 
suspected  that  it  had  been  reinforced 
during  the  night.  The  fire  told  with 
effect  on  Fort  Moultrie,  the  embrasures 
of  which  were  considerably  damaged. 
On  the  battery  on  Cumming’s  Point, 
which  seemed  invulnerable,  it  had  little 
effect,  the  shot  and  shell  glancing  harm- 
lessly off. 

As  the  hours  rolled  on,  the  firing  oi 
the  assailants  Avas  becoming  more  effect- 
ive. Their  guns  Avere  under  complete 
control.  Every  shot  told.  The  Avails 
and  parapets  of  Fort  Sumter  began  to 
give  evidence  of  their  destructive  work. 
It  seemed  to  be  the  purpose  of  the  ene- 
my to  destroy  the  barbette  guns.  W ith 
this  end  in  view,  they  poured  their 
heaviest  fire  on  the  parapet  of  the  fort. 
A large  portion  of  the  j)arapet  was  car- 
ried away;  several  of  the  heavy  guns 
were  dismounted  or  otheiwise  disabled, 
and  the  garrison  was  thus  limited  to 
the  use  of  the  two  lower  tiers  of  guns, 
which  were  protected  by  casemates. 
About  the  same  moment  it  Avas  discov- 
ered that  the  barracks  were  on  fire. 
It  Avas  now  about  noon.  Surgeon  CraAA^- 
ford,  Avho  had  volunteered  to  ascend 


NO  HOPE. 


29 


the  parapet  for  the  purpose  of  making 
observations,  and  who  had  succeeded, 
in  spite  of  the  tempest  of  shot  and  shell 
which  raged  around  him,  on  returning 
below  reported,  to  the  delight  o:^  the 
now  almost  despairing  garrison,  that 
through  the  fog  and  blinding  rain  he 
saw  two  vessels,  bearing  the  dear  old 
flag.  It  was  part  of  Fox’s  relief  squad- 
ron. The  Pawnee,  ten  guns,  the  Har- 
riet Lane,  five  guns,  and  the  transport 
Baltic,  were  lying  outside  the  bar. 
They  could  not  cross.  The  buoys  had 
been  removed,  and  ships  laden  with 
stones  had  been  sunk  in  the  channel. 
The  vessels  dipped  their  flags  by  way 
of  greeting;  but  Sumter  could  not  re- 
spond. Its  ensign  was  still  flying,  but 
it  was  entangled  in  the  halyards,  which 
had  been  cut  by  the  enemy’s  shot.  In 
the  afternoon  the  enemy’s  fire  had  been 
particularly  severe;  shot  came  rattling 
into  the  embrasures ; and  severe  injuries 
were  inflicted  by  flying  splinters  of  ma- 
sonry. The  shells  bursting  in  rapid 
succession  against  all  parts  of  the  fort, 
scattered  the  loosened  brick  and  stone 
in  every  direction,  broke  the  windows, 
and  set  fire  to  the  woodwork.  The  men 
ill  the  fort  worked  with  a will.  The 
day,  however,  had  told  sadly  on  their 
strength.  Their  firing  had  become  less 
rapid.  Their  cartridges  were  now  well- 
nigh  exhausted;  and  before  sunset  it 
had  been  found  necessary  to  abandon  all 
the  guns  but  six.  When  darkness  came 
on,  Anderson  ordered  the  port-holes  to 
be  closed.  Some  of  the  men  were  per- 
mitted to  rest  while  others  watched. 
So  ended  the  first  day  of  the  war. 

The  storm,  which  had  lasted  all  da}^. 


continued  throughout  the  night.  The 
firing  of  the  insurgents  was  maintained 
at  intervals,  until  the  morning.  Every 
fifteen  minutes  the  little  garrison  cooped 
up  in  Fort  Sumter  heard  another  shot 
or  shell  rattling  against  their  shattered 
walls.  It  was  a w'eary  night  for  An- 
derson and  his  men.  But  there  was  no 
murmur,  no  complaint.  The  provisions 
were  all  but  exhausted.  In  a few  hours 
more  the  last  parcel  of  rice  would  be 
cooked,  and  nothing  would  be  left  for 
the  garrison  but  salt  pork.  The  relief 
ships  were  outside  the  bar ; but  the 
storm  made  it  impossible  for  them  to 
complete  their  mission  of  mercy. 

The  sun  of  Saturday  morning  rose  in 
splendor.  The  storm  had  ceased  April 
before  the  early  dawn.  The  bom- 
bardment  was  resumed  with  tremen- 
dous energy.  It  seemed  to  be  the  pur- 
pose of  the  assailants  to  force  matters 
to  an  early  conclusion.  Bed-hot  shot 
was  now  freely  used.  On  Friday  the 
buildings  in  the  fort  had  been  on  fire 
four  times.  Four  times  the  flames  had 
been  extinguislied.  Now  the  barracks 
and  the  officers’  quarters  were  again  on 
Are.  The  situation  of  Anderson  had 
become  desperate.  Yet  he  clung  to  the 
skirts  of  liope^  with  undying  tenacity. 
There  was  provision  to  last  for  three 
days,  and  for  three  days  more  he  was 
anxious  to  hold  out.  With  the  excep- 
tion of  the  magazine,  the  buildings 
were  left  to  their  fate.  No  attempt 
was  made  to  extinguish  the  flames.  The 
red-hot  shot  which  the  enemy  were 
pouring  in  upon  them  made  such  efforts 
useless.  The  conflagration  spread  raj)- 
idly.  It  was  feared  that  the  magazine 


30 


FORT  SUMTER. 


might  explode,  and  its  doors  were 
locked.  The  main  gate  took  fire  and 
was  soon  destroyed;  and  the  sail} -port 
was  now  open  to  the  besiegers.  The 
heat  had  become  intolerable;  and  the 
clouds  of  smoke  were  suffocating.  The 
crashing  of  the  shot,  the  bursting  of 
the  shells,  the  falling  of  walls,  and  the 
roaring  of  the  flames  were  terrific,  and 
made,  says  an  eye-witness,  “ a pande- 
monium of  the  fort.”  The  garrison 
was  now  reduced  to  its  last  three  cart- 
ridges. Still  no  thought  of  surrender. 
The  flag  still  waved.  Eight  times  its 
staff  had  been  hit  by  the  enemy’s  shot, 
without  serious  injury.  At  twenty  min- 
utes before  one  o’clock  it  was  hit  again, 
and  this  time  with  success.  “ The  flag 
is  down — it  has  been  shot  away,”  was 
the  cry,  when  Lieutenant  Hall  rushed 
out  and  snatched  it  fi*om  the  glowing 
embers,  before  it  could  take  fire.  Car- 
ried immediately  by  Lieutenant  Snyder 
to  the  ramparts,  he  handed  it  to  Sergeant 
Hart,  who,  sj)ringing  upon  the  sand- 
bags, and  with  the  assistance  of  one 
Lyman,  a mason  from  Baltimore,  plant- 
ed again  the  broken  staff,  and  left  the 
soiled  banner  flying  proudly  and  defi- 
antly, in  spite  of  the  shot  and  shell 
which  fell  like  hail  aroi^nd. 

Soon  after  the  flag  had  fallen,  and 
towards  the  close  of  the  day,  a man 
presented  himself  at  one  of  the  embra- 
sures of  the  fort,  with  a white  handker- 
chief tied  to  the  point  of  his  sword.  Pri- 
vate Thompson  of  the  fort  was  the  first 
to  whom  he  addressed  himself.  I am 
General  Wigf all,”  he  said,  ^‘and  I want 
to  see  Major  Anderson.  For  God’s 
sake,”  he  added,  as  Thompson  left  him 


to  find  his  commander,  “let  mein.  I 
can’t  stand  it  out  here  in  the  firing.” 

o 

On  being  admitted,  he  met  Captain  J. 
G.  Foster,  Lieutenant  J.  C.  Davis,  Siir- 
geoi)  J.  W.  Crawford,  and  Lieutenant 
B.  K.  Meade.  “ I am  General  Wigfall,” 
he  repeated,  under  great  excitement; 
“ I come  from  General  Beauregard,  who 
wants  to  stop  this  bloodshed.  You  are 
on  fire,  and  your  flag  is  down ; let  us 
stop  this  firing.”  “Our  flag  is  not 
down,”  was  the  reply.  “ It  is  yet  flying 
from  the  ramparts.”  ‘Well,  I want  to 
stop  this,”  he  said;  and  holding  out  his 
sword  and  handkerchief  to  one  of  the 
officers,  he  added,  “will  you  hoist  this?” 
“No,  sii’,”  was  the  answer.  “Will  any 
of  you  hold  this  out  of  the  embrasure?” 
he  asked.  Beceiving  no  reply,  he  asked, 
“ May  I hold  it,  then ? ” “If  you  wish.” 
Springing  into  the  embrasure,  he  waved 
tlie  white  flag  several  times.  The  firing 
did  not  abate ; and  Wigfall,  frightened 
out  of  his  wits  by  a shot  which  struck 
near  him,  abandoned  his  position.  The 
handkerchief  was  taken  up  and  waved 
out  of  the  port-hole  by  Corporal  Bring- 
hurst ; but  he,  too,  finding  that  no  heed 
was  paid  to  it,  sprang  from  the  peril- 
ous ] ost.  Addressing  Lieutenant  Davis, 
Wigfall  said,  “If  you  will  show  a 
white  flag  from  your  ramparts,  they 
will  cease  firing.”  “It  shall  be  done,” 
said  Davis,  “ if  your  object  is  to  hold  a 
conference  with  Major  Anderson.”  At 
this  point  Anderson  appeared.  “ I 
come  from  General  Beauregard,  who 
wishes  to  stop  this,  sir.”  “Well,  sir,  ’ 
said  Anderson,  eyeing  Wigfall  keenly. 
“You  have  defended  your  flag  nobly, 
sir,”  continued  Wii^fall.  “ You  have 

/ O 


FALL  OF  SUMTER. 


31 


done  all  that  can  be  done,  sir.  Your 
fort  is  on  hre.  Let  us  stop  this.  On 
what  terms  will  you  evacuate  the  fort, 
sir?”  “My  terms  are  already  known 
to  General  Beauregard,”  replied  the 
Major.  “Instead  of  noon  on  the  15th, 
I will  go  now.”  “ I understand  you  to 
say,”  said  Wigfall,  “that  you  will  evac- 
uate the  fort  now,  sir,  upon  the  terms 
proposed  the  other  day.”  “Yes,  sir, 
on  those  terms  only.”  Then  said  Wig- 
fall,  “I  understand  the  fort  is  to  be 
ours.”  “Yes,  sir,”  said  Anderson,  “on 
those  conditions  only.”  “Very  well,” 
said  Wigfall,  “ I will  return  to  General 
Beauregard.”  Believino:  that  Wmfall 
was  telling  the  truth,  Anderson  caused 
a white  has:  to  be  hoisted  over  the  fort. 

The  Major  was  not  undeceived  until'  a 
little  before  two  o’clock,  when  Colonels 
Chesnut,  Pryor,  Miles,  and  Lee  arrived 
at  Fort  Sumter,  with  instructions  from 
their  chief  to  ascertain  the  meaning  of 
the  white  flag.  When  they  stated  the  ob- 
ject of  their  mission,  Anderson  observed 
that  there  Avas  somethino;  wronof.  There 
was  confusion  on  both  sides.  AVigfall, 
it  appeared,  had  not  seen  Beauregard 
in  two  days.  He  had  no  instructions 
from  him.  He  had  acted  on  his  own 
responsibility.  Having  been  on  Morris 
Island,  he  had,  by  false  misrepresenta- 
tions, obtained  leave  from  the  command- 
er there,  to  visit  the  beleaguered  fort. 
Anderson,  fired  Avith  indignation,  at 
the  deception  played  upon  him,  threat- 
ened to  haul  doAvn  the  Avhite  flag. 
“That  Avliite  tlag,”  he  said,  “shall  come 
doAvn  immediately.”  He  AAms  entreated, 
howeA^er,  to  leave  matters  as  they  AA^ere, 
to  put  ill  writing  what  AVigfall  had 


said,  and  to  wait  till  they  saw  Beaure- 
gard. This  he  consented  to  do;  anJ 
the  flring  ceased.  Several  deputations 
waited  upon  Anderson  during  the 
course  of  the  afternoon,  to  obtain,  if 
possible,  better  terms.  He  was  not  to 
be  moved.  At  last,  between  seven  and 
eight  o’clock.  Major  D.  B.  Jones,  ac- 
companied by  Colonels  Miles  and  Pryor 
and  Captain  Hartstene,  arrived  at  the 
fort  and  announced  that  Beauregard 
had  accepted  Anderson’s  terms.  The 
garrison  Avas  to  be  allowed  to  depart, 
with  company  arms  and  property,  Avith 
all  private  property,  and  Avilh  the  priAU- 
lege  of  saluting  and  retaining  their  flag. 
Thus  ended  the  bombardment  of  Fort 
Sumter. 

One  of  the  most  extraordinary  cir- 
cumstances connected  Avith  this  remark- 
able siege  was  that  not  a single  man  had 
lost  his  life  either  at  Fort  Sumter  or  in 
the  ranks  of  the  Confederates.  It  de- 
serves to  be  remembered,  too,  that  the 
fort  had  been  evacuated,  not  surren- 
dered. Anderson  retained  the  flag,  and 
exactly  four  years  afterAvards,  as  Alajor- 
General  in  the  armies  of  the  United 
States,  raised  the  same  old  tattered  flaor 
OAmr  the  fortress,  then  a heap  of  ruins. 

On  Sunday  morning,  the  Isabel  came 
doAvn  from  Charleston  and  an-  April 
chored  near  Fort  Sumter.  The  H. 
steamer  Clinch  lay  alongside  the  Avharf, 
to  convey  Anderson  and  his  men  to  the 
larerer  Amssel.  An  unfortunate  circum- 
stance  occurred  at  the  last  moment. 
The  baggage  had  all  been  put  on  board 
the  Clinch.  Of  the  soldiers  Avho  were 
still  inside  the  fort,  a number  Avere  de- 
tailed to  salute  the  flag  of  the  United 


32 


BULL  EUN. 


States.  At  the  firing  of  the  fifteenth 
gun,  a premature  explosion  took  place, 
killing  one  man,  seriously  wounding  an- 
other, and  inflicting  upon  other  two  inju- 
ries more  or  less  dangerous.  They  were 
the  first  casualties  of  any  moment  from 


the  beginning  of  the  conflict.  On  Mon- 
day Anderson  and  his  men  were  trans- 
ferred to  the  Baltic  and  sailed  for  April 
New  York,  where  they  were  des-  15* 
tined  to  receive  the  plaudits  and  the  hon- 
ors of  a delighted  and  grateful  people. 


CIIAPTEB  III. 


The  Fall  of  Fort  STimter  the  First  Link  in  a Chain  of  Great  Events, — War  now  a Necessity. — The  Grief  and  Rage 
of  the  North. — Lincoln's  Proclamation. — Congress  Summoned  to  Meet. — Secession  Sentiments  finding  Expres- 
sion.— The  probable  Theatre  of  War. — Conspiracy  to  Seize  Washington. — Confederate  Troops  on  the  March. — 
Manassas  Junction. — Arlington  Heights. — What  the  President  could  see  from  the  White  House. — Military 
Movements. — Delay. — The  Impatience  of  the  People  of  the  North. — “On  to  Richmond.” — General  Irwin 
McDowell, — The  two  Armies. — General  Joseijh  E.  Johnston. — General  Beauregard. — Centreville. — The  On- 
ward Movement, — Tyler’s  Mistake. — McDowell's  Delay. — The  Three  Months’  Term  of  Service  Expiring. — 
The  Battle  Ground. — The  Relative  Strength  of  the  two  Armies. — McDowell’s  Plan. — Sunday  Morning. — The 
Battle  Begun. — The  First  Hour  of  the  Fight. — The  Confederates  Driven  Back. — McDowell's  Mistake. — “ Stone- 
wall” Jackson. — The  Tide  of  Battle  Tiirned. — Noon. — The  Second  Phase  of  the  Battle. — The  Confederate 
Position. — The  Rising  Ground  near  the  Henry  House. — Terrific  Struggle  for  the  Plateau. — Ellsworth's 
Zouaves. — The  Seventy-Ninth  and  Sixty-Ninth  Regiments. — Death  of  Colonel  Cameron, — The  Critical  Mo- 
ment.— Arrival  of  Kirby  Smith. — Panic  among  the  National  Troops. — The  Battle  Lost. — A Rout. — Terrible 
Losses. — Reflections. — The  Victory  Complete,  but  the  Battle  not  Decisive. — Effects  of  the  Battle  North  and 
South. — The  President’s  Call  for  Half  a Million  of  Men. — McDowell  Superseded  by  McClellan. 


It  is  useless  now  to  discuss  the  cpies- 
tion  whether  Fort  Sumter  could 

1861 

or  could  not  have  been  reinforced. 
Our  experience  to-day  is  very  different 
to  what  it  ^vas  when  the  relief  ships 
anchored  in  the  outer  harbor ; and  the 
presumption  is  that  if  the  attempt  at 
reinforcement  had  to  be  made  now,  it 
would  be  made  with  more  daring  and 
perhaps  with  complete  success. 

As  it  was,  the  fall  of  Fort  Sumter 
constituted  the  first  link  in  a chain  of 
great  events  which  culminated  in  one 
of  the  most  gigantic  revolutions  in  mod- 
ern times.  Its  immediate  effect  was  to 


make  an  end  of  all  possibility  of  com- 
promise. War  ’was  now  a necessity. 
There  was  but  one  arbiter  possible ; 
and  that  was  the  sword.  In  the  South 
the  intelligence  was  received  with  a 
wild  yell  of  delight.  In  the  North,  the 
news  produced  generally  a feeling  of 
sadness.  Momentarily  there  was  si- 
lence— not  the  silence  of  despair,  but 
that  silence  which  comes  from  surprise, 
from  vexation,  from  an  overburdened 
heart.  Soon,  however,  the  strong  man 
recovered  himself;  and  from  the  con- 
fines of  the  British  provinces  to  the 
waters  of  the  broad  Ohio  there  arose 


SECESSIO^^  SPREADIXG. 


33 


that  hearty  cheer — a cheer  which  can 
only  come  from  Anglo-Saxon  throats 
and  from  men  devoted  to  truth,  to  right, 
to  liberty — a cheer  deep-toned  and  firm, 
full  of  hope  and  full  of  confidence. 
Henceforth  the  division  was  complete. 
Minor  differences  among  the  population 
on  either  side  w^ere  overlooked ; and 
the  waters  of  the  Ohio  rolled  between 
two  powerful  confederations,  united  and 
prepared  for  battle. 

On  Sunday,  the  14th  day  of  April, 
April  garrison  of  Fort  Sumter  low- 
14*  ered  their  fiag  and  marched  out 
of  the  work.  On  the  day  following, 
April  President  Lincoln  issued  a pro- 
1^*  clamation  calling  for  seventy-five 
thousand  men  to  serve  for  three  months. 
At  the  same  time,  in  consideration  of 
the  gravity  of  the  situation,  he  sum- 
moned an  extra  session  of  Confess — 

o 

senators  and  representatives  being  in- 
structed “ to  assemble  at  their  resj^ect- 
ive  chambers  in  Washington  City,  at 
noon  on  Thursday,  the  4th  day  of  July 
next  ensuing,  then  and  there  to  con- 
sider and  determine  such  measures,  as 
in  their  wisdom  the  public  safety  might 
seem  to  demand.”  The  authorities  at 
Montgomery  were  equally  active.  A 
call  Avas  made  for  thirty-five  thousand 
additional  troops ; and  the  call  was  re- 
sponded to  Avith  alacrity  and  enthusi- 
asm. Up  until  the  date  of  the  bom- 
bardment of  Fort  Sumter,  the  Southern 
Confederacy  consisted  only  of  the  seA^en 
cotton  States.  The  other  eight  slave 
States — \ irginia,  Maryland,  Delaware, 
^orth  Carolina,  Kentucky,  Tennessee, 
Missouri  and  Arkansas,  embracing  the 
larger  half  of  the  population  of  the 


South,  had  stood  aloof  from  the  seces- 
sion mo  Axemen  t.  Their  sympathies  Avere 
illy  concealed;  but  they  had  resolved 
not  to  declare  themseU^es  until  circum- 
stances rendered  a decision  necessary. 
The  proclamation  of  President  Lincoln 
left  them  no  choice.  Being  still  in  the 
Union,  these  several  States  Avere  called 
upon  to  furnish  their  proportion  of 
troops.  From  almost  all  of  them  came 
replies  of  the  most  defiant  kind.  Mary- 
land and  Delaware  AA^ere  less  pronounced 
than  some  of  the  others.  Secession  went 
on  apace.  Virginia  openly  joined  the 
Confederacy  on  the  17th  of  April,  two 
days  after  the  proclamation  ; she  Avas 
folloAved  by  Arkansas  on  the  6th  of 
May;  by  North  Carolina  on  May  the 
20th ; and  by  Tennessee  on  the  8th  of 
June.  In  the  remaining  slaA^e  States — 
Delaware,  Maryland,  Kentucky  and  Mis- 
souri— sentiment  Avas  divided ; and  al- 
though the  contest  was  protracted  and 
keen,  it  was  found  possible  to  retain  them 
in  the  Union.  The  cause  of  the  South 
Avas  immensely  strengthened  by  the  ad- 
hesion of  the  above-mentioned  States; 
and  Virginia  was  justly  regarded  as  a 
great  acquisition.  As  soon  as  that  State 
withdrew  from  the  Union,  Bichmond 
Avas  made  the  head-quarters  of  the 
Confederate  government.  In  the  loyal 
States  of  the  North  the  proclamation 
of  President  Lincoln  Avas  hailed  A\dth 
rapturous  enthusiasm ; from  the  pulpit, 
from  the  platform,  and  through  the  press 
burning  Avords  Avent  forth  to  the  j^eople ; 
and,  within  a few  days,  the  militia  of 
the  different  States  were  out  in  force, 
and  large  bodies  of  men  were  converg- 
ing toAvards  the  national  capital. 


34 


BULL  RUX. 


It  soon  became  manifest  that  Virginia 
in  the  east,  and  the  border  States,  Ken- 
tucky and  Missouri  in  the  west,  would 
1)0  the  principal  theatre  of  the  w^ar. 
Towards  those  States  a general  move- 
ment was  made  by  the  forces  of  both 
Korth  and  South.  From  the  moment 
that  Virginia  joined  the  Southern  Con- 
federacy, and  that  Richmond  became  the 
rival  capital,  it  was  seen  and  felt  that 
the  war  struggle  in  the  first  instance  at 
least,  would  be  limited  to  a compara- 
tively narrow  area.  Tlie  fall  of  Fort 
Sumter  inspired  the  South  with,  per- 
haps, a little  too  much  confidence.  ‘‘No 
man,”  said  Walker,  the  Confederate  war 
secretary,  “ can  foretell  the  events  of  the 
war  now  inaugurated ; l)ut  this,  I will 
venture  to  predict  that  the  Confederate 
fiag  will,  l)efore  the  1 st  of  May,  fioat  over 
the  dome  of  the  capitol  at  Wasliing- 
ton.”  Walker  was  not  ignorant  of  the 
fact  that  a conspiracy  existed  having 
for  its  object  the  capture  of  Washing- 
ton, the  seizure  of  the  government  ofli- 
cers,  and  the  inauguration  of  a provis- 
ional government,  in  the  interests  of 
the  South.  Of  the  existence  of  some 
such  conspiracy  there  can  be  no  doubt. 
Southern  men,  supposed  to  be  in  the 
secret,  have  since  confessed  that  if 
Washington  could  not  be  held,  after  it 
fell  into  their  hands,  the  intention  was 
to  fire  it,  destroy  the  national  archives 
and  leave  the  city  a mass  of  ruins. 
“If  Maryland  secedes,”  said  Alexander 
II.  Stephens,  “ the  District  of  Columbia 
falls  to  her  by  reversionary  right,  as 
Sumter  fell  to  South  Carolina.”  The 
designs  of  the  Confederates  on  Wash- 
ington while  they  determined  the  move- 


ment of  Southern  forces,  gave  zeal 
and  energy  to  the  North.  To  protect 
W ashington  became  the  great  primary 
object  of  the  North.  Manassas  Junc- 
tion, a point  on  the  railroad  between 
Washington  and  Richmond,  where  a 
branch  comes  in  from  the  Shenandoah 
Valley,  was  singled  out  as  the  rendez- 
vous for  the  South ; and  thither  their 
troops  were  hurried  forward  with  all 
possible  rapidity.  Manassas  Junction 
is  only  thirty  miles  from  Washington  ; 
and  it  wms  doubtless  selected,  because 
it  threatened  Washington,  rather  than 
because  it  miorht  cover  Richmond.  It 

O 

was  a daring  movement  on  the  part  of 
the  South.  If  they  were  able  to  make 
their  position  good  at  Manassas,  their 
next  move  would  have  been  to  occupy 
Arlington  Heights,  which  overlook  and 
command  the  national  capital.  Arling- 
ton Ileiorhts  secured,  it  was  not  unnatu- 
ral  for  them  to  conclude  that  Washing- 
ton might  be  in  their  hands,  before  the 
4th  of  July,  when  Congress  was  sum- 
moned to  meet.  It  was  a splendid 
vision  — it  can  hardly  be  called  a 
dream;  had  it  been  realized,  the  Civil 
War,  if  not  prematurely  brought  to  a 
close,  would  certainly  have  rolled  on  in 
other  channels,  and  the  condition  of  the 
United  States  to-day  would  have  been 
different. 

W hile  the  South  was  busy,  the  North 
was  not  idle.  After  not  a little  diffi- 
culty and  some  bloodshed,  the  loyal 
forces  found  themselves  in  considerable 
strength  in  Washington.  Maryland  had 
foolishly  interfered  with  the  passage  of 
the  loyal  troops  through  her  tenitory. 
It  was  a bad  blunder;  but  force  and 


TO  EIOHMOND/’ 


35 


persuasion  ultimately  prevailed,  and 
the  right  of  way  was  resumed,  not 
again  to  be  called  in  question.  Towards 
the  end  of  May,  a large  army,  under 
General  Scott,  was  assembled  in  and 
around  the  capital.  Notwithstanding 
all  that  had  happened,  Lincoln  was  ex- 
tremely unwilling  to  invade  the  South. 
Delay,  however,  had  been  perilous  in 
the  extreme.  From  the  window  of  his 
chamber  in  the  White  House,  the  pres- 
ident could  see,  on  the  other  side  of  the 
Potomac,  the  waving  folds  of  the  South- 
ern flag;  and  with  the  aid  of  his  fleld- 
glass,  he  might  observe  the  Confederate 
engineers  at  work.  By  night  their 
camp-flres  lit  up  with  a lurid  light  the 
southern  sky.  A forward  movement 
was  resolved  upon.  On  the  23d  of  May, 
f^fay  a strong  column,  under  the  com- 
23.  mand  of  General  McDowell,  was 
thrown  across  the  Potomac,  and  Ar- 
lington Heights  and  the  town  of  Alex- 
andria were  occupied.  Before  the  end 
of  the  month.  General  Butler,  with  a 
body  of  twelve  thousand  men,  held  pos- 
session of  Fortress  Monroe ; General 
Patterson,  with  another  column,  was 
posted  near  Harper’s  Ferry ; while  Gen- 
eral G.  B.  McClellan,  with  another  pow- 
erful body,  had  crossed  the  Ohio  Eiver 
and  taken  a strong  position  in  Western 
Virginia.  The  main  body  of  the  Con- 
federates was  stationed  at  Manassas 
J unction,  and  was  under  the  command 
of  General  Beauregard.  General  Ma- 
gruder  held  General  Butler  in  check  on 
the  Peninsula.  General  J.  E.  Johnston 
confronted  Patterson  in  the  valley  of 
the  Shenandoah.  Another  strong  force 
was  posted  in  the  high  lands  of  West 


Virginia,  prepared  to  meet  any  aggres- 
sive movement  on  the  part  of  the  Union 
soldiers. 

Such  was  the  state  of  affairs  in 
June  and  the  early  days  of  July,  1861. 
McClellan’s  West  Virginia  campaign — 
including  the  battle  at  Philippi,  June 
3d,  the  later  action  at  Eich  Mountain, 
July  11th,  and  the  subsequent  encoun- 
ters at  Carrack’s  Ford  and  at  Beverly — 
all-important  as  they  were,  must  be  re- 
garded as  forming  part  of  the  prelude 
to  the  first  great  battle  which  was  soon 
to  be  fought.  The  same  may  be  said  of 
General  Butler’s  less  successful  effort 
at  Big  Bethel,  June  lOth.  Patterson 
was  still  idly  confronting  Johnston  in 
the  Shenandoah  Valley. 

Public  impatience,  at  length,  reached 
a climax.  The  new  regiments  were 
coming  in  slowly ; and  the  term  for^ 
which  the  three  months’  troops  had^ 
been  called  out  would  expire  about 
the  end  of  July.  The  people  felt  that 
if  something  was  not  done  at  once,  the 
Confederates,  having  opposed  to  them 
only  raw  and  undisciplined  recruits, 
would  have  all  things  their  own  way. 
The  soldiers  themselves  were  disgusted 
with  their  life  of  inaction.  The  cry 
became  general,  ‘‘On  to  Eichmond”; 
and  it  was  echoed  as  loudly  by  the  men 
in  the  field  as  by  the  public. 

Arrans^ements  had  been  made  to 
make  a forward  movement  on  the  8th 
day  of  July;  but  it  was  deemed  unsafe 
to  break  up  the  camp  before  the  15th. 
General  Scott,  the  commander-in-chief, 
in  consequence  of  age  and  infirmity, 
did  not  feel  himself  equal  to  the  task  of 
taking  command  in  the  field.  For  this 


36 


BULL  EUU. 


highly  responsible  position,  he  select- 
ed Brigadier-General  Irwin  McDowell. 
McDowell  was  a native  of  Ohio,  a 
graduate  of  West  Point;  he  had  seen 
service  in  Mexico  under  General  Wool, 
and  had  acquired  the  reputation  of  be- 
ing an  excellent  soldier.  He  had  al- 
ready been  placed  at  the  head  of  the 
Union  forces  in  Virginia,  and  as  we 
have  seen  had  made  himself  master 
of  Arlington  Heights,  where  were  his 
head-quarters. 

The  forces  on  the  one  side  and  on 
the  other  were  disposed  as  follows. 
The  main  body  of  tlie  Northern  -army, 
under  IVIcDowell,  numbering  about  for- 
ty-five thousand  men,  lay  in  front  of 
Washington,  its  back  upon  the  Poto- 
mac, and  extended  from  Alexandria  to 
the  Chain  Bridge.  At  Martinsburg, 
toward  the  northwest,  and  beyond  the 
Blue  Pidge,  with  its  back  also  on  the 
Potomac,  there  was  the  army  of  General 
Patterson,  numbering  some  eighteen 
thousand  men.  The  position  was  strong. 
The  three  bridges  which  span  the  Poto- 
mac at  Washington  City  were  well 
guarded  by  batteries  and  earthworks. 
The  fortifications  on  Arlington  Heights 
covered  all  the  positions  which  com- 
manded Washington  and  Georgetown. 
The  Confederate  forces,  numbering  some 
twenty  thousand,  and  under  the  com- 
mand cf  Beauregard,  already  familiar 
to  the  reader  as  the  commander-in-chief 
in  Charleston  Harbor,  were  strongly 
posted  at  Manassas  Junction — a place 
of  great  natural  strength,  and  made  al- 
most impregnable  by  the  Confederate 
engineers.  Manassas  is  situated  about 
half-way  between  the  eastern  spur  of 


the  Blue  Pidge  and  the  Potomac  below 
Alexandria ; and  it  had  the  advantage 
of  being  connected  by  railroad  with 
Pichmond  and  the  valley  of  the  Shenan- 
doah. Pegarding  Manassas  as  their 
centre,  the  right  swung  out  and  rested  on 
the  Potomac,  below  Alexandria,  hold- 
ing the  forts  which  blockaded  the  river. 
Their  left  consisting  of  some  eight 
thousand  men  under  Joseph  E.  John- 
ston, lay  at  Winchester,  confronting  the 
Federal  army  under  Patterson.  Such 
were  the  relative  positions  of  the  rival 
armies  on  the  eve  of  the  battle  of  Bull 
Pun,  or  as  the  Southerners  prefer  to 
name  it,  the  battle  of  Manassas.  In 
point  of  numerical  strength,  the  advan- 
tage most  certainly  lay  with  the  North  ; 
but  the  South  had  chosen  a splendid 
position  and  made  admirable  use  of  its 
natural  advantages. 

On  the  15th  of  July  McDowell  re- 
ceived instructions  to  advance  and  jniy 
attack  the  Confederate  position 
at  Manassas  Junction.  It  deserves  to 
be  remarked  here  that  Patterson,  who, 
as  we  have  seen,  was  stationed  at  Mar- 
tinsburg, received  strict  orders  not  to 
abandon  his  position,  but  to  hold  the 
Confederates  under  Johnston  in  his  grij3, 
and  to  prevent  them  by  every  possible 
means  from  coming  to  the  aid  of  Beau- 
regard at  Manassas.  This  was  part 
of  the  battle-plan ; and  although,  as 
we  shall  see  presently,  it  led  to  dis- 
astrous results,  it  was  at  once  well- 
conceived  and  well-intended.  On  the 
16th  the  forward  movement  be-  July, 
gan.  Leaving  some  fifteen  thou- 
sand  men  to  guard  the  seat  of  govern- 
ment, McDowell,  at  the  head  of  some 


TYLER’S  MISTAKE. 


37 


thirty  thousand  men,  arranged  in  four 
divisions,  and  commanded  respectively 
by  Brigadier- General  Taylor,  Colonels 
Hunter,  Heintzelman  and  Miles,  ad- 
vanced towards  Fairfax  Court  House. 
This  place  was  about  ten  miles  distant 
and  was  known  to  be  in  the  possession 
of  the  Confederate  forces.  The  army 
moved  in  four  columns — Tyler  with 
the  right  wing  taking  the  Georgetown 
road ; Hunter  with  the  centre  taking 
the  Leesburg  and  Centreville  road ; 
Heintzelman  with  one  portion  of  the 
left  taking  the  Little  Biver  turnpike, 
and  Miles  with  the  remaining  portion 
of  the  left  proceeding  along  the  old 
Braddock  road,  which,  as  it  passes 
through  Fairfax  Court  House  and  Cen- 
treville, becomes  the  Warrenton  turn- 
pike. The  movement  was  made  in  good 
order,  and  with  complete  success.  It 
was  a success,  however,  coupled  with 
disappointment;  for  at  Fairfax  Court 
House,  where  they  expected  to  find  the 
enemy  in  strength  and  ready  to  offer 
battle,  they  found  only  a deserted  camp 
and  an  almost  ruined  village.  The 
Confederates,  hearing  of  their  approach, 
had  retired  hastily  but  in  good  order 
through  Centreville  to  Bull  Bun,  a 
stream  flowing  in  front  of  their  position 
at  Manassas  Junction.  The  national 
forces  were  naturally  enough  elated  with 
easy  victory.  Some  little  excesses  were 
indulged  in  ; but  they  were  promptly 
rebuked  and  they  were  not  repeated. 

On  hearing  that  the  enemy  had  evac- 
uated Centreville,  McDowell’s  first  in- 
tention was  to  make  a vigorous  demon- 
stration on  their  front  with  a view  of 
turning  their  right.  On  a closer  exam- 


ination of  the  situation,  he  saw  that 
this  course  was  beset  with  some  peril. 
He  deemed  it  expedient,  therefore,  to 
change  his  plan,  and  resolved  to  turn, 
if  possible,  the  Confederate  left,  and 
seize  the  railroad  in  their  rear.  While 
thus  engaged,  McDowell’s  plans  were 
well-nigh  frustrated  by  the  rash  enthu- 
siasm of  one  of  his  subordinates.  About 
noon  of  the  18th,  General  Tyler,  jujy 
believing  that  he  could,  without 
much  difficulty,  march  directly  on  Man- 
assas, moved  down  from  Centreville 
towards  Blackburn’s  Ford.  He  took 
with  him  Bichardson’s  Brigade,  a squad- 
ron of  cavalry  and  Ayres’  battery, 
Sherman’s  brigade  being  held  in  re- 
serve. Beauregard,  who  had  been  well 
advised  of  all  that  was  taking  place, 
was  there  in  position  and  ready  to  re- 
ceive him.  The  ground  was  thickly 
wooded ; and  the  opposing  forces  were 
concealed  from  each  other’s  view.  Open- 
ing an  artillery  Are  on  the  forest  in 
front,  Tyler  soon  perceived  the  glitter- 
ing points  of  the  bayonets  of  the  ene- 
my; and  a rattling  discliarge  of  artillery 
and  musketry  taught  him  the  danger  of 
his  position.  The  affair  was  brief ; but 
it  was  bloody.  In  vain  Tyler  attempted 
to  dislodge  the  enemy.  In  vain  he  push- 
ed forward  his  regiments.  In  vain  he 
brought  up  Sherman’s  brigade.  After- 
an  hour’s  ineffectual  effcnds  he  was  com- 
pelled to  retire.  The  skirmish  at  Black- 
burn’s Ford,  called  by  the  Confederate^, 
the  battle  of  Bull  Bun,  was  justly 
claimed  by  them  as  a victory.  The 
Nationals  lost  about  one  hundred  men ; 
the  Confederate  loss  was  about  twenty. 
The  losses,  it  is  true,  were  not  great;; 


IDS 


38 


BULL  RUN. 


hut  the  lesson  was  emphatic.  It  nat- 
urally enough  emboldened  the  South; 
while  it  taught  the  military  politicians 
and  enthusiasts  of  the  North  that  the 
putting  down  of  the  rebellion  was  not 
to  be  a mere  holiday  exercise. 

McDowell  felt  the  necessity  for  im- 
mediate and  vigorous  action.  The  situ- 
ation had  become  critical.  Every  hour 
was  increasingly  precious.  In  a few 
days  more,  he  knew  he  would  lose  the 
flower  of  his  army.  The  three  months’ 
term  of  service  for  which  the  first  call 
of  volunteers  was  made,  had  all  but  ex- 
pired. In  his  own  report  the  General 
says,  “In  the  next  few  days,  day  by 
day,  I shall  have  lost  ten  thousand  of 
the  best  anned,  drilled,  officered  and 
disciplined  troops  in  the  army.”  The 
Confederate  army  meanwhile  was  stead- 
ily increasing  in  numbers.  Adhering 
to  his  plan  to  turn  the  Confederate 
left,  he  concentrated  his  forces  at  and 
around  Centreville,  and  made  instant 
preparations  for  an  attack.  In  addition 
to  a force  of  five  thousand  men  within 
call,  he  had  around  him  and  ready  for 
immediate  action  some  twenty-eight  or 
thirty  thousand  men,  with  forty-nine 
guns.  On  the  19th  a reconnoissance 
July  made ; and  it  was  intended 

1^*  to  make  the  attack  on  the  follow- 
ing day.  His  supplies,  however,  came 
late ; and  another  day  was  lost.  The 
July  50th  was  Saturday.  On  the  eve- 
20#  mug  of  that  day  McDowell’s  ar- 
my began  to  melt  away.  The  term  of 
service  of  the  Fourth  Pennsylvania  and 
Varian’s  Battery  of  the  New  York 
Eighth  having  expired,  those  troops 
could  not  be  induced  to  remain;  and 


the  historian  must  regretfully  chronicle 
the  fact  that  on  the  following  morning 
they  “moved  to  the  rear  to  the  sound 
of  the  enemy’s  cannon.” 

At  this  stage  it  is  necessary  for  the 
reader  to  form  something  like  a clear 
and  accurate  conception  of  the  ground 
on  which  the  impending  conflict  was  to 
take  place.  Bull  Bun,  it  is  to  be  re- 
membered, flows  from  the  northwest  to 
the  southeast.  During  a part  of  its 
course,  it  is  equidistant  about  three 
miles  from  Centreville  and  Manassas 
Junction,  the  head-quarters  respectively 
of  the  Union  and  Confederate  armies. 
There  are  three  roads  running  out  of 
Centreville,  which  cross  the  stream  at 
different  points.  There  is  the  Warren- 
ton  turnpike  which  crosses  by  the  Stone 
Bridge.  There  is  another  road  which 
crosses  at  Blackburn’s  Ford.  There  is 
a third  road  further  to  the  south,  which 
crosses  at  Union  Mills  Ford.  These 
are  the  three  principal  fords;  and  in 
the  order  in  which  we  have  named 
them,  they  mark  consecutively  the  Con- 
federate left,  centre  and  right.  In  ad- 
dition to  these  are  Sudley’s  Spring 
Ford  about  two  miles  to  the  northeast 
of  the  Stone  Bridge,  Bed  Hill  Ford, 
between  the  Stone  Bridge  and  Sudley’s 
Spring,  and  McLean’s  Ford,  between 
Blackburn’s  and  Union  Mills.  Cub 
Bun,  a branch  of  Bull  Bun,  and  flow^ 
ing  from  north  to  south,  is  another 
feature  of  the  landscape  which  deserves 
to  be  noted.  Along  the  line  of  Bull 
Bun,  over  a distance  of  eight  miles,  the 
Confederates  were  posted  as  follows. 
There  were  six  brigades — Ewell’s  at 
Union  Mills  Ford;  Jones’  at  McLean’s 


EEADY  FOE  BATTLE. 


39 


Ford;  Longstreet’s  at  Blackburn’s  Ford; 
Bonham’s  at  Mitchell’s  Ford;  Cocke’s 
at  Ball’s  Ford ; and  Evans’  at  the  Stone 
Bridge.  The  brigades  of  Holmes  and 
Early  v^ere  held  in  reserve  in  the  rear 
of  the  right,  as  were  those  of  Jackson 
and  Bee  on  the  left.  The  total  strength 
of  the  Confederate  army  was  about 
twenty-two  thousand  men.  In  numeii- 
cal  strength,  it  was  inferior  to  the  army 
under  McDowell;  but  in  the  strength 
of  their  position  and  their  thorough 
knowledge  of  the  ground  the  Confede- 
rates had  immeasurably  the  advantage. 

W e have  seen  already  that  Patterson 
was  stationed  in  the  valley  of  the  Shen- 
andoah, and  that  it  was  his  special  busi- 
ness to  hold  Johnston  at  Winchester 
and  prevent  him  from  joining  Beaure- 
gard at  Manassas.  When  McDowell 
advanced  to  Fairfax  Court  House  on 
the  17th,  information  of  the  fact  was 
conveyed  to  the  Confederate  War  De- 
partment ; and  Johnston  was  immediate- 
ly telegraphed  to  join  the  army  of  the 
Potomac  with  all  his  forces.  The  de- 
spatch was  received  on  the  18th  in  the 
morning;  and  by  noon  of  the  20th,  hav- 
ing eluded  Patterson,  Johnston  reached 
Manassas  Junction,  with  six  thousand 
men.  He  had  marched  unmolested 
through  Ashby’s  Gap  to  Piedmont ; and 
thence  by  railroad  he  hurried  forward 
his  infantry  to  Manassas,  leaving  the 
cavalry  and  artillery  to  pursue  their 
journey  as  before.  The  arrival  of  John- 
ston was  an  immense  gain  to  the  Con- 
federates. Being  senior  officer,  he  im- 
mediately took  command  of  the  army, 
without  interfering  in  the  least,  how- 
ever, with  Beauregard’s  plans.  The 


Confederates  were  now  as  eager  to  join 
battle  as  were  the  Unionists,  because 
they  feared  that  unless  they  struck  at 
once,  Patterson,  discovering  that  John- 
ston had  outgeneralled  him  and  made 
good  his  escape,  would  hurry  forward 
and  reinforce  McDowell.  It  was  a 
groundless  fear,  as  the  result  proved ; 
but  it  was  surely  most  natural  in  the 
circumstances. 

McDowell’s  plan,  as  we  have  seen, 
was  to  turn  the  Confederate  left,  drive 
them  from  the  Stone  Bridge  and  from 
the  Warrenton  turnpike,  and  so  make 
himself  master  of  the  Manassas  Gap 
railroad  in  their  rear.  By  this  means,  he 
hoped  to  prevent  the  junction  of  the 
forces  of  Johnston  and  Beauregard. 
He  did  not  know  that  through  the 
blundering  of  Patterson  the  junction 
had  already  been  effected.  To  carry 
out  his  plans,  Tyler  was  instructed  to 
move  along  the  Warrenton  turnpike 
and  open  tire  on  the  Confederate  left 
at  Stone  Bridge.  Hunter  and  Heintzel- 
man  were  to  follow  him  for  a certain 
distance,  then  to  make  a detour  north- 
ward, crossing  Bull  Bun  near  Sudley’s 
Spring,  and  fall  upon  the  flank  and  rear 
of  the  Confederates,  when  already  under 
Are  from  Tyler’s  men.  Miles  with  Bich- 
ardson’s  brigade  attached,  was  to  remain 
at  Centreville  and  guard  the  position. 
The  movement  was  to  commence  at 
half-past  two  o’clock  on  the  morning  of 
Sunday,  the  21st.  By  midnight  every- 
thing was  in  readiness.  The  night  had 
been  more  than  ordinarily  beautiful. 
The  surrounding  country  was  in  all 
the  glory  of  midsummer.  Innumerable 
camp-fires  shed  a strange  light  on  the 


40 


BULL  EUU. 


dense  foliage  of  the  neighboring  forests. 
The  air  was  fresh,  and  not  a breath 
rustled  the  lightest  leaf.  The  moon 
was  full;  and  from  the  blue  vault  of 
the  cloudless  heavens  it  diffused  over 
the  scene  below  a soft,  mellow  light. 
As  night  wore  into  early  morn,  and  the 
summer  sun  began  to  gild  the  summits 
of  the  distant  hills.  Nature,  beautiful  in 
her  brightest  robes,  seemed  all-uncon- 
scious of  the  terrific  struggle  which  was 
to  disturb  the  stillness  of  that  Sabbath 
day. 

The  onward  march  of  the  three  divis- 
ions from  Centreville,  was,  as  we  have 
seen,  to  begin  at  half-past  two  o’clock 
on  Sunday  morning.  It  was  calculated 
by  McDowell  that,  if  his  orders  were 
faithfully  carried  out,  Tyler  would 
reach  the  Stone  Bridge  about  four,  that 
Hunter  and  Heintzelman  having:  accom- 
plished  their  semicircular  detoui’,  would 
be  at  the  appointed  spot  about  six,  and 
that  when  Tyler  had  fairly  engaged 
the  attention  of  the  enemy  in  front,  the 
other  two  divisions  should  unexpectedly 
make  a vigorous  attack  on  his  flank  and 
rear.  That  demon  of  delay  which  had 
prevented  him  reaching  Centreville  un- 
til the  18th,  a day  later  than  he  had 
intended,  and  which  hindered  him  from 
offering  battle  on  the  20th,  was  again 
fatal  to  McDowell’s  plans.  It  was  six 
or  a little  later  when  Tyler  reached 
the  Stone  Bridge;  and  it  was  nearly 
four  hours  later,  the  hot  July  sun  be- 
ing already  high  in  the  heavens,  when 
Hunter  and  Heintzelman  arrived  at 
their  destination.  McDowell,  who  was 
ill,  had  followed  in  a carriage;  but  im- 
patient of  the  ruinous  delay,  he  mounted 


his  horse,  and,  followed  by  a few  at- 
tendants, was  the  first  on  the  battle 
ground.  Before  the  battle  began,  he 
saw  that  his  plans  had  been  frustrated. 

The  discharge  of  a shell  from  a thirty- 
pounder  Parrott  gun,  which  fell  among 
a band  of  Confederates,  seen  in  a ja’y 
meadow  below  Bull  Bun,  and  21. 
scattered  their  ranks,  was  the  signal  for 
battle.  Although  other  shells  were 
fired  in  quick  succession,  the  Confede- 
rates were  slow  to  reply.  McDowell 
dreaded  that  an  attack  was  contem- 
plated on  his  left,  further  down  the 
st]*eam.  He  therefore  held  in  reserve 
one  of  Heintzelman ’s  brigades  (How- 
ard’s), in  case,  as  he  said,  “he  should 
have  to  send  any  troops  back  to  rein- 
force Miles’  division.”  Colonel  Evans, 
who,  with  a very  small  force,  held  the 
Stone  Bridge  for  the  Confederates,  nat- 
urally enough  believed  at  first  that  the 
attack  made  in  front  by  the  force  under 
Tyler  was  the  real  one.  He  was  soon, 
however,  undeceived.  As  early  as  half- 
past nine,  he  was  mad-e  aware  that  a 
large  force  of  the  enemy  was  passing 
through  the  woods  on  his  left  and  tow- 

O 

ards  his  rear.  By  ten  o’clock,  the  ad- 
vance brigade  of  Hunter’s  column,  com- 
manded  by  Burnside,  had  I’eached  the 
open  fields.  In  the  interval,  however, 
he  had  found  time  to  send  for  reinforce- 
ments, to  wheel  around,  making  an  en- 
tire change  of  front,  and  to  post  himself 
in  a first  class  position  to  receive  the 
enemy.  His  right  rested  in  a long 
and  narrow  gi’ove  in  front  of  Young’s 
Bi’anch — a petty  tributary  of  Bull  Run  ; 
his  centre  crossed  the  Sudley  road  to 
the  north  of  the  Warrenton  turnpike; 


A FURIOUS  STRUGGLE. 


41 


and  his  left  was  concealed  among  the 
outhouses,  sheds,  haystacks  and  fences 
of  a neighboring  farm.  The  position 
was  somewhat  elevated,  enabling  him 
to  pour  a destructive  lire  of  artillery 
and  musketry  on  the  forces  of  the  ene- 
my, as  soon  as  they  emerged  from  the 
woods,  and  while  yet  distant  many  hun- 
dred yards. 

The  appearance  of  the  head  of  Burn- 
side’s column  at  the  edge  of  the  wood 
was  the  signal  for  the  opening  of  the 
Confederate  lire.  ■ It  was  sharp  and 
severe,  and  well  fitted  to  produce  con- 
fusion among  comparatively  raw  re- 
cruits, as  yet  but  little  experienced  to 
the  severities  and  sudden  surprises  of 
the  battle  field.  But  the  men  under 
Burnside  were  full  of  purpose;  and 
having  enjoyed  half-an-hour’s  rest  at 
the  ford,  where  they  filled  their  can- 
teens with  water,  they  were  well  re- 
freshed. Not  waiting  to  form  proper 
line  of  order,  they  sharply  responded. 
The  Second  Bhode  Island,  under  Colonel 
John  Slocum,  was  the  first  under  fire. 
Burnside  was  not  slow  in  getting  his 
troops  in  hand  ; while  Porter’s  brigade, 
quickly  emerging  from  the  wood,  form- 
ed on  his  right,  Griffin’s  battery  also 
getting  into  position  and  replying  with 
effect  to  the  Confederate  artillery.  The 
battle  was  now  fairly  begun.  Evans 
was  already  sorely  pressed,  when  he 
received  some  welcome  assistance.  Gen- 
eral Bee,  who  was  next  in  what  had 
now  become  his  rear,  with  detachments 
of  his  men  and  Burton’s  Georffia  bri- 

O 

gade,  and  carrying  with  him  six  guns 
of  Imboden  and  Bichardson,  rushed 
down  the  slope  towards  the  turnpike. 


It  was  a critical  moment  for  the  National 
troops.  Burnsicle,  realizing  the  situa- 
tion, called  for  help.  Sykes’  battalion 
was  promptly  hurried  forward  from 
Porter  on  the  right.  The  national  line 
was  thereby  greatly  strengthened.  The 
battle  raged  fiercely,  the  Confederate 
artillery,  particularly  from  its  superior 
position,  telling  with  deadly  effect  on 
the  Union  ranks.  Colonel  Hunter  fell, 
severely  wounded,  and  had  to  be  carried 
from  the  field.  Colonel  Slocum  was 
mortally  wounded;  and  his  major,  Sul- 
livan Ballou,  had  his  horse  killed  under 
him,  and  his  leg  badly  crushed  by  a 
cannon  ball.  The  battle  had  lasted  an 
hour ; and  the  result  was  still  doubtful, 
when  Porter,  having  arrived  on  the 
scene,  poured  a heavy  fire  on  Evans’ 
left,  making  his  whole  column  waver 
and  bend.  Almost  at  the  same  moment, 
Sherman’s  brigade  of  Tyler’s  division, 
which  had  been  ordered  forward,  suc- 
cessfully crossed  the  ford  just  above 
the  Stone  Bridi^e,  and  added  its  strength 
to  the  Union  forces.  Hunter’s  success, 
however,  was  already  assured  ; the  Con- 
federates were  in  retreat ; and  Sherman 
was  ordered,  his  troops  being  still  fresh, 
^Ho  join  in  the  pursuit  of  the  enemy, 
who  was  falling  back  towards  the  Sud- 
ley’s  Spring  road.”  The  first  part  of 
JMcDowell’s  plan  had  been  carried  out 
with  success.  He  had  turned  the  ene- 
my’s left ; he  had  forced  him  from  the 
Warrenton  turnpike  ; he  had  uncovered, 
the  Stone  Bridge ; he  had  pressed  the 
opposing  lines  at  least  a mile  and  a 
half,  and  had  occupied  the  vacated 
ground. 

At  this  stage  occurred  McDowell’s 


42 


BULL  EUN". 


mistake — a mistake  which,  with  the 
light  we  now  enjoy,  we  can  afford  to 
call  fatal.  The  left  wing  of  the  Con- 
federates had  been  turned  and  broken, 
and  was  now  in  full  retreat.  We  have 
already  given  a general  view  of  the 
ground  on  which  the  opposing  forces 
were  encamped ; and  we  have  already, 
in  a passing  Avay,  referred  to  Young’s 
Branch.  At  this  point,  it  will  be  well 
for  the  reader  to  form  an  accurate  con- 
ception of  Young’s  Branch  or  Creek  and 
the  plateau  on  which  the  final  struggle 
took  place.  Young’s  Branch  Hows  from 
the  west  in  a valley  which  forms  a cui-ve 
concave  to  the  south,  and  joins  Bull 
Bun  a short  distance  below  the  Stone 
Bridge.  It  was  down  the  northern 
slope  of  this  valley  that  the  national 
troops  had  descended.  It  was  up  the 
southern  slope  that  the  Confederates 
were  being  driven.  On  the  summit  of 
this  southern  slope,  and  about  the 
height  of  a hundred  feet,  there  is  a 
j)iece  of  table  land  or  plateau,  oblong 
ill  form,  a mile  in  length  from  northeast 
to  southwest  and  about  half-a-niile  in 
width.  On  the  eastern  and  southern 
brows  of  this  plateau,  there  is  a pine 
forest;  while  to  the  west  there  is  a 
broad  belt  of  oaks  through  which  runs 
the  Sudley  road.  On  the  plateau  there 
were  three  houses — Bobinson’s  to  the 
north,  Henry’s  to  the  southwest  of  Bob- 
inson’s, and  Lewis’s  or  the  “Portico,” 
as  it  was  called,  still  'further  to  the 
south.  Across  the  Warrenton  turnpike 
and  up  towards  this  plateau,  the  defeat- 
ed Confederates  rushed ; and  by  the  aid 
of  Colonel  Hampton’s  splendid  legion, 
which  had  come  from  Bichmond  too 


late  to  take  part  in  the  furious  struggle, 
the  retreat  was  conducted  in  good  or- 
der. Up  towards  the  plateau  McDowell 
pursued  his  fiying  antagonists.  When 
Bee’s  discomfited  troops  reached  the 
summit  of  the  slope,  there  stood  a full 
brigade,  solid,  strong  and  immovable, 
in  line,  and  ready  for  battle.  It  was 
the  brigade  of  General  T.  J.  Jackson 
who  had  just  arrived  and  taken  a posi- 
tion behind  Bee.  “They  are  beating 
us  back,”  exclaimed  Bee.  “ Well,  sir,” 
said  Jackson,  with  the  utmost  coolness, 
“we  will  give  them  the  bayonet.”  Bee 
rallied  his  men.  “ Form  ! form  ! ” he 
cried.  “ There’s  Jackson,  standing  like 
a stone  wall.”  The  words  were  electric. 
“ Stonewall  Jackson,”  shouted  the  sol- 
diers. The  name  which  was  yet  to  be 
a watchword  and  a i*allying  ciy  on  many 
a bloody  battle  field,  was  from  that 
moment  immortal.  The  circumstance 
turned  the  tide  of  battle.  In  the  opin- 
ion of  many,  if  McDowell,  instead  of 
pursuing  the  Confederates  up  to  the 
hill  forest,  had  moved  direct  for  Manas- 
sas Junction,  the  day  would  have  been 
decided  and  the  victory  his.  This  of 
course  implies  that  the  effect  of  “ Stone- 
wall” Jackson’s  stubborn  resistance 
checked  the  tide  of  victory  which  had 
already  set  in  in  McDowell’s  favor,  and 
gave. the  Confederates  tlie  opportunity 
which  they  needed.  We  incline  to  this 
view  of  the  case ; but  we  are  unwilling 
to  forget  that  we  judge  the  situation 
with  a larger  knowledge  than  McDowell 
at  the  time  possessed.  He  was  ignor- 
ant of  the  position  of  General  Jackson; 
and  even  if  he  had  known  that  such  a 
force  under  such  a man  stood  firm  and 


THE  SECOND  PHASE  OF  THE  BATTLE. 


43 


fresh  on  the  heights,  he  might  have 
doubted  whether  a routed  army  could 
be  so  easily  checked  and  forced  to  turn 
around  and  face  the  pursuing  foe. 

^ It  was  noon.  The  heat  had  become 
intense.  Clouds  of  dust  and  smoke 
filled  the  air  and  blinded  the  assailants 
as  they  rushed  up  the  sloping  hillside. 
Johnston  and  Beauregard,  alarmed  by 
the  heavy  firing,  and  by  the  intelligence 
which  they  had  received  of  the  success- 
ful movements  of  the  national  troop'^, 
ordered  Generals  Holmes,  Early  and 
Ewell  to  hurry  forward  with  their 
troops  in  the  direction  of  the  sound  of 
the  battle,  while  they  themselves  gal- 
loped from  their  position,  four  miles 
distant,  to  the  plateau.  They  found 
upon  it  a force  of  seven  thousand  men, 
with  fourteen  guns ; but  they  were  well 
sheltered  in  a dense  thicket  of  pines. 
The  battle  was  all  but  lost;  the  situa- 
tion was  desperate ; but  the  brigades 
of  Holmes  and  Eai’ly  and  Ewell  and 
Bonham,  with  the  batteries  of  Pendle- 
ton and  Alburtis,  would  soon  be  on 
hand.  Johnston  rallied  the  shattered 
regiments  on  the  right ; Beauregard 
those  on  the  left.  This  done  and  some- 
thing like  order  restored,  Beauregard 
took  command  of  the  field,  and  John- 
ston retired  and  established  his  head- 
quarters at  the  house  of  Mr.  Lewis, 
called  “The  Portico,”  from  which  he 
had  a full  view  of  the  entire  field  of 
battle,  and  where  he  could  exercise  a 
general  supervision.  When  the  battle 
entered  upon  its  second  phase  and  the 
struggle  began  for  the  possession  of  the 
plateau,  the  Confederate  strength  was 
increased  to  ten  thousand  men  and 


twenty-two  guns.  It  was  discovered 
that  at  the  lower  fords  nothing  was  in- 
tended by  the  enemy.  Every  available 
man  was,  therefore,  hurried  forward  to 
the  “focus  of  the  fight.” 

On  the  national  side,  the  most  victor- 
ous  measures  were  adopted  to  make  the 
attack  a success.  It  was  felt  that  the 
Confederates  had  an  immense  advant- 
age in  the  position  which  they  occupied. 
To  drive  them  from  that  position  was 
the  task  now  on  hand.  The  attacking 
force  consisted  of  five  brigades.  Porter 
being  in  command  on  the  right,  Frank- 
lin and  Wilcox  in  the  centre,  and  Sher- 
man and  Keyes  on  the  left.  Howard’s 
brigade  was  upon  the  Pun.  Burnside’s 
brigade,  whose  ammunition  had  been 
exhausted  in  the  morning  battle,  had 
been  withdrawn  into  a wood  for  the 
purpose  of  being  supplied,  and  had  not 
yet  returned  to  the  scene  of  action. 
Schenck  was  on  hand  and  ready  to  cross 
the  bridge.  With  the  attacking  force 
were  Griffin’s,  Pickett’s  and  Arnold’s 
batteries,  and  a body  of  cavalry  under 
Major  Palmer.  The  entire  strength 
was  thirteen  thousand  men  and  sixteen 
guns.  Eighteen  thousand  men  still  re- 
mained on  the  west  side  of  Bull  Pun. 
The  five  brigades,  the  batteries  and  the 
cavalry  moved  boldly  and  steadily  up 
the  slope  south  of  the  Warrenton  turn- 
pike, McDowell  being  present  in  per- 
son, with  Heintzelman,  who  acted  as 
his  chief  lieutenant  on  the  held.  They 
were  exposed  to  a raking  hre  from  the 
Confederate  batteries.  Onward,  how- 
ever, they  pressed ; and  having  out- 
hanked  the  enemy,  they  were  soon  in 
possession  of  the  western  edge  of  the 


44 


BULL  RUN. 


plateau.  A little  to  the  southeast  of 
the  Henry  house,  to  which  we  have  al- 
ready made  reference,  there  was  a swell 
of  rising  ground,  which,  it  was  seen,  at 
once,  commanded  the  field  of  action.  It 
was  the  key  of  the  position.  Whoever 
held  it  had  command  of  the  entire  pla- 
teau. Orders  were  given  to  E-ickett’s 
and  Griffin’s  batteries  to  advance  and 
plant  themselves  upon  it.  The  bat- 
teries were  supported  by  the  Eleventh 
New  York,  the  Twenty-seventh  New 
York,  Fifth  and  Eleventh  Massachu- 
setts, the  Second  Minnesota,  and  Cor- 
coran’s Sixty-ninth.  The  attack  was 
bravely  made.  The  artillery,  with  the 
New  York  Eleventh  (Ellsworth’s  Fire 
Zouaves),  who  were  in  immediate  sup- 
port of  the  batteries,  in  the  face  of  a 
terrific  cannonade  moved  gallantly  for- 
ward. All  of  a sudden,  an  Alabama 
regiment  emerged  from  behind  a clump 
of  pines,  and  poured  a deadly  fire  on 
their  flank.  This  surprise  was  all  the 
more  demoralizing  that  the  attacking 
regiment  was  mistaken  at  first  for  one 
of  their  own.  When  staggering  under 
this  deluge  of  fire  in  front  and  on  hank, 
two  companies  of  Stuart’s  Black  Horse 
Cavalry  rushed  furiously  upon  their 
rear.  The  reffiment  was  ruined.  The 

O 

batteries,  the  horses  of  which  had  been 
killed,  were  in  utmost  peril.  Other 
regiments  were  sent  forward,  but  in 
vain.  Three  times  were  tlje  batteries 
overrun  by  Confederates ; and  three 
times  were  the  troops  of  the  enemy  re- 
pulsed and  the  batteries  reclaimed. 
While  this  struggle  was  raging  with  al- 
ternate success  and  defeat  on  the  right, 
an  attempt  was  also  being  made  by 


McDowell’s  left  to  carry  the  plateau. 
The  fighting  in  this  direction  had  been 
equally  severe.  Sherman  had  been  or- 
dered to  charge  the  batteries  of  the 
Confederates  with  his  entire  brigade, 
and  sweep  them  from  the  hill.  In  the 
encounter  the  riflemen  of  Quimby’s 
Thirteenth  New  York,  the  Seventy- 
ninth  (Scotch)  New  York,  and  the  Sixty- 
ninth  (Irish)  New  York,  especially  dis- 
tinguished themselves.  The  gallant 
Cameron  of  the  Seventy-ninth  was 
killed  when,  for  the  third  time,  he  led 
his  brave  Highlanders  to  the  charge. 
Corcoran,  of  the  Sixty-ninth,  had  his 
horse  shot  under  him,  and  was  made 
prisoner.  Keyes  had  little  better  suc- 
cess on  the  extreme  leffc.  He  had  forced 
his  way  up  the  slope,  and  reached  the 
Bobinson  house;  but  the  fire  from  the 
enemy’s  batteries  was  so  severe  that  he 
was  compelled  to  retire. 

The  critical  moment  had  arrived.  The 
slaughter  had  been  terrible  on  both 
sides.  The  Union  advance  had  been 
checked;  but  the  Confederate  strength 
was  well-nigh  exhausted.  Several  of 
their  best  officers  were  killed,  and  not  a 
few  were  disabled.  Bee  and  Baxter  had 
fallen  in  the  heat  of  the  fight,  near  the 
Henry  house.  Hampton  and  Jackson 
had  been  wounded.  Beauregard  had  his 
horse  shot  under  him.  McDowell  had 
still  two  brigades  fresh,  besides  Burn- 
side’s, in  reserve.  It  was  now  three 
o’clock,  and  there  was  no  appearance 
of  Early  and  his  three  fresh  regiments. 
The  order  had  been  sent  him  at  eleven, 
but  by  some  mishap  it  had  not  reached 
him  till  two.  “ Oh,  for  four  regiments,” 
cried  Johnston  to  Colonel  Cocke.  His 


AN  INGLORIOUS  ROUT. 


45 


wish  was  soon  to  be  gratified.  The 
mistake  made  by  Patterson  in  allowing 
Johnston’s  army  to  escape  from  Win- 
chester is  now  to  be  revealed.  A cloud 
of  dust  was  seen  in  the  direction  of 
Manassas  Gap.  Johnston’s  first  fear 
was  that  it  might  be  Patterson ; but 
no;  it  was  the  remainder  of  his  own 
army,  Elzey’s  brigade,  led  by  Kirby 
Smith.  They  were  about  three  thousand 
strong.  Hearing  the  sound  of  battle, 
they  had  stopped  the  cars  before  they 
reached  the  Junction.  Hurrying  up 
at  the  supreme  moment,  they  struck 
the  National  right  full  on  its  fiank.  The 
fate  of  the  day  was  decided.  The  bat- 
tle was  won.  The  cross  fire  of  the 
newly  arrived  troops  was  irresistible. 
The  cry  went  up  from  the  National 
ranks,  ‘‘Here’s  Johnston  from  the  Val- 
ley.” In  a moment  the  battle  was  ended. 
There  was  no  more  fight  in  the  Union 
men.  Helter  skelter  they  ran  down  the 
plateau.  It  was  not  a repulse.  It  w^as 
a rout.  Never  was  victory  more  com- 
plete. Never  was  rout  more  disgrace- 
ful. In  vain  did  McDowell  try  to  rally 
his  men.  They  would  not,  they  could 
not,  hear.  At  Cub  Run  the  rout  be- 
came a panic.  Arms  and  all  encum- 
brances were  flung  away.  Everything 
was  left  on  the  field.  Soldiers,  citizens 
and  camp  followers  rushed  to  Centre- 
ville  and  thence  on  to  Washington,  there 
to  describe  to  the  astonished  and  bewil- 
dered multitude  another  than  the  holi- 
day scene  which  some  of  them  had 
gone  forth  to  witness.  At  night  Jeffer- 
son Davis,  who  had  witnessed  the  great- 
er part  of  the  fight,  telegraphed  to  his 
Congress,  “Night  has  closed  upon  a 


hard  fought  field.  Our  forces  were  vic- 
torious. The  enemy  was  routed,  and 
fled  precipitately,  abandoning  a large 
amount  of  arms,  ammunition,  knapsacks 
and  baggage.  The  ground  was  strewed 
for  miles  with  those  killed,  and  the 
farm  houses  around  were  filled  with 

wounded Our  force  was  fifteen 

thousand ; that  of  the  enemy  estimated 
at  thirty  thousand.”  The  report  did 
not  speak  the  truth ; but  it  bespoke  the 
triumph  of  the  situation — the  pride  and 
spirit  of  the  man. 

The  loss  on  the  part  of  the  Confede- 
rates was  378  killed,  1489  wounded. 
The  national  loss  was  481  killed,  101 1 
wounded,  and  1460  prisoners. 

Not  one  of  all  the  battles  of  the  war 
has  been  so  variously,  and  in  some  in- 
stances so  unjustly,  commented  on  as 
Bull  Run.  It  is  not  our  business  in 
these  pages  to  combat  or  endorse  the 
opinions  which  have  been  expressed. 
There  are,  however,  some  things  which, 
in  justice  to  the  one  side  and  the  other, 
must  be  said.  It  is  not  to  be  denied 
that  on  both  sides  there  was  displayed 
much  bravery  and  not  a little  skill. 
Never,  perhaps,  before,  in  the  whole 
history  of  the  world,  was  such  fighting 
done  by  comparatively  raw  and  inexpe- 
rienced men.  On  the  part  of  the  South, 
the  battle  was  skillfully  fought  and  fair- 
ly won.  In  a better  cause,  Beauregard 
and  Johnston  would  have  covered  them- 
selves with  glory.  On  the  part  of  the 
North,  there  was  certainly  bad  manage- 
ment. Some  serious  blunders  were 
made.  General  Scott  blundered  by  the 
disposition  he  made  of  his  forces.  He 
had  eighty  thousand  men  at  his  dis- 


46 


MINOR  BATTLES. 


posal ; he  had  divided  them  into  three 
parts,  and  had  foolishly  allowed  one  of 
these  parts  to  be  flung  unsustained  on 
the  enemy.  Patterson  blundered  when 
he  allowed  Johnston  to  escape  from 
him  at  Winchester.  He  blundered  still 
more  when  he  remained  idle  in  his  po- 
sition after  he  discovered  that  the  ene- 
my had  escaped.  Patterson  has  since 
endeavored  to  explain ; but,  in  spite  of 
all  explanation,  he  will  forever  remain 
accused  before  the  bar  of  history  of 
culpable  inaction.  McDowell  blundered 
by  not  taking  pains  to  make  himself 
master  of  the  topographical  features  of 
the  ground  before  he  commenced  his 
march  fi'om  before  Washington.  He 
blundered  on  three  different  occasions 
by  losing  time.  He  blundered  most  of 
,all  in  not  bringing  his  three  fresh  bri- 
gades into  action  before  the  arrival  of 
Kirby  Smith.  Even  at  the  last  critical 
moment,  the  appearance  of  so  many 


fresh  troops  might  have  prevented  the 
rout,  and  nailed  victory  to  the  Union 
standards.  The  retreat  was  unusually 
well  conducted ; but  this  was  due  large- 
ly to  the  fact  that  the  Confederates  were 
too  exhausted  and  too  fearful  to  con- 
tinue the  pursuit.  The  battle  of  Bull 
Run,  decisive  as  it  was,  settled  nothing. 
The  South  gained  the  victory,  but  they 
failed  in  their  purpose.  Washington 
was  more  safe  than  before.  The  South 
was  jubilant.  The  North  was  humbled ; 
but  it  was  also  more  determined  than 
ever  to  prosecute  the  war.  It  was  evi- 
dent to  all  that  a protracted  struggle 
was  before  the  country.  Both  sides 
began  to  raise  and  organize  armies  on 
a gigantic  scale.  President  Lincoln 
called  for  half  a million  of  men. 
General  McDowell  was  removed ; and 
General  George  B.  McClellan  was 
placed  in  command  of  the  army  around 
W ashington. 


CHAPTER  IV.  • 

Importance  of  some  of  the  Minor  Battles. — Where  they  were  Fought. — The  Border  States. — Armed  Neutrality.  — 
Lincoln’s  Message. — Maryland  and  Delaware. — Virginia,  the  Focus  of  the  Rebellion. — Occupation  of  Harper’s 
Ferry. — The  Capture  of  Romney. — Beverley. — Carrack’s  Ford. — Change  of  Commanders. — McClellan. — His 
Past  Career. — Rosecrans. — Floyd. — Carnifex  Ferry. — Drainsville. — Ball’s  Blutf. — A Butchery. — Death  of 
Colonel  Baker. — Fremont  in  Missouri. — Dug  Springs. — Lyon. — Sigel. — Lyon  Wounded. — Colonel  Mitchell 
Killed. — Battle  of  Wilson’s  Creek. — Capitulation  of  Lexington. — Halleck  Supersedes  Fremont. — Kentucky. — 
Governor  Magoffin. — Kentucky  in  favor  of  the  Union. — Lincoln’s  Reply  to  Magoffin. — The  Young  Men  of 
Kentucky. — The  Older  Men. — Kentucky  Forced  into  Secession. — General  Polk. — Fort  Columbus. — Polk’s 
Invasion  of  Kentucky. — Grant  in  Command  at  Cairo. — Grant’s  Determination. — His  Proclamation. — Battle  of 
Belmont. — The  Attack. — Terrible  Fire  from  Fort  Columbus. — The  Victory  of  the  Nationals. — The  License  of 
the  Soldiers. — The  Victors  Compelled  to  Retreat. — Showers  of  Bullets. — The  Retreat  Successfully  Made. — 
The  Confederates  Claim  the  Victory. — It  Might  Have  Been  Different. — General  Grant  Learns  a Lesson. 


The  year  1861,  subsequent  to  the 

battle  of  Bull  Run,  was  not  mark- 
1861(  ^ 

ed  by  any  great  or  decisive  bat- 
tle. There  were,  however,  numerous 


engagements  of  a minor  character,  each 
of  which  was  attended  wdth  conse- 
quences of  greater  or  less  importance, 
and  all  of  wRich  tended  to  fan  into 


ARMED  NEUTRALITY. 


47 


more  furious  flame  that  growing  war 
sentiment  which  was  soon  to  And  devel- 
opment on  a more  gigantic  scale.  These 
engagements  can  hardly  be  said  to  have 
been  the  result  of  any  general  plan,  or 
to  have  formed  essential  links  in  the 
chain  of  events  which  were  soon  to  cul- 
minate in  what  may  be  called  the  great 
campaigns.  But  because  of  the  hero- 
ism with  which  they  were  illustrated, 
and  the  examples  of  self-sacrifice  which 
they  called  forth,  as  well  as  for  the  in- 
fluence which  they  exerted  in  their  sev- 
eral sections,  they  cannot,  in  a work 
like  this,  be  passed  over  in  silence. 

These  minor  battles  occurred  princi- 
pally in  the  border  States,  Kentucky, 
Missouri,  and  Virginia.  We  have  seen 
already  that  the  five  border  States,  in- 
cluding, in  addition  to  those  just  men- 
tioned, Maryland  and  Delaware,  were 
eagerly  coveted  by  both  North  and 
South.  It  was  evident  from  the  first 
that  in  those  States  the  great  struggle 
for  supremacy  should  take  place.  With 
the  border  States  secured,  and  bearing 
the  principal  burden  of  the  war,  it  was 
the  hope  of  the  Southern  leaders  that 
the  cotton  crop  might  be  raised  without 
molestation.  It  might  still  be  possible 
for  the  National  government  to  establish 
a blockade  by  sea  and  by  river;  but 
England  needed  cotton ; and  the  South 
counted  with  confidence  alike  on  En^- 
lish  sympathy  and  on  English  necessity. 

Situated  midway  between  the  rival  in- 
fluences of  North  and  South,  and  placed 
necessarily  in  the  very  front  of  the 
conflict,  it  was  very  natural  that  among 
the  inhabitants  of  those  States  there 
should  be  great  division  of  sentiment. 


Every  effort  was  made  by  the  Southern 
leaders  to  excite  the  slaveholding  inter- 
est, by  making  it  appear  that  the  North 
had  at  last  entered  upon  a crusade 
against  slavery,  and  that  the  Republican 
party,  now  in  power  at  Washington, 
were  bent  upon  the  most  tyrannical 
measures.  The  National  government 
was  just  as  anxious  that  the  border 
States  should  remain  steadfast  in  their 
loyalty.  How  to  deal  with  slavery  was 
the  great  difficulty  which  lay  in  the  way 
of  the  North.  To  pronounce  against 
slavery,  it  was  felt,  would  be  to  fling 
the  entire  slaveholding  interest  into  the 
arms  of  the  Confederacy.  All  through 
the  summer  of  1861  every  precaution 
was  taken  to  avoid  giving  offence  to 
the  slaveholding  interest.  As  the  sit- 
uation became  more  pressing,  different 
views  began  to  be  entertained  and  ex- 
pressed by  those  in  power.  General 
McClellan,  who  was  in  command  in 
Northeastern  Virginia,  declared  it  to  be 
his  purpose  not  only  not  to  interfere 
with  the  slaves,  but  to  crush  with  a 
hand  of  iron  any  attempt  made  by 
them  at  insurrection.  General  Butler, 
on  the  other  hand,  who  was  in  command 
at  Fortress  Monroe,  decided,  on  the  same 
day,  to  regard  them  as  “ contraband  ” 
of  war.  Armed  neutrality  found  favor 
with  not  a few ; but  President  Lincoln, 
in  his  message  to  Congress  at  its  extra 
session  in  July,  clearly  pointed  out  that 
armed  neutrality  would  be  more  a gain 
to  the  South  than  to  the  North.  “ In 
the  Border  States,  so  called,  in  fact,  the 
Middle  States,”  he  said,  there  are 
those  who  favor  a policy  which  they 
call  ‘ armed  neutrality  ’ ; that  is,  an  arm- 


48 


MINOR  BATTLES. 


ing  of  these  States  to  prevent  the  Union 
forces  passing  one  way  or  the  disunion 
the  other,  over  their  soil.  This  would 
be  disunion  completed.  Figuratively 
speaking;  it  would  be  building  an  im- 
passable wall  along  the  line  of  separa- 
tion— and  yet  not  quite  an  impassable 
one,  for  under  the  guise  of  neutrality,  it 
would  tie  the  hands  of  Union  men,  and 
freely  pass  supplies  froQi  among  them 
to  the  insurrectionists,  which  could  not 
be  done  if  they  were  open  enemies.  At 
a stroke,  it  would  take  all  trouble  off 
the  hands  of  secession,  except  only  what 
proceeds  from  the  internal  blockade. 
It  would  do  for  the  disunionists  that 
which  of  all  things  they  most  desire — 
feed  them  well,  and  give  them  disunion 
without  a struggle  of  their  own.  It 
recognizes  no  fidelity  to  the  Constitu- 
tion, no  obligation  to  maintain  the 
Union.” 

The  geographical  positions  of  Mary- 
land and  Delaware,  as  well  as  their 
special  interests,  prevented  theui  mak- 
ing any  very  strong  demonstration  of 
Southern  sympathy.  Delaware  was  too 
weak  and  too  thoroughly  hemmed  in  to 
be  allowed  to  think  either  of  secession 
or  of  neutrality ; and  General  Butler’s 
vigorous  efforts,  at  the  commencement 
of  the  war,  had  effectually  secured 
Maryland  to  the  Union.  It  was  qtlite 
otherwise  with  Virginia,  Missouri  and 
Kentucky. 

Virginia,  as  we  have  seen,  and  as  had 
been  evident  from  the  first,  had  become 
the  focus  of  the  rebellion.  The  Rich- 
mond authorities  had  seized  Harper’s 
Ferry,  immediately  upon  the  passage  of 
the  ordinance  of  secession.  Occupying 


it  with  as  large  a force  as  they  could 
spare  for  the  purpose,  they  held  the  line 
of  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  Railroad,  and 
thus  cut  off  all  communication  be- 
tween Western  Virginia  and  Washing- 
ton along  that  line.  Ko  movement  was 
made  by  the  National  government  until 
the  ordinance  of  secession  had  been  rat- 
ified, the  general  feeling  at  Wasliington 
being  that  every  care  should  be  taken 
to  do  nothing  which  was  capable  of 
being  interpreted  as  interference  with 
the  Border  States. 

Immediately  after  the  ratification  of 
the  ordinance.  General  George  B.  Mc- 
Clellan, to  whom  had  been  as-  May 
signed  the  command  of  the  De-  H. 
partment  of  the  Ohio,  including  West- 
ern Viiginia,  was  ordered  to  cross  the 
Ohio  and  advance  along  the  line  of  the 
Baltimoi’e  and  Ohio  Railroad,  as  far  as 
Harper’s  Ferry.  Having  issued  ad- 
dresses to  the  people  and  to  his  soldiers, 
in  one  of  which  he  denounced  “ the  in- 
famous attempt  of  the  traitorous  con- 
spiracy dignified  by  this  name  of  the 
Southern  Confederacy,”  he  moved  for- 
ward and  occupied  Parkersburg,  the 
terminus  of  the  railroad  on  the  Ohio 
River.  There  was  a Confederate  force 
at  Grafton  Junction,  not  far  distant. 
There  was  another  Confederate  force  of 
12,000  men  at  Romney.  In  addition  to 
these.  General  Joseph  E.  Johnston,  at 
the  head  of  a large  army,  lay  at  Har- 
per’s Ferry. 

The  force  at  Grafton  was  under  the 
command  of  General  G.  A.  Porterfield. 
On  the  appearance  of  McClellan  at  Par- 
kersburg, Porterfield  issued  an  address 
in  which  he  called  on  the  people  to  arise 


CAREACK’S  FORD. 


49 


and  resist  the  intruders,  who,  coming 
from  other  States,  sought  to  rule  over 
them.  McClellan  having  ordered  an 
advance  to  Philippi,  Porterfield  was 
pressed  back,  first  to  Beverley  and  then 
to  Huttonsville,  where  he  was  joined 
by  Governor  Wise,  who  came  up  with 
lar^e  reinforcements  and  assumed  com- 
mand.  In  this  engagement  at  Philippi, 
Colonel  Kelly,  who  performed  deeds  of 
great  valor,  was  severely  wounded. 

In  the  meantime  an  encounter  took 
place  at  Romney,  which  shed  some  little 
glory  on  the  National  arms.  Early  in 
June  General  Patterson,  who  was  in 
command  of  the  Department  of  Penn- 
sylvania, was  making  preparations  for 
an  attack  on  Maryland  Heights,  which 
overlook  and  command  Harper’s  Ferry. 
Colonel  Lewis  Wallace  had  been  di- 
rected to  join  Patterson.  As  he  drew 
near  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  Railroad, 
June  Wallace  learned  that  the  Confed- 
H*  erates  were  assembled  in  some 
strength  at  Romney.  In  twenty-four 
hours  Wallace  had  accomplished  a 
march  of  eighty-seven  miles,  forty-six 
of  which  were  on  foot.  Coming  up  with 
the  Confederates  at  Romney,  some  se- 
vere fighting  took  place.  The  Confed- 
erates were  driven  from  the  place;  and 
Johnston  was  so  alarmed  that  he  evacu- 
ated Harper’s  Ferry,  having  first  burned 
the  railroad  across  the  Potomac,  spiked 
the  guns  he  could  not  carry  off,  and 
obstructed  in  every  possible  way  the 
railroad  and  the  canal.  W hatever  glory 
resulted  from  the  capture  of  Romney 
must  be  set  down  to  the  credit  of 
Colonel  Lewis  Wallace.  It  was  he  who 
conceived  and  carried  out  the  enterprize. 


The  evacuation  of  Harper’s  Ferry,  if 
not  directly  caused  by  it,  was  at  least 
an  almost  immediate  and  perhaps  neces- 
sary consequence. 

McClellan’s  forces  were  still  at  Graf- 
ton. His  army,  since  his  encounter 
with  Porterfield,  had  been  greatly  in- 
creased ; and  by  the  4th  of  July  he  had 
under  him  twenty  thousand  men.  Por- 
terfield had  been  superseded  by  General 
Garnett,  an  officer  who  had  won  dis- 
tinction in  the  Mexican  war.  The  Con- 
federates were  afraid  that  McClellan 
might  make  an  effort  to  push  his  way 
through  some  of  the  mountain  passes 
which  lead  into  the  Shenandoah  Valley, 
and  so  effect  a junction  with  Patterson. 
Garnett  was  ordered  so  to  dispose  of 
his  forces  as  to  guard  the  mountain 
gaps  and  make  this  junction  impossible. 
Garnett,  with  the  main  body  of  his  ar- 
my, had  taken  a position  at  Laurel  Hill, 
near  Beverley.  A detachment  un-  ju|y 
der  Colonel  Pegram  was  stationed 
at  Rich  Mountain.  McClellan  saw  that 
his  forces  greatly  outnumbered  those  of 
the  enemy,  and  concluded  to  take  action 
at  once.  On  the  11th  of  July,  jipy 
therefore,  Rosecrans,  with  eight-  H. 
een  hundred  men,  fell  upon  the  detach- 
ment, which  was  about  nine  hundred 
strong.  Pegram  was  put  to  flight,  and 
lost  nearly  half  of  his  men.  McClellan 
now  came  up  with  his  main  army. 
Garnett,  who  had  been  joined  by  some 
remnants  of  Pegram’s  force,  offered  re- 
sistance ; but  his  rear  being  exposed  to 
Rosecrans,  he  was  speedily  compelled 
to  abandon  his  camp  and  his  cannon 
and  fall  back  towards  Beverley.  Mc- 
Clellan, however,  had  reached  that  place 


50 


MINOE  BATTLES. 


before  him ; and  Garnett  turned  his 
face  from  the  foe  and  made  a precipi- 
tate flight  toward  the  north.  Pegram, 
cut  olf  from  all  support  and  reduced  to 
great  extremities,  having  been  two  days 
without  food,  surrendered  with  six  hun- 
dred of  his  men.  Garnett  was  pursued 
and  overtaken  by  General  Morris  at 
Carrack’s  Ford.  Here  the  Confederates 
were  brought  to  bay.  Turning  upon 
their  pursuers,  they  offered  a spirited 
resistance.  It  was  impossible,  however, 
to  withstand  the  onward  rush  and  the 
overwhelming  numbers  of  the  triumph- 
ant Nationals.  General  Garnett,  who 
fought  like  a true  hero,  was  shot  through 
the  heart  while  vainly  attempting  to 
rally  his  men.  When  the  general  fell, 
the  Confederates  broke  and  fled.  The 
pursuit  was  continued  for  two  miles, 
when  the  exhausted  troops  were  re- 
called. 

Before  proceeding  with  our  narrative, 
it  is  necessary  to  notice  certain  changes 
which  took  place  in  the  principal  com- 
mands of  the  army.  General  George  B. 
McClellan,  in  his  campaign  in  Western 
Virginia,  had  been  singularly  successful. 
Hitherto  he  had  been  the  most  fortunate 
or  the  most  skilful  of  all  the  generals 
of  the  North.  After  the  battle  of  Bull 
Bun,  there  was  a universal  desire  that 
he  should  take  the  place  of  McDowell 
and  reorganize  the  shattered  army 
which  was  principally  depended  upon 
for  the  protection  of  the  capital.  On  the 
July  25th  of  July  McClellan  took  com- 
25.  mand  of  the  Departments  of 
Washington  and  of  Northeastern  Vir- 
ginia, his  head-quarters  being  at  Wash- 
ington City.  At  the  time  of  his  ap- 


pointment to  this  high  position  McClel- 
lan was  only  thirty-five  years  of  age. 
He  was  born  in  Philadelphia  in  1826. 
At  the  age  of  sixteen  he  entered  the 
Academy  at  West  Point,  where,  among 
others  who  rose  to  distinction  on  both 
sides  during  the  war,  he  had  for  fellow 
students  Stonewall  ” Jackson  and  A. 
P.  Hill.  After  four  years’  study  at 
West  Point,  he  graduated  as  second- 
lieutenant  of  engineers.  Before  the 
close  of  the  Mexican  war  he  had  won  his 
captaincy.  His  Manual  for  the  Army, 
and  his  Introduction  to  the  Bayonet 
Exercise,  published  a few  years  after- 
wards, and  while  stationed  at  West 
Point  as  director  of  field  labors  and  in- 
structor of  infantry,  gave  proof  at  once 
of  his  military  skill  and  of  his  devotion 
to  his  profession.  Having  filled  various 
military  positions  under  the  govern- 
ment, he  was  appointed  in  1855  one  of 
the  United  States  Military  Commission- 
ers to  the  Crimea.  His  report,  which 
contained  some  sharp  criticisms  on  the 
operations  before  Sevastopol,  was  gen- 
erally well  received,  and  showed  that 
he  had  studied  the  art  of  war  to  no 
small  advantage.  Some  years  before 
the  war  broke  out  he  had  resigned  his 
commission,  and  occupied  himself  with 
the  management  of  railroads.  He  had 
been  three  years  vice-president  of  the 
Illinois  Central ; and  at  the  beginning 
of  the  year  1861  he  was  general  super- 
intendent of  the  Ohio  and  Mississippi. 
The  war  furnished  him  the  opportunity 
for  which  he  had  been  longing.  His 
successful  career  in  Western  Virginia 
fully  justified  his  promotion  in  eluly; 
and  his  appointment  a little  later,  on 


CARNIFEX  FERRY. 


51 


the  occasion  of  the  resignation  of  Gen- 
eral Scott,  as  commander-in-chief  of  the 
armies  of  the  United  States,  was  hailed 
with  universal  satisfaction. 

After  the  encounter  at  Carrack’s 
Ford,  McClellan  in  his  despatch  to  the 
government  was  able  to  make  the  proud 
boast:  ^^We  have  completely  annihi- 
lated the  enemy  in  Western  Virginia. 
Our  loss  is  about  13  killed  and  not 
more  than  40  wounded,  while  the  en- 
emy’s loss  is  not  far  from  200  killed ; 
and  th§  number  of  prisoners  we  have 
taken  will  amount  to  at  least  1000. 
We  have  captured  seven  of  the  enemy’s 
guns  in  all.”  There  was  still,  however, 
some  hard  work  to  be  done  before  the 
campaign  was  completed.  On  the  ap- 
pointment of  General  McClellan  to  the 
command  of  the  Federal  forces  on  the 
Potomac,  General  Rosecrans  succeeded 
him  and  took  charge  of  the  troops 
which  had  done  so  well  in  W estern  Vir- 
ginia. Rosecrans  was  a graduate  of 
W est  Point ; and  for  four  years,  from 
1843  to  1847,  he  had  filled  some  of  the 
most  important  chairs  at  that  institu- 
tion. At  the  outbreak  of  the  war  he 
was  engaged  in  business;  but  he  lost 
no  time  in  volunteering  his  services ; 
and  to  his  skill  and  energy  not  a little 
of  the  success  which  had  attended  the 
army  of  Western  Virginia  was  due. 

General  J.  B.  Floyd,  formerly  secre- 
tary of  war  under  Buchanan’s  adminis- 
tration, had,  since  the  death  of  Garnett, 
who  was  killed  at  Carrack’s  Ford,  as- 
sumed the  command  of  the  Confederate 
forces.  A plan  of  campaign  had  been 
agreed  upon  at  Richmond ; and  it  was 
confidently  expected  that  the  Confede- 


rates would  be  able  not  only  to  drive 
the  Federals  out  of  Western  Virginia, 
but  to  menace  both  Pennsylvania  and 
Ohio.  Floyd  was  to  sweep  down  the 
Kanawha  Valley  and  force  Cox  of  Ohio 
beyond  the  border,  while  General  Rob- 
ert E.  Lee,  who  now  appears  for  the 
first  time  prominently  on  the  scene,  was 
to  scatter  the  Union  army  under  Rose- 
crans. The  plan  was  Lee’s ; and  it  has 
been  admitted  by  the  most  competent 
strategists  that  the  rules  of  war,  as 
shown  by  the  finished  drawings,  never 
found  more  perfect  illustration.  The 
scheme,  however,  was  not  to  succeed. 
Floyd,  who,  as  we  have  seen,  had  taken 
the  command  of  the  Confederate  forces 
in  Virginia  after  the  death  of  Garnett, 
moved  forward  with  a view  to  carry 
out  the  part  of  the  plan  assigned  to 
him.  He  relied  with  confidence  on  be- 
ing joined  by  Wise  before  he  encoun-^ 
tered  the  Federals  in  any  force.  He 
had  encountered  Tyler,  and  having  han- 
dled him  somewhat  severely,  scattered 
his  forces.  He  had  hoped  to  gain  the 
rear  of  Cox,  and  inflict  upon  him  simi- 
lar punishment.  But  Rosecrans  was 
hurrying  forward.  Over  the  western 
spurs  of  the  Alleghanies,  through  the 
ravines  and  iip  the  rugged  hillsides,  he 
had,  with  almost  incredible  rapidity, 
led  his  little  band.  At  noon  on  Au?# 
the  9th  of  August  he  had  reached 
the  summit  of  Powell  Mountain,  which 
looks  down  upon  one  of  the  most  beau- 
tiful scenes  of  that  lovely  region.  It 
was  no  time,  however,  to  halt  and 
admire  the  beauties  of  nature.  The 
two  armies  sighted  each  other.  Aug. 
On  the  following  day,  about  three 


LIBRARY 

UNIVERSITY  OF  ILLINOIS 
AT  URBANA- CHAMPAIGN 


52 


MIXOR  BATTLES. 


o’clock  in  the  afterno3n,  the  firing  com- 
menced. For  nearly  four  hours  the  bat- 
tle r^ged,  both  sides  performing  deeds 
of  great  valor.  The  Federal  forces  suf- 
fered severely  at  the  commencement  of 
the  conflict.  Colonel  Lytle  of  the  Ohio 
Tenth  was  wounded  in  the  leg  and 
had  his  horse  shot  under  him.  Colonel 
Iiowe  of  the  Ohio  Twelfth,  while  hurry- 
ing forward  his  regiment,  was  shot 
through  the  head  and  killed  instantly. 
Floyd,  however,  was  outnumbered ; and 
Wise  failing  to  come  to  his  support,  he 
was  unable  to  do  more  than  hold  his 
ground.  At  twilight,  when  McCook’s 
German  brigade,  although  exposed  to 
a terrific  fire,  seemed  on  the  point  of 
carrying  the  Confederate  batteries,  Kose- 
crans,  fearful  for  the  safety  of  his  men, 
ordered  a i*ecall.  The  onward  move- 
ment was  thus  checked  in  mid-career. 
It  was  the  intention  of  Losecrans  to  re- 
sume the  attack  on  the  following  morn- 
Aujr,  ing.  When  the  morning  dawned 
the  enemy  was  gone,  Floyd  hav- 
ing retired  and  taken  a strong  position 
on  Big  Sewell  Mountain,  some  thirty 
miles  distant  from  the  battle  held.  But 
for  the  caution  of  Kosecrans  the  pre- 
vious evening,  the  Confederates  might 
have  been  completely  routed.  As  it 
w^as,  the  battle  at  Carnifex  Ferry  was 
a substantial  victoiy  to  the  Federal 
arms. 

Lee  w^as  not  more  successful  in  carry- 
ing out  his  part  of  the  plan.  At  a 
critical  moment,  when  the  enemy,  25,000 
strong,  had  entrenched  themselves  at 
Big  Sewell  and  called  it  “ Camp  Deh- 
ance,”  and  were  threatening  an  aggres- 
sive movement,  Kosecrans  contrived  to 


effect  a retreat  and  was  not  pursued. 
After  some  other  unimportant  engage- 
ments, winter  intervened  and  the  cam- 
paign was  ended.  Lee  was  recalled  and 
sent  to  take  charge  of  the  coast  defenses 
of  South  Carolina;  Wise  was  ordered  to 
report  at  Richmond,  and  Floyd  was 
sent  to  the  West.  This  campaign  added 
fresh  lustre  to  McClellan’s  name,  who, 
although  he  was  not  personally  in  com- 
mand at  Carnifex  Ferry,  nor  indeed 
since  the  encounter  at  Carrack’s  Ford, 
was  supposed  to  be  giving  a general 
direction.  It  was  temporarily  greatly 
discouraging  to  the  Confederates,  who 
had  expected  much  from  General  Lee. 

Later  in  the  year  a serious  disaster 
befell  the  National  forces  at  Ball’s  BlufP. 
The  Nationals  and  Confederates  were 
confronting  each  other  on  opposite  sides 
of  the  Potomac  between  Washington 
and  Harper’s  Ferry.  A slight  skirmish 
had  occurred  at  the  latter  place  on  the 
8th  of  October.  On  that  occasion  oct. 
the  Nationals,  under  Colonel  J ohn 
W.  Geary,  gained  a decided  advantage. 
About  the  middle  of  the  month.  Gen- 
eral McClellan,  deeming  it  desirable  to 
ascertain  the  Confederate  strength  in 
the  neighborhood  of  Drainsville,  caused 
a reconnoisance  to  be  made  by  General 
McCall.  From  Major-General  Banks, 
whose  troops  held  tbe  river  on  the 
Maryland  side,  from  Darnestown  to 
Williamsport,  McClellan  received  a 
despatch  saying  that  the  enemy  had 
moved  away  from  Leesburg,  the  capital 
of  Loudon  County,  Virginia.  On  the 
strength  of  Banks’  despatch,  McClellan 
notified  General  Stone,  who  was  at 
Poolesville,  of  the  movement  of  McCall, 


BALL’S  BLUFF. 


53 


and  suggested  that  while  keeping  “ a 
good  lookout  on  Leesburg,  a slight  de- 
monstration on  his  part  might  have  the 
effect  of  moving  the  enemy.”  Both 
McCall  and  Stone  acted  promptly  and 
I ft.  desired.  On  the  night  of  the 
20th  Stone  telegraphed  to  the 
chief  that  he  had  made  a feint  of  cross- 
ing the  river  during  the  afternoon,  at 
two  places,  and  that  he  had  sent  out  a 
reconnoitering  party  toward  Leesburg, 
adding,  I have  means  of  crossing  one 
hundred  and  twenty-five  men  once  in 
• ten  minutes,  at  each  of  two  points.” 
This  despatch  brought  no  reply. 

In  obedience  to  instructions  from 
Stone,  Colonel  Devins,  in  two  flat-boats 
from  the  Chesapeake  and  Ohio  Canal, 
carried  over  to  Harrison’s  Island  four  j 
companies  of  his  Massachusetts  Fif-  ! 
teenth.  One  company  was  on  the  island  ! 
already.  A reserve  of  about  three  thou- 
sand men,  including  what  was  called 
the  First  California  Begiment,  under 
Colonel  E.  D.  Baker,  was  held  in  read- 
iness to  co-operate,  should  any  difficulty 
arise.  After  landing  his  troops,  Devins 
sent  a detachment  to  the  Virginia  shore 
to  make  an  exploration  towards  Lees- 
burg. A scouting  party  of  about  twenty 
men,  under  Captain  Philbrick,  having 
ascended  the  steep  bank  on  the  Virginia 
side  opposite  the  island,  and  known  as 
Balks  Bluff,  believed  they  saw  a small 
camp  of  Confederates,  about  a mile 
from  Leesburg.  This  being  made  known 
to  Stone,  he  ordered  Devins  to  land  on 
Ball’s  Bluff,  and  proceed  at  dawn  to 
surprise  the  camp.  The  order  was 
promptly  executed.  He  set  out  about 
midnight.  By  daylight  his  men  had 


all  wmrked  their  way  up  the  wet  and 
slippery  sides  of  the  bluff,  and  stood  on 
the  summit.  Without  delay,  he  ad- 
vanced towards  Leesburg,  in  the  direc- 
tion of  the  supposed  camp;  but  no 
trace  of  the  foe  could  be. seen;  what 
seemed  a camp  in  the  distance  was  only 
an  illusion  due  to  certain  openings  in 
the  woods.  Here  Devins  halted  his  men 
and  sent  to  Stone  for  orders. 

Meanwhile  Devins’  movements  had 
been  carefully  watched  by  the  Confed- 
erates, who,  under  Evans,  lay  in  consid- 
erable force  on  Goose  Creek.  It  was 
not  long  until  the  National  troops  began 
to  have  glimpses  of  the  Confederate 
cavalry  and  riflemen.  Perceiving  that 
the  enemy  were  gathering  around  him, 
Devins,  after  a slight  skirmish,  fell 
back  towards  the  bluff,  and  halted  hiB 
men  in  an  open  field  surrounded  by 
woods.  Here  he  received  orders  to  re- 
main, Stone  promising,  at  the  same  time, 
to  hurry  forward  reinforcements.  About 
noon  a fierce  attack  was  made  upon 
Devins’  little  band  (about  six  hundred 
and  fifty  men)  by  the  Confederates  under 
Colonels  Jenifer  and  Hunton..  Pressed 
by  the  cavalry  in  front  and  by  the  infant- 
ry on  the  left,  Devins  was  compelled  to= 
fall  back  towards  the  edge  of  the  bluff.. 
He  retired  about  sixty  paces,  and  took 
a position  about  half  a mile  in  front  of’ 
Colonel  Lee,  who  had  advanced  and 
occupied  Harrison’s  Island  and  the 
heights  after  the  departure  of  Devine 
in  the  morning.  Meanwhile  Baker, 
who  had  been  ordered  forward  to  rein- 
force Devins,  if  he  judged  such  a course 
desirable,  otherwise  to  withdraw  all 
the  troops  to  the  Maryland  shore,  had 


200 


54 


MINOR  BATTLES. 


arrived  on  the  scene.  In  circumstances 
of  almost  unparalleled  difficulty,  he  had 
succeeded  in  getting  his  men  across  the 
river.  At  a glance  he  saw  that  he  had 
no  choice.  It  was  too  late  to  attempt 
to  withdraw  the  troops  Outranking 
Devins,  he  immediately  took  command, 
and  assumed  the  responsibility  of  carry- 
ing on  the  fight.  He  had  reason  to 
believe  that  McCall  was  close  at  hand  ; 
and  he  naturally  enough  concluded  that 
on  hearing  the  sound  of  musketry  he 
would  hurry  to  the  scene  of  action. 
He  did  not  know  that  McCall,  having 
been  ordered  to  withdraw  his  troops 
from  Drains ville,  was  already  on  his 
way  back  to  his  camp  near  the  Chain 
Bridge,  and  that  General  Smith,  who, 
with  one  of  McCall’s  divisions,  was 
within  supporting  distance,  was  without 
any  special  instructions.  Getting  his 
men  into  battle  order.  Baker  put  forth 
almost  superhuman  efforts  to  resist  the 
attack  of  the  enemy.  But  the  ground 
was  unfavorable,  and  the  opposing 
force  was  strong.  About  three  o’clock 
in  the  afternoon  the  firing  became  gen- 
.eral.  Brarnhall  and  French  had  scarcely 
;got  their  guns  into  position  when  they 
were  both  wounded  and  carried  from 
the  field.  Shortly  afterwards  a greater 
calamity  followed.  Baker,  who  seemed 
everywhere  present,  encouraging  the 
men  by  word  and  deed,  fell  dead  upon 
the  field,  pierced  by  many  bullets.  The 
battle  had  lasted  two  hours.  On  the 
death  of  Baker,  first  Lee,  then  Coggs- 
well,  his  superior,  took  the  control  of 
affairs.  The  situation  had  become  des- 
perate ; and  there  was  no  sign  of  rein- 
forcements. Pressed  on  flank  and  front 


with  an  overwhelming  force,  and  with 
the  deep  waters  of  the  turbulent  river 
in  their  rear,  Coggswell  resolved  to 
move  to  the  left  and  cut  his  way  through 
to  Edwards’  Ferry.  At  this  moment, 
and  just  as  the  movement  was  about  to 
be  made,  the  Tammany  Kegiment,  mis- 
taking a Confederate  officer  for  a Na- 
tional one,  made  a rush  in  the  direction 
indicated  by  his  signs.  Thrown  out  of 
position,  a decimating  fire  was  poured 
upon  the  whole  column  by  the  Thir- 
teenth Mississippi.  CoggswelTs  plan 
was  now  impossible.  The  enemy  was 
closing  in  upon  them  at  every  point. 
A retreat  was  now  ordered  to  Harri- 
son’s Island  and  thence  across  to  the 
Maryland  shore.  The  retreat  soon  be- 
came a rout.  The  Confederates  pressed 
forward,  and  driving  the  Nationals  be- 
fore them  with  bayonet  and  bullet,  they 
quickly  took  possession  of  the  heights. 
Down  the  slippery  sides  of  the  bluff 
the  Nationals  rushed  in  the  wildest  con- 
fusion ; and  while  the  struggling  mass, 
crowding  to  the  water’s  edge^  sought 
for  boats  in  vain,  some  of  them  plunging 
into  the  water  and  attempting  to  swim 
to  the  island,  others  floating  on  logs, 
the  enemy  continued  to  pour  down  up- 
on them  the  most  destructive  fire.  It 
was  no  longer  a battle.  It  was  a butch- 
ery. Of  the  National  troops  at  least 
300  were  killed;  and  more  than  700 
were  wounded  or  made  prisoners.  At 
least  one-half  of  Coggswell’s  command, 
including  himself  and  Colonel  Lee,  fell 
into  the  enemy’s  hands.  Colonel  Devins 
escaped  on  horseback  and  swam  across 
the  river.  Ball’s  Bluff  can  only  be 
regarded  in  the  light  of  a temporary 


WILSON’S  CREEK. 


55 


misfortune.  It  did  not  seriously  atfect 
the  future  of  the  war.  The  mishap 
was  brought  about  partly  by  the  rash- 
ness of  General  Stone  and  partly  by 
the  imperfect  arrangements  made  by 
General  McClellan.  It  was  a misfor- 
tune, however,  redeemed  by  the  bravery 
exhibited  by  the  National  troops.  The 
army  of  the  Potomac  did  much  on  that 
sad  day  to  wipe  out  the  disgrace  in- 
curred by  the  battle  of  Bull  Run.  By 
the  death  of  General  Baker  the  Union 
cause  lost  one  of  its  ablest  men — a 
man  as  brave  in  the  field  as  he  was 
skilful  at  the  bar  and  powerful  in  the 
Senate. 

While  these  events  were  taking  place 
in  Virginia,  there  was  some  severe  fight- 
ing going  on  in  Missouri.  The  Confed- 
erates had  put  forth  their  best  efforts 
to  secure  the  State.  When  the  battle 
of  Bull  Run  was  fought,  General  Lyon, 
who  had  succeeded  General  Harney  in 
the  chief  command  of  the  National  forces 
in  the  West,  was  lying  at  Springfield 
waiting  for  reinforcements.  Meanwhile 
General  John  C.  Fremont,  who  had 
been  prominently  before  the  people  as 
the  Republican  candidate  for  the  presi- 
dency in  1856,  in  obedience  to  a popu- 
lar call,  had  been  appointed  to  the  com- 
jiily  mand  of  the  W estern  Department. 

Great  things  were  expected  from 
Fremont.  It  was  the  general  belief  that 
those  qualities  which  he  had  revealed 
as  an  explorer  would  stand  him  in  good 
stead  on  the  battle  field.  Whether 
from  incapacity  or  from  radical  differ- 
ence of  opinion  between  himself  and 
the  government  at  Washington,  Fre- 
mont proved  a failure.  The  high  hopes 


which  had  been  formed  of  him  were 
not  to  be  fulfilled.  Towards  the  close 
of  July,  Lyon,  dreading  that  if  he 
should  wait  longer  he  would  soon  be 
overwhelmed  by  the  Confederate  troops 
which  were  pouring  over  the  southern 
frontier  of  Missouri,  resolved  to  strike 
at  once  with  the  forces  at  his  disposal. 
He  had  not  more  than  five  thousand 
five  hundred  men.  The  enemy  num- 
bered at  least  twelve  thousand.  On 
the  1st  of  August  a skirmish  oc- 
curred  at  Dug  Springs.  Lyon  L 
gained  some  slight  advantage ; but  he 
found  it  impossible  to  hinder  the  junc- 
tion of  the  two  columns  of  the  enemy. 
Retreat  in  the  circumstances  would 
have  been  attended  with  great  peril. 
He  therefore  resolved  to  resume  the 
offensive.  Audacity  he  thought  might 
compensate  for  the  want  of  numbers. 
Ordering  Colonel  Sigel,  with  1200  men 
and  six  guns,  to  gain  the  enemy’s  rear 
by  the  right,  he  was  ready  by  the  early 
dawn  to  strike  the  meditated  blow. 
Sigel  was  at  the  appointed  place  in 
time.  It  was  the  10th  of  August.  Au?. 
At  five  o’clock  in  the  morning  the 
line  of  battle  was  formed.  The  forward 
movement  was  towards  the  extreme 
northern  point  of  the  Confederate  camp. 
The  first  onset  was  terrific.  The  Con- 
federates’ pickets  were  driven  in ; and 
Totten’s  battery  being  hurried  forward, 
the  enemy  yielded  and  were  driven  by 
Lyon’s  infantry  to  the  adjoining  heights. 
No  such  hand  to  hand  fighting  had  oc- 
curred since  the  commencement  of  the 
war.  But  the  enemy  had  the  advantage 
in  numbers.  Lyon  behaved  admirabl}^ 
He  was  twice  wounded,  and  his  horse 


56 


MmOK  BATTLES. 


was  shot  under  him.  Colonel  Mitchell 
of  the  Second  Kansas  was  killed  when 
leading  his  men  to  the  charge.  As 
Mitchell  fell,  the  cry  was  raised  by  his 
troops,  Who  shall  lead  us  now ? ” ‘‘I 
will  lead  you.  Come  on,  brave  men,*’ 
said  the  wounded  and  bleeding  Lyon. 
A few  moments  afterwards  he  was  shot 
through  the  heart.  The  battle  contin- 
ued to  rage,  Major  Sturgis  having 
taken  command.  Meanwhile  Sigel’s 
brigade  had  been  overwhelmed.  He 
had  lost  five  of  his  guns  and  more  than 
one-half  of  his  men.  Like  a rock  in  mid- 
ocean the  Union  men  stood  firm,  the 
Confederate  forces  dashing  against  them 
in  vain.  At  one  moment,  it  seemed  as 
if  the  line  would  break.  But  Dubois’ 
battery  dashed  forward  from  the  rear, 
and  poured  a destructive  volley  into  the 
Confederate  right  wing.  The  entire 
line  was  thrown  into  confusion  ; and  in 
broken  masses  they  fell  back  to  the 
shelter  of  the  wood.  At-  the  same 
time  their  wagon  train  was  seen  tc 
be  on  fire.  It  was  now  eleven  o’clock. 
The  battle  had  lasted  nearly  six  hours. 
A retreat  was  ordered  to  Springfield, 
about  nine  miles  distant.  The  em  - 
my  did  not  pursue.  On  the  follow- 
ing morning  at  three  o’clock  the  en- 
tire army  under  General  Sigel  retreat- 
ed to  Holla,  one  hundred  and  twenty- 
five  miles  distant,  in  a government  train. 
The  battle  of  Wilson’s  Creek,  as  thi 
fight  was  called,  is  claimed  as  a Confed- 
erate victory.  It  would  be  more  cor- 
rect to  call  it  a drawn  battle.  The  Na- 
tionals lost  223  killed,  721  wounded, 
292  missing.  The  Confederate  loss  was 
correspondingly  great. 


The  capitulation  of  Lexington,  after  a 
seige  of  eight  days  by  General  sep. 
Sterling  Price,  followed  close  up-  . 20. 
on  the  battle  of  Wilson’s  Creek ; and 
Fremont,  partly  because  he  failed  to 
come  to  the  aid  of  Colonel  Mulligan  and 
his  heroic  garrison  at  Lexington,  and 
partly  for  other  reasons,  was  relieved 
from  his  command.  General  IT.  ]\^ov. 
W.  Halleck  arrived  at  St.  Louis,  *8. 
and  took  charge  of  the  W estern  Depart- 
ment on  the  IStli  of  November. 

Kentucky,  as  may  readily  be  im- 
agined, was  eagerly  coveted  by  the  Con- 
federacy. The  slaveholding  interests 
were  large;  and  it  was  necessary  for 
the  welfare  of  the  secession  movement 
that  they  should  be  protected.  The  oc- 
cupation of  this  State  was  in  fact  con- 
sidered a military  necessity.  From  the 
first,  however,  Kentucky  had  manifested 
great  unwillingness  to  sever  itself  from 
the  Union.  But  the  governor,  Magofifin, 
who  had  been  elected  as  a Democrat  in 
1859,  was  a red-hot  secessionist.  To' 
President  Lincoln’s  call  for  troops  he 
had  rudely  responded,  refusing  to  fur- 
nish the  quota  required  of  the  State. 
On  two  successive  occasions — on  Janu- 
ary 18th  and  on  April  28th,  1861 — he 
•nimmoned  an  extra  session  of  the  Legis- 
lature for  the  purpose  of  calling  a State 
Convention.  On  both  occasions  the 
Legislature  refused  to  call  a Convention 
or  in  any  way  comply  witk  his  wishes ; 
on  the  latter  occasion  going  so  far  as  to 
resist  his  demand  for  three  millions  of 
dollars  for  the  purpose  of  arniing  the 
State,  and  even  amending  the  militia 
laws  so  as  to  require  the  State  Guard 
to  take  an  oath  of  allegiance  to  the 


KENTUCKY  AND  MAGOFFIN. 


57 


Union.  At  a meeting  held  in  Louisville 
April  18th,  immediately  after  the  cap- 
ture of  Fort  Sumter,  it  was  resolved 
that  Kentucky  was  in  sympathy  with 
those  who  have  an  interest  in  the  pro- 
tection of  slavery,  but  that  she  acknowl- 
edges her  fealty  to  the  United  States, 
until  its  government  becomes  regardless 
of  her  rights  in  slave  property.  The 
loyal  sentiments  of  Kentucky  were  still 
further  manifested  at  the  election  of  del- 
egates to  the  Peace  Convention  (May 
4th).  On  this  last  occasion  Kentucky 
gave  a Union  majority  of  fifty  thousand 
votes. 

Kentucky,  it  is  thus  seen,  had  by 
large  majorities,  and  on  repeated  occa- 
sions, declared  her  unwillingness  to  join 
in  the  secession  movement ; but  Gov- 
ernor Magoffin,  being  in  perfect  sympa- 
thy with  the  rebel  cause,  was  the  willing 
and  useful  instrument  in  the  hands  of 
the  Confederate  leaders.  In  a letter  to 
President  Lincoln,  dated  August 
19th,  he  declared  that  the  people 
of  his  State  earnestly  desired  to  avoid 
any  war  entanglements,  that  they  had 
been  guilty  of  no  rebellion,  and  that 
therefore  the  National  troops  now  en- 
camped on  their  soil  ought  at  once  to 
be  removed.  In  his  reply,  the  president, 
after  reminding  him  that  the  troops 
complained  of  were  all  Kentuckians, 
said,  “ I most  cordially  sympathize  with 
your  Excellency  in  the  wish  to  preserve 
the  peace  of  my  own  native  State,  Ken- 
tucky ; but  it  is  with  regret  I search 
for  and  cannot  find  in  your  not  very 
short  letter  any  declaration  or  intima- 
tion that  you  entertain  any  desire  for 
the  preservation  of  the  Federal  Union.” 


On  the  3d  of  September,  in  a message 
to  the  Legislature,  the  governor  Sep, 
again  complained  of  the  aggres- 
sions  of  the  North,  and  declared  it  to 
be  his  opinion  that  Kentucky  would 
never  renounce  her  sympathy  with  her 
aggrieved  sister  States  of  the  South. 
The  Les^islature  was  not  to  be  moved. 
They  resolved  that  the  neutrality  of 
Kentucky  had  been  violated  by  the 
Confederate  forces,  requested  the  gov- 
(‘rnor  to  call  out  the  militia  to  expel 
them,  and  at  the  same  time  invoked  the 
United  States  to  grant  aid  and  assist- 
ance. These  resolutions  the  governor 
had  the  hardihood  to  veto ; but  the 
Legislature  returned  to  the  charge,  and 
passed  them  over  his  veto  by  large  and 
overwhelming  majorities. 

The  young  men  of  the  State  had  most 
of  them,  yielding  to  the  enthusiasm  of 
the  moment,  adopted  the  cause  of  seces- 
sion ; but  the  older  men,  the  fathers  of 
tlie  State,  true  to  the  principles  of  their 
youth,  and  wisely  fearful  of  the  risks 
of  rebellion,  remained  faithful  to  the 
Union.  Crittenden,  the  United  States 
senator  from  Kentucky,  who  had  persist- 
ed so  devotedly  in  his  well-meant  effort 
to  avert  civil  war  by  conciliation  and 
compromise,  now  that  he  despaired  of 
peace,  did  not  hesitate  to  take  a firm 
stand  for  the  Union.  By  this  action  his 
house  was  divided.  One  of  his  sons  had 
taken  up  arms  in  behalf  of  the  Southern 
Confederacy,  a cause  which  his  father 
proclaimed  to  be  unholy,  and  its  pro- 
moters deserving  of  the  severest  punish- 
ment. Prentiss,  too,  the  veteran  editor 
of  the  Louisville  Journal^  while  man- 
fully serving  his  country  with  all  the 


58 


MINOR  BATTLES. 


power  of  his  vigorous  pen,  was  forced 
into  a conflict  with  his  own  child,  who 
fought  in  the  ranks  of  the  Confederates. 
These  are  but  two  illustrations  of  the 
effects  of  the  unhappy  civil  struggle  in 
Kentucky,  where  it  had  not  only  de- 
stroyed political  harmony,  but  domestic 
concord.  ‘‘Thousands  of  other  exam- 
ples,” wrote  one  who  was  deeply  grieved 
by  the  state  of  things  around  him, 
“might  be  readily  gathered  in  the  Bor- 
der States.  Those  at  the  extreme  North 
and  South,  though  they  may  be  suffer- 
ing from  the  ordinary  evils  of  war,  have 
no  conception  of  its  horrors  as  waged  in 
Kentucky  and  Missouri.” 

As  if  impatient  of  further  delay,  the 
Confederates  resolved  to  disregard  the 
sentiments  of  the  people  of  Kentucky, 
and  take  a Arm  footing  in  the  State.  If 
they  could  not  use  it  as  a bulwark,  they 
were  resolved  to  use  it  as  a battle  field. 
It  had  always  been  the  favorite  plan  of 
the  Confederate  General  Pillow  to  seize 
Columbus,  a commanding  position  about 
twenty  miles  below  the  mouth  of  the 
Ohio,  and  so  fortify  it  as  to  make  it 
command  the  Mississippi,  and  blockade 
that  river  completely.  The  position 
was  all  the  more  advantageous  that 
from  Columbus  to  Bowling  Green  there 
was  a railroad  connection.  General 
Polk,  who  had  formerly  been  a bishop 
of  the  Protestant  Episcopal  Church,  but 
who  had  exchanged  his  ecclesiastical 
vestments  for  those  of  the  soldier,  and 
abandoned  the  crosier  for  the  sword, 
resolved  to  carry  out  this  plan.  In  his 
first  general  order  he  showed  that,  al- 
though he  had  temporarily  retired  from 
the  sacred  oflice,  he  had  not  forgotten 


how  to  use  his  spiritual  weapons.  “ The 
invasion  of  the  South,”  he  said,  “by  the 
Federal  armies  has  brought  with  it  a 
contempt  for  constitutional  liberty,  and 
the  withering  influences  of  the  infidelity 
of  New  England  and  of  Germany  com- 
bined.” Polk  had  previously  been  as- 
signed to  the  command  of  a department 
which  extended  from  the  mouth  of  the 
Arkansas  northward  on  both  sides  of 
the  Mississippi.  On  the  4th  of  gep. 
September  he  advanced  and  seized  4. 
Hickman  and  Columbus.  A pretense 
of  opposition  was  made  by  the  Confed- 
erate secretary  of  war.  Walker,  who 
ordered  Polk  to  withdraw  his  troops 
from  Kentucky ; but  from  Jefferson 
Davis,  whom  Polk  had  notified  of  the 
movement,  a telegram  was  received  say- 
ing, “ The  necessity  justifies  the  act.” 
On  the  same  day  that  Polk  invaded 
Kentucky  on  the  west.  General  Zollikof- 
fer  entered  it  on  the  east,  on  the  ground 
that  the  step  Avas  necessary  for  the  safe- 
ty of  Tennessee.  In  a brief  space  of 
time  Polk  w^as  successful  in  converting 
Columbus  into  an  almost  impregnable 
fortress,  having  got  into  position  not 
fewer  than  one  hundred  and  twenty 
heavy  guns,  and  having  gathered  around 
him  from  25,000  to  30,000  men.  At 
this  time  Anderson,  of  Fort  Sumter  re- 
nown, was  in  command  of  the  army  of 
the  Cumberland.  General  William  T. 
Sherman  was  Anderson’s  lieutenant. 
It  was  the  earnest  desire  and  hope  of 
the  loyal  people  of  Kentucky  that  An- 
derson would  promptly  come  to  their 
aid  and  drive  out  the  invader.  Neither 
Anderson  nor  Sherman  came  up  to  the 
requirements  of  the  situation.  Ander- 


BELMONT. 


59 


son  fell  sick ; and  the  command  devolved 
upon  Sherman,  who  brought  upon  him- 
self some  ridicule  by  declaring  that  it 
would  require  an  army  of  two  hundred 
thousand  men  to  expel  the  Confederates 
from  Kentucky.  An  attempt  at  relief 
was  to  come  fi’om  another  source. 

As  soon  as  it  became  known  that 
General  Polk  had  invaded  Kentucky 
with  the  troops  of  another  State,  General 
Ulysses  S.  Grant,  then  in  command  of 
the  district  around  Cairo,  made  up  his 
mind  to  disregard  the  delusive  neutral- 
ity which  had  been  so  long  maintained, 
and  to  take  possession  of  Paducah,  a 
town  situated  at  the  junction  of  the 
Ohio  and  Tennessee  rivers,  and  some 
forty-seven  miles  east  of  Cairo.  The 
strong  position  which  the  enemy  had 
taken  at  Columbus  and  Hickman  on 
the  Mississippi,  and  the  advance  of 
troops  from  Tennessee  into  other  parts 
of  Kentucky,  had  rendered  the  posses- 
sion of  Paducah  absolutely  necessary 
for  the  protection  of  Cairo.  In  his  pro- 
clamation, Grant  said  he  had  come  sole- 
ly for  the  purpose  of  defending  the 
State  from  the  aggressions  of  the  Con- 
federate troops  and  to  protect  the  rights 
of  all  citizens.  If,  however,  it  should 
be  manifest  that  they  were  able  them- 
selves to  maintain  the  authority  of  the 
government,  he  promised  to  withdraw 
the  forces  under  his  command.  The 
foresight  and  promptitude  exhibited  by 
Grant  in  making  himself  master  of  Pa- 
ducah were  characteristic  of  the  man. 
The  same  qualities  were  destined  to  se- 
cure him  victory  on  many  a battle  field, 
and  to  carry  him  afterwards  to  the  high- 
est position  in  the  land.  In  obedience 


to  instructions  from  General  Fremont 
to  make  some  co-operative  movements. 
Grant,  who  had  already  greatly  strength- 
ened Paducah  by  erecting  fortifications, 
had  thrown  a pontoon  bridge  across 
the  Ohio,  half  a mile  below  the  town, 
had  seized  and  occupied  Smith  Bend, 
and  had  thus  cut  the  Confederates/ off 
fj’om  two  important  sources  of  supply, 
resolved  to  threaten  Columbus  by  at- 
tacking Belmont,  a small  village  and 
landing  place  on  the  Missouri  side  of 
the  river  and  directly  opposite  Colum- 
bus. He  had  learned  that  the  Confed- 
erate General  Price  was  receiving  rein- 
forcements  from  Polk;  and  he  hoped 
that,  by  making  himself  master  of  Bel- 
mont, he  would  break  up  the  connection 
between  them.  Having  arranged  some 
side  movements  for  the  purpose  of  dis- 
tracting the  attention  of  Polk,  Grant, 
with  about  three  thousand  troops,  in 
four  steam  transports,  and  having  for 
convoy  the  two  wooden  gunboats  Tyler 
and  Lexington,  commanded  respectively 
by  Captains  Walke  and  Stemble,  sailed 
down  the  Mississippi  from  Cairo  on 
the  evening  of  November  6.  At  ]Vov, 
Island  No.  1,  eleven  miles  above 
Columbus,  they  halted  for  the  night. 
There  Grant  learned  that  Polk  was 
sending  troops  across  to  cut  off  Oglesby, 
whom,  in  compliance  with  Fremont’s 
request,  he  had  previously  sent  off  to 
assist  Carlin  in  driving  Thompson  into 
Arkansas.  At  an  early  hour  on  the 
following  morning  he  landed  his  ]Vov« 
forces  at  Hunter’s  Point,  on  the  7. 
Missouri  side  of  the  river,  and  about 
three  miles  above  Belmont.  A battalion 
was  left  to  guard  the  transports.  The 


60 


MINOR  BATTLES. 


remainder  advanced  and  formed  in  line 
about  two  miles  above  the  village.  The 
gunboats  meanwhile  moved  down  and 
opened  fire  on  the  Confederate  batteries 
on  the  Iron  Banks.  The  centre  of  the 
attacking  column  was  under  Colonel 
Fouke,  the  right  under  Colonel  Buford, 
the  left  under  Colonel  Logan.  It  was 
evident  that  Polk  had  been  taken  by 
surprise.  General  Smith,  whom  Grant 
had  sent  ahead  the  day  before,  was 
threatening  him  at  Mayfield,  in  his  rear, 
and  he  had  been  making  his  prepara- 
tions to  resist  an  attack  in  that  direction. 
Dollins  and  Delano’s  cavalry  were  or- 
dered forward  to  scour  the  woods.  It 
was  not  long  before  they  encountered 
the  enemy,  in  considerable  force.  About 
a mile  and  a half  from  the  enemy’s  camp 
the  line  of  battle  was  fonued.  Behind 
an  abatis  of  felled  trees  which  surround- 
ed the  camp  lay  the  Thirteenth  Arkan- 
sas and  Ninth  Tennessee.  There  was 
also  opposite  Grant’s  left  a battery  of 
seven  guns,  commanded  by  Colonel 
Beltzhoover.  This  batteiy  was  pro- 
tected by  Colonel  Wright’s  Tennessee 
regiment.  In  the  face  of  a desti'uctive 
fire,  on  the  National  forces  rushed. 
Meanwhile  the  batteries  of  Columbus 
had  shifted  the  heavy  fire  from  the  gun- 
boats to  the  advancing  line.  The  guns, 
however,  were  not  in  range,  and  as  yet 
they  did  no  harm.  Nothing  daunted, 
Grant  pressed  forward  his  men.  In 
spite  of  the  galling  fire,  onw^ard  they 
moved,  charging  over  the  fallen  timber, 
capturing  the  battery  and  driving  the 
enemy  back  across  the  low  ground  to- 
wards the  river,  and  compelling  some 
of  them  to  take  to  their  boats.  In  a 


brief  space  of  time  the  heavy  guns  at 
Columbus  were  got  into  range,  and 
the  deadly  bullets  crashed  through  the 
woods,  over  and  among  the  advancing 
and  triumphant  Federals.  A second 
and  a third  time  was  the  retreating  foe 
overtaken  ; and  although  reinforced  and 
disposed  to  resist  to  the  last,  they  were 
ultimately  routed,  some  of  them  seeking 
shelter  behind  buildings  near  the  river, 
some  in  the  woods  above  the  camp,  and 
others  under  cover  of  the  batteries  at 
Columbus.  It  was  a complete  victory. 
The  National  troops  gave  themselves 
up  to  the  wildest  excitement.  As  yet 
discipline  in  the  army  was  loose.  In 
the  face  of  Polk’s  batteries,  three  cheers 
were  given  for  the  Union;  and  while 
some  of  the  soldiers  were  delivering 
stump  speeches,  others  were  rifling  the 
baggage  or  supplying  themselves  with 
the  arms  which  the  discomfited  rebels 
had  thrown  down  in  their  flight. 

Although  the  victoiy  was  complete, 
the  place  was  untenable,  commanded 
as  it  was  by  the  heavy  guns  of  Colum- 
])us.  While  these  were  brought  to  bear 
upon  the  National  troops  in  the  midst 
of  their  wild  abandonment,  Polk  or- 
dered General  Cheatham  to  cross  the 
river  above  with  his  regiments,  for  the 
purpose  of  cutting  Grant  off  from  his 
flotilla.  At  the  same  time  he  himself 
crossed  with  two  regiments  to  take  part 
in  the  pursuit.  Five  thousand  fresh 
men  were  thus  at  hand  to  hinder  or 
harass  the  retreat.  Grant,  however,  was 
equal  to  the  situation.  Getting  his  men 
in  order,  he  pressed  forward  to  the 
landing  place.  While  compelled  to  cut 
his  way  through  the  ranks  of  the  ene- 


GRANT’S  LESSON. 


61 


my,  he  was  exposed  to  a raking  fire 
from  the  Confederate  batteries  on  the 
Iron  Banks.  The  fighting  was  terrific. 
After  severe  suffering,  the  landing  place 
was  reached;  and  under  cover  of  the 
gunboats,  which  had  come  up,  and  which 
kept  the  enemy  at  bay,  the  embarkation 
was  completed.  By  five  o’clock  in  the 
afternoon,  the  flotilla,  with  the  entire 
force  on  board,  was  on  its  way  back  to 
Cairo.  Grant  carried  with  him,  in  ad- 
dition to  all  his  own  men,  two  of  Beltz- 
hoover’s  heavy  guns.  The  estimated 
National  loss  was  480  men  in  killed, 
wounded  and  missing.  That  of  the  ene- 
my was  642.  The  Confederates  claimed 


the  victory  at  Belmont,  and  exulted 
accordingly.  “ Accept  for  yourself,” 
wrote  Jefferson  Davis  to  General  Polk, 
‘‘  and  the  officers  and  men  under  your 
command,  my  sincere  thanks  for  the 
glorious  contribution  you  have  just 
made  to  our  common  cause.”  Belmont 
was  nevertheless  abandoned  as  untena- 
ble the  day  after  the  battle.  It  is  no 
disparagement  to  the  men  who  fought 
on  the  Confederate  side  to  say  that  if 
the  opposing  forces  had  been  equal, 
the  result  might  have  been  different. 
Belmont  taught  General  Grant  a lesson 
which  he  never  afterwards  forgot — the 
value  of  numbers. 


CHAPTER  V. 

Blockade  of  the  Southern  Ports. — Naval  and  Coast  Operations. — General  Butler. — Big  Bethel  and  Little  Bethel. — 
Death  of  Winthrop  and  Greble. — Butler  Believed  of  his  Command. — General  John  E.  Wool. — The  Hatteras 
Expedition. — Butler  and  Stringham  in  Command. — Forts  Hatteras  and  Clark. — Landing  the  Troops. — The  Bom- 
bardment.— The  Monticello  Aground. — The  Nationals  in  Fort  Clark. — The  Mistake. — The  Second  Day. — Decep- 
tion on  the  part  of  the  Confederates. — The  Bomb-Proof. — The  White  Flag. — The  Forts  Occupied  by  the  Nation- 
als.— Great  Joy  in  the  North. — Colonel  Hawkins  Closing  up  the  Passages  to  the  Sound. — RoanokeTsland. — The 
Scheme  of  the  Ocracoke. — Chicamacomico. — The  Steamtug  Fanny.— Capture  of  the  Fanny  by  the  Confede- 
rates.— The  Failure  of  the  Expedition  to  Chicamacomico. — The  Confederates  Land  on  Hatteras  Island. — Brown’s 
Retreat. — The  Confederates  Driven  from  Hatteras  Island. — Gulf  of  Mexico. — Fort  Pickens. — “Billy”  Wilson 
end  His  Zouaves.  —Warrington  Navy  Yard. — Burning  of  the  Dry  Dock. — Burning  of  the  Juda. — Battle  of  Santa 
Rosa. — “Death  to  Wilson.” — The  Confederates  Defeated. — “Billy”  Wilson’s  Letter. — Fort  McRae. — General 
Braxton  Bragg. — Fort  Pickens  Opens  Fire  on  Bragg’s  Works. — Two  Days’  Bombardment. — The  Mouths  of 
the  Mississippi. — The  Southwest  Pass. — The  Boast  of  Hollins. — The  Manassas. — Her  Attack  on  the  Rich- 
mond.— What  She  Might  Have  Done. — The  Port  Royal  Expedition. — General  T.  W.  Sherman. — Samuel  F. 
Dupont. — Departure  of  the  Fleet  from  Hampton  Roads. — A Magnificent  Spectacle. — Sealed  Orders. — The 
Storm. — The  Fleet  Dispersed. — Saved  from  the  Perils  of  the  Deep. — Place  of  Destination  Known. — The 
Confederates  Forewarned. — Port  Royal. — Forts  Walker  and  Beauregard. — Preparations  for  the  Attack. — The 
Plan. — The  Attack. — The  Forts  Abandoned. — A Great  Victory. — Negro  Misrule. — Bay  of  St.  Helena. — Warsaw 
Sound. — The  Union  Flag  floating  over  Georgia. — Port  Royal  Ferry. — Naval  and  Land  Expedition  to  Port  Royal, 
Ferry. — Heavy  Cannonading  by  the  Gunboats. — The  Fort  Abandoned. — The  Seventy-Ninth  Highlanders. — 
The  Eighth  Michigan. —A  Flag  of  Truce. — Sunset. — The  End  of  the  First  Day. — The  Enemy  Reappears  in 
the  Morning. — The  Gunboats  Rake  the  Woods. — The  Battle  Ended. — The  Coast  Expeditions  so  far  Successful.*^ 


Almost  immediately  after  the  inau- 
1861  President  Lincoln,  the 

attention  of  the  government  was 


directed  to  the  necessity  of  blockading 
the  southern  ports.  A proclamation 
was  accordingly  issued,  announcing  that 


62 


NAVAL  AND  COAST  OPERATIONS. 


an  insurrection  had  broken  out  in  South 
Carolina,  Georgia,  Alabama,  Florida, 
Mississippi,  Louisiana,  and  Texas,  that 
in  those  States  the  revenue  dues  could 
no  longer  be  collected,  that  the  persons 
combined  in  this  insurrection  had  threat- 
ened to  grant  letters  of  marque  against 
the  commerce  of  the  United  States,  and 
that  therefore  the  ports  of  the  aforesaid 
States  were  forthwith  blockaded.  A 
April  little  later,  on  the  27th  of  April, 
27.  another  proclamation  was  issued ; 
and  the  ports  of  Virginia  and  North 
Carolina  wei*e  included.  This  was  fol- 
lowed on  the  part  of  the  South  by  the 
authorization  of  privateers.  The  at- 
tempt to  effect  a blockade  on  the  part 
of  the  North,  and  the  authorization  of 
privateers  on  the  part  of  the  South, 
necessarily  gave  birth  to  land  and  naval 
encounters  of  greater  or  lesser  import- 
ance. In  a history  of  the  Battles  of 
the  Civil  War,  these  cannot  be  omitted 
without  marring  the  completeness  of 
the  woi*k.  It  will,  therefoi'e,  be  our  ob- 
ject in  this  chapter  to  group  together  a 
few  of  the  more  important  of  these  na- 
val and  coast  operations. 

Attention  is  first  called  to  the  coast 
of  North  Carolina.  At  the  commence- 
ment of  the  war,  General  Butler  made 
himself  conspicuous  by  his  vigorous 
conduct  in  suppressing  the  Baltimore 
riots,  and  by  so  establishing  order  in 
Maryland  that  that  State  never  again 
wavered  in  its  loyalty  to  the  government 
at  Washington.  Butler’s  conduct  of 
affairs  at  Baltimore,  successful  as  it  was, 
did  not  meet  the  approval  of  General 
Scott.  It  could  hardly  have  been  other- 
wise. General  Scott  had  spent  a long 


lifetime  in  camp  and  field.  He  was  a 
strict  disciplinarian,  and,  from  natural 
instinct  as  from  training  and  lifelong 
habit,  a man  of  order.  General  Butler 
had  purpose  and  will ; but  he  was  to- 
tally without  military  experience ; and  it 
was  of  all  things  the  most  natural  that, 
judged  by  the  high  standard  of  such  a 
man  as  General  Scott,  he  should  be 
found  wanting.  Butler  was  or- 
dered  to  take  command  at  Fort-  22. 
ress  Monroe.  Soon  after  his  arrival 
there,  he  found  himself  at  the  head  of 
twelve  thousand  troops.  Magruder  lay 
in  front  of  him  at  Yorktown,  having 
outposts  at  Big  Bethel  and  Little  Bethel, 
with  a force  amounting  in  all  to  not 
more  than  eight  thousand.  With  the 
exception  of  the  fortress,  the  entire  pen- 
insula was  in  the  hands  of  the  Confed- 
erates. Butler  being  considerably  rein- 
forced, resolved  to  extend  the  area 'of 
liis  authority.  He  had  but  litfle  difficul- 
ty in  making  himself  master  of  Hampton 
and  Newport  News.  His  subse-  May 
quent  efforts  against  Little  Bethel  27. 
and  Big  Bethel  were  less  fortunate. 
Little  acquainted  with  the  ground — lit- 
tle acquainted,  indeed,  with  the  art  of 
war,  and  influenced  by  the  counsels  of 
men  who  were  less  experienced  than 
himself,  he  fell  into  a series  of  blunders, 
the  very  reverse  of  creditable  to  the 
National  army.  There  was  no  lack  of 
heroism  on  the  part  of  the  troops;  but 
the  management  was  wretched.  In 
Major  Theodore  W inthrop  and  in  June 
Lieutenant  Greble,  both  of  whom 
were  killed,  the  North  lost  two  promis- 
ing young  officers ; but  Big  Bethel  and 
Little  Bethel  will  be  remembered  in 


HATTERAS  INLET. 


63 


connection  with  National  disaster  and 
National  disgrace.  It  was  an  ill-fated 
expedition  ; and  it  was  visited  with  the 
worst  of  all  kinds  of  punishment — con- 
demnation by  the  whole  people. 

Butler  was  relieved  of  his  command, 
Major-General  John  E.  Wool  having 
been  appointed  to  take  his  place. 
Butler  had  no  duty  assigned  to  him. 
Wool,  as  generous  as  he  was  far-seeing, 
gave  him  command  of  all  the  volunteer 
troops  outside  the  fortress.  Butler 
again  found  his  opportunity.  Informa- 
tion had,  some  short  time  before,  been 
conveyed  to  Commodore  Stringham, 
then  commanding  at  Hampton  Boads, 
that  Hatteras  Inlet  was  being  freely 
used  by  English  blockade  runners, 
which  were  supplying  the  Confederates 
with  arms,  ammunition,  and  clothing. 
Stringham  communicated  the  fact  to 
Butler;  and  Butler  reported  to  Wash- 
ington, suggesting  that  land  and  naval 
forces  should  be  sent  to  capture  the 
forts  at  the  inlet,  and  close  up  the  pass- 
age. The  suggestion  was  acted  upon ; 
and  a squadron  of  vessels,  on  which 
were  to  be  conveyed  some  nine  hundred 
men,  now  lying  in  Hampton  Koads, 
was  got  in  immediate  readiness.  To 
General  Butler  was  assigned  the  com- 
mand of  the  troops.  Commodore  String- 
ham took  command  of  the  squadron. 

Silas  H.  Stringham  was  born  at  New- 
burg.  New  York,  in  the  year  1796. 
His  first  naval  service  was  as  midship- 
man, on  board  the  frigate  President, 
Commodore  Kodgers,  in  1809.  In  1830 
he  commanded  on  the  West  India  sta- 
tion. From  1835  to  1837  he  held  a 
command  in  the  Mediterranean.  He 


subsequently  commanded  the  Porpoise, 
the  Independent,  and  the  Ohio.  When 
the  Mexican  war  broke  out,  he  was  in 
command  at  the  Brooklyn  Navy  Yard. 
He  again  took  charge  of  the  Ohio ; and 
in  the  successful  bombardment  of  Vera 
Cruz  and  in  the  capture  of  the  Castle 
of  San  Juan  d’Ulloa,  it  was  he  who  led 
the  squadron.  From  1852  to  1855  he 
was  in  command  of  the  Mediterranean 
squadron.  From  the  time  of  his  return 
to  the  commencement  of  the  war,  he 
was  in  charge  of  the  Charlestown  Navy 
Yard,  Massachusetts.  He  left  that  post 
to  take  chief  command  of  the  naval 
force  blockading  the  hostile  States. 
While  on  this  service,  he  was  called  to 
take  charge  of  the  first  naval  expedi- 
tion. Stringham,  it  will  thus  be  seen, 
was  a man  of  large  experience ; and  it 
was  everywhere  felt  that  the  expedition 
was  safe  in  his  hands. 

Butler  took  passage  by  the  Minne- 
sota. His  troops  were  on  the  transports 
George  Peabody  and  Adelaide.  In  addi- 
tion to  these  vessels  there  were  the  Paw- 
nee, Monticello,  and  Harriet  Lane.  The 
frigate  Cumberland  also  was  ordered  to 
join  the  squadron.  On  the  afternoon 
of  Tuesday,  August  27th,  the  Au?. 
ships  w^ere  brought  to  anchor, 
about  eighteen  miles  from  the  cape; 
and  preparations  were  made  for  land- 
ing the  troops  early  on  the  following 
morning.  On  the  west  end  of  Hat- 
teras Island,  and  commanding  the  in- 
let, were  two  forts,  named  respectively 
Hatteras  and  Clark.  It  was  arranged 
that  the  troops  should  land  a short  dis- 
tance up  the  beach,  so  as  to  be  able  to 
attack  the  forts  in  the  rear,  while  the 


64 


NAVAL  AND  COAST  OPERATIONS. 


vessels  should  advance  and  assail  them 
in  front.  Breakfast  was  served  at  four 
o’clock.  The  Cumberland,  a sailing 
vessel,  was  taken  in  tow  by  the  Wabash 
and  dragged  to  her  position.  Both 
vessels  opened  fire  about  a quarter  to 
ten  o’clock.  The  flag-ship  Minnesota 
shortly  afterwards  passed  inside  the 
other  two  and  joined  in  the  fight.  Later, 
the  Susquehanna,  which  had  also  joined 
the  expedition,  came  up  and  opened 
fire.  Great  difficulty  was  experienced 
in  landing  the  troops.  The  breakers 
were  high  and  beating  heavily.  The 
boats  were  dashed  against  the  beach 
with  great  violence ; and  one  of  them, 
belonging  to  the  Pawnee,  was  actual- 
ly capsized.  Fortunately  no  one  was 
drowned.  About  three  hundred  men 
succeeded  in  effecting  a landing,  under 
cover  of  the  guns  of  the  Monticello  and 
Harriet  Lane.  After  four  hours  con- 
tinuous work,  the  firing  ceased  on  both 
sides.  The  flags  of  the  forts  were  taken 
down.  It  was  believed  by  the  Nation- 
als that  both  works  were  about  to  be 
surrendered.  The  Monticello  moved 
cautiously  into  the  inlet,  followed  by 
the  Harriet  Lane.  As  they  entered, 
fire  was  immediately  opened  by  Fort 
Hatteras;  and  it  fell  heavily  on  the 
Monticello.  The  other  vessels,  the  Min- 
nesota, Susquehanna,  and  Pawnee  now 
reopened  fire.  The  contest  was  contin- 
ued until  half-past  six  o’clock,  when  the 
whole  squadron,  with  the  exception  of 
the  Harriet  Lane  and  the  Pawnee,  was 
withdrawn  for  the  night.  During  the 
fight  the  Monticello  unhappily  ran 
aground;  and  although  she  kept  up  a 
most  vigorous  fire  on  Fort  Hatteras,  dis- 


charging fifty-five  shells  in  fifty  minutes, 
it  seemed  for  a time  as  if  she  could  not 
escape  destruction.  At  the  close  of  the 
day’s  struggle  she  got  off,  and  floated 
out  of  range  of  the  guns.  She  had  re- 
ceived seven  eight-inch  shot  in  her 
hull.  The  damage  done,  however,  was 
not  serious ; nor  had  she  sustained  the 
loss  of  a single  man.  Meanwhile  some 
of  the  troops  who  had  got  on  shore  had 
had  a singular  experience.  When  the 
forts  ceased  firing,  and  the  flags  were 
taken  down,  they  discovered  that  Fort 
Clark  was  abandoned,  the  men  having 
fled  to  Fort  Hatteras.  Taking  posses- 
sion of  the  abandoned  fort,  they  raised 
over  it  the  Union  flag.  Seeing  the 
flag  again  raised,  but  unable  to  recog- 
nize it  as  their  own,  the  war  ships  re- 
opened fire  upon  Fort  Clark,  and  the 
National  troops  were  compelled  to  re- 
tire to  the  landing.  There  they  spent 
the  night  as  best  they  were  able.  In 
the  morning  they  did  some  good  service 
by  turning  their  rifled  howitzer,  which 
they  had  managed  to  carry  with  them, 
on  some  Confederate  steamers  which 
were  lying  off  in  the  bay,  compelling 
them  to  retire,  and  thus  preventing 
any  other  than  signal  communications 
with  Fort  Hatteras.  They  were  again 
placed  in  peril  by  the  firing  of  the 
Pawnee ; and  it  was  not  until  the  white 
flag  was  hoisted  that  they  were  perfect- 
ly safe. 

In  the  morning  the  ships  resumed 
the  bombardment.  An  eleven- 
inch  shell  was  flung  from  the  29. 
Susquehanna.  Her  example  was  fol- 
lowed by  the  Minnesota  and  the  Wa- 
bash. The  guns  were  admirably  man- 


BUTLER^S  SUCCESS. 


65 


aged ; and  it  was  seen  that  every  shell 
was  falling  and  exploding  inside  Fort 
Hatteras.  The  Harriet  Lane  and  the 
Cumberland  came  up  a little  later,  and, 
taking  part  in  the  fight,  greatly  added 
to  the  severity  of  the  fire.  For  a time 
the  Confederates  continued  to  resist 
with  great  spirit.  Once  again  they  at- 
tempted to  deceive  by  hauling  down 
the  flag.  This  time,  however,  the  Na- 
tionals were  not  to  be  caught.  The  fir- 
ing from  the  ships  continued,  the  shell 
falling  thick  and  fast  within  the  fort, 
and  working  terrible  destruction.  The 
garrison,  unable  any  longer  to  endure 
the  tremendous  punishment  they  were 
receiving,  had  taken  refuge  inside  the 
bomb-proof.  Here,  however,  they  were 
not  long  to  be  safe.  An  eleven-inch 
shell  found  its  way  through  the  ventila- 
tor and  exploded  in  the  midst  of  them. 
This  was  the  determining  shot  of  the 
day.  Kesistance  now  was  no  longer  pos- 
sible. The  white  flag  was  raised  and 
the  firing  ceased.  General  Butler,  on 
board  the  tug  Fanny,  landed  at  the  fort 
and  demanded  an  unconditional  surren- 
der. To  this  the  Confederate  command- 
er, Commodore  Barron,  objected,  and 
Butler  yielded  so  far  as  to  agree  that 
the  officers  and  men  should  be  treated 
as  prisoners  of  war.  A treaty  was 
signed  by  Commodore  Stringham  and 
General  Butler  on  the  one  hand  and  by 
Commodore  Barron,  Colonel  Martin, 
and  Major  Andrews  on  the  other;  and 
the  Union  flag  floated  once  more  over 
the  forts  commanding  Hatteras  Inlet. 
Although  the  firing  had  been  severe, 
there  was  little  loss  of  life.  The  loss 
was  all  on  the  side  of  the  Confederates. 


On  the  National  side,  according  to  Gen- 
eral Butler’s  report,  not  a man  was 
killed  or  injured. 

The  result  of  the  Hatteras  expedition 
was  a great  triumph  for  the  North.  All 
over  that  section  the  intelligence  was 
received  with  transports  of  delight.  It 
had,  as  was  natural,  a correspondingly 
depressing  influence  on  the  South.  It 
was  a gain  to  General  Butler.  He  had 
redeemed  his  reputation,  or  rather  he 
had  made  it.  His  instructions  were  to 
destroy  the  forts  and  not  to  hold  them. 
Convinced  that  the  forts  should  be  held, 
he  hurried  to  Washington,  and  explain- 
ed his  views  to  the  government  in  per- 
son. The  forts  were  held  ; and  Butler 
was  commissioned  by  the  secretary  of 
war  to  go  to  New  England  and  “raise, 
arm,  uniform,  and  equip  a volunteer 
force  for  the  war.” 

It  was  confidently  expected  that  the 
success  of  the  Hatteras  expedition 
would  enable  the  Nationals  to  seize 
and  hold  the  whole  coast  of  North  Car- 
olina washed  by  the  waters  of  Pamlico 
and  Albemarle  Sounds.  This  expecta- 
tion was  not  to  be  realized.  On  Butler’s 
departure  for  W ashington  Colonel  Haw- 
kins was  left  in  charge  of  the  post  at 
Hatteras.  He  had  with  him  a portion 
of  the  Ninth  New  York,  a Zouave  regi- 
ment. In  September  he  was  joined  by 
Colonel  Brown  and  the  Twentieth  Indi- 
ana regiment.  Hawkins  held  the  island 
of  Hatteras  and  guarded  the  inlet.  He 
proceeded  to  close  up  the  passages  from 
the  sea  to  the  two  sounds.  Attention 
was  first  given  to  Ocracoke  Inlet,  a few 
miles  down  the  coast  from  Hatteras. 
Lieutenant  J.  T.  Maxwell  was  sent 


66 


NAVAL  AND  COAST  OPERATIONS. 


thither,  with  a detachment  of  marines 
and  soldiers,  on  board  the  tugboat 
Fanny.  An  earthwork  called  Fort 
Ocracoke  and  the  older  Fort  Morgan 
had  been  abandoned.  Maxwell  de- 
stroyed the  forts  and  returned. 

Another  expedition,  to  which  even 
Sep.  greater  importance  was  attached, 
29*  was  sent  up  the  island  to  a ham- 
let named  Chicamacomico.  It  had  be- 
come known  that  the  Confederates  had 
taken  possession  of  Roanoke  Island  with 
three  thousand  men,  and  it  was  believed 
that  their  intention  was  to  land  on  Hat- 
teras  and  make  an  attempt  to  recover 
what  they  had  lost.  Colonel  Brovm, 
with  his  Twentieth  Indiana,  was  ordered 
to  Chicamacomico  to  hold  the  enemy  in 
check.  The  regiment,  which  was  land- 
ed in  small  boats,  was  destitute  of  eve- 
rything except  a small  quantity  of  pro- 
visions. All  the  supplies,  camp  equip- 
age, and  intrenching  implements  had 
been  put  on  board  the  steamtug  Fanny. 
This  vessel  was  detained  at  the  forts  a 
day  beyond  the  appointed  time.  She 
Oft,  did  not  sail  before  the  1st  of  Oc- 
b tober.  On  the  evening  of  that 
day  she  appeared  off  the  point;  and 
when  she  was  about  to  land  her  stores, 
three  gunboats  hove  in  sight  and  opened 
fire  upon  her.  The  Fanny  had  time 
neither  to  land  her  stores  nor  to  make 
her  escape.  One  boat  only,  with  ten 
persons  on  board,  had  put  off  for  land. 
These  ten  escaped.  All  the  others,  to 
the  number  of  thirty-one,  including  sol- 
diers and  sailors,  together  with  the  tug- 
boat and  its  precious  freight,  the  latter 
equal  in  value  to  one  hundred  and  fifty 
thousand  dollars,  fell  into  the  hands  of 


the  Confederates.  The  enterprise  was 
completely  defeated.  Encouraged  by 
this  success,  the  enemy  grew  more 
bold ; and  on  the  4th  of  October  o’ft, 
a squadron  of  six  steamers,  hav-  4. 
ihg  on  board  over  two  thousand  men, 
appeared  off  Chicamacomico.  Shells 
were  immediately  flung  into  the  N’ation- 
al  camp ; and  under  cover  of  the  fire, 
two  bodies  of  men  were  landed,  one 
above  and  one  below  the  encampment, 
the  object  evidently  being  to  surround 
the  regiment  and  cut  off  its  retreat. 
Brown  succeeded  in  eluding  the  vigi- 
lance of  the  enemy  and  carried  off  his 
men  ; but  it  was  not  until  he  had  reach- 
ed the  lighthouse  at  Cape  Hatteras, 
after  having  marched  twenty-eight  miles 
and  experienced  great  privation,  that 
he  felt  himself  perfectly  safe.  It  was 
not  without  good  reason  that  the  Con- 
federates boasted  loudly  of  this  victory. 
It  was  a real  victory,  and  was,  besides, 
a positive  gain.  It  enabled  them  to 
hold  on  to  Roanoke  Island — a posses- 
sion which,  so  long  as  they  held  it,  gave 
them  control  of  Loggerhead  and  Oregon 
Inlets,  and  thus  neutralized  to  a large 
extent  the  victory  won  by  Stringham 
and  Butler.  They  were  not,  however, 
long  permitted  to  remain  on  the  island 
of  Hatteras.  Under  the  heavy  firing  of 
the  Monticello  and  Susquehanna,  they 
were  soon  compelled  to  take  to  their 
boats  and  fly  for  their  lives.  The  great 
mistake  committed  in  this  expedition 
was  in  allowing  l^e  steamtug  Fanny  to 
sail  without  a proper  convoy.  Skilful 
management  should  have  made  such  a 
disaster  impossible. 

Movements  of  this  description  were 


SAXTA  ROSA. 


67 


not  confined  to  the  coast  of  North  Caro- 
lina. Events  quite  as  thrilling  were 
taking  place  in  the  neighborhood  of 
Fort  Pickens,  on  the  waters  of  the  gulf 
of  Mexico.  That  place  had  narrowly 
escaped  being  seized  by  the  Pensacola 
insurgents  in  the  spring ; and  the  island 
of  Santa  Posa,  on  which  Fort  Pickens 
i ; built,  had  since  June  been  guarded 
l)y  the  New  York  Sixth,  known  as  Wil- 
son’s Zouaves.  Besides  these  troops 
there  was  a small  blockading  squadron, 
with  a garrison  ixi  the  fort.  Colonel 
“ Billy  ” Wilson  was  somewhat  of  a 
character.  His  regiment,  which  had 
been  raised  almost  entirely  in  New 
York,  was  composed  of  men  who  were 
never  indisposed  to  a little  riotous  sport, 
and  who  knew  nothing  of  fear.  For 
some  months  life  was  rather  tame  at 
Santa  Rosa.  Wilson  and  his  men  had, 
however,  contrived  to  make  themselves 
specially  obnoxious  to  the  Confederates 
on  the  mainland.  Descents  on  the  coast 
were  frequently  threatened;  and  the 
Confederate  supply  boats  were  al- 
ways in  danger.  It  was  not  till  the 
Sep.  night  of  the  2d  of  September  that 
2*  anything  of  a serious  nature  oc- 
curred. On  that  night  a party  from 
Fort  Pickens,  under  Lieutenant  Shepley, 
crossed  over  and  burned  the  dry  dock 
at  the  navy  yard  at  Warrington.  On 
Sep.  fiiG  night  of  the  13th  the  experi- 
ment  was  repeated.  At  the  head 
of  about  one  hundred  men.  Lieutenant 
John  H.  Russel,  of  Commodore  Mer- 
win’s  flag-ship  Colorado,  reached  the 
y^^^i  ^nd  before  morning  had 
boarded  a large  schooner  called  the 
Juda,  then  being  fitted  out  as  a pri- 


vateer, had  spiked  a ten-inch  colum- 
biad  with  which  she  was  armed,  and 
burned  the  vessel  to  the  water’s  edge. 
With  the  help  of  mufided  oars,  they 
managed  to  reach  the  ship,  accomplish 
their  purpose,  and  get  out  of  the  reach 
of  danger  before  tlie  Confederates  were 
aware  of  what  had  happened. 

Naturally  enough,  these  repeated  acts 
of  daring  and  of  violence  roused  the 
Confederates  to  a high  pitch  of  excite- 
ment and  of  indignation.  Such  doings 
were  no  longer  to  be  tolerated.  The 
Nationals  must  be  driven  from  Santa 
Rosa.  Wilson’s  troops  especially  must 
be  captured  or  destroyed.  With  this 
end  in  view.  General  Anderson,  assisted 
by  General  Ruggles,  gathered  together 
about  fifteen  hundred  men,  mostly  vol- 
unteers for  this  special  service,  from  the 
various  camps  in  the  neighborhood  of 
Pensacola.  Embarking  this  force  on^ 
the  night  of  October  8th,  on  sev-  oct. 
eral  steamers,  Anderson  landed  8. 
next  morning  at  Deer  Point,  Santa  Rosa 
Island,  some  four  or  five  miles  to  the 
east  of  the  Zouave  encampment.  Ar- 
ranging his  force  into  three  divisions, 
he  marched  immediately  upon  the  camp. 
The  pickets  were  driven  in;  and  the 
Zouaves,  little  dreaming  of  their  danger, 
found  themselves  beset  by  their  furious 
antagonists.  Death  to  Wilson,”  “No 
quarter” — such  were  the  cries  which 
intimated  too  plainly  the  near  presence 
and  the  deadly  purpose  of  the  Confed- 
erates. The  night  was  unusually  dark. 
The  Zouaves,  however,  were  not  found 
wanting.  Offering  a stout  resistance, 
and  contesting  the  ground  as  they  re- 
tired, they  fell  back  in  good  order, 


68 


XAVAL  AXD  COAST  ‘OPEEATIOXS. 


under  cover  of  the  two  batteries  Lincoln 
and  Totten,  situated  on  either  side  of 
the  island,  and  about  four  hundred 
yards  from  Fort  Pickens.  Here  they 
were  met  by  reinforcements  from  Fort 
Pickens — two  companies  under  Major 
Vogdes  and  other  two  under  Major 
Arnold;  and  the  combined  force  turned 
and  charged  upon  the  Confederates.  The 
latter,  meanwhile,  had  been  rifling  the 
camp  and  setting  Are  to  the  tents  and  the 
ban*acks.  Not  susj)ecting  the  sudden  re- 
turn of  the  Nationals,  Anderson’s  men 
were  somewhat  disorganized.  It  was 
their  turn  now  to  be  taken  by  surprise. 
In  the  wildest  confusion  they  rushed 
towards  the  boats,  the  Nationals  pursu- 
ing and  pouring  volley  upon  volley  into 
their  disordered  ranks.  While  embark- 
ing and  making  sail  they  sutfered  se- 
verely, one  of  their  launches,  loaded 
with  men,  being  so  riddled  with  bullets 
that  it  sank.  The  Confederates,  it  was 
estimated,  lost  by  this  affair  about  one 
hundred  and  flfty  men.  The  National 
' loss  in  killed,  wounded,  and  prisoners, 
amounted  to  sixty-four  men.  Among 
the  prisoners  carried  off  was  Major 
Vogdes.  In  a characteristic  letter,  sent  to 
General  Arthur  of  New  York,  Billy  ” 
Wilson  says,  “ They  are  exhibiting  my 
head  and  hair  in  Pensacola.  The  re- 
ward is  already  claimed ; also,  an  old 
flag  which  I nailed  to  a flagstaff  on  the 
Fourth  of  July,  which  has  been  left 
there  ever  since;  nothing  left,  however, 
but  the  stars.  The  ladies  have  cut  it 
up  in  pieces,  and  have  it  pinned  on 
their  bosoms  as  a trophy.  Every  one 
in  Pensacola  has  my  sword  and  uniform. 
I must  have  had  a large  quantity  of 


hair,  plenty  of  swords  and  uniforms. 
They  say  if  I was  to  be  taken  alive,  I 
was  to  be  put  in  a cage  and  exhibited.” 
Such  was  the  battle  of  Santa  Rosa. 

During  the  course  of  the  next  month 
Colonel  Harvey  Brown,  who  had  charge 
of  the  garrison  at  Fort  Pickens,  acting 
in  conjunction  with  flag-officer  McKean, 
who  was  in  command  of  the  little  block- 
ading squadron  in  the  neighborhood, 
opened  fire  upon  the  Confederate  works 
which  lined  the  shore  from  the  navy 
yard  to  Fort  McRae.  After  a bom- 
bardment of  two  days,  November 
22-23,  the  firing  ceased,  but  not  22. 
until  the  village  of  Warrington  was 
burned.  Fort  McRae  practically  silenced, 
and  great  damage  done  to  ^ the  navy 
yard.  The  Confederate  fortifications  on 
the  mainland  surroundino^  the  harbor 
of  Pensacola  and  in  front  of  Fort  Pick- 
ens were  in  charge  of  General  Braxton 
Bragg. 

Still  following  along  the  coast  in  a 
westerly  direction,  we  come  to  the 
mouths  of  the  Mississippi.  Here,  late  in 
the  year  1861,  occurred  one  of  the  most 
memorable,  if  not  one  of  the  most  im- 
portant, of  those  coast  engagements  to 
which  in  this  chapter  we  have  been  con- 
fining our  attention.  On  the  12th  oct. 
of  October  the  following  despatch  12. 
startled  alike  North  and  South  : 

‘‘Fort  Jacksox,  October  12,  1861. 

‘‘  Last  night  I attacked  the  blockaders 
with  my  little  fleet.  I succeeded,  after 
a very  short  struggle,  in  driving  them 
all  aground  on  the  Southwest  Pass  bar, 
except  the  Preble,  which  I sunk.  I 
captured  a prize  from  them,  and  after 


HOLLINS’  BOAST. 


CO 


fliey  were  fast  in  the  mud,  I peppered 
them  well.  There  were  no  casualties 
on  our  side.  It  was  a complete  suc- 
cess. Hollins.” 

What  were  the  facts  in  this  case? 
The  Confederates  had  exteuiporized  a 
flotilla,  consisting  of  a steam-ram  called 
the  Manassas,  mounted  with  one  sixty- 
four-pounder  Dahlgren ; the  steamer 
Calhoun,  with  one  twenty-four-pounder 
Dahlgren  ; the  steamer  Ivy,  ^\dth  an 
eight-inch  thirty-two-pounder,  rifled ; 
the  steamer  Jackson,  with  two  eight- 
inch  columbiads  ai^d  a twenty-four- 
pounder,  rifled ; and  the  cutter  Pickens, 
with  an  eight-inch  columbiad  and  four 
twenty-four-pound  carronades.  The  Ma- 
nassas was  originally  the  steamer  Enoch 
Train,  but  had  been  completely  recon- 
structed. In  her  new  form  she  had  a pe- 
culiar “ram”-like  shape,  and  altogether 
had  a formidable  appearance.  She  was 
double  planked  all  over  with  wood  of 
six  feet  in  thickness.  Her  bow  extended 
to  a length  of  nine  feet,  and  vras  made 
of  the  thickest  and  the  strong^est  oak. 
The  whole  surface  of  the  vessel  was 
covered  with  iron  plates  two  inches 
thick.  Her  hull  rose  above  the  water 
only  about  two  feet  and  a quarter;  and 
her  deck  was  covered  in  with  a slanting 
roof  of  heavy  wood  covered  with  iron 
plates.  Below  the  water-mark,  and  pro- 
jecting from  her  bow,  was  an  iron  prow 
or  borer,  as  thick  as  a man’s  arm,  in- 
tended to  pierce  and  sink  any  vessel 
she  might  choose  to  strike.  She  was 
one  of  the  first  of  the  ironclads ; and  to 
the  only  ships  which  the  National  gov- 
ernment could  as  yet  oppose  to  her,  she 


was  most  undoubtedly  a dangerous  an- 
tagonist. 

This  flotilla  was  put  under  the  com- 
mand of  Captain  Hollins,  an  officer  of 
immense  pretension,  but  one  who  was 
remembered  chiefly  in  connection  with 
an  exploit  at  San  Juan,  where  he  had 
indulged  his  vanity  and  passion  for  au- 
thority by  burning  an  unoffending  town. 
The  blockade  fleet  on  which  Hollins 
intended  to  operate  was  composed  of 
the  war  steamer  Richmond,  fourteen, 
guns;  of  the  Vincennes,  a sloop-of-war, 
twenty-one  guns ; of  the  Preble,  another 
sloop-of-war,  sixteen  guns;  and  of  the 
Water-Witch  and  Nightingale,  both 
small  steamers  of  one  gun  each.  Hollins 
chose  a dark  night  for  his  experiment. 
The  Manassas  was  close  to  ilie  Richmond 
before  she  was  discovered ; and  by  the 
time  the  watch  could  give  the  alarm, 
lier  iron  prow  struck  the  Richmond 
“abreast  the  port  fore-channels,”  tear- 
ing a coal  schooner  that  was  alongside 
from  her  fastenings,  and  penetrating 
the  ship’s  side,  making  a hole  about 
five  inches  in  circumference  and  about 
two  feet  below  the  water-line.  The 
ram  drew  off,  and  falling  aft,  made  an 
attempt  to  strike  with  her  prow  the 
Richmond’s  stern.  The  attempt  was. 
unsuccessful.  Meanwhile,  as  the  mon- 
ster passed,  the  Richmond  gave  it  a 
volley  from  the  port  battery.  The 
other  sloops  had  been  notified  of  the 
appearance  of  the  Manassas;  and  hav- 
ing slipped  their  cables,  they  ran  down 
to  the  Pass,  the  Richmond  covering  their 
retreat.  At  about  eight  o’clock  in  the 
morning,  the  other  vessels  being  inside, 
the  Richmond  and  Vincennes  grounded 


202 


70 


NAVAL  AND  COAST  OPERATIONS. 


while  attempting  to  pass  the  bar.  There 
they  were  bombarded  by  the  Manassas ; 
and  fire  rafts  were  sent  down  to  burn 
them.  The  fire  rafts  proved  perfectly 
harmless;  and  at  ten  o’clock  the  Con- 
federate commodore  withdrew,  ran  up 
to  Fort  Jackson,  and  sent  news  of  his 
splendid  victory  to  Richmond.  After 
a fashion,  Hollins  had  no  doubt  won  a 
victory ; but  he  had  done  little  damage 
to  the  National  ships.  A coal  schooner 
had  been  bruised;  a boat  had  been 
sunk ; and  Captain  Pope’s  gig  had  been 
staved  in.  That  was  all.  It  was  not 
wonderful,  therefore,  that  when  the 
true  facts  of  the  case  became  known, 
Hollins’  famous  exploit  was  made  the 
subject  of  much  merriment  and  ridicule. 
The  Manassas,  at  this  date,  was  by  far 
the  most  powerful  and  efficient  ship  of 
war  in  North  American  waters;  and, 
in  capable  hands,  she  might  have  anni- 
hilated the  small  blockading  squadron, 
cleared  the  gulf,  and  swept  the  coast 
from  Florida  to  Maine.  As  it  was,  she 
did  little  harm  and  some  good.  She 
taught  the  government  at  Washing- 
ton that  other  than  wooden  walls  were 
now  necessary,  and  that  if  the  battle 
was  to  be  fought  at  sea  with  any  hope 
of  success,  ironclad  must  be  confronted 
by  ironclad,  if  not  of  equal  tonnage,  at 
least  of  equal  power  for  resistance  and 
attack. 

Later,  in  the  fall,  Hampton  Roads 
presented  a spectacle  not  unlike,  but  in 
some  respects  more  imposing  than,  that 
witnessed  towards  the  close  of  August, 
when  Butler  and  Stringham  set  sail  for 
Hatteras.  It  was  also  a land  and  naval 
armament,  but  on  a grander  scale,  and 


was  fitted  out  for  the  purpose  of  mak- 
ing a descent  on  the  borders  of  lower 
South  Carolina.  The  land  force  of  the 
expedition  had  been  assembled  at  An- 
napolis, in  Maryland.  It  was  about 
fifteen  thousand  strong,  and  was  placed 
in  charge  of  Brigadier-General  T.  W. 
Sherman.  The  fleet,  which  consisted  ( t 
some  seventy-seven  vessels  in  all,  in- 
cluding fourteen  gunboats,  thirty-four 
steamers,  and  twenty-six  sailing  vessels, 
was  placed  under  the  command  of  Com- 
modore S.  F.  Dupont. 

The  commanders  to  wffiom  this  expe- 
dition was  entrusted  were  well  chosen. 

Thomas  W.  Sherman,  not  to  be  con- 
founded with  W.  T.  Sherman,  was  a 
native  of  Rhode  Island.  He  graduated 
at  West  Point  in  183G,  taking  a high 
place  in  his  class,  and  was  appointed 
second  lieutenant  in  the  Third  U.  S. 
Artillery  in  July  of  the  same  year.  In 
1837  he  was  promoted  to  a first  lieuten- 
ancy; and  on  May  28th,  1846,  on  the 
outbreak  of  the  Mexican  war,  he  was 
made  captain.  For  his  gallant  conduct 
at  Buena  Vista,  February  23d,  1847, 
he  was  brevetted  major.  On  the  form- 
ation of  the  Fifth  Artillery,  he  was  ap- 
pointed lieutenant-colonel,  and  in  this 
capacity  took  part  in  the  battle  of  Bull 
Run.  He  was  advanced  to  the  rank  of 
brigadier-general  May  17th,  1861. 

Commodore  Samuel  F.  Dupont  was 
born  at  Bergen  Point,  New  Jersey,  in 
1803.  His  father,  a Frenchman,  as  the 
name  indicates,  came  to  the  United 
States  in  1799.  The  Delaware  Mills, 
where  is  manufactured  the  famous 
“Dupont  powdei*,”  were  founded  by 
an  uncle ; and  the  works  still  remain  in 


“THE  GREAT  ARMADA” 


n 


the  possession  of  the  family.  Young 
Dupont  entered  the  United  States  navy 
December  19th,  1815,  having  received 
from  President  Madison  his  warrant  as 
a midshipman.  His  first  cruise  was  in 
the  Franklin.  When  the  Mexican  war 
broke  out,  he  was  in  command  of  the 
frigate  Congress,  but  was  transferred  to 
the  Cyane.  It  was  he  who  transported 
Colonel  Fremont,  with  his  band  of  trap- 
pers and  Indians,  to  San  Diego,  the 
Cyane  being  the  first  United  States 
man-of-war  to  enter  that  harbor.  After 
his  return  from  the  Pacific,  he  was  em- 
ployed in  various  ways  and  in  different 
capacities,  his  high  character,  his  knowl- 
edge of  his  profession,  his  powers  of 
organization,  and  his  business  habits 
always  revealing  themselves  and  justi- 
fying the  confidence  reposed  in  him. 
In  1857  he  sailed  for  China  in  the  Min- 
nesota ; in  186Q  he  was  placed  in  charge 
of  the  navy  yard  at  Philadelphia ; and 
now,  at  the  close  of  1861,  we  find  him 
at  the  head  of  this  great  naval  expedi- 
tion. 

The  fleet,  with  the  troops  on  board, 
sailed  out  of  Hampton  Roads  and  pro- 
0ft.  ceeded  to  sea  on  the  morning  of 
29*  the  29th  of  October.  Never  did 
any  such  expedition  leave  port  under 
auspices,  to  outward  appearances,  more 
favorable.  The  sun  rose  and  shone  with 
unusual  splendor,  revealing  the  rich 
robes  with  which,  in  the  late  fall,  na- 
ture in  those  regions  clothes  herself. 
From  an  early  hour  the  ramparts  at 
Fortress  Monroe  were  crowded  with  sol- 
diers ; hearty  hurrahs  greeted  each  vessel 
as  it  took  its  position ; while  the  military 
bands  on  the  transports,  striking  up  a 


succession  of  favorite  tunes,  intensified 
the  general  excitement  and  inspired  all 
with  hope.  Sherman’s  troops  were  di- 
vided into  three  brigades,  and  were  com- 
manded respectively  by  Generals  Egbert 
L.  Viele,  Isaac  I.  Stevens,  and  Horatio 
G.  Wright,  each  of  the  commanders, 
like  Sherman  himself,  being  a graduate 
‘ of  West  Point  Military  Academy.  The 
flag-ship  Wabash  led  the  way,  the  others 
following  in  three  parallel  lines,  and 
from  the  vast  space  which  they  covered, 
as  well  as  from  the  order  which  they 
preserved,  presenting  a most  magnificent 
spectacle.  The  weather  continued  good 
all  day.  It  was  a glorious  night.  The 
next  day  was  all  that  could  be  wished. 
The  vessels  were  still  in  the  same  order 
in  which  they  started.  On  the  second 
night  it  was  still  calm.  There  was  no 
moon ; but  the  stars  shining  bright  and 
clear,  looked  down  upon  a scene  of 
rare  and  matchless  beauty.  With  such 
weather  dawned  the  mornins:  of  the 
third  day ; and  so  clear  was  the  atmos- 
phere and  so  unruffled  the  water,  that 
a passenger  on  the  Atlantic  was  able  to 
count  no  fewer  than  thirty-eight  of  the 
vessels  of  the  fleet. 

The  objective  point  of  the  expedition 
had  been  studiously  concealed  from  the 
public ; and  it  was  unknown  to  the  mas- 
ters and  men  of  the  different  ships.  It 
was  known  only  to  the  government  and 
to  those  in  immediate  command.  To 
provide  against  mishap,  however,  sealed 
orders  were  on  board  every  vessel.  The 
great  object  of  this  secrecy  was  to  ena- 
ble them  to  strike  the  intended  point 
by  surprise,  and  to  accomplish  their 
mission  before  the  Confederates  should 


NAVAL  AND  COAST  OPERATIONS. 


72-‘ 


have  time  to  make  preparations  for 
their  arrival.  Such  a course  had  been 
deemed  advisable ; as  recent  experi- 
ence had  shown  that,  from  the  number 
and  efficiency  of  Southern  spies,  male 
and  female,  in  the  National  capital,  the 
plans  of  government  were  known  to 
the  authorities  at  Richmond  before  they 
were  known  to  the  public  at  Washing- 
ton. It  even  seemed  as  if  the  Richmond 
spy  had  found  his  w^ay  into  the  very 
council  chamber  of  the  president  and 
his  ministers.  The  precaution  unfor- 
tunately was  doomed  to  fail  of  its  pur- 
pose; but  the  failure  itself  disclosed 
the  wisdom  and  foresight  with  which 
all  the  arrangements  had  been  made. 

Toward  the  evening  of  the  third  day 
heavy  clouds  gathered  and  darkened 
the  face  of  the  sky,  the  wind  began  to 
rise,  and  everything  indicated  a coming 
storm.  Come  it  did,  and  quickly;  and 
such  a storm  as* has  seldom  raged  along 
the  southern  coast.  It  literally  scat- 
tered the  fleet  to  the  winds;  and  for  a 
time  it  was  feared  that  the  “ Great  Ar- 
mada,” as  it  was  fondly  but  somewhat 
ominously  called,  had  been  completely 
destroyed.  On  the  morning  of 
the  2d  of  November  only  one 
vessel  could  be  seen  from  the  deck  of 
the  Wabash.  The  first  intelligence  of 
the  disaster  reached  the  North  through 
Southern  sources,  and,  of  course,  was 
highly  colored.  The  South  was  jubilant. 
The  North,  it  was  said,  was  opposing  it- 
self to  fate.  The  elements  were  fighting 
in  the  interests  of  the  Southern  cause. 
“The  stars  in  their  courses  fought 
against  Sisera.  The  winds  of  heaven 
were  now  fighting  for  the  good  cause  of 


Southern  independence.  Let  the  Debo- 
rahs of  the  South  sing  a song  of  deliv- 
erance.” Such  was  the  highly- wrought 
style  in  which  Southern  enthusiasm 
found  expression.  Affairs,  however, 
were  not  quite  so  desperate  as  they 
seemed.  The  fleet,  although  dispersed, 
was  not  ruined.  In  the  isolated  state  in 
which  the  different  vessels  found  them- 
selves, the  sealed  orders  were  opened ; 
and  it  was  found  that  Port  Royal  was  the 
place  of  rendezvous.  On  Sunday  morn- 
ing, the  3d  of  November,  the  storm  be- 
gan to  abate ; and  the  scattered  vessels 
one  by  one  gathered  around  the  flag- 
ship. On  the  following  morning,  jfov. 
as  early  as  eight  o’clock,  the  Wa- 
bash  anchored  off  Port  Royal,  accom- 
panied by  twenty-five  vessels,  and  being 
rapidly  joined  by  the  rest  of  the  fleet. 
It  was  found  that,  during  that  fearful 
storm,  some  of  the  war-ships  were  saved 
by  throwing  their  heavy  guns  over- 
board, that  four  transports  went  down, 
but  that,  happily,  not  more  than  a dozen 
persons  lost  their  lives. 

Saved  from  the  perils  of  the  deep, 
they  were  now  to  encounter  perils  of  a 
different  but  not  less  alarming  kind. 
The  Confederates  had  done  their  best 
to  make  the  navigation  of  the  coast  dif- 
ficult, if  not  impossible.  All  the  light- 
houses were  destroyed ; and  all  the 
beacons  and  buoys  had  been  removed. 
Scientific  skill,  however,  soon  overcame 
these  difficulties;  and  with  the  help  of 
Commander  Charles  H.  Davis,  the  chief 
of  staff,  and  Mr.  Boutelle  of  the  Coast 
Survey,  the  entrance  to  Port  Royal 
Sound  was  found,  and  so  marked  off 
with  buoys  that  Dupont  was  able  to 


POUT  ROYAL. 


73 


enter  with  his  fleet.  He  was  told  that 
he  could  count  with  confidence  on  eight- 
een feet  of  water.  The  movement  com- 
menced shortly  after  three  o’clock ; and 
Ly  twilight  all  the  vessels,  which  had 
arrived,  were,  with  the  exception  of 
the  Wabash,  over  the  bar  and  anchored 
in  the  roadstead  of  Port  Royal.  Other 
difiiculties,  however,  had  to  be  encoun- 
tered. The  Confederates,  in  conse- 
quence of  the  mishap  which  had  be- 
fallen the  fleet,  had  had  ample  time, 
after  they  became  aware  of  the  destina- 
tion of  the  expedition,  to  strengthen 
the  works  in  the  neighborhood  of  Port 
Royal,  and  otherwise  to  prepare  them- 
selves for  a vigorous  and  stubborn  re- 
sistance. The  time  had  not  been  lost. 
On  the  right  of  the  entrance,  on  St. 
Philip’s  Island,  at  what  is  called  Bay 
Point,  stood  Fort  Beauregard.  This 
was  an  earth \vork ; but  it  was  carefully 
built,  and  mounted  some  twenty  guns, 
several  of  them  heavy  rifles.  It  had  an 
outwork,  toward  the  sea,  mounting  five 
guns.  On  the  left,  on  Hilton  Head, 
stood  Fort  Walker.  This  was  a regular- 
work,  with  bastions  and  curtains.  Built 
upon  a blutf  eight  feet  high,  and  mount- 
ing twenty-three  guns,  with  an  outwork 
on  the  sea  front  having  a rifled  gun. 
Fort  Walker  commanded  not  only 
Port  Royal  entrance,  but  the  approach 
to  the  town  of  Beaufort  by  the  Beau- 
fort River.  Of  the  two  works,  it  was 
by  far  the  more  formidable.  When 
the  expedition  arrived.  Fort  Walker 
was  manned  by  some  six  hundred  and 
twenty  men,  and  was  in  charge  of  Gen- 
ei-al  T.  F.  Drayton,  a rich  land-owner 
of  the  neighborhood.  At  Camp  Look- 


out, about  six  miles  from  Fort  Walker, 
was  a small  body  of  Scriven’s  guer- 
rillas, which  was  ultiiuately  increased 
in  strength  to  the  number  of  nearly 
two  thousand  men.  There  were  over 
six  hundred  men  at  Bay  Point,  under 
Colonel  R.  G.  M.  Dunovant.  Of  this 
force  one  hundred  and  forty-nine  garri- 
soned Fort  Beauregard,  under  the  com- 
mand of  Captain  Stephen  Elliott,  jr.,  of 
Beaufort.  Two  miles  further  up,  at 
the  junction  of  the  Beaufort  and  Broad 
Rivers,  there  was  a fleet  of  five  or  six 
gunboats,  under  Commodore  Josiah  Tat- 
nall,  a veteran  of  the  war  of  1812. 

A reconnoisance  of  the  Confederate 
works  was  made  on  the  5th  by  the  jvov, 
Ottawa,  supported  by  the  Curlew, 
Seneca,  and  Smith,  when  it  was  ascer- 
tained that  of  the  two  forts.  Fort  Walker 
was  greatly  the  more  powerful.  The 
Wabash,  which  had  been  unable  to  cross 
with  the  other  vessels,  was  now  safely 
over  the  bar,  and  everything  was  ready 
for  a movement  against  the  enemy  and 
his  works.  ‘‘The  order  of  battle,”  to 
quote  from  Dupont’s  report,  “comprised 
a main  squadron,  ranged  in  a line  ahead, 
and  a flanking  squadron,  which  was  to 
be  thrown  off  on  the  northern  section 
of  the  harbor,  to  engage  the  enemy’s 
flotilla,  and  prevent  them  taking  the 
rear  ships  of  the  main  line,  when  it 
turned  to  the  southward,  or  cutting  off 
a disabled  vessel.”  If  this  plan  could 
be  carried  out,  it  would  be  impossible 
for  Tatnall  with  his  gunboats  to  hinder 
or  in  any  way  annoy  the  main  body 
while  carrying  out  instructions.  “ The 
plan  of  attack,”  to  quote  from  the  same 
authority,  “ was  to  pass  up  midway  be- 


74 


NAVAL  AND  COAST  OPERATIONS. 


tween  Forts  Walker  and  Beauregard, 
receiving  and  returning  the  fire  of  both, 
to  a distance  about  two  and  a half  miles 
north  of  the  latter.  At  that  point,  the 
line  was  to  turn  to  the  south  around  by 
the  west  and  close  in  with  Fort  Walker, 
encountering  it  on  its  weakest  flank, 
and  at  the  same  time  enfilading  in  near- 
ly a direct  line  its  two  water  faces.” 
“ When  abreast  of  the  fort,  the  engine 
w^as  to  be  slowed,  and  the  movement 
reduced  to  only  as  much  as  would  be 
just  sufficient  to  overcome  the  tide,  to 
preserve  the  order  of  battle,  by  passing 
the  batteries  in  slow  succession,  and  to 
avoid  becoming  a fixed  mark  for  the 
enemy’s  fire.  On  reaching  the  extrem- 
ity of  Hilton  Head,  the  line  was  to 
turn  to  the  north  by  the  east,  and  pass- 
ing to  the  northward,  to  engage  Fort 
Walker  with  the  port  battery  nearer 
than  when  first  on  the  same  course. 
These  evolutions  were  to  be  repeated.” 
The  ships  were  to  pass  the  forts  at  eight 
hundred  yards  when  moving  to  the 
south  for  the  first  time,  but  when  mak- 
ing the  second  circuit  they  were  to  sight 
their  guns  for  five  hundred  and  fifty 
yards.  This  arrangement  would  make 
it  next  to  impossible  for  the  guns  of 
the  fort  to  strike  the  vessels.  The  latter 
would  be  in  motion ; and  they  would  be 
three  hundred  yards  nearer  than  when 
they  passed  at  first. 

The  caj)tains  were  summoned  on 
board  the  Wabash  and  received  their 
I^ov.  instructions.  It  was  the  7th  of 
November.  At  eight  o’clock  the 
signal  was  made  to  get  under  way. 
At  nine  o’clock  the  signal  was  made 
for  close  order.”  At  about  half-past 


nine  the  action  was  commenced,  the 
first  shot  being  fired  from  Fort  Walker. 
The  W abash  responded  promptly.  The 
Susquehanna  quickly  followed.  The 
first  prescribed  turn  having  been  made, 
the  signal  was  given  at  a quarter  past 
ten  for  “closer  action.”  The  Wabash 
came  up,  and  passed  Fort  Walker  at 
the  distance,  when  abreast,  of  eight 
hundred  yards.  The  Susquehanna  and 
the  others  followed.  A second  time 
was  the  elliptical  movement  performed, 
the  ships  this  time  passing  the  fort  and 
firing  at  a distance  of  less  than  six  hun- 
dred yards.  About  this  time,  half-past 
eleven,  the  enemy’s  flag  was  shot  away. 
Meanwhile  good  and  effective  work  was 
being  done  by  some  of  the  smaller  ves- 
sels, which  had  taken  their  stations  at 
the  enfilading  point.  It  was  evident 
that  the  garrison  was  becoming  exhaust- 
ed. The  firing  was  already  feeble,  from 
few  guns,  and  at  long  intervals.  After 
the  third  circuit,  “the  enemy  had  en- 
tirely ceased  to  reply,  and  the  battle 
was  ended.”  At  a quarter  past  one 
P.  M.  the  Ottawa  signalled  that  the 
fort  was  abandoned.  It  was  discovered 
a little  later  in  the  day  that  Fort  Beau- 
regard, whose  guns  had  been  silent  for 
some  time,  was  also  abandoned.  At 
twenty  minutes  past  two  o’clock,  Cap- 
tain John  Kodgei  s,  who  had  been  sent 
on  shore  with  a flag  of  truce,  hoisted 
the  Union  flag  over  the  abandoned  work. 
At  sunrise  on  the  following  mornim^ 
the  old  flag  was  raised  also  over  Fort 
Beauregard.  The  National  loss  during 
the  engagement  was  thirty-one,  of  whom 
eight  were  killed.  The  Confederates 
reported  a loss  of  fifty  in  all,  of  whom 


PORT  ROYAL  FERRY. 


75 


ten  were  killed.  No  life  was  lost  in 
Fort  Beaureo^ard.  Both  forts  were  form- 
ally  taken  possession  of,  Fort  Walker 
on  the  day  of  the  battle  by  General 
Wright’s  brigade,  Fort  Beauregard  on 
the  morning  of  the  8th  by  the  brigade 
of  General  Stevens.  The  great  object 
of  the  expedition  had  thus  been  accom- 
plished. 

It  was  of  all  things  most  natural  that 
there  should  be  great  joy  and  rejoicing 
in  the  North.  Over  the  soil  of  South 
Carolina,  which  was  the  first  State  to 
raise  the  standard  of  rebellion,  the 
Union  flag  was  again  floating.  It  was 
just  as  natural  that  the  loss  of  Port 
Royal  should  have  been  felt  to  be  an 
irreparable  blow  by  the  South.  The 
feeling  was  universal  that  an  important 
step  had  been  taken  on  the  part  of  the 
Nationals  towards  the  recovery  of  the 
entire  southern  coast. 

General  Sherman  was  not  slow  to 
take  advantage  of  his  victory.  Hilton 
Head  was  greatly  strengthened,  and 
made  a depot  for  supplies.  An  im- 
mense wharf  was  constructed;  build- 
ings of  various  kinds  were  multiplied  ; 
and  Flilton  Head  and  Port  Royal  Island 
^oon  became  great  centres  of  life  and 
industry.  Beaufort,  a delightful  little 
town  on  Port  Royal  Island,  and  the  fa- 
vorite summer  retreat  of  the  aristocracy 
of  South  Carolina,  where  some  of  them 
had  built  luxurious  homes,  hid  fi'om 
view  by  vine-covered  verandahs^  em- 
bosomed in  groves  of  orange  and  lemon, 
and  surrounded  on  all  sides  by  the  gor- 
geous plants  and  rich  fruitage  of  the 
tropics,  was  entirely  abandoned  by  the 
white  population.  For  a few  days 


Beaufort  was  entirely  at  the  mercy  of 
the  negroes,  who,  in  the  homes  of  their 
former  masters,  gave  themselves  up  to 
all  manner  of  licentiousness,  indulging 
in  scenes  of  wildest  revelry  and  waste- 
fulness. Beaufort  was  soon  occupied 
by  the  National  troops;  and  military 
order  was  substituted  for  barbarous  li- 
cense. Meanwhile  Dupont  had  sent  his 
vessels  in  various  directions,  up  the  riv- 
ers, among  the  islands,  and  along  the 
coast.  Everywhere,  it  was  found,  the 
whites  had  fled,  the  slaves  who  had  re- 
fused to  accompany  them  remaining 
behind  and  occupying  the  plantations 
and  houses.  Expeditions  were  sent 
north  towards  the  bay  of  St.  Helena 
and  south  towards  Warsaw  Sound. 
Both  were  completely  successful.  The 
Confederates  in  truth  having  disappear- 
ed, there  was  no  one  to  offer  resistance. 
Both  positions  were  of  great  strategic 
value,  in  view  of  future  operations. 
The  possession  of  the  bay  of  St.  Helena 
secured  the  command  of  large  rivers 
communicating  with  the  interior  of 
South  Carolina,  as  well  as  an  excellent 
harbor — a harbor  almost  equal  to  that 
of  Charleston  itself.  The  possession  of 
Warsaw  Inlet  and  Sound  secured  the 
command  of  an  entrance  to  the  Savan- 
nah River,  with  a passage  little  inferior 
to  that  of  Tybee,  a little  more  to  the 
north.  Some  days  later,  on  the  ]Vov, 
25th,  Big  Tybee  Island  was  also  25. 
seized ; and  Dupont  was  able  to  write 
to  the  secretary  of  war : “The  flag  of 
the  United  States  is  flying  over  the  ter- 
ritory of  the  State  of  Georgia.”  All 
along  the  coast,  from  Warsaw  Sound, 
below  the  mouth  of  the  Savannah, 


76 


NAVAL  AND  COAST  OPERATIONS. 


northward  as  far  as  the  North  Edisto 
River,  the  National  authority  was  su- 
preme. With  but  two  exceptions,  every 
fort  on  the  islands  throughout  that  re- 
gion had  been  abandoned.  Forts  Pu- 
laski and  Jackson,  the  one  on  Cockspur 
Island,  at  the  mouth  of  the  entrance, 
the  other  on  the  mainland  of  Georgia 
and  above  the  other  approaches  from 
the  sea,  still  remained  in  the  hands  of 
the  Confederates,  and  effectually  guard- 
ed the  river  and  city  of  Savannah. 

At  one  place  only  did  the  Confede- 
rates make  a stand  in  defence  of  the 
islands  off  the  coast  of  South  Carolina 
and  Georgia.  It  was  known  that  they 
had  a fortified  camp  at  Port  Royal 
Ferry,  on  the  Coosa w,  and  that  they 
had  collected  a force  there,  under  Gen- 
erals Gregg  and  Pope,  some  eight  thou- 
sand strong.  It  was  evidently  their 
intention  to  shut  up  the  Nationals  in 
Port  Royal  Island — at  least  so  to  shut 
them  up  as  to  prevent  them  crossing  to 
the  mainland  in  the  direction  of  Savan- 
nah. To  this  end  they  had  placed  ob- 
structions in  the  Coosaw  River  and  the 
other  streams  and  creeks  which  sep- 
arate the  island  from  the  mainland, 
and  erected  batteries  at  Seabrook,  at 
Boyd’s  Creek,  at  Port  Royal  Ferry, 
and  at  other  commanding  positions. 
Dupont  had  already  made  an  unsuc- 
cessful attempt  to  reach  the  Savannah 
River  by  way  of  Augustine  Creek, 
in  the  rear  of  Fort  Pulaski.  This 
accomplished,  he  might  have  been  able 
to  cut  off  all  communication  with  the 
fort,  and  take  possession  of  the  city 
.of  Savannah.  The  Confederates,  how- 
.ever,  had  been  on  their  guard ; and  the 


expedition  failed.  It  was  felt  to  be 
necessary  to  break  up  the  fortified  camp 
at  Port  Royal  Ferry;  and  with  this  end 
in  view  a joint  land  and  naval  force,  un- 
der Brigadier-General  Stevens  and  Com- 
mander C.  R.  P.  Rodgers  was  organized. 
The  troops  under  Stevens  consisted  of 
Colonel  Frazier’s  Forty-Seventh  and 
Colonel  Perry’s  Forty-Eighth  New  York 
regiments ; the  Seventy-Ninth  New 
York  Highlanders,  Major  Morrison ; the 
Fiftieth  Pennsylvania,  Colonel  Crist; 
the  Eighth  Michigan,  Colonel  Fenton; 
and  the  One  Hundredth  Pennsylvania 
(Roundheads),  Colonel  Leasure ; in  all 
about  five  thousand  men.  The  naval 
force  assembled  at  Beaufort,  and  was 
composed  of  the  Ottawa,  Seneca,  Pem- 
bina, and  Hale,  with  the  ferryboat  Helen 
and  four  boats  belonging  to  the  Wa- 
bash, each  of  these  last  carrying  a P- 
pound  howitzer. 

The  expedition  moved  on  the  evening 
of  the  31st  of  December.  The  Dec. 
greater  portion  of  this  fleet  went 
up  the  Broad  River,  on  the  west  side  of 
Port  Royal  Island,  their  purpose  being 
to  approach  the  ferry  by  Whale  Creek. 
The  land  forces  made  their  way  to  a 
point  where  the  Brick-Yard  Creek,  a 
continuation  of  the  Beaufort  River, 
unites  with  the  Coosaw.  There  Com- 
mander Rodgers  met  Stevens  with 
launches ; and  the  troops  were  embark- 
ed. It  was  the  first  morning  of  the 
new  year  1862.  Some  of  the  troops 
landed  at  Haywood’s  plantation,  and 
the  remainder  at  Adams’  plantation,  the 
next  landing.  A forward  march  against 
the  Confederates  was  at  once  begun. 
The  Eighth  Michigan  were  thrown  out 


A FLAG  OF  TRUCE. 


77 


as  skirmisliers,  the  gunboats  opening  a 
brisk  fire  into  the  woods  in  their  front. 
The  Seventy-Ninth  New  York  (High- 
landers) were  in  front  of  the  main  body. 
They  were  now  near  the  ferry,  when  a 
concealed  battery  opened  upon  them 
with  grape  and  cannister.  The  brunt 
of  this  fire  was  borne  by  the  Highland- 
ers and  the  Eighth  Michigan.  The  Fif- 
tieth Pennsylvania  rushed  forward  to 
their  support.  The  boats,  coming  up 
one  after  the  other,  brought  so  heavy 
a fire  to  bear  on  the  works  that  they 
were  soon  abandoned.  Immediately 
after  the  Ottawa  was  anchored  the  ferry 
was  opened ; and  the  Pennsylvania 
Koundheads  passed  over  and  took  pos- 
session of  the  abandoned  fort.  At  four 
o’clock  they  were  joined  by  General 
Stevens  with  the  advance  guard.  About 
this  time  the  Confederates  appeared  in 
force  and  in  line  of  battle  on  the  Na- 
tional right.  The  Ottawa  and  the  Pem- 
bina were  ordered  to  move  a short  dis- 
tance down  the  river,  where  they  opened 
fire  with  their  11-inch  and  Parrott  guns, 
flinging  their  shells  into  the  midst  of 
the  Confederates,  driving  them  through 
the  woods  and  clearing  the  National 
flank.  It  was  now  sunset.  There  was 
a pause  in  the  battle. 

A messenger  from  the  Confederates 
appeared  at  one  of  the  outposts,  bearing 
a flag  of  truce,  and  asking  permission 


to  carry  off  their  dead  and  wounded. 
At  this  moment  the  gunboats  reopened 
fire ; and  before  General  Stevens’  mes- 
senger could  convey  his  reply,  granting 
one  hour  to  carry  off  the  wounded,  the 
offiicer  who  brought  the  flag  of  truce  had 
galloped  off.  The  enemy  reappeared 
in  the  morning,  when  the  gunboats 
Ottawa,  Seneca,  Pembina,  Helen,  and 
Hale  all  opened  fire,  flinging  shot  and 
shell  into  the  woods.  It  was,  however, 
but  of  short  duration.  At  forty  minutes 
past  nine  o’clock  the  troops,  having 
demolished  the  works  and  fired  some 
houses  in  the  neighborhood,  began  to 
recross  the  ferry.  The  Confederates 
made  no  further  demonstration.  By 
noon  the  troops  were  all  over ; and  the 
field  guns,  at  the  request  of  General 
Stevens,  were  landed  for  the  purpose 
of  covering  the  rear  of  the  returning 
column.  So  ended  the  attack  on  Port 
Boyal  Ferry.  General  Stevens  lost 
nine  men.  Major  Watson  of  the  Eighth 
Michigan  was  mortally  wounded. 

So  far  these  coast  expeditions  had 
been  successful.  The  Nationals  were 
masters  of  Hatteras  Inlet ; and  on  the 
southern  borders  of  South  Carolina 
and  the  northern  borders  of  Georgia 
the  Confederates  had  been  driven 
from  every  stronghold,  with  the  two 
exceptions.  Fort  Jackson  and  Fort  Pu- 
laski. 


78 


FORTS  HENRY  AND  DONELSON. 


CHAPTER  VI. 


The  Beginning  of  1862. — State  of  Public  Feeling. — The  Army  of  the  Potomac  a Splendid  Toy. — McClellan’s 
Keasons  for  Delay. — Kesignation  of  General  Scott. — The  War  Office. — Stanton  succeeds  Cameron. — New  Lite 
in  the  Government. — The  Army  Ordered  to  Move. — The  Protection  of  Washington. — The  West. — Halleck  and 
Buell. — Sidney  Johnston. — Mill  Spring. — Zollikofifer  Killed. — General  Thomas. — The  Confederate  Line  of 
Defense. — Halleck's  Plan  of  Attack. — Where  to  Strike. — The  Army  at  Cairo. — General  Grant  in  Command. — 
Fort  Henry. — Foote  and  His  Flotilla. — The  Army  in  Motion. — A Thunder-Storm. — Fire  Opened  upon  the 
Fort  by  the  Gunboats. — Tilghman  Lowers  His  Flag. — Fort  Henry  Occupied  by  the  Nationals. — The  Union 
Flag  Floats  again  over  the  Soil  of  Tennessee. — The  Fall  of  Fort  Henry  a damaging  Blow  to  the  South. — Joy 
in  the  North. — Fort  Donelson. — Its  Position. — Its  Strength. — General  Albert  Sidney  Johnston. — Pillow, 
Floyd,  and  Buckner. — The  March  on  Donelson. — Foote's  Flotilla  on  the  Cumberland. — Fire  Opened  upon  the 
Fort. — The  Nationals  Repulsed. — The  Night  of  the  Thirteenth  of  February. — Two  separate  Attacks  and  Two 
Failures. — The  Confederates  full  of  Confidence. — Sally  of  the  Garrison. — McClernand  vigorously  Attacked. — 
The  Nationals  Forced  Back. — General  Lewis  Wallace  makes  a determined  Stand. — A Lull. — Grant  Arrives. — A 
general  Attack  ordered. — The  Confederates  Driven  Back  within  their  Entrenchments. — Lost  Ground  Re- 
claimed.— A Fearful  Night. — Humanity  of  Wallace. — Floyd  and  Pillow  make  their  Escape. — Buckner  Proposes 
to  Surrender. — Grant’s  Terms. — “Unconditional  and  Immediate  Surrender.” — Buckner  Indignant. — Fall  of 


Donelson. — A Great  Victory  and  Great  Rejoicing. 

" The  year  1862  opened  rather  gloom- 

1862  campaigns  of  the  pre- 

vious year  had  not  been  particu- 
larly encouraging  to  the  Northern  cause. 
At  Washington  there  was  much  excite- 
ment, not  a little  activity,  but  no  re- 
joicing. The  army  of  the  Potomac  had 
been  reconstructed  and  put  in  splendid 
condition.  Never  was  army  more  thor- 
oughly drilled  or  more  perfectly  equip- 
ped for  battle.  It  reflected  the  highest 
credit  on  General  McClellan,  and  gave 
abundant  evidence  that,  whatever  might 
be  his  qualities  on  the  field  of  actual 
warfare,  he  had  as  a military  organizer 
few,  if  any,  equals  among  the  command- 
ers of  his  time.  But  armies  are  not 
intended  to  be  splendid  toys,  magnifi- 
cent playthings.  When  the  army  of 
the  Potomac  was  brought  up  to  a fight- 
ins:  condition,  no  haste  was  made  to 


turn  it  to  account.  The  enemy,  who 
had  mightily  increased  his  strength,  was 
all  but  knocking  at  the  gates  of  the 
capital ; but  the  general-in-chief  seemed 
to  have  no  other  use  for  his  well  trained 
and  gorgeously  equipped  army  than  to 
exhibit  its  skill  in  evolution,  to  the  daily 
delight  of  the  people  of  Washington. 
The  toy  was  splendid  ; McClellan  seem- 
ed unwilling  to  mar  its  beauty.  It  was 
not  all  at  once  that  these  thoughts 
entered  the  minds  of  even  the  more 
thoughtful  and  reflective  of  the  people 
of  the  North.  For  a time  they  approved 
and  applauded.  As  the  army  of  the 
Potomac  grew  in  beauty  and  in  strength, 
it  was  as  much  a source  of  delight  and 
hope  to  them  as  it  was  evidently  a pride 
to  its  commander.  Hope  deferred,  how- 
ever, maketh  the  heart  sick.  Delay 
gave  birth  to  impatience.  Before  the 


EDWIN  M.  STANTON. 


79 


end  of  October  the  previous  year,  the 
army  under  the  immediate  care  of 
McClellan  had  reached  a strength  of 
nearly  one  hundred  and  twenty  thou- 
sand men.  It  was  his  opinion  that  the 
advance  upon  Manassas  should  not  be 
postponed  beyond  the  25th  of  Novem- 
ber ; and  it  was  his  desire  that,  as  far 
as  was  possible,  all  the  other  armies 
should  make  sacrifices,  so  as  to  add  to 
the  actual  strength  under  his  command. 
In  the  interval,  on  the  31st  of  October, 
he  was  made  commander-in-chief,  on 
the  resignation  of  Genei^al  Scott.  With 
the  change  in  his  position  there  came  a 
change  in  his  views.  Up  until  this 
time  he  had  undervalued  the  importance 
of  possible  effort  in  the  West.  Now  he 
wished  to  make  a simultaneous  move- 
ment in  East  Tennessee  and  Virginia, 
and  capture  Nashville  contemporane- 
ously with  Richmond.  In  order  to 
bring  up  the  armies  of  the  West  to  the 
same  high  standard  with  the  army  of 
the  Potomac,  further  delay  was  neces- 
sary. So  the  month  of  November  rolled 
past,  the  weather  having  been  fine  and 
the  roads  in  excellent  condition  for  mil- 
itary movements ; and  to  the  impatient 
millions  scattered  over  the  Northern 
States,  who  hourly  expected  to  hear  of 
a dashing  movement  and  a brilliant 
victory,  no  other  message  came  but 
the  same  wearisome  iteration,  ^‘All 
quiet  on  the  Potomac.”  Impatience  at 
last  reached  its  height.  ‘‘When  will 
McClellan  move?”  “What  does  he 
mean  to  do  ? ” These  and  such  like  ques- 
tions were  in  every  mouth;  and  by 
many  the  opinion  began  to  be  enter- 
tained that  the  commander-in-chief 


either  had  no  plan  or  was  afraid  to 
move. 

Such  was  the  state  of  things  in  the 
opening  weeks  of  the  second  year  of  the 
war.  In  the  second  week  of  January 
an  important  change  was  made  in  the 
War  Office.  On  the  13th  Mr.  jan, 
Edwin  M.  Stanton  took  the  place 
of  Mr.  Secretary  Cameron,  who  was 
offered  the  position  of  Minister  to  Russia. 
The  change  was  not  intended  in  any  way 
to  reflect  on  Secretary  Cameron.  On 
the  contrary,  it  was  his  own  desire,  as 
well  as  the  desire  of  the  other  members 
of  the  government,  that  the  position, 
which  was  onerous  and  exacting  in  the 
extreme,  should  be  filled  by  some  man 
who  to  more  than  ordinary  intellectual 
ability  and  force  of  character  added 
great  powers  of  endurance.  Of  all  the 
available  men  at  that  moment,  as  the 
result  proved,  Stanton  was  the  man  in 
whom  those  qualities  were  most  united. 
He  had  already  made  himself  conspicu- 
ous, during  the  administration  of  Bu- 
chanan, by  exposing  and  defeating  the 
schemes  of  the  conspirators  who  plotted 
the  seizure  of  Washington.  It  was 
said  of  Stanton  by  some  of  his  jealous 
rivals  that  he  was  a man  of  only  one 
idea.  The  remark,  though  otherwise 
intended,  actually  conveyed  a compli- 
ment. The  times  preeminently  required 
concentration  of  thought  and  purpose; 
and  if  Stanton  was  a man  of  one  idea, 
his  idea  was  the  preservation  of  the 
Union — the  grandeur  and  immortality 
of  the  Republic.  Stanton  was  one  of 
those  whose  patience  was  completely 
exhausted  by  the  inactivity  of  McClel- 
lan. It  was  at  his  suggestion  that  the 


80 


FORTS  HENRY 

president  issued  the  order  that  on  the 
22d  of  February  a general  forward  move- 
ment of  the  land  and  naval  forces  of  the 
Union  should  take  place ; that  “especial- 
ly the  army  at  or  about  Fortress  Monroe, 
the  army  of  the  Potomac,  the  army  of 
Western  Virginia,  the  army  near  Miim- 
fordsville,  Kentucky,  the  army  and  flo- 
tilla near  Cairo,  and  the  naval  force  in 
the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  be  ready  to  move 
on  that  day ; that  all  other  forces,  both 
land  and  naval,  with  their  respective 
commanders,  obey  existing  orders  for 
the  time,  and  be  ready  to  obey  addi- 
tional orders  when  duly  given ; that 
the  heads  of  departments,  and  especially 
the  secretaries  of  war  and  the  navy, 
with  all  their  subordinates,  and  the  gen- 
erals-in-chief,  with  all  other  command- 
ers and  subordinates  of  land  and  naval 
forces,  will  severally  be  held  to  their 
strict  and  full  responsibilities  for  the 
prompt  execution  of  this  order.”  A 
special  order,  which  in  some  particulars 
was  afterwards  modified,  was  issued  on 
Jau.  ^Ist  of  January,  to  the  effect 
^Ghat  all  the  disposable  force  of 
the  army  of  the  Potomac,  after  provid- 
ing safely  for  the  defense  of  Washing- 
ton, be  formed  into  an  expedition  for 
the  immediate  object  of  seizing  upon 
the  railroad  southwestward  of  what  is 
known  as  Manassas  Junction ; all  de- 
tails to  be  in  the  discretion  of  the  corn- 
man  der-in-chief,  and  the  expedition  to 
move  before  or  on  the  2 2d  day  of  Feb- 
ruary next.”  These  orders  were  too 
jdain  to  be  misconstrued.  If  they  did 
not  imply  mistrust  of  McClellan,  they 
certainly  contained  a rebuke.  His  dila- 
tory conduct  had  not  only  disappointed 


lND  DONELSON. 

— it  had  disgusted  all  ranks  and  classes 
of  the  people. 

The  war,  in  what  might  be  called 
systematic  form,  was  now  about  to  be- 
gin. Hitherto  the  forces  had  been  scat- 
tered, and  the  battles  fruitless  of  result 
as  they  had  been  without  plan  or  pur- 
pose. Now  there  was  a recognized 
central  authority,  there  was  a genei’al 
plan,  and  arrangements  were  made  for 
concerted  action.  A variety  of  circum- 
stances had  made  it  evident  as  well  as 
necessary  that  the  first  battles  of  1862 
should  be  fought  in  the  West.  General 
Halleck,  as  we  have  seen  already,  was 
now  in  command  in  Missouri,  and  Gen- 
eral Buell  had  charge  of  the  Department 
of  the  Ohio.  The  Confederates,  under 
Albert  Sidney  Johnston,  held  a strong 
defensive  line  running  from  the  Missis- 
sippi Biver  eastward  to  the  Cumberland 
Mountains.  The  left  was  at  Columbus 
on  the  Mississippi.  Forts  Henry  and 
Donelson  guarded  the  Cumberland  and 
Tennessee  Fivers.  An  intrenched  camp 
at  Bowling  Green,  with  a considerable 
army,  covered  the  great  railroad  lines 
southward  to  Nashville.  The  right 
flank  was  held  by  a force  posted  at  Mill 
Spring,  Kentucky.  General  Halleck, 
who  had  divided  his  large  command  into 
districts,  had  assigned  to  General  Grant 
the  District  of  Cairo,  which  included 
Paducah,  in  Kentucky.  General  Buell, 
who  had  a large  force  under  him,  ar- 
ranged it  into  four  grand  divisions, 
himself,  with  a portion  of  his  troops, 
threatening  Bowling  Green,  and  General 
George  H.  Thomas,  one  of  his  subordi- 
nates, threatening  the  Confederate  force 
at  Mill  Spring.  A glance  at  the  map 


MILL  SPRING. 


81 


will  stow  that  on  the  part  of  the  Con- 
federates these  positions  were  singu- 
larly well  chosen.  If  they  could  hold 
this  line,  the  great  cotton-producing 
States  w^ould  be  comparatively  safe; 
and  while  the  sinews  of  war  would  thus 
be  provided  for  another  year,  they 
would  be  the  more  easily  able  to  con- 
centrate their  strength  against  the  army 
which  threatened  them  in  the  east. 

Early  in  the  month  of  January,  Gen- 
eral Thomas  came  into  collision  with 
the  Confederate  forces  stationed  at  Mill 
Spring.  The  battle  lasted  the  greater 
Jan*  of  Sunday,  the  18th,  and  was 
18.  fought  with  great  spirit  on  both 
sides.  Early  in  the  fight  the  Confede- 
rate General  Zollikoffer  was  killed,  and 
before  the  close  of  the  day  the  National 
arms  were  completely  victorious,  the 
Confederates  being  driven  from  their 
position  and  compelled  to  retreat  to- 
wards their  camp  in  the  wildest  confu- 
sion. In  the  struggle  the  Nationals  lost 
two  hundred  and  forty-seven  men,  of 
whom  thirty-nine  were  killed,  the  re- 
mainder wounded;  the  Confederates 
lost  three  hundred  and  forty-nine,  of 
w'hom  one  hundred  and  ninety-two  were 
killed,  sixty-two  wounded,  and  the  re- 
mainder made  prisoners.  As  the  spoils 
of  victory,  General  Thomas  captured 
• and  carried  wuth  him  twelve  pieces  of 
artillery,  with  their  caissons  packed, 
two  army  forges,  one'  battery  wagon,  a 
large  quantity  of  arms  and  ammunition, 
over  a thousand  horses  and  mules,  to- 
gether with  wagons,  commissary  stores, 
intrenching  tools,  and  a considerable 
amount  of  camp  equipage.  It  was  felt 
to  be  a damaging  blow  by  the  South, 


as  it  broke  their  line  in  Kentucky  and 
opened  a door  of  deliverance  for  East 
Tennessee.  It  was  hailed  as  a great 
victory  by  the  North,  and  called  forth 
a spirited  proclamation  from  the  secre- 
tary of  war,  who  declared  it  to  be  the 
purpose  of  the  war  “ to  pursue  and 
destroy  a rebellious  enemy,  and  to  de- 
liver the  country  from  danger.”  In 
the  prompt  and  spirited  movements 
and  daring  at  Mill  Spring,”  he  said, 
“ the  nation  will  realize  its  hopes.  It 
will  also  delight  to  honor  its  brave 
soldiers.” 

In  Zollikoffer  the  Confederates  lost 
one  of  their  ablest  generals.  Of  Swiss 
origin,  he  was  born  in  North  Carolina 
in  1812.  At  an  early  age  he  emigrated 
to  Tennessee,  where  he  worked  as  a 
printer  and  afterwards  became  an  ed- 
itor. In  1834  he  edited  and  published 
the  Columbian  Observer;  and  from  1835 
to  1837  he  held  the  profitable  place  of 
state  printer  of  Tennessee.  In  1842  he 
had  editorial  charge  of  the  Nashville 
Banner ; and  through  the  influence  of 
that  partisan  journal  he  succeeded  in  ob- 
taining several  political  offices.  At  the 
beginning  of  the  secession  movement  in 
Tennessee,  Zollikoffer  was  opposed  to 
it ; but  he  was  finally  induced  to  yield ; 
and  on  joining  the  army  he  was  ap- 
pointed a brigadier-general.  He  had 
only  joined  the  secession  force  at  Mill 
Spring  a few  hours  before  the  battle. 
The  chief  in  command  was  General 
Crittenden ; but  the  attack  at  Mill 
Spring  -has  generally  been  attributed 
to  Zollikoffer,  who  was  a man  of  great 
energy  and  courage. 


82 


FORTS  HE^^RY  AND  DONELSON. 


General  George  H.  Thomas,  who  on 
that  day  at  Mill  Spring  first  chained 
victory  to  the  Union  standard,  and  be- 
gan that  series  of  brilliant  and  substan- 
tial achievements  with  which  his  name 
is  associated,  was  a man  of  another 
mould.  A Virginian  by  birth,  he  was 
educated  at  West  Point,  and  in  1841 
was  appointed  a lieutenant  of  artillery. 
During  the  Mexican  war  he  rose  to  the 
rank  of  major.  In  1850  he  accepted 
the  position  of  teacher  of  artillery  and 
cavalry  at  West  Point.  At  the  begin- 
ning of  the  war,  Thomas,  who  held  the 
rank  of  major  of  the  Second  Cavalry, 
was  promoted  to  the  lieutenant-colonel- 
cy of  his  regiment,  and  a little  later  he 
became  colonel.  On  the  1 7th  of  August, 
1861,  he  was  made  brigadier-general; 
and  after  having  served  under  Generals 
Anderson  and  Sherman,  he  was  appoint- 
ed by  General  Buell  to  the  command 
of  the  Tenth  Division. 

It  will  be  observed  that  the  battle  of 
Mill  Spring  was  fought  and  won  before 
the  date  of  the  president’s  general  order 
for  the  forward  movement  of  all  the  ar- 
mies ; and  there  can  be  little  doubt  that 
the  spirited  conduct  of  the  National 
troops  on  that  occasion  gave  the  spur  to 
that  impatience  of  further  delay  which 
President  Lincoln  shared  with  the  rest  of 
the  Northern  people.  The  president  was 
not  more  anxious  for  immediate  action 
than  were  the  officers  in  the  field  and 
the  rank  and  file  under  their  care.  We 
have  seen  that  the  victory  at  Mill 
Spring  broke  the  Confederate  right, 
and  by  opening  a door  of  deliverance 
for  East  Tennessee,  prepared  the  way 
for  the  aggressive  and  successful  efforts 


which  were  to  follow.  The  Confede- 
rate line,  however,  remained  strong  and 
intact  from  Bowling  Green  to  Colum- 
bus. The  ground  was  also  well  guarded 
from  Bowling  Green  to  Nashville,  fur- 
ther to  the  south.  At  Bowling  Green 
there  was  an  intrenched  camp.  Fort 
Henry,  on  the  east  bank  of  the  Tennes- 
see, and  Fort  Donelson,  on  the  west 
bank  of  the  Cumberland,  were  bastioned 
earthworks,  about  twelve  miles  apart 
and  connected  by  a well  constructed 
road.  There  were  redoubts  on  Island 
No.  10,  in  the  Mississippi  Eiver;  and 
Columbus,  which  was  still  in  charge  of 
General  Polk,  had  been  so  strengthened 
as  to  be  proudly  spoken  of  as  the  Gib- 
raltar of  America.  To  defend  this  line 
the  Confederate  commander  had  under 
him  at  least  60,000  men.  The  forcing 
of  this  line  by  the  National  armies  had 
become  a necessity,  if  any  serious  effort 
was  to  be  made  to  bring  the  South  back 
to  its  allegiance.  The  question  was 
how  to  strike  and  where.  Various  plans 
had  already  been  suggested ; but  there 
is  some  difference  of  opinion  as  to  who 
is  entitled  to  credit  for  the  plan  which 
was  ultimately  adopted,  and  which 
proved  completely  successful.  It  is 
known  that  General  Buell  had  suggest- 
ed some  such  plan  as  that  adopted,  in 
a communication  made  to  General  Hal- 
leck  early  in  the  month  of  January, 
1862.  It  is  also  known  that  about  "the 
same  time  or  shortly  afterwards.  Gene- 
ral Grant,  without  any  knowledge  of 
what  Buell. had  done,  wrote  to  Halleck 
and  asked  permission  to  carry  out  the 
plan  which  was  afterwards  accomplish- 
ed. It  is  recorded  that  one  evening 


THE  FLOTILLA  AND  ARMY  IN  MOTION. 


83 


late  in  December,  1861,  Generals  Hal- 
leck,  Sherman,  and  Cullum  were  to- 
gether at  the  Planters’  Hotel  in  St. 
Louis,  when  the  conversation  turned  up- 
on the  proper  line  of  invasion.  “ Where 
is  their  line  ? ” asked  Halleck.  “ Why, 
from  Bowling  Green  to  Columbus,”  re- 
plied Sherman.  ^‘Well,  then,  where 
is  the  true  point  of  attack?  ” “Natu- 
rally the  centre.”  “ Then  let  us  see  in 
what  direction  it  should  be  made.”  A 
map  was  at  hand.  With  a blue  pencil 
Halleck  drew  a line  from  Bowling 
Green  to  Columbus,  past  Forts  Donel- 
son  and  Henry.  He  drew  another  line 
perpendicular  to  its  centre.  The  latter 
line  coincided  nearly  with  the  Tennessee 
River.  “There,”  said  Halleck,  “that 
is  the  true  line  of  attack.”  After  all, 
it  was  the  natural  and  obvious  course 
to  follow ; and  it  is  more  than  probable 
that  to  the  minds  of  each  of  these  men, 
educated  in  military  tactics  and  expe- 
rienced in  military  affairs,  the  same 
plan  at  the  same  time  was  independently 
suggested.  One  thing  is  absolutely 
certain  regarding  this  matter : Grant 
had  written  his  second  letter  to  Hal- 
leck, urging  the  propriety  of  his  allow- 
ing him  to  proceed  at  once  by  land  and 
water  against  Fort  Henry,  to  take  and 
hold  it  as  a base  for  other  operations, 
before  the  order  of  the  30th  came  au- 
thorizing the  desired  movement. 

It  has  already  been  shown  that  the 
Confederate  line  stretched  from  Bow- 
ling Green  to  Columbus,  and  that  the 
strength  of  the  entire  force  holding  the 
line  was  about  sixty  thousand  men. 
The  Confederate  general  in  command 
was  Albert  Sidney  Johnston,  one  of 


the  oldest  and  most  experienced  officers 
on  the  American  continent.  The  garri- 
son of  Fort  Henry,  which  was  2734 
strong,  was  under  the  immediate  charge 
of  General  Tilghman.  The  armament 
of  the  fort  consisted  of  seventeen  guns. 
Johnston’s  headquarters  were  at  Bow- 
ling Green,  where  he  was  confronted 
and  held  in  check  by  General  Buell, 
an  able  officer,  who  held  the  chief 
command  of  the  army  of  the  Cumber- 
land. 

Immediately  on  receiving  permission 
from  Halleck  to  proceed  with  his  pro- 
posed plan,  Grant  made  arrangements 
for  the  attack  on  Fort  Henry.  He  had 
at  his  disposal  some  seventeen  thousand 
men.  It  was  arranged  that  flag-officer 
Foote,  with  a flotilla  of  seven  gunboats, 
should  move  along  the  Ohio,  steer  up 
the  Tennessee,  and  open  the  attack, 
while  Grant,  on  the  land  side,  should 
render  what  assistance  was  necessary 
and  cut  off  all  retreat.  On  Mon-  pei), 
day,  the  2d  of  February,  Foote  2. 
left  Cairo,  and  on  the  morning  of  Tues- 
day he  was  a few  miles  below  Fort 
Henry.  Grant,  in  the  meantime,  with 
the  divisions  of  McClernand  and  C.  F. 
Smith,  had  embarked  in  transports 
which  were  convoyed  by  the  flotilla. 
These  landed  a few  miles  below  the 
fort ; and  Foote  proceeded  up  the  river, 
having  orders  from  Grant  to  move  slow- 
ly and  shell  the  woods,  in  order  to  dis- 
cover whether  there  were  any  concealed 
batteries.  On  the  morning  of  the  pebi 
6th  it  was  understood  that  every- 
thing  was  in  readiness  for  the  attack, 
which  was  to  be  made  simultaneously 
I on  land  and  water.  A heavy  thunder- 


84 


FORTS  HENRY  AND  DONELSON. 


storm  had  raged  the  previous  night; 
and,  as  a consequence,  the  roads  were 
heavy  and  the  streams  so  swollen  that 
bridges  had  to  be  built  for  the  passage 
of  the  artillery.  The  land  forces,  thus 
encountering  unlooked-for  obstacles, 
were  considerably  delayed.  Shortly 
after  12  o’clock  Foote  op?ned  fire  upon 
the  fort.  Beginning  at  a thousand  yards 
distance,  he  gradually  ran  his  vessels  to 
within  six  hundred  yards  of  the  enemy. 
The  firing  for  a time  was  vigorously 
returned ; but  Foote  pressed  forward 
with  irresistible  bravery,  and  his  men 
worked  with  a will  and  as  if  they  meant 
to  win.  It  was  evident  to  Tilghman 
from  the  first  that  it  was  next  to  impos- 
sible for  him  to  hold  the  fort.  He  nev- 
ertheless exerted  himself  to  the  utmost, 
encouraging  his  men  alike  by  word  and 
example,  going  so  far  as  to  work  one  of 
the  guns  himself.  A series  of  accidents, 
meanwhile,  occurred  inside  the  fort. 
A rified  24-pounder  burst,  killing  and 
wouncfing  a number  of  the  men.  A 
42-pounder  burst  prematurely,  and  kill- 
ed three  of  the  gunners.  In  a short 
time  the  well-directed  fire  from  the 
gunboats  had  dismounted  seven  of  the 
guns  and  made  them  useless;  the  flag- 
staff also  was  shot  away.  The  garrison 
became  completely  demoralized.  It  was 
in  vain  that  Tilghman  attempted  to 
replace  the  exhausted  gunners.  The 
troops^  in  the  camp  outside  the  fort 
made  good  their  escape,  some  by  the 
Dover  road,  leading  to  Fort  Donelson, 
others  on  board  a steamer  which  was 
lying  a little  above  Fort  Henry.  Foote 
had  promised  to  reduce  the  foi  t within 
an  hour.  When  he  made  that  promise 


he  counted  on  assistance  from  the  forces 
on  the  land  side.  Without  any  such 
aid — for  the  land  forces  had  not  yet 
arrived  on  the  scene — he  made  good 
his  word;  for  the  hour  had  scarcely 
expired  when  the  white  flag  was  raised. 
There  was  no  unnecessary  delay.  The 
main  body  of  his  troops  having  made 
good  their  escape,  Tilghman,  with  his 
staff  and  some  sixty  artillerists,  surren- 
dered to  the  victorious  Foote.  In  killed 
and  wounded  the  Confederate  loss  was 
twenty-one  men.  The  only  serious  dam- 
age sustained  by  the  fleet  in  the  river 
was  on  board  the  ironclad  Essex.  A 
shot  from  the  enemy  had  penetrated  her 
boiler ; and  some  twenty-nine  officers 
and  men,  including  Commander  Porter, 
were  seriously  scalded. 

The  capture  of  Fort  Henry  was  felt 
by  the  South  to  be  a damaging  blow; 
and  it  led  to  bitter  murmuring  and 
even  loud  complaints  against  the  author- 
ities at  Bichmond.  It  was  justly  re- 
garded by  the  North  as  a victory  of 
great  importance.  It  was  full  of  in- 
struction, inasmuch  as  it  proved  the 
value  of  gunboats  on  the  narrow  rivers 
of  the  West,  especially  when  acting  in 
conjunction  with  land  forces.  It  in- 
spired hope,  inasmuch  as  it  reclaimed 
lost  territory  and  restored  the  old  flag. 
“ Fort  Henry  is  ours ! ” said  Halleck  in 
his  despatch  to  McClellan.  ^‘The  flag 
of  the  Union  is  re-established  on  the 
soil  of  Tennessee.  It  will  never  be  re- 
moved.” Foote  was  formally  thanked 
by  the  secretary  of  the  navy.  ‘‘The 
country,”  he  was  told,  “ appreciates 
your  gallant  deeds,  and  this  Depart- 
ment desires  to  convey  to  you  and  your 


A COUNCIL  OF  WAR. 


85 


brave  associates  its  profound  thanks  for 
the  service  you  have  rendered.” 

After  the  fall  of  Fort  Henry,  prepara- 
tions were  made  for  an  attack  on  Fort 
Donelson  with  as  little  delay  as  possi- 
ble. General  Halleck  felt  it  to  be  his 
duty  to  do  his  utmost  to  strengthen  the 
army  under  Grant’s  command ; and  ac- 
cordingly reinforcements  were  hurried 
forward  from  Buell’s  army,  from  St. 
Louis,  Halleck’s  headquarters,  from 
Cincinnati,  and  from  Kansas. 

Fort  Donelson,  as  has  already  been 
stated,  was  distant  from  Fort  Henry 
about  twelve  miles,  and  was  situated 
near  the  town  of  Dover,  on  the  west 
bank  of  the  Cumberland,  on  a platform 
of  elevated  ground,  which  at  its  highest 
point  rises  from  the  river  about  one 
hundred  feet.  It  was  about  forty  mJes 
above  the  point  where  the  Cumberland, 
after  draining  the  highlands  of  south- 
eastern Kentucky  and  northeastern 
Tennessee,  empties  its  waters  into  the 
Ohio.  The  entire  work  covered  one 
hundred  acres.  The  country  around 
was  rugged  and  heavily  wooded.  Nat- 
urally a strong  position,  everything 
had  been  done  which  art  and  science 
could  accomplish  to  make  it  impregna- 
ble. On  the  water  side  it  was  especially 
strong,  the  batteries  being  admirably 
planted  and  well  mounted.  Including 
the  light  artillery,  there  were  in  the 
fort  at  the  moment  of  the  attack  not 
fewer  than  ninety-five  pieces.  With 
the  men  who  had  made  good  their 
escape  thither  from  Fort  Henry,  the 
strength  of  the  garrison  amounted  to 
twenty-one  thousand  men.  All  around 
the  works  on  the  land  side,  abatis  had 


been  formed  hj  felling  timber  and  half 
chopping  otf  the  smaller  trees. 

As  soon  as  it  became  evident  that 
Fort  Donelson  was  likely  to  be  attacked, 
Johnston  exerted  himself  to  the  utmost 
to  make  the  position  invulnerable.  Ee- 
inforcements  were  hurried  forward  from 
Bowling  Green ; the  work  was  pushed 
day  and  night ; and  a fortified  line  two 
and  a half  miles  in  length,  enclosing 
the  town  of  Dover,  was  drawn  along 
the  high  ground,  which  commanded  the 
avenues  of  approach.  Gideon  J.  Pillov/' 
arrived  with  his  command  on  the  peb 
10th  ana  took  control.  Simeon 
B.  Buckner,  at  the  head  of  the  rein^ 
foi  cements  from  Bowling  Green,  arrived 
on  the  11th.  On  the  13tli  John  E, 
Floyd,  who  had  fied  from  Virginia  with 
his  followers,  in  obedience  to  orders  re- 
ceived from  Johnston,  appeared  upon 
the  scene,  and,  outranking  Pillow,  took 
the  chief  command.  * 

Meanwhile  Grant  was  not  idle.  On 
the  evening  of  the  day  which  witnessed 
the  capture  of  Fort  Henry,  a flotilla 
under  Lieutenant  Phelps  sailed  up  the 
Tennessee  Eiver,  for  the  purpose  of 
ascertaining  the  condition  of  the  banks 
in  the  upper  waters.  The  reconnoisance 
was  completely  successful.  It  was  found 
that  there  was  no  real  hindrance  to  a 
southward  movement.  The  country 
was  comparatively  unprotected ; and 
the  people  seemed  impatient  to  be  de- 
livered from  the  dreadful  tyranny  under 
which  they  were  groaning.  On  peb, 
the  11th  a council  of  war  was  H. 
held ; and  the  question  was  put,  “ Shall 
we  march  on  Donelson,  or  shall  we  wait 
for  further  reinforcements?”  The  de- 


S04 


86 


FORTS  HENRY  AND  DONELSON. 


cision  was  in  favor  of  immediate  action. 
Foote  was  busy  getting  ready  with  his 
gunboats;  and  the  delay  hitherto  was 
mainly  on  that  account.  It  was  all-im- 
portant that  the  gunboats  should  parti- 
cipate in  the  attack ; but  it  was  felt  that 
every  hour  was  adding  to  the  enemy’s 
strength.  At  the  head  of  fifteen  thou- 
Peb,  sand  men,  on  Wednesday,  the 
12.  12th,  Grant  moved  from  Fort 

Henry  upon  Donelson.  The  foremost 
brigade  advanced  by  the  telegraph  road ; 
the  others  moved  by  the  road  which 
leads  to  Dover.  For  the  month  of  Feb- 
ruary, the  day  was  beautiful.  The  atmos- 
phere was  warm  and  balmy,  like  a day  in 
f-pring.  In  their  march  over  the  hilly 
country,  the  advancing  troops  experi- 
enced but  little  difficulty.  Before  sun- 
down Grant  was  before  the  fort;  and 
what  remained  of  daylight  he  spent 
in  bringing  his  troops  into  position. 
During  the  night  there  was  little  idle- 
ness. Batteries  were  posted,  and  the 
line  of  battle  was  formed.  Meanwhile 
Foote  was  moving  up  the  Cumberland 
with  his  gunboats,  convoying  transports 
which  were  to  constitute  Lewis  Wal- 
lace’s Thii*d  Division.  It  was  Grant’s 
intention,  should  the  gunboats  arrive, 
to  begin  the  attack  in  the  morning. 
McClernand’s  Division,  consisting  of 
the  four  brigades  of  Oglesby,  Wallace, 
McArthur,  and  Morrison,  was  posted 
on  the  right.  C.  F.  Smith’s  Division, 
composed  of  the  brigades  of  Cook,  Lan- 
man,  and  M.  L.  Smith,  was  posted  on 
the  left.  Lewis  Wallace’s  Division,  so 
soon  as  it  arrived,  was  to  take  its  posi- 
tion in  the  centre.  The  line  extended 
some  four  miles,  the  right  sweeping 


round  almost  to  Dover,  the  left  resting’ 
on  Hickman’s  Creek,  where,  at  the 
house  of  a Mrs.  Crisp,  Grant  established 
his  headquarters. 

Morning  dawned,  but  there  was  no 
sign  of  the  gunboats.  Grant  was  p^b, 
unwilling  to  hazard  a general  en- 
gagement  until  the  expected  forces  ar- 
rived. Early  in  the  forenoon,  however, 
a cannonade  was  opened ; and  some 
lively  work  was  done  by  Berge’s  sharp- 
shooters, who,  concealed  behind  the 
trees,  picked  off  not  a few  of  the  Con- 
federate gunners.  About  noon  an  at- 
tempt was  made  to  effect  a lodgment 
upon  the  Confederate  intrenchments. 
McClernand  ordered  Colonel  Wallace 
to  capture  a formidable  battery,  known 
as  the  Middle  Redoubt.  The  troops 
employed  for  this  purpose  were  Illi- 
nois regiments — the  Seventeenth,  Major 
Smith;  the  Forty -Eighth,  Colonel 
Hayn ; and  the  Forty-Ninth,  Colonel 
Morrison,  McAllister’s  battery  covering 
them.  Hayn,  being  the  senior  colonel, 
took  command  of  the  attacking  party. 
The  attack  was  made  in  the  most  spirited 
manner.  But  the  enemy  was  strongly 
posted ; and  although  the  National 
troops  behaved  with  the  utmost  gal- 
lantry in  the  presence  of  overwhelming 
numbers  and  under  a most  galling  fire, 
they  were  ultimately  repulsed.  An 
equally  unsuccessful  effort  was  made  on 
the  left  by  a portion  of  Lanman’s  bri- 
gade. In  both  cases  the  National  loss 
was  heavy.  When  the  darkness  came  on, 
the  troops,  not  a little  dispirited,  had 
fallen  back  to  the  ground  occupied  by 
them  in  the  morning. 

The  night  of  the  13th  presented  a 


ARRIVAL  OF  REINFORCEMEXTS. 


87 


striking  contrast  to  the  beautiful  spring- 
like morning.  The  afternoon  had  be- 
come chilly ; and  towards  evening  rain 
fell  in  torrents.  The  rain  was  succeed- 
ed by  sleet  and  snow ; and  at  midnight 
a severe  frost  set  in,  the  mercury  falling 
to  ten  degrees  below  zero.  The  be- 
sieging force  was  without  tents;  and 
many  of  the  soldiers  were  not  even  pro- 
vided with  Idankets.  Fires  were  not 
permitted,  as  they  would  prove  marks 
for  the  enemy’s  guns.  Scantily  supplied 
with  food,  and  with  the  pitiful  cries  of 
the  wounded  calling  for  water  resound- 
ing in  their  ears,  they  were  compelled 
to  spend  the  weary  hours,  resting  on 
their  arms.  It  was  one  of  those  sad 
nights,  often,  alas ! repeated  before  the 
war  reached  its  close. 

The  morning  of  the  14th  dawned 
Feb.  with  apparently  brightening  pros- 
14*  pects  for  the  Federal  arms.  Fully 
realizing  the  peril  of  the  situation  and 
the  necessity  of  using  every  available 
man.  Grant  had,  at  the  close  of  the  con- 
test the  night  previous,  sent  a courier 
to  General  Lewis  Wallace,  who  had 
been  left  behind  with  a small  garrison 
at  Fort  Henry,  commanding  him  to 
hasten  at  once  to  the  scene  of  action. 
Wallace,  with  his  garrison,  which  con- 
sisted of  the  Eleventh  Indiana,  the 
Eighth  Missouri,  and  Company  A,  Chi- 
cago Artillery,  in  charge  of  a battery, 
was  ready  by  the  break  of  day.  After 
such  a night,  the  ground  was  not  in  the 
best  condition  for  the  movement  of  in- 
fantry and  artillery ; but  the  men  were 
in  excellent  spirits ; and  in  spite  of  the 
drifting  frost  which  blew  in  their  faces, 
they  made  good  time,  Wallace  being 


able  to  report  at  Grant’s  headquarters 
before  the  hour  of  noon.  On  their  arrival 
Lewis  Wallace’s  little  band  found  the 
Union  soldiers  in  high  hope  and  expecta- 
tion. During  the  course  of  the  night 
Foote,  with  the  gunboats  and  trans- 
ports, tlie  latter  bringing  the  Third  oi' 
Wallace’s  Division,  about  ten  thousand 
strong,  had  arrived.  Their  landing  had 
been  safely  effected ; they  were  already 
around  Grant’s  headquarters ; and  when 
Wallace  appeared  on  the  scene  he  was 
immediately  placed  in  command  and 
took  his  position  in  the  centre,  mth 
Smith  on  the  left  and  McClernand  on 
the  right.  By  this  fresh  accession  of 
strength.  Grant  was  enabled  to  com- 
plete the  investment  of  the  fort  and  its 
outworks ; and  for  the  first  time  since 
he  commenced  to  grapple  with  the  ene- 
my, he  had  the  advantage  of  superior 
numbers.  Supplies  having  arrived  in 
abundance,  rations  were  liberally  sup- 
plied to  the  half-famished  men,  and 
preparations  were  made  for  a general 
assault. 

The  experience  of  the  previous  day 
had  been  such  that,  even  with  largely 
increased  forces.  General  Grant  was  un- 
willing to  make  any  rash  attack  from 
the  laud  side.  The  fort  was  powerfully 
mounted ; and  without  the  aid  of  earth- 
works and  trenches,  an  attack  • made 
from  the  land  side,  whether  upon  a par- 
ticular point  or  on  the  entire  enemy’s 
works,  however  it  might  result  finally, 
could  not  fail  to  be  attended  by  an  enor- 
mous sacrifice  of  life.  Grant’s  instruc- 
tions to  his  generals  were  that  they 
should  preserve  the  line  of  investment 
intact,  being  ready  to  repel  any  attempt 


88 


FORTS  HENRY  AND  DONELSON. 


which  the  enemy  might  make,  either  in 
the  way  of  assault  or  escape. 

The  gunboats  had  done  so  well  at 
Fort  Henry  that  perhaps  too  much  was 
expected  of  them  at  Fort  Donelson.  At 
all  events,  it  was  arranged  that  the  gun- 
boats should  have  the  honor  of  opening 
the  assault.  At  three  o’clock  in  the 
afternoon  Foote  moved  forward  with 
four  ironclads  and  two  wooden  boats. 
In  addition  to  these,  there  was  the  gun- 
boat Carondelet,  Commander  AV  alke, 
which  had  arrived  two  days  before. 
The  armored  vessels  moved  in  front. 
While  yet  a mile  and  a half  distant, 
the  gunboats  opened  fire,  the  batteries 
on  the  fort  remaining  perfectly  silent. 
It  was  not  the  silence  of  a helpless,  par- 
alyzed foe : it  was  the  silence  of  con- 
scious strength — of  a determined  and 
deadly  purpose.  Onward  the  little  fleet 
moved,  still  belching  forth  destruction, 
but  meeting  with  no  response.  Sud- 
denly, however,  when  within  four  hun- 
dred yards  of  the  batteries,  a plunging 
fire  was  opened  upon  it  by  twenty  heavy 
guns,  placed  high  on  the  hillside,  the 
shot  falling  with  dreadful  precision  and 
effect.  In  face  of  this  terrific  fire,  Foote 
pressed  closer  and  closer.  The  well- 
directed  fire  of  the  gunboats  had  silenced 
the  upper  battery  of  four  guns.  The 
fighting, 'however,  was  not  equal.  The 
columbiad  and  32-pound  rifle  now  told 
with  fatal  effect  on  the  ironclads ; while 
the  shot  and  shell  from  the  ships  fell 
powerless  on  the  heavy  sand-banks 
which  protected  the  enemy’s  guns.  A 
heavy  shot  had  cut  away  the  rudder- 
chains  of  the  Louisville,  and  she  drifted 
helplessly  down  the  current.  The  flag- 


ship St.  Louis  was  soon  in  a similar 
plight.  Commodore  Foote  himself  being 
wounded.  The  other  two  armored  Ves- 
sels had  suffered  severely,  a heavy  rifled 
cannon  having  burst  on  board  the  Car- 
ondelet. The  battle  had  lasted  one 
hour  and  a half.  It  was  useless  to  pro- 
long the  struggle.  Orders  were  given 
to  Avithdraw ; and  as  the  flotilla  moved 
back  down  the  river,  it  received  some 
severe  parting  blows  from  the  shore 
batteries,  some  of  the  fugitives  from 
which  had  returned  and  resumed  their 
guns.  It  was  another  failure.  The 
strength  of  the  place  had  not  been  prop- 
erly gauged.  What  Avas  practicable  and 
easy  at  Fort  Henry  was  impossible  at 
Fort  Donelson.  In  the  attack  the  Na- 
tionals lost  fifty-four  men  in  killed  and 
wounded.  The  Confederates  lost  not  a 
man,  nor  were  their  batteries  in  any  way 
injured.  Fifty-nine  shots  had  struck  the 
St.  Louis ; thirty -five  the  Louisville  ; 
thirty -five  the  Carondelet,  and  twenty^ 
one  the  Pittsburg. 

T wo  days  had  now  been  wasted ; and 
two  experiments  in  the  way  of  attack 
had  been  made,  Avith  signal  want  of 
success.  All  had  been  done  on  the  riA^er 
side  Avhich  could  be  done  Avith  the 
means  now  at  Grant’s  command.  Any 
fresh  attempt  made  on  the  land  side 
was  certainly  as  perilous  as  ever ; nay, 
it  seemed  to  involve  even  greater  risks, 
for  the  Union  commander  could  no 
longer  count  with  confidence  on  the 
gunboats,  which  he  had  hoped  AA^ould 
greatly  aid  him  in  the  accomplishment 
of  his  diflicult  task.  The  original  plan 
had  failed.  A new  plan  had  become 
necessary.  It  was  accordingly  arranged 


ATTACK  OK  THE  NATIONAL  EIGHT. 


89 


in  a conference  between  Grant  and 
Foote,  on  the  evening  of  Friday,  that 
the  Commodore  should  return  to  Cairo, 
repair  and  augment  his  fleet,  and  return 
with  a naval  force  adequate  to  the  re- 
quirements of  the  situation.  Grant  re- 
solved meanwhile  to  go  on  perfecting 
his  line  of  investment,  so  strengthening 
his  weak  points  as  to  shut  the  Confede- 
rates effectually  within  their  intrench- 
ments,  and  so  cutting  off  their  supplies 
as  possibly  to  starve  or  frighten  them 
into  a suri'ender. 

While  the  Union  commanders  were 
thus  deploring  their  ill  fortune  and 
making  arrangements  for  future  and 
more  effective  operations,  events  had 
taken  a peculiar  turn  inside  the  Confed- 
erate lines.  Floyd,  the  commander-in- 
chief, was  not  in  the  least  elated  by  the 
effective  resistance  which  he  had  been 
able  to  offer  to  McClernand’s  attack  on 
the  13th,  or  by  the  defeat  of  the  gun- 
boats on  the  14th.  He  felt  that,  in 
spite  of  his  strength,  he  was  effectually 
hemmed  in.  There  was  not  a point 
within  the  intrenchments  which  might 
not  be  reached  by  the  enemy’s  artillery 
from  the  boats  on  the  river  or  from  the 
batteries  on  land.  It  would  be  easy, 
by  passing  a column  above  him  on  the 
river,  to  cut  off  at  once  his  only  source 
of  supply  and  his  only  means  of  egress. 
Moreover,  he  had  seen  that  day  a fleet 
of  transports  arrive,  bringing  a power- 
ful addition  to  the  ranks  of  the  enemy ; 
and  he  knew  that  the  whole  available 
Union  force  in  the  Western  States  could 
be  speedily  concentrated  against  Fort 
Donelson.  It  was  Floyd’s  opinion  that 
the  fort  could  not  be  held  with  a gar- 


rison of  less  than  fifty  thousand  men. 
At  a council  of  war,  held  on  the  evening 
of  the  14th,  it  was  unanimously  resolved 
to  abandon  the  place,  force  a way  past 
Grant’s  right,  and  pass  into  the  open 
country  around  Nashville. 

From  the  position  enclosed  within 
the  Confederate  lines  two  roads  led  to- 
wards Nashville — the  Wynn’s  Ferry 
road,  running  from  Dover  through 
Charlotte ; and  the  other  an  obscure 
and  at  best  an  undesirable  road,  cross- 
ing the  flats  of  the  Cumberland.  The 
latter  road  was  submerged  by  the  over- 
flow of  the  river.  There  remained, 
therefore,  but  the  one  way  of  escape,  if 
escaj)e  was  to  be  attempted,  and  that 
was  the  Wynn’s  Ferry  road.  But  this 
road  was  effectually  covered  by  McCler- 
nand’s  Division,  the  right  wing  of  the 
Union  army.  What  was  the  Confede- 
rate plan  of  attack  ? Pillow’s  Division, 
which  formed  the  Confederate  left,  was 
to  make  a vigorous  attack  upon  the 
Union  right  flank;  and  Buckner’s  Di- 
vision, drawn  from  the  right,  a few  men 
being  left  in  the  intrenchments  to  main- 
tain an  appearance,  was  to  strike  at  the 
same  time  the  right  flank  of  the  Union 
centre,  which  rested  upon  the  Wynn’s 
Ferry  road.  It  was  hoped  that  if  Pil- 
low’s attack  should  prove  successful, 
McClernaiid’s  Division,  the  Union  right, 
would  be  forced  back  upon  Wallace’s 
Division,  the  Union  centre,  and  that 
Buckner,  striking  the  divided  masses  in 
flank,  would  roll  both  divisions  back  in 
confusion  on  that  of  Smith,  the  Union 
left.  In  such  a case,  the  Wynn’s  Ferry 
road  would  be  effectually  opened  as  a 
way  of  escaj^e,  and  possibly  Grant’s 


90 


FORTS  HENRY  AND  DONELSON. 


forces  might  be  routed  and  driven  to  I 
their  transports.  It  was  a daring  and 
well-conceived  plan;  and,  as  we  shall 
by  and  by  see,  so  far  as  it  was  faithfully 
executed,  it  was  a complete  success. 

On  the  morning  of  Saturday,  the 
Feb,  15th,  at  the  early  hour  of  live 
o’clock,  Pillow’s  column,  eight 
thousand  strong,  accompanied  by  For- 
rest’s cavalry,  thirty  heavy  guns,  and  a 
full  complement  of  artillery,  was  al- 
ready in  motion.  Pillow  was  resolved, 
as  he  said  in  his  high-sounding  style, 
to  roll  the  enemy  in  full  retreat  over 
upon  General  Buckner,”  and  then,  by 
an  attack  in  flank  and  rear,  to  cut  up 
the  enemy  and  put  him  completely  to 
rout.”  He  went  to  his  work  with  a 
will,  and  as  if  he  meant  to  make  his 
purpose  good.  McClernand  was  well 
posted  to  resist  the  assailants;  but,  al- 
though this  point  has  been  disputed, 
there  can  be  no  reasonable  doubt  that 
he  was  taken  by  surprise.  His  division 
was  arranged  in  tliree  brigades — McAr- 
thur’s on  the  right,  Oglesby’s  in  the 
centre,  W.  H.  L,  Wallace’s  on  the  left. 
Pillow’s  onslaught  was  swift  and  furi- 
ous. It  fell  mainly  upon  the  two  right 
brigades,  McArthur’s  and  Oglesby’s. 
The  Confederate  line  covered  the  front 
of  these  brigades,  and  extended  some 
distance  beyond  the  right  flank.  In  the 
struggle  which  ensued,  there  was  no 
lack  of  heroism  on  either  side.  At  a 
critical  moment,  timely  and  effective 
assistance  was  rendered  by  the  sister  bri- 
gade of  W.  H.  L.  Wallace,  Colonel  John 
A.  Logan,  at  the  head  of  his  brave  regi- 
ment, the  Thirty-First  Illinois,  exerting 
himself  by  word  and  deed  to  sustain 


I and  cheer  the  men.  In  such  a strug- 
gle, however,  enthusiasm  is  but  a sor- 
ry compensation  for  lack  of  numbers. 
The  soldiers  did  their  best.  Inch  by 
inch  the  ground  was  contested.  Over- 
powered, however,  and  outflanked,  the 
two  brigades  were  turned  and  forced 
from  their  position.  Meanwhile  Buck- 
ner, who  had  moved  his  troops  over 
from  the  extreme  Confederate  right, 
formed  them  in  front  of  McClernand’s 
left  brigade.  Colonel  W.  H.  Wallace. 
It  will  thus  be  seen  that  the  whole 
hostile  mass — the  entire  concentrated 
strength  of  the  Confederate  army — was 
pressing  upon  McClernand’s  Division, 
the  right  wing  of  the  Union  army.  The 
left  brigade  soon  followed  the  example 
of  the  other  two — it  fell  back  from  its 
position ; and  by  nine  o’clock  the  entire 
position  occupied  in  the  beginning  of 
the  contest  by  the  right  wing  of  the 
National  army  was  in  the  possession  of 
the  Confederates.  The  Wynn’s  Ferry 
road  was  open. 

The  tide  was  still  in  favor  of  the 
Confederates.  So  far  they  had  boldly 
carried  out  their  plan,  and  successfully 
accomplished  their  purpose.  The  Na- 
tional army  was,  indeed,  at  this  partic- 
ular moment  in  a very  critical  condition. 
The  situation  was  all  the  more  alarming 
that  the  general-in-chief,  who  had  not 
been  present  all  the  morning,  was  not 
yet  on  the  field.  At  2 A.  M.  he  had 
gone  on  board  a gunboat  to  hold  a con- 
sultation with  Commodore  Foote,  who, 
it  will  be  remembered,  was  wounded  in 
the  struggle  the  day  previous.  It  is 
more  than  possible  that  if  Grant  had 
been  on  the  field  fi*om  the  commence- 


GRANT  ON  THE  FIELD. 


91 


ment  of  the  contest,  McClernand  would 
have  been  able  to  hold  his  ground.  In 
the  absence  of  the  general-in-chief  there 
was  no  officer,  during  all  those  preg- 
nant hours,  who  could  assume  the  right 
to  combine  and  direct  the  entire  forces 
in  the  field.  The  division  next  to 
McClernand  was  that  of  Lewis  Wallace. 
When  Wallace  first  heard  the  firing, 
he  concluded  that  McClernand  had  re- 
sumed the  attack.  At  about  8 A.  M. 
he  received  a message  from  McClernand 
asking  assistance.  Not  knowing'What 
to  do,  he  sent  the  message  to  headquar- 
ters; but  General  Grant  was  still  ab- 
sent. Later  he  received  another  mes- 
sage from  McClernand,  disclosing  the 
fact  that  his  men  were  being  pressed 
back  by  overwhelming  numbers.  There- 
upon Wallace  detached  two  brigades, 
and  sent  them  under  Colonel  Cruft. 
Cruft,  however,  was  in  some  way  misled 
too  far  to  the  right,  and  being  forced 
to  fight  his  way,  he  arrived  only  in  time 
to  share  the  fate  of  the  whole  right 
wing.  Seeing  flocks  of  fugitives  crowd- 
ing up  in  the  rear  of  his  own  line,  Wal- 
lace promptly  put  in  motion  his  remain- 
ing brigade  under  Colonel  Thayer.  The 
column  had  marched  but  a short  dis- 
tance when  McClernand’s  brigades  were 
met,  retiring  to  the  left — retiring  in 
good  order  and  slowly,  complaining  of 
many  things,  but  complaining  most  of 
all  that  their  ammunition  was  exhausted. 
The  brave  fellows  seemed  to  feel  as  if 
they  had  no  right  to  be  in  that  position. 
The  enemy  was  following  but  slowly. 
Wallace  had  time  to  deploy  his  brigade 
on  the  crest  of  a hill  which  crossed  the 
line  along  which  the  enemy  was  moving 


towards  the  left.  Here  he  presented  a 
firm  front  at  right  angles  to  his  former 
front,  and  behind  him  the  defeated 
troops  of  the  right  wing  rallied  and  re- 
formed. In  this  position  they  awaited 
the  approach  of  Pillow  and  Buckner. 
Mortified  with  the  defeat  of  the  morn- 
ing, the  troops  of  the  right  wing  had 
no  sooner  filled  their  cartridges  than 
they  took  their  places  and  were  ready 
for  action.  When,  therefore,  the  Con- 
federates advanced  and  began  to  ascend 
the  crest,  so  terrific  was  the  fire  that 
they  reeled  and  staggered  and  broke, 
falling  back  in  wild  confusion.  A sec- 
ond time  they  attempted  to  charge; 
but  the  second  repulse  was  more  disas- 
trous than  the  first.  The  men  could 
not  aQ:ain  be  brought  into  line.  Some  of 
them  fled  precipitately  to  their  works ; 
the  remainder  were  brought  to  a stand 
on  the  ground  occupied  by  the  National 
right  wing  in  the  early  morning. 

Grant  had  now  appeared  on  the  field. 
It  was  about  noon  when  the  Confede- 
rates were  driven  back  to  their  trenches. 
The  battle  had  lulled ; but  everything 
was  yet  in  confusion.  The  chief  must 
have  bitterly  regretted  the  fact  of  his 
own  absence  from  the  scene  of  action  in 
the  early  part  of  the  day.  But  it  was  no 
time  now  for  idle  and  worthless  lament- 
ation. It  was  action  that  was  needed — 
prompt,  decided,  vigorous  action.  Grant 
was  not  slow  to  come  to  a conclusion, 
although  it  is  simply  absurd  to  say  that 
in  this  instance  he  made  up  his  mind 
at  once.  About  three  o’clock  in  the 
afternoon  he  called  McClernand  and 
Wallace  aside  for  consultation.  They 
were  all  on  horseback.  Grant  held  in 


92 


FORTS  HENRY  AND  DONELSON. 


his  hand  some  despatches,  to  which  now 
and  then  he  nervously  turned  his  eyes. 
His  face  was  flushed  and  revealed  high 
excitement.  He  was  evidently  swayed 
by  strong  emotions.  He  said  something 
about  the  necessity  of  falling  back  and 
intrenching — about  waiting  for  rein- 
forcements and  Foote’s  new  flotilla.  It 
was  suggested  by  one  of  the  other  two 
that  in  consequence  of  McClernand’s 
defeat  the  road  to  Clarksville  was  un- 
covered, and  that  the  enemy  might  es- 
cape if  he  chose.  Whether  Grant  had 
merely  been  sounding  the  opinions  of 
his  subordinates,  or  whether  new  light 
at  the  moment  dawned  upon  him,  we 
know  not ; but  all  of  a sudden  he  gave 
orders  that  the  right  wing  should  re- 
take the  ground  which  it  had  lost  in 
the  morning,  and  that  the  left  wing, 
under  Smith,  should  make  a simultane- 
ous attack  on  the  Confederate  right. 
General  Grant  has  since  given  us  his 
own  reason  for  the  course  which  he  re- 
solved to  pursue.  “ On  riding  upon  the 
field,”  he  says,  “ I saw  that  either  side 
was  ready  to  give  way  if  the  other 
showed  a bold  front.  I took  the  oppor- 
tunity, and  ordered  an  advance  of  the 
whole  line.” 

The  orders  were  promptly  executed. 
Wallace  took  charge  of  the  troops  which 
had  been  engaged  and  which  had  suf- 
fered so  much  in  the  morning  and  early 
part  of  the  day,  and  whose  duty  it  was 
to  resume  lost  ground.  The  ground 
was  rough  and  badly  blocked  with 
wood.  There  were,  besides,  bloody 
memorials  of  the  morning’s  struggle. 
The  Nationals,  however,  pressed  on, 
the  Confederates  vigorously  resisting. 


For  more  than  an  hour  the  conflict  raged 
fiercely,  and  the  result  seemed  doubtful. 
Ultimately,  however,  the  Confederates 
yielded  to  the  fierce  energy  of  their  as- 
sailants, and  were  compelled  to  retire 
within  their  own  intrenchments.  In  the 
hour  of  victory  almost  complete,  when 
wdthin  one  hundred  and  fifty  yards 
of  the  enemy’s  works,  Wallace  was 
astonished  by  an  order  from  the  gen- 
eral-in-chief, commanding  him  to  halt 
and  retire  his  troops,  as  a new  plan 
of  operations  had  been  arranged  for 
the  morrow.  He  felt  satisfied  that 
Gi'ant  was  ignorant  of  the  success 
which  had  attended  his  movement. 
Darkness,  however,  was  at  hand.  He 
contented  himself,  therefore,  with  hold- 
ing the  ground  he  had  taken,  and  dis- 
obeyed orders  only  to  the  extent  of  bi- 
vouacking on  the  field  of  victory.  Smith 
was  equally  successful  in  his  attack  on 
the  Confederate  right.  Buckner,  who 
in  abandoning  the  left  made  it  the  easy 
|)rey  of  Wallace,  arrived  too  late  at  his 
old  position  on  the  right  to  save  it  from 
the  dashing  energy  of  Smith.  In  spite 
of  all  that  he  could  do,  the  Confederates 
were  forced  from  their  intrenchments 
and  driven  inside  the  work. 

All  along  the  line,  the  ground  lost  in 
the  morning  had  been  reclaimed.  Nay, 
more : — On  both  the  left  and  the  right 
the  enemy  had  found  it  necessary  to 
abandon  his  own  chosen  ground  and  to 
retire  more  and  more  under  the  works 
of  the  fort.  When  darkness  fell.  Grant 
had  reason  to  feel  satisfied.  He  had  by 
his  single  will  converted  a day  of  dis- 
aster into  a day  of  triumph.  The  fruit 
of  victory  was  not  yet  in  his  hands,  but 


THE  SURRENDER. 


93 


it  was  ripe  and  ready  to  fall.  So  ended 
tlie  third  day  at  Fort  Donelson. 

The  night  which  followed  was  one  of 
the  saddest  yet  experienced  in  the  his- 
tory of  the  war.  The  cold  was  intense, 
the  thermometer  indicating  more  than 
twenty  degrees  below  the  freezing 
point.  The  ice-covered  branches  of  the 
trees  swayed  and  crackled  in  the  night 
breeze.  Camp  life  had  not  yet  become 
a luxury.  There  were  no  tents,  and 
even  the  blanket  had  not  become  a 
necessary  part  of  the  soldier’s  equipage. 
General  Grant  found  a sleeping-place  in 
a negro  hut.  General  Smith  lay  down 
on  the  frozen  ground.  The  soldier 
slept  as  he  best  might,  leaning  on  his 
musket  or  I’esting  on  his  knapsack. 
Four  thousand  brave  Americans  lay 
scattered  over  the  battle  field,  many  of 
them  dead,  some  of  them  freezin^:  to 
death,  the  feeble  but  piteous  cries  of 
the  latter  filling  the  weary  hours  with 
woe.  It  is  in  scenes  such  as  these  that 
true  humanity  stands  forth  conspicuous 
and  commands  universal  admiration. 
With  such  a background,  goodness, 
pure,  true,  and  unselfish,  shines  as  if 
with  a heavenly  light.  General  Lewis 
Wallace,  to  his  honor  be  it  said,  with 
many  of  his  men,  who,  filled  with  his 
spirit  and  fired  by  his  example,  worked 
far  into  the  morning  hours,  ministering 
to  the  wounded  on  both  sides,  and  with 
kindly  hands  burying  the  dead. 

Grant  had  made  all  necessary  arrange- 
ments for  resuming  the  attack  along  the 
whole  line  on  the  following  (Sunday) 
morning.  Such  attack,  however,  was 
not  to  be  necessary.  A council  of  war 
was  held  at  Pillow’s  headquarters,  late 


ap — 

on  Saturday  night.  Floyd,  Pillow, 
Buckner,  and  their  staff-officers  were  all 
present.  Some  bad  temper  w^as  reveal- 
ed ; and  on  many  points  there  was  dif- 
ference of  opinion.  On  one  point  they 
were  agreed — that  another  sortie  would 
be  absolutely  disastrous.  Buckner  did 
not  believe  that  he  could  hold  his  posi- 
tion half  an  hour  after  daylight.  In  his 
judgment  there  was  no  escape  from  a 
suiTender.  Floyd  and  Pillow  were 
equally  of  opinion  that  the  situation 
was  desperate,  and  that  there  was  noth- 
ing for  them  but  immediate  capitulation. 
The  one  absorbing  question  with  Floyd 
and  Pillow  was  ‘‘How  shall  we  es- 
cape ? ” Floyd  knew  wLat  he  had  done, 
and  he  trembled  to  fall  into  the  hands 
of  the  enemy.  “You  know,”  he  said, 
“the  position  in  which  I stand.”  Pil- 
low seemed  to  feel  himself  in  a similar 
plight,  although  he  perhaps  somewhat 
overestimated  his  individual  importance. 
It  was  ultimately  agreed  that  Buckner 
should  assume  the  command,  and  that 
Floyd  and  Pillow  should  be  allowed 
to  make  their  escape,  Floyd  taking  with 
him  his  Virginia  brigade.  Floyd  sur- 
rendered the  command.  Pillow,  who 
was  next  in  rank,  said  “I  pass  it.” 
Buckner  called  for  writing  materials 
and  a bugler;  and  Floyd  and  Pillow 
hastened  off  to  save  their  precious  lives. 
Pillow  crossed  the  river  in  a scow.  Floyd 
and  his  men  went  on  board  a steamer 
at  the  wharf,  and  steered  off  amid  the 
curses  and  hisses  of  their  former  com- 
panions in  arms.  It  was  a shameful 
transaction ; but  Buckner’s  conduct  was 
honorable  throughout.  Floyd  had  now 
appeared  in  his  true  character. 


94 


FORTS  HENRY  AND  DONELSON. 


When  on  the  morning  of  Sunday,  the 
Feb.  February,  the  light  broke 

along  the  lines,  there  was  no  con- 
viction more  general  among  the  Nation- 
al soldiers  than  that  the  stirring  scenes 
of  the  previous  day  were  about  to  be  re- 
peated, and  repeated,  perhaps,  in  more 
aggravated  and  bloody  form ; nor  was 
there  disposition  anywhere  to  shirk  the 
ordeal.  Suddenly,  however,  the  clear 
notes  of  the  bugle  were  heard  sounding 
a parley ; and  as  the  gray  dawn  passed 
away  before  the  brighter  light  of  the 
opening  day,  a white  flag  was  seen  wav- 
ing over  the  fort.  It  was  a token  of  a 
Avillingness  to  surrender.  We  can  read- 
ily imagine  that  the  altered  situation 
was  gladly  welcomed  by  all.  A letter 
was  received  by  Grant  from  Buckner, 
asking  for  the  appointment  of  commis- 
sioners to  settle  upon  terms  of  capitula- 
tion, and  suggesting  an  armistice  till 
noon.  To  this  Grant  returned  his  char- 
acteristic reply,  ^‘No  terms  other  than 
an  unconditional  surrender  can  be  ac- 
cepted. I propose  to  move  immediately 
on  your  works.”  Buckner  regarded 
these  terms  as  “ ungenerous  and  unchiv- 
alric”;  but  he  was  nevertheless  obliged 
to  accept  them.  The  old  flag  was  im- 
mediately raised ; and  the  stars  and 
stripes  floated  over  the  stronghold  of 
the  Cumberland.  About  15,000  pris- 


oners, 17. GOO  small  arms,  and  65  guns 
constituted  the  prize  which  fell  into  the 
hands  of  the  National  commander.  His 
losses  were  2041,  of  whom  425  were 
killed.  Grant  paid  a high  compliment 
to  his  soldiers.  He  told  them  that  for 
four  successive  nights,  without  shelter 
during  the  most  inclement  weather 
known  in  this  latitude,  they  had  faced 
an  enemy  in  large  force,  and  in  a posi- 
tion chosen  by  himself,  and  had  com- 
pelled him  to  surrender  without  condi- 
tions, the  victory  achieved  being  not 
only  great  in  the  effect  it  must  have  in 
breaking  down  the  rebellion,  but  also 
in  this,  that  it  had  secured  the  greatest 
number  of  prisoners  of  war  ever  taken 
in  any  battle  on  this  continent.” 

The  investment  of  Donelson  had  been 
followed  by  the  evacuation  of  Bowling 
Green  ; its  fall  was  followed  by  the 
abandonment  of  Nashville.  This,  how- 
ever, w^as  not  all.  Polk  found  it  neces- 
sary to  evacuate  Columbus  and  fall  back 
on  Island  No.  10.  The  so-called  Gib- 
raltar of  the  West  was  forthwith  occu- 
pied by  National  troops.  The  Southern 
line  of  defense  was  completely  broken 
down.  General  Grant  had  nobly  accom- 
plished the  task  which  he  had  under- 
taken. Henceforward  he  was  regarded 
as  one  of  the  strongest  pillars  of  the 
National  cause. 


ISLAND  No.  10  SUERENDERS. 


95 


CHAPTER  VII. 

The  Effects  of  the  Fall  of  Donelson. — Johnston’s  Mistake. — The  Enemy’s  Centre  Broken. — Evacuation  of  Coluro 
bus. — Island  No.  10  and  New  Madrid. — Surrender  of  Island  No.  10. — Vexation  of  the  South. — National 
Victories  in  the  West. — Popularity  of  Grant. — The  Importance  of  Corinth. — Grant  Preparing  to  Advance. — 
Grant  Kemoved  from  Command. — C.  F.  Smith  put  in  Charge  of  the  Army. — Halleck  Gives  His  Keasons. — ‘ 
Grant’s  Answer. — Movement  up  the  Tennessee. — Crump's  Landing. — The  Gunboats. — Sherman  in  Advance. — 
Pittsburg  Landing. — The  Confederates  at  Corinth. — Description  of  the  Ground  at  Pittsburg  Landing. — Shiloh 
Church. — The  Illness  of  General  Smith. — General  Grant  again  in  Charge. — Disposition  of  the  National 
Troops. — The  Confederates. — How  Disposed. — Their  Plans  and  Prospects. — General  Beauregard. — Arrival  of 
Johnston. — Buell  Ordered  to  Join  Grant. — Johnston’s  Proclamation. — The  Confederates  Moving  Forward. — 
Grant’s  Plans  Well  Laid,  but  the  Troops  Scattered. — The  Morning  of  the  Sixth  of  April. — The  Nationals 
Attacked. — A Tremendous  Onslaught. — Grant  not  on  the  Field. — His  Arrival. — Sherman's  Bravery. — Sherman 
and  Prentiss  Driven  from  their  Ground. — The  Battle  Doubtful. — The  Confederates  Gaining  Ground. — The 
Ammunition  Train. — Four  Division  Camps  Plundered. — Three  Divisions  Routed. — W.  H.  L.  Wallace  Comes 
to  the  Rescue. — Wallace  Mortally  Wounded. — The  Situation  Desperate. — Neither  Lewis  Wallace  nor  Buell  yet 
on  the  Field. — Driven  to  a Corner  of  the  Field. — W 11  Grant  Surrender? — Both  Armies  Exhausted. — Johnston 
Wounded  and  Carried  from  the  Field. — A Lull  in  the  Fight. — Beauregard  in  Command. — The  Ravine. — The 
Battery  on  the  Crest  of  the  Hill. — The  Gunboats. — The  Terrible  Struggle. — The  Slaughter. — A Valley  of 
Death. — End  of  the  First  Day. — The  Second  Day. — The  Battle  Resumed. — Wallace  and  Buell  now  on  the 
Field. — Beauregard  Attempts  to  Turn  the  National  Left.-  An  Artillery  Duel. — The  Confederates  Pressed 
Back. — The  Nationals  Gaining  Ground  all  along  the  Line. — A Cheer  of  Victory. — The  Battle  Ended. — Re- 
flections.— Unexampled  Bravery  on  Both  Sides. — Magnanimity  of  General  Grant. 


The  fall  of  Fort  Donelson,  as  we 
mentioned  at  the  close  of  the  last 

1862 

chapter,  completely  broke  up  that 
line  of  defense  stretching  from  Bowling 
Green  to  Columbus — a line  of  defense 
which  the  Confederates  fondly  imag- 
ined to  be  invulnerable.  It  carried  the 
whole  Union  front  forward  two  hun- 
dred miles.  It  had  the  immediate  effect 
of  driving  the  insurgents  completely  out 
of  Kentucky.  It  threw  them  back  into 
the  centre  of  Tennessee,  and  brought 
the  capital  of  that  State  under  Union 
authority.  It  practically  unbound  both 
’ the  Cumberland  and  Tennessee  Rivers 
— an  immense  gain  to  the  Union  com- 
manders, as  they  fully  appreciated  the 
great  advantage  of  gunboats  on  those 
inland  rivers. 


There  can  now  be  no  doubt  in  any 
mind  at  all  familiar  with  the  subject, 
that  the  Union  victories  at  Forts  Henry 
and  Donelson  were  rendered  compar- 
atively easy  by  the  bad  management 
of  the  Confederate  commander-in-chief. 
Had  General  Johnston,  in  place  of  at- 
taching so  much  importance  to  the  pro- 
tection of  the  two  forts  on  the  Tennes- 
see and  the  Cumberland  respectively, 
concentrated  his  various  armies  and 
forced  either  Grant  or  Buell  or  both  to 
risk  the  chances  of  battle  in  the  open 
ground,  the  result  might  have  been  very 
different.  Johnston  saw  this  himself 
when  it  was  too  late ; and  in  a remark- 
able letter  addressed  from  Murfrees- 
boro’ to  Jefferson  Davis,  he  said,  ^‘If  I 
join  this  corps  to  the  forces  of  General 


SHILOH. 


9G 

Beauregard,  then  those  who  are  now 
declaiming  against  me  will  be  without 
an  argument.” 

Bowling  Green  had  been  evacuated 
before  Fort  Donelson  fell ; for,  believ- 
ing it  to  be  untenable,  Johnston  had 
moved  on  towards  the  south.  Nashville 
was  thrown  into  a perfect  panic  by  the 
report  of  the  capture  of  Donelson ; and 
as  Johnston  had  declared  that  he  fouglit 
for  that  city  while  endeavoring  to  save 
this  fort' on  the  Cumberland,  the  capital 
of  Tennessee  fell  an  easy  prey  to  the 
troops  of  General  Buell.  Six  days  after 
j^ar.  capture  of  Nashville,  General 
Halleck  telegraphed  to  General 
McClellan  from  St.  Louis,  “ Columbus, 
the  Gibraltar  of  the  West,  is  ours,  and 
Kentucky  is  free.  Thanks  to  the  bril- 
liant strategy  of  the  campaign  by  which 
the  enemy’s  centre  was  pierced  at  Forts 
Henry  and  Donelson,  his  wings  isolated 
from  each  other  and  turned,  compelling 
thus  the  evacuation  of  his  stronghold 
of  Bowling  Green  first,  and  now  Colum- 
bus.” Driven  from  all  these  strong:- 
holds,  it  became  necessary  for  the  Con- 
federates to  select  some  defensive  posi- 
tion further  to  the  south.  In  obedience 
to  instructions  from  Bichmond,  Polk 
fell  back  some  miles,  still  clinging  to 
the  shores  of  the  Mississippi,  and  estab- 
lished himself  at  Island  No.  10  and  at 
New  Madrid.  These  places,  although 
fortified  with  great  strength,  Island  No. 
10  particularly,  having  had  the  special 
attention  of  General  Beauregard,  and 
being  deemed  the  most  impregnable  of 
all  the  posts  on  the  Mississippi,  the 
Confederates  were  compelled  in  succes- 
sion to  evacuate.  The  attack  on  Island 


No.  10  reflected  the  highest  credit  on 
the  skill  of  the  Union  commanders  and 
on  the  bravery  of  the  Union  troops. 
It  was  not  until  a canal  had  been  cut 
across  Donaldson’s  Point,  bet^veen  Isl- 
and No.  8 and  New  Madrid,  that  the 
Nationals  had  any  hope  of  dislodging 
the  enemy.  The  canal  was  twelve  miles 
long  and  fifty  feet  wide ; and  nineteen 
days  were  consumed  in  cutting  it  from 
j)oint  to  point  and  making  it  navigable 
for  the  largest  of  the  gunboats.  Com- 
mander Foote  reported  to  his  govern- 
ment that  Island  No.  10  was  “harder 
to  conquer  than  Columbus,  its  shores 
being  lined  with  forts,  each  fort  com- 
manding the  one  above  it.”  Beauregard 
telegraphed  to  Richmond  that  the  Na- 
tional guns  had  “thrown  three  thousand 
shells  and  burned  fifty  tons  of  gunpow- 
der,” his  batteries  being  uninjured  and 
only  one  man  killed.  The  canal  made 
a complete  change  in  the  situation. 
New  Madrid  had  been  evacuated  on 
the  12th  of  March;  and  on  the  April 
8th  of  April,  four  days  after  the  8. 
completion  of  the  canal,  Island  No.  10 
had  ceased  to  be  a Confederate  strong- 
hold. The  defenders  of  the  batteries 
had  fled  in  confusion ; but  they  were 
pursued  by  Pope  and  compelled  to  sur- 
render. The  garrison  on  the  island, 
learning  what  had  taken  place  and  be- 
lieving the  situation  to  be  hopeless,  sent 
a flag  of  truce  to  Commander  Foote, 
offering  to  surrender.  The  immediate 
fruits  of  victory  were  some  seven  thou- 
sand prisoners,  including  three  gene- 
rals and  two  hundred  and  seventy 
field  and  company  officers,  one  hundred 
heavy  siege  guns,  twenty-four  pieces  of 


PEA  RIDGE. 


97 


field  artillery,  a large  quantity  of  am- 
munition, several  thousand  stands  of 
small  arms,  with  tents,  horses,  and  wag- 
ons innumerable.  ‘‘No  single  battle 
field  has  yet  afforded  to  the  North  such 
visible  fruits  of  victory  as  have  been 
srathered  at  Island  No.  10.”  Such  was 

o 

the  language  used  by  the  high  officials 
at  Kichmond.  The  Mississippi  was  now 
open  as  far  south  as  Fort  Pillow. 

While  these  events  were  following 
each  other  in  rapid  succession  in  Middle 
Tennessee  and  Western  Kentucky,  suc- 
cesses of  a scarcely  less  substantial  kind 
were  attending  the  National  arms  in 
Arkansas,  in  the  grand  movement,  con- 
ducted by  Curtis,  Sigel,  and  others, 
down  the  Mississippi  valley  toward  the 
gulf.  Early  in  February  the  Confede- 
rate General  Price  had  been  compelled 
to  retreat  from  Missouri  into  Arkansas. 
Pel),  On  the  18th  of  that  month  he  was 
18.  closely  followed  by  the  Nationals 
under  General  Samuel  K.  Curtis  of 
Iowa.  On  the  same  day,  joy  was  created 
throughout  the  Union  by  a telegram 
sent  by  General  Halleck  to  General 
McClellan.  “ The  flag  of  the  Union,’’ 
said  Halleck,  “ is  floating  in  Arkansas. 
. . . The  army  of  the  Southwest  is  do- 
ing its  duty  nobly.”  Curtis  foresaw, 
however,  that  he  was  certain  soon  to  be 
taken  at  a disadvantage,  as  the  Confed- 
erates, in  retreating,  had  really  been 
falling  back  upon  reinforcements.  He 
therefore  took  post  upon  Sugar  Creek. 
His  entire  force  consisted  of  two  thou- 
• sand  five  hundred  men,  with  forty-nine 
guns.  The  enemy,  under  General  Earl 
VanDorn,  a dashing  Confederate  officer, 
was  at  least  twenty  thousand  strong.  On 


the  morning  of  the  7th  of  March 
the  two  armies  came  into  collision. 

There  had  been  much  previous  manoeu- 
vreing ; and  in  consequence  of  a skilful 
and  successful  flank  movement  made  by 
VanDorn,  Curtis  was  compelled,  almost 
at  the  last  moment,  to  change  his  front. 
When  the  struggle  began,  the  First  and 
Second  Divisions,  under  Sigel  and  As- 
both,  were  on  the  left,  the  Third,  under 
Davis,  was  in  the  centre,  and  Carr’s 
Fourth  Division  formed  the  right.  The 
line  extended  between  three  and  four 
miles,  from  Sugar  Creek  to  Elkhorn 
Tavern.  On  the  opposite  side  of  a ra- 
vine called  Cross  Timber  Hollow,  the 
Confederate  line  was  stretched  out  be- 
fore them,  with  Price  on  the  right, 
McIntosh  in  the  centre,  and  McCulloch 
on  the  left.  The  attack  fell  heavily 
upon  Carr’s  Division,  which  during  the 
course  of  the  day  was  driven  back  near- 
ly a mile,  but  was  not  disorganized. 
An  attempt  was  made  by  McCulloch, 
by  a movement  of  his  force  to  the  left, 
to  join  VanDorn  and  Price  in  their  at- 
tack on  Curtis’  right.  To  arrest  this 
movement,  Sigel  pushed  forward  three 
pieces  of  artillery,  with  a body  of  cav- 
alry to  protect  and  support  them.  The 
cavalry  were  immediately  overwhelmed 
and  the  guns  captured.  Davis  hurried 
to  the  assistance  of  Sigel ; a desperate 
struggle  followed,  victory  oscillating 
like  a pendulum,  the  Nationals  and 
Confederates  recoiling  and  recovering 
alternately ; ultimately,  however,  the 
Confederate  right  was  broken  and  rout- 
ed, and  among  those  left  on  the  field 
vrere  Generals  McCulloch  and  McIntosh, 
mortally  wounded.  At  the  close  of  the 


98 


SHILOH. 


fighting  on  the  Tth,  Price  was  on  the 
Fayetteville  road,  in  Curtis’  rear.  Van- 
Dorn  had  his  headquarters  at  Elkhorn 
Tavern.  On  the  right  the  National  ar- 
my had  been  defeated ; it  was  cut  off 
from  its  line  of  communication ; its  pro- 
visions were  all  but  exhausted.  The 
Confederates,  however,  had  been  de- 
feated on  their  right,  and  nearly  driven 
from  the  field.  During  the  night  the 
Confederates  united  their  forces  on  the 
ground  held  by  their  left  wing.  A 
change  was  also  effected  in  the  National 
line,  Davis  taking  the  right,  Carr  the 
centre,  and  Sigel  the  left.  At  sunrise 
the  battle  was  resumed,  Sigel  opening 
a heavy  cannonade,  and  advancing 
round  the  enemy’s  right,  Davis  at  the 
same  time  turning  the  enemy’s  left.  It 
was  a daring  and  skilful  movement,  and 
had  all  the  effects  of  a surprise.  All 
at  once  the  Confederates  found  them- 
selves exposed  to  a destructive  cross 
fire.  They  made  a brave  resistance,  but 
in  two  hours,  such  was  the  precision 
and  rapidity  of  Sigel’s  gunners,  they 
were  in  full  retreat  throus-h  the  defiles 

O 

of  Cross  Timber  Hollow.  Thus  ended 
what  is  known  as  the  battle  of  Pea 
Ridge.  In  the  two  days  the  Nationals 
lost  over  thirteen  hundred  men.  The 
Confederate  loss  must  have  been  great- 
er. This  battle  had  no  direct  connec- 
tion with  the  movements  more  immedi- 
ately under  consideration.  It  did  not 
result  from  the  fall  of  Forts  Henry  and 
Donelson.  It  did  not  in  any  way  affect 
the  impending  struggle  at  Pittsburg 
Landing.  But  inasmuch  as  the  move- 
ments of  the  army  under  Curtis  were 
part  of  Halleck’s  general  plan,  as  that 


plan  contemplated  quite  as  much  the 
opening  of  the  Mississippi  from  Cairo 
to  the  gulf  as  the  driving  of  the  enemy 
out  of  Kentucky  and  Tennessee,  and  as 
the  battle  of  Pea  Ridge  was  noted  for 
skill  on  the  part  of  the  officers  and 
bravery  on  the  part  of  the  men,  it  has 
been  deemed  wise,  the  more  especially 
as  it  occurred  simultaneously  with  the 
events  now  under  review,  to  give  it  a 
place  in  these  pages,  which  are  intended 
to  be  preliminary  to  the  most  gigantic 
effort  yet  made  on  either  side  since  the 
commencement  of  the  war. 

After  the  fall  of  Donelson,  it  was 
only  natural  that  General  Grant  should, 
for  a time  at  least,  become  the  popular 
favorite.  All  over  the  Union  his  praises 
were  liberally  sounded;  and  by  not  a few 
who  had  acquired  an  insight  into  his 
character  he  was  hailed  already  as  the 
coming  man.  His  sphere  of  action  had 
been  greatly  enlarged.  General  Halleck, 
as  if  to  mark  his  appreciation  of  Grant’s 
noble  services,  had  assigned  him  to  the 
command  of  the  new  District  of  West 
Tennessee,  a command  wffiich  extended 
from  Cairo  to  the  northern  borders  of 
Mississippi,  and  embraced  the  entire 
country  between  the  Mississippi  and 
Cumberland  Rivers.  General  Grant 
took  immediate  steps  to  turn  to  account 
the  victories  which  he  had  won,  and 
to  press  the  enemy  still  further  to  the 
south.  He  established  his  headquarters 
at  Fort  Henry,  where  General  Lewis 
Wallace  was  in  command.  We  have 
seen  already  that  Foote’s  flotilla  was 
withdrawn  from  the  Cumberland,  that 
part  of  it  had  gone  up  the  Tennessee 
River,  and  that  Foote  himself,  with  a 


GRANT  REMOVED  FROM  COMMAND. 


99 


powerful  naval  armament,  had  gone 
down  the  Mississippi  for  the  purpose 
of  co-operating  with  the  land  troops 
r gainst  Columbus,  Hickman,  Island  No. 
10,  and  New  Madrid. 

It  seems  to  have  been  the  conviction 
of  all  the  Union  commanders — of  Hal- 
leck,  of  Buell,  of  Grant — that  a lodg- 
mtmt  should  be  made  at  or  near  Corinth 
in  Northern  Mississippi.  The  posses- 
sion of  Corinth  or  Florence  or  Tuscum- 
bia,  but  particularly  Corinth,  would 
give  the  National  forces  control  of  the 
Memphis  and  Charleston  Railroad,  the 
key  to  the  great  railway  communica- 
tions between  the  Mississippi  and  the 
East,  as  well  as  the  border  slave  States 
and  the  Gulf  of  Mexico.  It  would  fa- 
cilitate the  capture  of  Memphis,  because 
it  would  place  it  more  completely  at 
the  mercy  of  the  troops  now  moving 
down  the  Mississippi ; and  it  would 
render  effective  assistance  to  General 
Curtis,  who,  as  we  have  seen,  was  at 
this  moment  caiTying  on  important  op- 
erations in  Arkansas.  While  adopting 
vigorous  measures  for  the  purpose  of 
giving  effect  to  the  general  plan.  Grant 
had  the  mortification  to  receive  an  order 
from  Halleck,  instructing  him  to  turn 
over  his  command  to  General  C.  F. 
Smith,  and  to  remain  himself  at  Fort 
Henry. 

In  such  circumstances  such  an  order 
must  have  been  humiliating  in  the  last 
degree  to  General  Grant ; and  it  is  not 
surprising  that,  stung  to  the  quick  as 
he  must  have  been,  he  should  have 
asked  to  be  entirely  relieved  from  duty. 
As  a general  rule,  it  is  unwise  to  attach 
too  much  importance  to  individuals  in 


a great  national  contest.  No  one  man 
is  absolutely  indispensable.  It  is  unde- 
niable, however,  that  the  retirement  of 
General  Grant  at  this  particular  junc- 
ture might  have  materially  affected  the 
future  history  of  the  great  national 
struggle  now  fairly  begun,  and  already 
bearing  upon  it  somewhat  of  the  impress 
of  his  character  and  genius.  The  story 
of  this  short-lived  difficulty  is  easily 
told.  Complying  with  a request  for  an 
interview.  Grant  had  on  the  27th  of 
February  gone  on  a visit  to  Buell,  up 
the  Cumberland  to  Nashville.  In  the 
meantime  Halleck  had  ordered  him  to 
ascend  the  Tennessee,  then  in  full  flood, 
and  establish  himself  on  the  Memphis 
and  Charleston  Railroad  at  or  near 
Corinth.  On  the  1st  of  March,  |^ar. 
Halleck  ordered  him  to  fall  back  1* 
from  the  Cumberland  to  the  Tennessee, 
with  the  view  of  carrying  out  the  orders’* 
previously  given.  It  was  supposed  at 
this  moment  that  the  Confederates  had 
retreated  to  Chattanooga.  Sherman 
meanwhile  received  orders  to  seize  * all 
steamboats  passing  Paducah,  and  to  send 
them  up  the  Tennessee  for  the  trans- 
portation of  Grant’s  army.  On  hearing 
that  Grant  had  gone  up  the  Cumberland, 
Halleck  telegraphed  to  him : Why 
don’t  you  obey  my  orders  ? Why  don’t 
you  answer  my  letters  ? Turn  over  the 
command  of  the  Tennessee  expedition 
to  General  C.  F.  Smith,  and  remain 
yourself  at  Fort  Henry.”  At  the  same 
time  Halleck  wrote  complainingly  to 
McClellan  at  Washington,  saying  he 
could  get  no  reports  from  Grant,  whose 
troops  were  demoralized  by  their  vic- 
tory. To  Grant  himself  Halleck  wrote, 


100 


SHILOH. 


stating  that  his  repeated  neglect  of 
positive  orders  to  report  his  strength 
had  created  great  dissatisfaction,  and 
sei'iously  interfered  with  the  general 
military  arrangements ; and  that  his 
going  to  Nashville  when  he  ought  to 
have  been  with  his  troops,  had  given 
such  offense  at  Washington  that  it  had 
been  considered  advisable  to  arrest  him 
on  his  return.  It  is  possible  that, 
judged  by  the  highest  forms  of  mili- 
tary law,  Grant,  in  some  of  the  particu- 
lars charged,  was  to  blame.  It  is  possi- 
ble, too,  that  Halleck,  who  was  a man 
of  the  old  school,  and  strict  to  the  let- 
ter of  the  law,  was  officious  overmuch. 
Grant,  however,  had  his  explanation 
ready.  He  had  not  received  Halleck’s 
orders  in  time ; he  had  gone  to  Nash- 
ville for  the  good  of  the  service,  and 
not  for  personal  pleasure  or  for  any 
selfish  motive;  he  had  reported  every 
day,  had  written  on  an  average  more 
than  once  a day,  and  had  done  his  best 
to  obey  orders  from  headquarters;  he 
had  not  permitted  his  troops  to  maraud ; 
on  the  contrary,  he  had  sent  the  ma- 
rauders on  to  St.  Louis.  He  submitted 
to  instructions  by  turning  the  army  over 
to  General  Smith.  He  asked,  however, 
that  he  might  be  relieved.  The  ex- 
planations so  far  satisfied  Halleck  that 
he  requested  the  authorities  at  Wash- 
ington to  allow  the  matter  to  drop. 
Smith,  however,  remained  in  command, 
but,  as  the  reader  will  soon  discover, 
only  for  a brief  period. 

The  temporary  change  of  command- 
ers did  not  allow  any  intermission  of 
the  work.  The  expedition  up  the  Ten- 
nessee was  hurried  forward.  An  acqui- 


sition was  found  in  Sherman,  who,  in 
compliance  with  orders  from  Halleck, 
reported  to  Smith.  It  was  not  many 
days  until  seventy  transports,  carrying 
over  thirty  thousand  troops,  were  ready 
to  move  to  the  point  agreed  upon.  As 
the  boats  steamed  up  to  Savannah, 
where  the  depot  of  supplies  was  estab- 
lished, bands  playing  and  banners  fly- 
ing, it  was  perhaps  the  most  splendid 
pageant  seen  since  the  commencement 
of  the  war.  On  the  11th  of  March  lyjar, 
the  greater  portion  of  the  army  H. 
was  debarked  at  Savannah  in  perfect 
safety.  General  Lewis  Wallace,  with 
his  division,  disembarked  on  the  west 
bank  of  the  river  at  Crump’s  Landing, 
about  four  miles  above  Savannah,  and 
took  post  on  the  road  to  Purdy.  His 
instructions  were  to  destroy  the  rail- 
road bridge  in  the  immediate  neighbor- 
hood of  that  village.  This  was  a hazard- 
ous undertaking ; for  the  Confederates, 
as  was  afterwards  learned,  were  lying 
close  at  hand ; but  it  was  successfully 
accomplished,  and  that,  too,  under  the 
inconvenience  and  discomfort  of  a series 
of  heavy  thunderstorms.  A Confede- 
rate train  approached  while  the  bridge 
was  burning,  and  narrowly  escaped  cap- 
ture by  reversing  the  engine.  Sherman 
was  ordered  by  Smith  to  take  his  o^vn 
division  and  the  two  gunboats  Tyler 
and  Lexington,  to  proceed  further  up 
the  river,  and  to  strike  the  Memphis  and 
Charleston  Railroad.  Sherman  went  up 
as  far  as  Tyler’s  Landing,  at  the  mouth 
of  Yellow  Creek,  just  within  the  bor- 
ders of  Mississippi ; but  the  roads  were 
so  flooded  by  the  heavy  rains  that  he 
found  it  impossible  to  reach  the  rail- 


GRANT  AGAIN  IN  COMMAND. 


101 


road.  Had  the  enemy  known  bis  op- 
portunity, Sherman’s  division  might 
liave  been  cut  to  pieces ; for  it  was  with 
the  utmost  difficulty,  and  not  until 
many  men  and  horses  had  perished  in 
iie  swollen  streams,  that  he  got  back 
to  his  boats.  On  his  way  up  the  stream, 
Sherman  made  one  important  discovery. 
On  passing  Pittsburg  Landing  the  gun- 
boats were  tired  upon  by  a Confederate 
regiment.  It  had  already  become  known 
that  the  Confederate  army  was  concen- 
trating at  Corinth,  and  that  two  batte- 
ries were  already  posted  in  advance, 
one  at  Eastport,  the  other  just  above 
the  mouth  of  Bear  Creek.  Sherman 
learned  that  a road  led  from  Pittsburg 
Landing  to  Corinth  ; he  conveyed  the 
information  at  once  to  Smith,  and  de- 
clared it  to  be  all-important,  in  his  judg- 
ment, that  Pittsburg  Landing  should 
be  occupied.  The  advice  was  taken  ; 
and  the  23lace  became  sacred — the  name 
immortal. 

After  a personal  examination  of  the 
ground,  Smith  was  satisfied  that  Sher- 
man’s advice  was  sound ; and  Hurlbut 
was  ordered  to  occupy  Pittsburg  Land- 
ing ; while  Sherman  was  directed  to 
bring  his  division  on  the  ground,  but  to 
take  a position  out  from  the  river,  leav- 
ing space  enough  behind  him,  as  Smith 
put  it,  ^‘for  a hundred  thousand  men.” 

Pittsburg  Landing  is  about  eight  or 
nine  miles  above  Savannah,  and  lies 
on  the  west  side  of  the  Tennessee.  The 
river  banks  at  the  Landing  rise  about 
eighty  feet,  but  are  cloven  by  a number 
of  ravines,  through  one  of  which  runs 
the  main  road  to  Corinth  to  the  south- 
west, and  branching  off  to  Purdy  to  the 


northwest.  The  Landing  is  fianked  on 
the  left  by  a short  but  precipitous  ra- 
vine. On  the  right  and  left  are  Snake 
and  Lick  Creeks,  streams  which  rise  near 
each  other  and  gradually  diverge,  fall- 
ing into  the  Tennessee  some  four  or  five 
miles  apart  on  either  side  of  the  Land- 
ing. Between  these  streams,  which  form 
a good  flanking  arrangement,  making 
attack  possible  only  in  the  front,  lies  a 
plateau  or  table-land  rising  some  eighty 
feet  high,  of  irregular  surface,  cleared 
near  the  shores,  but  covered  with  tall 
oaks  and  thick  brushwood  further  from 
the  river.  About  three  miles  from  the 
Landing,  and  embowered  in  trees,  stood 
a little  log  building — a place  used  occa- 
sionally by  the  Methodists  for  holding 
cam^)  meetings.  It  had  neither  doors 
nor  wundows,  and  was  only  half -floored. 
Some  corn  in  the  husk  lay  piled  on  the 
floor.  This  was  Shiloh  Church,  des- 
tined to  give  its  name  to  the  neighbor- 
hood and  to  the  bloody  contest  which 
was  so  soon  to  disturb  its  quiet  sur- 
roundin!2:s. 

The  illness  of  General  Smith,  whicE 
resulted  in  death  on  the  25th  of  April, 
brought  Grant  again  to  the  front.  Mar,, 
On  the  17th  of  March  he  arrived  II* 
at  Savannah,  established  his  headquar- 
ters at  the  house  of  Mr.  Cheney,  and 
assumed  the  command.  He  found  the 
army  already  in  position,  and  made  no 
radical  change The  Landing  was- 
guarded  by  the  gunboats  Tyler  and 
Lexington.  Sherman’s  Division,  eight 
thousand  strong,  formed  a sort  of  out- 
lying force,  covering  all  the  main  roads, 
leading  to  the  Landing.  There  was  a 
gap  between  his  centre  and  his  right,, 


20G 


102 


SHILOH. 


and  a still  wider  gap  of  about  two  and  a 
half  miles  between  his  centre  and  his 
left.  Hurlbut’s  Division  was  put  in 
line  on  the  left  of  the  main  Corinth 
road,  and  Smith’s  own  division,  under 
General  W.  H.  L.  Wallace,  was  on 
Hurlbut’s  right.  Lewis  Wallace’s  Di- 
vision was  detached  and  stationed  at 
Crump’s  Landing,  to  observe  any  move- 
ments which  might  be  made  by  the 
Confederates  at  Purdy,  and  to  cover 
the  river  communications  between  Pitts- 
burg Landing  and  Savannah.  McCler- 
nand’s  Division  was  about  a mile  in 
front  of  W.  H.  L.  Wallace,  with  that 
of  Prentiss  to  his  right.  These  two  di- 
visions— that  of  McClernand  and  that 
of  Prentiss — formed  the  real  line  of 
battle.  The  entire  force  was  about 
thirty- three  thousand  men.  In  estimat- 
ing the  possible  strength  of  the  Union 
army,  the  aid  which  might  come  from 
Buell  must  be  taken  into  <account.  This 
general,  after  repeatted  solicitations  that 
he  might  be  permitted  to  abandon 
Nashville,  across  Tennessee  and  join  his 
forces  to  those  of  Grant,  with  a view  to 
counteract  the  Confederate  concentra- 
tion at  Corinth,  had  at  last  obtained 
Halleck’s  consent.  The  army  of  the 
Ohio,  which  numbered  some  forty  thou- 
sand men,  was  therefore  already  on  its 
31ar.  niarch ; and  by  the  20th  of  March 
20.  it  had  reached  Columbia.  The 
roads  were  bad  and  the  weather  stormy 
in  the  extreme;  but  it  was  not  unreas- 
onable to  conclude  that  Buell  would  be 
able  to  accomplish  the  distance  in  time. 
Should  this  large  increase  of  strength 
arrive  before  the  commencement  of  hos- 
tilities, Grant  could  have  but  small 


reason  for  any  misgivings  as  to  the  issue 
of  the  contest. 

Let  us  now  glance  at  the  position  of 
the  Confederates,  and  consider  their 
plans  and  their  prospects.  When  the 
first  line  of  the  Confederate  defense  had 
been  swept  away  by  the  capture  of  Fort 
Donelson,  Johnston  retired  first  of  all 
to  Murfreesboro’ ; but  the  great  object 
aimed  at  both  by  him  and  Beauregard 
was  to  concentrate  the  Confederate 
forces  and  establish  a second  line  of 
defense  on  the  Memphis  and  Charleston 
Railroad.  Concentration  had  for  some 
time  past  been  the  favorite  idea  of 
Beauregard.  If  his  advice  had  been 
taken  in  time,  Donelson  might  not  yet 
have  fallen.  Beauregard  selected  Co- 
rinth as  the  most  desirable  point  for 
concentrating  the  scattered  forces  of  the 
Confederacy.  Here  the  two  great  rail- 
roads which  connect  the  Gulf  of  Mexico 
and  the  Mississippi  with  the  Atlantic 
Ocean  form  a junction.  It  is  the  key 
of  the  railroad  system  of  Mississippi. 
Orders  were  issued  to  the  commanders 
of  all  the  outlying  positions ; and  Beau- 
regard was  soon  joined  by  Bragg  from 
Pensacola,  by  Polk  from  the  Mississippi, 
Johnston  also  coming  up  with  his  en- 
tire army  from  Murfreesboro’.  Corinth, 
therefore,  became  a great  military  camp; 
and,  in  addition  to  its  other  advantages, 
it  afforded  complete  protection  to  Mem- 
phis. In  three  weeks  the  Confederate 
strength  had  risen  from  eleven  thousand 
to  forty-five  thousand  men.  This,  how- 
ever, was  not  all.  VanDorn  and  Price, 
whom  we  recently  saw  retiring  before 
Curtis  and  Sigel  at  Pea  Ridge,  were 
known  to  be  coming  up  from  Ai’kansas 


THE  CONFEDERATE  PLAN. 


103 


witli  other  thirty  thousand  men.  Since 
the  commencement  of  the  war  the  Con- 
federates never  found  themselves  in  cir- 
cumstances more  favorable  for  striking 
a bold  and  decisive  blow.  After  the 
junction  with  Johnston,  that  general 
took  the  command,  Beauregard  being 
nominally  second,  but  remaining  really 
the  soul  of  the  movement. 

It  had  been  the  intention  of  Halleck, 
under  whose  instructions  the  entire 
movement  on  the  part  of  the  Nationals 
was  conducted,  to  intervene  between 
Johnston  and  Beauregard.  When,  there- 
fore, he  heard  that  Johnston  had  dis- 
appeared from  Murfreesboro’,  and  that 
his  object  was  to  join  Beauregard  at 
Corinth,  he  ordered  Buell  to  hurry  for- 
ward to  the  aid  of  Grant,  and  counter- 
act as  far  as  possible  the  Confederate 
concentration.  There  had  been  un- 
necessary delay,  which  permitted  the 
Confederate  generals  to  unite  their 
strength ; and  now  the  weather  and 
the  roads  were  such  that,  althougli 
Buell’s  army  was  at  Columbia  on  the 
20th,  it  took  full  seventeen  days  to 
reach  Pittsburg  Landing,  a distance  of 
only  ninety  miles. 

To  the  Confederate  general  two  ques- 
tions presented  themselves.  Shall  I 
wait  for  VanDorn  and  Price?  or  shall 
I strike  Grant  at  once,  before  Buell  has 
time  to  come  up  ? At  this  time  Breck- 
enridge,  with  the  Confederate  right, 
which  consisted  of  eleven  thousand 
men,  was  stationed  at  Burnsville;  Har- 
dee and  Bragg,  with  more  than  twenty 
thousand  men,  formed  the  centre  at 
Corinth  ; and  Polk  and  Hindman,  with 
ten  thousand  men,  were  on  the  left,  to 


the  north  of  the  Memphis  and  Charles- 
ton Bailroad.  Johnston,  on  assuming 
command,  had  issued  a flaming  procla- 
mation: “You  are  expected,”  he  said 
to  the  soldiers,  “to  show  yourselves 
worthy  of  your  valor  and  courage, 
worthy  of  the  women  of  the  South, 
whose  noble  devotion  in  this  war  has 
never  been  exceeded  in  any  time.”  On 
the  3d  of  April,  their  available  ^prii 
strength  being  forty  thousand 
men,  the  Confederates  commenced  their 
onward  march.  Their  plan  was  first  to 
destroy  Grant  and  then  to  fall  with  all 
their  weight  on  Buell.  The  roads  were 
in  a tenible  condition,  and  in  conse- 
quence the  progress  made  was  slow.  It 
was  intended  to  attack  the  National  ar- 
my on  the  5th;  but  the  attack  was  de- 
layed in  consequence  of  a heavy  rain- 
storm which  fell  in  the  afternoon.  They 
were  the  less  unwilling  to  delay  the 
attack  that  information  had  just  reached 
them  that  the  troops  from  the  west, 
under  VanDorn  and  Price,  would  cer- 
tainly join  them  the  next  morning. 
That  night  they  were  distant  from  the 
National  pickets  only  about  three-quar- 
ters of  a mile.  Hardee  was  in  front ; 
Bragg  was  in  a second  line  behind; 
Polk  was  behind  Bragg ; and  Brecken- 
ridge  brought  up  the  rear.  During  the 
course  of  the  evening  a council  of  war 
was  held.  There  was  a disposition  to 
wait  for  VanDorn  and  Price.  But  there 
was  peril  in  waiting.  If  Buell  should 
arrive,  Johnston  would  lose  his  golden 
opportunity.  It  was  the  general  con- 
viction that  their  forward  movement 
was  unknown  to  Grant;  and,  after  a 
consultation  of  some  two  hours,  it  was 


104 


SHILOH. 


resolved  to  strike  a blow  before  dawn 
of  the  coming  day.  “ Gentlemen,”  said 
Beauregard  at  the  close  of  the  coun- 
cil, while  pointing  in  the  direction  of 
Grant’s  army,  “ we  sleep  in  the  enemy’s 
camp  to-morrow  night.” 

The  Confederate  generals  made  a 
mistake  in  supposing  that  Grant  was 
ignorant  of  the  fact  that  they  were 
moving  forward  upon  him  with  the 
view  of  making  an  attack.  That  the 
enemy  was  massed  at  Corinth  he  was 
well  aware  ; but  he  was  in  the  enemy’s 
country,  and  information  was  not  wil- 
lingly obtained  from  the  people  of  the 
neighborhood.  That  he  expected  to  be 
attacked  is  proved  by  the  instructions 
which  he  gave  to  his  officers,  particu- 
larly to  Lewis  Wallace  and  Sherman. 
But  he  had  no  means  of  knowing  the 
enemy’s  strength.  He  did  not  know 
that  concentration  was  taking  place  so 
rapidly ; and  a vague  idea  prevailed  in 
the  Union  camp  that  the  force  opposed 
to  them  did  not  exceed  ten  thousand 
men.  Of  the  forward  march  of  the  en- 
emy he  could  not  be  ignorant ; for  on 
April  dth  an  infantry  picket  belong- 
ing  to  Colonel  Buckland’s  bri- 
gade, having  been  captured,  Sherman 
took  that  brigade,  with  some  cavalry, 
and  drove  back  the  Confederate  horse- 
men some  six  miles  from  the  front  of 
the  camp.  The  firing  of  cannon  was 
heard  in  the  evening.  On  the  same  day 
Lewis  Wallace  reported  eight  regiments 
of  infantry  and  twelve  hundred  cavalry 
at  Purdy,  and  an  equal  force  at  Bethel. 
It  is  not  to  be  denied,  however,  that 
Grant  was  in  doubt  from  what  direction 
the  onslaught  would  be  made.  They 


might  attack  his  main  camp;  or  they 
might  cross  over  Snake  Creek  to  the 
north  and  west  of  him,  establishing 
themselves  on  the  Tennessee  below  and 
forcing  him  to  fight  or  cross  to  the  east 
side  of  the  river.  Grant  had  his  feel- 
ers out  all  around ; and,  as  the  result 
proved,  he  did  best  to  risk  a battle  on 
the  ground  which  had  been  chosen  and 
on  which  he  stood. 

The  uncertainty  which  prevailed  in  the 
Union  camp  as  to  the  point  which  might 
first  have  to  bear  the  shock  of  battle, 
proved  an  immense  gain  to  the  Confed- 
erates. It  enabled  them  to  mass  them- 
selves in  great  force  and  fall  with  de- 
structive effect  on  one  part  of  the  Union 
line.  So  great,  indeed,  was  the  advan- 
tage which  they  thus  obtained  that  the 
wonder  is  not  so  much  that  victory  lean- 
ed to  their  standards  during  the  greater 
part  of  the  first  day’s  fighting,  but  that 
they  did  not  succeed,  in  a few  hours, 
in  completely  sweeping  the  Union  army 
from  the  field.  Their  plan  was  to  pen- 
etrate the  Union  centre,  divide  the  ar- 
my in  two  and  cut  it  up  in  detail.  This 
done,  it  would  not  be  difficult  to  make 
short,  sharp  work  with  Buell.  The 
plan  was  good  enough ; but  in  their 
calculations  the  Confederate  generals 
made  one  mistake — they  did  not  take 
into  account  the  cool  pluck  and  skill  of 
the  Union  commanders  and  the  stern 
courasre  and  determination  of  the  Union, 
men. 

The  night  of  the  5th  was,  as  we  have 
seen,  wild  and  stormy.  The  next  April 
morning  (Sunday)  rose  bright  and 
clear.  The  recent  rains,  while  they  had 
filled  the  creeks  and  streams,  had  given 


THE  BATTLE  BEGUN. 


105 


an  air  of  freshness  to  the  surrounding 
country.  The  breath  of  spring  was 
everywhere.  The  trees  were  robed  in 
tke  most  delicate  green ; and  the  sweet, 
rich  voices  of  the  morning  songsters 
tilled  the  air  with  melody.  In  the 
Union  camp  it  was  still  unknown  to- 
wards what  point  the  enemy  might  be 
moving;  but  there  was  watchfulness 
everywhere.  Prentiss’  grand  guards 
had  been  doubled  the  night  before ; 
and  his  pickets  were  out  one  mile  and 
a half.  Sherman’s  troops  had  already 
breakfasted,  and  were  formed  into  line. 
With  the  early  dawn  Hardee’s  corps, 
Avhich  formed  the  first  Confederate  line, 
was  in  motion.  Quickly  but  silently 
they  passed  across  the  ravine  of  Lick 
Creek  and  the  ground  which  separated 
it  from  the  outlying  divisions  of  the 
Union  army.  It  was  the  more  easy  for 
them  to  move  noiselessly  that  the  fallen 
leaves,  being  soaked  with  rain,  made 
no  rustling  sound  under  the  footsteps 
of  the  men.  The  onslaught  was  tre- 
mendous. Avalanche-like,  it  overcame 
all  resistance.  The  Union  outposts  were 
di-iven  like  chalf  before  the  wind.  On 
Hardee  moved,  falling  heavily  on  Sher- 
man’s left,  and  then,  as  if  rebounding 
from  that  firm  phalanx,  his  entire  force 
rolled  with  resistless  and  crushins:  weiorht 

o o 

upon  Prentiss’  division.  The  fierce  yells 
of  the  charging  regiments,  the  sharp, 
shrill  sounds  of  musketry,  the  booming 
of  cannon,  the  bursting  of  shells,  the 
crashing  of  timber,  and  the  clouds  of  sul- 
phurous smoke  which  filled  the  woods, 
too  plainly  told  that  the  battle  of  Shiloh 
had  begun. 

When  the  first  shots  were  fired.  Grant, 


unfortunately,  was  not  on  the  ground. 
He  had  gone  down  the  river  to  Savan- 
nah, some  nine  miles  off,  to  have  an 
interview  with  Buell.  Soon  as  he  heard 
the  first  guns,  he  hastened  to  the  scene 
of  action.  Leaving  a letter  for  Buell, 
and  ordering  Nelson,  who  had  arrived 
with  a portion  of  Buell’s  forces,  to  hur- 
ry forward,  he  took  a steamboat  for 
Pittsburg  Landing.  Halting  at  Crump’s 
Landing,  he  gave  directions  to  Lewis 
Wallace  to  follow  at  once,  unless  it 
should  turn  out  that  the  firing  they 
heard  was  intended  to  deceive  and  that 
the  real  attack  was  to  be  made  upon 
him.  In  the  latter  event  he  was  to  de- 
fend himself  to  the  utmost,  and  to  rely 
with  confidence  on  reinforcements  being 
sent  him  with  the  least  possible  delay. 
The  attack  had  been  made  at  the  first 
streak  of  early  dawn.  It  was  eight 
o’clock  before  Grant  reached  the  field 
of  Shiloh.  He  saw  that  he  had  to  fight 
the  combined  Confederate  force,  and 
without  the  aid  of  Buell.  What  the 
Confederate  strength  was  Grant  could 
only  guess.  We  know  that  the  com- 
bined army  was  over  forty  thousand 
strong.  Grant  had  an  available  force  of 
thirty-three  thousand  men.  He  believed 
he  could  depend  upon  Lewis  Wallace, 
who  had  five  thousand  more.  Some  se- 
vere work,  however,  had  already  been 
done.  There  was  a considerable  gap  be- 
tween Prentiss’  right  and  Sherman’s  left. 
It  was  into  this  gap  that  Hardee  tried  to 
force  himself,  his  object  being  to  out- 
flank and  turn  both  lines.  In  the  begin- 
ning of  the  conflict  Sherman’s  left,  as  we 
have  indicated,  was  sorely  pressed  and 
suffered  terribly.  But  that  active  and 


106 


SHILOH. 


skilful  general  was  present  in  the 
thickest  of  the  fight ; and  by  his  cheer- 
ing words  and  personal  bravery,  as 
well  as  by  the  admirable  manner  in 
which  he  handled  his  men,  he  laid  that 
day  the  foundation  of  a fame  which 
the  American  people  will  not  willingly 
let  die.  Hildebrand’s  brigade,  which 
had  been  driven  from  its  position  by 
the  first  onset  of  the  enemy,  he  tried  in 
vain  to  rally.  While  thus  engaged,  he 
received  a severe  bullet  wound  in  the 
hand.  Nothing,  however,  could  daunt 
his  energy  or  induce  him  to  relax  his 
efforts.  McClernand  pushed  forward  a 
portion  of  his  troops  to  aid  the  smitten 
Hildebrand ; and  these  for  a time  bore 
the  shock  of  battle. 

All,  however,  was  in  vain.  In  poured 
the  Confederates  in  ever-increasing  num- 
bers. Bragg  had  come  to  the  aid  of 
Hardee ; and  Polk,  with  the  third  Con- 
federate line,  was  already  moving  to- 
ward Sherman’s  rear.  By  nine  o’clock 
a very  large  portion  of  Sherman’s  di- 
vision was  virtually  out  of  the  fight; 
and  before  ten  Prentiss  had  been  forced 
from  his  ground,  his  camp  captured  and 
plundered,  his  division  thrown  into  con- 
fusion, and  he  himself  isolated  from  his 
men.  But  for  the  pluck  and  skill  of 
Sherman,  the  battle  at  this  stage  might 
have  been  lost,  although  it  cannot  be 
said  that  there  was  any  lack  of  bravery 
on  the  part  of  any  of  the  Union  divis- 
ions. Officers  and  men  everywhere  vied 
with  each  other  in  deeds  of  daring.  But 
Sherman  showed  strategy  as  well  as 
pluck.  Feeling  the  pressure  of  the  ene- 
my and  in  danger  of  being  caugbt  in 
the  rear,  he  swung  round  upon  his  right 


as  upon  a pivot,  coming  out  at  a right 
angle  and  taking  entirely  new  ground. 
Here  he  took  a firm  position  and  held 
it  tenaciously  for  several  hours,  the  re- 
peated and  vigorous  attacks  of  the  ene- 
my falling  upon  the  solid  front  of  his 
well  arranged  battalions  as  upon  a 
shield  of  shining  steel. 

The  falling  back  of  Sherman,  while 
it  enabled  him  to  prolong  the  contest 
and  successfully  to  prevent  attack  in 
the  rear,  left  McClernand’ s division 
completely  exposed.  On  this,  there- 
fore, the  Confederate  forces  fell  with 
tremendous  energy.  For  a time  McCler- 
nand boldly  and  even  successfully  re- 
sisted, most  effective  aid  being  rendered 
by  Dresser’s  powerful  rifled  cannon. 
Kegiment  after  regiment  of  the  Confed- 
erates rushed  through  the  abandoned 
camps  and  pressed  forward  only  to  be 
cut  to  pieces  by  the  deadly  rifle  shot. 
Ultimately,  however,  the  force  of  over- 
whelming numbers  began  to  tell  on 
McClernand’s  lines.  He  was  forced  to 
retire,  not,  however,  except  in  the  most 
perfect  order,  fighting  as  he  went,  and 
bravely  contesting  every  inch  of  ground. 
By  eleven  o’clock  this  division  was  on 
a line  with  Hurlbut,  close  to  W.  H.  L. 
Wallace,  with  Sherman  to  the  right. 

Meanwhile  Stewart’s  brigade,  of  Sher^ 
man’s  division,  which  was  posted  on 
the  extreme  left  of  the  National  line, 
about  two  miles  from  Pittsburg  Land- 
ing, on  the  Hamburg  road,  near  Lake 
Creek,  where  Buell  was  expected  to 
land,  was,  in  consequence  of  the  falling 
back  of  the  other  divisions,  in  an  ex- 
tremely perilous  position.  The  scream- 
ing  of  a shell  in  its  passage  through  the 


THE  NATIONAL  SITUATION  DESPERATE. 


107 


brandies  of  tbe  trees  overhead  apprised 
Stewart  of  the  approach  of  the  enemy 
in  his  direction.  It  turned  out  to  be  a 
column  of  cavalry  and  infantry,  com- 
posed for  the  most  part  of  Brecken- 
ridge’s  reserves.  They  were  moving 
alono:  the  road  leading  from  Corinth  to 

o o 

Hamburg.  Notifying  W.  H.  L.  W allace 
of  his  difficulty,  and  calling  for  aid,  he 
calmly  awaited  the  attack.  It  w\as  fierce- 
ly made  and  gallantly  resisted.  Wallace 
sent  McArthur  to  the  aid  of  Stewart ; 
but  McArthur  missed  his  way,  and 
came  directly  on  the  Confederates  under 
Withers.  It  was  impossible  for  Stewart 
to  maintain  his  position ; but  so  vigor- 
ously did  McArthur  engage  the  enemy 
that  Stewart  managed  to  avoid  capture, 
and  succeeded  in  reaching  a place  of 
comparative  safety,  where  he  restored 
his  shattered  force  to  something  like 
Older. 

The  battle  had  raged  since  the  early 
morning.  It  was  fiercest  about  ten 
o’clock.  There  was  but  little  intermis- 
sion, however,  until  two.  About  ten 
Girant  visited  Sherman’s  camp,  and  find- 
ing that  the  supply  of  cartridges  was 
short,  he  organized  a train  of  ammuni- 
tion wagons  to  run  between  the  camp 
and  the  Landing — an  arrangement  beset 
with  great  difficulty,  in  consequence  of 
the  large  number  of  fugitives  who  were 
forcing  their  way  through  the  narrow 
road.  By  twelve  o’clock  noon,  the  Con- 
federates had  possession  of  the  ground 
occupied  in  the  morning  by  the  first 
line  of  the  National  army;  and  the 
camps  of  Sherman,  McClernand,  Pren- 
tiss, and  Stewart  had  been  captured  and 
plundered.  Three  of  the  five  divisions  of 


that  army  had  been  completely  routed. 
The  ground  being  entirely  cleared  be- 
fore them — Prentiss’  brigade,  as  we  have 
seen,  being  demolished  and  Stewart  hav> 
ing  been  compelled  to  retreat,  McCler- 
nand, too,  and  Sherman  having  both 
yielded  on  the  right — the  Confederates, 
apparently  resolved  to  push  matters  to 
a crisis,  rushed  with  tremendous  fury 
upon  Hurlbut,  who  still  maintained  his 
original  position,  and  who  had  been 
joined  by  Prentiss  and  some  two  thou- 
sand of  his  men.  W.  H.  L.  Wallace 
fiew  to  the  aid  of  Hurlbut,  taking  with 
him  the  Missouri  batteries  of  Stone, 
Kichardson,  and  Webber.  Hurlbut, 
who  had  hitherto  been  in  the  open 
fields,  now  fell  back  into  the  woods 
which  lay  between  his  camp  and  the 
river,  and  there,  nobly  aided  by  Wal- 
lace, who  fought  like  a hero  of  old, 
gallantly  resisted  the  foe  for  several 
weary  hours.  Upon  this  compact  body 
of  National  troops,  wffio  knew  that  if 
they  had  death  in  front  they  had  cer- 
tain death  in  the  rear,  three  most  des- 
perate charges  were  made,  as  if  upon  a 
wall  of  iron.  In  one  of  these  encoun- 
ters General  W.  H.  L.  Wallace  fell, 
mortally  wounded.  McArthur  took  the 
command ; but  in  spite  of  their  best 
efforts,  both  he  and  Hurlbut  were  com- 
pelled to  retire  a little  further  down 
and  towards  the  river.  In  the  confu- 
sion, Prentiss  and  his  company  getting 
isolated,  were  captured,  sent  to  the  Con- 
federate rear,  and  finally  marched  to 
Corinth  as  prisoners  of  war. 

The  situation  now  seemed  desperate. 
It  was  between  three  and  four  o’clock. 
Sherman  and  McClernand,  all  but  ufi 


108 


SHILOH. 


terly  exhausted,  and  having  lost  many 
of  their  guns,  had  fallen  back  and  taken 
a position  in  front  of  the  bridge  which 
crosses  Snake  Creek  It  was  over  this 
bridge  that  General  Lewis  Wallace  was 
momentarily  expected  to  come.  Grant 
had  been  pressed  into  a corner  of  the  bat- 
tle field,  his  army  at  this  time  occupying 
a space  of  not  more  than  four  hundred 
acres  on  the  very  verge  of  the  river. 
As  yet  there  were  no  signs  of  Wallace, 
nor  any  explanation  of  his  delay.  Buell, 
too,  had  failed  to  come  to  time.  Five 
of  the  Union  camps  had  been  captured ; 
and  many  guns  and  prisoners  had  fallen 
into  the  enemy’s  hands.  Fatigue  and 
disorder  had  done  and  were  still  doing 
their  terrible  work.  Cooped  up  in  this 
narrow  corner  of  the  field,  with  the  tri- 
umphant enemy  in  front  and  the  dark 
rolling  waters  of  the  Tennessee  in  the 
rear — death  before  and  death  behind — 
what  more  can  Grant  do?  Will  he  sur- 
render ? No.  The  word  had  no  place 
in  his  system  of  tactics. 

The  Confederates,  however,  were  less 
strong  than  they  seemed.  Success  had 
broken  their  ranks ; and  the  hard  work 
of  the  day  had  produced  its  natural 
fruit.  The  men  were  completely  woi’n 
out.  Some  of  their  best  men  had  per- 
ished. Generals  Gladdon  and  Hindman 
had  been  killed;  and  about  half-past 
two  o’clock,  when  pressing  his  men  to- 
wards the  Landing,  and  almost  reck- 
lessly exposing  himself,  Commander-in- 
chief  Johnston  received  a rifle  bullet  in 
the  leg,  which  proved  fatal.  There  was 
a lull  in  the  fight  after  Johnston  fell; 
but  Beauregard  assumed  command ; and 
the  struggle  for  possession  of  Pittsburg 


Landing  was  resumed  with  fresh  en- 
ergy. Beauregard  felt  that  there  was 
no  time  to  lose ; for  night  and  Buell 
were  coming. 

The  entire  strength  of  the  Confed- 
erate army  was  at  this  stage ^ being 
pressed  against  the  National  left.  It 
seemed  to  be  the  object  of  Beauregard 
to  turn  the  National  line  or  force  them 
into  the  river.  In  any  case,  he  was  de- 
termined to  seize  the  Landing.  Hap- 
pily, as  the  result  proved,  a deep  ravine 
lay  between  the  Confederates  and  the 
Nationals,  who,  cooped  up  as  they  were, 
still  covered  the  Landing.  This  ravine 
was  impassable  for  artillery  and  cavalry. 
In  consequence  of  the  heavy  rains,  the 
bottom  was  wet  and  the  sides  slippery. 
The  ravine  led  down  to  the  river ; and 
at  its  mouth  the  two  gunboats  Tyler 
and  Lexington  had  taken  position,  their 
commanders  having  obtained  permission 
from  General  Grant  to  exercise  their 
discretion  in  shelling  the  woods  and 
sweeping  the  ravine.  On  the  brow  of 
his  side  of  the  ravine  General  Grant 
had  hastily  flung  up  some  earthworks 
in  the  form  of  a half-moon.  To  several 
siege  guns  which  were  parked  there. 
Colonel  Webster,  Grant’s  chief  of  staff, 
added  a number  of  guns  which  had  be- 
longed to  light  batteries,  now  broken 
up,  and  thus  secured  a semi-circular  de- 
fense, of  about  fifty  cannon.  This  hur- 
riedly-improvised battery  reached  round 
nearly  to  the  Corinth  road.  The  wretch- 
ed condition  to  which  the  National  ar- 
my had  been  reduced  may  be  gathered 
from  the  fact  that  it  was  with  the  ut- 
most difficulty  men  could  be  got  to 
work  the  guns.  The  men  were  exhaust- 


A VALLEY  OF  DEATH. 


109 


ed  and  demoralized.  Volunteers  were 
called  for ; and  Dr.  Cornyn,  surgeon  of 
the  First  Missouri  Artillery,  having 
offered  his  services,  his  example  was 
quickly  followed.  The  Confederate 
assault  was  led  by  Chalmers,  Withers, 
Cheatham,  Euggles,  Anderson,  Stuart, 
Pond,  and  Stevens.  It  was  a perilous 
attempt,  but  it  was  bravely  made. 
Down  the  steep  sides  of  the  ravine 
they  rushed,  uttering  their  favorite  and 
familiar  cry.  For  a moment  it  seemed 
as  if  all  was  lost,  and  as  if  Beauregard 
was  about  to  crown  the  day’s  work  by 
a final  crushing  blow.  But  no.  It  was 
destined  to  be  otherwise.  The  slippery 
sides  of  the  ravine,  and  the  slush  and 
mud  at  the  bottom,  greatly  hindered 
the  movements  of  the  attacking  party. 
Once  in  the  deadly  hollow,  there  was 
literally  no  way  of  escape.  At  a signal 
given,  Webster’s  guns  from  their  fifty 
mouths  opened  fire  in  front ; while  the 
Tyler  and  Lexington,  striking  the  Con- 
federates on  the  flank,  swept  the  ravine 
with  their  eight-inch  shells.  It  was 
now  a most  unequal  contest.  The  Con- 
federates had  fallen  into  a trap.  Every 
onward  movement  was  vigorously  re- 
pulsed. The  National  troops  began  to 
rally,  and  finding  position,  contributed 
to  the  work  of  destruction  by  the  un- 
erring aim  of  their  rifles.  Again  and 
again  and  yet  again  did  the  Confede- 
rates face  the  terrible  fire,  rushing  across 
the  ravine  as  if  they  would  storm  the 
battery  in  front ; but  it  was  only  to  be 
mowed  down  like  grass  or  driven  back 
like  sheep.  The  ravine  was  filled  with 
the  wounded  and  the  dead.  So  dense 
was  the  smoke  that  the  entire  scene  was 


Avrapped  in  almost  midnight  darkness — 
a darkness  relieved  only  by  the  swift- 
recurring  rifle  flash  and  the  cannon’s 
blaze.  It  was  a virtual  hell — a real,  a 
veritable  valley  of  death  itself.  The 
tide  had  turned.  The  crisis  was  past. 
Beauregard,  seeing  that  it  was  useless 
to  prolong  the  struggle,  withdrew  his 
men.  He  professed  himself  satisfied 
with  what  he  had  done;  and,  as  it  was 
near  nightfall,  he  thought  he  might  rest 
for  the  night  and  give  the  finishing 
touch  in  the  morning.  The  firing  now 
ceased,  and  Grant  was  left  master  of 
the  ground.  Before  the  close  of  the 
struggle.  Nelson,  with  Buell’s  advance, 
had  arrived  on  the  field;  and  Xewis 
Wallace,  having  at  last  found  his  way, 
was  coming  up  with  his  five  thousand 
men.  For  the  National  cause,  the  first 
day  at  Shiloh  had  ended  not  inglorious- 
ly;  and  with  these  fresh  accessions  of 
strength,  the  prospect  was  bright  for 
the  coming  day. 

The  dreary  hours  of  the  night  were 
sufficiently  filled  with  horrors.  The 
gunboats  kept  up  an  incessant  cannon- 
ade, in  some  places  setting  the  woods 
on  fire.  The  wounded  on  both  sides 
vainly  sought  to  escape  from  the  grasp  of 
this  new  and  terrible  destroyer.  Hap- 
pily a heavy  rain-storm  fell  upon  the 
scene  of  agony,  and'  the  fire  was  extin- 
guished. Shortly  after  the  firing  had 
ceased,  Grant  visited  Sherman ; and  as 
it  was  the  opinion  of  both  that  the  Con- 
federates were  exhausted,  it  was  agreed 
that  the  attack  should  be  resumed  early 
in  the  morning.  Subsequently  Grant 
visited  each  of  the  division  command- 
ers, giving  the  necessary  instructions, 


no 


SHILOH. 


and  then  flung  himself  on  the  wet 
ground  and  snatched  a few  hours’  rest, 
with  his  head  resting  on  the  stump  of 
a tree.  During  the  night  Lewis  Wal- 
lace came  up,  and  Buell  arrived  in  per- 
son. All  night  through,  steamboats 
kept  busily  plying  between  Savannah 
and  Pittsburg  Landing,  bringing  up 
the  remaining  divisions  of  Buell’s  army. 
Nelson’s  Division  was  all  on  the  field 
by  nine  o’clock,  P.  M.  Crittenden’s 
arrived  a little  later;  and  by  five  in  the 
morning  McCook’s  division,  which  was 
the  last  to  come  up,  having  had  to  wait 
for  boats,  was  all  safely  disembarked. 
Twenty-seven  thousand  men  were  thus 
added  to  the  National  army. 

With  the  early  light  of  the  morning  of 
April  which  came  in  with  a 

7*  drizzling  rain,  the  troops  w^ere  in 
position  and  ready  to  make  the  attack. 
The  fi’esh  troops  were  placed  in  line,  as 
they  came  upon  the  field,  considerably 
in  advance,  and  upon  the  ground  aban- 
doned by  Beauregard  after  the  failure 
of  his  last  attack.  Nelson  was  on  the 
left;  then  in  order,  Crittenden,  McCook, 
Hurlbut,  McClernand,  Sherman,  and 
Lewis  Wallace.  Thomson,  of  Wallace’s 
division,  with  his  field  guns,  was  the 
first  to  disturb  the  silence  of  the  morning 
and  to  awaken  the  echoes  of  the  forest. 
The  response  w^as  vigorous ; but  the 
fresh  troops  of  Wallace  stood  bravely 
to  their  work.  At  this  moment  Grant 
arrived,  and  ordered  Wallace  to  press 
forw^ard  and  attack  the  Confederate  left 
under  Bragg,  who,  since  the  death  of 
Johnston,  w'as  second  in  command. 
This  was  gallantly  done,  the  Confede- 
rates being  compelled  to  abandon  the 


high  ground,  which  was  soon  occupied 
by  Wallace’s  troops.  Here  a halt  was 
made,  Wallace  expecting  Sherman  to 
come  to  his  aid. 

Meanw^hile  the  two  armies  had  come 
into  collision  at  the  other  extremities  of 
their  lines.  From  what  has  been  said 
above,  it  will  be  seen  that  Buell’s  force, 
w^hich  lay  nearest  to  Pittsburg  Landing, 
composed  the  centre  and  left  of  Grant’s 
new  line  of  battle.  The  divisions  of 
Nelson  and  Crittenden  only  were  ready, 
wdien  Wallace’s  guns  were  heard  boom- 
ing to  the  right.  They  moved  forward 
at  once.  Nelson’s  division  leading. 
Their  artillery  had  not  yet  arrived; 
but  the  batteries  of  Mendenhall  and 
Terrill,  of  the  regular  service,  were 
placed  at  their  disposal.  Nelson  had 
moved  half  a mile,  at  least,  before  he 
felt  the  enemy.  At  the  first  touch  he 
seemed  to  yield;  but  it  was  only  for 
a moment.  At  this  point  Beaui'egard 
had  gathered  up  his  strength  and  was 
resolved  to  strike  a deadly  blow.  If  he 
could  turn  the  National  left,  he  might 
still  accomplish  his  purpose  of  yester- 
day, and  make  himself  master  of  the 
Landing.  His  onslaught  was  tremen- 
dous. For  a second  Nelson’s  troops 
jwavered ; but  it  w^as  only  for  a second. 
Mendenhall’s  battery  was  hurried  into 
action ; and  the  advancing  Confederates 
were  driven  back  in  confusion  by  a 
tempest  of  grape  and  canister.  Hazen’s 
brigade  charged,  captured  one  of  Beau- 
regard’s batteries,  and  turned  it  with 
deadly  effect  on  the  foe.  Once  more 
the  Confederates  came  up,  with  re- 
doubled strength,  and  Hazen  fell  back 
before  the  advancing  tide.  Terrill’s 


A WALL  OF  IRON. 


Ill 


battery  of  McCook’s  division  was  now 
got  into  position.  Pouring  forth  shell 
from  his  ten-pounders  and  grape  and 
canister  from  his  brass  twelves,  Terrill 
did  splendid  and  effective  work.  For 
two  hours  the  artillery  conflict  raged. 
Crittenden  was  on  Nelson’s  right,  and 
McCook  was  to  the  right  of  Crittenden, 
fronting  the  Confederate  centre.  Buell 
had  taken  general  command  of  his  own 
troops.  The  terrible  artillery  duel  be- 
gan to  tell  on  the  Confederate  line. 
Nelson,  becoming  more  daring,  began 
to  move  forward.  Crittenden  and  Mc- 
Cook advanced  abreast  at  the  same 
time;  but  every  inch  of  ground  was 
keenly  contested ; and  victory,  now 
leaning  to  one  side  and  now  to  the 
other,  seemed  undecided  as  to  which  to 
award  the  palm. 

Sherman’s  captured  camp  was  still  in 
the  Confederate  rear ; and  to  this  as  an 
objective  point  the  National  line  kept 
slowly  but  steadily  advancing.  Sher- 
man and  Wallace,  carrying  out  Grant’s 
instiTictions  to  the  letter,  have  advanced 
under  a terrible  fire  and  have  reached 
the  ridge  occupied  by  the  former  on 
Sunday  morning.  The  little  log  church 
in  Shiloh  has  again  become  a conspicu- 
ous object  in  the  battle  field.  Around 
it  the  tempest  of  battle  is  again  to  rage. 
Beauregard,  despairing  of  success  on 
the  left,  had,  by  countermarching  his 
troops,  greatly  strengthened  himself  in 
front  of  the  enemy’s  right.  The  strug- 
gle at  this  point  was  protracted  and 
severe.  Sherman  and  W allace  held  their 
ground ; and  it  soon  became  apparent 
that  Beauregard’s  strength  was  all  but 
exhausted. 


At  the  same  time  that  the  Confede- 
rate general  had  concentrated  his  troops 
against  the  National  right,  he  did  not 
neglect  an  opportunity  which  i^eemed 
to  present  itself  more  towards  what 
might  be  called  the  National  centre. 
Noticing  a slight  gap  between  Critten- 
den and  McCook,  he  endeavored  to 
force  a passage  between  them.  Here 
he  made  his  last  effort — his  last  decided 
stand.  It  was  all  in  vain.  McCook’s 
division  stood  like  a wall  of  iron.  The 
Confederate  centre  now  began  to  yield. 
All  along  the  line  from  Nelson  on  the 
left  to  Sherman  and  Wallace  on  the 
right,  the  Nationals  were  pressing  for- 
ward. Everywhere  the  enemy  was  seen 
retiring.  Cheer  after  cheer,”  says 
Wallace,  ‘^rang  through  the  woods, 
and  every  man  felt  that  the  day  was 
ours.”  The  battle  of  Shiloh  was  ended. 
“Don’t,”  said  Beauregard  to  Brecken- 
ridge,  as  he  ordered  a retreat,  “ don’t 
let  this  be  converted  into  a rout.”  It 
was  now  half-past  five  o’clock  ; and  the 
wearied  National  troops  being  in  no 
mood  to  pursue  the  foe,  the  retreat  was 
the  more  easily  conducted.  The  two 
days’  fighting  had  resulted  in  the  loss 
of  over  twenty  thousand  men — the  Con- 
federate killed  and  wounded  amounting 
to  more  than  ten  thousand,  the  Nation- 
als to  nearly  twelve  thousand. 

General  Halleck  only  did  what  was 
right  when  he  thanked  Generals  Grant 
and  Buell,  “and  the  officers  and  men 
of  their  respective  commands,  for  the 
bravery  and  endurance  with  which  they 
sustained  the  general  attack  of  the  ene- 
my on  the  6th,  and  for  the  heroic  man- 
ner in  which  on  the  7th  they  defeated 


112 


SHILOH. 


and  routed  the  entire  rebel  army.” 
General  Grant  showed  his  magnanimity 
when,  in  writing  to  the  War  Depart- 
ment, ie  said,  “Sherman  held  with  raw 
troops  the  key-point  of  the  Landing. 
It  is  no  disparagement  to  any  other  offi- 
cer to  say  that  I do  not  believe  there 
was  another  division  commander  on  the 
field  who  had  the  skill  and  enterprise 
to  have  done  it.  To  his  individual 
efforts  I am  indebted  for  the  success  of 
the  battle.” 

Lewis  Wallace  was  greatly  blamed 
for  his  non-appearance  on  the  field  of 
battle  on  the  6th.  It  was  not  difficult, 
however,  for  that  brave  officer,  who  did 
such  effective  work  on  the  7th,  to  give 
sufficient  and  satisfactory  explanations. 
He  had,  it  appeared,  obeyed  his  first 
orders,  which  were  that  he  should  join 
the  right  of  the  army,  but  not  knowing 
that  it  had  fallen  back,  he  had  wasted 
the  whole  afternoon  in  a fruitless  march. 

There  has  been  much  useless  discus- 
sion as  to  how  much  Grant  was  indebt- 
ed to  Buell  for  the  victory  at  Shiloh. 
What  did  happen  we  know.  What 
might  have  been  we  cannot  tell.  Some 
of  the  facts  of  the  case  are  j)lain,  and 
admit  of  no  double  interpretation.  Dur- 
ing the  greater  part  of  Sunday,  the  Con- 
federates marched  triumphantly  from 
point  to  point.  The  Nationals  w^ere 
driven  back  entirely  from  their  original 
ground;  five  of  their  division  camps 
were  overrun  and  captured  ; and  Grant, 
with  his  whole  army,  was  pressed  into 
a corner  of  the  field.  The  situation 
was  desperate.  One  blow  more,  and  it 
seemed  as  if  Beauregard  would  reap  a 
glorious  victory.  Of  all  this  there  can 


be  no  doubt.  It  is  as  little  to  be  denied, 
however,  that  at  the  last  moment  Grant 
snatched  victory  from  his  triumphant 
rival.  The  advancing  Confederates  were 
not  only  successfully  resisted,  but  driv- 
en back  in  confusion  and  compelled  to 
give  up  the  struggle.  All  this  Grant 
accomplished  before  any  effective  assist- 
ance anived  from  Buell.  It  would 
simply  be  absurd  to  deny  that  the  ar- 
rival of  reinforcements,  which,  includ- 
ing W allace’s  division,  amounted  in  all 
to  twenty-seven  thousand  men,  made 
victory  on  the  following  day  compara- 
tively more  easy.  But  we  are  not  at 
liberty  to  say  that,  without  the  aid  of 
Buell,  Grant  might  not  have  accom- 
plished his  purpose  and  driven  the  ene- 
my from  the  field.  We  simply  cannot 
tell.  We  know  that  both  Grant  and 
Buell  did  their  best,  and  that  their  best 
w^as  needed.  From  earliest  dawn  till 
half-past  five  in  the  afternoon  the  battle 
raged  without  intermission.  It  was  no 
easily  won  victory ; and  if  praise  is 
due  to  the  Union  commanders,  justice 
compels  us  to  be  equally  generous  to 
General  Beauregard.  If  for  the  moment 
we  could  forget  the  cause,  and  think 
only  of  the  skill  and  heroism  displayed, 
we  should  say  that  on  those  two  days 
he  covered  himself  with  glory.  In  Beau- 
res^ard  the  Union  commanders  found  a 
foeman  worthy  of  their  steel.  lie  was 
by  far  the  ablest  general  who  had  yet 
appeared  in  the  Confederate  ranks. 

There  is  one  other  ^loint  on  which  it  is 
necessary  to  make  a remark  before  clos- 
ing this  chapter.  It  is  to  be  borne  in 
mind  that  Grant  was  not  responsible 
either  for  the  selection  of  the  battle 


THE  THIRD  LINE  OF  DEFENSE. 


113 


ground  or  for  the  disposition  of  the 
troops.  Whatever  praise  or  blame  re- 
sulted from  the  one  or  the  other  was  due 
to  General  C.  F.  Smith.  When  Grant 
was  restored  to  the  chief  command  of  the 
’hrmy  of  the  Tennessee,  it  was  only  a few 
days  before  the  commencement  of  the 
fight ; and  any  attempt  to  make  radical 
changes  in  the  arrangements,  carried 
out,  as  these  must  have  been,  in  the  pre- 
sence of  a vigilant  and  powerful  enemy. 


would  have  been  perilous  in  the  ex- 
treme. If  the  battle  of  the  6th  had 
ended  differently,  General  Grant  might 
have  been  justified  in  making  some  com- 
plaint as  to  the  circumstances  in  which 
he  found  the  enemy  on  resuming  com- 
mand. As  it  is,  his  mouth  has  been 
shut.  He  has  shown  himself  a true 
man  by  nobly  respecting  the  memory 
of  General  Smith — a capable  command- 
er and  a brave  man. 


CHAPTER  VIII. 


The  Confederate  Lines  of  Defense. — The  Second  Line  all  bnt  Abandoned. — Beauregard’s  Eetreat  to  Corinth. — 
First-rate  Strategy. — Beauregard  Strengthening  His  Position. — Position  and  Importance  of  Corinth. — Mitchell 
at  Shelby ville  and  Huntsville. — Stevenson,  Decatur,  and  Tuscumbia. — Mitchell's  Address  to  His  Soldiers. — 
Mitchell  Promoted  to  the  Hank  of  Major-General. — Sherman  at  Bear  Creek. — The  Memphis  and  Charleston 
Kailroad. — Halleck  at  Corinth. — Grant  Second  in  Command. — Halleck’s  Complaint  against  Grant. — Halleck 
too  Cautious. — The  Position  of  the  two  Armies. — The  Confederates  in  High  Hopes. — The  National  Army 
Kesolved  to  Win. — The  Composition  of  the  National  Army. — The  Nationals  Move  Forward. — Marmaduke’s 
Eetreat. — Farmington  Eeoccupied. — Kussell’s  House. — The  Nationals  Win  and  Hold  the  Position. — The 
National  Army  in  Line. — Beauregard's  Delay. — Corinth  Evacuated. — The  Eetreat  equal  to  a Victory. — The 
Pursuit. — Beauregard  at  Tupelo. — The  Pursuit  Abandoned. — The  National  Army  in  Corinth. — Eepairing  the 
Eailroads. — Buell  sent  to  Chattanooga. — Halleck  the  Eising  Man. — Beauregard  had  Eeason  to  be  Satisfied. — 
A good  General,  but  given  to  Extravagance  of  Language. — Eemarks  upon  Shiloh  and  Corinth. — Their  Import- 
ance.— Eemarks  on  some  of  the  Principal  Generals. — Beauregard,  Halleck,  Grant,  and  Sherman. 


The  victory  at  Shiloh  broke  down 
the  second  line  of  Confederate  de- 
fense, as  the  fall  of  Donelson  had 
broken  down  the  first.  In  view  of  the 
general  plan  of  the  campaign — which 
was  to  drive  the  enemy  out  of  the  val- 
ley of  the  Mississippi,  and  to  reopen 
that  river  to  the  gulf — it  will  be  seen 
that  the  National  forces  were  steadily 
marching  on  toward  the  full  accomplish- 
ment of  their  purpose.  The  first  line 
of  defense  stretched  from  Columbus  on 
the  west,  through  Fort  Henry,  Fort 


Donelson  and  Nashville,  including  Bow- 
ling Green  and  Mill  Spring,  and  east- 
ward toward  the  Alleghanies.  That 
line  broken,  the  Confederates  had  no 
choice  but  fall  back  on  the  line  formed 
by  the  Memphis  and  Charleston  Rail- 
road. There  was  still  a third  line  on 
which  it  was  possible  for  them  to  retire 
and  make  a resolute  if  not  successful 
resistance.  Of  this  third  line  the  stra- 
tegic points  were  Vicksburg,  Jackson, 
Meridian,  and  Selma.  From  all  the 
points  of  the  second  line,  with  the  ex- 


114 


CORINTH. 


ceptions  of  Corintli  and  Fort  Pillow,  the 
enemy  had  been  forcibly  driven  or  had 
voluntarily  retired.  Fort  Pillow  was 
now  useless,  and  was  soon  abandoned. 
All  over  the  North  and  throughout  the 
army  and  navy  there  were  enthusiastic 
demonstrations  of  joy  and  gratitude; 
and  the  action  of  the  government  at 
Washington  was  in  perfect  harmony 
with  the  sentiments  of  the  people  when 
it  recommended  a general  thanksgiving 
for  the  victories  gained  at  Pea  Pidge, 
at  New  Madrid,  at  Island  No.  10,  and 
at  Shiloh. 

After  his  defeat  on  the  7th  of  April, 
April  Beauregard  retired,  and,  as  we 
have  seen  already,  in  good  order, 
to  Corinth.  The  retreat  was  conducted 
ill  circumstances  of  great  inconvenience 
and  hardship ; and  the  successful  man- 
ner in  which  it  was  accomplished  will 
ever  be  regarded  by  impartial  judges  as 
a triumph  of  military  genius  on  the  part 
of  the  Confederate  commander.  The 
principal  way  of  escape  from  the  held 
was  along  a narrow  and  all  but  impassa- 
ble road,  some  seven  or  eight  miles  in 
length  ; and  all  the  difficulties  insepara- 
ble from  the  attempt  to  preserve  order 
in  a routed  army,  burdened  with  the 
care  of  wagon-loads  of  wounded  and 
dying  men,  were  aggravated  by  a pit- 
iless storm,  which,  beginning  about 
nightfall,  raged  with  unrelenting  sever- 
ity for  several  hours.  It  is  not  to  be 
wondered  at  that  many  of  the  wounded 
perished  by  the  way.  The  wonder 
rather  is  that  the  losses  during  the  re- 
treat did  not  amount  to  several  thou- 
sands in  place  of  a few  hundreds.  The 
retreat  from  Shiloh  on  the  night  of  the 


7th  furnished  a strange  commentary  to 
Beauregard’s  boastful  language,  on  the 
night  of  the  5th  ; but  it  is  not  the  busi- 
ness of  the  historian  to  load  with  abuse 
a defeated  general  who  narrowly  es- 
caped reaping  a great  and  signal  victory, 
and  who,  in  the  hour  of  unlooked-for 
misfortune,  proved  himself  equal  to  the 
emergency. 

Arrived  at  Corinth,  Beauregard  lost 
no  time  in  making  all  needed  23repara- 
tions  for  whatever  attack  might  be  made 
upon  him.  If  he  could  hold  this  posi- 
tion and  successfully  repel  the  onslaught 
of  the  National  troops,  he  might  even 
yet  convert  defeat  into  a victory,  and 
re-establish  in  some  form  his  second 
line  of  defense.  If  unable  to  hold  Co- 
rinth, he  had  no  choice  but  fall  back 
upon  his  third  line,  thus  leaving  the 
entire  valley  of  the  Mississippi,  as  far 
south  as  Vicksburg,  in  the  hands  of  his 
enemies.  While  Beauregard  was  busy 
strengthening  his  position,  the  Nationals 
were  making  all  necessary  preparations 
to  advance  upon  the  Confederate  lines. 
Corinth,  it  thus  became  manifest,  was 
to  be  the  point'  at  which  the  armies  of 
the  North  and  South,  each  of  them 
greatly  increased  in  numbers  and  effi- 
ciency, were  next  to  come  into  deadly 
collision.  A small  and  insignificant 
village,  and  at  that  time  unmarked  on 
common  maps,  Corinth  owed  its  mili- 
tary importance  to  the  fact  that  it  was 
situated  at  the  intersection  of  two  great 
arterial  railroads — the  ‘^Mobile  and 
Ohio”  and  the  ‘‘Memphis  and  Charles- 
ton.” The  importance  of  these  railroads 
is  indicated  by  their  names.  Corinth 
was  about  forty  miles  east  of  the  Grand 


HALLECK  TAKES  COMMAND. 


115 


Junction,  and  some  twenty  odd  miles 
from  the  closing  scenes  of  the  last  great 
struggle.  It  is  built  upon  a low  and 
clayey  plain,  but  has  for  natural  de- 
fenses ridges  at  some  distance  outside. 
The  country  beyond,  to  the  banks  of 
the  Tennessee,  is  very  much  broken  by 
ridges,  valley  streams,  and  marshes. 
The  approach  was  rendered  more  diffi- 
cult from  the  fact  that,  in  his  retreat 
from  Pittsburg,  the  bridges  over  the 
creeks  had  been  destroyed  by  Beaure- 
gard, and  the  roads  heavily  obstructed 
by  timber.  Farmington,  on  the  east, 
and  College  Hill,  on  the  north,  are 
the  highest  points  in  the  immediate  vi- 
cinity of  Corinth ; and  these  were  occu- 
pied by  the  enemy  as  the  signal  out- 
posts of  his  vast  intrenchments,  encir- 
cling the  town. 

As  a strategic  point,  for  the  South  at 
least,  Corinth  had  already  been  shorn 
of  much  of  its  value.  When  Buell  set 
out  from  Nashville  to  reinforce  Grant 
at  Shiloh,  he  sent  General  Mitchell 
southward,  with  instructions  to  destroy, 
as  far  as  possible,  the  Memphis  and 
Charleston  Bailroad.  On  the  4th  of 
April  Mitchell  was  at  Shelby ville, 
whence  he  hastened  forward  by  forced 
marches  to  Huntsville,  taking  the  town 
April  surprise  at  an  early  hour  on 
Hi  the  morning  of  the  1 1th,  and  cap- 
turing seventeen  locomotives,  more  than 
one  hundred  passenger  cars,  a large 
amount  of  supplies  of  every  kind,  with 
about  one  hundred  and  sixty  prisoners. 
At  Huntsville  the  railroad  lines  were 
torn  up  both  to  the  east  and  west  of  the 
town.  . From  Huntsville  he  sent  one 
expedition  eastward  as  far  as  S!:evenson, 


and  another  expedition  westward  as  far 
as  Decatur  and  Tuscumbia,  the  object 
of  both  expeditions  being  to  capture 
what  could  be  had  and  to  destroy  the 
railroads.  On  the  16th  of  April  Mitchell 
could  say  to  his  soldiers : “You  have 
struck  blow  after  blow  with  a rapidity 
unparalleled.  Stevenson  fell,  sixty  miles 
to  the  east  of  Huntsville.  Decatur  and 
Tuscumbia  have  been  in  like  manner 
seized  and  are  now  occupied.  In  three 
days  you  have  extended  your  front  of 
operations  more  than  one  hundred  miles, 
and  your  morning  guns  at  Tuscumbia 
may  now  be  heard  by  your  comrades 
on  the  battle  field  made  glorious  by 
their  victory  before  Corinth.”  Mitchell 
had  placed  his  army  midway  between 
Corinth  and  Nashville,  had  opened  com- 
munication with  Buell,  and  had  added 
another  hundred  miles  of  the  Tennessee 
to  the  free  navigation  of  the  North.  It 
was  Mitchell’s  intention  to  move  east- 
ward as  far  as  Chattanooga,  to  destroy 
the  railroads  there,  especially  that  lead- 
ing to  Atlanta,  and  to  burn  the  foun- 
dries and  machine  shops  at  Home.  This, 
however,  he  was  unable  to  accomplish 
without  reinforcements;  and  as  these 
were  not  to  be  had,  he  was  compelled 
to  retire  before  the  superior  strength  of 
General  Kirby  Smith.  Mitchell,  how- 
ever, had  already  done  great  things, 
and  shown  what  might  have  been  ac- 
complished if  his  spirit  had  been  shared 
by  some  of  his  superiors.  Under  date 
of  May  1st,  writing  to  the  secretary  of 
war,  he  could  say : “ The  campaign  is 
ended,  and  I now  occupy  Huntsville  in 
perfect  security;  wdiile  all  of  Alabama 
north  of  the  Tennessee  Biver  fioats  no 


116 


CORIOTH. 


flag  but  that  of  the  Union.”  It  was 
not  without  good  reason  that  Mitchell 
was  commissioned  a major-general  of 
volunteers.  The  importance  of  Corinth 
had  been  fully  recognized  by  Halleck 
and  Grant  as  well  as  by  Buell  and 
Mitchell.  A few  days  after  the  battle 
of  Shiloh,  General  Sherman,  with  some 
fresh  troops  from  Buell’s  army,  moved 
up  the  Tennessee  to  the  mouth  of  Bear 
Creek,  and  there  destroyed  the  railroad 
bridge  which  spans  the  river  at  that 
place.  It  will  thus  be  seen  that  before 
the  struggle,  suspended  on  the  field  of 
Shiloh,  was  resumed  in  the  immediate 
neighborhood  of  Corinth,  the  Memphis 
and  Charleston  Bailroad,  broken  in 
many  places,  had  ceased  to  be  useful 
as  a line  of  communication  between  the 
Mississippi  and  the  Atlantic  States.  In 
proportion  as  Corinth  became  a railroad 
centre  in  name  only  and  not  in  reality, 
so  did  it  lose  its  value  as  a strategical 
point  in  the  estimation  of  the  Confede- 
rate general.  A proper  appreciation  of 
this  fact  will  help  the  reader  to  under- 
stand the  issue  of  the  siege. 

As  soon  as  the  battle  of  Shiloh  had 
been  fought  and  won,  Halleck  made  up 
his  mind  that  the  occupation  of  Corinth 
was  the  next  necessary  step  in  the  on- 
ward movement  against  the  enemy.  On 
the  9th  of  April  he  left  St.  Louis  for  the 
April  scene  of  action.  On  the  12th  he 
arrived  at  Pittsburg  Landing  and 
took  command  in  person  of  the  “ Grand 
Army  of  the  Tennessee  ” ; for  such  now 
was  its  style  and  title.  Grant  was 
placed  second  in  command,  without  any 
real  duty.  The  manner  in  whicb  he 
had  fought  the  battle  of  Shiloh  was  not 


satisfactory  to  his  chief;  and  the  great- 
est captain  in  the  Northern  army,  as 
the  result  proved,  was  compelled  for  a 
second  time  to  submit  to  uncalled-for 
humiliation.  Grant  bore  his  punish- 
ment— for  punishment  it  was — with  the 
best  grace  possible.  Halleck,  as  if  on 
second  thoughts,  did  what  he  could  to 
reassure  him,  informing  him  that  no 
censure  was  intended,  and  that  his 
strangely  anomalous  position  was  that 
which  was  due  to  his  rank.  Halleck’s 
objection  to  Grant’s  conduct  in  the  late 
contest  was  that  he  had  not  shown  suf- 
ficient caution — that  he  had  erred,  in 
fact,  in  not  throwing  up  whatever  forti- 
fications were  possible  in  the  circum- 
stances between  himself  and  the  enemy. 
As  if  to  justify  his  complaint,  and  to 
show  what  should  have  been  done  at 
Shiloh,  Halleck  moved  forward  with  a 
caution  which  became  painful,  intrench- 
ing himself  at  every  step.  Blame  now 
fell  upon  him  in  turn.  He  was  cau- 
tious overmuch.  It  was  tauntingly  said 
that  it  took  him  six  weeks  to  march 
fifteen  miles ; and  there  are  not  a few 
who,  to  this  day,  incline  to  the  opinion 
that  Halleck’s  excessive  care  robbed 
the  National  forces  of  the  proper  fruit 
of  the  victory  at  Shiloh. 

Let  us  see  now  what  were  the  rela- 
tive positions  of  the  two  armies.  The 
Confederate  defenses  were  very  strong ; 
and  considering  their  strength,  it  was 
not  wholly  without  reason  that  Halleck 
advanced  with  cautious  and  well-guard- 
ed steps.  In  one  continuous  line,  and 
occupying  the  brow  of  the  first  ridge 
outside  of  the  town,  the  intrencbments 
extended  over  fifteen  miles.  All  the 


FARMINGTON  AND  RUSSEL’S  HOUSE. 


n? 


roads  and  bridges  which  could  facilitate 
the  approach  of  the  National  troops  had 
been  destroyed.  On  the  east  there  was 
a ravine,  and  Philip’s  Creek  in  front. 
On  the  north  there  was  a heavy  abatis, 
\7ith  a cleared  space  in  front.  At  every 
road-crossing,  along  their  exterior  lines 
there  were  either  strong  redoubts  or  bat- 
teries with  massive  epaulments.  Beau- 
regard was  nothing  if  not  an  engineer; 
and  it  is  not  at  all  unreasonable  to  con- 
clude that  in  throwing  up  those  power- 
ful works  around  Corinth,  he  bore  in 
mind  that  he  was  about  to  test  the  skill 
of  an  engineer  like  himself  and  a fellow 
W est-Pointer. 

The  Confederate  army  concentrated 
at  Corinth  was  composed  of  first  class 
elements.  There  were  the  “ soldiers  of 
Shiloh,”  the  -army  which  had  fought 
at  Pittsburg  Landing;  those  of  ‘^Elk- 
horn,”  the  combined  army  of  VanDorn 
and  Price,  from  Arkansas  and  Missouri ; 
and  the  forces  under  (xeneral  Lovell, 
which  had  evacuated  New  Orleans 
vrhen,  on  the  28th  of  April,  the  gun- 
boats appeared  before  it.  In  addition 
to  these,  a large  militia  force  had  been 
hastily  sent  forward  from  Alabama,  Mis- 
sissippi, and  Louisiana.  Bragg,  as  second 
in  rank,  had  command  of  the  ‘‘Army  of 
the  Mississippi.”  The  old  organization 
of  the  corps — under  Hardee,  Bragg, 
Breckenricige,  and  Polk — was  retained. 
Breckenridge  commanded  the  reserve, 
and  VanDorn  the  reinforcements.  The 
whole  force  was  about  sixty-five  thou- 
sand men,  most  of  them  the  best  troops 
in  the  Confederacy.  The  retreat  from 
Shiloh  had  discouraged,  no  doubt,  but 
it  had  not  damped  the  hopes  of  the  au- 


thorities at  Bichmond ; neither  had  the 
Confederate  soldiers  lost  their  spirit, 
Pligh  hopes,  therefore,  were  entertained 
that  the  efforts  about  to  be  put  forth  at 
Corinth  would  turn  the  tide  of  battle 
and  cloud,  if  not  efface,  the  memory  of 
Pittsburg  Landing. 

Confronting  this  large  and  well-ap- 
pointed army,  the  very  flower  of  the 
Confederacy,  and  resolved  to  expel  it 
from  its  stronghold  and  to  capture  it,  if 
possible.  General  Plalleck  had  under 
him  over  one  hundred  thousand  men, 
not  all  of  them  experienced,  but  all  of 
them  imbued  with  the  spirit  which  is 
inseparable  from  a righteous  cause,  and 
determined  once  again  to  chain  victory 
to  their  standards.  There  were  three 
armies — the  army  of  the  Tennessee,  ori- 
ginally Grant’s,  now  confided  to  General 
George  H.  Thomas,  and  containing  the 
divisions  of  Hurlbut,  Sherman,  Smith, 
and  Davies ; the  army  of  the  Ohio,  com- 
manded by  Don  Carlos  Buell,  and  com- 
posed of  the  divisions  of  McCook,  T.  J. 
Wood,  Nelson,  and  Crittenden;  the 
army  of  the  Mississippi,  General  John 
Pope,  originally  containing  three  divis- 
ions, and  reinforced  by  one  division  from 
General  Curtis.  Thomas  formed  the 
right  wing,  Buell  the  centre,  and  Pope 
the  left.  Grant,  being  in  orders  second 
in  command,  had  a general  supervision 
of  the  right  wing,  under  Thomas,  and 
the  reserves  of  McClernand  and  Wal- 
lace’s divisions,  commanded  by  McCler- 
nand. 

On  the  23d  of  April  General  Halleck 
commenced  a cautious  forward  April 
movement.  On  the  3d  of  May  23. 
his  advance  under  General  Sherman^ 


118 


CORINTH. 


was  in  the  vicinity  of  Monterey,  within 
six  or  seven  miles  of  Beauregard’s  lines. 
May  C)n  the  same  day,  Pope  sent 
Paine’s  division  to  reconnoitre, 
and,  if  possible,  occupy  Farmington, 
one  of  the  most  important  outposts  of 
the  enemy.  Marmaduke,  who  had  un- 
der him  some  four  thousand  five  hun- 
dred men,  made  but  little  resistance. 
On  the  contrary,  he  retired  rapidly  to 
Corinth,  leaving  his  camp  with  all 
its  supplies,  and  only  thirty  dead.  At 
the  time  it  seemed  as  though  his  orders 
had  been  to  withdraw,  but  the  subse- 
quent efforts  of  the  Confederates  to  re- 
cover Farmington  prove  that  this  could 
not  have  been  so.  An  artillery  recon- 
noissance,  well  supported  by  cavalry,  as 
far  as  Glendale,  on  the  Memphis  and 
Charleston  Railroad,  was  successful  in 
destroying  the  track  and  breaking  up 
two  important  trestle-bridges.  In  tlie 
meantime,  General  Wallace  bad  sent  out 
General  Morgan  L.  Smith,  with  three 
battalions  of  cavalry  and  a brigade  of 
infantry,  upon  the  Mobile  and  Ohio 
Railroad.  They  met  and  fought  the 
Confederates  in  a wood,  destroying  a 
brid2:e  and  the  track  not  far  from  Pur- 
dy,  and  thus  cut  off  Beauregard  from 
Jackson,  Tennessee,  whence  supplies  and 
reinforcements  were  expected.  Hal- 
leck’s  scheme  was  working  well;  the 
National  troops  were  gradually  ap- 
proaching in  front,  and  at  the  same 
time  cutting  and  recutting  the  commu- 
nications on  both  flanks. 

Pope  was  not  to  be  allowed  to  hold 
the  position  which  he  had  so  easily  won. 
He  had  miscalculated  the  enemy’s  vigi- 
lance, and  underestimated  the  value 


which  they  attached  to  Farmington. 
Generals  Paine  and  Palmer,  who  were 
left  in  charge,  had  under  them  only  a 
single  brigade.  On  the  9th  of  ]^ay 
May  the  Confederates,  some  twen- 
ty  thousand  strong,  fell  upon  this  ad- 
vanced brigade  with  terrific  force.  It 
resisted  the  attack  for  several  hours, 
but  at  length  fell  back,  because  it  was 
believed  that  General  Halleck  did  not 
desire,  by  supporting  it,  to  bring  on  a 
general  engagement.  The  front  attack  of 
the  enemy  was  conducted  by  VanDorn, 
while  Price  had  been  ordered  early  in 
the  day  to  make  a detour  to  the  left, 
and  get  into  the  rear  of  these  isolated 
troops.  Either  he  was  too  late,  or 
VanDorn  too  early.  The  combination 
was  a failure ; they  did  not  capture  any 
portion  of  Pope’s  army,  although  they 
occupied  Farmington,  and  found  a small 
quantity  of  baggage  there.  Eight  days 
afterwards  Pope  reoccupied  the  post 
with  his  whole  force. 

On  the  17th,  and  while  the  army , was 
impatient  to  be  led  to  the  attack,  ]^ay 
there  was  a lively  fight  for  the  H. 
capture  of  what  was  called  Russel’s 
house,  an  important  eminence  command- 
ing the  junction  of  the  roads  three 
hundred  yards  beyond,  and  only  a mile 
and  a quarter  from  the  outer  intrench- 
ments  of  the  enemy.  The  project  was 
Sherman’s.  General  Hurlbut  sent  for- 
ward two  regiments  and  a battery 
under  General  Denver  and  General 
M.  L.  Smith.  The  attack  was  success- 
ful; and  the  position,  which  w^as  one 
of  great  natural  strength,  was  imme- 
diately fortified  and  occupied  by  a 
large  force. 


BEAUREGARD  RETREATS. 


119 


Gradually  the  National  lines  began 
to  draw  nearer  the  Confederate  out- 
works, Halleck  cautiously  fortifying  his 
May  position  as  he  advanced.  On  the 
2b  21stof  May  the  National  army  was 
fairly  in  line  three  miles  from  Corinth, 
with  detached  works  in  front,  corre- 
sponding with  the  general  direction  of 
May  those  of  the  enemy.  On  the  28th, 

28.  still  drawing  closer  and  closer,  it 
was  within  thirteen  hundred  yards  of 
the  enemy’s  outer  line.  Heavy  siege 
guns  were  now  in  position ; and  recon- 
noisances  in  great  force  were  being 
made  on  both  flank  and  centre.  On  the 
May  29th  Pope  drove  them  from  their 

29.  advance  batteries,  and  Sherman 
planted  heavy  guns  within  a thousand 
yards  of  Beauregard’s  left.  It  was  not 
possible  now  that  the  end  could  be 
long  delayed.  Beauregard’s  position 
was  such  that  his  delay  in  making  a 
vigorous  attack  was  simply  inexplicable. 
He  had  allowed  the  National  troops, 
comparatively  unmolested,  to  get  within 
easy  fighting  distance  of  his  lines,  and 
to  establish  themselves  behind  fortifica- 
tions quite  as  strong  as  his  own.  He 
had  allowed  himself  to  be  completely 
isolated  from  all  possible  sources  of  as- 
sistance. His  railroad  communications 
had  been  cut  north,  south,  east,  and 
west.  It  was  General  Halleck’s  confi- 
dent belief  on  the  night  of  the  29th 
that  Beauregard  would  offer  battle  in 
the  morning.  The  battle  might  be  san- 
guinary, but  he  was  confident  of  success; 
for  he  knew  he  had  a superior  force,  and 
that  retreat  would  be  impossible,  as  all 
the  railroad  communications  had  been 
cut.  He  did  not  know  that  retreat  had 


already  been  accomplished.  In  the  early 
morning  the  skirmishers  sought  the  foe 
in  vain.  Suddenly  the  earth  was  shaken 
as  if  by  an  earthquake;  and  dense  clouds 
of  smoke  rolled  up  over  Corinth.  The 
enemy  was  gone.  Beauregard  had  fled. 
For  days  ahead  he  had  been  sending  on 
his  sick  and  his  most  valuable  stores 
towards  Mobile.  Some  twenty-four 
hours  before,  a part  of  his  effective 
force  and  nearly  all  his  ordnance  had 
been  moved  off  in  the  same  direction. 
The  rear-guard  had  left  for  the  south 
and  west  the  night  before.  Some 
wretched  creatures  had  willingly  or 
unwillingly  been  left  behind  to  fire  the 
town.  So  ended  the  siege  of  Corinth. 
After  all  his  labor  and  patience,  Hal- 
leck reaped  a bloodless  but  compara- 
tively barren  victory.  Beauregard  was 
compelled  to  retire ; but  he  had  the 
proud  satisfaction  of  having  saved  his 
army  and  all  his  munitions  of  war.  Flis 
retreat  was  in  some  respects  equal  to  a 
victory. 

No  time  was  lost  in  following  up  the 
retreating  foe.  At  seven  o’clock  on  the 
morning  of  the  30th,  Pope’s  ad-  May 
vance  drove  the  small  rear-guard  39. 
of  the  Confederate  cavalry  through  the 
town;  while  the  brave  Gordon  Gran- 
ger, setting  out  with  a brigade  and  a 
battery  on  the  Boones ville  road  from 
Farmington  at  noon,  pushed  the  flying 
foe  through  the  former  place,  and  keep- 
ing up  the  pursuit,  crossed  Twenty-mile 
Creek  the  following  day,  the  main  army 
being  close  upon  his  heels.  On  June 
the  10th  of  June  the  pursuit  end-  *9. 
ed,  the  National  advance  having  reached 
Baldwin  and  Gumtown,  and  still  on  the 


120 


CORmTH. 


railroad.  Beauregard  had  established 
himself  at  Tupelo,  a few  miles  below, 
where  the  railroad  is  crossed  by  Old 
Tom  Creek,  an  affluent  of  the  Tombig- 
bee.  Halleck,  thinking  that  he  had 
risked  enough,  and  fearing  for  the  safe- 
ty of  his  communications,  ordered  a 
halt ; and  so  the  brief  campaign  of  Co- 
rinth was  brought  to  an  end. 

The  National  army  returned  to  Co- 
rinth, where  it  remained  making  busy 
preparations  for  a new  movement.  The 
waters  of  the  Tennessee  were  already 
low ; and  as  for  months  to  come  they 
would  become  lower  and  lower,  and 
therefore  useless  as  a means  of  com- 
munication, the  railroad  was  repaired 
and  put  in  good  condition  as  far  as 
Columbus.  General  Buell,  with  the 
army  of  the  Ohio,  was  sent  on  the  10th 
of  June  to  Chattanooga,  while  General 
Grant,  with  the  army  of  the  Tennessee, 
held  possession  of  the  new  strategic 
line  of  railroad  between  Memphis  and 
luka.  Halleck  had  already  accom- 
plished much ; and  at  Washington,  as 
we  shall  soon  have  occasion  to  see,  he 
was  regarded  as  the  rising  man.  Much 
as  he  had  done,  he  might  have  done 
more.  We  have  already  expressed  the 
opinion  that  a little  more  dash  and  dar- 
ing, and  a little  less  caution,  when  he 
took  command  in  person  after  the  battle 
of  Shiloh,  might  have  resulted  in  the 
complete  defeat  if  not  capture  of  Beau- 
regard’s army,  before  that  general  was 
able  to  surround  himself  with  fortifica- 
tions at  Corinth.  As  it  was,  the  fate  of 
the  great  States  of  Kentucky  and  Ten- 
nessee had  to  all  appearance  been  de- 
cided ; and  the  entire  northwest  of  the 


Confederacy,  a vast  space  of  many  thou- 
sand square  miles,  had  been  wrenched 
away.  The  plan,  the  execution  of 
which  commenced  with  the  attack  on 
Fort  Henry,  had  worked  admirably; 
and  although  some  hard  fighting  had 
yet  to  be  done  before  the  enemy  was 
completely  driven  out  of  the  valley  of 
the  Mississippi,  and  before  the  Father 
of  Waters  was  open  through  to  the  sea, 
the  North  had  reason  so  far  to  be  well 
satisfied  with  Halleck’s  services  and 
success. 

Beauregard  had  much  less  reason  to 
feel  satisfied  with  the  position  in  which 
he  found  himself.  He  had  no  doubt 
done  his  best.  If  he  had  not  made  at 
Corinth  so  bold  and  vigorous  a stand  as 
was  expected  by  friend  and  foe  alike, 
it  was  because  he  correctly  measured 
his  strength,  and  took  in  the  true  value 
of  his  position.  If  he  had  been  better 
supported  by  the  authorities  at  Rich- 
mond, the  results  might  have  been  dif- 
ferent. Most  unquestionably  he  showed 
greater  wisdom  in  retreating  as  he  did, 
than  he  would  have  done  by  risking  a 
battle  in  the  later  days  of  the  siege. 
His  forces  had  not  been  sufficiently  in- 
creased ; and  Corinth  had  been  rendered 
not  only  worthless  but  dangerous  by 
the  destruction  of  the  railroads.  For 
some  time  he  had  been  ill ; and  at  Tu- 
pelo he  took  the  liberty  of  retiring  to 
Bladdon  Springs,  about  twelve  miles 
distant,  for  the  purpose  of  recuperating, 
leaving  General  Bragg  in  command, 
with  instructions  to  put  the  army  in 
condition  to  take  the  field  on  his  return. 
On  hearing  this,  Davis  became  wild 
with  rage,  telegraphed  Bragg  to  assume 


BEAUREGAKD,  GRANT,  AND  SHERMAN. 


121 


permanent  command,  and  declared  that 
nothing  could  ever  induce  him  again  to 
entrust  the  army  to  Beauregard.  It  was 
not  long  until  Davis  had  sufficient  rea- 
son to  alter  his  determination.  While 
saying  this  much  for  Beauregard,  we 
cannot  afc  all  hold  him  excusable  for 
the  grossly  exaggerated  and  sometimes 
false  reports  which  he  was  in  the  habit 
of  sending  to  his  government.  He 
claimed  a great  and  glorious  victory” 
when  he  had  been  defeated  and  driven 
from  Shiloh.  He  declared  Corinth  to 
be  the  “strategic  point  of  that  cam- 
paign,” and  assured  his  government 
that  he  was  able  to  hold  it;  and  yet 
from  Tupelo,  whither  he  had  found  it 
necessary  to  retreat,  he  could  write  that 
he  had  “ accomplished  his  purposes  and 
ends.”  Human  nature  often  reveals 
such  inconsistencies;  and  this  weakness, 
on  the  part  of  the  Confederate  com- 
mander, stands  out  in  striking  contrast 
with  other  and  unmistakably  great  qual- 
ities which  the  man  possessed.  This 
particular  weakness  is  and  i:\4ust  ever 
remain  a source  of  regret  to  all  who, 
from  any  cause,  learned  to  admire  the 
better  part  of  one  of  the  greatest  gene- 
rals produced  on  either  side  during  the 
civil  conflict. 

It  would  not  be  easy  to  overestimate 
the  importance  of  Shiloh  and  Corinth 
on  the  general  character  of  the  struggle. 
Taken  together,  they  constituted  a turn- 
ing point  in  the  progress  of  events.  In 
retiring  from  Corinth,  the  enemy  aban- 
doned his  second  line  of  defense.  As 
he  must  now  fall  back  upon  his  third 
line,  it  was  manifest  to  all  that  the  next 
great  struggle  would  be  around  Vicks- 


burg. In  consequence  of  events  which 
will  be  detailed  in  a future  chapter, 
this  was  now  the  one  remaining  strong- 
hold of  the  Confederates  on  the  line  of 
the  Mississippi.  Vicksburg  captured, 
the  great  river  would  again  be  open  to 
the  sea.  The  capture  of  Vicksburg — 
this  was  the  purpose  which  now  filled 
the  minds  of  Halleck  and  Grant,  and  to 
this  end  all  their  energies  were  hence- 
forth directed.  Extensive  preparations 
must  be  made,  and  some  hard  work 
must  be  done,  before  the  next  great 
struggle ; but  Vicksburg  became  the 
objective  point  of  all  the  efforts  of  the 
army  of  the  Tennessee. 

At  the  close  of  this  chapter,  it  can 
hardly  be  deemed  out  of  place  to  notice 
the  influence  of  Shiloh  and  Corinth  on 
the  fortunes  of  some  of  the  principal 
actors.  Among  the  Confederates,  Beau- 
regard was  the  man  principally  affected. 
He  had  the  greatest  opportunity.  He 
sustained  the  greatest  loss.  The  effect 
of  Shiloh  and  Corinth  was  undoubtedly 
injurious ; but  it  was  not  lasting.  Beau- 
resrard  suffered  the  less  that  neither  at 
Shiloh  nor  at  Corinth  did  any  rival  of 
equal  capacity  come  to  the  front.  On 
the  National  side  three  men  shared 
largely  of  the  favors  of  fortune — Hal- 
leck, Grant,  and  Sherman.  Halleck 
reaped  a glory  which  was  scarcely  all 
his  own.  Grant,  in  spite  of  a treat- 
ment which  must  be  pronounced  un- 
j ust,  not  only  preserved  his  reputation, 
but  secured  the  opportunity  of  making 
himself  what  he  soon  afterwards  was 
recognized  to  be,  the  leading  represent- 
ative on  the  field  of  the  Northern  cause. 
Sherman,  in  the  one  battle  and  in  the 


122 


COAST  OPEKATIOJ^S  m 1862. 


other,  surpassed  himself  in  deeds  of 
skill  and  daring,  and  earned  his  right 
and  title  to  a place  in  the  front  rank 


of  the  great  military  men  whom  the 
war  was  gradually  developing — a place 
which  he  never  afterwards  lost. 


CHAPTER  IX. 


The  Third  Great  Expedition. — Burnside  and  Goldsborough. — Departure  of  the  Fleet  from  Hampton  Eoads. — Ter- 
rific Storm. — Disaster  to  the  Fleet. — Hatteras  Inlet. — Roanoke  Island. — Fort  Barton. — The  Bombardment. — 
The  Confederate  Flotilla. — Landing  of  the  National  Troops. — The  Battle  of  Roanoke. — National  Victory. — The 
Confederates  Discouraged. — Albemarle  Sound. — Elizabeth  City  Captured. — Edentown. — The  Dismal  Swamp 
Canal. — Winton. — Plymouth. — Burnside  and  Goldsborough’s  joint  Address  to  the  People  of  North  Carolina. — 
Governor  Clark’s  Counter-Proclamation. — New  Berne. — Expedition  against. — Landing  Troops  at  Slocum’s 
Creek. — Disposition  of  the  Forces. — The  Battle  of  New  Berne. — Severe  Fighting. — The  Confederate  Right 
Driven  in. — A Panic. — The  Retreat  of  the  Confederates. — Capture  of  New  Berne. — Burnside’s  Order. — His 
Report. — Compliment  to  McClellan. — Expedition  against  Fort  Macon. — Preparations  for  Bombardment. — 
Arrival  of  Burnside. — Call  for  Surrender. — The  Bombardment. — Splendid  Work. — Description  of  the  Fight. — 
The  Fort  Surrenders. — Beaufort. — Reno  at  South  Mills. — Burnside’s  Good  Fortune. — He  is  Summoned  to 
Washington. — The  Savannah  Blockade. — Dawfuskie  Island. — Jones’  Island. — Big  Tybee. — Fort  Pulaski, — 
Preparations  for  the  Bombardment. — Commander  Dupont. — General  Quincy  A.  Gillmore. — The  Erection 
of  Batteries  on  Venus  Point  and  on  Long  Island. — The  Siege  Batteries  on  Big  Tybee. — Colonel  Olmstead 
called  upon  to  Surrender. — General  Hunter  Supersedes  Sherman. — The  Opening  of  the  Fire  on  the  Fort, — 
The  Walls  of  the  Fort  Honeycombed. — The  White  Flag. — The  Surrender. — The  Blockade  of  Savannah  Com- 
plete.— Along  the  Florida  Coast. — Commander  Dupont  and  General  Wright. — Fort  Clinch. — Fernandina. — 
Brunswick. — Jacksonville. — Fort  Marion  and  St.  Augustine. — Pensacola. — Forts  McRae  and  Barrancas. — On 
the  Gulf  and  along  the  Atlantic  Seaboard,  the  National  Power  Supreme. — New  Orleans  Expedition. 


In  a previous  chapter  of  this  work 
1862  described  the  character 

and  traced  the  progress  of  two 
great  naval  and  military  expeditions, 
both  of  them  fitted  out  in  Hampton 
Roads,  and  both  of  them  sent  forth  for 
the  purpose  of  rendering  more  effective 
the  blockade  of  the  southern  ports. 
One  of  these  was  under  the  command 
of  General  Butler  and  Commodore 
Stringham,  and  was  successful  in  driv- 
ing the  Confederates  from  Harrison’s 
Inlet,  and  in  retaining  possession  of  the 
inlet  and  of  the  island  of  the  same 
name.  The  other,  which  ^vas  fitted  out 
somewhat  later  and  on  a larger  scale. 


was  entrusted  to  the  care  of  General  T. 
W.  Sherman  and  Commodore  Dupont. 
We  have  seen  how,  after  a severe  storm, 
that  expedition  succeeded  in  reaching 
Port  Royal,  capturing  Forts  Walker 
and  Beauregard  and  taking  possession 
of  Warsaw  Sound  to  the  south  and  Big 
Tybee  to  the  north,  thus  driving  the 
Confederates  from  every  stronghold  on 
the  southern  shores  of  South  Carolina, 
and  on  the  northern  shores  of  Georgia, 
with  the  exceptions  of  Fort  Pulaski,  at 
the  mouth  of  the  Savannah,  and  Fort 
Jackson,  further  up  the  river. 

In  the  beginning  of  1862  another  ex- 
pedition was  fitted  out  on  a grand  scale, 


THE  THIRD  GREAT  EXPEDITION. 


123 


and  was  intended  not  only  to  operate 
on  the  southern  coast,  but  to  advance 
into  the  interior  and  act  in  conjunction 
mth  the  Federal  armies.  This  expedi- 
tion was  put  in  charge  of  General  Am- 
brose Everett  Burnside  and  Flag-officer 
Louis  M.  Goldsborough.  The  military 
force,  like  that  of  Butler,  had  been 
gathered  at  Annapolis.  It  was  com- 
posed of  fifteen  regiments  and  a battal- 
ion of  infantry,  a battery  of  artillery, 
and  a large  number  of  gunners  capable 
of  serving  either  on  land  or  sea.  The 
whole  force  was  divided  into  three  bri- 
gades, which  were  commanded  respect- 
ively by  Generals  John  G.  Foster,  Jesse 
L.  Beno,  and  John  G.  Parke.  The  fleet 
comprised  over  one  hundred  steam  and 
sailing  vessels,  consisting  of  gunboats, 
transports,  and  tugs.  It  was  divided 
into  two  columns  for  active  service,  in- 
trusted respectively  to  the  care  of  Com- 
manders S.  G.  Hazard  and  Stephen  H. 
Bowan.  The  troops  to  be  conveyed  in 
these  vessels  numbered  in  all  about  six- 
teen thousand. 

The  commanders  were  well  chosen ; 
and  there  could  be  no  reason  to  doubt 
that,  so  far  as  their  ability  and  fidelity 
were  concerned,  the  expedition  would 
not  fail  of  success.  General  Burnside 
was  born  at  Liberty,  Union  County, 
Indiana,  on  the  23d  of  May,  1824.  In 
1842,  at  the  age  of  nineteen,  he  entered 
the  Military  Academy  at  West  Point, 
and  graduated  in  1847,  when  he  became 
a second-lieutenant  in  the  United  States 
Artillery.  He  served  under  General 
Patterson  in  Mexico,  where  he  remained 
till  the  end  of  the  war.  In  Aimnst, 
1849,  he  distinguished  himself  in  a skir- 


mish with  the  Apaches  at  Los  Vegas; 
and  for  his  gallantry  on  that  occasion 
he  was  promoted  to  a first-lieutenancy. 
He  was  one  of  the  commissioners  ap- 
pointed to  settle  the  boundary  line  be- 
tween Mexico  and  the  United  States; 
and  in  1851  he  performed,  as  the  bearer 
of  despatches  from  Colonel  Graham  to 
President  Fillmore,  the  marvellous  feat 
of  riding  on  horseback,  in  seventeen 
days,  over  a space  of  one  thousand  two 
hundred  miles,  through  a country  beset 
with  hostile  Indians.  Burnside,  like 
many  others  of  the  military  men  of  that 
day,  grew  tired  of  a life  of  inactivity  ; 
and  in  1853  he  resigned  his  commission 
in  the  army.  For  some  years  he  was 
engaged  in  railroad  management.  He 
was  a trained  child  of  the  republic; 
and  when  the  war  broke  out,  he  was 
naturally  expected  to  give  his  country 
the  benefit  of  his  training  and  experi-. 
ence.  Appointed  by  Governor  Sprague 
to  the  command  of  the  First  Bhode 
Island  Volunteers,  he  responded  to  the 
call  of  duty,  and  marched  with  his  reg- 
iment to  Washington.  His  conduct  at 
Bull  Bun  won  for  him  the  highest 
praise  both  from  the  government  and 
from  the  people.  No  fitter  man  could 
have  been  found  for  the  leadership  of 
such  an  expedition.  Flag-officer  Golds- 
borough was  a man  of  equal  worth  and 
of  even  greater  experience.  He  had 
been  in  the  navy  since  1812.  He  had 
been  at  sea  for  eighteen  years ; had  been 
on  duty  on  shore  for  twelve  years;  and 
for  some  eighteen  years  he  had  been 
without  active  employment,  when  he 
was  appointed  to  the  command  of  the 
frigate  Congress.  From  the  Congress 


124 


COAST  OPERATIONS  IN  1862. 


he  was  transferred  to  the  Minnesota, 
taking  command  of  one-half  of  the  At- 
lantic blockading  squadron.  Goldsbor- 
ough  had  been  for  some  time  stationed 
in  Hampton  Roads,  when  he  was  in- 
structed to  take  charge  of  the  fleet  in 
the  third  joint  military  and  naval  expe- 
dition. It  is  thus  seen  that  the  com- 
mand of  the  expedition  was  placed  in 
thoroughly  competent  hands. 

On  the  Ilth  of  January,  after  two 
Jan,  months’  preparation,  with  the 
troops  all  on  board  the  transports, 
the  magnificent  fleet  sailed  out  of  Hamp- 
ton Roads,  and  proceeded  to  sea.  It 
was  Sunday;  and  the  scene  witnessed 
in  the  neighborhood  of  Fortress  Monroe 
was  much  the  same  as  that  which  had 
been  witnessed  in  October  of  the  pre- 
vious year,  on  the  occasion  of  the  de- 
parture of  the  expedition  under  Sher- 
man and  Dupont.  As  in  the  former 
case,  the  destination  of  the  fleet  was 
kept  a profound  secret.  The  instruc- 
tions, which  had  been  given  to  General 
Burnside  on  the  7th  of  January,  were 
that  he  should  unite  with  Flag-officer 
Goldsborough,  in  command  of  the  fleet 
at  Fortress  Monroe,  and  proceed  to  cap- 
ture New  Berne,  seize  the  Weldon  Rail- 
road, and  reduce  Fort  Macon.  It  was 
not,  however,  deemed  advisable  that 
these  instructions  should  have  the  effect 
of  putting  the  Confederates  on  their 
guard ; and  hence  care  was  taken  that 
the  objective  point  of  the  expedition 
should  be  known  only  to  the  govern- 
ment and  to  the  two  commanders.  The 
secret  was  well  kept ; but  the  govern- 
ment at  Richmond  was  not  ignorant  of 
the  necessities  of  the  situation  or  of  the 


general  policy  in  favor  with  the  authori- 
ties at  Washington.  With  characteristic 
shrewdness  the  Confederates  divined 
the  direction  of  the  intended  blow,  and 
were  not  wholly  unprepared  for  it  when 
it  fell.  The  public  had  not  had  time 
to  forget  the  terrific  storm  which  scat- 
tered Dupont’s  fleet  in  the  first  days  of 
November;  and,  considering  the  season 
of  the  year,  there  were  many  fears  and 
some  forebodings  of  evil.  The  fears,  as 
the  result  proved,  were  not  groundless. 
The  forebodings  w'ere  too  literally  real- 
ized. No  great  difficulty  was  experi- 
enced dntil  the  vessels  were  off  the 
stormy  Hatteras.  The  advance  had 
reached  the  stiller  waters  of  the  inlet, 
when,  on  Monday  night,  a dreadful 
storm  broke  out,  striking  the  vessels  in 
the  rear  with  terrific  fury.  Four  trans- 
ports, a gunboat,  and  a floating  battery 
were  wrecked.  Among  these  the  fine 
steamer  City  of  New  York,  with  four 
hundred  barrels  of  gunpowder,  one 
thousand  five  hundred  rifles,  eight  hun- 
dred shells,  and  other  stores  and  sup- 
plies, valued  in  all  at  about  a quarter 
of  a million  dollars,  went  down  in  sight 
of  the  shore.  Some  of  the  vessels,  which 
had  been  purchased  in  New  York,  were 
evidently  unfit  for  such  service;  and 
the  opinion  was  very  generally  enter- 
tained that  the  ship  merchants  of  that 
city  had  taken  advantage  of  the  necessi- 
ties of  the  government  to  dispose  of 
worthless  stock.  Happily,  in  the  first 
instance  at  least,  no  human  lives  were 
lost.  On  the  1 4th,  however,  a jan. 
party  went  ashore  from  one  of  H. 
the  transports,  yet  outside ; the  boat, 
on  returning,  was  capsized,  and  three  of 


EOANOKE  ISLAND. 


125 


the  party  were  drowned.  These  were 
Colonel  J.  W.  Allen  of  Burlington,  New 
Jersey,  commander  of  the  Ninth  Kegi- 
ment  from  that  State;  Surgeon  F.  S. 
Waller;  and  the  mate  of  the  transport. 
Great  difficulty  was  experienced  in  get- 
ting the  vessels  through  the  inlet,  as 
the  weather  continued  boisterous,  and 
the  vessels  crowded  each  other  and  ob- 
structed progress.  It  was  the  end  of 
January  before  all  the  vessels  were 
through  the  inlet ; and  it  was  not  until 
Feb.  the  Tth  of  February  that  the  reor- 
7*  gauized  expedition,  having  moved 
forward  over  the  still  waters  of  Pam- 
lico, had  reached  the  entrance  to  Croa- 
tan  Sound. 

It  can  readily  be  imagined  of  what 
advantage  the  storm  proved  to  the  Con- 
federates. It  did  seem  once  more  as  if 
the  winds  of  heaven  were  enlisted  on 
their  side  and  fighting  their  battles. 
Information  leaked  out  through  the 
newsjoapers ; and  what  with  their  own 
knowledge  of  the  coast  and  the  general 
purpose  of  the  government  at  Washing- 
ton, they  had  no  great  difficulty  in  ar- 
riving at  the  conclusion  that  Boanoke 
Island,  which  lay  behind  Bodies’  Island 
and  between  Pamlico  and  Albemarle 
Sounds,  and  about  thirty  miles  from 
Hatteras  Inlet,  was  to  be  the  first  point 
of  attack.  The  island,  which  was  well 
fortified  and  garrisoned,  completely  pro- 
tected the  entire  northeastern  coast  of 
North  Carolina  from  invasion  by  sea; 
and  it  effectually  guarded  the  rear  ap- 
proaches to  Norfolk  and  Portsmouth  in 
Virginia.  It  was  scarcely  second  in  im- 
portance to  Fortress  Monroe.  The  isl- 
and and  its  vicinity  were  now  under 


the  command  of  Brigadier-General  H. 
A.  Wise,  In  consequence  of  the  illness 
of  Wise,  Colonel  H.  M.  Shaw,  of  the 
Eighth  North  Carolina  Begiment,  was 
performing  the  duties  of  commander-in- 
chief on  the  island.  He  had  under  him 
his  own  regiment;  the  Thirty-First 
North  Carolina  Volunteers,  Colonel  J. 
V.  Jordan;  three  companies  of  the  Sev- 
enteenth North  Carolina,  Major  G.  H. 
Hill ; and  four  hundred  and  fifty  men, 
Lieutenant-Colonel  Anderson.  On  all 
the  prominent  points  of  the  shores  of 
Boanoke,  batteries  had  been  erected 
commanding  Croatan  Sound  on  the  one 
side  and  Pamlico  Sound  on  the  other. 
On  the  narrowest  part  of  the  island, 
between  Shallowbag  Bay  and  Croatan 
Sound,  there  was  an  intrenched  camp 
with  a strong  redoubt,  extending  across 
the  road  which  traversed  the  middle  of 
the  island.  All  these  fortifications  were 
well  mounted  and  well  manned.  In 
addition  to  those  on  the  island,  there 
were  powerful  batteries  on  the  main- 
land, commanding  the  channels  of  Croa- 
tan Sound.  This,  however,  was  not  all. 
The  principal  channel  of  Croatan  Sound 
was  blocked  with  sunken  vessels ; and 
the  entire  waters  at  Pork  Point,  from  the 
island  to  the  mainland,  were  filled  with 
stakes  and  other  obstructions.  Above 
these,  and  towards  Albemarle  Sound, 
was  a flotilla  of  small  gunboats,  eight 
in  number  and  carrying  eleven  guns, 
under  the  command  of  Lieutenant  W. 
F.  Lynch,  now  charged  with  the  defense 
of  the  coast  of  North  Carolina. 

As  early  as  the  5th  of  February  Com- 
modore Goldsborough  had  made  peb* 
a reconnoissance  with  thirty  of  his  5. 


126 


COAST  OPERATIONS  IN  1SG2. 


gunboats  towards  Croatan  Sound ; and 
Feb.  on  the  Tth  he  began  to  move  on 
7*  the  forts  on  either  side.  The 
morning  of  that  day  was  dull  and  un- 
promisiog ; but  later  the  sun  burst  forth 
in  splendor ; and  Goldsborough,  at 
about  ten  o’clock,  hoisted  the  signal, 
“This  day  our  country  expects  every 
man  to  do  his  duty.”  The  gunboats 
advanced  in  three  columns.  The  first 
was  led  by  the  Stars  and  Stripes,  Lieu- 
tenant Worden;  the  second  by  the 
Louisiana,  Commander  Alexander  Mur- 
ray ; and  the  third  by  the  Hetzel,  Lieu- 
tenant H.  R.  Davenport.  Goldsborough 
was  on  board  the  Southfield,  which  he 
made  his  flag-ship,  and  was  accompa- 
nied by  the  gunboat  Underwriter.  At 
eleven  o’clock,  a bombardment  was 
opened  on  Fort  Barton,  on  Pork  Point ; 
and  within  thirty  minutes  afterwards 
the  battle  had  become  general.  The 
Confederate  gunboats  took  part  in  the 
fight;  but  they  were  soon  driven  be- 
yond the  range  of  the  National  guns; 
and  the  Curlew,  their  largest  steamer, 
was  so  badly  damaged  that  she  began 
to  sink,  and  was  saved  by  being  beached 
under  the  guns  of  Fort  Forrest  on  the 
mainland.  The  fleet  thus  put  out  of 
the  way,  Goldsborough  concentrated 
his  Are  on  Fort  Barton,  at  a range  of 
about  three-quarters  of  a mile,  as  close 
as  the  depth  of  water  would  permit  him 
to  advance.  Soon  the  flagstaff  of  the 
fort  was  shot  away ; the  barracks  were 
set  on  Are ; and  the  entire  works  began 
to  fall  to  pieces,  under  the  weight  of 
the  shot  and  the  terrific  explosions  of 
the  shells. 

The  transports  were  now  brought 


forward;  and  preparations  were  made 
for  landing  the  troops  at  Ashby’s  Har- 
bor, on  Roanoke  Island,  about  two 
miles  below  Fort  Barton.  The  Confed- 
erates had  anticipated  this  movement ; 
and  a force  of  two  thousand  men,  with 
a battery  of  three  pieces,  lay  concealed 
in  the  woods  in  front  of  the  landing. 
In  the  meantime  the  Confederate  flotilla 
returned  to  the  attack.  A shower  of 
shot  and  shell  from  the  National  gun- 
boats quickly  cleared  the  woods ; and, 
after  an  hour’s  vigorous  firing  on  both 
•sides,  the  Confederate  flotilla  again  re- 
tired. About  midnight  the  troops  were 
got  on  shore.  The  landing,  however, 
had  been  accomplished  in  circumstances 
of  more  than  ordinary  difficulty.  The 
night  was  extremely  cold;  there  was  a 
heavy  rain-storm ; and  to  add  to  the  dis- 
comforts of  the  situation,  such  was  the 
shallowness  of  the  water  that  the  boats 
could  not  effect  a landing,  and  the  men 
were  compelled  to  wade  w^aist-deep,  for 
a quarter  of  a mile.  Early  on  the  peb, 
morning  of  the  8 th  the  troops, 
about  eleven  thousand  in  number,  who 
had  spent  the  dark  hours  as  best  they 
could  without  any  shelter,  were  moved 
forward  to  attack  the  enemy’s  intrench- 
ments  in  the  interior  of  the  island.  The 
advancing  column  was  under  the  com- 
mand of  General  Foster,  the  next  in 
rank  to  General  Burnside,  who  remained 
at  the  landing.  The  main  body  fol- 
lowed, and  was  led  by  Generals  Reno 
and  Parke.  About  eight  o’clock  Foster 
reached  the  enemy’s  position.  Their 
ground  was  well  chosen.  On  either 
side  was  a morass.  A narrow  causeway 
was  the  only  approach  to  their  works ; 


THE  ZOUAVES. 


127 


and  this  they  had  protected  by  an  earth- 
work mounting  three  guns.  Inside  the 
intrenchments  there  were  some  three 
thousand  troops,  under  command  of 
Colonel  Shaw.  Foster  had  brought 
from  the  naval  launches  some  six  or 
eight  boat-howitzers.  These  were  un- 
der the  immediate  command  of  Mid- 
shipman B.  F.  Porter.  Foster  contin- 
ued to  press  forward ; but  the  ground 
being  swampy  and  bordered  with  woods, 
the  march  was  conducted  slowly  and 
with  great  caution.  With  musketry 
and  cannon  the  battle  was  begun  on 
both  sides.  The  Twenty-Fifth  Massa- 
chusetts, Colonel  Upton,  supported  by 
the  Twenty-Third  Massachusetts,  Col- 
onel Kurtz,  were  the  first  engaged. 
These  were  soon  joined  by  the  Twenty- 
Seventh  Massachusetts,  Colonel  Lee, 
and  the  Tenth  Connecticut,  Colonel 
Russell.  The  battle  now  raged  fiercely, 
the  Confederates  firmly  holding  their 
ground  and  making  a most  gallant  de- 
fense. Reno,  with  the  Twenty-First 
Massachusetts,  Colonel  Maggi,  the  Fif- 
ty-First New  York,  Colonel  Ferrero, 
the  Fifty-First  Pennsylvania,  Colonel 
Hartranft,  and  the  Ninth  New  Jersey, 
now  came  up  to  the  aid  of  Foster. 
Pushing  through  the  tangled  swamps, 
he  took  a position  on  Foster’s  right. 
While  Reno  thus  advanced  to  the  right, 
Parke,  with  the  Fourth  Rhode  Island, 
Colonel  Rodman,  the  first  battalion 
Fifth  Rhode  Island,  the  Eighth  Con- 
necticut, and  Ninth  New  York,  the  last 
under  Colonel  Hawkins,  pressed  to- 
wards the  left.  At  this  moment  the  fight- 
ing was  terrific,  both  sides  performing 
deeds  of  great  valor;  while  among  the 


Nationals,  Massachusetts,  Connecticut, 
New  York,  New  Jersey,  and  Pennsyl- 
vania, each  emulous  of  all  the  others, 
strove  for  the  prize  of  the  day.  Not- 
withstanding the  immensely  superior 
numbers  by  which  they  were  attacked, 
the  Confederates  stubbornly  held  their 
ground.  The  Nationals,  who  had  suf- 
fered severely  from  the  Confederate 
fire,  now  began  to  experience  a scarcity 
of  ammunition.  It  was  evident  to  Gen- 
eral Foster  that  a bold  stroke  must  be 
made  vigorously  and  at  once.  The  main 
battery  which  commanded  the  causeway 
must  be  silenced.  A bayonet  charge 
was  resolved  upon.  Major  E.  A.  Kim- 
ball of  Hawkins’  Ninth  New  York 
(Zouaves)  volunteered  to  lead  the  at- 
tack. “ You  are  the  man,”  said  Foster; 
‘Hhe  Ninth  is  the  regiment;  and  this 
is  the  moment.  Zouaves,  storm  the 
battery ! Forward ! ” With  a leap  and 
a yell,  they  went  bounding  across  the 
causeway.  ‘‘  Make  way  for  the  red- 
caps ! ” resounded  on  every  side ; while 
the  cry  of  “ Zou ! Zou ! ” rent  the  air. 
It  was  the  work  of  a moment.  The 
Zouaves  rushed  into  the  battery,  fol- 
lowed closely  by  the  Tenth  Connecticut, 
the  Fifty-First  New  York,  and  the 
Twenty-First  Massachusetts.  The  col- 
ors of  the  Fifty-First  and  the  State  flag 
of  Massachusetts,  planted  on  the  cap- 
tured battery,  revealed  the  rapidity  of 
the  attack  and  the  completeness  of  the 
victory.  The  Confederates,  after  the 
first  shot,  abandoned  their  guns  and 
fled  to  the  northern  part  of  the  island. 
Reno,  with  the  Twenty-First  Massachu- 
setts and  Ninth  New  York,  started  off 
in  vigorous  pursuit.  Foster,  having 


128 


COAST  OPERATIONS  IN  1862. 


re-formed  his  men,  quickly  followed. 
Hawkins,  with  his  Zouaves,  hurried  to- 
ward Shallowbag  Bay,  where,  it  was 
understood,  the  Confederates  had  a two- 
gun  battery.  After  a chase  of  some  five 
or  six  miles,  Foster  was  met  by  a flag  of 
truce  in  the  hands  of  Colonel  Pool,  of  the 
Eighth  North  Carolina,  who  bore  a mes- 
sage from  Colonel  Shaw,  the  command- 
ant of  the  island,  asking  on  what  terms 
capitulation  would  be  granted.  There 
was  but  one  answer  possible.  “ Uncon- 
ditional and  immediate  surrender,”  was 
Foster’s  prompt  reply.  Two  thousand 
men  laid  down  their  arms  and  became 
prisoners  of  war.  Among  them  was 
Colonel  Shaw.  Meanwhile  Keno,  who 
had  turned  toward  W eir’s  Point,  forced 
the  surrender  of  some  eight  hundred, 
who,  with  Colonel  Jordan  at  their  head, 
were  vainly  attempting  to  escape  from 
the  island ; while  Hawkins  found  easy 
possession  of  the  battery  at  Shallowbag 
Bay,  and  captured  some  two  hundred 
who  were  seeking  a chance  to  escape  to 
Nag’s  Head  on  the  mainland. 

While  success  was  thus  attending:  the 
land  forces,  Coldsborough  was  making 
good  use  of  his  gunboats.  He  had  re- 
newed his  Are  on  Fort  Barton,  at  Pork 
Point.  Towards  the  close  of  the  day, 
and  in  order  to  complete  the  conquest 
of  the  island,  Foster  sent  a detachment 
to  capture  the  fort.  The  guns  were  al- 
ready silenced ; it  was  found  that  the 
garrison  had  retired ; and  shortly  after 
four  o’clock,  Coldsborough,  on  seeing 
the  National  colors  floatina;  over  the 
stronghold,  signalled  to  his  fleet,  “ The 
fort  is  ours.”  About  the  same  time  the 
Confederate  steamer  Curlew,  which  had 


been  beached  under  the  guns  at  Bed- 
stone Point,  was  blown  up ; and  the 
barracks  at  that  place  were  set  on  Are. 
The  Confederate  flotilla  retired  into  the 
waters  of  Albemarle  Sound ; and  what 
is  known  as  the  battle  of  Eoanoke  was 
ended. 

From  Fort  Barton,  where  he  took  up 
his  headquarters.  General  Burnside  sent 
a report  of  the  day’s  proceedings  to 
Washington.  He  had  captured  six 
forts,  forty  guns,  most  of  them  of 
large  calibre,  three  of  them  being  100- 
pounders,  and  about  three  thousand 
prisoners.  With  a magnanimity  which 
is  characteristic  of  true  greatness,  he 
gave  all  the  credit  of  the  victory  to 
Generals  Foster,  Beno,  and  Parke.  In 
Atting  terms  he  lamented  the  deaths  of 
Colonel  Charles  S.  Bussell  and  Lieuten- 
ant-Colonel Vigeuf  de  Monteuil,  both 
of  whom  fell  when  gallantly  leading 
the  attack  in  the  centre  of  the  island. 
His  entire  loss  was  Afty  killed  and  two 
hundred  and  twenty-two  wounded.  The 
Confederate  loss  was  much  less,  as  they 
fought  for  the  most  part  under  breast- 
works. According  to  Pollard,  there 
were  twenty-three  killed,  Afty-eight 
wounded,  and  sixty-two  missing. 

The  capture  of  Boanoke  was  justly 
regarded  by  the  South  as  a damaging 
blow  to  their  cause.  Pamlico  Sound  was 
now  completely  wrenched  from  their 
grasp ; Albemarle  Sound  must  soon 
share  a similar  fate ; and  tlijii  nearly 
the  entire  seaboard  of  Virginia  and  the 
better  part  of  that  of  North  Carolina 
would  be  in  the  hands  of  the  Nationals. 
This,  however,  was  not  all.  Boanoke 
Island  was  indissolubly  associated  with 


ELIZABETH  CITY 


129 


the  early  history  of  America.  North 
Carolina  was  proud  to  own  it.  It  was 
the  scene  of  Sir  Walter  Kaleigh’s  colo- 
nizing experiment  in  1585;  and  it  was 
here  that  the  first  attempt  was  made  to 
establish  a titled  and  privileged  aris- 
tocracy in  the  New  World.  After  two 
unsuccessful  attempts  at  colonization, 
Manteo,  a native  chief,  Avas,  by  com- 
mand of  Raleigh,  and  with  the  approval 
of  Queen  Elizabeth,  made  Lord  of  Ro- 
anoke. The  loss  of  the  island  implied 
the  dismemberment  of  one  of  the  oldest 
and  proudest  of  the  Southern  States. 
The  people  of  the  South  veiy  properly 
complained  that  Roanoke  was  not  bet- 
ter fortified,  and  that  the  island  should 
have  been  allowed  to  fall  so  easily  a 
prey  to  the  enemy.  General  Huger, 
who  had  charge  of  that  department, 
with  his  headquarters  at  Norfolk,  and 
Secretary  of  War  Benjamin,  were  both 
greatly  blamed.  Although  the  battle 
of  Roanoke  was  won  by  the  Nationals 
with  comparative  ease,  and  although 
there  was  no  great  loss  of  life  on  either 
side,  few  of  the  battles  of  the  war  were 
conducted,  on  the  one  side  or  the  other, 
with  more  ability  or  with  greater  deter- 
mination. The  Nationals  were  vastly 
superior  in  numbers;  and  for  this  reason 
the  issue,  from  the  commencement  of 
the  contest,  was  not  doubtful. 

The  Confederate  flotilla  had  crossed 
Feb.  Albemarle  Sound,  and  had  sailed 
up  the  Pasquotank  River  as  far 
as  Elizabeth  City,  in  the  neighborhood 
of  the  Great  Dismal  Swamp.  Elizabeth 
City  is  the  capital  of  Pasquotank  Coun- 
ty, North  Carolina.  It  is  situated  on 
the  right  bank  of  the  Pasquotank  River, 


about  thirty  miles  from  its  mouth.  It  is 
a post  town,  and  contains  a court-house, 
jail,  and  several  churches.  Vessels 
drawing  seven  feet  of  water  can  come 
up  close  to  the  city  with  the  greatest 
ease.  It  has  a Avater  communication 
with  Norfolk  by  means  of  the  Pasquo- 
tank River  and  the  Dismal  Swamp 
Canal.  Into  these  waters  the  Nationals 
resolved  to  follow ; and  Goldsboro  ugh, 
the  day  after  the  capture  of  Roan- 
oke, detailed  some  fourteen  vessels, 
under  Commander  Rowan,  for  that  pur- 
pose. Rowan  had  some  difficulty  in  get- 
ting his  fleet  past  the  sunken  vessels, 
piles,  and  other  obstructions  in  Croatan 
Sound ; but  on  the  morning  of  the  peb. 
10th  he  had  so  far  accomplished  1^* 
his  purpose  as  to  have  his  entire  fleet  in 
the  harbor  of  Elizabeth  City.  There 
he  found  the  Confederate  fleet,  consist- 
ing of  seven  steamers  and  a schooner 
armed  with  two  32-pounders.  A four- 
gun  battery  had  been  planted  on  shore. 
There  was  also  one  heavy  gun  in  the 
town,  in  front.  The  entire  arrangement 
was  in  charge  of  Commander  Lynch. 
Rowan  lost  no  time  in  getting  his  ves- 
sels in  order;  and  about  nine  o’clock 
he  opened  fire  upon  the  enemy’s  fleet 
and  also  upon  the  batteries.  The  fight 
was  of  short  duration.  The  Confederate 
vessels  were  run  aground.  The  one 
gun  was  silenced ; so  also  were  tlie  bat- 
teries. The  vessels  were  set  on  fire  and 
abandoned.  The  fight  had  lasted  only 
forty  minutes.  Lynch  fled,  and  was 
not  again  heard  of  during  the  war,  until 
he  reappeared  at  Smithfield,  on  the  oc- 
casion of  the  capture  of  Fort  Fisher,  in 
1865.  In  his  report  of  the  engagement, 


130 


COAST  OPERATIONS  IN  1862. 


Rowan  said  that  he  had  destroyed  or 
captured  the  entire  naval  force  of  the 
enemy,  that  he  had  silenced  and  de- 
stroyed his  batteries,  and  that  the  only 
vessel  saved  was  the  Ellis*  whose  cap- 
tain, J.  M.  Cook,  was  wounded  and  a 
prisoner.  His  own  loss  was  “two  or 
three  killed  and  some  wounded.”  Eliz- 
abeth City  was  promptly  taken  posses- 
sion of,  but  not  before  a most  barbarous 
attempt  had  been  made  by  the  retreat- 
ing Confederates  to  destroy  it  by  fire. 
Happily  the  flames  were  got  under; 
and  the  lives  of  many  helpless  women 
and  children  were  saved. 

Burnside  did  not  allow  himself  to 
rest  upon  his  laurels.  The  advantages 
gained,  to  be  made  secure,  required  that 
the  Confederates  be  rendered  powerless 
for  evil  all  along  the  coast  of  North 
Carolina.  The  capture  of  Elizabeth 
City  was  followed  by  similar  move- 
ments into  the  harbors  and  bays  which 
branch  off  Albemarle  Sound.  The  first 
movement  was  towards  Edentown,  a 
flourishing  little  place  at  the  head  of 
the  bay  of  the  same  name,  near  the 
western  end  of  the  sound.  It  is  a post 
town,  a port  of  entry,  and  the  capital 
of  Chowan  County.  Edentown  was 
Feb.  settled  as  far  back  as  1716.  On 
the  day  after  the  capture  of  Eliza- 
beth, Lieutenant  A.  Maury,  with  part  of 
Rowan’s  fleet,  took  possession  of  Eden- 
town, the  Confederates  offering  no  re- 
sistance. A body  of  flying  artillery,  as 
soon  as  they  saw  the  gunboats,  made  a 
precipitate  retreat,  without  firing  a shot. 
Maury  found  a schooner  on  the  stocks, 
and  some  cannon,  which  he  destroyed, 
and  passed  on,  capturing  other  vessels 


in  the  sound.  Next  day  (February  13), 
Lieutenant  Jeffers,  with  a portion 
of  the  fleet,  proceeded  to  the  13* 
mouth  of  the  Chesapeake  and  Albe^ 
marie  Canal — the  canal  which  traverses 
the  Great  Dismal  Swamp,  connecting 
the  Pasquotank  with  the  Elizabeth 
River.  It  was  the  intention  of  the 
Nationals  to  destroy  the  canal ; but 
when  Jeffers  arrived,  he  found  that  this 
work  had  already  been  accomplished  by 
the  Confederates  themselves.  He  saw 
two  small  steamers  and  three  schooners 
about  a mile  and  a quarter  up  the  canal. 
Some  pickets  stationed  near  the  en- 
trance fired  their  muskets  as  a signal ; 
and  what  seemed  a large  body  of  men 
got  under  cover  close  by  the  vessels. 
At  about  a hundred  yards  from  the 
mouth  of  the  canal  the  National  gun- 
boats grounded.  The  Whitehead  w^as 
ordered  to  open  fire  with  her  nine-inch 
guns.  After  three  shells  had  been  flung 
at  them,  the  Confederate  troops  fled 
precipitately,  and  the  vessels  moved 
further  up  the  canal.  On  landing,  Jef- 
fers found  that  a schooner  had  been 
sunk  about  fifty  yards  from  the  canal’s 
mouth,  and  that,  to  prevent  it  changing 
its  position,  it  was  well  supported  by 
piles,-  logs,  and  other  material.  A large 
dredging  machine  had  been  left  behind. 
This,  after  destroying  its  machinery, 
the  Nationals  sank  diagonally  across 
the  canal,  thus  effectually  blocking  the 
way  for  even  the  smallest  vessel.  Still 
another  movement  of  a similar  kind  was 
made  before  Burnside  girt  himself  foi 
the  heavier  work  which  had  to  be  peb. 
accomplished  further  to  the  south. 

On  the  19th  the  combined  fleet  set  out 


NEW  BERNE. 


131 


from  Edentown  on  a reconnoisance.  One 
portion  of  the  fleet  sailed  up  the  Chowan 
River  as  far  as  Winton,  while  another 
portion  proceeded  up  the  Roanoke  to 
Plymouth.  At  neither  place  was  any 
attempt  made  to  land ; but  as  in  both 
cases  they  were  fired  upon  from  the 
land,  the  gunboats  responded  with 
shells;  and  Winton  was  partially  and 
Plymouth  almost  completely  destroyed. 

In  a joint  address  to  the  people  of 
North  Carolina,  Burnside  and  Golds- 
borough  stated  the  object  of  their  mis- 
sion, and  repelled  the  unfounded  charges 
made  against  them  by  the  Confederate 
leaders.  After  assuring  them  that  they 
were  Christians  like  themselves,  and 
that  they  realized  the  obligations  which 
that  sacred  name  implied,  they  thus, 
concluded,  “We  invite  you,  in  the  name 
of  the  constitution,  and  in  that  of  virtu- 
ous loyalty  and  civilization,  to  separate 
yourselves  at  once  from  these  malign 
influences,  to  return  to  your  allegiance, 
and  not  compel  us  to  resort  further  to 
the  force  under  our  control.  The  gov- 
ernment asks  only  that  its  authority 
may  be  recognized ; and  we  repeat,  in 
no  manner  or  way  does  it  desire  to  in- 
terfere with  your  laws,  constitutionally 
established,  your  institutions  of  any 
kind  whatever,  your  property  of  any 
sort,  or  your  usages  in  any  respect.” 
This  document  was  signed  by  both  corn- 
Feb.  rnanders,  and  bore  date  February 
18,  1862.  Such  a proclamation 
naturally  enough  alarmed  and  irritated 
the  Confederate  leaders;  and  on  the 
Feb.  2 2d  a violent  counter-proclama- 
22.  tion  was  issued  by  Henry  T. 
Clark,  the  governor  of  North  Carolina. 


The  tone  of  Governor  Clark’s  proclama- 
tion was  as  bellicose  as  that  of  Burnside 
and  Goldsborough  was  peaceful.  It 
denounced  the  expedition  as  an  attempt 
to  deprive  the  inhabitants  of  their  most 
sacred  rights.  It  proclaimed  the  war 
as  waged  by  the  North  to  be  one  of 
subjugation — “ a war  forced  tipon  us  in 
wrong,  and  prosecuted  without  right  and 
in  a spirit  of  vengeful  wickedness,  with- 
out a parallel  in  the  history  of  warfare 
among  civilized  nations.”  It  was  a war 
of  “avarice  and  ambition.”  “I  call,” 
said  the  governor,  “ upon  the  brave  and 
patriotic  men  of  our  State  to  volunteer 
from  the  mountains  to  the  sea.”  Such 
were  the  sentiments  which,  at  this  stage 
of  the  war,  prevailed  respectively  in  the 
North  and  in  the  South.  It  was  useless 
to  cry  “ Peace  ” ; for  there  was  none,  and 
there  was  to  be  none  for  three  weary  and 
sadly  eventful  years. 

New  Berne  was  the  next  place  singled 
out  for  attack.  For  that  purpose  all 
necessary  preparations  were  made.  Ro- 
anoke Island  was  now  the  basis  of  ope- 
rations. There  the  troops  concentrated ; 
and  there  the  scattered  vessels  of  the 
fleet  congregated.  As  Goldsborough 
had  been  ordered  back  to  Hampton 
Roads,  the  naval  portion  of  the  new 
expedition  was  entrusted  to  the  care  of 
Commodore  Rowan.  On  the  11th  ^jar, 
of  March,  after  taking  on  board  G. 
some  fifteen  thousand  troops.  Rowan, 
with  Burnside  on  board,  rendezvoused 
at  Hatteras  Inlet.  Early  the  following 
morning  the  entire  fleet,  including  the 
transports,  sailed  from  the  inlet,  mak- 
ing for  Slocum’s  Creek,  about  twelve 
miles  above  which,  on  the  Neuse  River. 


132 


COAST  OPERATIONS  IN  1862. 


where  it  is  joined  by  the  Trent,  stands 
the  town  of  New  Berne. 

New  Berne  is  a small  township,  the 
capital  of  Craven  County.  It  contained 
at  that  time  about  six  thousand  inhab- 
itants. It  had  a good  harbor,  leading 
to  the  Atlantic  Ocean,  through  Ocracoke 
Inlet;  and  as  it  was  connected  with  the 
great  commercial  centres  by  railroad,  it 
did  a good  business  both  by  land  and 
sea.  It  was  very  justly  regarded  by 
the  North  as  a point  of  considerable 
strategic  importance. 

Early  on  the  morning  of  the  13th,  the 
War.  entire  force  having  arrived  the 
13.  night  previous,  the  troops  began 
to  land  off  Slocum’s  Creek,  under  cover 
of  the  gunboats.  The  landing  was  ef- 
fected “ with  the  greatest  enthusiasm 
on  the  part  of  the  troops,”  wrote  Burn- 
side in  his  report.  ‘‘Many,  too  impa- 
tient for  the  boats,  leaped  into  the  water 
and  waded  waist-deep  to  the  shore,  and 
then,  after  a toilsome  march  through  the 
mud,  the  head  of  the  column  marched 
within  a mile  and  a half  of  the  enemy’s 
stronghold,  at  eight  P.  M.,  a distance  of 
twelve  miles  from  the  point  of  landing, 
where  we  bivouacked  for  the  night,  the 
rear  of  the  column  coming  up  with  the 
boat  howitzers  about  three  o’clock  next 
morning,  the  detention  being  caused  by 
the  shocking  condition  of  the  roads, 
consequent  upon  the  heavy  rain  that 
had  fallen  during  that  day  and  the 
whole  of  the  night,  the  men  often  wad- 
ing knee-deep  in  mud,  and  requiring  a 
whole  regiment  to  drag  the  eight  pieces 
which  had  been  landed  from  the  navy 
and  our  own  vessels.”  The  gunboats 
moved  up  the  river  abreast  of  the  army, 


the  flag-ship  Delaware  leading  the  way. 
The  main  body  of  the  Confederates  was 
under  the  command  of  General  Branch, 
and  consisted  of  eight  regiments  of  in- 
fantry, five  hundred  cavalry,  and  three 
batteries  of  field  artillery  of  six  guns 
each.  These  were  posted  within  a line  of 
intrenchments,  extending  from  near  the 
river  across  the  railroad  and  turnpike, 
of  more  than  a mile  in  length.  On  their 
left  they  were  protected  by  Fort  Thomp- 
son, which  was  armed  with  thirteen 
heavy  guns.  This  work  commanded, 
also,  the  channel  of  the  river.  On  the 
right  there  was  a long  succession  of 
rifle-pits,  curvettes  and  redans  terminat- 
ing in  a two-gun  redoubt.  These  works 
were  a little  over  four  miles  from  the 
town  of  New  Berne.  Burnside  marched 
his  army  in  three  divisions.  General 
Foster,  with  the  first  brigade,  marched 
along  the  main  county  road,  to  attack 
Fort  Thompson  and  the  Confederate 
left.  General  Reno,  with  the  second 
brigade,  followed  more  upon  the  line 
of  railroad,  with  the  view  of  striking 
the  Confederate  right.  General  Parke, 
with  the  third  brigade,  followed  in  such 
a manner  that  he  might  be  able  to  at- 
tack in  front  or  support  either  or  both 
brigades,  as  circumstances  might  re- 
quire. 

About  seven  o’clock,  on  the  morning 
of  the  14th,  the  skirmishers  of  the  i^ar. 
National  army  came  into  contact 
with  the  Confederate  outposts.  Gen- 
eral Burnside  rode  to  the  front  with  his 
staff.  Scarcely  had  he  appeared  in  view 
of  the  enemy’s  breastwork,  when  a shell 
fell  within  a few  feet  of  himself  and 
party,  splashing  them  with  mud,  but. 


NSW  BERNE. 


133 


as  it  did  not  explode,  doing  no  further 
damage.  The  regiments  were  quickly 
in  their  respective  positions.  General 
Foster  arranged  his  brigade  in  line  of 
battle  alorn^  the  frins^e  of  the  woods, 
skirting  the  edge  of  the  field  before  the 
breastwork.  The  Twenty-Fourth  Mas- 
sachusetts, Colonel  Stevenson,  was  on 
the  extreme  right.  The  Twenty-Fifth 
Massachusetts,  Colonel  Upton,  was 
next,  with  its  left  resting  on  the  road. 
Next  to  this  again  was  the  Twenty- 
Ninth  Massachusetts,  Colonel  Lee,  with 
its  right  resting  on  the  road.  The 
Twenty-third  Massachusetts  was  on  the 
extreme  left  of  the  brigade,  with  the 
Tenth  Connecticut  in  reserve.  The 
National  artillery  had  only  partially 
arrived  on  the  battle-ground;  and  con- 
secpiently  there  were  only  a few  pieces 
with  which  to  oppose  the  numerous  and 
powerful  guns  of  the  enemy.  On  the 
extreme  right  of  Foster’s  position  was 
McCook’s  battery  of  boat  howitzers, 
manned  by  Lieutenants  McCook,  Ham- 
mond, Daniels,  and  Tillotson,  with  ma- 
rines and  a detachment  of  the  Union 
Coast  Guard.  In  the  centre,  and  near 
the  road,  was  a 12-pounder  steel  gun 
from  the  Cossack,  manned  by  Captain 
Bennett  and  twenty  of  his  ship’s  crew. 
On  the  left  was  Captain  Dayton’s  bat- 
tery, from  the  transport  Highlander. 
The  second  brigade,  under  General 
Reno,  and  the  third  brigade,  under 
General  Parke,  maintained  the  positions 
asdgned  to  them  in  the  line  of  march, 
as  above  described. 

It  was  about  eight  o’clock  when  the 
battle  was  fairly  begun.  Foster’s  bri- 
gade was  the  first  to  feel  the  effect  of 


the  enemy’s  fire.  After  the  first  shot 
the  Confederates  ran  their  flag  defiantly 
up  over  the  ramparts;  and  from  the 
many  mouths  of  their  powerful  guns 
they  poured  forth  a perfect  storm  of 
round-shot,  grape,  canister,  and  shell. 
Their  infantry,  which  were  stationed  in 
fi’ont  of  the  wwks,  and  extended  the 
entire  length  between  the  river  and  the 
railroad,  kept  up  a brisk  and  steady 
fire  of  musketry.  The  fight  from  the 
commencement  was  severe.  It  was  not 
Ions:  until  several  of  the  re  Aments  lost 
some  of  their  principal  officers.  At  the 
place  where  the  Confederate  intrench- 
raents  crossed  the  railroad,  the  struggle, 
for  a time,  was  terrific.  For  nearly 
four  hours  the  brigade  of  Foster  bore 
the  brunt  of  the  battle,  the  regiments 
one  and  all  coverins;  themselves  with 
glory.  General  Parke,  with  his  third 
brigade,  following  out  the  instructions 
of  Burnside,  had  been  supporting  Fos- 
ter. It  wms  now  evident  that  the  latter 
could  hold  his'gi’ound  against  the  ene- 
my; and  Parke,  still  carrying  out  the 
original  arrangement,  withdrew  his 
troops  and  moved  to  the  support  of 
Reno,  who,  with  his  brigade,  was  suc- 
cessfully carrying  out  his  flank  move- 
ment against  the  Confederate  right.  It 
deserves  to  be  noted  here  that  General 
Reno  experienced  unexpected  difficulty 
in  carrying  out  his  part  of  the  plan  of 
attack.  It  was  not  known  that  the  line 
of  intrenchments  extended  beyond  the 
railroad,  at  least  to  any  distance.  When, 
therefore,  the  National  troops  attempted 
to  get  to  the  rear  of  the  enemy,  they  dis- 
covered not  merely  all  but  impassable 
swamps,  but  redoubts  and  rifle-pits 


134 


COAST  OPERATIONS  IN  1862. 


whicli  temporarily  checked  their  pro- 
gress. Happily,  an  attack  on  the  right 
had  not  been  suspected  by  the  Confede- 
rates, their  whole  strength  being  centred 
on  the  left  wing.  As  soon,  however,  as 
they  discovered  what  was  going  on  on 
the  right,  they  hurried  forward  a suffi- 
cient number  of  men  to  reinforce  the 
redoubts  and  to  defend  the  rifle-pits. 
After  he  had  been  joined  by  Parke, 
Reno  resolved  to  make  a bold  advance 
on  the  enemy’s  works.  The  Twenty- 
First  Massachusetts,  Colonel  Clarke, 
was  ordered  to  charge.  With  the  speed 
of  lightning  they  rushed  forward,  and 
were  soon  inside  the  intrenchments. 
They  had  taken  possession  of  the  guns 
and  were  actually  attempting  to  turn 
them  against  the  enemy,  when,  the  Con- 
federates being  reinforced,  they  were 
driven  back,  with  the  loss  of  some  of 
their  men,  who  were  made  prisoners. 
The  repulse,  however,  was  but  moment- 
ary. Re-forming,  and  being  joined  by 
the  New  York  Fifty-First,  the  Fourth 
Rhode  Island,  and  the  Ninth  New  Jer- 
sey, with  the  Fifth  Rhode  Island  in  re- 
serve, they  returned  to  the  assault ; and 
after  a terrible  hand-to-hand  fight,  in 
which  victory  trembled  in  the  balance, 
the  works  remained  in  the  hands  of  the 
Nationals,  the  Confederates  being  com- 
pletely routed  and  chased  at  the  point 
of  the  bayonet  back  out  of  sight.  In 
the  fierce  struggle  over  the  ramparts,  the 
Twenty-First  Massachusetts  especially 
distinguished  themselves;  and  in  making 
the  victory  complete,  gallant  service  was 
rendered  by  the  Fifth  Rhode  Island  and 
the  Eighth  and  Eleventh  Connecticut. 
While  this  struggle  was  going  on,  Reno 


was  greatly  annoyed  by  another  battery 
which  was  doing  most  destructive  work. 
Calling  up  his  reserve  regiment,  the 
Fifty-First  Pennsylvania,  Colonel  Hart- 
ranft,  he  ordered  it  to  charge.  The  or- 
ders were  promptly  obeyed,  and  the 
work  was  gallantly  done.  Meanwhile 
the  cheering  on  the  National  left  had 
attracted  the  attention  of  Foster  on  the 
right.  It  was  impossible  for  him  any 
longer  to  restrain  his  men.  Coming  out 
from  their  position  along  the  edge  of 
the  woods,  they  dashed  across  the  fields 
and  assailed  the  enemy  at  the  very  muz- 
zles of  their  guns.  It  was  a perilous 
movement.  It  might  have  resulted  in 
terrible  slaughter.  But  the  retreat  on 
their  right  flank  had  created  a panic  in 
the  Confederate  ranks.  There  was  no 
more  fight  in  them.  Leaving  their  guns 
unspiked,  their  caissons  and  their  unex- 
pended ammunition,  with  a number  of 
horses,  they  fled  ingloriously  towards 
the  Trent.  Foster  pursued  ; but  when 
he  reached  the  verge  of  the  river,  the 
enemy  had  crossed  and  burned  both  the 
railroad  and  turnpike  bridges  in  their 
rear.  Such  was  what  is  known  as  the 
battle  of  New  Berne.  The  capture  of 
the  town  of  that  name  followed  as  a 
matter  of  course. 

The  National  squadron  had  taken  an 
active  part  in  the  contest,  and  contrib- 
uted not  a little  towards  securing  the 
victory.  It  lent  effective  aid  in  driving 
the  Confederates  out  of  Fort  Thompson 
and  the  other  batteries  on  the  shore. 
These  being  evacuated,  and  the  National 
flag  left  floating  over  them,  the  gun- 
boats passed  the  obstructions  in  the 
river  and  moved  up  toward  the  town. 


FORT  MACON. 


135 


On  their  arrival  they  found  that  it  had 
been  fired  in  no  fewer  than  seven  places 
by  the  fleeing  Confederates,  and  that  it 
was  almost  completely  deserted.  On 
the  day  of  the  battle  the  terror-stricken 
inhabitants  had  fled  by  the  thousand. 
General  Foster’s  brigade  was  taken  over 
to. the  city  wharves  by  some  of  Rowan’s 
gunboats.  General  Burnside  established 
his  headquarters  at  the  fine  old  mansion 
of  the  Stanley  family,  in  the  suburbs 
Mar.  town.  On  the  following 

I'b  day  he  issued  an  order  appointing 
General  Foster  military  governor  of  the 
place,  and  ordered  that  the  churches  be 
opened  on  Sunday,  the  16th,  in  order 
that  the  chaplains  of  the  dilferent  regi- 
ments might  hold  divine  service  therein. 
The  bells  were  to  ring  as  usual.  On 
the  same  day  he  issued  an  order  con- 
gratulating his  troops  on  their  ‘‘bril- 
liant and  hard- won  victory,”  and  di- 
recting every  regiment  to  place  the  name 
of  New  Berne  on  its  banner.  In  his 
report  he  gave  General  McClellan  the 
credit  of  planning  the  expedition.  “ I 
have  endeavored,”  he  said,  “ to  carry 
out  the  very  minute  instructions  given 
me  by  him  before  leaving  Annapolis, 
and  thus  far  events  have  been  sins^u- 
larly  coincident  with  his  anticipations.” 
In  a work  in  which  McClellan’s  conduct 
is  fairly  and  candidly  criticised,  it  gives 
us  pleasure  to  be  able  to  record  this 
tribute  to  his  genius. 

By  this  victory  the  Nationals  not  only 
captured  New  Berne,  and  secured  all 
the  advantages  w^hich  the  possession  of 
such  a place  implied,  but  eight  batteries, 
mounting  forty-six  heavy  guns,  three 
batteries  of  light  artillery,  and  a large 


amount  of  stores  of  all  kinds.  Burn- 
side’s loss  was  ninety-one  killed  and 
four  hundred  and  sixty-six  wounded. 
The  Confederate  loss,  according  to  their 
own  statement,  was  ninety-four  killed, 
one  Inmdred  and  one  wounded,  and 
four  hundred  and  thirteen  missing.  Its 
moral  effect  on  both  sides  was  great. 
It  cheered  the  hearts  of  the  Northern 
people.  It  greatly  discouraged  the 
South. 

Burnside’s  next  movement  was  against 
Fort  Macon.  This  was  an  old  fortress 
of  the  United  States.  It  had  been 
seized  by  the  authorities  of  North  Caro- 
lina at  the  commencement  of  the  war. 
It  stands  on  a long  ridge  of  sand,  called 
Bogue  Island,  and  is  separated  from 
the  mainland  by  Bogue  Sound,  which 
is  navigable  for  vessels  of  light  ton- 
nage. On  the  side  of  Beaufort  harbor, 
at  the  terminus  of  the  railway  from  New 
Berne,  is  Morehead  City.  On  the  op- 
posite or  northern  side  of  the  harbor  is 
Beaufort,  the  capital  of  Carteret  County, 
an  old  and  pleasant  town,  and,  as  al- 
ready described,  a favorite  summer  re- 
treat for  the  aristocracy  of  North  Caro- 
lina. Fort  Macon  commanded  the  har- 
bor of  Beaufort;  and  as  the  Confede- 
rates had  been  making  free  use  of  the 
harbor  in  introducing  contraband  goods 
by  means  of  foreign  vessels,  it  was 
deemed  necessary,  in  order  to  the  effi- 
ciency of  the  blockade,  that  that  strong- 
hold should  be  reduced. 

Immediately  after  the  capture  of  New 
Berne,  Burnside  made  all  necessary  ar- 
rangements for  the  reduction  of  the 
fort.  He  placed  the  expedition  in 
charge  of  General  Parke,  General  Reno 


136 


COAST  OPEEATIOXS  IX  1863. 


jiaving  been  sent  to  make  some  further 
demonstrations  in  the  rear  of  Norfolk. 
Mar.  Nine  days  after  the  fall  of  New 
2^*  Berne,  Parke  having  been  con- 
veyed, with  his  troops,  by  water  to 
Slocum’s  Creek,  and  having  marched 
thence  across  the  country,  proceeded  to 
Mar.  invest  Morehead  City.  On  the 
25.  25th  of  March,  a detachment  com- 
posed of  the  Fourth  Bhode  Island  and 
the  Eighth  Connecticut  entered  Beau- 
fort without  opposition.  A flag  was 
sent  to  Fort  Macon,  demanding  its  sur- 
render. The  place  was  in  charge  of 
Colonel  Moses  T.  White,  a nephew  of 
Jefferson  Davis.  White  declared  that 
he  would  not  yield  until  he  had  eaten 
his  last  biscuit  and  slain  his  last  horse. 
Parke  made  immediate  and  vigorous 
preparations  to  take  the  fort  by  storm. 
A reconnoisance  was  made  in  force  on 
April  11th  of  April;  and  suitable 
D.  points  were  selected  for  planting 
siege  guns.  The  garrison  was  closely 
watched,  as  it  was  feared  that  in  their 
desperation  they  might  make  a fierce 
sortie.  Ordnance  and  ordnance  stores 
were  brought  over  on  rafts  from  Caro- 
lina City ; and  batteries  were  construct- 
ed behind  sand  hills  on  Bogue  Spit. 
Gunboats  had  been  provided ; and  it  was 
arranged  that  they  should  co-operate 
with  the  batteries  on  the  island.  There 
were  three  batteries.  The  first  was 
under  Lieutenant  Flagler  of  the  New 
York  Third  Artillery.  It  was  fourteen 
hundred  yards  from  the  fort,  was  well 
covered  by  a large  sand  hill,  and  mount- 
ed four  ten-inch  mortars.  The  second 
was  under  Captain  Lewis  J.  Morris  of 
the  First  Begular  Artillery.  It  was 


about  two  hundred  yards  in  advance  of 
the  first,  and  mounted  three  long  thirty- 
pound  Parrott  guns.  The  third  was  in 
charge  of  Lieutenant  Prouty  of  the 
Third  New  York  Artillery.  It  was 
one  hundred  yards  nearer  the  fort  than 
the  second,  and  mounted  four  ei^ht-inch 
mortars.  Communications  between  the 
batteries  were  established  by  cutting 
trenches  in  the  sand  and  skirting  the  hil- 
locks. To  guard  against  any  sortie  which 
the  garrison  might  be  tempted  to  make, 
sharpshooters  were  posted  in  rifle-pits  on 
both  flanks  and  in  front.  The  gunboats 
which  were  to  take  part  in  the  attack 
were  the  Daylight  (flag-ship).  Command- 
er Lockwood ; the  State  of  Georgia, 
Commander  Armstrong;  the  Chippewa, 
Lieutenant  Bryson ; and  the  barque 
Gemsbok,  Lieutenant  Cavendish. 

When  the  arrangements  were  com- 
pleted, Burnside  came  down  from  New 
Berne.  On  the  24th,  under  a flag  April 
of  truce,  he  had  an  interview  with  24. 
Colonel  White,  and  summoned  him  to 
surrender.  White  peremptorily  refused, 
declaring  that  he  had  been  placed  in 
command  of  the  fort,  and  that  he  would 
defend  it  to  the  extent  of  his  abil-  April 
ity.  On  the  morning  of  the  25th,  25. 

at  six  o’clock,  Burnside  ordered  the 
gunboats  within  range  of  the  fort.  Or- 
ders were  then  given  for  both  gunboats 
and  batteries  to  open  fire.  For  half  an 
hour  no  response  came  from  the  fort. 
Suddenly,  however,  there  were  a series 
of  flashes,  a succession  of  loud  reports, 
and  the  deadly  missiles  fell  thick  and 
fast  among  the  gunboats  and  close  by 
the  batteries.  From  that  time  till  four 
o’clock  in  the  afternoon  the  firing  con- 


FORT  PULASKI. 


137 


tinned  on  both  sides  without  intermis- 
sion. For  a time  it  was  wild  and  inef- 
fective ; but  gradually  the  range  on 
either  side  was  attained  with  increasing 
accuracy  ; and  the  shot  and  shell  began 
to  strike  more  frequently  in  the  near 
neighborhood  of  the  hostile  positions. 
By  midday  the  effect  of  the  fire  from 
the  batteries  was  distinctly  visible  on 
the  fort.  The  gunboats,  after  the  first 
hour  and  a half,  were  withdrawn,  a 
southwest  wind  disturbing  the  waters 
and  making  it  difiicult  for  them  to  ma- 
noeuvre with  ease  and  accuracy.  During 
the  course  of  the  day  there  was  some 
splendid  work  done  by  the  National 
gunners,  Lieutenant  Prouty,  with  his 
eight-inch  mortar  battery,  particularly 
distinguishing  himself  by  the  accuracy 
of  his  aim.  An  eye-witness  tells  us 
that  the  scene  was  grandest  about  two 
o’clock.  “ A flash  and  a puff  of  smoke 
betokened  a discharge ; an  interval 
elapsed,  which  terminated  with  the  re- 
port of  the  piece ; then  came  the  sonor- 
ous hum  of  the  shell  as  it  flew  through 
the  air;  another  puff  of  smoke,  soon 
followed  by  a second  report,  and  the 
deadly  missile  had  exploded.”  Shortly 
after  four  o’clock  a vs^hite  flag  was  dis- 
played on  the  foit ; and  the  firing  ceas- 
ed. Before  ten  o’clock  next  morning 
Fort  Macon  was  in  the  possession  of 
the  National  forces,  and  General  Burn- 
side had  the  double  gratification  of  see- 
ing the  old  banner  of  the  republic  and 
the  new  colors  of  his  own  Fifth  Rhode 
Islanders,  just  presented  them  by  the 
women  of  Providence,  unfurled  over  its 
battered  walls. 

Burnside  had,  indeed,  much  to  be 


proud  of.  For  the  present,  at  least,  he 
seemed  to  be  a favorite  child  of  fortune. 
Since  the  day  he  left  Annapolis  every- 
thing had  gone  well  with  him.  He  had 
restored  the  supremacy  of  the  Union 
in  Pamlico  and  Albemarle  Sounds,  and 
in  their  adjoining  creeks  and  bays ; 
he  had  captured  New  Berne,  and,  by 
the  reduction  of  Fort  Macon,  he  had 
destroyed  the  Confederate  power  in  the 
harbor  of  Beaufort.  Good  luck  seemed 
to  attend  his  generals  as  well  as  him- 
self ; for  while  Parke  was  nailing  vic- 
tory to  the  National  standard  at  Bogue 
Island,  Reno,  equally  successful,  had 
won  a splendid  victory  over  the  Con- 
federates at  South  Mills,  near  Camden 
Court  House.  The  occupation  of  the 
different  places  from  Beaufort  and  New 
Berne  in  the  south  to  Winton  and  Ply- 
mouth and  Washington,  at  the  head  of 
the  Pamlico  River,  in  the  north,  greatly 
scattered  Burnside’s  troops,  and  made 
it  impossible  for  him,  unless  reinforced, 
to  make  any  further  aggressive  efforts. 
In  the  present  condition  of  things  at 
Washington,  reinforcement  for  such  a 
purpose  was  out  of  the  question.  Mc- 
Clellan, who  had  been  compelled  to 
fall  back  from  before  Richmond,  was 
lying  at  Harrison’s  Landing;  and  such 
men  as  Burnside  were  needed  nearer 
headquarters.  He  was  summoned  to 
Fortress  Monroe,  with  all  the  forces  he 
could  collect,  on  July  17th.  General 
Foster  was  left  in  command  of  the  de- 
partment. 

In  a previous  chapter  we  have  given 
an  account  of  the  expedition  under 
General  T.  W.  Sherman  and  Commodore 
Dupont.  At  first  this  expedition  was 


138 


COAST  OPERATIONS  IN  1862. 


attended  with  great  success.  With  the 
exception  of  tw^o  forts — Fort  Pulaski, 
at  the  mouth  of  the  Savannah  Piver, 
and  Fort  Jackson,  up  the  river  and  near 
the  town  of  Savannah — the  entire  coast 
fi’om  Warsaw  Sound  below  the  Savan- 
nah River  to  the  North  Edisto,  well  up 
towards  Charlestou,  was,  at  the  close  of 
1861,  under  the  control  of  the  National 
forces.  At  the  same  time,  this  expedi- 
tion did  not  fulfill  its  high  promise. 
In  place^of  moving  against  the  enemy 
in  the  interior,  and  making  a bold  effort 
to  capture  Savannah  and  Charleston, 
Sherman  remained  in  his  encampments 
in  the  neighborhood  of  Port  Royal, 
busying  himself  with  the  construction 
of  intrenchments,  as  if  defense  had  been 
the  main  object  of  the  expedition.  It  is 
but  just,  however,  to  say  in  vindication 
of  General  Sherman  that  he  had  not 
been  instructed  to  press  his  advantages, 
and  that,  with  the  forces  at  his  com- 
mand, he  was  not  in  a position  to  attack, 
with  any  great  hope  of  success,  either 
Savannah  or  Charleston.  Still,  the 
panic  which  followed  the  fall  of  Port 
Royal  and  the  victory  at  Port  Royal 
Ferry  was  such  that  more  daring  meas- 
ures might  have  been  crowned  with 
greater  victories. 

Dupont  had  made  several  unsuccess- 
ful attempts  to  reach  Savannah  by  way 
of  Warsaw  Sound,  and  by  means  of  the 
creeks  which  abound  in  that  region. 
He  had  at  last  succeeded  in  getting 
possession  of  Dawfuskie  Island,  which, 
in  its  southeastern  extremity,  commands 
the  entrance  to  the  Savannah  River. 
Here  he  had  stationed  some  gunboats, 
with  a detachment  of  troops.  It  was 


felt,  however,  that  the  one  thing  to  be 
done  was  the  reduction  of  Fort  Pulaski. 
How  was  this  to  be  accomplished  ? It 
was,  as  we  have  had  occasion  to  remark, 
in  a previous  chapter,  one  of  the  strong- 
est works  on  the  Atlantic  seaboard. 
Its  peculiar  position  made  bombard- 
ment extremely  difficult.  It  was  the 
opinion  of  General  Quincy  A.  Gillmore, 
General  Sherman’s  chief  ensrineer,  that 
the  place  could  be  successfully  attacked 
by  batteries  of  rified  guns  and  mortars 
placed  on  Big  Tybee  Island,  which  lies 
to  the  southeast  of  Cockspur,  on  which 
the  fort  stood,  and  on  the  opposite  side 
of  the  narrow  channel.  It  was  also  his 
opinion  that  very  effective  aid  might 
be  given  from  a battery  on  Venus  Point, 
on  Jones’  Island,  two  miles  from  Cock- 
spur in  the  opposite  direction.  Big 
Tybee  Island,  as  we  have  already  seen, 
^vas  occupied  by  the  Nationals  towards 
the  close  of  1861.  The  question  now 
was,  how  to  get  to  Venus  Point,  on 
Jones’  Island,  the  entire  entrance  being 
so  completely  commanded  by  the  guns 
of  the  fort.  Information  was  given  by 
some  negroes  to  the  effect  that  there 
was  a channel  which  connected  Cali- 
bogue  Sound  with  the  Savannah  River. 
The  information  was  found  to  be  cor- 
rect, the  two  being  connected  by  an 
artificial  channel,  some  two  hundred 
yards  in  length,  called  Wall’s  Cut. 
This  channel  had  been  obstructed  by 
three  rows  of  piles  and  by  a sunken 
brig.  At  high  tide,  however,  the 
water  rose  above  these  obstructions 
some  ten  feet.  The  reconnoitring  par- 
ty had,  therefore,  no  difi&culty  in  get- 
ting over.  Arrangements  were  imme- 


THE  SURRENDER. 


139 


diately  made  for  the  removal  of  these 
obstructions. 

It  was  also  ascertained  that  the  Sa- 
vannah River  might  be  reached  by  way 
of  Warsaw  Sound,  Wilmington  Nar- 
rows, and  St.  Augustine’s  Creek,  al- 
though the  creek  was  greatly  obstruct- 
ed. Means  of  access  to  the  Savannah 
River,  in  the  rear  of  Fort  Pulaski,  hav- 
ing thus  been  discovered,  Sherman  pro- 
ceeded at  once  to  construct  batteries  on 
all  the  available  points.  A body  of 
men  under  the  immediate  command  of 
General  Viele  succeeded  in  reaching 
Jones’  Island  by  way  of  Wall’s  Cut,  and 
there,  on  Venus  Point,  they  built  an 
earthwork,  mounting  it  with  heavy 
guns,  and  giving  it  the  name  of  Battery 
V ulcan.  Jones’  Island  is  a mere  marsh  ; 
and  the  guns,  which  were  three  tons 
each,  had  to  be  brought  across  its  entire 
width.  It  was  a labor  of  extreme  dif- 
hculty.  The  weather  was  stormy ; and 
the  nights  were  dark.  Not  unfrequently 
did  the  men  work  waist-deep  in  the 
slushy  morass ; and  it  was  no  uncommon 
thing  for  the  guns  to  slip  off  the  rough 
corduroy  road  and  sink  deep  in  the 
mire.  In  spite  of  all  difficulties,  how- 
ever, the  work  was  completed  at  Venus 
Feb.  Point,  on  the  11th  of  February, 
G*  It  was  found  that  this  single  bat- 
tery did  not  completely  command  the 
Savannah  River.  Two  other  batteries 
were  therefore  erected — one  on  the 
northeast  extremity  of  Long  Island, 
and  another  on  flats  at  the  noi’th  of 
Mud  River.  These  batteries  so  com- 
manded the  Savannah  as  to  completely 
cut  off  all  communications  between  Sa- 
vannah City  and  Fort  Pulaski.  The 


Confederate  gunboats  also  found  it  con- 
venient to  remain  at  a distance.  As 
early  as  the  2 2d  of  February, 
when  these  works  were  all  com-  22. 
pleted.  Fort  Pulaski  was  in  a condition 
of  absolute  blockade. 

The  next  thing  to  be  done  was  the 
erection  of  siege  batteries  on  the  north- 
west face  of  Big  Tybee  Island,  opposite 
the  fort.  Tybee  Island,  like  all  the 
ground  in  the  neighborhood,  is  a huge 
marsh.  Its  soil,  where  not  actually  un- 
der water,  is  a species  of  mud  jelly. 
All  the  difficulties  experienced  on  Jones 
Island  were  experienced  here  in  an  ag- 
gravated form.  The  guns,  which  were 
all  heavy — eight  and  ten-inch  colum- 
biads,  ten  and  thirteen-inch  mortars, 
and  rifles  of  large  calibre — had  to  be 
dragged  two  miles  over  such  ground. 
Difficulties,  however,  did  not  hinder  the 
progress  of  the  work.  On  the  9th 
of  April  General  Gillmore,  who 
was  in  command,  had  completed  his 
preparations.  Eleven  batteries,  mount- 
ing in  all  some  thirty-six  guns,  were  in 
readiness  to  open  fire  on  the  fort ; and 
on  that  day  the  commanding  general 
gave  minute  instructions  as  to  the  work- 
ing of  the  guns,  and  notified  his  troops 
that,  if  the  garrison  did  not  in  the  mean- 
time surrender,  he  should  open  fire  at 
daybreak  the  following  day. 

General  Hunter  had  succeeded  Gen- 
eral Sherman  in  command  of  the  depart- 
ment. On  the  evening  of  the  8th  he 
arrived  at  Tybee.  On  the  morning  of 
the  10th,  at  sunrise,  Lieutenant  j\prii 
J.  H.  Wilson  was  sent  to  the  fort 
with  a message  from  the  general-im 
chief  to  the  commander  of  the  garrison. 


140 


COAST  OPERATIONS  IN  1862. 


Colonel  Charles  H.  Olmstead,  calling 
upon  him  to  surrender.  The  answer 
was  as  prompt  as  it  was  brief.  “ I am 
here,”  said  the  colonel,  ‘‘to  defend  this 
fort,  not  to  surrender  it.”  At  a quarter 
past  eight  o’clock  the  batteries  opened 
fire.  Fort  Pulaski,  as  we  have  already 
said,  had  the  reputation  of  being  one  of 
the  strongest  forts  on  the  Atlantic  coast. 
It  was  well  mounted ; and  its  walls 
were  seven  and  a half  feet  thick.  The 
National  batteries  were  planted  at  dif- 
ferent distances  — the  nearest  being 
about  a mile  from  the  fort,  the  most 
distant  about  two  miles.  Three  min- 
utes after  the  first  shot  was  fired  by 
the  Nationals,  the  Confederates  replied 
from  a ten-inch  barbette  gun.  The  fir- 
ing then  became  general;  and  for  the 
remainder  of  the  day  it  was  maintained 
with  great  spirit  on  both  sides.  The 
day  was  not  far  advanced  when  it  be- 
came manifest  that  the  masonry  of  the 
fort  could  not  long  resist  the  terrible 
pounding  of  the  batteries.  Long  before 
night  came  on,  the  rifles  had  honey- 
combed the  avails,  the  shot  at  sixteen 
hundred  and  fifty  yards,  the  distance 
of  the  nearest  rifle-battery,  penetrating 
the  walls  to  a depth  of  from  twenty  to 
twenty-six  inches ; and  the  ten-inch  sol- 
id shot,  which  struck  with  less  velocity, 
fell,  as  an  eye-witness  puts  it,  like  a 
trip-hammer,  battering  to  pieces  the 
damaged  masonry.  It  was  Gillmore’s 
opinion,  after  he  had  seen  the  effect  of 
his  guns,  that,  if  he  had  known,  he 
might  have  completed  his  preparations 
in  one  week  instead  of  two,  and  con- 
tented himself  with  placing  his  nearest 
battery  at  twenty-five  hundred  yards. 


When  darkness  fell,  five  of  the  guns  of 
the  fortress  were  silenced,  and  the  fir- 
ing generally  had  become  feeble.  All 
night  long  four  of  Gillmore’s  guns  fired 
at  intervals  of  fifteen  or  twenty  min- 
utes. On  the  morning  of  the  11th,  April 
at  sunrise,  the  firing  from  the  bat- 
teries  was  commenced  afresh,  and  con- 
tinued with  great  vigor.  A yawning 
breach  began  to  be  visible  in  the  south- 
east angle  of  the  fort ; yet  the  garrison 
gallantly  maintained  the  fight  until  two 
o’clock.  A practicable  breach  had  been 
made ; and  Olmstead  perceived  that 
“ it  was  impossible  to  hold  out  any 
longer,  as  the  rifle-shots  were  fast  work- 
ing their  way  into  the  magazines,  and 
as  many  of  his  guns  were  disabled.” 
He  accordingly  raised  the  white  flag, 
and  placed  himself  and  garrison  uncon- 
ditionally at  the  mercy  of  the  conqueror. 
Forty-seven  guns,  a large  supply  of  fixed 
ammunition,  forty  thousand  pounds  of 
powder,  large  quantities  of  commissary 
stores,  and  three  hundred  and  ninety 
prisoners,  constituted  the  spoils  of  victo- 
ry. The  Nationals  had  one  man  killed. 
The  Confederates  had  three  wounded. 
At  Fort  Pulaski  a striking  illustration 
was  given  of  the  power  and  etficiency 
of  modern  artillery.  It  had  always  been 
supposed  that  such  walls  could  not  be 
successfully  breached  at  distances  great- 
er than  eight  hundred  yards.  The  near- 
est battery,  as  we  have  seen,  was  dis- 
tant from  the  fort  at  least  sixteen  hun- 
dred and  fifty  yards. 

It  was  the  general  expectation  at 
Savannah  that  Fort  Jackson  would  be 
immediately  attacked,  and  that  the  fort 
and  Savannah  itself  would  both  be  sur- 


THE  NATIONAL  POWER  SUPREME. 


141 


rendered.  Nothing  of  the  kind  was 
intended.  It  would  have  been  a useless 
waste  of  the  National  forces  to  employ 
them  in  garrisoning  Fort  Jackson  and 
in  occupying  Savannah.  With  Fort 
Pulaski  in  their  possession,  the  Nation- 
als commanded  the  entrance  to  the 
river — the  blockade  of  Savannah  was 
complete ; and  this  was  all  that  was  im- 
mediately contemplated. 

While  these  events  were  progressing 
at  the  mouth  of  the  Savannah,  Commo- 
dore Dupont  and  General  Wright  were 
making  rapid  and  easy  conquests  along 
the  coast  of  Florida.  Dupont  had  left 
Peb,  Port  Eoyal  on  the  28th  of  Feb- 
28.  ruary,  with  twenty  armed  vessels 
and  six  transports,  tilled  with  troops; 
Mar,  and  on  the  1st  of  March  he  ar- 
b rived  in  St.  Andrew’s  Sound, 
north  of  Cumberland  and  St.  Andrew’s 
Islands.  As  but  little  if  any  resistance 
was  offered,  it  is  unnecessary  in  a work 
of  this  kind  to  do  more  than  note  the 
results  of  this  expedition.  Fort  Clinch 
and  the  adjoining  village  were  found 
deserted ; and  Dupont  was  able  to  write 
to  the  secretary  of  the  navy.  “We  cap- 
tured Port  Royal,  but  Fernandina  and 
Fort  Clinch  have  been  given  to  us.” 
Brunswick,  the  terminus  of  the  Bruns- 
wick and  Pensacola  Railroad,  were 
taken  possession  of  with  equal  ease. 
Jacksonville  followed,  but  not  until  a 
wicked  attempt  had  been  made  by  the 
Confederates  to  destroy  it  by  tire.  Fort 
Marion  and  the  ancient  city  of  St.  Au- 
gustine, a little  further  down  the  coast, 
Mar.  were  surrendered  to  Commander 
lb  C.  R.  P.  Rodgers,  on  the  11th  of 
March.  Pensacola  was  soon  after  aban- 


doned by  the  Confederate  General  T. 
N.  Jones,  who  burnt  whatever  he  could 
at  the  navy  yard,  at  the  hospital,  and 
in  Forts  McRae  and  Barrancas,  before 
he  retreated  into  the  interior.  On  the 
2 7th  of  March  Dupont  returned  to  Mar. 
Port  Royal,  when  he  found  that  27. 
Skiddaway  and  Green  Islands  had  been 
abandoned  by  the  Confederates,  thus 
leaving  Warsaw  and  Ossabaw  Sounds 
and  the  Vernon  and  Wilmington  Rivers 
open  to  the  National  forces.  Edisto 
Island  had  been  captured  as  early  peb, 
as  the  11th  of  February.  Thus  lb 
it  was  that  on  the  first  anniversary  of 
the  attack  on  Fort  Sumter,  the  entire 
Atlantic  and  Gulf  coast,  from  Cape 
Hatteras  to  Perdido  Bay,  excepting  only 
the  harbor  of  Charleston  and  its  imme- 
diate surroundings,  had  been  abandoned 
by  the  Confederates,  and  that  along 
that  whole  line  the  National  power  was 
supreme. 

In  a previous  chapter  we  have  men- 
tioned the  fact  that  .after  the  capture  of 
Hatteras  Island,  General  Butler  hurried 
to  Washington  for  the  purpose  of  in- 
ducing the  government  not  to  abandon 
the  conquest  which  he  had  made,  but 
to  leave  a certain  number  of  troops  on 
the  island.  General  Butler’s  advice  was 
taken,  as  we  have  seen ; and  he  himself 
was  commissioned  by  the  secretary  of 
war  to  go  to  New  England  and  “raise, 
arm  and  uniform  a volunteer  force  for 
the  war,”  to  be  composed  of  six  regi- 
ments. In  this  the  general  was  com- 
pletely successful.  As  early  as  jan, 
the  13th  of  January,  1862,  he  had  1^» 
a conference  with  Secretary  Stanton, 
then  newly  installed  as  war  secretary  in 


142 


MEMPHIS  AND  NEW  ORLEANS. 


room  of  Mr.  Cameron.  The  result  of 
this  conference  was  a determination  on 
the  part  of  the  government  to  make  a 
vigorous  effort  to  capture  New  Orleans, 
and  so  take  possession  of  the  Lower 
Pel),  Mississippi.  On  the  25th  of  Feb- 
25*  ruary,  General  Butler  embarked 
at  Hampton  Hoads,  accompanied  by  his 
wife,  his  staff,  and  fourteen  hundred 
troops,  in  the  steamship  Mississippi. 


On  the  20th  of  March,  after  a stormy 
and  perilous  voyage,  he  reached  ]^ar. 
Ship  Island,  and  commenced  those  2D. 
preparations  which  resulted,  through 
the  united  efforts  of  himself  and  Com- 
modore Farragut,  in  the  capture  of  the 
Queen  City  of  the  South.  The  story 
of  the  capture  of  New  Orleans,  how- 
ever, must  be  reserved  for  another 
chapter. 


CHAPTEH  X. 


Memphis  and  New  Orleans. — Island  No.  10. — Confederate  Grief. — Fort  Pillow. — General  Villepigne. — Jeff. 
Thompson. — Foote  and  His  Flotilla. — General  Pope. — Hollins. — Pope  Recalled  to  Corinth. — Foote  Left  Alone 
at  Fort  Pillow. — Foote's  Wonnd  making  Retirement  Necessary. — C.  H.  Davis  takes  Command  of  the  Flotilla. — 
Activity  of  Hollins. — The  Fight  Commenced. — The  Boiler  of  the  McRae  Penetrated. — The  White  Flag. — The 
Losses  on  Both  Sides. — Ellet  and  His  “ Ram ’’rSquadron. — Flight  of  the  Confederates. — The  Effect  of  the  Fal' 
of  Corinth. — The  Fort  Occupied  by  the  Nationals. — Occupation  of  Fort  Randolph. — Memphis  Unprotected  on 
the  North. — The  Gunboats  at  the  Levee. — The  Memorable  Sixth  of  June. — The  National  Fleet  in  Motion.— 
The  Opening  of  the  Fight. — The  Queen  cf  the  West. — The  Monarch. — The  Queen  and  the  Price. — The  Fighting 
General. — The  Queen  badly  Injured. — The  Lovell  Shattered  to  Pieces  and  Sunk.— One  Half-Hour’s  Work. — A 
Grand  and  Impressive  Scene. — The  Last  Hope  of  Memphis  Perished. — Surrender  of  Memphis. — Memphis 
Occupied  by  the  Union  Troops. — Fitch  Appointed  Provost-Marshal. — Another  Obstruction. — New  Orleans. — 
The  Key-Position  of  the  Great  Valley. — Naval  Expedition. — David  G.  Farragut. — Stanton’s  Energy. — Farragut 
at  Ship  Island. — His  Instructions. — Butler  and  the  Land  Force. — Porter  and"  His  Gunboats. — All  things  Ready 
for  a Combined  Movement. — The  Difficulties. — Forts  St.  Philip  and  Jackson. — The  River  Chain. — The 
Louisiana. — The  Manassas. — Twiggs  and  Lovell — Higgins. — The  Confidence  of  the  South. — All  things  in 
Readiness  for  an  Assault. — The  Plan. — Porter’s  Device. — The  Bombardment  Commenced. — Fort  Jackson 
Fires  the  First  Shot. — Terrible  Fighting. — Farragut's  Resolve. — The  Chain  Across  the  River  Cut. — One  Thou- 
sand Shells. — The  Fleet  Passes  the  Obstructions. — Farragut  on  the  Fore-Rigging  of  the  Hartford. — Passing 
the  Forts. — The  Ram  Manassas. — The  Fire-Rafts. — Bailey  and  Boggs. — The  Vanina. — The  Battle  Ended. — • 
Brief,  but  Desperate  and  Destructive. — The  Evacuation  of  the  Forts. — The  Louisiana  Set  on  Fire  by  Her 
Commander. — The  Intention. — The  River  in  Flames. — New  Orleans  Hemmed  In. — A Thunder-Storm. — Call 
for  Surrender. — The  Mayor’s  Reply. — Landing  of  the  Marines. — The  National  Flag  Waving  over  Neu 
Orleans. — Butler  in  Charge  of  the  City. — Honor  to  the  Brave. 


Hightly  to  appreciate  tbe  actual  state 
1862  in  the  valley  of  the- Mis- 

sissippi, and  intelligently  to  fol- 
low the  events  which  will  be  recorded 
in  the  immediately  succeeding  chapters, 
the  reader  must  now  give  his  attention 


to  certain  naval  operations  which,  in  the 
interest  of  the  National  cause,  had  been 
successfully  conducted  on  two  separate 
portions  of  the  lower  section  of  the 
great  western  river.  Memphis,  as  we 
have  already  had  occasion  to  remark. 


FORT  PILLOW. 


143 


had  fallen ; and  General  W allace  had 
l^jay  there  established  his  headquarters. 

h On  the  1st  of  May,  two  days  after 
the  occupation  of  Corinth  by  the  Nation- 
al troops,  New  Orleans  had  yielded  to 
the  strategy  and  daring  of  Farragut ; and 
the  old  flag  was  floating  over  the  largest 
and  in  some  respects  most  important  city 
of  the  Confederacy.  After  the  capture 
of  New  Orleans  and  the  fall  of  Mem- 
phis, Vicksburg  was  the  one  remaining 
stronghold  of  any  importance  which 
obstructed  the  free  navigation  of  the 
Mississippi  from  St.  Louis  to  the  sea. 
Let  us  see  how  it  came  to  pass  that 
both  Memphis  and  New  Orleans  were 
wrenched  from  the  hands  of  the  Con- 
federates. 

In  a previous  chapter  we  have  given 
a somewhat  detailed  account  of  the  op- 
erations, by  land  and  water,  which  re- 
sulted in  the  capture  and  occupation  of 
Island  No.  10.  The  fall  of  that  island 
was  felt  by  the  Confederates  to  be  one 
of  the  deadliest  blows  which  they  had 
yet  received.  It  was  one  of  the  strong- 
est places  on  the  river,  richly  supplied 
with  all  the  material  of  war ; and  every- 
thing fell  into  the  victors’  hands.  It 
was  openly  confessed  by  the  Confede- 
rates themselves,  amid  much  grief  and 
lamentation,  that  no  single  battle  had 
yet  afforded  the  North  such  visible 
fruits  of  victory  as  had  been  gathered 
at  Island  No.  10.  It  was  not,  however, 
solely  on  account  of  the  number  of  men 
who  had  been  made  prisoners,  or  be- 
cause of  the  vast  quantity  of  arms  and 
ammunition  which  had  become  the  spoil 
of  the  victorious  Nationals,  that  the  Con- 
federates were  filled  with  grief.  They 


had  another  cause  for  sorrow.  Memphis, 
the  most  important  city  on  the  Mississip- 
pi between  St.  Louis  and  New  Orleans, 
was  virtually  left  undefended.  Fort 
♦Pillow,  it  is  true,  remained;  but  Fort 
Pillow,  strong  as  it  was,  could  scarcely 
be  expected  long  to  resist  the  captors 
of  Forts  Henry  and  Donelson  and  Co- 
lumbus, now  flushed  with  success  from 
their  fresh  triumph  at  Island  No.  10. 

The  Confederates,  however,  were  nei- 
ther without  the  means  nor  without  the 
spirit  to  offer  the  invaders  a stubborn 
resistance.  Fort  Pillow,  whose  works 
occupied  a line  of  seven  miles  in  cir- 
cumference, was  very  strong,  and  was 
under  the  excellent  superintendence  of 
General  Villepigue,  a New  Orleans 
creole,  a West-Pointer,  and,  as  an  en- 
gineer, regarded  second  only  to  Beau- 
regard himself.  It  had  forty  heavy 
guns  in  position.  There  were  nine  gun- 
boats under  Hollins ; and  J eff.  Thomp- 
son was  there  with  about  six  thousand 
troops. 

After  the  fall  of  Island  No.  10,  Com- 
modore Foote  lost  no  time  in  pushing 
his  way  down  the  Mississippi.  General 
Pope  followed,  in  transports,  with  his 
army,  numbering  some  twenty  thousand 
men.  Pope  arrived  on  the  13th  April 
of  April;  and  preparations  were 
immediately  made  for  an  attack.  Foote 
opened  fire  and  moved  against  the  gun- 
boats on  the  following  day,  and  with 
such  vigor  that  Hollins  found  it  neces- 
sary to  seek  the  shelter  of  the  fort. 
Pope  had  landed  his  troops  on  the 
Arkansas  shore,  but  so  greatly  was  the 
land  overflowed  with  water  that  he 
could  render  no  assistance.  On  the 


144 


MEMPHIS  AND  NEW  OELEANS. 


ITtli  he  was  recalled  with  his  entire 
force,  to  join  Halleck,  who  was  then 
advancing  on  Corinth.  Foote  was  thus 
left  to  prosecute  the  work  alone;  and 
soon  afterwards,  in  consequence  of  the 
painfulness  of  the  wound  which  he  had 
received  in  his  ankle  at  Fort  Donelson, 
he  was  compelled  to  retire  from  active 
duty,  leaving  the  command  in  the  hands 
of  Captain  C.  H.  Davis. 

Hollins,  meanwhile,  had  not  been 
i^Iay  idle ; and  on  the  10th  of  May, 
having  re-formed  his  flotilla,  he 
came  out  from  under  the  guns  of  the 
fort,  sweeping  around  Point  Craighead, 
on  the  Arkansas  shore,  with  armored 
steamers.  Some  of  the  steamers  were 
fitted  \vith  strong  bows,  plated  with 
iron.  Davis  was  ready  to  receive  him. 
The  fight  was  commenced  by  Hollins’ 
largest  gunboat,  the  McKae,  which, 
armed  with  a strong  iron  prow,  rushed 
at  the  moi’tar  boat  No.  16.  The  com- 
mander of  the  mortar  boat,  Acting- 
Master  Gregory,  made  a gallant  fight, 
firing  his  single  mortar  no  fewer  than 
eleven  times.  The  gunboats  Cincinnati 
and  Mound  City  came  to  Gregory’s  as- 
sistance, when  the  fighting  became  gen- 
eral. The  fight  had  lasted  the  better 
part  of  an  hour,  when  a shell  from  the 
Boston  penetrated  the  boiler  of  the 
McRae.  This  was  the  end.  Clouds  of 
steam  enveloped  the  ill-fated  vessel,  and 
torrents  of  boiling  water  were  doing 
more  effective  work  among  the  men  on 
board  than  the  shells  from  the  National  | 
gunboats.  The  flag  was  raised  in  token 
of  surrender.  The  National  gunboats 
were  in  no  condition  to  pursue  and  cap- 
ture. Some  of  them  were  much  injured. 


the  Cincinnati  particularly,  which  soon 
went  to  the  bottom  of  the  river.  As 
their  steam  power  was  too  weak  to 
enable  them  to  resist  the  powerful  cur- 
rent of  tbe  river,  it  was  wisely  con- 
cluded not  to  grapple  the  disabled  ves- 
sels of  the  enemy,  lest  by  so  doing  they 
might  be  dragged  under  tbe  guns  of 
the  fort.  The  National  loss  was  four 
men  wounded.  The  Confederate  loss 
must  have  been  considerably  greater. 
The  damage  sustained  by  tbe  McRae 
alone,  through  tbe  bursting  of  her  boil- 
er, must  have  exceeded  that  sustained 
by  tbe  entire  National  fleet.  In  some 
respects  it  was  a barren  victory ; but  it 
afterwards  proved  more  fruitful  than  at 
first  it  seemed. 

Three  weeks  were  allowed  to  pass 
without  any  attempt  being  made,  on 
either  side,  to  renew  the  conflict.  About 
the  beginning  of  June,  Davis  was  rein- 
forced by  Colonel  Charles  Ellet,  jr., 
with  his  famous  “ ram ’’-squadron — a 
I fleet  of  boats  of  a peculiar  model,  of 
which  he  was  the  inventor.  Thus 
j strengthened,  Davis  concluded  to  re- 
I peat  the  trial  of  strength.  It  was  too 
I late.  The  enemy  had  fled.  Fort  Pillow 
I was  deserted.  Hearing  of  the  disaster 
i which  had  befallen  Beauregard,  and  of 
; his  flight  from  Corinth,  the  garrison, 

^ officers  and  men,  were  filled  with  alarm ; 

' and  having  first  blown  up  their  maga- 
“ zines  and  fired  their  barracks  and  stores, 
they  went  down  the  river  in  transports, 
accompanied  by  the  Confederate  fleet. 
The  evacuation  and  retreat  took  place 
under  cover  of  the  night  of  the  juue 
4th.  On  the  following  day  the 
National  flag  floated  over  Fort  Pillow 


A TEREIFIC  SCENE. 


145 


and  over  Fort  Kandolph,  a place  of 
some  strength  but  of  less  importance, 
further  down  the  river.  Believing  in 
the  strength  of  the  forts  on  the  river 
above  and  below,  the  authorities  had  not 

I . ^ 

thought  it  necessary  to  fortify  the  town 
itself.  On  the  northern  side,  Memphis 
was  now  entirely  unprotected.  The 
only  defense  that  now  remained  was 
the  flotilla  of  gunboats,  now  lying  close 
to  the  levee. 

The  situation  of  Memphis  on  the 
June  morning  of  the  memorable  6th 
of  June  was  peculiar  in  the  ex- 
treme. The  inhabitants  had  before 
them  a great  sensation,  and  the  al- 
most certain  expectation  of  a great  sor- 
row. In  their  immediate  presence,  in 
the  broad  sea-like  waters  which  rolled 
past  their  city,  a great  naval  engage- 
ment was  about  to  take  place ; and  the 
result,  which  could  hardly  bring  to 
them  any  permanent  advantage,  might 
in  a few  hours  or  minutes  place  them- 
selves, their  property,  and  their  institu- 
tions entirely  at  the  mercy  of  the  enemy. 
At  the  early  dawn  the  National  fleet, 
with  the  Cairo  in  advance,  was  moving 
in  battle  order  toward  the  levee.  The 
Confederate  fleet,  which,  as  we  have 
seen,  lay  there,  consisted  of  eight  ves- 
sels. The  National  fleet,  it  will  be  re- 
membered, had  been  strengthened  by 
four  ram-boats  under  Ellet.  While  the 
National  boats  were  moving  forward, 
and  only  as  yet  within  long  range,  the 
Confederate  Little  Bebel  hurled  a rifled 
shot  at  the  Cairo.  The  Cairo  replied 
with  a broadside.  Thus  the  conflict 
began.  For  a time  the  battle  was  con- 
fined to  the  gunboats.  Suddenly,  how- 


ever, two  of  the  Confederate  rams  (Beau- 
regard and  Price)  pushed  forward  and 
joined  in  the  fray.  Ellet  observed  the 
movement ; and  watching  for  his  oppor- 
tunity, he  brought  the  two  rams  Queen 
of  the  West  (his  flag-ship)  and  Monarch 
right  in  front  of  the  gunboats.  He 
made  a dash  at  the  Confederate  rams, 
the  Queen  being  brought  down  toward 
the  Beauregard  with  tremendous  force, 
but  missing  her.  Bushing  at  the  Price, 
the  Queen  struck  the  wheel-house  of 
that  vessel  with  her  iron  prow,  and  so 
damaged  her  that,  to  avoid  sinking,  she 
was  compelled  to  seek  the  opposite 
shore.  The  Beauregard  now  turned 
upon  the  Queen ; and,  both  vessels, 
rushing  together  at  full  speed,  the  lat- 
ter received  a crushing  blow,  which  dis- 
abled her.  The  Monarch,  hastening  to 
the  aid  of  the  Queen,  struck  the  Beau- 
regard fair  in  the  bow,  causing  her  to 
sink  almost  immediately.  A white  flag 
was  raised  on  the  Beauregard  ; and  the 
ram  fight  having  ceased,  the  Monarch 
towed  the  badly  wounded  Queen  of  the 
West  to  a place  of  safety.  Meanwhile 
the  struggle  was  going  on  between 
the  gunboats.  The  Confederates,  being 
hard  pressed  by  the  Nationals,  were 
steadily  falling  back.  The  fighting  was 
conducted  with  great  spirit,  and  the 
destruction  was  terrific.  The  Confede- 
rates, however,  were  the  only  suflcerers. 
The  boilers  on  some  of  their  boats  were 
burst  and  the  crews  scalded.  A fifty- 
pound  ball,  hurled  from  the  Benton  by 
a rifled  Parrott  gun,  hit  the  Lovell 
with  such  force  that  she  was  shattered 
almost  to  pieces,  and  sunk  in  a few 
minutes,  in  seventy-five  feet  of  water, 


146 


MEMPHIS  AND  NEW  OPtLEANS. 


carrying  with  her  the  greater  portion  of 
her  officers  and  crew.  Such  had  been 
the  destructive  work  done  in  the  brief 
space  of  half  an  hour  that  only  four 
Confederate  vessels  remained  afloat — 
the  Thompson,  the  Bragg,  the  Sumter, 
and  the  VanDorn;  but  these  were  all 
badly  injured  and  made  for  the  shore. 
They  were  all  abandoned  except  the 
YanDorn,  which  made  good  its  escape 
down  the  river.  Not  a man  had  been 
killed  on  board  the  National  gunboats. 
When  the  brief  conflict  was  at  its  height 
the  scene  Avas  grand  and  impressive  in 
a high  degree.  The  battle  had  been 
AAutnessed  by  many  thousands  of  the  in- 
habitants of  Memphis.  The  firing  of 
the  first  gun  had  roused  them  from  their 
slumbers;  and  anxious  multitudes  soon 
lined  the  shores  and  croAvded  the  roofs 
of  the  houses.  The  dense  smoke,  Avhich 
gathered  cloud-like  around  the  ships, 
concealed  from  AueAV  much  of  the  actual 
fighting;  but  the  AAuld  Avar  of  jarring 
sounds — the  booming  of  cannon,  the 
rattling  of  musketry,  the  bursting  of 
shells,  the  explosion  of  boilers,  the 
crasliing  of  timbers  as  the  rams  rushed 
together  in  fierce  embrace — all  attested 
the  severity  of  the  conflict  which  Avas 
raging  behind.  When  the  cloud  of 
smoke  arose  and  the  Avreck  Avas  re- 
vealed, the  last  hope  of  Memphis  had 
perished. 

There  Avas  no  further  resistance.  To 
the  request  of  Commodore  Davis  that 
he  surrender  the  city,  the  mayor  politely 
replied  that  he  had  no  means  of  defense, 
and  that  the  city  was  in  his  hands. 
Jeff.  Thompson,  who  had  command  of 
the  city,  and  who  had  witnessed  the 


fight,  when  he  found  that  the  fleet  was 
defeated,  beat  an  immediate  retreat.  The 
■ old  Union  flag  was  hoisted  on  the  public 
buildings ; and  Memphis  was  taken  pos- 
session of  by  the  National  troops,  Col- 
onel Fitch,  of  the  Forty-Ninth  Indiana, 
being  appointed  provost-marshal.  The 
reader  noAV  knoAvs  hoAV  it  came  to  pass 
that  Memphis  had  been  wrenched  from 
the  Confederates,  and  hoAV  it  Avas  that 
General  LeAvis  Wallace,  of  Grant’s  ar- 
my, entered  and  occupied  that  city  Avith- 
out  encountering  any  resistance.  The 
fall  of  Memphis  left  the  Mississippi 
comparatively  unobstructed  as  far  doAvn 
as  Vicksburg. 

Let  us  noAv  give  our  attention  to  AAffiat 
had  happened  on  the  same  AAmters  to 
the  south  of  Vicksburg  and  nearer  to 
the  sea.  Very  early  in  the  history  of 
the  war  the  attention  of  the  National 
government  had  been  directed  to  NeAV 
Orleans;  and  it  was  felt  that  so  long 
as  the  city  remained  in  the  possession 
of  the  Confederates  there  could  be  no 
free  naAugation  of  the  Mississippi.  It 
Avas  the  key-position  ; and  Avhoever  Avas 
strong  enough  to  hold  that  position  was 
master  of  the  great  valley.  In  the  au- 
tumn of  1861  it  was  resolved  not  to 
Avait  until  the  military  coml)inations 
had  forced  a passage  down  the  river, 
but  to  send  a naval  expedition,  which, 
fitted  out  in  the  Atlantic  ports,  should 
move  up  from  the  gulf.  The  command 
of  this  ex23edition  was  assigned  to  Ca^A- 
tain  David  G.  Farragut,  a Tennessean 
by  birth,  and  an  officer  who  had  seen 
service  and  done  good  work  both  in  the 
Mexican  campaign  and  in  the  naval 
operations  of  1812.  It  was  not,  how- 


READY  FOR  ATTACK. 


147 


ever,  until  early  in  1862  that  this  expe- 
dition showed  any  signs  of  vitality.  By 
that  time  Stanton  had  succeeded  Came- 
ron as  head  of  the  War  Department; 
and  the  energy  of  the  new  chief  was 
making  itself  everywhere  felt. 

On  the  2d  of  February  Farragut 
Febi  sailed  from  Hampton  Koads  in  the 
2*  armed  steamer  Hartford.  Having 
been  detained  by  sickness  at  Key  West, 
he  did  not  reach  Ship  Island,  his  point 
Feb.  destination,  until  the  20th  of 
20#  the  same  month.  Farragut’s  in- 
structions were  of  the  most  positive 
kind.  He  was  to  proceed  with  all  pos- 
sible despatch  to  the  Gulf  of  Mexico, 
and  assume  command  of  the  western 
gulf  squadron,  relieving  Flag-officer 
McKean.  The  gulf  squadron,  which 
was  employed  in  enforcing  the  block- 
ade, was  to  be  considerably  strength- 
ened; and  in  addition,  there  was  to 
be  attached  to  the  squadron  a power- 
ful bomb  flotilla,  under  Commander 
David  Porter.  With  these  mortar  ves- 
sels, as  soon  as  they  were  ready,  and 
with  such  others  as  might  be  spared 
from  the  blockade,  he  was  to  reduce 
the  defenses  which  guarded  the  ap- 
proaches to  New  Orleans,  take  posses- 
sion of  that  city,  under  the  guns  of  the 
squadron,  and  hold  it  until  troops  should 
be  sent  to  his  aid.  If  the  expedition 
from  Cairo  should  not  yet  have  got 
down  the  river  so  far,  he  was  to  push  a 
strong  force  up  the  stream  past  the  city, 
and  destroy  the  defenses  in  the  rear. 
Thus  instructed,  and  having  been  pro- 
vided with  plans  of  the  principal  works 
on  the  lower  Mississippi,  Farragut  set 
about  the  accomplishment  of  his  task. 


Arrangements  had  been  made  to  back 
up  the  efforts  of  the  fleet  by  a powerful 
land  force.  An  army  of  eighteen  thou- 
sand men  was  furnished  and  placed 
under  the  command  of  Major-General 
Butler.  Farragut,  we  have  seen,  ar- 
rived at  Ship  Island  on  the  20th  of 
February.  On  the  25th  of  the  peb. 
same  month.  General  Butler,  his  25. 
troops  on  board  five  transports,  sailed 
from  Plampton  Boads.  Porter’s  fleet 
of  mortar  boats,  which  were  to  rendez- 
vous at  Key  West,  arrived  in  due  time. 
It  was  a formidable  fleet.  Fitted  up  in 
the  Brooklyn  Navy  Y^ard,  it  had  for 
months  been  the  subject  of  not  a little 
speculation ; and  it  was  generally  ex- 
pected that  with  such  instruments  Por- 
ter and  Farragut  would  be  able  to  do 
some  effective  work.  There  were  in  all 
twenty-one  vessels,  of  from  two  hun- 
dred to  three  hundred  tons  each,  of 
great  strength,  and  constructed  so  as  to 
draw  as  little  water  as  possible.  They 
were  armed  with  mortars  eight  and  a 
half  tons  in  weight,  and  capable  of 
throwing  a 15-inch  shell.  Each  vessel 
carried  also  a 82-pounder  rifled  cannon. 
Before  the  middle  of  April  the  fleet 
was  in  perfect  order;  Butler,  too,  had 
arrived ; and  all  necessary  preparations 
had  been  made  for  a combined  move- 
ment against  the  enemy. 

Strong  as  the  National  forces  now 
undoubtedly  were,  Farragut  had  a task 
on  hand  fitted  to  unnerve  the  strongest 
arm  and  to  appal  the  stoutest  heart. 
New  Orleans  was  well  fortified ; and  the 
numerous  narrow  and,  in  some  places, 
shallow  outlets  by  which  the  Alissis- 
sippi  seeks  the  sea,  make  its  approaches 


148 


MEMPHIS  AND  NEW  ORLEANS. 


exceedingly  perilous  to  ships  of  heavy 
tonnage.  These  outlets  are  five  in  num- 
ber, and  are  named  respectively  Pass  d 
r Outre,  Northeast  Pass,  Southeast  Pass, 
South  Pass,  and  Southwest  Pass.  At 
a bend  about  thirty  miles  up  the  river 
there  were  two  powerful  forts — one  on 
the  right  or  south  bank.  Fort  Jackson, 
and  the  other  on  the  left  or  north  bank. 
Fort  St.  Philip.  These  barred  the  ap- 
proach to  the  city  from  the  gulf ; and 
the  Confederates  had  armed  them  with 
one  hundred  and  twenty-six  guns  of 
long  range  and  large  calibre.  At  this 
point  a large  chain,  sustained  upon  eight 
hulks,  was  stretched  across  the  river. 
Close  to  Fort  Jackson  there  was  a for- 
midable water-batter^^ ; and  under  the 
guns  of  the  forts  tliere  was  a fleet  of 
thirteen  gunboats,  a powerful  ironclad 
floating  battery,  called  the  Louisiana, 
carrying  sixteen  guns,  and  the  steam- 
I’ani  Manassas.  In  addition  to  all  these 
tremendous  war  appliances,  there  were 
numerous  rafts  and  fire-ships.  Further 
up  the  river  and  to  the  southwest  of  the 
town,  on  the  bayous  and  lakes,  there 
were  elaborate  and  powerful  works, 
which  Beauregard  had  greatly  strength- 
ened. In  and  around  the  city  of  New 
Orleans  there  was  a force  of  at  least 
ten  thousand  men.  General  Twiggs,  of 
somewhat  questionable  reputation  as  a 
soldier,  had  been  entrusted  by  the  Con- 
federates with  the  defense  of  the  city. 
Plis  position,  by  this  time,  however, 
had  been  assumed  by  Mansfield  Lovell, 
formerly  a politician  and  ofiice-holder 
in  New  York.  Lovell  had  for  his  as- 
sistant General  Buggies,  a man  of  abil- 
ity and  energy.  The  general  command 


of  the  river  defenses  was  entrusted  to 
General  J.  K.  Duncan,  another  New 
York  office-holder.  Forts  Jackson  and 
St.  Philip  being  under  the  immediate 
command  of  Lieutenant-Colonel  Ed- 
ward Higgins.  Lovell  had  made  appli- 
cation to  the  governor  of  the  State  for 
ten  thousand  men ; but  such  had  been 
the  drain  upon  the  army  by  the  neces- 
sities of  the  Border  States  that  not 
more  than  three  thousand  could  be 
spared  him  as  a reinforcement.  As  it 
was,  however,  it  was  not  wholly  with- 
out reason  that  the  Confederate  strength 
around  New  Orleans  was  believed  by 
some  to  be  sufficient  to  “ beat  off  any 
navy  in  the  world.”  “ Our  only  fear,” 
said  one  of  the  New  Orleans  journals, 
is  that  the  Northern  invaders  may  not 
appear.  We  have  made  such  exten- 
sive preparations  to  receive  them  that  it 
were  vexatious  if  their  invincible  ar- 
mada escapes  the  fate  we  have  in  store 
for  it.” 

On  the  8th  of  April  the  National 
fleet,  consisting  of  four  sloops-of-  April 
war,  seventeen  gunboats,  twenty-  8. 
one  mortar  schooners,  and  two  sailing 
vessels,  but  having  no  ironclads,  had 
been,  with  great  labor,  carried  over  the 
bar.  The  Brooklyn  had  been  dragged 
through  the  mud  of  the  Southwest  Pass. 
At  the  shallowest  part,  the  water  was 
barely  fifteen  feet  deep,  the  mud  having 
greatly  increased  in  the  channel  since 
the  commencement  of  the  blockade. 
By  the  17th  all  things  were  in  April 
readiness  for  an  attack.  Not  only 
were  the  two  fleets  now  fully  in  the 
river:  Butler,  with  his  troops,  was  at 
the  Southwest  Pass,  immediately  below, 


THE  « CHAIN”  CUT. 


149 


ready  to  take  what  action  might  be  ne- 
cessary. A fire-raft,  which  came  sailing 
down  .the  river,  gave  the  Nationals  an 
idea  of  the  species  of  tactics  the  enemy 
April  was  disposed  to  adopt.  On  the 
following  day  the  movement  be- 
gan in  earnest.  According  to  the  plan 
agreed  upon  at  Washington,  and  which 
formed  part  of  the  instructions  given  to 
Farragut,  Porter  was  to  attempt  to  re- 
duce the  forts  by  his  mortars,  and  if  he 
failed,  Farragut  was  to  run  past  them 
with  his  heavy  vessels.  In  the  event 
of  the  latter  course  being  attended  with 
success,  Butler  was  to  land  his  troops 
in  the  rear  of  St.  Philip  and  carry  it  by 
assault. 

The  south  bank  of  the  river  for  sev- 
eral miles  below  Fort  Jackson  was 
thickly  wooded.  At  some  distance  be- 
low the  bend,  and  in  order  to  enable 
the  guns  of  the  fort  to  sweep  the  river 
and  prevent  the  vessels  from  ascending, 
a large  opening  was  cut  through  the 
wood.  It  was  impossible,  however,  to 
rob  the  Nationals  of  all  the  advan- 
tages which  the  trees  afforded.  Under 
cover  of  the  woods,  fourteen  of  the 
mortar  boats,  their  masts  and  rigging 
being  clothed  with  leafy  boughs,  to 
make  them  indistinguishable  from  trees, 
moved  up  the  river  and  were  moored 
at  desirable  points  without  being  dis- 
covered. The  remainder  of  Porter’s 
boats  were  on  the  other  side  of  the 
river;  but  as  it  was  found  that  they 
were  within  the  range  of  the  guns  of 
the  forts,  they  too  were  brought,  on  the 
morning  of  the  second  day,  under  cover 
of  the  woods.  Early  on  the  morning 
of  the  18th  the  bombardment  com- 


menced. The  first  shot  was  fired  from 
Fort  Jackson.  Porter  was  ready  co  re- 
ply ; the  mortar  vessels  opened  fire  im- 
mediately ; and  the  effect  was  terrific. 
From  a position  on  board  the  Harriet 
Lane,  Porter  watched  the  effect  ol  the 
shells,  and  directed  their  range  accord- 
ingly. In  Fort  Jackson  the  barracks 
were  set  on  fire  soon  after  the  bom- 
bardment opened.  The  guns  were  fre- 
quently silenced,  the  men  being  terror- 
stricken  by  the  shells  which  were  ex- 
ploding all  around  them.  It  was  ob- 
served that  the  shells  were  bursting  in 
the  air,  in  consequence  of  the  badness 
of  the  fuses.  The  fuses  were,  therefore, 
put  in  full  length,  to  delay  the  explo- 
sion. The  change  had  the  desired  ef- 
fect. The  shells,  penetrating  the  earth 
eighteen  or  twenty  feet,  and  then  ex- 
ploding, tearing  up  the  ground  and 
scattering  it  all  around,  had  the  effect 
of  a constantly  repeating  earthquake. 
The  firing  from  the  forts,  in  spite  of  all 
this,  was  kept  up  with  great  energy, 
shot  and  shell  coming  crashing  through 
the  woods  and  tearing  up  the  trees  by 
the  roots.  During  the  first  twenty-four 
hours  fifteen  hundred  bombs  must  have 
been  flung  by  Porter’s  mortars,  the  en- 
emy replying  with  equal  spirit ; and 
for  six  weary  days  and  nights  this  ter- 
rible work^went  on.  No  such  continued 
and  heavy  fighting  had  been  witnessed 
since  the  days  of  Nelson.  At  the  dis- 
tance of  thirty  miles  from  the  scene  of 
action,  window  panes  were  broken  by 
the  concussion ; and  fish,  stunned  by 
the  dreadful  explosions,  were  floating 
about  on  the  surface  of  the  water. 

On  the  third  day  of  the  bombard- 


212 


150 


MEMPHIS  AND  NEW  ORLEANS. 


ment,  Farragiit,  seeing  that  no  decisive 
results  were  likely  to  be  attained  unless 
bolder  measures  were  adopted,  called  a 
council  and  announced  his  determina- 
tion to  cut  the  barricade,  run  the  gaunt- 
let of  the  forts,  and  pass  up  to  the  city 
of  New  Orleans  in  spite  of  their  guns. 
Butler  was  at  hand,  with  at  least  ten 
thousand  troops,  ready  to  land  and  as- 
sist in  the  capture  of  the  forts,  all  his 
transports,  with  the  exception  of  the 
Great  Bepublic,  having  entered  the 
Mississippi  on  the  18th.  If  this  move- 
ment was  to  be  carried  out,  the  first 
thing  to  be  done  was  to  remove  the 
obstructions  from  the  river.  On  the 
April  night  of  the  20th,  therefore,  un- 
20.  der  cover  of  the  darkness,  a fierce 
north  vdnd  blowing  at  the  time,  Com- 
mander Bell,  with  the  Pinola  and  Itaska, 
supported  by  the  Iroquois,  Kennebec, 
and  AVinona,  ran  up  to  the  boom.  The 
Pinola  attempted,  but  unsuccessfully, 
to  blow  up  one  of  the  hulks,  by  means 
of  a petard.  The  Itaska  was  lashed  to 
the  hulk  adjoining.  A rocket  thrown 
up  from  Fort  Jackson  revealed  her  pres- 
ence, and  a heavy  fire  was  immediately 
opened  upon  her  from  the  fortress. 
Nothing  daunted,  the  men  kept  at  their 
Avork ; and  by  means  of  cold-chisels, 
hammers,  sledges,  and  saws,  the  chain 
was  cut.  The  river  being  in.  full  flood, 
the  powerful  current  swung  around 
both  hulk  and  gunboat,  the  latter  being 
grounded  in  the  mud  in  shallow  water. 
The  Pinola  came  promptly  to  the  res- 
cue, and,  after  some  difificulty,  succeeded 
in  carrying  her  consort  back  in  safety 
to  the  fleet.  Some  two  hours  after- 
Avards  a fire-raft  came  blazins^  doAvn  the 


stream.  It  was  caught,  however,  in 
time,  and  rendered  harmless.  Mean- 
time the  firing  neA^er  ceases,  either  on 
board  the  mortar  boats  or  in  the  forts ; 
and  night  after  night  those  blazing  fire- 
rafts  are  let  loose  on  their  errands  of 
destruction.  There  were  no  signs  as 
yet  that  the  forts  would  surrender. 
One  thousand  shells  at  least  had  burst 
within  Fort  Jackson ; twenty-five  thou- 
sand had  been  hurled  against  it;  yet 
General  Duncan  could  say : “ God  is 
certainly  protecting  us.  AVe  are  still 
cheerful,  and  have  an  abiding  faith  in 
our  ultimate  success.” 

The  arrangements  for  the  onward 
movement  up  the  river  Avere  now  com- 
pleted. The  chain  was  broken ; and 
Farragut  was  ready.  On  the  April 
night  of  the  23d  the  Itaska,  which  23. 
had  run  up  to  the  boom,  signalled  that 
all  was  right — that  the  channel  was 
clear,  Avith  the  exception  of  the  hulks, 
which,  with  care,  might  be  easily  passed. 
The  fleet  had  been  arranged  in  three 
divisions,  under  Farragut,  Captain  Bell, 
and  Captain  Theodor  us  Bailey.  Six 
gunboats  were  to  engage  the  water- 
battery  below  Fort  Jackson,  but  were 
not  to  proceed  further.  Farragut  had 
charge  of  the  first  division,  which  con- 
sisted of  the  three  large  ships,  the  Hart- 
ford (flag-ship),  the  Bichmond,  and  the 
Brooklyn.  This  division  was  to  keep 
to  the  right  bank  of  the  river  and  fight 
Fort  Jackson.  The  second  division  was 
under  Bailey,  and  Avas  composed  of  the 
Pensacola,  Mississippi,  Oneida,  Varu- 
na,  Katahdin,  Kineo,  AV^issahickon,  and 
Portsmouth.  This  division  Avas  to  keep 
to  the  left  bank  and  fight  Fort  St.  Philip. 


THE  ‘^MANASSAS/’ 


151 


The  third  division,  which  comprised 
the  Scioto,  Winona,  Iroquois,  Pinola, 
Itaska,  and  Kennebec,  and  was  under 
Bell,  v/ho  was  ordered  to  press  on  neg- 
lectful of  the  forts,  and  attack  the  Con- 
federate fleet  above.  At  one  o’clock  on 
April  morning  of  the  24th  all  hands 
24.  were  called,  hammocks  stowed, 
and  everything  put  in  readiness  to  weigh 
anchor  at  two  o’clock.  The  night  was 
dark,  and  a heavy  fog  rested  upon  the 
river. 

At  two  o’clock  precisely,  two  red 
lights  were  hung  out.  They  were  the 
signal  for  going  into  action.  In  less 
than  an  hour,  the  whole  fleet  was  un- 
der way.  There  was  an  ominous  si- 
lence at  the  forts,  as  if  they  were  fully 
aware  of  what  was  going  on,  and  were 
preparing  to  give  the  fleet  a warm  re- 
ception. Meanwhile  Porter’s  boats  had 
opened  a terrific  fire,  literally  filling  the 
air  with  shells,  and  making  night  hid- 
eous with  their  noise.  As  if  redoubling 
their  efforts,  the  men  kept  up  the  firing 
with  unceasing  vigor  until  Farragut’s 
vessels  were  all  fairly  in  the  heat  of 
the  conflict.  The  waning  crescent  of 
the  moon  revealed  itself  just  as  Far- 
ragut,  struggling  with  the  fierce  current, 
safely  passed  the  broken  chain,  its  pale 
light  blending  strangely  with  the  fierce 
glare  of  the  hissing  shells.  As  the  ves- 
sels under  his  care  slowly  but  steadily 
approached  Fort  Jackson,  Farragut, 
from  the  fore-rigging  of  the  Hartford, 
eagerly  watched,  with  the  help  of  his 
night-glass,  the  movements  of  Bailey 
and  Bell.  When  within  a little  over  a 
mile  of  Fort  Jackson,  the  guns  of  both 
forts  opened  upon  him  with  great  force 


and  with  singular  precision  of  aim. 
Farragut  was  in  no  haste  to  reply,  al- 
though the  Hartford  was  hit  several 
times.  Drawing  closer  and  closer,  and 
waiting  fully  fifteen  minutes  after  the 
first  volley  had  been  aimed  at  him,  he 
began  with  two  heavy  guns  which  he 
had  mounted  on  the  forecastle ; and 
then,  when  within  half  a mile  of  Fort 
Jackson,  and  having  that  work  fairly 
within  range,  he  sheered  around  and 
poured  forth  such  broadsides  of  grape 
and  canister  that  no  living  thing  could 
stand  before  them.  The  men  were 
driven  from  the  barbette  guns,  and  the 
wildest  confusion  prevailed.  The  firing 
from  the  casemates  continued ; and  the 
conflict  raged  with  tremendous  fury. 
The  Bichmond,  which  had  successfully 
passed  the  barricade,  soon  came  up  and 
took  part  in  the  fight.  The  Brooklyn 
had  been  less  fortunate.  In  passing 
through  the  opening  made  by  the 
breaking  of  the  chain,  she  became  en- 
tangled with  one  of  the  hulks;  and 
while  in  this  position  she  was  exposed 
at  once  to  the  fire  of  the  forts  and  to 
attacks  from  the  Confederate  ironclads. 
Scarcely  was  the  Brooklyn  extricated 
from  this  peril  when  the  iron  ram  Ma- 
nassas came  down  upon  her  with  great 
fury,  firing  from  the  trap-door  a heavy 
bolt  at  the  Brooklyn’s  steam  drum. 
Happily  the  shot  lodged  in  some  sand- 
bags and  did  no  harm.  The  next  mo- 
ment the  ram  butted  into  the  sliip’s 
starboard ; but  the  impetus  was  insufii- 
eient  to  make  any  impression  on  the 
Brooklyn,  whose  sides  were  bound 
round  and  round  with  chain  armor. 
As  the  Manassas  glided  away  and  was 


152 


MEMPHIS  AND  NEW  ORLEANS. 


lost  in  the  darkness,  and  while  still 
under  the  lire  of  Fort  Jackson,  the 
Brooklyn  encountered  another  steamer. 
Tha  struggle  with  this  one  was  short 
and  sharp.  One  hearty  broadside,  at 
the  distance  of  fifty  or  sixty  yards,  and 
the  strange  vessel  was  no  more.  The 
Brooklyn  was  then  abreast  of  Foi’t  St. 
Philip,  and  her  guns  were  within  easy 
range.  “ I had  the  satisfaction,”  said 
Captain  Craven,  in  his  report,  “of  com- 
pletely silencing  that  work  before  I left 
it,  my  men  in  the  tops  witnessing,  in 
the  flashes  of  the  bursting  shrapnel,  the 
enemy  running  like  sheep  for  more  com- 
fortable quarters.” 

Farragut,  meanwhile,  was  having 
enough  to  do  on  board  the  Hartford. 
While  engaged  with  the  forts,  a huge 
fire-raft  was  pushed  against  him  by  the 
Manassas.  In  attempting  to  avoid  the 
blazing  raft,  the  Hartford  ran  aground  ; 
and  in  a moment,  the  incendiary  having 
come  crashing  alongside  of  her,  the  ship 
was  in  flames  on  the  port  side  and  half- 
way up  to  the  main  and  mizzen-tops. 
While  the  flames  raged,  the  Hartford  did 
not  discontinue  her  cannonading.  “ All 
the  time,”  says  Farragut,  “we  were  pour- 
ing shells  into  the  forts,  and  they  into 
us,  and  now  and  then  a rebel  steamer 
would  get  under  our  fire  and  receive 
our  salutation  of  a broadside.”  The 
flames  were  soon  extinguished ; and  the 
Hartford,  being  released,  sailed  up  the 
stream.  Half  an  hour  more  and  Farra- 
gut had  successfully  passed  through  the 
fiery  storm,  having  done  his  work  ef- 
fectually as  he  moved  along. 

Bailey,  with  his  second  division,  had 
had,  if  possible,  even  a harder  experi- 


ence ; but  his  success  was  scarcely  less 
marked.  In  crossing  the  river  obstruc- 
tions he  encountered  the  fire  of  both 
forts ; and  scarcely  had  he  passed 
through,  when,  owing  to  the  great 
speed  of  the  Cayuga,  he  found  himself 
ahead  of  his  friends  and  alone  in  the 
midst  of  the  Confederate  fleet.  His 
situation  was  one  of  extreme  peril. 
The  Manassas,  the  floating  battery  Lou- 
isiana, and  at  least  sixteen  other  armed 
vessels,  all  turned  upon  him;  and  his 
vessel  seemed  doomed.  The  swiftness 
of  the  ship  came  to  his  aid ; and  he 
handled  her  with  exquisite  skill.  While 
completely  successful  in  so  keeping  out 
of  the  way  of  the  Confederate  ironclads 
that  they  could  neither  butt  nor  board 
him,  he  so  used  his  guns  that  he  com- 
pelled three  of  them  to  surrender  before 
any  aid  came  to  him.  Meanwhile  the 
Vanina,  Captain  Boggs,  and  the  Oneida, 
Captain  Lee,  came  up  and  engaged  the 
enemy.  The  Cayuga  had  been  hit  forty- 
two  times,  and  was  so  damaged  that 
Bailey  deemed  it  prudent  to  retire. 
The  Varuna  was  the  next  object  of  at- 
tack. Boggs  found  himself,  all  at  once, 
after  passing  the  forts,  as  he  said  in  his 
report,  “ amid  a nest  of  rebel  steamers.” 
The  brave  captain  did  not  hesitate  as 
to  what  he  should  do.  Bushing  at  once 
into  the  midst  of  them,  he  “worked 
both  his  sides,  loaded  with  grape,”  pro- 
ducing terrible  havoc  among  the  Con- 
federate ships,  which  were  strangely 
overcrowded.  “An  explosion,  terrific 
yells,  a careen,  and  that  fellow  is  done 
for.”  Such  is  the  language  of  an  eye- 
witness. And  so  the  fearful  work  goes 
on,  until  the  Varuna  has  sunk,  one  after 


PAST  THE  FORTS. 


153 


another,  six  of  the  enemy’s  vessels. 
Meanwhile  she  was  badly  hurt  herself. 
The  heavy  shot  of  the  ironclads  had 
told  on  her  rigging  and  on  her  timbers. 
One  raking  discharge  from  one  of  them 
had  killed  four  and  wounded  nine  of 
her  men.  Four  times  she  had  been 
butted  by  the  powerful  rams  of  her  an- 
ta2:onists.  The  last  time  she  was  struck, 
her  side  was  crushed  in  ; but  before  the 
ram  could  get  out  of  her  way,  she  put 
through  her  unarmored  stern  five  8-inch 
shells  ‘‘  that  settled  her,  and  she  went 
ashore  in  flames.”  In  fifteen  minutes 
after  she  was  struck  the  Varuna  went 
to  the  bottom;  but  in  the  interval  she 
had  settled  her  antagonist.  It  was  no- 
ble fighting,  conducted  in  the  true  spirit 
of  the  sea  kings  of  ancient  times. 

The  Moore  was  the  last  vessel  which 
the  Varuna  had  to  encounter.  Badly 
disabled  as  the  Varuna  was,  Boggs 
kept  up  the  fight,  with  his  vessel 
aground  and  her  bow  tied  to  the  trees. 
It  was  not  until  the  water  was  up  over 
the  gun-trucks  that  the  captain  gave 
his  attention  to  the  saving  of  his  men. 
Happily  all  the  survivors,  including  the 
wounded,  were  got  out  and  saved  be- 
fore the  vessel  went  down.  At  the  last 
moment  the  Oneida,  Captain  Lee,  came 
up  to  the  aid  of  the  sinking  Varuna. 
Boggs  waved  him  on”  after  the 
Moore,  which  was  in  fiames  but  trying 
to  get  away.  In  a little  while  the 
Moore  was  suiTendered  to  the  Oneida 
by  the  second  officer,  the  captain  hav- 
ing fled,  after  setting  the  vessel  on  fire. 
But  for  her  timely  capture,  fifty  of  her 
men,  maimed  and  wounded,  must  have 
perished  in  the  flames. 


Bell  had  been  less  fortunate  than 
either  Farragut  or  Bailey  in  bringing 
his  ships  into  action  and  accomplishing 
the  task  assigned  him.  The  Scioto, 
Iroquois,  and  Pinola  passed  the  forts; 
but  the  Itaska,  being  disabled,  drifted 
down  the  river.  The  Winona  recoiled 
from  the  terrible  fire  which  had  proved 
fatal  to  her  companion.  The  Kennebec 
got  entangled  in  attempting  to  pass  the 
obstructions,  and  finally,  having  lost 
her  way  in  the  darkness,  returned  to 
her  moorings. 

The  fight  was  now  ended.  It  had 
been  as  brief  as  it  had  been  desperate. 
It  was  little  more  than  an  hour  and  a 
half  since  the  fleet  had  left  its  moor- 
ings; and  in  that  brief  space  of  time 
all  that  it  was  intended  to  do  had  been 
successfully  accomplished.  The  forts 
had  been  passed  and  the  Confederate 
navy  was  destroyed.  The  ironclad  Ma- 
nassas, from  which  such  great  things 
were  expected,  shared  the  fate  of  the 
smaller  vessels.  Commander  Porter’s 
description  of  the  last  moments  of  this 
naval  monster  are  well  deserving  of  re- 
production. W e have  seen  that  he  kept 
up  a continuous  fire  from  the  mortar 
boats  while  Farragut  was  pressing  on 
his  way.  ‘Mt  was  reported  to  me,”  he 
says,  ‘That  the  celebrated  ram  Manas* 
sas  was  coming  out  to  attack  us,  and 
sure  enough,  there  she  was,  apparently 
steaming  along  shore,  ready  to  pounce 
upon  the  defenseless  mortar  vessels ; 
but  I soon  discovered  that  she  could 
harm  no  one  again.  She  was  beginning 
to  emit  smoke  from  her  ports  or  holes; 
she  was  on  fire  and  sinking.  Her  pipes 
were  twisted  and  riddled  with  shot ; 


^54 


MEMPHIS  AND  NEW  ORLEANS. 


her  hull  was  cut  up.  She  had  evidently 
been  used  up  by  the  squadron  as  she 
passed  along.  I tried  to  save  her  as  a 
curiosity  by  getting  a hawser  around 
her  and  securing  her  to  the  bank;  but 
just  after  doing  so,  she  faintly  exploded. 
Her  only  gun  went  off,  and,  emitting 
flames  from  her  bow-port,  like  some 
huge  animal  she  gave  a plunge  and  dis- 
appeared under  the  water.”  The  de- 
scription of  the  closing  scenes  of  the 
contest,  from  the  same  pen,  is  equally 
graphic.  After  the  Manassas  had  gone 
down,  there  came  a steamer  on  Are ; 
after  her,  tw^o  others,  burning  and  float- 
ing down  the  stream.  Fires  seemed  to 
be  raging  all  along  the  ‘up  river,’  and 
we  supposed  that  our  squadron  was 
burning  and  destroying  the  vessels  as 
they  passed  along.  The  sight  of  this 
night  attack  was  awfully  grand.  The 
river  was  lit  up  by  rafts  filled  Avith 
pine  knots;  and  the  ships  seemed  to 
be  literally  fighting  among  flames  and 
smoke.” 

The  Cayuga,  Captain  Bailey’s  flag- 
ship, had,  as  we  have  seen,  when  re- 
lieved by  the  Vainna  and  the  Oneida, 
and  after  having  been  struck  at  least 
forty-two  times,  and  consequently  been 
considerably  damaged,  sailed  up  the 
river.  It  was  the  advance  boat.  It  had 
not  sailed  far  when  Bailey  discovered 
the  camp  of  the  famous  Chalmette  regi- 
ment. On  the  approach  of  the  Cayuga, 
the  regiment  attempted  to  effect  its  es- 
cape. Bailey  opened  fire ; a volley  of 
canister  was  sufficient  to  compel  a halt, 
which  was  soon  followed  by  an  uncon- 
ditional surrender.  By  this  time  Bailey 
was  joined  by  Farragut;  and  the  Na- 


tional fleet,  consisting  of  thirteen  ves- 
sels, was  ready  to  steam  up  to  New 
Orleans.  On  reaching  the  quarantine 
ground,  Farragut  concluded  to  halt  for 
the  night,  and  to  move  on  the  city  on 
the  following  morning. 

Let  us  see  what  was  taking  place  in 
the  rear  of  the  National  fleet.  Farragut 
had  passed  the  forts,  but  he  had  not 
silenced  them.  Where  was  Porter,  with 
his  mortar  boats;  and  what  was  General 
Butler  doing  with  his  soldiers?  We 
shall  see.  Butler,  with  his  staff,  had 
witnessed  from  the  deck  of  the  Saxon 
the  contest  between  the  fleet  and  the 
forts.  Half  an  hour  after  he  had 
reached  the  quarantine,  Farragut  sent 
Captain  Boggs  in  a smallboat,  through 
the  bayous,  with  despatches  for  Butler 
and  Porter.  Butler  had  already  joined 
his  transports.  With  the  least  delay 
possible  they  were  moved  to  Sable 
Island,  whence  the  troops  were,  with 
very  considerable  difficulty,  conveyed 
in  smallboats  and  landed  successfully  a 
short  distance  above  Fort  St.  Philip, 
and  under  cover  of  the  guns  of  the  Mis- 
sissippi and  Kineo.  A portion  of  them 
w^ere  sent  across  the  river,  to  be  ready 
to  take  possession  of  Fort  Jackson. 
Meanwhile  Porter,  who  had  remained 
behind  the  fleet,  had  not  been  idle.  On 
Fort  Jackson  particularly  he  had  kept 
up  an  incessant  fire ; the  shells  from  his 
mortars  giving  terrible  annoyance  to 
the  enemy,  although  not  producing  any 
visible  impression  on  the  works.  On 
the  2Gth  he  sent  a flag  of  truce,  April 
demanding  its  surrender,  stating  26, 
that  he  had  information  of  the  capture 
of  New  Orleans.  Colonel  Higgins,  who 


FARKAGUT  AT  NEW  ORLEANS. 


155 


had  command  of  the  forts,  refused  to 
surrender,  stating  that  he  had  no  in- 
formation of  the  fall  of  New  Orleans, 
and  that  until  he  had  such  information, 
from  what  he  should  consider  a reliable 
source,  the  thought  of  surrender  was 
not  for  a moment  to  be  entertained. 
Meantime  it  began  to  be  known  to  the 
soldiers  that  Butler  was  in  the  rear  of 
Fort  St.  Philip;  and  in  spite  of  the  en- 
couraging words  of  General  Duncan, 
the  commander  of  the  coast  defenses, 
then  in  Fort  Jackson,  that  they  were  as 
capable  of  repelling  the  enemy  to-day 
as  they  were  before  the  bornbardment, 
the  garrison  began  to  mutiny.  Spiking 
their  guns,  some  of  them  sallied  out  and 
surrendered  to  Butler’s  pickets,  stating 
that  they  had  been  impressed  and  com- 
pelled to  fight  against  their  will.  It 
was  now  evident  to  the  Confederate 
officers  that  it  was  useless  to  prolong 
the  struggle;  and  Colonel  Higgins,  feel- 
ing that  he  had  done  his  best,  accepted 
Porter’s  not  ungenerous  terms.  While 
the  treaty  w^as  being  signed  on  board  the 
Harriet  Lane,  the  huge  battery,  the  Lou- 
isiana, was  set  on  fire  by  its  commander, 
and  let  loose  in  the  strong  current  of  the 
river,  with  all  its  guns  shotted.  It  was 
the  evident  intention  of  its  officers  to 
destroy  by  this  means  Porter’s  fleet  of 
mortar  boats.  Their  calculation  proved 
a failure.  The  monster  blew  up  when 
abreast  of  Fort  St.  Philip,  a flying  frag- 
ment killing  one  of  its  garrison.  It 
was  a barbarous  proceeding  ; and  it  was 
with  great  propriety  that  Mitchell  and 
his  subordinates  were  sent  close  pris- 
oners to  the  North.  The  treaty  of  sur- 
render being  completed,  the  forts  were 


turned  over  by  Porter  to  General 
Phelps.  It  was  found  that  the  works 
were  comparatively  uninjured.  The 
actual  number  of  the  Confederate  killed 
and  wounded  has  never  been  correctly 
given.  The  whole  number  of  prisoners 
surrendered,  including  those  of  the 
Chalmette  regiment  and  the  men  from 
the  gunboats,  amounted  to  nearly  one 
thousand. 

On  the  morning  of  the  25th,  Farragut 
proceeded  up  the  river  with  nine  April 
vessels.  Owing  to  the  slowness  of  25. 
some  of  the  boats,  and  to  a want  of 
knowledge  of  the  river,  it  was  10.30 
A.  M.  before  the  fleet  had  reached  what 
is  called  the  English  Turn.  All  the 
morning,”  says  Farragut  in  his  official 
report,  ‘‘  I had  seen  abundant  evidence 
of  the  panic  which  had  seized  the  people 
in  New  Orleans.  Cotton-loaded  ships  on 
fire  came  floating  down,  and  working  in- 
struments of  every  kind,  such  as  are  used 
in  shipyards.  The  destruction  of  prop- 
erty was  awful.  The  levee  in  New 
Orleans  was  one  scene  of  desolation. 
Ships,  steamers,  cotton,  coal  were  all  in 
one  common  blaze,  and  our  ingenuity 
was  much  taxed  to  avoid  the  floating 
conflagration.”  On  his  way  up,  and 
when  about  three  miles  from  the  city, 
fire  was  opened  upon  him  by  the  Chal- 
mette batteries,  one  being  on  each  side 
of  the  river ; but  the  vessels  were  now 
well  together,  and  a few  vigorous  and 
well  directed  broadsides  soon  silenced 
the  guns  and  scattered  the  men  in  all 
directions.  New  Orleans  was  now  ut- 
terly defenseless ; and  the  water  in  the 
river  was  so  high  that  a gunboat  could 
easily  be  taken  up  as  far  as  Benner’s 


156 


MEMPHIS  AND  NEW  ORLEANS. 


plantation,  ten  miles  above  the  city, 
and  thus,  by  commanding  the  narrow 
neck  of  land  across  which  the  railroad 
passes,  and  which  connects  the  river 
and  the  swamp,  completely  enclose  the 
city,  shutting  off  all  means  of  egress 
and  every  source  of  supply.  In  the  cir- 
cumstances, and  seeing  that  he  had  no 
hope  of  saving  the  city,  Lovell,  with 
the  sanction  of  the  municipal  authori- 
ties, who  were  anxious  to  avoid  the  hor- 
rors of  a bombardment,  sent  off  his  mu- 
nitions and  a large  portion  of  his  troops, 
and,  having  disbanded  the  rest,  turned 
the  city  over  to  the  mayor. 

At  one  o’clock,  on  the  afternoon  of 
the  25th,  and  in  the  midst  of  a fierce 
thunder-storm,  Farragut  anchored  his 
squadron  off  New  Orleans.  The  excite- 
ment was  tremendous.  The  inhabitants, 
who  believed  that  the  defenses  of  the 
city  were  invulnerable,  gave  way  to 
the  most  frantic  rage,  invoked  venge- 
ance on  Higgins  and  Lovell,  and  de- 
manded that  the  city  be  given  to  the 
fiames  rather  than  sui*i-endei’ed.  On 
board  the  National  ships  the  sailors 
were  wild  with  delight.  They  had 
seen  the  end  of  their  mission  ; they  had 
nobly  and  successfully  done  their  work ; 
and  cheer  after  cheer  went  sounding: 
from  the  ships  to  the  shore.  Farragut 
sent  Bailey  to  the  city  authorities,  with 
a flag,  demanding  the  immediate  sur- 
render of  the  city,  and  infoiming  them 
that  no  flag  but  that  of  the  United 
States  would  be  allowed  to  float  in 
presence  of  the  fleet.  The  mayor,  John 
T.  Monroe,  in  a foolish  letter,  refused 
to  surrender  or  take  down  the  Confede- 
rate flag,  declaring  that  the  city  was 


defenseless,  that  he  was  no  military 
man,  and  knew  neither  how  to  com- 
mand an  army  nor  to  surrender  an  un- 
protected place;  that  there  was  not  a 
man  in  the  city  whose  heart  would  not 
be  palsied  by  the  mere  thought  of 
hoisting  any  flag  but  the  flag  of  their 
adoption ; and  that  he  would  seek  in 
vain  for  so  wretched  and  desperate  a 
renegade  as  would  dare  to  profane  with 
his  hand  the  sacred  emblem  of  our  as- 
pirations.” In  the  meantime  a party 
had  landed  from  the  Pensacola  and 
hoisted  the  National  flag  over  the  gov- 
ernment mint ; but  it  was  quickly  torn 
down  and  dragged  in  derision  through 
the  streets.  A gambler  named  Mum- 
ford,  who  was  chiefly  responsible  for 
this  rash  act,  afterwards  paid  the  pen- 
alty with  his  life.  Farragut,  patient  as 
he  was,  and  merciful  as  he  wished  to 
be,  was  not  to  be  hindered  in  the  dis- 
charge of  his  duty  by  the  querulous 
protestations  of  the  mayor.  He  notified 
the  mayor  to  remove  the  women  and 
children  from  the  city  within  forty-eight 
hours,  as  he  had  no  desire  that  the  in- 
nocent and  the  helpless  should  suffer, 
in  the  event  of  a bombardment.  An- 
other letter,  more  ridiculous  than  the 
former,  came  back  from  the  mayor. 
“Do  your  worst,  but  don’t  speak  about 
humanity.  If  the  Confederate  flag  must 
be  taken  down,  and  the  National  flag 
raised,  the  work  must  be  done  by  other 
hands  than  ours.”  Such  was  the  bur- 
den of  the  mayoi‘’s  reply.  Farragut, 
having  learned  of  the  surrender  of  the 
forts  below,  and  knowing  that  General 
Butler  would  soon  be  on  hand  and 
ready  to  take  possession,  felt  that,  not- 


BUTLER  IN  CHARGE. 


157 


withstanding  the  irritating  conduct  of 
Mayor  Monroe,  he  could  afford  to  act 
with  caution  and  patience.  Next  day 
April  Captain  Bell  landed  with  a hun- 
26*  dred  marines;  and  the  National 
fla^r  was  raised  over  the  mint  and  the 
custom-house.  To  these  no  violence 
was  offered.  The  people  had  become 
aware  of  the  fact  that  Butler  was  com- 
ing up  the  river  with  his  transports. 
April  Cn  the  30th,- Farragut  informed 
the  city  authorities  that  he  should 
hold  no  more  intercourse  with  them, 
and  that  as  soon  as  General  Butler 
arrived  he  should  turn  over  the  charge 
Ifjay  of  the  city  to  him.  On  the  1st 
b of  May,  General  Butler,  with  his 
transports,  bearing  two  thousand  armed 
men,  appeared  off  the  levee  in  front 
of  New  Orleans.  On  the  afternoon  of 
the  same  day  the  debarkation  took 
place,  and  New  Orleans  was  formally 
occupied  by  United  States  troops.  Be- 
fore the  middle  of  the  month.  Baton 
Bouge  and  Natchez  had  also  been  occu- 
pied ; and  the  Mississippi  was  free  both 
above  and  below  Vicksburg.  The  cap- 
ture of  New  Orleans,  which  was  accom- 
plished at  the  small  sacrifice  of  40  killed 
and  177  wounded,  was  justly  regarded 
as  one  of  the  greatest  victories  yet 
achieved  by  the  North.  The  people 
were  jubilant;  and  President  Lincoln, 
in  a cheerful  proclamation,  and  as  if  to 
give  the  world  assurance  of  the  com- 
pleteness of  the  National  victories,  de- 
June  clared  the  termination,  on  June 
b 1st,  of  the  blockade  of  the  ports 


of  Beaufort,  of  Port  Boyal,  and  of  New 
Orleans.  It  was  j ustly  felt  to  be  a heavy 
loss  to  the  South.  “It  annihilated  us  in 
Louisiana,”  says  Pollard,  “diminished 
our  resources  and  supplies  by  the  loss 
of  one  of  the  greatest  grain  and  cattle 
countries  within  the  limits  of  the  Con- 
federacy ; gave  to  the  enemy  the  Missis- 
sippi liiver,  with  all  its  means  of  naviga- 
tion, for  a base  of  operations,  and  finally 
led  by  plain  and  irresistible  conclusion 
to  our  virtual  abandonment  of  the  great 
and  fruitful  valley  of  the  Mississippi.” 

We  have  thus  answered  the  questions 
which  we  put  to  ourselves  at  the  com- 
mencement of  this  chapter.  We  have 
told  the  story  of  the  occupation  of 
Memphis  and  the  story  of  the  capture  of 
New  Orleans,  and  have  explained  why  it 
w^as  that  at  the  date  of  the  Confederate 
retreat  from  Corinth  and  its  occupation 
by  General  Halleck  and  the  National 
forces,  Vicksburg  alone  remained  to  ob- 
struct the  free  navigation  of  the  waters 
of  the  Mississippi.  We  leave  General 
Butler  in  possession  of  New  Orleans; 
but  the  consideration  of  his  adminstra- 
tion  of  the  affairs  of  that  city  forms  no 
essential  part  of  the  plan  of  this  work. 
The  naval  operations  wBich  resulted  in 
the  occupation  of  Memphis  on  the  one 
hand  and  the  capture  of  New  Orleans 
on  the  other,  were  in  the  highest  degree 
creditable  to  the  officers  of  the  North. 
Farragut  covered  himself  with  glory; 
so  did  Bailey;  so  did  Boggs;  but  where 
all  did  so  well,  it  is  invidious  to  singlet 
out  and  bestow  special  praise. 


158 


lUKA  AND  COEINTH. 


CHAPTEE  XI. 


The  Army  of  the  West. — The  Army  Inactive. — Halleck  made  Commander-in-Chief. — Buell  Sent  to  Chattanooga, — 
The  Army  of  the  West  Weakened. — Grant  in  Command. — Pope  Sent  to  Virginia. — Rosecranz  takes  Pope’s 
place  under  Grant. — The  Position  of  the  Array  of  the  West. — Price  and  VanDorn. — The  Confederate  Array 
Preparing  to  Strike. — Grant’s  Caution. — The  Object  of  the  Confederates. — luka. — Armstrong’s  Raids. — Colonel 
Murphy  in  Command  at  luka. — Price  at  luka. — Grant  Watchful  and  Ready. — Time  Precious. — Generals  Ord 
and  Ross. — Rosecranz’s  Army  in  Motion. — The  Confederates  Well  Posted. — The  Battle-Ground  at  luka. — 
The  Battle  Begun. — The  Battery  of  the  Eleventh  Ohio. — Fearful  Fighting. — Colonel  Eddy  Killed. — The 
Battery  Captured. — Ord  Deceived. — Too  Late  on  the  Field. — A Great  Misfortune. — Defeat  and  Retreat  of 
the  Confederates. — Corinth. — Preparations  for  another  Fight. — The  Old  Battle-Ground. — The  Place  Greatly 
Strengthened. — Major  Prime. — Chewalla  Road. — Beginning  of  the  Fight. — Terrific  Onslaught  of  the  Confede- 
rates.— The  First  Day  a Victory  for  the  Confederates. — The  Confederates  Reinforced. — Resolved  to  Capture 
Corinth. — The  Confederates  Open  Fire. — A Deceptive  Movement. — The  Movement  Defeated. — The  Confede- 
rates Come  Up  in  Force. — Great  Bravery  and  Great  Slaughter. — A Temporary  Panic  among  the  Nationals. — 
Fort  Powell  Captured. — At  Rosecranz's  Headquarters. — Are  they  to  Win? — Victory  turned  into  Defeat. — The 
Confederate  Right  Driven  Back  to  the  Woods. — The  Confederate  Left. — Their  Advance  on  the  National  Works. — 
A Terrible  Reception. — “ Gorgeous  Pyrotechnics.” — A Murderous  Fire. — The  Confederates  Fall  Back. — Another 
Attack. — The  Battle  Ended. — A National  Triumph. — The  Pursuit. — The  Battle  of  the  Hatchie. — The  Confetlr- 
rates  Defeated. — Iluribut  and  Ord. — Ord  Wounded. — Pursuit  Discontinued. — Promotion  of  Rosecranz. — Ills 
Order  of  the  Tw'enty-Fourth  of  October. — The  First  Praise  Due  to  Grant. — Grant’s  Command  Enlarged. 


Before  proceeding  to  call  the  read- 
1862  attention  to  the  important 

events  which  were  already  taking 
place  on  the  Atlantic  coast,  we  have 
deemed  it  advisable,  for  the  sake  of 
unity,  to  remain  a little  longer  with 
the  army  of  the  West,  and  to  describe 
somewhat  in  detail  the  operations  of 
that  army,  and  the  work  generally 
which  had  to  be  done  after  the  capture 
of  Corinth  and  before  General  Grant 
was  in  a fit  condition  to  march  upon 
Vicksburg. 

Corinth  was  evacuated  on  the  30th 
]>Iay  cf  May,  and  on  the  same  day  was 
occupied  by  the  National  troops. 
From  a variety  of  causes,  the  conquer- 
ors of  Shiloh  remained  comparatively 
inactive  from  June  to  September.  Ilal- 
leck  remained  in  command  until  the 


11th  of  August,  when  he  was  summoned 
to  Washington,  and  by  general 
orders  from  the  War  Department  G. 
assigned  to  the  command  of  ‘‘the  whole 
land  forces  of  the  United  States,  as 
general-in-chief.”  During  that  time  ho 
employed  himself  in  strengthening  tho 
fortifications  of  Corinth  and  repairing 
the  railroads  between  that  jdace  and 
Columbus.  General  Buell  was  detached 
on  the  10th  of  June,  and  sent  to  June 
Chattanooga  to  oppose  Bragg ; 
for  the  Confederates,  encouraged  by 
the  success  w^hich  had  attended  their 
arms  in  the  East,  were  making  super- 
human efforts,  not  only  with  the  view 
of  marching  upon  Washington,  but  for 
the  purpose,  also,  of  recovering  what 
they  had  lost  in  Tennessee  and  Ken- 
tucky. Should  Bragg  succeed  in  moving 


GRANT’S  PLAN. 


159 


along  the  west  flank  of  the  Cumberland 
Mountains  and  in  capturing  Louisville, 
he  would  undo  all  that  Halleck  had 
done  in  his  southward  march  along 
the  Tennessee.  In  order  to  strengthen 
Buell,  and  so  enable  him  to  counter- 
check Bragg,  the  Shiloh  army  was 
robbed  of  some  of  its  ablest  and  most 
experienced  soldiers.  On  the  departure 
of  Halleck  for  Washington,  General 
Grant  succeeded  to  the  chief  command 
of  his  old  army;  but,  from  the  causes 
above  mentioned,  its  ranks  were  consid- 
erably thinned. 

When  Grant  assumed  the  command. 
General  Pope  had  been  ordered  to  Vir- 
ginia, and  General  Bosecranz  had  taken 
charge  of  that  leader’s  forces  under 
Grant.  Bosecranz’s  division  was  known 
as  the  army  of  the  Mississippi,  and  was 
charged  with  the  occupation  of  Northern 
Mississippi  and  Alabama,  in  the  vicin- 
ity of  Corinth  and  eastward  to  Tus- 
cumbia.  The  entire  army  under  Grant 
was  stationed  from  Memphis  to  Bridge- 
port, Tennessee,  along  the  Memphis  and 
Charleston  Bailroad.  His  headquar- 
ters were  at  Jackson,  Tennessee,  where 
the  Central  Mississippi  Bailroad  unites 
with  the  Mobile  and  Ohio.  In  conse- 
quence of  the  low  water  of  the  Tennes- 
see, it  was  necessary  for  him  to  hold 
the  railroads  from  Corinth  and  Bolivar 
north  to  Columbus. 

In  Grant’s  immediate  front  lay  the 
Confederates,  in  considerable  force,  un- 
der Price  and  VanDorn.  Becoming 
aware  of  the  fact  that  Grant’s  army 
had  been  greatly  weakened  by  the 
transfer  of  troops  to  Buell,  these  officers 
moved  their  armies  toward  the  Ten- 


nessee Biver  at  the  beginning  of  Sep- 
tember. Of  this  forward  movement 
General  Grant  was  fully  aware;  but 
with  a caution  which  was  fully  justified 
by  the  result,  he  refrained  from  any 
precipitate  action,  his  attention  being 
mainly  devoted  to  ascertain  the  plans 
of  his  opponents.  It  was  evidently  the 
object  of  the  Confederate  generals  to 
get  possession  of  Corinth,  the  key  to 
the  military  possession  of  Tennessee. 
This  in  their  hands,  they  could  render 
effective  aid  to  Bragg;  they  might  even 
resume  possession  of  their  lost  territory, 
and  bring  Kentucky  and  Tennessee 
once  more  within  the  limits  of  the  Con- 
federacy. There  can  be  little  doubt 
that  Bragg  expected  Price  and  VanDorn 
to  follow  him;  and  there  is  every  reason 
to  believe  that  these  two  ofiicers  felt 
confident  of  their  ability  to  measure 
swords  with  Grant  and  Bosecranz. 
They  hoped,  however,  that  Grant  would 
be  tempted  to  abandon  Corinth ; in  this 
showing  that  they  shared  the  feeling 
which  was  commonly  entertained  at 
Bichmond,  that  Bragg’s  march  on  Lou- 
isville would  compel  the  National  com- 
mander to  release  his  hold  on  the  Mis- 
sissippi. They  did  not  know  their  man. 
Grant’s  character,  in  fact,  was  not  yet 
fully  understood. 

Of  the  approach  of  the  enemy,  and 
of  two  unsuccessful  raids  made  by  a 
cavalry  force  under  General  Armstrong, 
Grant  duly  informed  Bosecranz,  who 
was  at  the  time  at  Tuscumbia.  Bose- 
cranz hastened  to  luka,  a sweet  village 
on  the  Memphis  and  Charleston  Bail- 
road, in  Tishamingo  County,  Missis- 
sippi, noted  for  its  mineral  springs  and 


160 


lUKA  AND  CORINTH. 


the  beauty  of  its  suiToun dings.  At 
luka  there  was  collected  a large  amount 
of  stores.  Leaving  the  place  in  charge 
of  Colonel  K.  C.  Murphy,  of  the  Eighth 
Wisconsin,  with  orders  to  remove  the 
property  to  Corinth  or  destroy  it,  Kose- 
cranz  hurried  westward,  with  Stanley’s 
division,  to  Clear  Creek,  some  seven 
miles  east  of  Corinth,  and  there  en- 
Sfp,  camped.  On  the  1st  of  Septem- 
b her.  Price,  with  twelve  thousand 
men,  reached  Jacinto,  when  the  small 
National  force  stationed  there  retired 
and  fled  to  Corinth.  Tuscumbia  and 
luka  were  in  like  manner  abandoned ; 
and  Price,  unresisted,  established  his 
headquarters  at  the  latter  place,  taking 
possession  of  the  National  property 
which  Murphy  had  failed  to  destroy. 

The  time  had  now  come  for  Grant  to 
act.  He  had  watched  the  movements 
of  the  enemy  with  great  earnestness. 
He  had  now  divined  their  meaning. 
He  had  also  found  his  opportunity. 
What  the  Confederate  leaders  intended 
was  now  clear.  Price  wished  so  to  en- 
gage the  attention  of  Grant  as  to  tempt 
him  to  draw  his  forces  out  of  Corinth. 
VanDorn,  meanwhile,  was  to  be  ready 
to  spring  upon  the  abandoned  or  poorly 
garrisoned  stronghold,  and  secure  it 
for  the  Confederacy.  From  his  scouts 
Grant  had  learned  that  VanDorn  could 
not  reach  Corinth  for  at  least  four  days. 
Price,  as  we  hav^e  seen,  had  established 
his  headquarters  at  luka ; and  VanDorn 
was  at  Holly  Springs.  There  was  time, 
therefore,  to  punish  Price,  and  to  be 
back  at  Corinth  ready  to  give  Van- 
Dorn a warm  reception.  But  the  time 
was  precious.  Not  an  hour  was  to  be 


lost.  Every  second  delayed  was  a pos- 
itive gain  to  the  enemy.  The  instruc- 
tions were  promptly  given.  General 
Ord  was  directed  to  move  on  the  left 
of  the  railroad,  through  Burnsville,  to 
luka,  taking  care,  of  course,  to  leave 
garrisons  at  Corinth  and  other  points 
that  required  protection.  General  Boss 
was  ordered  by  telegraph  to  come  at 
full  speed  from  Bolivar  on  the  same 
route,  and,  leaving  a small  rearguard  at 
Burnsville,  to  join  Ord  with  three  thou- 
sand four  hundred  men.  This  force, 
six  thousand  five  hundred  in  all,  was  to 
attack  Price  from  the  north.  Rosecranz 
was  ordered  to  send  one  division  of 
Stanley’s,  with  Mizner’s  cavalry,  by 
way  of  Jacinto,  to  strike  the  enemy’s 
flank,  while  Hamilton  should  move 
round  by  the  Fulton  road,  to  cut  olf  his 
southward  retreat  or  turn  it  into  a rout. 
The  force  under  Rosecranz  amounted  to 
nine  thousand.  This,  with  the  three 
thousand  under  Ord  and  the  three  thou- 
sand four  hundred  under  Ross,  made 
the  army  of  Grant  in  the  field  larger, 
by  three  thousand,  than  that  of  Price. 
The  choice  of  position  made  by  the 
Confederates  more  than  compensated 
for  the  difference  in  actual  strength. 
The  combined  movement  of  the  Na- 
tional troops  began  at  four  o’clock  in 
the  morning  of  the  18th  of  Sep-  Sep, 
tember.  That  night,  after  having  18. 
marched  through  a terrible  rain-storm, 
the  troops  of  Rosecranz  bivouacked  at 
Jacinto,  about  twenty  miles  south  of 
luka. 

On  the  following  morning  they  push- 
ed on  in  light  marching  order  to-  Sep. 
ward  luka,  with  Mizner’s  cavalry. 


DEFEAT  OF  PEICE. 


161 


At  Barnett’s  Corners  they  encountered 
some  Confederate  outposts,  driving  them 
in,  after  a sharp  skirmish.  Early  in  the 
afternoon,  when  about  two  miles  from 
luka,  Hamilton’s  division,  while  mov- 
ing cautiously  and  expecting  every  mo- 
ment to  hear  the  guns  of  Ord,  came 
suddenly  upon  the  enemy,  in  strong 
force  and  well  posted  on  the  side  of  a 
hill  which  flanked  a deep  ravine.  Ham- 
ilton immediately  formed  line  of  battle. 
The  ground  was  so  broken,  so  tangled 
with  thickets,  so  interlaced  with  creeks 
and  ravines,  that  it  was  impossible  to 
bring  the  troops  into  action  in  large 
bodies.  The  men  formed  themselves 
wherever  the  ground  would  permit 
them.  The  line  was  thus  broken  at 
frequent  intervals ; and  the  fighting 
seemed  to  be  done  by  a number  of 
small  armies.  The  fighting,  however, 
was  severe.  After  much  exertion,  and 
in  spite  of  a most  destructive  fire  of 
grape,  canister  and  shell  from  the  ene- 
emy’s  guns,  the  Eleventh  Ohio  battery 
was  put  in  position  on  the  crest  of  the 
hill.  This  battery  was  supported  by 
the  Fifth  Iowa,  Colonel  Matthias,  and 
the  Twenty-Sixth  Missouri,  Colonel 
Boomer ; and  commanding  the  road  in 
front,  it  did  excellent  and  effective 
work.  Colonel  Eddy,  with  the  Forty- 
Eighth  Indiana,  was  holding  ground  a 
little  in  front  of  the  battery,  where  the 
fighting  was  most  fierce,  and  where  the 
Confederates  were  led  by  General  Price 
in  person  ; and  although  assistance  was 
given  him  by  the  Fourth  Minnesota, 
Captain  LeGro,  and  by  the  Sixteenth 
Iowa,  Colonel  Chambers,  he  was  driven 
again  and  again  back  upon  the  battery. 


Around  the  battery  of  the  Eleventh 
Ohio,  the  battle  raged  most  fiercely. 
Three  or  four  times  the  guns  of  this 
battery  were  taken  and  retaken.  The 
commander  of  the  battery,  Lieutenant 
Sears,  did  noble  work.  At  length  Cob 
onel  Eddy  fell  mortally  wounded  ; and 
his  regiment  being  hurled  back  in  dis- 
order, the  guns — every  horse  having 
been  killed,  seventy-two  of  the  men  and 
nearly  all  the  officers  either  killed  or 
wounded — were  seized  and  carried  off 
by  the  Confederates.  While  this  strug- 
gle lasted,  Stanley’s  division  came  up; 
but  such  was  the  nature  of  the  ground 
that  only  the  Eleventh  Missouri  could 
be  pushed  to  the  front.  This  regiment 
rendered  most  effective  assistance,  and 
helped  to  drive  the  Confederates  back 
into  the  ravine.  The  fight  lasted  until 
nightfall ; and,  the  Confederates  having 
been  compelled  to  take  shelter  in  the 
hollow  toward  the  village,  darkness  fell 
upon  the  combatants  and  made  an  end 
of  the  carnage. 

The  reader  will  observe  that  Ord  was 
not  present  to  take  any  part  in  the  con- 
test. Why  was  this?  He  had,  it  seems, 
spent  the  greater  part  of  the  day  watch- 
ing the  movements  of  a Confederate 
force  which  appeared  to  be  advancing  in 
the  direction  of  Corinth.  This  proving 
to  be  only  a feint,  he  hastened  to  Burns- 
ville, where  he  found  Boss  waiting  with 
his  three  thousand  men.  Grant  ordered 
him  forward,  with  five  thousand  men, 
with  directions  to  halt  within  four  miles 
of  Tuka  until  he  should  hear  Bosecranz’s 
guns.  A high  north  wind,  which  blew 
all  the  afternoon,  prevented  him  from 
hearing  the  sound  of  the  cannon.  It 


162 


lUKA  AND  CORmTH. 


was  not  until  next  morning  that  he  heard 
the  expected  signal;  but  it  was  too 
late.  When  he  reached  luka,  the  en- 
emy had  disappeared.  As  illustrative 
of  the  difficulties  of  the  situation,  it  de- 
serves to  be  noted  that,  at  half-past  ten 
o’clock  on  the  night  of  the  19th,  Rose- 
cranz  sent  a dispatch  to  General  Grant, 
stating  that  he  had  been  engaged  for 
several  hours,  and  had  lost  three  pieces 
of  artillery,  and  requesting  the  assist- 
ance and  co-operation  of  the  troops  un- 
der Ord.  This  dispatch  should  have 
been  in  Grant’s  hands  within  two  hours. 
It  did  not  reach  him  until  thirty-five 
minutes  past  eight  the  next  morning. 
Mortified  by  ‘the  delay,  and  dreading 
the  possible  result.  Grant  wrote  to  Ord 
in  the  most  urgent  language.  “ Rose- 
c -anz,”  he  said,  “ may  find  his  hands 
full.  Hurry  up  your  troops — all  possi- 
ble.” Happily,  the  character  of  Ord 
was  well  known,  and  there  was  no  rea- 
son to  suspect  his  bravery  or  his  willing- 
ness to  take  part  in  the  fight. 

The  Fulton  road  had  not  been  cov- 
ered, as  Grant  had  ordered,  and  Price 
was  able  during  the  night  to  make  good 
his  escape.  As  soon  as  his  flight  was 
known,  a pursuit  was  made ; but  Price 
had  too  much  the  start  to  be  overtaken. 
Although  Grant  had  reason  to  sympa- 
thize with  Rosecranz,  in  consequence  of 
the  nonappearance  of  Ord,  he  was  ill 
satisfied  with  the  result  of  the  fight. 
He  had  counted  on  the  destruction  or 
capture  of  Price’s  army.  As  it  was, 
luka  was  a victory,  and  his  plan  had 
been  amply  justified.  Price  lost  one  of 
his  best  generals.  Little,  who  was  killed. 
At  least  a thousand  of  his  men  were 


made  prisoners;  the  number  of  his  killed 
and  wounded  was  large;  and  he  was 
unable  to  carry  with  him  the  captured 
guns.  The  National  loss  was  about 
seven  hundred  and  thirty  men  killed 
and  wounded.  On  the  22d  Grant  sep. 
withdrew  his  forces  and  returned  22. 
to  Corinth  to  prepare  for  the  reception 
of  VanHorn. 

Corinth  again  comes  prominently  into 
the  foreground.  In  May  it  was  the 
theatre  of  great  and  stirring  events 
which  commanded  the  attention  of  both 
continents;  and  now,  in  October,  it  is 
to  be  the  theatre  of  events  even  more 
momentous  and  greatly  more  enduring 
in  their  results.  Price  joined  VanDorn 
at  Ripley;  and,  little  daunted  at  the 
failure  of  their  plan  to  get  hold  of  Co- 
rinth by  stratagem,  they  made  up  their 
minds  to  take  it  by  force.  It  was  known 
that  VanDorn  was  already  approaching 
from  the  west ; but  it  was  not  known 
what  point  he  might  first  attack.  It 
might  be  Jackson ; it  might  be  Bolivar ; 
it  might  be  Corinth — the  latter  most 
likely.  Grant  took  all  needful  precau- 
tion to  make  his  different  points  of 
strength  secure,  knowing  that  it  would 
not  be  difficult  to  concentrate,  once  the 
enemy  was  encountered  and  his  pur- 
pose fully  understood.  Rosecranz  was 
marched  back  through  Jacinto  to  Co- 
rinth, which  he  reached  on  the  sep» 
26th.  Ord  was  stationed  at  Boli-  26. 
var;  and  Grant  returned  to  his  head- 
quarters at  Jackson.  General  Huiibut 
was  thrown  out  with  his  division  to- 
wards Pocahontas.  The  united  Con- 
federate forces  moved  northward  to 
Pocahontas,  striking  the  Memphis  and 


THE  FIRST  DAY  AT  CORINTH. 


163 


Charleston  Railroad  about  halfway  be- 
tween Corinth  and  Grand  Junction. 
There  they  met  the  troops  of  Mansfield 
Lovell,  whose  acquaintance,  the  reader 
will  remember,  we  made  in  the  last 
chapter,  when  describing  the  capture 
of  New  Orleans.  Thus  strengthened, 
the  Confederate  army  numbered  about 
twenty-two  thousand  men,  and  was  un- 
der the  immediate  command  of  General 
VanDorn,  who  ranked  both  Price  and 
Oct.  Lovell.  On  the  night  of  the  2d 
2*  of  October,  the  united  forces  bi- 
vouacked at  Chewalla,  ten  miles  from 
Corinth.  Early  on  the  morning  of  the 
Oct,  «^d,  the  Confederates  came  up  in 
force ; and  Rosecranz  had  no  lon- 
ger any  reason  to  doubt  that  the  object- 
ive point  aimed  at  by  VanDorn  was 
Corinth.  Rosecranz  disposed  of  his 
troops  accordingly.  Hamilton  he  placed 
on  the  right,  Davis  in  the  centre,  and 
McKean  on  the  left;  while  Colonel 
Oliver,  with  three  regiments  and  a sec- 
tion of  artillery,  was  stationed  on  the 
Chewalla  road,  beyond  the  old  works 
of  Beauregard.  Mizner’s  cavalry  was 
disposed  in  every  direction  around  the 
town,  watching  the  roads  at  Burnsville, 
Boneyard,  Kossuth,  and  also  in  the 
front.  On  the  Confederate  side,  the 
left,  under  Price,  was  on  the  Mobile 
and  Ohio  Railroad,  to  the  north  of  Co- 
rinth. VanDorn  had  charge  of  the 
centre,  a little  more  to  the  west,  on  the 
Chewalla  road ; and  the  right  was  held 
by  Lovell.  It  was  evident  that  the 
attack  was  to  be  made  upon  the  north- 
west side  of  Corinth — the  point  which 
VanDorn  had  been  led  to  understand 
was  the  most  vulnerable.  He  did  not 


know  that  this  defect  in  the  original 
fortifications  of  Beauregard  had  been 
completely  obviated.  Grant  having  caus- 
ed to  be  constructed  here  four  powerful 
redoubts.  Corinth,  in  truth,  was  a very 
different  place  in  these  first  days  of 
October  to  what  it  was  when  Beaure- 
gard abandoned  it  in  May. 

When  the  National  forces,  after  the 
retreat  of  Beauregard,  entered  Co- 
rinth, the  defenses,  which  had  been  con- 
structed by  the  Confederate  chief,  were 
found  to  extend  fifteen  miles.  To  de- 
fend so  extended  a line  would  have 
required  an  enormous  army.  To  obvi- 
ate this  difficulty,  and  in  order  to  make 
the  place  defensible  by  a much  smaller 
force.  General  Halleck  had  constructed 
an  inner  line  of  defenses.  Grant,  how- 
ever, was  not  satisfied  with  these.  Ma- 
jor F.  E.  Prime,  the  chief  engineer  of 
General  Grant,  under  his  direction, 
threw  up  a line  of  batteries  on  the  north 
front,  far  inside  of  Halleck’s  line,  and 
close  to  the  town  of  Corinth,  having  an 
enfilading  fire  uj^on  the  Bolivar  and 
Chewalla  roads,  and  a sweeping  cross- 
fire upon  all  assailable  parts  of  the  en- 
tire front.  On  the  extreme  right  were 
the  old  works  of  Beauregard ; and  from 
that  point  the  chain  of  forts  reached 
to  the  extreme  left.  On  succeeding  to 
the  command  of  all  the  forces  in  the 
District  of  West  Tennessee  and  North- 
ern Mississippi,  Grant  examined  the  de- 
fenses of  Corinth,  which  were  then  be- 
ing constructed  under  the  superintend- 
ence of  General  Cullum,  and  expressed 
the  opinion  to  General  Halleck  that 
they  wmuld  be  appropriate  if  there  was 
an  army  of  one  hundred  thousand  men 


164 


lUKA  AND  CORINTH. 


to  defend  them,  but  that  they  were  of 
too  great  extent  for  the  force  at  his  dis- 
posal. Immediately  upon  General  Hal- 
leck’s  departure  for  Washington,  Prime’s 
works  were  pushed  forward  with  ener- 
gy, and  by  the  25th  of  Septembei’,  when 
liosecranz  took  command,  they  were 
nearly  completed.  To  Major  Prime, 
under  General  Grant’s  orders,  belongs 
the  credit  of  laying  out  and  construct- 
ing the  fortifications  against  which  the 
enemy  was  now  about  to  hurl  his  masses 
with  impetuous  but  unavailing  valor. 

The  first  pressure  of  the  Confederates 
was  felt  by  Colonel  Oliver,  who,  as  we 
liave  seen,  was  somewhat  in  advance  on 
the  Chewalla  road.  It  was  the  van- 
guard of  the  Confederate  army,  under 
Mansfield  Lovell.  Lovell  pushes  his 
men  forward  with  such  energy  that 
Oliver  finds  his  position  one  of  consid- 
erable difficulty.  Hard  pressed,  he  is 
joined  by  General  McArthur,  who  in 
turn  finds  himself  overmatched  and  in 
danger  of  being  outflanked.  McAr- 
thur is  strengthened  by  four  regiments 
from  McKean’s  division.  In  spite  of 
this  assistance,  McArthur  is  pushed 
back,  as  Oliver  had  been  before  him. 
The  battle  now  becomes  general.  Davis 
is  hard  pressed;  and,  an  interval  ap- 
pearing between  him  and  McArthur, 
the  Confederates  make  a desperate  rush 
to  All  up  the  gap.  The  onslaught  was 
tremendous.  Davis,  to  save  his  flank, 
was  compelled  to  retire  a thousand 
yards,  and  in  so  doing  lost  two  guns. 
It  was  evident  that  the  Confederates 
were  in  earnest,  and  that  they  meant 
to  capture  Corinth.  New  dispositions 
were  therefore  made  of  the  National 


troops,  bringing  them  nearer  the  town. 
These  were  being  carried  out  when  the 
darkness  ended  the  conflict.  The  strue- 
gle  had  been  severe ; and  not  a few 
brave  men  on  the  National  side  had 
fallen.  General  Oglesby  was  severely 
wounded ; and  General  Hackelman  was 
killed.  It  was  not  without  reason  that 
VanDorn  was  jubilant.  He  had  pressed 
the  National  army  back  wdth  compara- 
tive ease.  When  night  fell,  he  had  en- 
veloped Kosecranz’s  front.  If  he  tele- 
graphed to  Richmond,  announcing  a 
victory,  he  was  only  stating  what  was 
a fact.  Perhaps  he  was  too  jubilant, 
and  too  confident  that  Corinth  would 
be  his  before  the  rising  of  the  sun  on 
the  following  morning;  but  this  was 
because  he  was  ignorant  of  the  strength 
of  the  works  behind  which  the  National 
forces  were  able  to  entrench  themselves. 

By  the  break  of  day  on  the  morning 
of  the  4th  of  October,  the  battle  oct. 
w^as  resumed.  The  Confederate  L 
line  was  closed  up  to  within  a thousand 
yards  of  the  outer  works  which  guarded 
the  town.  The  night  had  not  been 
spent  by  them  in  slumber;  for  it  was 
observed  that  they  had  thrown  up  sev- 
eral batteries  in  front  of  the  National 
line.  Besides  VanDorn,  Price,  and 
Lovell,  there  were  present  on  the  Con- 
federate side  Generals  Villepigue,  Rust, 
Maury  and  L.  Hebert ; and  the  troops 
were  of  the  best  possible  material.  The 
Nationals  had  been  equally  on  the  alert. 
All  the  batteries  around  the  town  were 
well  manned;  and  a new  one,  called 
Fort  Richardson,  and  mounting  five 
guns,  had  been  constructed  by  the  sap- 
pers and  miners  during  the  dark  hours 


TEMPESTS  OF  IPON. 


165 


of  the  night.  The  ground  which  lay 
between  the  combatants  was  of  a varied, 
irregular  character.  Hill  and  swampy 
land  alternated;  and  the  whole  was 
covered  by  forest  trees  and  brushwood. 
On  the  north  and  west  there  were  fields 
interspersing  the  woods ; in  front  of 
the  right  centre,  a swamp;  and  in  front 
of  the  left  centre,  impracticable  hills. 
The  National  left,  held  by  Stanley’s  di- 
vision, was  protected  by  Battery  Rob- 
inett  on  the  left  and  Battery  Williams 
on  the  right.  The  centre  was  on  a 
slight  ridge,  just  north  of  the  houses  of 
Corinth,  and  consisted  of  Davies’  divis- 
ion, slightly  retired,  with  sharp-shooters 
in  front,  and  having  Battery  Powell  on 
the  right.  Hamilton’s  division  was  on 
the  right,  with  Dillon’s  battery,  ad- 
vanced beyond  Davies,  and  having  two 
regiments  in  rear  of  his  left. 

The  first  shot  was  fired  from  one  of 
the  newly  erected  Confederate  batte- 
ries, the  one  most  in  advance,  and  dis- 
tant only  from  Battery  Bobinett  some 
two  hundred  yards.  This  was  the  open- 
ing of  the  fight.  The  shells  fell  in  the 
streets  of  Corinth,  producing  the  wild- 
est consternation  among  the  inhabitants. 
For  a time  this  battery  was  unanswered. 
It  was  not  until  daylight  when  Captain 
Williams,  of  Battery  Williams,  opened 
his  20-pounder  Parrott  guns  upon  it, 
silencing  it  in  three  minutes.  Clearly 
it  was  the  intention  of  the  Confederate 
commander  to  attract  the  attention  of 
the  Nationals  by  this  cannonading ; and, 
by  keeping  them  employed  in  this  di- 
rection, to  give  Lovell  an  opportunity 
to  storm  the  works  on  their  left.  The 
silencing  of  this  advanced  battery  ne- 


cessitated a change  of  plan.  There  was, 
however,  no  delay.  Shortly  after  nine 
o’clock.  Price  came  down  on  Bosecranz’s 
centre  with  tremendous  force.  Moving 
in  heavy  masses,*  and  marching  rapidly 
along  the  Bolivar  road,  the  Confederates 
came  up  in  wedge-like  form,  and  fell 
fiercely  upon  Davies  and  Fort  Powell. 
Never  was  advancino:  column  more 

O 

warmly  received.  The  road  was  swept 
by  a direct,  cross  and  enfilading  fire. 
As  the  column  advanced,  it  was  literal- 
ly torn  through  and  through.  At  each 
successive  volley,  huge  gaps  appeared 
in  the  ranks.  The  men  were  mowed 
down  like  grass.  There  had  been  no 
such  destruction  of  human  life  since  the 
commencement  of  tlie  war.  It  put  into 
the  shade  the  massacre  at  Ball’s  Bluff 
and  the  Valley  of  the  Shadow  of  Death 
at  Pittsburg  Landing.  Undismayed  by 
this  storm  of  grape  and  canister,  which 
covered  the  ground  with  the  bodies  of 
their  comrades,  the  Confederates  pressed 
gallantly  on.  An  eye-witness  of  this 
attack  has  told  us  that  they  came  up 
bending  their  necks  downward,  and 
with  their,  faces  averted,  like  men  striv- 
ing to  protect  themselves  against  a 
driving  storm  of  hail.”  Are  they  to 
win  the  day  ? Davies’  division  yields ; 
and  there  is  a temporary  panic.  On- 
wmrd  push  the  brave  Confederates. 
They  capture  Fort  Powell ; and,  in 
spite  of  the  guns  of  Fort  Bichardson, 
they  penetrate  to  the  public  square  and 
make  themselves  masters  of  the  head- 
quarters of  Bosecranz.  In  a better 
cause,  such  bravery  ought  to  have  been 
rewarded  with  victory.*  As  it  was,  the 
triumph  was  short-lived.  Bosecranz,  see- 


!814 


166 


lUKA  AND  CORINTH. 


ing  the  panic  which  had  seized  Davies’ 
men,  rushed  into  the  midst  of  the  wa- 
vering battalions;  and,  what  with  en- 
treaty and  threats  and  the  flat  of  his 
sabre,  he  succeeded  in  restoring  order. 
‘'The  ragged  head  of  the  column” 
vchich  had  forced  its  way  into  the  town, 
v'as  assailed  by  a section  of  Immers 
battery,  supported  by  the  Tenth  Ohio 
and  the  Fifth  Minnesota,  and  driven  to- 
Avard  the  forest.  Fort  Powell  was  re- 
taken by  a splendid  charge  of  the  Fifty- 
Sixth  Illinois.  Meanwhile,  the  guns  of 
Hamilton,  who  had  fallen  back  with 
Davies,  being  in  full  command  of  the 
avenues  of  advance  and  retreat,  were  i 
spreading  death  and  destruction  in  the  ' 
Oonfederate  ranks.  AVhat  for  a mo-  | 
ment  seemed  a victory  was  now  con- 
verted into  a rout.  Price’s  men  were 
driven  back  at  all  points.  In  the  wild- 
est confusion,  they  fled  to  the  shelter  of 
the  woods,  the  victorious  Nationals 
closely  pursuing.  Price’s  attack  tlius 
])roved  a complete  failure. 

The  attack  on  the  left  was  conducted 
by  VanDorn  in  person.  It  was  intended 
that  the  attack  on  the  right  and  that  on 
the  left  should  be  made  at  the  same 
moment.  VanDorn,  however,  was  de- 
layed by  the  difficulties  of  the  ground; 
and  Price  had  been  engaged  some  twen- 
tv  minutes  before  he  Avas  able  to  bring 
his  men  into  action.  Arranging  his 
regiments  in  four  columns,  and  placing 
piis  heavy  artillery  in  the  rear,  VanDorn 
marched  forward  under  the  fire  of  the 
guns  of  the  two  forts,  Hobinett  and 
Williams.  From  the  moment  they  came 
in  sight,  they  wete  mowed  and  torn  and 
shattered  by  grape  and  shell  and  canis- 


ter. On,  however,  they  moved,  with 
an  audacity  which  compelled  the  ad- 
miration of  the  National  troops.  Now 
Avere  Avitnessed  those  gorgeous  pyro- 
technics,” of  AAffiich  Kosecranz  speaks  in 
bis  official  despatch,  and  the  description 
of  AAffiich  he  leaA^es  “to  pens  dipped  in 
poetic  ink.”  Never  in  the  history  of 
Avarlike  movements  was  there  exhibited 
cooler  determination  or  greater  bravery 
on  the  part  of  the  rank  and  file.  On 
they  move,  in  spite  of  the  tempest  of 
iron.  It  seems  as  if  nothing  Avill  hinder 
them.  They  are  now  within  fifty  yards 
of  Fort  Robinett.  Suddenly  the  Ohio 
brigade,  Avhich  has  been  lying  fiat,  rises 
at  a signal  and  pours  so  murderous  a 
lire  upon  the  advancing  columns  that 
they  stagger,  break,  and  fall  back  into 
the  AA'oods.  The  battle,  however,  is  not 
yet  ended.  The  Confederates  re-form  ; 
and  again,  as  if  convinced  that  a more 
daring  effort  will  giA^e  them  the  victory, 
tliey  come  up  gallantly  to  the  charge, 
led  by  Colonel  Rogers,  of  the  Second 
Texas.  This  time  they  succeed  in  reach- 
ing the  ditch.  Rogers,  revolver  in  hand, 
has  leaped  the  ditch  and  scaled  the  par- 
apet. At  this  moment  the  Ohio  bri- 
gade, again  springing  up,  pours  its  mur- 
derous volleys  upon  the  assailants.  The 
effect  Avas  terrific.  Rogers,  Avith  five 
equally  brave  companions,  falls  inside 
the  fort.  The  Avord  “ charge  ” is  given 
by  the  National  brigade  commander. 
Taken  up  and  repeated  by  the  men, 
it  rings  loud  above  the  din  of  battle ; 
and  the  Eleventh  Missouri  and  the 
Twenty-SeA^enth  Ohio  rush  bounding 
over  the  parapet,  and,  after  a severe 
hand  to  hand  fight  Avith  the  assailants. 


BATTLE  OF  THE  HATCHIE. 


167 


chase  “their  broken  fragments  back  to 
the  woods.”  By  noon  the  battle  was 
ended.  It  was,  beyond  all  question, 
one  of  the  bloodiest  contests  since  the 
commencement  of  the  war.  On  both 
sides  the  greatest  bravery  was  exhib- 
ited ; and  although  the  Nationals  were 
victorious,  they  had  little  cause  to  dis- 
esteem  the  prowess  of  their  opponents. 

On  the  morning  of  the  5th,  the  men 
Oct,  having  been  allowed  to  rest  for 
the  night,  the  pursuit  of  the  Con- 
federate army  was  begun.  It  was  con- 
tinued for  forty  miles  by  the  infantry, 
and  for  sixty  miles  by  the  cavalry. 
During  the  course  of  that  day,  a severe 
engagement  took  place  between  a body 
of  the  Nationals  and  a detachment  of 
Confederates  who  had  been  sent  to 
guard  the  crossing  of  the  Hatchie.  In 
this  engagement,  which  is  known  as  the 
battle  of  the  Hatchie,  the  Confederates 
had  a largely  superior  force ; but  they 
were  broken  in  spirit,  battle- worn  and 
weary,  and  made,  in  consequence,  but 
a poor  resistance.  Driven  back  across 
the  river  toward  Corinth,  they  were 
compelled  to  make  a wide  circuit,  and 
recross  the  Hatchie  at  Crum’s  Mill,  six 
miles  above.  In  their  retreat  they  left 
behind  them  two  guns;  and  three  hun- 
dred of  their  men  were  made  prisoners. 
The  glory  of  this  victory  must  be  di- 
vided between  Huribut  and  Ord,  who 
in  succession  held  the  chief  command. 
In  the  course  of  the  struggle  Ord 
was  severely  wounded,  and  Huribut 
resumed  the  command,  which  he  had 
relinquished  in  the  early  part  of  the 
day,  on  the  arrival  of  his  superior.  At 
whither  the  great  body  of  the 


National  army  had  pursued  the  retreat- 
ing Confederates,  the  pursuit  was  dis- 
continued, Grant  deeming  it  advisable 
not  to  advance  further  for  the  present. 
Bosecranz  was  justly  proud  of  the  vic- 
tory which  he  had  won  ; and  it  was 
only  a just  reward  for  the  services 
which  he  had  rendered  at  luka  and  Co- 
rinth, when,  a few  days  after  his  return, 
he  was  promoted  to  the  chief  command 
of  the  army  of  the  Ohio,  now  called  the 
army  of  the  Cumberland,  thus  super- 
seding Buell.  In  an  order  issued  to 
his  troops  on  the  24th  of  Octo-  oct. 
ber,  E-osecranz  said : “ The  enemy  24. 
numbered,  according  to  their  own  au- 
thorities, nearly  40,000  men — almost 
double  your  own  numbers.  You  fought 
them  in  the  position  we  desired  on  the 
3d,  punishing  them  terribly;  and  on 
the  4th,  in  three  hours  after  the  infantiy 
entered  into  action,  they  were  beaten. 
You  killed  and  buried  one  thousand 
four  hundred  and  twenty-four  officers 
and  men.  Their  wounded,  at  the  usual 
rate,  must  exceed  five  thousand.  You 
took  two  thousand  two  hundred  and 
sixty-eight  prisoners,  among  whom  were 
one  hundred  and  thirty-seven  field  offi- 
cers, captains,  and  subalterns,  represent- 
ing fifty-three  regiments  of  infantry, 
sixteen  regiments  of  cavalry,  thirteen 
batteries  of  artillery,  and  seven  battal- 
ions, making  sixty-nine  regiments,  thir- 
teen batteries,  seven  battalions,  besides 
several  companies.  You  captured  three 
thousand  three  hundred  and  fifty  stand 
of  small  arms,  fourteen  stand  of  colors, 
two  pieces  of  artillery,  and  a large  quan- 
tity of  equipments.  You  pursued  his 
retreating  columns  forty  miles  in  force 


168 


lUKA  AND  CORINTH. 


witli  infantry,  and  sixty  miles  with  cav- 
alry.” 

The  entire  National  loss,  including, 
of  course,  luka  and  Corinth,  was  315 
killed,  1812  wounded,  and  232  prison- 
ers and  missing. 

General  Grant,  although  he  had  some 
reason  to  complain  that  the  army  of 
VanDorn  had  not  been  completely  de- 
stroyed, had  just  cause  to  be  gratified 
with  these  fresh  successes.  His  plans 
had  worked  admirably.  His  calcula- 
tions had  been  perfect.  It  was  a piece 
of  great  daring,  and,  in  other  hands, 
would  have  implied  tremendous  risks, 
to  march  first  on  luka  to  whip  Price, 
and  then  to  find  time  to  return  to  Co- 
rinth to  demolish  VanDorn.  His  suc- 
cess must  have  strengthened  his  faith 
in  his  own  judgment.  It  certainly  con- 
vinced the  authorities  at  Washington 
and  the  people  at  large  that  in  Grant 
the  National  cause  had  found  a defender 
whose  ability  was  equal  to  his  daring, 
and  whose  judgment  was  thoroughly  to 
be  trusted.  His  abilities  did  not  find 
full  scope,  nor  did  he  get  credit  for 
what  he  actually  accomplished,  so  long 
as  Halleck  held  the  chief  command. 
Now  that  he  was  free  to  act  on  his  own 
responsibility,  the  true  character  of  the 
man  revealed  itself ; and  it  besran  to  be 
seen  that  it  was  to  General  Grant,  more 


than  to  any  other  man,  that  the  nation 
was  indebted  for  that  series  of  brilliant 
victories  which,  begun  at  Forts  Henry 
and  Donelson,  had  swept  the  Confede- 
rates out  of  Kentucky  and  Tennessee. 
Too  much  praise  can  hardly  be  bestowed 
on  General  Kosecranz;  nor  can  it  bo 
denied  that  Ord  did  well  according  to 
his  limited  opportunity.  Price  and  Van- 
Dorn revealed  all  the  qualities  of  brave 
and  dashing  generalship ; but  there  was 
a visible  absence  from  the  management 
of  the  Confederate  troops  of  that  cool 
and  calculating  head  which  directed  the 
movements  of  the  Nationals. 

By  a general  order  of  the  16th  of 
October,  the  department  of  which  oct. 
General  Grant  had  command  was 
largely  extended  and  named  the  Depart- 
ment of  the  Tennessee,  with  the  head- 
quarters at  Jackson.  The  Confederates 
having  been  again  repulsed,  and  the 
course  so  far  cleared.  Grant  began  to 
make  vigorous  preparations  for  the  car- 
lying  out  of  the  original  intention  of  the 
campaign  inaugurated  at  Donelson,  but 
brought  into  temporary  abeyance  by 
the  abstraction  of  so  many  of  his  troops. 
Vicksburg  remained  the  chief  obstacle 
to  the  free  navigation  of  the  Missis- 
sippi; and  to  the  reduction  of  Vicks- 
burg all  the  energies  of  Grant  were 
now  directed. 


KENTUCKY  AND  TENNESSEE. 


1C9 


CHAPTER  XII. 


The  Army  of  the  Ohio. — Buell  Sent  to  Chattanooga. — Vicksburg. — Delay  in  Marching  on. — The  Keason. — Con- 
federate Boldness. — The  Invasion  of  Maryland  and  Kentucky. — General  Bragg. — Kirby  Smith. — Cumberland 
Gap. — Smith’s  Raid  through  Kentucky. — Excitement  in  Ohio. — The  Importance  of  Chattanooga. — The  Race 
for  Chattanooga. — Bragg  Wins.  — Bragg’s  Army. — Buell  Follows  Bragg. — Intercepted  Despatches. — Buell 
First  at  Louisville. — Reinforcements  from  Grant. — Buell’s  Blunder. — Relieved  of  His  Command. — The  Order 
Recalled. — Bragg's  Proelam  ition. — The  Confederate  Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs. — A Bribe  to  the  North- 
west.— Attempt  to  Inaugurate  a Confederate  Government  in  Kentucky. — A Political  Failure  but  a Successful 
Raid. — Bragg’s  Retreat  with  His  Booty. — Buell  Pursues. — Concentration  at  Perryville. — Scarcity  of  Water. — 
Preparing  for  Battle. — Bragg  Preparing  to  Retreat. — He  Resolves  to  give  Battle. —The  Battle  of  Perryville 
Commenced. — Severe  Fighting. — Colonel  McCook  Sorely  Pressed. — Reinforced. — The  Confederates  Pressed 
Back  into  the  Woods. — Major-General  McCook  Comes  Up. — He  Takes  Position. — Advance  of  Rousseau. — 
Chaplin’s  Creek. — A Commanding  Position. — General  McCook  Surprised. — A Terrific  Blow  Dealt  by  the  Con- 
federates.— Death  of  Jackson. — The  Nationals  Driven  Back. — Terrill  Mortally  Wounded. — Rousseau  also  Falls 
Back. — Mitchell  and  Sheridan. — Sheridan’s  Opportunity. — Terrific  Slaughter. — Reinforcements  Wanted. — 
Crittenden  Ordered  Forward. — The  Battle  of  Perryville  Ended. — Retreat  of  Bragg. — Bragg  and  Buell  both 
Blamed. — Buell  Removed. — Rosecranz  takes  His  Place. — His  Promptitude. — Preparations  for  another  Strug- 
gle.— Murfreesboro’. — Rejoicings  at  Bragg’s  Headquarters. — Bragg  Over-Confident. — Trying  to  Annoy  Grant. — 
Rosecranz  Moves  Southward. — The  Battle-Ground. — Stone  River. — The  Two  Armies  in  Position. — Bragg's 
Army  the  Stronger. — Rosecranz's  Plan  of  Attack. — Bragg's  Plan. — The  Battle  Begun. — A Terrific  Onslaught. — 
A Temporary  Defeat. — Plan  of  Battle  Changed. — Critical  Position  of  Sheridan. — Terrible  Loss  of  Life. — 
Sheridan  Exhausted. — Negley  and  Thomas. — The  Battle  all  but  Lost. — Hazen  and  His  Brigade. — Rosecranz’s 
new  Arrangements  Completed — A Tempest  of  “Double-Shotted  Iron  Fire.” — The  Tide  of  Battle  Turned. — 
Stubbornness  of  the  Confederates. — Rosecranz  in  the  Front.  — “ Forward  Now.” — Darkness. — A Drawn  Battle. — 
Burying  the  Dead. — The  Battle  Resumed  on  the  Third  of  January. — The  Confederates  Driven  Back. — Terrible 
Havoc. — Rosecranz  in  Murfreesboro’. — A Great  National  Victory. — Rosecranz  Complimented. 


On  the  10th  of  June,  as  we  have  seen 

1862  ^ previous  chapter,  General 

Buell,  at.  the  head  of  his  old  army 
— the  army  of  the  Ohio — was  ordered 
by  General  Halleck  to  move  towards 
Chattanooga.  This  was  almost  imme- 
diately after  the  retirement  of  Beaure- 
gard from  Corinth  and  the  occupation 
of  the  same  by  the  National  troops. 

What  was  it  that  rendered  necessary 
this  breaking  up  of  the  army  of  the 
West  at  this  particular  juncture?  In  a 
space  of  time  which  hardly  justified  the 
result,  that  army  had  marched  from 
Henry  to  Donelson,  from  Donelson  to 
Shiloh,  from  Shiloh  to  Corinth,  had 


opened  the  Mississippi*  as  far  south  as 
Memphis,  and  had  swept  the  Confede- 
rates out  of  Kentucky  and  Tennessee. 
Farragut  had  already  pushed  his  way 
beyond  New  Orleans ; and  that  city 
had  been  restored  to  the  Union.  At 
the  time  that  the  victorious  army  was 
divided,  and  Buell  with  his  forces  was 
sent  towards  Chattanooga,  it  seemed  to 
be  the  plain  duty  of  Halleck  to  move 
southward  and  capture  Vicksburg,  the 
one  remaining  barrier  of  any  conse- 
quence to  the  free  and  unrestricted  navi- 
gation of  the  great  river  from  St.  Louis 
to  the  sea.  Moreover,  the  capture  of 
Vicksburg  formed  part  of  that  grand 


170 


PERRYVILLE  AKD  MURFREESBORO’. 


plan  which  was  inaugurated  at  Forts 
Henry  and  Donelson.  There  must  have 
been  good  and  substantial  reasons  why 
this  plan  was  not  followed  out — why 
what  seemed  a plain  duty  was  not  per- 
formed, What  w^ere  those  reasons? 

To  answer  this  question,  it  will  be 
necessary  for  us  to  take  a brief  retro- 
spect of  the  situation.  It  deserves  here 
to  be  noted  that  the  successes  of  Hal- 
leck,  Grant  and  Buell  in  the  West  had 
been  more  than  counterbalanced  by  the 
victories  of  the  Confederates  in  the 
East.  The  government  at  Bichmond  had 
made  tremendous  efforts  to  strengthen 
their  armies ; and  conscription  had  suc- 
cessfully accomplished  their  purpose. 
McClellan,  as  we  shall  see  more  fully 
in  the  next  chapter,  had  been  driven 
back  from  Bichmond  ; and  his  peninsu- 
lar campaign  had  totally  failed.  Noth- 
ing daunted  by  the  succession  of  defeats 
sustained  in  the  West,  it  was  resolved 
by  the  Confederate  authorities  to  give 
effect  to  the  clamor  of  the  South,  ‘Go 
carry  war  into*  the  enemy’s  country, 
and  relieve  us  from  its  intolerable  bur- 
dens.” With  this  end  in  view,  Lee  was 
directed  to  move  into  Maryland;  and 
Bragg,  who  had  succeeded  Beauregard 
in  command,  was  ordei'ed  into  Ken- 
tucky. It  was  believed  that  these  slave- 
holding States  would  be  easily  reclaim- 
ed, and  that  from  them  it  would  be 
easy  to  invade  the  North,  and  wring 
peace  from  it  in  one  or  other  of  the 
irreat  cities.  Of  Lee  and  his  movements 

o 

we  shall  have  occasion  to  treat  in  a sub- 
sequent chapter.  Our  attention  for  the 
present  must  be  given  to  Bragg,  and  to 
the  events  which  were  taking  place. 


or  were  about  to  take  place,  in  Ken- 
tucky. 

The  southward  movement  of  the  Na- 
tional forces,  and  their  concentration  for 
a time  at  Shiloh  and  Corinth,  had  left 
Kentucky  and  Tennessee  to  a large  ex- 
tent unprotected.  Taking  advantage  of 
this,  Morgan,  Forrest,  and  other  guerilla 
chiefs,  had  overrun  those  States,  produc- 
ing terror  and  dismay  among  the  inhab- 
itants and  woiking  terrible  destruction. 
The  successful  raids  by  those  bands 
greatly  encouraged  the  Confederates  in 
their  determination  to  make  bold  and  ag- 
gressive efforts  in  the  North ; and  Gene- 
ral Kirby  Smith,  an  officer  who,  the  read- 
er will  remember,  played  an  important 
part  at  the  first  battle  of  Bull  Bun,  con- 
trived to  unite  those  irregular  bands, 
and  make  use  of  their  experience  in  fur- 
thering the  plans  of  the  Confederate 
government.  At  the  head  of  these  men, 
as  the  advanced  guard  of  Bragg’s  army, 
this  general  marched  th’O’igh  Bogeis’ 
and  Big  Creek  Gaps  of  the  Cumberland 
Mountains  into  Kentucky.  At  Bich- 
mond, ill  this  Slate,  he  encountered  a 
body  of  Unionists  under  the  command 
of  Major-General  Nelson,  and  defeated 
them,  two  thousand  of  the  Union  troops 
being  captured  and  two  hundred  killed 
and  wounded.  Among  the  latter  was 
General  Nelson  himself.  After  their 
success  at  Bichmond,  they  found  little 
opposition  at  Lexington,  at  Frankfort, 
at  Shelby ville,  at  Paris,  and  at  Cynthh 
ana.  It  was  not  long  until  they  were 
on  the  banks  of  the  Ohio.  The  people 
of  that  State  became  wild  with  excite- 
ment; and  the  citizens  of  Cincinnati 
made  vigorous  efforts  to  be  in  readiness 


CHATTANOOGA. 


in 


for  the  daring  invader.  When  within 
one  day'^s  march  of  the  city,  Kirby  Smith, 
Sep.  on  the  12th  of  September,  fell 
back  on  Frankfort  and  Lexing- 
ton. Later,  having  been  reinforced  by 
ti’oops  fi'om  Southwestern  Virginia,  un- 
der Humphrey  Marshall,  he  manoeuvred 
so  as  to  accomplish  his  original  purpose, 
which  was  to  effect  a junction  with 
Bragg. 

Chattanooga,  the  citadel  of  the  moun- 
tain fastness  of  Tennessee,  and  the  point 
iVappui  for  operations  towards  Atlanta, 
was  justly  regarded  by  Halleck  as  a 
strategic  point  of  the  tirst  importance. 
Chattanooga  held  by  a strong  National 
force,  it  would  be  impossible  for  the 
Confederates  to  make  any  very  effective 
i.iroad  into  Kentucky.  But  the  import- 
ance of  Chattanooga  for  certain  pur- 
poses was  as  well  known  to  Bragg  as 
it  was  to  Buell.  It  was  the  object  of 
the  Nationals  to  possess  themselves  of 
Chattanooga,  and  so  prevent  such  in- 
vasion. It  was  the  object  of  the  Con- 
federates to  enter  Kentucky  in  force 
before  Chattanooga  was  in  the  hands  of 
their  enemies.  Hence  Chattanooga  was 
so  far  the  objective  point  of  both  com- 
manders. The  National  commander  de- 
sired to  take  advantage  of  the  concen- 
tration of  the  Confederate  forces  on  the 
Mississippi  line  by  seizing  Chattanooga; 
the  Confederate  commander  desired  to 
take  advantage  of  the  concentration  of 
National  forces  on  the  same  line  by  an 
.June  advance  towards  the  Ohio.  On 
lb  the  11th  of  June  Buell  commenced 
his  march  from  Corinth.  Following  the 
route  prescribed  by  Halleck,  which 
was  the  direct  route  through  North 


Alabama,  by  way  of  the  Memphis 
and  Charleston  Kailroad,  the  divisions 
moved  forward  in  close  succession  by 
marches  of  fourteen  miles  a day.  The 
distance  from  Corinth  to  Chattanooga 
by  this  railroad  is  two  hundred  miles. 
When  joined  by  Mitchell,  whom  he  had 
left  behind  him  to  guard  Middle  Ten- 
nessee, and  General  Morgan,  who  had 
seized  Cumberland  Gap,  Buell  had  un- 
der him  some  forty  thousand  men.  Cau- 
tiously and  carefully  providing  for  all 
contingencies  by  the  way,  he  had  by 
the  end  of  July  thrown  forward  two 
divisions,  under  McCook  and  Critten- 
den, to  Battle  Creek,  some  twenty-live 
miles  from  Chattanooga ; and  all  pre- 
parations for  an  advance  on  the  latter 
place  were  complete. 

Bragg,  however,  had  reached  Chat- 
tanooga in  person  on  the  28th  of  jnjy 
July ; his  troops  were  already  28. 
well  in  hand;  and,  what  wdth  the  so- 
called  army  of  East  Tennessee,  number- 
ing thirteen  thousand  men,  and  which, 
under  the  command  of  Kirby  Smith, 
covered  his  right  at  Knoxville,  he  could 
count  on  an  effective  force,  for  immedi- 
ate use,  of  fifty  thousand  men.  Bragg’s 
army  was  organized  in  three  corps — 
one  under  Kirby  Smith,  as  we  have 
seen,  at  Knoxville,  and  the  two  others, 
under  Hardee  and  Polk,  at  Chatta- 
nooga. With  the  two  latter,  Bragg 
moved  northward,  directing  his  march 
towards  the  Louisville  and  Nashville 
Kailroad.  Forestalled  in  the  occupation 
of  Chattanooga,  Buell  was  dependent 
upon  Louisville  for  supplies,  and  hence 
had  to  guard  nearly  three  hundred  miles 
of  railroad.  As  Bragg  marched  north- 


172 


PERRYVILLE  AND  MURFREESBORO^ 


ward,  he  had  no  choice  but  execute  a 
parallel -march  and  fall  back  upon  Nash- 
ville. Bragg,  who  had  struck  the  rail- 
road at  Mumfordsville,  moved  thence 
to  Frankfort,  where  he  was  joined  by 
Smith.  Buell  had  by  this  time  dis- 
covered, through  some  intercepted  de- 
spatches, that  their  true  object  was 
Louisville,  and  not  Nashville,  as  their 
movements  seemed  to  indicate.  Leav- 
ing a garrison  at  the  latter  place,  he 
hurried  on  to  Louisville,  which  he 
Sep.  reached  on  the  25th  of  Septem- 
25.  ber.  Bragg’s  movements  had  been 
slow.  It  had  taken  him  six  weeks  to 
march  from  Chattanooga  to  Frankfort. 
Slow,  however,  as  his  march  had  been, 
he  would  certainly  have  been  first  at 
Louisville,  had  it  not  been  for  a burnt 
bridge  near  Bardstown,  which  obstruct- 
ed his  progress  and  caused  considerable 
detention.  As  it  was,  Louisville  was 
secure.  The  arrival  of  Buell  was  an 
immense  relief  to  the  panic-stricken  cit- 
izens, who  had  become  aware  of  the 
near  approach  of  the  Confederates. 

At  Louisville  Buell  received  large 
reinforcements.  Some  of  these  were  in 
the  shape  of  new  levies ; but  not  a few 
of  them  were  veterans,  sent  up  the  Mis- 
sissippi and  the  Ohio  from  the  army  of 
Grant.  His  entire  force,  after  he  had 
been  joined  by  General  Nelson,  was 
estimated  at  about  one  hundred  thou- 
sand men.  The  National  force  thus 
greatly  outnumbered  the  Confederate 
force,  which,  including  that  of  Kirby 
Smith,  did  not  exceed  sixty-five  thou- 
sand men.  Buell  had  conducted  the 
retrograde  movement  from  the  Tennes- 
see to  the  Ohio  with  marked  ability; 


he  was  entitled  to  no  little  praise  for 
anticipating  Bragg  at  Louisville;  but 
he  had  made  a grand  mistake  in  not 
being  first  at  Chattanooga.  He  had 
allowed  the  enemy  to  invade  Kentucky 
by  not  being  forward  in  time  at  that 
strategic  pbint ; and  considering  the  ir- 
ritable mood  in  which  the  Northern 
mind  was  at  the  moment,  it  is  not  won- 
derful that  the  cry  of  incapacity  was 
loudly  raised,  and  a demand  made  for 
his  recall.  This  feeling  being  yielded  to, 
Buell,  just  as  he  had  got  his  army  in 
order  and  was  about  to  march  from 
Louisville  against  the  Confederates,  re- 
ceived from  Washington  an  order  reliev- 
ing him  of  his  command,  and  appointing 
General  G.  H.  Thomas  to  act  in  his 
stead.  Thomas,  who  had  the  highest 
respect  for  the  military  talent  of  Buell, 
refused  to  supersede  him.  At  Thomas’s 
urgent  request,  the  order  Avas  revoked 
and  Buell  remained  in  command. 

Bragg,  meanwhile,  had  commenced 
to  carry  out  his  instructions  in  regard 
to  the  organization  of  Kentucky  on 
Confederate  principles.  On  the  gep. 
18th  of  September  he  issued  a 
proclamation  from  Glasgow,  declaring 
that  the  Confederate  army  had  come  as 
the  liberators  of  Kentuckians  ‘rtrom  the 
tyranny  of  a despotic  ruler,  and  not  as 
conquerors  or  despoilers.”  “Your  gal- 
lant Buckner,”  he  said,  “leads;  Mar- 
shall is  on  the  right;  while  Breckin- 
ridge, dear  to  us  as  you,  is  advancing 
with  Kentucky’s  radiant  sons  to  receive 
the  honor  and  applause  due  to  their 
heroism.”  He  told  them  that  he  must 
have  supplies  for  his  army,  but  that  they 
I would  be  faiily  paid  for.  “Kentuck- 


CONFEDERATE  CONCILIATION. 


173 


ians,”  he  concluded,  ‘‘we  have  come 
with  joyful  hopes.  Let  us  not  depart 
in  sorrow,  as  we  shall  if  we  find  you 
wedded  in  your  choice  to  your  present 
lot.  If  you  prefer  Federal  rule,  show 
it  by  your  frowns,  and  we  shall  retire 
whence  we  came.  If  you  choose  rather 
to  come  within  the  folds  of  our  brother- 
hood, then  cheer  us  by  the  smiles  of 
your  women,  and  lend  your  willing 
hands  to  secure  yourselv^es  in  your  her- 
itage of  liberty.  Women  of  Kentucky! 
your  persecutions  and  heroic  bearing 
have  reached  our  ears.  Banish  hence- 
forth forever  from  your  minds  the  fear 
of  loathsome  prisons  or  insulting  visit- 
ations. Let  your  enthusiasm  have  free 
rein.  Buckle  on  the  armor  of  your  kin- 
dred, your  husbands,  sons  and  brothers, 
and  scotf  to  shame  him  who  would  prove 
recreant  in  his  duty  to  you,  his  country, 
and  his  God.”  Bragg  was  giving  ex- 
pression to  sentiments  then  common  at 
Eichmond.  It  was  evidently  his  opin- 
ion that  the  dominant  feeling  was  in 
favor  of  the  South,  and  that  the  Ken- 
tuckians would  gladly  welcome  his  ap- 
pearance as  that  of  a friend  and  lib- 
erator. It  would  be  absurd  to  deny 
that  there  were  among  these  j)eople 
many  who  sympathized  warmly  with 
the  Southern  cause.  But  they  were  not 
the  majority,  nor  were  they  as  a rule 
the  better  class  of  citizens.  Kentucky 
had  fairly  and  squarely  cast  in  her  lot 
with  the  North,  and  she  was  not  to  be 
shaken  in  her  purpose  or  tempted  from 
the  path  of  duty.  At  this  juncture 
the  Confederates,  elated  with  their  suc- 
cesses in  the  East,  began  to  indulge  in 
the  wildest  day  dreams.  It  was  not 


Kentucky  or  Tennessee  alone  that 
would  gladly  join  and  make  common 
cause  with  the  South.  Why  should 
not  the  Northwestern  States  do  thj 
same?  Duty  and  interest  alike  pointed 
them  in  that  direction.  On  the  same 
day  that  Bragg  issued  his  proclamation, 
the  Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs  made 
a report  to  the  Confederate  Congress 
with  respect  to  the  propriety  of  a pro- 
clamation with  a view  to  influence  the 
States  of  the  Northwest.  In  the  free 
navigation  of  the  Mississippi  and  its 
tributaries,  the  Northwest  and  the 
South  had  a common  interest.  As  a 
reward  for  the  alliance  of  these  North- 
western States,  the  Eichmond  authori- 
ties were  willing  to  cede  the  free  navi- 
gation of  the  Mississippi  and  to  open 
to  them  the  markets  of  the  South.  The 
Northwest,  however,  equally  with  Ken- 
tucky and  Tennessee,  had  decided  upon 
their  course  of  duty,  and  had  such  a 
proclamation  been  issued,  the  sturdy 
men  of  the  West  might  have  been 
justified  in  reminding  their  generous 
friends  that  the  ownership  of  the  Mis- 
sissippi and  its  tributaries  was  no  longer 
an  open  question.  Still  further,  in  car- 
rying out  the  instructions  he  had  re- 
ceived, Bragg,  while  with  Kirby  oct» 
Smith,  at  Frankfort,  inaugurated  L 
on  the  4th  of  October,  a provisional 
governor  of  the  State  of  Kentucky. 

The  Confederate  commander,  howev- 
er, had  made  good  use  of  his  time  and 
opportunities  for  other  purposes  as 
well.  His  guerrillas  and  foraging  par- 
ties had  scoured  the  country  round  and 
round,  and  had  carried  off  thousands  of 
hogs  and  cattle,  with  bacon  and  bread- 


174 


PERRYVILLE  AND  MURrREESBORO\ 


stuffs  of  every  kind.  In  every  town  the 
shops  and  stores  were  forced  open,  and 
whatever  was  wanted  was  taken  and 
paid  for  in  worthless  Confederate  mo- 
ney. A little  later  than  this,  when  the 
Confederates  were  driven  out  of  the 
State,  the  boast  was  made  by  the  Rich- 
mond newspapers  that  “the  wagon  train 
of  supplies  brought  out  of  Kentucky 
by  Kirby  Smith  was  forty  miles  long. 
It  brought  a million  yards  of  jeans, 
with  a large  amount  of  clothing,  boots 
and  shoes,  and  two  hundred  wa^on- 
loads  of  bacon,  six  thousand  barrels  of 
pork,  fifteen  hundred  mules  and  horses, 
eight  thousand  beeves,  and  a large  lot 
of  swine.”  It  ought  to  be  added  here 
that  his  tender  feelings  towards  the  un- 
fortunate Kentuckians  did  not  prevent 
him  from  enforcing  the  Confederate 
conscription  act  wherever  his  influence 
extended,  and  thus  largely  increasing 
the  effective  strength  of  his  army. 

Anticipate  d in  the  occupation  of  Lou- 
isville, and  feeling  convinced  that  he  was 
already  defeated  in  the  main  purpose  of 
his  campaign,  Bragg  prepared  to  retreat 
and  to  protect  the  large  booty  which 
he  had  collected.  It  was  certainly  the 
next  most  important  thing  for  him  to 
do  in  the  premises.  He  moved  back- 
ward with  great  deliberation,  his  object 
being  to  cover  his  supply  trains  until 
they  got  a good  start  toward  Tennessee. 
Ocf,  On  the  1st  of  October,  Buell,  his 
L army  reinforced  and  reorganized, 
moved  out  of  Louisville  in  pursuit  of 
his  antagonist.  His  army  was  arranged 
in  three  corps,  commanded  respectively 
by  Generals  Gilbert,  Crittenden,  and 
McCook.  General  George  H.  Thomas, 


who  was  Buell’s  second  in  command, 
had  charge  of  the  right  wing.  It  was 
known  that  Bragg  was  at  Bardstown. 
Towards  Bardstown,  therefore,  Buell 
directed  his  divisions.  Crittenden,  who 
was  in  immediate  command  of  the  iK^ht, 
marched  by  way  of  Shepherdsville.  The 
left  moved  in  a line  nearer  to  Frankfort. 
The  other  columns,  marching  by  differ- 
ent routes,  fell  respectively  into  the 
roads  leading  from  Mt.  Washington, 
Faiifleld  and  Bloomfield  to  Bardstown. 
Arrived  at  Bardstown,  it  was  found 
that  Bragg  had  retired  some  eight  hours 
before,  and  that  he  had  moved  in  a di- 
rection which  suggested  that  he  would 
probably  concentrate  at  Harrodsburg. 
After  leaving  Bardstown,  Buell  learned 
that  the  force  of  Kirby  Smith  had 
crossed  to  the  west  side  of  the  Kentucky 
River,  and  that  the  enemy  was  moving 
to  concentrate  either  at  Harrodsburs:  or 
Perryville.  The  centre,  under  Gilbert, 
was  accordingly  ordered  to  march  on 
Perryville,  where  it  arrived  late  on  the 
afternoon  of  the  7th,  finding  the  oct. 
Confederates  apparently  assem-  7. 
bled  in  strength.  Buell  and  his  staff 
moved  with  this  corps.  “ The  advanced 
guard,”  General  Buell  tells  us  in  his 
report,  “ under  Captain  Gay,  consisting 
of  cavalry  and  artillery,  supported  to- 
wards evening  by  two  regiments  of  in- 
fantry, pressed  successfully  upon  the 
enemy’s  rearguard  to  within  two  miles 
of  the  town,  aerainst  a somewhat  stub- 
born  opposition.”  The  National  arm  / 
had  suffered  greatly,  for  the  three  pre- 
vious days,  from  the  scarcity  of  water. 
In  the  bed  of  Doctor’s  Creek,  a tribu- 
tary of  Chaplin  River,  about  two  and  a 


JACKSOX  KILLED. 


175 


half  miles  from  Perry ville,  some  pools 
of  water  were  found;  and  the  thirty- 
sixth  brigade,  from  General  Sheridan’s 
division,  under  Colonel  D.  McCook, 
was  ordered  to  seize  and  hold  a com- 
manding position  which  covered  these 
pools.  The  order  was  promptly  exe- 
cuted; and  a supply  of  bad  water,  al- 
though the  best  that  could  be  had,  was 
obtained  for  the  wants  of  the  army. 
Deteiinined  to  offer  battle  early  on  the 
following  morninc:,  Buell  sent  orders  to 
General  McCook  and  General  Critten- 
den to  march  at  tliree  o’clock  in  the 
morning,  so  as  to  close  up  on  his  right 
and  left,  and,  if  possible,  surround  the 
foe. 

McCook  did  not  receive  his  orders 
until  half-past  two  o’clock,  and  he 
marched  at  five.  Crittenden,  failing  to 
find  water,  had  gone  off  his  path  some 
six  or  seven  miles ; and  he  was  late, 
in  consequence,  several  hours.  Bragg 
had  already  seen  the  peril  of  his  posi- 
tion, and  had  commenced  to  retreat. 
Perceiving,  however,  that  the  centre 
under  Gilbert  and  McCook  had  out- 
marched Crittenden,  he  resolved  to  give 
battle  at  once.  It  was,  at  least,  worth 
making  the  effort.  If  he  could  defeat 
Gilbert  and  McCook  before  the  arrival 
of  Crittenden,  he  might  be  able  either 
to  make  good  his  retreat  in  the  interval, 
or  failing  that,  he  could  fall  upon  him 
in  turn. . Bragg’s  army  was  arranged  in 
five  divisions — two  under  Hardee,  and 
one  each  under  Anderson,  Cheatham, 
and  Buckner — the  whole  being  under 
the  immediate  command  of  Major-Gen- 
eral Polk.  Smith  had  already  retreated 
further  to  the  west,  carrying  with  him 


the  ‘‘provisional  government,”  in  the 
person  of  Governor  Hawes. 

Early  in  the  morning  of  the  8th,  the 
fight,  which  had  been  interrupted  ocl. 
by  the  darkness  of  the  night  pre- 
ceding,  was  resumed.  Colonel  McCook, 
as  we  have  seen,  had  taken  a position 
on  a height  which  commanded  Doctor’s 
Creek ; and  this  secured  a supply  of 
water,  such  as  it  was,  for  the  National 
army.  At  the  break  of  day  an  attempt 
was  made  to  draw  Colonel  McCook 
from  his  position.  For  a time  he  had 
to  bear  the  whole  weio:ht  of  the  Con- 
federate  attack  alone.  When  beins: 
somewhat  pressed,  the  Second  Missouri, 
a regiment  which  did  memorable  service 
at  Pea  Bidge,  with  the  Fifteenth  Mis- 
souri as  a support,  came  to  his  aid,  and 
the  Confederates  were  compelled  to  re- 
tire into  the  woods.  While  retiring, 
they  were  heavily  smitten  on  the  flank 
by  the  Second  Minnesota  battery. 

Buell,  who,  as  we  have  seen,  was  with 
the  central  corps,  under  the  immediate 
charge  of  General  Gilbert,  dreaded  an 
attack  on  that  body,  all  the  more  so 
that  neither  McCook  nor  Crittenden 
had  yet  arrived.  The  engagement  with 
Colonel  McCook’s  brigade  at  Doctor’s 
Creek  had,  to  all  appearance,  sufficiently 
engaged  the  attention  of  the  Confede- 
rate chief ; and  between  ten  and  eleven 
o’clock,  when  Colonel  McCook  had  re- 
pelled the  enemy  and  firmly  established 
himself,  the  first  corps,  under  Major- 
General  McCook,  came  up  on  the  Max- 
ville  road.  After  the  arrival  of  this 
corps,  no  formidable  attack  was  appre- 
hended. McCook  was  ordered  to  get 
promptly  into  position  on  the  left  of 


176 


PERRYVILLE  AND  MURFREESRORO\ 


tlie  centre  corps,  and  to  make  a recon- 
noissance  to  his  front  and  left.  The 
reconnoissance  was  still  being  continued 
by  Captain  Gay  toward  his  front  and 
right,  and  sharp  firing  with  artillery 
was  going  on. 

The  head  of  McCook’s  column  reached 
the  point  designated  shortly  after  ten 
o’clock.  It  was  about  three  and  a half 
miles  from  Perryville,  his  line  being 
abreast  of  Gilbert’s  corps.  Only  two 
of  McCook’s  three  divisions — those, 
namely,  of  Rousseau  and  Jackson — 
were  present,  that  of  Sill  having  been 
sent  toward  Frankfort.  Rousseau  ad- 
vanced with  his  cavalry,  and  secured  his 
ground,  and  the  batteries  of  Loomis  and 
Simonson  were  placed  in  commanding 
positions.  General  Jackson’s  two  bri- 
gades were  stationed  on  high  ground  to 
the  right  of  the  Maxville  and  Perryville 
road,  and  his  instructions  were  to  hold 
them  there  in  column  so  that  they  might 
be  • easily  moved  in  whatever  direction 
the  occasion  might  require.  McCook 
was  under  orders  to  report  to  General 
Buell  in  person.  Having  made  these 
dispositions,  he  rode  off  to  Buell’s  head- 
quarters. He  was  not  long  absent ; 
but  when  he  returned  he  found  that  the 
Confederates  had  put  in  position  three 
batteries,  and  that  an  ineffectual  artil- 
lery duel  was  going  on  between  them 
and  the  batteries  of  Loomis  and  Simon- 
son. Seeing  no  infantry  near,  he  gave 
instructions  to  the  commanders  of  these 
last  mentioned  batteries  to  discontinue 
firing  and  to  husband  their  ammunition. 
Water  was  extremely  scarce,  and  his 
men  were  suffering  terribly  in  conse- 
quence. Following  oat  instructions  re- 


ceived from  Buell,  McCook  proceeded 
to  make  a reconnoissance  toward  Chap- 
lin’s Creek.  Here  he  found  high  com- 
manding ground,  altogether  a better  po- 
sition, and  not  far  from  the  river.  Hav- 
ing sent  for  Generals  Jackson  and 
Terrill,’  he  showed  them  the  water, 
marked  their  line  of  battle,  and  ordered 
a battery  to  be  posted  on  this  line,  with 
strong  supports.  Terrill  at  the  same 
time  received  instructions  to  advance  a 
body  of  skirmishers  cautiously  down 
the  slope  of  the  hill  to  the  water,  as 
soon  as  his  line  was  formed.  Not  ap- 
prehending any  immediate  danger  at 
this  point.  General  McCook  now  moved 
toward  the  right  of  his  line.  At  this 
very  moment  the  Confederate  force  was 
moving  stealthily  upon  him.  Cheat- 
ham’s division  had  stolen  up  to  Jack- 
son’s left,  which  was  under  the  imme- 
diate command  of  General  Terrill,  and 
which  consisted  chiefly  of  raw  troops. 
McCook  had  scarcely  completed  his 
general  arrangements,  when  the  enemy 
fell  upon  him  like  a thunderbolt.  The 
Confederate  general  had  made  himself 
familiar  with  the  position  of  his  antago- 
nist. McCook’s  right  rested  firmly  on 
Gilbert’s  left ; but  his  left  was  compara- 
tively weak  and  altogether  unprotected. 
It  was  on  the  left,  therefore,  that  the 
Confederates  fell  with  the  greatest  fury. 
Their  charge  was  terrific ; and  their 
horrid  yells  filled  the  air.  At  the  first 
volley  Jackson  was  killed,  a bullet  or 
a fragment  of  a shell  having  hit  him 
in  the  breast.  Terrill,  who  showed 
great  bravery,  did  everything  that  man 
could  do  to  steady  his  troops ; but,  de- 
moralized by  the  fall  of  Jackson,  and 


CHAPLIN’S  HILLS. 


177 


being  vastly  outnumbered,  they  broke 
and  fled  in  the  wildest  confusion.  Ter- 
rill himself  fell  mortally  wounded.  He 
died  the  same  evening.  McCook’s  left 
was  thus  driven  back,  and  the  Confede- 
rates fell  with  equal  fury  on  Eousseau’s 
division.  Starkweather’s  brigade,  aided 
by  the  batteries  of  Bush  and  Stone, 
made  a gallant  resistance,  and  held  the 
enemy  at  bay  for  nearly  three  hours. 
It  was  found  impossible,  however,  to 
repel  the  flerce  and  determined  attack. 
Bush’s  battery  had  lost  thirty -five 
horses ; the  ammunition  of  both  infant- 
ry and  artillery  was  all  but  exhausted ; 
and  Bousseau’s  left  was  compelled  to 
fall  back.  On  the  Confederates  pressed, 
Eousseau’s  centre  and  right,  commanded 
respectively  by  Colonels  L.  A.  Harris 
and  W.  H.  Lytle,  yielding  in  succession. 
In  the  struggle,  Lytle  was  seriously 
wounded,  and,  believing  his  wound  to 
be  mortal,  refused  to  allow  himself  to 
be  carried  from  the  field.  Gilbert’s 
left  flank  was  now  exposed,  and  Bragg 
was  leading  the  attack  in  person.  The 
situation  had  become  critical  in  the  ex- 
treme. The  position  here  was  held  by 
E.  P.  Mitchell  and  Philip  H.  Sheridan. 
Sheridan  had  now  a chance  to  show  the 
metal  of  which  he  was  made.  He  held 
the  key  of  the  National  position,  and 
he  knew  it.  If  he  must  relinquish  the 
position,  it  will  not  be  without  a strug- 
gle. He  had  been  more  or  less  engaged 
all  the  forenoon,  and  had  just  repelled 
an  assault  oh  his  front.  Turning  his 
guns  upon  the  victorious  Confederates, 
who  had  just  thrown  back  Eousseau’s 
right,  he  opened  upon  them  a most  ter- 
rific fire,  which  checked  their  advance ; 


and  while  fighting  valiantly  and  hold- 
ing the  enemy  back,  he  was  joined  by 
Carlin’s  brigade,  which  Mitchell  pushed 
forward  to  the  support  of  his  right. 
This  force,  charging  at  the  double  quick, 
broke  the  line  of  the  Confederates  and 
drove  them  back  through  Perry ville, 
capturing  two  caissons,  fifteen  wagons 
of  ammunition,  with  the  guard,  which 
consisted  of  three  officers  and  one 
hundred  and  thirty-eight  men.  Mean- 
while Colonel  Gooding,  who  had  been 
sent  to  the  aid  of  McCook,  had  for  over 
two  hours  been  fighting  with  great  per- 
sistence against  a superior  force.  He 
lost  one  third  of  his  men  ; and  his  horse 
having  been  shot  under  him,  he  was 
made  prisoner.  It  was  about  four 
o’clock  in  the  afternoon  before  General 
Buell  became  aware  that  a severe  battle 
had  been  raging  for  hours.  The  fact 
was  made  known  to  him  by  General 
McCook's  aide-de-camp,  who  came  to 
him  with  a request  for  reinforcements. 
These  were  promptly  sent.  Orders 
were  also  sent  to  General  Crittenden 
to  hurry  forward,  and  with  all  expedi- 
tion possible,  to  send  one  division  to 
strengthen  the  centre,  and  “ to  move 
with  the  rest  of  his  corps  energetically 
against  the  enemy’s  left  flank.”  Such, 
however,  was  the  distance  from  one 
flank  of  the  army  to  the  other — six 
miles — that  before  the  orders  could  be 
delivered,  and  action  taken,  night  came 
on  and  terminated  the  battle.  Such 
was  the  battle  of  Perryville,  or,  as  it  is 
sometimes  called,  Chaplin’s  Hills. 

All  the  necessary  arrangements  were 
made  for  resuming  the  contest  early  on 
the  following  morning.  It  was  Buell’s 


178 


PERRYVILLE  AKD  MURFREESBORO\ 


expectation  that  the  Confederate  gen- 
eral would  endeavor  to  hold  his  posi- 
tion. Orders,  in  consequ3nce,  were 
given  to  the  commanders  of  corps  to  be 
prepared  to  attack  at  daylight.  Gilbert 
and  Crittenden  were  to  move  forward 
at  six  o’clock  and  attack  the  Confed- 
erates on  their  front  and  also  on  their 
left  flank.  In  obedience  to  orders  these 
commanders  moved  early  in  the  morn- 
ing; but  Bragg,  with  his  entire  army, 
had  fled.  They  retired  first  to  Har- 
rodsburg,  where  they  were  joined  by 
Kirby  Smith  and  General  Withers; 
thence  they  hurried  to  Camp  Dick  Rob- 
son; and  from  Camp  Dick  Robinson 
they  hastened  back  to  Chattanooga 
through  Cumberland  ,Gap.  The  retreat 
was  conducted  by  General  Polk,  covered 
])y  the  cavalry  of  Wheeler.  At  Hai- 
rodsburg  they  left  behind  them  about 
twelve  hundred  sick  and  wounded. 
Buell  pursued  as  far  as  London,  and 
then  returned.  During  the  pursuit  the 
Confederates  were  compelled  to  aban- 
don at  various  points  as  much  as  twenty- 
five  thousand  barrels  of  pork. ' The 
Confederate  loss  in  this  engagement 
must  have  amounted  to  2500.  Buell’s 
loss  was  916  killed,  2943  wounded,  489 
missing,  and  10  guns.  Eight  of  the 
captured  guns  were  left  behind. 

The  Confederates  had  been  driven 
out  of  Kentucky ; but  they  had  re- 
treated with  scarcely  any  loss,  and  they 
had  carried  off  immense  booty.  The 
main  body  of  the  National  army,  under 
General  Thomas, '“was  moved  towards 
Nashville.  Buell  went  to  Louisville. 
He  had  shown  but  little  generalship 
in  this  campaign.  His  movements  had 


been  singularly  and  inexplicably  slow. 
If  he  had  been  afraid  or  unwilling  to 
fight,  he  could  hardly  have  acted  other- 
wise. He  blundered,  first  of  all,  when 
he  allowed  Bragg  to  reach  Chattanooga 
before  him.  He  blundered  again  when, 
having  reached  Louisville  before  his  an- 
tagonist, and  been  reinforced,  he  did 
not  strike  the  Confederates  at  once,  and 
before  Kirby  Smith  had  time  to  retire 
with  his  booty.  He  blundered  in  his 
arrangements  at  Perryville,  where  he 
ought  to  have  cut  Bragg’s  army  to 
pieces.  He  blundered  worst  of  all 
when,  after  Perryville,  he  allowed  the 
enemy  to  escape.  It  is  not  wonderful 
that  his  conduct  gave  great  dissatisfac- 
tion at  Washington,  and  that  he  was 
supplanted  by  General  Rosecranz,  who 
had  covered  himself  with  so  much  glory 
at  luka  and  Corinth.  Rosecranz  took 
command  on  the  30th  of  October ; oct. 
and  the  army  of  the  Ohio  became, 
from  that  date,  the  army  of  the  Cum- 
berland. 

The  Confederate  government  was  as 
little  satisfied  w'ith  Bragg,  as  the  gov- 
ernment at  Washington  was  with  Buell. 
His  expedition  had  been  a failure.  He 
had,  in  reality,  accomplished  nothing. 
He  had  collected  some  valuable  booty, 
it  is  true ; but  that  was  a small  result 
from  a campaign  from  which  such  great 
things  were  so  confidently  expected. 
He  had  gained  no  brilliant  victory.  He 
had  failed  to  make  any  impression  on 
the  Northwest;  and  but  few  Kentuck- 
ians had  voluntarily  joined  his  army. 
On  the  contrary,  his  seizure  of  their 
property  had  done  more  to  alienate  the 
people  of  Kentucky  from  the  Confede- 


CHRISTMAS  REJOICINGS. 


179 


rate  cause  than  anything  which  had 
hitherto  happened.  Bragg  was  not  re- 
moved from  his  command,  but  he  was 
ordered,  almost  as  soon  as  he  reached 
Chattanooga,  to  return  and  move  again 
to  the  north. 

On  assuming  the  command  of  the 
army  of  the  Cumberland,  known  also 
as  the  fourteenth  army  corps,  Bose- 
cranz  found  that  the  task  he  had  under- 
taken, while  it  involved  serious  respon- 
sibilities, was  beset  with  difficulties  of 
no  ordinary  kind.  The  army  was  in  a 
dilapidated  condition.  Its  ranks  had 
been  thinned.  The  men  had  to  be 
clothed  and  supplied  with  all  the  neces- 
saries for  another  campaign.  This, 
however,  was  not  all.  The  railroad 
between  Louisville  and  Nashville  was 
badly  injured,  and  could  not  be  used 
for  transport ; and,  as  was  the  case  on 
the  occasion  of  Bragg’s  former  march 
northward,  the  country  was  overrun  by 
Confederate  raiders,  who,  well  mounted, 
spread  everywhere  terror  among  the 
inhabitants,  and  otherwise  worked  infi- 
nite inconvenience.  Kosecranz  knew 
well  the  temper  of  the  government  and 
the  people.  Both  were  impatient  to 
see  his  army  in  motion.  Nothing  could 
justify  delay.  Out  of  the  war  levy  of 
six  hundred  thousand  men  called  out 
by  the  government,  he  received  rein- 
forcements ; and  the  work  of  reorganiz- 
Oct.  ation  went  rapidly  on.  It  was  on 
the  30th  of  October  he  assumed 
the  command;  and  on  the  7th  of  No- 
Jlov,  vember  the  advance  corps  of  his 
army  was  at  Nashville,  one  hun- 
dred and  eighty-three  miles  distant. 
Nashville,  which  had  been  held  by 


General  Negley,  and  which  for  a time 
had  been  in  great  peril,  had  been  re- 
lieved ; and  here  Kosecranz  established 
his  headquarters.  The  work  on  the 
railroad  was  carried  on  with  great  ener- 
gy; and  by  the  26th  of  November 
the  connection  was  complete  and 
the  cars  were  running.  From  this  date 
on  to  the  2Gth  of  December,  Kosecranz 
tells  us,  every  effort  was  bent  to  com- 
plete the  clothing  of  the  army,  to  pro- 
vide it  mth  ammunition,  and  replenish 
the  depot  at  Nashville  with  needful 
supplies,  to  insure  us  against  want  from 
the  longest  possible  detention  likely  to 
occur  by  the  breaking  of  the  Louisville 
and  Nashville  Kailroad ; and  to  insure 
this  work,  the  road  was  guarded  by  a 
heavy  force  posted  at  Gallatin.”  All 
this  looked  like  business.  It  revealed  a 
man  of  energy  and  activity,  and  pre- 
sented Kosecranz  in  striking  contrast 
with  Buell. 

Bragg  evidently  expected  that  Kose- 
cranz would  take  up  his  winter  quarters 
at  Nashville;  and  so  he  prepared  his 
own  winter  quarters  at  Murfreesboro’. 
Possibly  he  hoped,  as  Kosecranz  sug- 
gests, to  make  them  at  Nashville  before 
the  winter  was  ended.  It  was  about 
the  season  of  Christmas ; and  there  was 
evidently  a feeling  of  security  in  the 
ranks  of  the  -Confederates.  The  Con- 
federate president,  Jefferson  Davis,  was 
on  a visit  to  Bragg  at  his  private  resi- 
dence in  the  fine  mansion  of  Major 
Manning.  The  occasion  was  celebrat- 
ed with  much  festivky  and  rejoicing. 
There  was  a famous  wedding.  Mor- 
gan, the  guerrilla  chief,  was  married  to 
the  daughter  of  Mr.  Charles  Keady, 


180 


PEREYVILLE  AND  MURFREESBORO’. 


who  had  been  a member  of  Congress 
in  1853.  Davis  was  at  the  wedding. 
Most  of  the  principal  army  officers  were 
present.  The  ceremony  was  performed 
by  General  Polk,  who  put  on  the  cas- 
sock for  the  occasion  ; and  the  merry 
party  found  a means  of  increasing  their 
pleasure  by  dancing  upon  a floor  car- 
peted with  American  flags. 

During  the  time  that  Posecranz  was 
completing  his  arrangements,  there  oc- 
curred certain  minor  engagements,  such 
as  that  at  Lavergne  and  that  at  Harts- 
ville,  but  on  these  we  cannot  afford  to 
dwell.  They  were  but  preliminaries  to 
the  great  struggle  which  was  now  im- 
pending. Bragg,  over-confident,  had 
sent  a large  cavalry  force  into  West 
Tennessee  to  annoy  Grant,  and  another 
lai'ge  force  into  Kentucky  to  break  up 
tbe  railroad.  Evidently  he  had  not 
formed  a proper  judgment  on  the  man 
who  was  eagerly  watching  his  every 
movement.  In  the  absence  of  these 
forces,  and  now  that  he  had  abundant 
supplies  in  Nashville,  the  National  com- 
mander deemed  the  moment  opportune 
to  make  a dash  on  his  antagonist.  Ear- 
Dec.  ly  in  the  morning  of  the  26th  of 
26*  December,  and  amid  a heavy, 
chilling  rain,  the  National  army  began 
its  southward  march.  The  Confederate 
outposts  yielded  as  it  advanced.  It 
was  not  possible  for  them,  so  vigorous 
was  the  pressure  of  the  National  ad- 
vance, to  destroy  the  bridges  on  the 
Jefferson  and  Murfreesboro’  turnpikes. 
Dec.  C)n  the  80th,  Bragg,  finding  he 
was  about  to  be  attacked,  had 
concentrated  his  army  some  two  miles 
in  front  of  Murfreesboro’.  Stone  River, 


which  rises  in  the  high  lands  south  of 
Murfreesboro’,  flows  towards  the  north- 
west, and  passes  that  town  about  a 
mile  to  the  west.  A few  miles  above 
Nashville,  it  empties  itself  into  the 
Cumberland.  Bragg’s  army,  some  six- 
ty-two thousand  strong,  was  arranged 
in  the  following  order.  Four  divisions 
— those  of  Withers,  Cheatham,  Cle- 
burne, and  McCown — were  on  the  west 
side  of  the  river,  the  line  running  slio^ht- 
ly  in  a southwesterly  direction.  One 
division — that  of  Breckinridge — was  on 
the  east  side  of  the  river,  and  there  held 
the  approaches  to  the  town.  The  Na- 
tional army,  forty-three  thousand  strong, 
was  arranged  in  a line  as  nearly  as  pos- 
sible parallel  to  that  of  Bragg,  the  en- 
tire force  being  on  the  west  side  of  the 
river.  The  line  extended  between  three 
and  four  miles.  Crittenden  was  on  the 
left,  with  three  divisions — those  of 
Wood,  YanCleve,  and  Palmer.  Thomas 
was  in  the  centre,  with  two  divisions — 
those  of  Negley  and  Rousseau,  the  latter 
in  reserve.  McCook  was  on  the  right, 
with  three  divisions — those  of  Sheridan, 
Davis,  and  Johnson.  The  left  wing 
touched  the  river;  the  right  stretched 
a little  beyond  the  Franklin  road.  Such 
was  the  disposition  of  the  rival  forces 
on  the  morning  of  the  last  day  of  the 
year  1862. 

It  was  the  intention  of  Rosecranz  to 
attack  with  his  left ; and  consequently 
he  had  concentrated  two-thirds  of  his 
force  on  that  wing.  His  plan  was  to 
throw  his  left  and  centre  hurriedly  on 
Breckinridge  at  daybreak,  to  drive  him 
from  his  position,  to  wheel  rapidly 
round  and  strike  the  Confederates  in 


DIAGRAMS  SHOWING  THE  POSITIONS  OF  THE  ARMIES  AT  THE  BATTLE  OF 
MURFREESBORO’  OR  STONE  RIVER. 


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THE  CONFEDERATE  ATTACK. 


181 


front  and  flank,  and  pressing  through 
Murfreesboro’  to  cut  off  their  line  of 
retreat,  and  so  destroy  their  army  in 
detail.  The  plan  was  bold  and  daring, 
and  well  fitted  to  inspire  sanguine  hopes. 
On  the  east  side  of  the  river  are  com- 
manding heights.  These  taken  posses- 
sion of  and  covered  with  artillery,  the 
Nationals  would  be  able  to  strike  in  re- 
verse the  works  fronting  the  centre  of 
their  line ; and  it  was  expected  that  the 
artillery  fire  would  so  shake  the  Con- 
federates that  the  rest  of  the  plan  would 
be  easy  of  execution.  While  Thomas 
and  Palmer  were  to  open  with  skirmish- 
ing, and  so  engage  the  attention  of  the 
Confederate  centre  and  left  towards  the 
river,  VanCleve  and  Wood,  of  Critten- 
den’s division,  were  to  cross  the  river 
further  to  the  north,  fall  upon  Breckin- 
ridge, and  carry  out  the  plan  as  pro- 
posed. The  necessity  to  cross  the  river 
was  the  one  disadvantage  which  Rose- 
cranz  had  to  contend  with.  Meanwhile 
McCook,  whose  divisions,  as  we  have 
seen,  were  on  the  right,  was  to  maintain 
his  position  and  hold  the  hostile  left  in 
check. 

Singularly  enough,  Bragg  had  also 
resolved  to  take  the  offensive ; and  he, 
too,  meant  to  deal  the  first  effective 
blow  with  Ins  strong  left  arm.  There 
was  thus  on  both  sides  a similar  inten- 
tion and  a not  dissimilar  disposition  of 
force.  Both  were  strongest  on  the  left 
wing;  and,  as  a natural  consequence, 
each  was  weakest  at  the  point  of  attack. 
It  was  Bragg’s  plan  to  rest  on  Polk’s 
right,  as  on  a pivot,  and,  by  a constant 
wheeling  of  his  whole  line  towards  the 
light,  to  force  the  National  right  and 


centre  back  upon  Stone  River,  and  so 
make  himself  master  of  the  turnpike 
and  the  railroad  to  Nashville,  their 
lines  of  communication  in  the  rear. 
The  plan  was  not  less  daring — not  less 
striking — than  that  of  Rosecranz.  It 
was  evident  that  two  capable  generals 
were  confronting  each  other,  that  each 
had  found  in  the  other  a foeman  worthy 
of  his  steel,  and  that  each  was  mak- 
ing the  best  of  his  position  and  of  the 
means  at  his  command.  On  the  night 
of  the  30th  both  armies  lay  on  their 
arms. 

On  the  following  morning,  before  sun- 
rise— a mild  and  pleasant  morn-  Dgj;, 
ing  for  the  season  of  the  year — 31, 

the  National  movement  began.  Van- 
Cleve’s  division  took  the  lead,  as  di- 
rected. Two  of  his  brigades  had  made 
the  passage  in  safety  and  without  any 
interruption.  Wood,  with  his  division, 
was  ready  to  follow.  While  thus  cross- 
ing the  stream  with  haste  and  high 
hopes,  and  while  the  movement  was 
making  satisfactory  progress,  suddenly 
there  burst  forth  the  roar  of  battle  on 
the  far-off  right,  and  so  violent  was  the 
shock  that  it  was  felt  by  the  moving 
column  on  the  extreme  left.  Emerging 
from  a thick  fog  which  had  settled  over 
the  ground,  his  troops  massed  in  over- 
whelming force,  Bragg  had  fallen  furi- 
ously upon  Johnson’s  divuslon,  which 
was  on  the  extreme  National  right ; and 
so  unexpected  was  the  attack  that  two 
of  its  batteries  were  captured  before  a 
gun  could  be  fired.  It  was  a decisive 
blow.  It  came  down  like  the  crash  of 
a thunderbolt.  Johnson’s  division  was 
instantly  swept  aw’ay.  One  of  his  bri- 


siie 


182 


PERRYVILLE  AND  MURFREESBORO’. 


gade  commanders,  Kirk,  was  severely 
wounded;  another,  Willick,  had  his 
horse  killed  under  him,  and  was  made 
prisoner;  and  a large  number  of  his 
men  were  surrounded  and  made  prison- 
ers. Davis,  whose  division  stood  next, 
was  assailed  in  front  and  on  his  uncov- 
ei-ed  flank.  The  shock  was  irresistible. 
S[)ite  of  his  bravery,  he,  too,  was  com- 
l)elled  to  give  way,  with  the  loss  of 
many  guns.  Sheridan’s  division  was 
next  to  that  of  Davis,  and  still  to  the 
1‘ight.  On  this  the  victorious  Confede- 
rates fell  with  accumulated  power,  and 
with  an  energy  and  purpose  increased 
and  intensified  with  success.  And  now 
came  the  opportunity  for  a man  who 
had  in  him  the  true  military  instinct. 
All  was  lost,  if  Sheridan  could  not 
prolong  the  resistance.  But  Sheridan 
again,  as  he  had  done  before  at  Perry- 
ville,  proved  himself  equal  to  the  emer- 
gency and  rose  to  the  grandeur  of  the 
occasion. 

Kosecranz  had  been  slow  to  abandon 
his  plan  or  stop  his  aggressive  move- 
ment. It  was  not  until  he  had  received 
a second  message  from  McCook  that  he 
comprehended  the  gravity  of  the  situa- 
tion. To  the  first  call  for  help  by  that 
general,  he  returned  for  answer  that  he 
was  to  dispose  his  troops  to  the  best 
advantage  and  hold  his  ground  obsti- 
nately. ^‘Tell  him,”  said  Rosecranz, 
“to  contest  every  inch  of  the  ground. 
If  he  holds  them,  we  will  swing  into 
Murfreesboro’  with  our  left  and  cut 
them  off.”  The  second  message,  which 
informed  him  that  the  right  wing  was 
being  driven,  “ a fact  which  was  becom- 
ing apparent  by  the  rapid  movement  of 


the  noise  of  battle  toward  the  north,” 
opened  the  eyes  of  the  commander-in- 
chief ; and  while  General  Thomas  was 
ordered  to,  despatch  Rousseau  into  the 
cedar  brakes  to  the  right  and  rear  of 
Sheridan,  and  General  Crittenden  was 
ordered  to  suspend  the  movement  across 
the  river  by  VanCleve  and  Wood,  Rose- 
cranz began  to  feel  and  confess  that  his 
forward  movement  on  the  foe  was  al- 
ready paralyzed,  and  that  a change  of 
plan  was  necessary.  If  he  would  save  . 
his  right  and  defend  his  communica- 
tions, he  must  withdraw  his  left — he 
must,  in  fact,  establish  a new  line. 
Whether  he  could  do  this,  depended 
much  on  Sheridan. 

Sheridan’s  position  had  become  criti- 
cal in  the  extreme.  So,  in  truth,  had 
that  of  the  whole  National  army;  for, 
if  Sheridan  had  given  way  easily,  the 
Confederates  would  have  pressed  up- 
on both  flank  and  rear,  driven  it  to- 
ward the  river  and  cut  it  off  from  its 
lines  of  communication.  In  consequence 
of  the  defeat  and  overthrow  of  Johnson 
and  Davis,  Sheridan’s  division  was  com- 
pletely uncovered  on  his  right  flank, 
and  absolutely  unprotected  in  front. 
On  his  front,  therefore,  he  was  attacked 
by  the  Confederate  division  of  Withers, 
and  on  his  right  the  victorious  bands  of 
McCown  and  Cleburne,  flushed  with 
success,  rushed  with  tremendous  fury. 
The  first  onslaught  was  made  by  With- 
ers. The  approach  was  made  over  an 
open  cotton  field.  Sheridan  had  three 
batteries  advantageously  posted  along 
his  line ; and  as  the  Confederates  came 
forward  in  column  closed  in  mass  seve- 
ral regiments  deep,  they  were  received 


‘‘HERE’S  ALL  THAT  IS  LEFT” 


183 


with  a destructive  fire.  Sevei;ie  as  was 
this  fire,  it  was  powerless  to  check  the 
forward  march  of  the  foe.  On,  steadily 
on,  came  the  mighty  mass,  until  within 
fifty  yards  of  the  edge  of  the  timber  in 
which  lay  Sheridan’s  troops.  Springing 
to  their  feet,  the  infantry  poured  such 
a shower  of  bullets  in  the  faces  of  the 
Confederates  that  they  were  compelled 
to  halt.  Volley  succeeded  volley  in  ever- 
increasing  power  and  destructiveness. 
It  was  a very  tempest  of  iron.  The 
Confederates  wavered,  broke,  and  fled. 
Sheridan’s  men  charged  and  drove  them 
across  the  open  field  and  behind  their 
intrenchments.  The  tide  of  battle  had 
now  turned.  It  was  not,  however,  with- 
out great  loss  that  this  partial  victory 
was  won.  The  young  and  chivalrous 
Sill,  one  of  the  most  promising  officers 
in  the  National  army,  was  killed  while 
leading  the  charge.  By  this  time  the 
divisions  of  McCown  and  Cleburne 
were  on  Sheridan’s  right ; and  outflank- 
ing him,  exposed  him  to  attack  in  the 
rear.  Sheridan  was  entitled  to  retire, 
on  the  ground  that  his  flank  was  unpro- 
tected. But  he  did  better.  Retiring 
his  right  and  reserve  brigades,  and 
charging  with  the  left  into  the  woods, 
he  caused  the  Confederates  to  recoil, 
and  thus  found  time  to  swing  around  so 
as  to  bring  his  line  perpendicular  to  its 
former  direction.  He  now  faced  south 
i istead  of  east,  and  his  line  ran  parallel 
to  the  Wilkinson  turnpike.  He  was 
row  in  a better  position  to  withstand  his 
opponents.  But  he  was  opposed  by 
mighty  odds;  and  the  divisions  which 
had  driven  Johnson  and  Dc.vis  from  the 
field  oveidapped  his  right  by  nearly 


their  whole  length.  It  was  not  possible 
for  Sheridan  to  repel  them ; but  he 
could  hold  them  in  check.  To  reach 
the  Nashville  road,  they  must  put  Sher- 
idan out  of  the  way ; but  to  do  this 
implied  hard  fighting  and  time ; and 
time  was  salvation.  Doubling  in  to- 
wards their  right,  the  Confederates 
rushed  upon  him  with  all  their  might. 
But  it  was  all  to  little  purpose.  His 
troops  and  his  batteries  gathered  around 
him ; there  he  stood  like  a rock  in  mid- 
ocean against  which  the  tempestuous 
billows  surge  and  foam  and  spend  their 
fury  in  vain.  An  hour  had  now  been 
saved.  The  Confederates  crowded 
around  him  in  increasing  numbers.  A 
change  of  front  was  again  necessary. 
Pivoting,  so  to  speak,  on  the  right  flank 
of  Negley’s  division,  he  wheeled  round 
his  line  so  as  to  face  the  w^est,  and 
planted  his  batteries  on  the  salient  of 
his  front.  In  his  new  position  he  cov- 
ered Negley^s  rear,  and  with  that  com- 
mander he  was  now  forming  a wedge- 
shaped  mass.  Here  again  he  w^as  sav- 
agely assailed.  The  full  w^eight  of  the 
four  divisions  of  Hardee  and  Polk  was 
hurled  against  him  and  Negley.  Thrice 
they  came  forward  with  impetuous  fury, 
and  thrice  were  they  received  with 
a fire  so  biting  and  so  merciless  that 
they  staggered  and  fell  back.  Another 
hour  had  been  gained — another  precious 
Iiour  for  Rosecranz.  But  Sheridan  had 
done  his  utmost.  His  ammunition  was 
spent ; and  there  were  no  means  of  ob- 
taining a fresh  supply,  as,  in  the  dis- 
comfiture of  the  right,  the  ammunition 
train  had  faPen  into  the  hands  of  the 
enemy.  Nor  was  this  all.  Sill,  Roberts, 


184 


PERRYVILLE  AND  MURFREESBORO’. 


Shaeffer,  his  three  brigade  commanders, 
had  been  killed.  Even  he  now  must 
fall  back.  But  he  must  do  so  in  a man- 
ner worthy  of  the  glorious  resistance 
he  has  been  able  to  make;  and,  if  he 
has  not  powder,  he  has  steel.  Covered, 
therefore,  with  the  bayonets  of  his  re- 
serve, he  retired  unconquered  out  of 
the  cedar  thicket  toward  the  IN’ashville 
road.  It  was  eleven  o’clock  when  he 
went  out  of  the  fight.  He  had  lost 
1630  men;  but  with  their  heroic  lives 
he  had  won  three  hours  for  Rosecranz, 
and  turned  the  fortunes  of  the  day. 
“Here’s  all  that  is  left,”  he  said  sadly 
as  he  joined  his  chief. 

After  the  retirement  of  Sheridan,  the 
brunt  of  the  battle  fell  upon  Thomas. 
His  command  was  chiefly  in  and  near 
the  cedar  brakes.  He  had  done  his 
best,  as  we  have  seen,  through  Negley’s 
division,  to  sustain  Sheridan.  Negley 
was  now  exposed  to  the  attacks  of  the 
Confederates  both  in  flank  and  rear. 
Rousseau,  at  the  head  of  Thomas’  other 
division,  was  sent  to  the  front  to  the 
assistance  of  Negley.  The  Confede- 
rates, however,  continued  to  press  fur- 
ther to  the  National  rear;  and  by  and 
by,  having  reached  a commanding  posi- 
tion, they  poured  a concentrating  cross- 
fire on  those  two  divisions.  It  was  im- 
possible longer  to  resist  the  fury  and 
concentrated  strength  of  the  enemy. 
Thomas,  therefore,  withdrew  his  troops 
from  the  cedar  woods  and  formed  his 
line  between  them  and  the  Nashville 
turnpike.  It  was  a perilous  operation, 
and  was  attended  with  great  loss  of  life, 
one  brigade  alone — that  of  Lieuten- 
ant-Colonel Shepherd — losing  twenty- 


two  ofiioers  and  five  hundred  and  two 
men  in  killed  and  wounded.  In  his 
new  position  Thomas  held  his  ground 
firmly.  It  seemed,  however,  as  if  the 
battle  was  lost.  The  right  wing  of  the 
National  army  was  gone.  The  centre 
had  been  dreadfully  cut  up  and  driven 
from  the  field.  All  now  depended  on 
the  left. 

While  these  events  were  taking  place 
on  his  right  and  centre,  Rosecranz  was 
not  idle.  The  stubborn  resistance  of- 
fered by  Sheridan  and  the  two  divisions 
of  Thomas  had  given  him  time  to  make 
good  use  of  his  left  wing,  and  to  re- 
form his  line  of  battle.  We  have  seen 
that  the  National  right  had  not  only 
been  turned,  but  driven  off  the  field. 
We  have  seen  that  a similar  fate  had 
befallen  the  National  centre.  In  their 
victorious  march,  therefore,  describing, 
so  to  speak,  a circle  drawn  to  the  right, 
the  Confederates  were  moving  steadily 
on  to  what  would  have  been  the  rear 
of  the  National  left,  if  the  dispositions 
of  the  early  morning  had  remained  un- 
changed. It  was  the  possibility  of  such 
a calamity  that  lent  such  importance  to 
the  heroic  endurance  of  Sheridan  and 
Negley  and  Rousseau  and  the  men  un- 
der their  commands.  It  was  this  possi- 
bility which  gave  such  value  to  those 
pi'ecioiis  three  hours  which,  so  to  speak, 
Jiad  been  arrested  in  their  course.  When 
the  victorious  Confederates  had  borne 
down  all  opposition,  and  reached  the 
National  left,  Rosecranz  had  all  but 
completed  his  new  formation.  On  a 
commanding  knoll  which  overlooks  the 
plain  west  of  the  Mui'freesboro’  road, 
he  had  massed  his  batteries,  somewhat 


HAZEX’S  BRIGADE. 


185 


after  the  fashion  of  Napoleon  at  Auster- 
litz.  With  this  as  a point  cTappui^  he 
was  forming  his  new  line,  which  was  to 
face  no  longer  to  the  west,  as  in  the 
original  disposition  of  the  troops,  bat 
to  the  southwest,  with  the  Nashville 
turnpike  in  its  rear.  His  object,  of 
course,  was  to  bring  his  army  into  such 
a position  that  he  should  be  able  to  pre- 
sent his  front  to  the  enemy.  It  requires 
but  little  knowledge  of  the  military  art 
to  understand  how’  difficult,  how  peril- 
ous even,  it  is  for  an  army  in  such  cir- 
cumstances to  pass  from  one  formation 
to  another.  While  the  change  is  being 
made,  it  is  necessarily  disjointed  and 
helpless.  At  the  last  moment  it  seemed 
as  if  the  experiment  of  forming  a new 
line  might  fail.  Palmer’s  division  held 
the  right  of  the  National  left  wing. 
After  Sheridan  had  been  compelled  to 
retire,  and  when  Thomas’s  two  divisions 
under  Negley  and  Rousseau  had  been 
driven  through  the  cedar  woods,  the 
Confederates  fell  upon  Palmer  like  an 
avalanche.  His  two  right  brigades  w^ere 
swept  away  at  once.  If  his  left  brigade 
could  not  prolong  the  resistance,  Rose- 
cranz  would  be  struck  before  his  new 
line  was  completed ; and  the  day  would 
in  all  probability  be  lost.  But  this 
brave  brigade,  with  the  gallant  Colonel 
W.  B.  Hazen  at  its  head,  was  equal  to 
the  emergency.  The  role  of  Sheridan 
was  repeated.  Once  and  again  and  yet 
again  the  foe  came  down  upon  this  bri- 
gade with  all  its  force,  every  time  doing 
tremendous  damage,  but  every  time  re- 
pulsed with  terrible  loss.  Some  twelve 
hundred  men  thus  kept  thousands  at 
bay  until  Rosecranz,  having  adjusted 


his  new  front,  was  ready  for  the  Con- 
federate charge.  It  is  no  disparagement 
to  any  of  the  other  division  or  brigade 
commanders,  or  to  the  men  whom  they 
led,  to  say  that  to  Hazen  and  his  brigade 
must  .be  freely  accorded  the  honor  of 
having  saved  the  day.  It  was  not, 
however,  without  a great  sacrifice;  for 
nearly  one  half  of  the  brigade  had  per- 
ished. 

The  struggle,  however,  was  not  yet 
ended.  Bragg’s  entire  army,  with  the 
exception  of  a portion  of  the  division  of 
Breckinridge,  which  was  on  the  other 
side  of  the  river,  having  issued  from  the 
cedar  thickets  which  they  had  won,  was 
advancing  over  the  plain  in  one  magnifi- 
cent column.  Victory  seemed  to  be  in 
their  shout,  and  triumph  in  their  firm 
and  steady  footsteps.  It  was  a glorious 
sight,  but  it  lasted  only  for  a moment. 
Rosecranz  was  fully  prepared.  There 
was  the  loud  roar  of  artillery  and  the 
sharp  rattling  sound  of  musketry  all 
along  the  National  line.  It  was  a tem- 
pest of  “double-shotted  iron  fire.’’  It 
was  “a  sirocco  of  lead.”  Deep  lanes 
were  cut  in  the  Confederate  ranks.  The 
slaughter  was  terrible.  Again  and 
again  the  attempt  was  made  to  face 
the  desolating  storm  of  bullets ; but  in 
vain.  Blinded  by  the  sulphurous  smoke 
which,  like  a cloud-wall,  rose  up  be- 
tween them  and  Rosecranz’s  line,  and 
exposed  to  a fire  which  was  increasing 
in  rapidity  and  becoming  more  deadly 
in  its  aim,  the  troops  of  Bi'agg,  so  re- 
cently so  triumphant,  staggered,  broke 
and  fell  back  in  confusion  to  the  shelter 
of  the  woods. 

Compelled  to  abandon  all  further 


186 


PERRYVILLE  AND  MURFREESBORO^ 


attempts  on  the  new  and  powerful  front 
of  his  adversary,  Bragg  determined  to 
make  another  attack  on  the  left.  With 
this  end  in  view,  he  brought  up  the  di- 
vision of  Breckinridge,  which,  as  we 
have  seen  already,  was  during  the  fore- 
noon on  the  east  side  of  Stone  River, 
and  consequently  not  as  yet  in  the  fight. 
This  force  was  seven  thousand  strong. 
The  salient  point  of  the  National  left 
was  still  held  by  the  brave  Hazen.  His 
command,  which  had  been  so  terribly 
cut  up,  was  well  supported  now  both 
on  the  right  and  left.  About  four 
o’clock  in  the  afternoon  the  Confede- 
rates came  down  upon  this  point  with 
tremendous  energy.  The  attack,  howev- 
er, was  gallantly  received  and  repelled. 
Rosecranz,  when  the  fight  was  keenest, 
appeared  on  the  scene,  and  hastened  to 
animate  the  men  by  his  voice  and  pres- 
ence. Dashing  across  the  field  of  fire, 
a shell  grazed  his  person  and  carried  off 
the  head  of  his  chief  of  staff,  Colonel 
Garesche,  who  was  riding  at  his  side. 
But  it  was  no  time  for  idle  giief. 
Rushing  to  the  front,  he  had  words  of 
advice  and  good  cheer  for  the  soldiers. 
“ Men,”  said  he,  do  you  wish  to  know 
how  to  be  safe  ? Shoot  low.  Give  them 
a blizzard  at  their  shins  ! Do  you  wish 
to  know  how  to  be  safest  of  all  ? Give 
them  a blizzard,  and  then  charge  with 
cold  steel ! Forward,  now,  and  show 
what  you  are  made  of ! ” The  encour- 
aging words  were,  of  course,  obeyed 
with  a will.  The  first  attack  being  re- 
pelled, Breckiniadge  brought  his  second 
line  into  action.  The  result  was  the 
same.  It  broke  to  the  rear,  at  the  first 
volley.  This  was  the  last  encounter  of 


the  day.  The  sun  had  gone  down; 
and  the  two  rival  hosts,  sick  of  the 
bloodshed  and  weary  of  the  toil,  rested 
on  their  arms.  It  was  the  last  day  of 
the  year  1862.  The  night  was  unusu- 
ally beautiful.  The  stars  shone  bright 
in  an  almost  cloudless  sky.  The  silvery 
moon  shed  her  pale  beams  over  the 
cedar  brake,  where  were  many  sad 
relics  of  the  day’s  struggle — thousands 
of  brave  men,  stretched  in  the  cold  em- 
brace of  death,  thousands  more  wound- 
ed and  helpless,  piercing  the  night  air 
with  their  cries  of  agony.  There  were, 
no  doubt,  many  thoughts  of  home — 
pleasant  memories  and  bitter  recollec- 
tions of  days  that  were  gone ; but 
among  those  wounded  men  and  those 
thousaqds  of  wairiors  who,  on  both 
sides,  were  fighting  for  what  they  be- 
lieved to  be  the  right,  there  were  few 
of  those  joys  which  usually  belong  to  a 
New  Y^ear’s  morning. 

The  battle  of  the  31st  of  December 
was,  however,  only  a drawn  battle. 
The  National  troops  still  held  the  orig- 
inal ground  on  their  left ; and  their  new 
position  was  strong.  From  all  the  other 
points,  however,  they  had  been  driven 
back.  Neither  general  had  been  able 
to  carry  out  his  original  plan.  Nothing 
was  decided.  Everything  must  depend 
on  a subsequent  effort.  On  New 
Year’s  day,  the  two  armies  stood 
looking  at  each  other,  and  but  little  was 
done  in  the  way  of  fighting.  Both,  jan* 
however,  were  busy  making  pre-  b 
parations  for  a fresh  test  of  strength. 
Some  slight  fighting  took  place  in  the 
afternoon ; but  it  led  to  no  result. 
There  is  good  reason  for  believing  that 


BRAGG’S  RETREAT. 


187 


Bragg  thought  the  National  army  would 
retreat;  but  in  this  he  was  mistaken. 
Retreat  was  not  as  yet  any  part  of  Rose- 
Jan.  cranz’s  plan.  On  the  morning  of 
2*  the  2d,  Friday,  the  Confederates 
opened  four  batteries  on  the  National 
centre ; but  these  were  soon  silenced. 
A similar  demonstration  was  made  a 
little  more  to  the  National  right,  with 
a like  result.  About  three  o’clock  in 
the  afternoon  a spirited  attack  was 
made  by  Breckinridge.  The  position 
was  held  by  VanCleve’s  division,  which 
showed  a want  of  steadiness,  and  yield- 
ed to  the  force  of  the  enemy.  Critten- 
den came  to  his  rescue,  and  posted  his 
batteries  in  an  advantageous  position 
on  the  west  side  of  the  river,  while  two 
brigades  of  Negley’s  division  were  or- 
dered up.  ‘‘  The  firing  was  terrific, 
and  the  havoc  fearful.  The  enemy  re- 
treated more  rapidly  than  he  had  ad- 
vanced. In  forty  minutes  they  had  lost 
two  thousand  men.”  There  was  a re- 
treat and  a pui'suit.  But  it  was  now 
after  dark,  and  rain  was  falling  heavily. 
The  pursuit,  therefore,  was  discontin- 
ued. As  it  was,  the  Confederates  had 
been  foiled  in  all  their  efforts,  and  the 
Nationals  had  gained  some  points  of 
Jan.  advantage.  On  the  morning  of 
the  3d  it  was  still  raining  heav- 
ily,  and  nothing  was  attempted  on 
either  side.  During  the  course  of  the 
day  there  was  some  skirmishing  and 
picket-firing  all  along  the  lines ; but 
there  was  no  serious  effort,  and  but 
little  change  made  in  the  relative  posi- 
jan.  tions  of  the  two  armies.  On  the 
morning  of  the  4th,  Sunday,  it 
was  found  that  Bragg  had  retreated 


with  his  entire  army  during  the  pre- 
vious night.  He  had  left  behind  him 
about  two  thousand  of  his  sick  and 
wounded,  with  attendant  surgeons,  in 
his  hospitals.  Nothing  was  done  on 
that  day ; but  on  Monday  morn-  jao, 
ing  Thomas  entered  Murfreesboro’ 
and  drove  the  Confederate  cavalry  some 
seven  miles  towards  Manchester.  On 
the  same  day  Rosecranz  established  his 
headquarters  in  the  village.  Such  was 
the  end  of  the  famous  battle  in  the 
cedar  brakes  at  Stone  River — a battle 
in  which  were  put  hors  de  combat  nearly 
thirty  thousand  men.  The  Confede- 
rates had  lost  over  14,000  and  the  Na- 
tionals over  15,000  men.  More  than 
one-third  of  the  National  artillery  and 
a large  portion  of  its  train  had  been 
captured.  Undecisive  as  had  been  the 
terrible  struggle — one  of  the  greatest 
in  the  war — it  had  at  least  determined 
this — that  the  Confederates  could  not 
break  through  the  line  of  investment 
between  the  Cumberland  Mountains 
and  the  Free  States.  Two  desperate 
attempts  had  been  made ; but  both  had 
failed. 

The  result  of  the  battle  of  Murfrees- 
boro’ filled  the  National  heart  with  joy. 
It  was  natural  that  it  should  be  so. 
On  the  first  day  Rosecranz  was  all  but 
defeated,  when  he  turned  the  tide  of 
victory,  saved  his  army,  and  compelled 
his  antagonist  to  leave  the  field.  If  he 
had  not  completely  accomplished  his 
purpose — if  the  possession  of  Middle 
Tennessee  would  still  have  to  be  con- 
tested— the  presumption  now  was  that 
in  the  next  struggle  that  important 
question  would  be  settled  in  favor  .f 


188 


PERRYVILLE  AND  MURFREESRORO’. 


the  North.  This,  however,  was  not  all. 
The  victory,  partial  as  it  was,  was  sin- 
gularly opportune.  The  summer  cam- 
paign had  been,  all  over,  the  reverse  of 
favorable  to  the  National  arms.  The 
Confederates,  both  in  the  east  and  west, 
had  been  daringly  aggressive ; and  the 
successes  which  had  attended  and  re- 
warded their  efforts  pained  and  dis- 
couraged the  people  of  the  North. 
Grant,  after  luka  and  Corinth,  had  sus- 
tained a series  of  checks  in  his  onward 
movement  towards  Vicksburg ; and  the 
disastrous  battle  of  Fredericksburg, 
which  was  fought  on  the  13th  of  De- 
cember, had  produced  a shock  from 
which  neither  the  government  nor  the 
people  had  wholly  recovered.  Light 
seemed  to  break  in  upon  the  darkness 
when  the  tidings  of  Murfreesboro’  were 
flashed  across  the  land.  There  was  a 
general  who  knew  how  to  handle  his 
troopa.  There  were  men  who  knew 
how  to  follow  and  obey.  By  their 
joir";  efforts  they  had  snatched  victory 
out  of  defeat.  It  was  the  grateful  and 
delighted  sentiments  of  an  entire  people 
which  President  Lincoln  telegraphed 
to  Rosecranz,  “God  bless  you  and  all 
of  you ; please  tender  to  all,  and  accept 


for  yourself,  the  nation’s  gratitude  for 
your  and  their  skill,  endurance,  and 
dauntless  courage.”  The  words  of  the 
general-in-chief  were  equally  expressive 
of  the  feeling  of  the  Northern  people. 
“ The  victoiy,”  he  said  in  greeting  Rose- 
cranz, “ was  well  earned,  and  one  of  the 
most  brilliant  of  the  war.  You  and 
your  brave  men  have  won  the  gratitud3 
of  the  army  and  the  admiration  of  the 
world.” 

During  the  time  that  the  Confede- 
rates under  Bragg  were  engaging  the 
whole  attention  and  all  the  available 
forces  of  Rosecranz,  the  superior  cavalry 
of  the  South  were  scouring  Tennessee 
and  Kentucky,  plundering  the  inhabit- 
ants and  destroying  the  railroads.  Of 
these  marauding  bands,  the  principal 
were  under  the  lead  of  Forrest  and  Mor- 
gan. By  and  by  they  were  compelled 
to  desist ; and  attention  began  to  centre 
again  on  Chattanooga,  near  which,  it 
was  evident,  another  trial  of  arms  must 
take  place.  Of  this,  however,  we  shall 
have  occasion  to  treat  in  a subsequent 
chapter.  Our  attention,  meanwhile, 
must  be  directed  to  certain  important 
events  which  had  already  happened  on 
the  Atlantic  border. 


WASHINGTON  AND  RICHMOND. 


189 


r 


CHAPTER  XIII. 


The  Armies  of  the  — What  They  Have  Done. — The  Eastern  Campaign.  —The  Object  of  the  Eastern  Cam- 

paign.— Too  Much  Importance  Attached  to  Kichmond.  — General  Scott. — The  Army  of  the  Potomac, — McClellan 
Commander-in-Chief. — His  Delay. — The  Nation  Impatient, — President  Lincoln  Urgent. — A Council  of  Gen- 
erals.— McClellan’s  Secresy. — Had  He  a Plan? — War  Order  No.  1. — Edwin  M.  Stanton. — McClellan’s  Plan. — 
New  Army  Arrangements. — Three  Great  Departments. — The  West  Under  Halleck. — The  Mountain  Department 
Under  Fremont. — The  East  Under  McClellan. — Manassas  Evacuated. — McClellan’s  Promenade.  —Quaker  Guns, 
— The  Office  of  Commander-in-Chief  Abolished. — The  Movement  to  the  Peninsula  Begun. — The  Capital  not 
Sufficiently  Defended. — McDowell’s  Command  Detached  and  Detained. — McClellan  Complains. — Lincoln  Re- 
monstrates.— Before  Yorktown. — Magruder. — The  Nationals  Brought  to  a Halt. — The  Folly  of  Manassas 
Repeated. — McClellan  Asks  for  More  Troops. — Franklin’s  Division  Sent  to  His  Aid. — The  Firing  Com- 
menced.— Charge  of  the  Vermont  Brigade. — Compelled  to  Fall  Back. — Another  Charge. — The  First  Assault 
on  the  Confederate  Position  Fails. — The  Twenty-Sixth. — Another  Assault, — A Redoubt  Carried  and  De- 
stroyed.— Another  Pause, — The  Third  of  May. — All  Things  are  Ready. — Further  Delay. — Confederate  Retreat. 
— Magruder’s  Statement, — McClellan’s  Great  Mistake. — The  Government  Disappointed. — National  Indigna- 
tion.— McClellan’s  Excuses. — Lincoln’s  Letter. — The  Story  of  Manassas  Repeated. 


For  reasons  already  given,  we  have 
lingered  a whole  year  with  the 
armies  of  the  West.  We  have 
followed  Grant  and  his  victorious  le- 
gions from  Cairo  to  Corinth,  and  seen 
them  driving  the  Confederates  before 
them,  until  Kentucky  and  Tennessee 
were  secured  to  the  Union,  and  un- 
til Vicksburg  and  Port  Hudson  alone 
barred  the  free  navigation  of  the  Missis- 
sippi. We  have  seen  a National  flotilla 
under  Foote  and  Davis  driving  the  en- 
emy from  stronghold  after  stronghold 
on  the  great  river  until  the  National  flag 
was  again  floating  over  the  city  of  Mem- 
phis. We  have  followed  Farragut  and 
his  fleet  from  the  gulf  to  New  Orleans, 
and  seen  that  most  important  of  south- 
ern cities  wrenched  from  the  grasp  of 
the  rebellious  Confederacy.  We  have 
followed  Buell  from  Coiinth  to  Chatta- 
nooga, and  from  Chattanooga  to  Louis- 
ville. We  have  returned  with  him  on 
his  backward  march,  and  seen  him  suc- 


cessfully resist  and  even  force  the  re- 
treat of  the  Confederates  at  Perryville. 
We  have  followed  the  same  army  under 
its  new  leader,  Rosecranz,  and  witnessed 
the  bloody  and  well-contested,  though 
indecisive,  battle  of  Murfreesboro’ — a 
battle  in  which,  although  neither  side 
could  justly  claim  the  victory,  the  Na- 
tionals not  only  held  their  ground,  but 
again  compelled  their  antagonists  to  re- 
tire before  them. 

During  that  time,  important  opera- 
tions had  been  going  on  in  the  East.  It 
becomes  a necessity,  therefore,  for  us 
now  to  leave  the  valley  of  the  Missis- 
sippi and  return  to  the  Atlantic  border. 
The  object  of  the  western  campaign, 
which  was  the  opening  of  the  Missis- 
sippi River,  was  in  a fair  way  of  being 
accomplished.  The  object  of  the  east- 
ern or  peninsular  campaign  was  the 
capture  of  Richmond.  It  will  be  our 
business,  in  the  chapters  which  imme- 
diately follow,  to  ascertain  how  this 


190 


YORKTOWN. 


campaign  had  been  conducted,  and  with 
what  success. 

There  are  certain  vexed  questions  re- 
garding the  management  of  the  East- 
ern forces — questions  the  discussion  of 
which  has  led  to  a large  amount  of  ill- 
feeling  without  producing  any  satisfac- 
tory result.  Into  these  questions  we 
will  not  enter  further  than  is  necessary 
for  the  elucidation  of  our  subject.  It  is 
quite  possible  that  General  McClellan 
attached  too  much  importance  to  the 
capture  of  Kichmond.  There  can  be 
no  doubt,  we  think,  that  the  strength 
of  the  Confederacy  lay  rather  in  the 
strength  of  its  armies  than  in  the  pos- 
session of  any  particular  locality,  city, 
or  stronghold.  The  capture  of  Wash- 
ington by  the  Confederates  in  the  early 
stages  of  the  Avar  might  have  pi*oved 
fatal  to  the  Union  cause.  But  it  would 
be  absurd  to  say  that  Kichmond  was  to 
the  South  all  that  Washington  AA’as  U) 
the  North  and  to  the  National  cause 
generally.  The  capture  of  Washington, 
the  seat  of  the  National  government, 
and  where  'were  treasured  all  the  Na- 
tional archives,  would  certainly  ha\^e 
been  followed  by  the  recognition  of  the 
Confederacy  by  foreign  governments. 
It  might  have  had  another  result  equally 
bad,  perhaps  worse.  The  holders  of 
the  capital  might  have  been  regarded 
as  the  rightful  rulers  of  the  republic; 
and  the  hesitating  democratic  sentiment 
of  the  North  might  haA^e  enabled  them 
to  impose  their  own  terms  on  the  nation, 
and  so  not  only  resist,  but  throAv  back 
the  revolution  for  an  indefinite  period. 
Even  in  a sectional  point  of  view  no 
such  importance  could  attach  to  Kich- 


mond. It  Avas  the  most  influential  town 
in  the  Confederacy ; that  was  all.  The 
Confederate  government  could  have 
been  cariied  on  in  any  other  town ; and 
the  strength  of  the  Confederacy  Avould 
still  have  consisted  in  the  streno^th  of 
the  army.  The  correctness  of  this  prin- 
ciple was  abundantly  proved  in  the 
later  stages  of  the  war.  .Charleston  fell 
by  the  march  of  Sherman;  Kichmond 
yielded  to  the  persistent  operations  of 
Grant ; but  neither  the  one  general  nor 
the  other  cared  to  enter  the  city  which 
he  had  conquered.  In  the  estimation 
of  each  the  extermination  of  the  army 
was  more  important  than  the  occupation 
of  the  city. 

It  had,  however,  been  decided,  or 
rather  it  was  taken  for  granted,  that 
the  capture  of  Kichmond  Avas  a matter 
of  primary  importance.  The  question, 
therefore,  was  how  it  could  be  most 
easily  and  effectively  accomplished. 
One  thing,  it  was  obvious  from  the  out- 
set, must  not  be  overlooked  in  any  plan 
which  might  be  adopted.  Washington 
must  not,  in  any  case,  be  left  unpro- 
tected. This  condition  complied  with 
and  a plan  agreed  upon,  it  was  abso- 
lutely necessary  that  action  be  taken  at 
once.  General  McClellan,  as  we  have 
seen,  was  appointed  to  the  command  of 
the  army  of  the  Potomac  in  July,  1861. 
On  tlie  1st  of  November,  on  the  j^ov. 
resignation  of  General  Scott,  he 
was  promoted  to  the  chief  command  of 
the  armies  of  the  United  States.  No 
general,  for  the  time  being,  so  com- 
pletely commanded  the  confidence  of 
the  government  and  the  people.  He 
was  by  far  the  most  popular  and  most 


McCLELLAN’3  INACTIO:!. 


191 


trusted  man  in  the  army.  Although 
commander-in-chief,  he  still  remained 
at  the  head  of  the  army  of  the  Potomac. 
At  the  date  of  his  elevation,  that  army 
had  an  elTective  strength  of  one  hun- 
dred and  thirty-four  thousand  two  hun- 
dred and  eighty-five  men,  with  some 
three  hundred  guns.  On  the  1st  of 
February  the  aggregate  strength  of 
the  army  had  risen  to  two  hundred 
and  twenty-two  thousand  one  hundred 
and  ninety-six,  there  being  present  for 
duty  over  one  hundred  and  ninety  thou- 
sand men.  The  Confederate  force  in 
front  of  him  at  Manassas,  where  they 
had  remained  since  the  battle  of  Bull 
Bun,  did  not  exceed  fifty-five  thousand. 
In  regard  to  drill  and  equipment,  no  finer 
army  than  that  under  McClellan  was 
ever  held  in  readiness  for  battle.  Abso- 
lutely trusted  by  the  government,  and 
permitted  to  mature  his  plans  in  secret, 
it  was  confidently  expected  that  with 
such  an  army  he  would  make  such  a 
dash  upon  his  antagonist  as  would  force 
the  war  to  a hurried  conclusion. 

For  reasons  best  known  to  himself, 
McClellan  was  in  no  haste  to  put  his 
army  in  motion.  There  was  no  end  of 
parades — no  end  of  magnificent  manoeu- 
vre in  g — which  for  a time  delighted  and 
astonished  the  people  of  Washington. 
Autumn  was  allowed  to  pass  by,  and 
the  wdnter  of  1861 ; and  yet  nothing 
was  done.  An  excuse  for  delay  was 
always  at  hand.  It  was  too  hot,  or  it 
was  too  cold.  The  foliage  on  the  trees 
was  as  yet  too  thick,  or  the  roads  were 
too  heavy  for  rapid  and  successful  mili- 
tary operations.  The  people  began  to 
manifest  impatience.  News  of  the  suc- 


cess of  the  army  of  the  West  began  to 
arrive ; and  the  conduct  of  Halleck  and 
Grant  was  contrasted  with  the  persist- 
ent inaction  of  McClellan.  The  daily 
exhibitions  of  the  army  of  the  Potomac 
no  longer  pleased — they  disgusted  the 
populace.  On  to  Bichmond,”  became 
the  popular  and  imperious  cry.  Through 
the  press,  from  the  platform  and  from 
the  pulpit,  the  words  rang  out  over  the 
length  and  breadth  of  the  North,  finding 
a response  in  every  loyal  heart.  There 
were  many  who  did  not  hesitate  to  -af- 
firm that  McClellan  was  at  heart  in  sym- 
pathy with  the  rebellion.  The  govern- 
ment caught  the  contagion,  and  all  the 
more  readily  that  the  president  had 
for  some  time  been  dissatisfied  with 
McClellan.  He  saw  that  the  heart  of 
the  nation  was  sinking.  Expenses  had 
been  frightful,  and  there  had  been  no 
result.  The  treasury  was  all  but  ex- 
hausted ; and  there  was  the  danger  of 
the  loss  of  public  credit.  He  could 
obtain  no  satisfactory  explanation  from 
the  commander-in-chief.  There  were 
signs  of  disaffection  in  the  ranks ; and 
the  subordinate  ofiScers  were  impatient 
and  sick  of  their  life  of  inaction.  They 
were  there  to  protect  their  country  and 
to  repel  the  foe;  but  they  had  been 
compelled  to  spend  precious  months  in 
daily  repetition  of  a meaningless  show. 

In  these  circumstances  the  president 
summoned  Generals  McDowell  and 
Franklin  to  a conference  with  himself 
and  his  cabinet.  To  them  he  frankly 
revealed  his  distress.  ^‘If  something  is 
not  soon  done,”  he  said,  ‘‘  the  bottom 
will  be  out  of  the  whole  affair ; and  if 
General  McClellan  does  not  want  to  use 


192 


YORKTOWj^. 


the  army,  I would  like  to  horroiv  it,  pro- 
vided I can  see  how  it  could  be  made 
to  do  something.”  He  had  been  to  the 
house  of  the  commander-in-chief ; but 
he  had  not  been  admitted  to  his  pre- 
sence. It  was  necessary  that  he  should 
talk  to  somebody ; and  therefore  he 
had  sent  for  them,  to  learn,  if  possi- 
ble, whether  there  was  any  probability 
of  an  early  movement  of  the  array. 
McDowell  was  in  favor  of  immediate 
action.  He  would  aJvance  with  a heavy 
force  on  the  front  and  flanks  of  the  Con- 
federates at  Manassas.  He  believed 
that  their  numbers  were  greatly  exag- 
gerated, and  that  it  would  not  be  diffi- 
cult to  make  an  end  of  the  disgraceful 
blockade,  and  drive  the  besieging  army 
back  upon  Kichmond.  Franklin,  who 
was  somewhat  in  the  confidence  of  Mc- 
Clellan, and  knew  at  least  part  of  his 
plan,  was  in  favor  of  something  being 
done  at  once ; but  he  approved  of  a 
movement  upon  Kichmond  by  way  of 
the  lower  Chesapeake  and  the  Virginia 
peninsula.  There  were  further  confer- 
ences, McDowell  and  Franklin  mean- 
while consulting  with  other  prominent 
army  officials.  The  result  was  that  these 
two  generals  agreed  as  to  the  necessity 
of  moving  directly  on  Manassas;  and 
they  recommended  such  a movement. 
At  this  stage,  however,  the  cabinet  was 
somewhat  divided;  and  it  was  agreed 
to  hold  another  conference,  and  to  ask 
General  McClellan  to  be  present  and 
give  his  own  views  on  the  question. 
The  meeting  was  held  accordingly ; 
General  McClellan  appeared,  but  took 
no  part  in  the  discussion.  He  showed 
signs  of  being  offended.  To  McDow^ell, 


who  apologized  for  the  position  in 
which  himself  and  Franklin  were 
placed,  he  said  haughtily  that  they 
could  have  any  opinion  they  pleased. 
When  asked  by  the  president  ^Svhat 
and  when  anything  could  be  done,”  his 
answer  was  ‘‘  that  the  case  was  so  plain 
that  a blind  man  could  see  it.”  To  the 
question  of  the  secretary  of  the  treasury 
as  to  where  and  how  he  proposed  to 
use  the  ai-my,  he  gave  for  answer  only 
that  ‘The  movements  in  Kentucky  were 
to  precede  any  from  Washington.”  At 
the  same  time  he  expressed  his  willing- 
ness to  develop  his  plans,  if  he  was 
ordered  to  do  so,  although  he  said  it 
was  his  conviction  that  always,  in  mili- 
tary matters,  the  fewer  who  knew  the 
plans  to  be  carried  out  the  better. 

A few  days  afterwards  his  plan, 
which  was  to  abandon  his  present  base 
and  proceed  towards  Kichmond  by  way 
of  the  lower  Chesapeake,  was  laid  be- 
fore the  president.  The  president  liked 
it  not.  It  implied  further  delay.  It 
would,  besides,  be  a tedious  operation ; 
and,  so  far  as  he  could  see,  it  promised 
little.  Determined  to  be  done  with  this 
do-nothing  policy,  the  president, 
on  the  2Tth  of  January,  issued  his 
famous  War  Order  No.  1,  in  which  he 
directed  the  2 2d  of  February  fol-  jan, 
lowing  “to  be  the  day  for  a gen-  27# 
eral  movement  of  the  land  and  naval 
forces  of  the  United  States  against  the 
insurgent  forces.”  Four  days  after- 
wards a special  order  was  issued  to 
McClellan,  directing  .him  to  form  all 
the  disposable  force  of  the  army  of  the 
Potomac,  after  providing  for  the  safety 
of  Washington,  into  an  expedition  for 


MANASSAS  EVACUATED. 


193 


the  immediate  object  of  seizing  and  oc- 
cupying a point  on  the  railroad  south- 
east of  Manassas  Junction,  the  details 
of  the  movement  to  be  left  to  the  dis- 
cretion of  the  commander-in-chief.  This 
dispatch  on  the  part  of  the  president  has 
generally  been  attributed  to  the  energy 
and  firmness  of  Edwin  M.  Stanton,  who 
had,  a few  weeks  before,  succeeded 
Cameron  as  secretary  of  war.  Against 
this  order  McClellan  remonstrated. 
This  led  to  a correspondence  between 
him  and  the  president,  each  advocating 
his  own  plan  in  preference  to  that  of 
the  other.  The  result  was  that  the 
whole  question  was  submitted  to  a 
council  of  twelve  officers,  McClellan’s 
plan  being  approved  of  by  eight  out  of 
the  twelve.  The  president,  of  course, 
acquiesced ; and  on  the  same  day  orders 
Were  issued  from  the  War  Department 
for  the  procuring  of  transports  for  the 
troops  and  the  other  necessaries  of  war. 
Mar.  On  the  8th  of  March  the  presi- 
8*  dent  issued  a general  order,  direct- 
ing the  army  of  the  Potomac  to  be  divid- 
ed into  four  corps,  to  be  commanded  re- 
spectively by  Generals  McDowell,  Sum- 
ner, Heintzelman,  and  Keyes.  A fifth 
corps,  formed  from  his  own  and  General 
Shields’  division,  was  under  the  com- 
mand of  General  Banks.  The  command 
of  the  National  troops  in  the  valley  of 
the  Mississippi  and  westward  of  the 
longitude  of  Knoxville  in  Tennessee, 
was  assigned  to  General  Halleck;  and 
a Mountain  Department,  covering  the 
region  between  McClellan  and  Halleck, 
was  created  and  placed  under  the  com- 
mand of  General  Fremont.  The  com- 
manders of  departments  were  instructed 


to  report  directly  to  the  secretary  of 
war,  and  not,  as  formerly,  through  the 
commander-in-chief.  This  order  gave 
great  offense  to  McClellan.  Later  on 
the  same  day,  another  order  directed 
that  no  change  should  be  made  in  the 
base  of  operations  without  leaving  a 
competent  force  for  the  protection  of 
Washington;  that  not  more  than  fifty 
thousand  troops  should  be  moved  to- 
ward the  scene  of  intended  operations 
until  the  navigation  of  the  Potomac 
should  be  freed  from  the  enemy’s  bat- 
teries and  other  obstructions” ; that  the 
new  movement  on  Chesapeake  Bay 
should  begin  as  early  as  the  18th  of 
March,  and  that  the  general-in-chief 
should  ‘‘be  responsible  that  it  moves 
so  early  as  that  day”;  and  that  “the 
army  and  navy  co-operate  in  an  im- 
mediate effort  to  capture  the  enemy’s 
batteries  upon  the  Potomac,  between 
Washington  and  the  Chesapeake  Bay.” 
On  learning  that  McClellan  was  about 
to  move,  Johnston  (March  9th)  j^jar, 
evacuated  Manassas,  and  hastened 
towards  Bichmond,  carrying  everything 
with  him.  It  was  a timely  and  masterly 
retreat,  and  evinced  that  ability  for 
which  Johnston  has  obtained  credit 
alike  from  friend  and  foe,  and  which 
stamjDed  him  as  one  of  the  greatest 
commanders  developed  on  either  side 
during  the  progress  of  the  war.  j^iar. 
On  the  ensuing  morning  McClel- 
Ian  made  a “promenade,”  as  it  has 
been  called,  to  the  deserted  position, 
when  his  soldiers  were  mortified  to 
witness  the  miserable  earthworks  and 
Quaker  guns — logs  of  wood  shaped  like 
cannon — by  which  an  army  little  more 


194 


YORKTOWlSr. 


than  one-fourth  their  own,  had  kept 
them  so  long  at  bay.  Undoubtedly  this 
discovery  irritated  the  president  greatly, 
Mid*went  far  to  shake  his  faith  in  the 
ability  or  honesty  of  the  general-in- 
chief. It  is  not  wonderful,  therefore, 
the  day  on  which  McClel- 
Ian  returned  from  the  “prome- 
nade,” he  should  have  been  relieved, 
by  a special  order  from  the  president, 
of  all » the  military  departments  except 
that  of  the  Potomac.  The  reason  as- 
signed for  this  change  was  that  the 
campaign  on  which  the  army  of  the  Po- 
tomac was  about  to  enter  would  require 
all  the  resources  and  all  the  attention 
of  its  commander.  It  is  impossible,  how- 
ever, not  to  perceive  in  each  of  these 
successive  orders  a manifestation  of  dis- 
trust— an  increasing  want  of  confidence 
in  the  commander-in-chief. 

The  movement  which  had  been  agreed 
upon  was  carried  out  with  all  prompti- 
tude. There  was  no  unnecessary  de- 
lay. There  were  chartered  one  hundred 
and  thirteen  steamers,  one  hundred 
and  eighty-eight  schooners,  eighty-eight 
barges;  and  by  means  of  these  there 
were  transported,  in  thirty-seven  days, 
to  Fortress  Monroe,  one  hundred  and 
twenty-one  thousand  troops,  fourteen 
thousand  five  hundred  and  ninety-two 
cattle,  eleven  hundred  and  fifty  M^ag- 
ons,  forty-four  batteries,  seventy-four 
ambulances,  as  well  as  a vast  quantity 
of  equipage.  McClellan  left  Washing- 
April  fc>n  on  the  1st  of  April.  On  the 
b same  day  he  sent  to  the  adjutant- 
general  a detailed  statement  of  the 
number  and  disposition  of  the  forces 
which  he  had  left  behind.  The  number 


of  men  left  for  the  avowed  purpose  of 
protecting  the  capital  was  about  sev- 
enty-three thousand.  These,  however, 
were  so  disposed  that  not  more  than 
twenty  thousand,  and  they  but  imper- 
fectly organized,  were  all  that  were  left 
for  the  defense  of  Washington  and  Man- 
assas Junction.  The  president  was  indig- 
nant ; and  General  McDowell’s  corps 
was  detached  from  McClellan’s  com- 
mand and  detained  at  the  capital.  Mc- 
Clellan complained  and  delayed  action. 
In  a letter  WTitten  by  him  at  the  time  to 
McClellan,  Lincoln  explained  and  fully 
justified  the  course  which  he  had  been 
forced  to  adopt.  In  the  same  letter, 
Lincoln  forcibly  reminded  him  that  in- 
action was  no  longer  to  be  tolerated. 
“It  is  indispensable  to  yo^^,”  he  wrote, 
“that  you  strike  a blow.  I am  power- 
less to  help  this.”  ^ “ The  country 

will  not  fail  to  note,”  he  added,  “is  now 
noting,  that  the  present  hesitation  to 
move  upon  an  intrenched  camp  is  but 
the  story  of  Manassas  repeated.”  He 
wrote  him,  he  assured  him,  in  the  ut- 
most kindness ; but  his  last  words  were 
“ You  must  act.” 

McClellan  did  not  pay  much  atten- 
tion to  the  injunction.  He  seemed  to 
feel  that  he  was  distrusted;  and  his 
hesitation  to  strike  a blow  that  might 
be  ineffectual,  almost  implied  distrust 
in  himself.  When  McClellan’s  army 
fairly  landed  on  the  peninsula,  there 
ought  to  have  been  no  hesitation.  A 
bold  and  vigorous  blow  promptly  dealt 
could  scarcely  have  failed  to  drive 
the  enemy  before  him ; it  would  cer- 
tainly have  redeemed  his  reputation  for 
bravery.  The  Confederates  under  Gen- 


Ai'%  '1, 

gir";,::'  „ 


LEE’S  MILLS. 


195 


eral  Magruder  did  not  exceed  in  number 
eleven  thousand  men.  At  the  time 
of  his  landing,  this  was  the  only  force 
opposed  to  him  on  the  peninsula ; and 
he  was  aware  of  the  possibility  of  Ma- 
gi’uder  being  reinforced  by  Johnston. 
This  force  was  so  divided  by  the  neces- 
sity of  placing  fixed  garrisons  at  York- 
town,  on  Gloucester  Point,  and  on  Mul- 
berry Island,  on  the  James  River,  that 
the  line  in  front  of  McClellan’s  great 
army,  and  stretching  thirteen  miles 
from  Yorktown  across  the  peninsula, 
did  not  consist  of  more  than  five  or  six 
thousand  men.  On  this  point  authori- 
ties differ,  but  the  largest  estimate  does 
not  give  Magruder  for  this  line  more 
than  eight  thousand.  Magruder’s  own 
claim  was  that,  exclusive  of  the  garri- 
sons above  named,  he  had  only  five 
thousand  men.  The  National  army 
April  began  to  move  forward  from  Fort- 
ress  Monroe  on  the  3d  of  April. 
McClellan’s  avowed  object  was  to  drive 
or  capture  Magruder’s  army  before  it 
could  be  reinforced  by  Johnston.  The 
Nationals  moved  steadily  but  slowly  in 
two  columns,  the  one  column  by  the 
old  Yorktown  road,  the  other  along  the 
Warwick  road.  These  columns  were 
commanded  respectively  by  Generals 
Heintzelman  and  Keyes,  Heintzelman 
being  on  the  right  and  Keyes  on  the 
April  left.  On  the  afternoon  of  the 
5th,  the  advance  of  each  column 
was  compelled  to  halt  by  Magruder’s 
fortified  lines — ^the  right  near  Yorktown 
on  the  York  River,  and  the  left  near 
Winn’s  Mill  on  the  Warwick  River. 
What  did  McClellan  now  do  ? Did  he 
remember  and  seek  to  repair  the  blun- 


der he  made  at  Manassas?  Did  he 
remember  the  kindly  but  withal  sting- 
ing words  of  the  president,  “It  is  indis- 
pensable to  you  that  you  strike  a blow.” 
“You  must  act”?  Not  at  all.  The  same 
demon  of  delay  had  taken  hold  of  him. 
The  folly  of  Manassas  was  repeated,  if 
possible,  in  more  aggravated  form.  In 
place  of  acting  at  once,  he  commenced 
the  tedious  operations  of  a regular  siege, 
casting  up  intrenchments  and  otherwise 
acting  like  a field  officer  of  the  middle 
ages,  rather  than  a skilled  and  practical 
general  of  modern  times.  Meantime  he 
wrote  complaining  letters  to  Washing- 
ton, declaring  it  to  be  his  conviction 
that  he  would  have  to  fight  all  the 
available  troops  of  the  Confederates 
not  far  from  his  present  position.  “ Do 
not  force  me  to  do  so,”  he  said,  “ with 
diminished  numbers ; but,  whatever 
your  decision  may  be,  I will  leave  noth- 
ing undone  to  obtain  success.”  At 
McClellan’s  urgent  request,  Franklin’s 
division  of  McDowell’s  corps  was  sent 
to  his  aid.  Towards  the  end  of  April 
the  National  forces  in  front  of  York- 
town amounted  to  close  upon  one  hun- 
dred and  forty  thousand  men;  and  of 
these,  one  hundred  and  twelve  thousand 
were  ready  for  duty.  In  addition  to 
these,  McClellan  could  count  on  the 
co-operation  and  aid  of  Wool’s  force, 
which  was  at  Fortress  Monroe. 

It  was  surely  of  all  things  the  most 
natural  that  the  government  and  people 
should  expect  that  some  prompt  and 
effective  work  would  be  done  with  an 
army  so  large  and  so  splendidly  equip- 
ped. McClellan  left  Fortress  Monroe,  as 
we  have  seen,  on  the  3d  of  April.  In- 


196 


YORKTOWN. 


stead  of  liastening  forward  and  making 
a dash  on  the  Confederate  position,  he 
occupied  his  time  in  throwing  up  earth- 
works and  advantageously  placing  his 
April  guns.  It  was  the  16th  before 
any  serious  encounter  took  place. 
Ther^e  had  been  cannonading  on  both 
sides,  and  some  skirmishing ; but  as  yet 
no  regular  encounter.  On  the  day  just 
mentioned,  McClellan  discovered  that 
the  Confederates  were  strens^thenin^ 
their  works  at  Lee’s  Mills,  on  a stream- 
let of  the  Warwick  Liver.  On  these 
he  ordered  fire  to  be  opened.  Captain 
Mott,  with  the  New  York  battery,  took 
a position  on  the  left  of  the  enemy’s 
works ; Captain  Bartlett,  with  the 
Rhode  Island  Battery  B,  placed  him- 
self on  the  right;  the  Third  Vermont 
regiment,  acting  as  skirmishers,  were 
thrown  out  in  front,  while  a force  of 
some  strength  was  posted  in  the  rear 
as  a reserve.  About  eight  o’clock  in 
the  morning  the  first  section  of  Mott’s 
battery,  consisting  of  two  ten-pounder 
Parrott  guns,  moved  forward  to  within  a 
thousand  yards  of  the  Confederate  work, 
and  took  post  under  cover  of  a wood  on 
the  Warwick  road.  Fire  was  immedi- 
ately opened.  The  Confederates  made 
a brisk  response ; and  such  was  the  ac- 
curacy of  their  aim  that  three  of  Mott’s 
men  were  killed  and  four  wounded. 
Mott  brought  up  the  remainder  of  his 
guns;  and  the  cannonading  which  en- 
sued was  kept  up  on  both  sides  for 
two  hours,  when  the  Confederates  were 
driven  back.  At  this  stage  General 
Smith,  who  had  charge  of  the  Vermont 
brigade,  attempted  to  throw  a force 
across  the  stream,  with  a view  to  take 


the  defenses  by  assault.  It  was  now 
about  three  in  the  afternoon.  Colonel 
Hyde  took  charge  of  the  storming  par- 
ty, which  consisted  of  four  companies, 
D,  E,  F,  and  K,  of  the  Third  Vermont 
regiment.  These  companies  were  fresh, 
not  having  taken  any  part  in  the  en- 
gagement of  the  morning ; and  to  cover 
them  as  they  advanced,  four  batteries 
of  light  artillery,  commanded  respect- 
ively by  Ayres,  Mott,  Kennedy,  and 
Wheeler  were  placed  on  advantageous 
ground.  As  the  batteries  opened  a con- 
certed fire  on  the  fort,  throwing  shot, 
shell  and  spherical  case  into  it,  in  rapid 
succession,  the  four  companies  dashed 
forward,  plunged  into  the  water,  which 
in  some  places  reached  to  their  arm-pits, 
and  made  for  the  work.  While  the 
men  were  still  in  the  water,  a terrific 
fire  was  opened  upon  them  by  a body 
of  Confederates  who  had  hitherto  lain 
low  and  concealed  themselves.  On 
pushed  the  brave  little  band;  and  in 
spite  of  their  soaked  condition,  and, 
what  was  still  worse,  their  wet  cart- 
ridge-boxes, they  reached  the  fort  and 
drove  their  antagonists  out  of  the  rifle- 
pit.  Here  they  held  their  position  for 
nearly  half  an  hour.  Strange  to  say, 
while  thousands  of  men  were  close  at 
hand,  reinforcements  failed  to  reach 
them  in  time.  Observing  the  advance 
of  two  or  three  fresh  Confederate  regi- 
ments, the  brave  little  battalion  had  no 
choice  but  fall  back  and  recross  the 
river.  In  crossing  and  recrossirg,  they 
sustained  very  considerable  loss. 

As  soon  as  the  remnant  of  these  com- 
panies had  returned  wilhin  their  own 
lines,  the  National  batteries,  which  for 


THE  BOMBARDMENT. 


197 


a time  had  been  silent,  again  opened 
fire.  Orders  were  given  to  the  Sixth 
Vermont  regiment  to  resume  the  at- 
tack, and  storm  the  work  by  the  left 
fiank.  Colonel  Lord,  at  the  head  of  his 
brave  soldiers,  dashed  into  the  stream. 
Seven  companies  followed.  The  ad- 
vance had  reached  within  three  rods 
of  the  breastwork,  when,  being  in  three 
feet  of  water,  they  were  fired  upon  by 
a long  line  of  rifies  which  were  popped 
above  the  parapets.  A running  fire 
from  at  least  one  thousand  small  arms 
kept  pouring  upon  the  Nationals  as 
they  pressed  on  to  the  fort.  While  the 
breastwork  was  lit  up  by  a continuous 
sheet  of  flame,  the  National  batteries 
kept  up  a steady  fire,  the  shot  and  shell 
falling  thick  and  fast  inside  the  work. 
The  Nationals  were  fighting  at  a great 
disadvantage ; but  they  kept  tlieir 
ground  and  used  their  rifles  with  great 
effect,  taking  off  their  men  as  they 
raised  their  heads  from  time  to  time 
above  the  parapet.  For  a time  the 
battle  raged  with  great  fury ; and  the 
scene  was  grand  and  imposing  in  the 
extreme.  The  Confederates  continued 
to  increase  in  strength  at  the  point  of 
attack ; and  as  it  was  impossible,  in  the 
circumstances,  to  make  any  effective 
use  of  the  bayonet,  Lord  ordered  a 
. retreat,  carrying  his  wounded  with  him. 
In  this  struggle  the  National  loss  was 
35  killed,  120  wounded,  and  9 miss- 
ing. Captain  Mott,  on  whose  battery 
the  Confederates  had  concentrated  theii* 
fire,  had  three  men  killed  and  seven 
wounded.  Of  his  horses,  seven  were 
disabled.  The  Confederate  loss  was 
also  considerable.  Colonel  McKinney, 
218 


of  the  Fifteenth  North  Carolina  Hegi- 
ment,  which  bore  the  chief  part  in  the 
fray,  having  been  killed. 

After  this  ineffectual  assault  on  the 
Confederate  battery,  ten  days  were  al- 
lowed to  elapse  before  any  event  of 
consequence  occurred.  General  McClel- 
lan meanwhile  busied  himself  in  the 
perfecting  of  his  siege  arrangements. 
The  Merrimac,  of  which  we  shall 
have  something  to  say  in  our  next 
chapter,  gave  him  some  uneasiness, 
and  compelled  him  to  be  fearful  for 
his  gunboats.  On  the  26th  of  jvpri! 
April,  the  monotony  of  the  siege 
was  varied  by  a spirited  attack  which 
was  made  on  a Confederate  redoubt. 
This  work  stood  in  front  of  a wood  near 
the  Yorktown  road,  and  was  somewhat 
in  advance  of  the  main  defenses.  Sur- 
rounded by  a ditch  six  feet  deep,  with 
a strong  parapet,  it  was  manned  by  two 
companies  of  infantry,  but  with  no  ar- 
tillery. It  was  resolved  to  take  this 
redoubt,  and  ascertain  the  nature  of  the 
works  behind.  Five  Massachusetts  com- 
panies were  detailed  for  the  purpose. 
Three  of  these  companies  were  from 
the  First  regiment,  and  were  under 
Lieutenant-Colonel  Wells.  Two  were 
from  the  Eleventh  regiment,  and  were 
under  Major  Tripp.  The  attack  was 
well  planned.  One  company  vv^as  sent 
out  to  skirmish  on  the  left,  in  the  corn- 
field, with  instructions  to  prevent  a. 
flank  movement  of  the  enemy;  another 
company  was  held  in  reserve  toward  the 
right,  near  a ravine;  while  a third  com- 
pany, under  Captain  Carroll,  made  the 
assault.  The  assaulting  party  rushed 
across  the  cornfield  at  double-quick,, 


198 


YORKTOWK'. 


making  straight  for  the  Confederate  re- 
doubt. A warm  reception  awaited 
them.  As  soon  as  they  came  in  view, 
the  Confederate  infantry  opened  fire, 
and  used  their  rifles  to  some  purpose. 
Nothing  daunted,  the  Massachusetts 
men  pushed  forward.  Not  one  of  them 
fired  a shot  until  they  were  within  a 
few  yards  of  the  ditch.  Then  halting, 
they  let  fly  a full  volley  into  the  faces 
( f their  antagonists.  On  again  they 
rushed,  clearing  the  ditch  and  mounting 
the  parapet.  The  Confederates  fled  be- 
fore them,  and  the  redoubt  was  cap- 
tured. A working  party  came  up  with 
spades  and  shovels,  and  the  woik  was 
soon  demolished.  Thirteen  Confede- 
rates were  made  prisoners.  On  the  side 
of  the  Nationals  there  were  three  men 
killed  and  thirteen  wounded. 

There  was  another  pause.  Nothing 
further  was  done  in  the  way  of  direct 
ApriJ  hostilities  until  the  30th.  That 
day,  General  McClellan  having  ad- 
vanced his  parallels,  got  one  of  his 
large  batteries  in  position  and  opened 
fire  on  the  Confederate  works,  at  the 
distance  of  two  miles.  The  first  shot  was 
fired  f]‘om  batteiy  No.  1,  at  the  mouth 
of  Wormsley’s  Creek.  It  was  aimed  at 
the  Confederate  shipping,  and  it  suc- 
ceeded in  scattering  the  vessels.  The 
guns  were  now  directed  against  the 
works  at  Yorktown  and  Gloucester. 
The  Confederates  replied  with  their 
large  pivot  gun,  a rifled  sixty-eight 
pounder,  which  was  mounted  on  the 
heights  of  Yorktown.  For  some  hours, 
the  firing  on  both  sides  was  maintained 
with  great  spirit.  No  result,  however, 
was  visible.  During  the  night  the  Con- 


federates continued  to  fling  shot  and 
shell  on  McClellan’s  advanced  parallels, 
where  the  men  were  at  work.  Next 
morning  they  tried  their  columbiad, 
which  was  well  posted  on  the  heights, 
firing  it  with  great  rapidity ; but  after 
the  tweftty-third  discharge,  “ it  went 
into  a thousand  pieces,  tearing  up  the 
parapet,  and  making  havoc  with  the 
crowd  who  were  collected  around  it 
at  the  time.”  This  was  the  only  gun 
which  seemed  capable  of  competing 
with  McClellan’s  heavy  siege  batteries. 
The  National  batteries  maintained  a 
continuous  fire.  Saturday  arrived, 
the  3d  day  of  May.  Before  the 
close  of  that  day  everything  was  in 
readiness  for  opening  the  bombard- 
ment— the  huge  siege  batteries  being 
all  in  position.  Still  McClellan  is  in 
no  haste.  To-morrow  (Sunday)  is  to 
be  given  to  sacred  rest ; and  on  Mon- 
day the  guns  are  to  be  opened  all  along 
the  line.  The  general  is  confident  of 
success,  and  believes  in  a triumphant 
victory.  On  that  same  Saturday  night, 
the  Confederates  evacuated  Yorktowm 
and  Gloucester,  carrying  with  them 
their  sick,  their  hospital  stores,  their 
ammunition,  and  their  camp  equipage, 
and  moved  toward  Williamsburg.  So 
quietly  and  so  skilfully  was  the  retreat 
accomplished,  that  it  was  not  until 
next  morning  the  fact  was  known  to 
the  Nationals.  McClellan  on  the  j^jay 
morning  of  the  4th  telegraphed 
to  the  Secretary  of  War  that  he  was  in 
possession  of  the  abandoned  fortress,  and 
added,  with  an  air  of  mightiness  which 
ill  became  him  in  the  circumstances, 
‘‘No  time  shall  be  lost.  I shall  push 


LAME  EXCUSES. 


199 


the  enemy  to  the  wall.”  Such  was 
the  end  of  the  siege  of  Yorktown — an 
end  almost  as  disgraceful,  all  things  con- 
sidered, as  would  have  been  a defeat. 

When  the  National  troops  entered 
the  abandoned  fortifications,  they  found 
fifty-two  guns  spiked,  and  some  stores ; 
but  such  surely  was  a poor  trophy  for 
so  great  an  army,  and  especially  after 
such  magnificent  and  costly  prepa- 
rations for  a successful  siege.  It  was 
McClellan  over  again — all  show  and  no 
work.  The  National  army  left  Fortress 
Monroe,  as  we  have  seen,  on  the  3d  of 
April.  On  the  afternoon  of  the  5th, 
the  advance  of  both  columns  halted  in 
front  of  Magruder's  fortifications.  For 
nearly  one  month,  therefore,  McClellan 
with  more  than  one  hundred  thousand 
men,  and  well  supplied  with  all  the  ne- 
cessaries of  war,  lay  before  Yorktown. 
Doing  what?  Preparing  for  a great 
siege — when  there  was  to  be  no  siege. 
Constructing  extensive  and  costly  lines 
of  defense — which  were  never  needed. 
General  Magruder’s  account  of  McClel- 
lan’s conduct  reads  like  a caricature; 
but  we  know  nothing  of  those  four 
weeks  before  Yorktown,  which  does 
not  justify  us  in  saying  that  Magruder’s 
account  is  the  simple  truth.  To  my 
utter  surprise,”  says  that  general,  ^Gie 
(McClellan)  permitted  day  after  day  to 
eiapse  vvdthout  an  assault.  In  a few 
(lays  the  object  of  his  delay  became  ap- 
parent. In  every  direction  in  front 
of  our  lines,  through  the  intervening 
woods  and  in  the  open  fields,  earth- 
works began  to  appear.”  Had  McClel- 
lan moved  on  Yorktown  and  Gloucester 
at  once,  in  place  of  halting  for  a whole 


four  weeks,  these  places  most  undoubt- 
edly would  have  yielded  to  the  first 
attack,  and  the  waste  of  time,  of  labor, 
of  money,  of  human  life  even,  in  that 
inhospitable  region,  would  have  been 
avoided.  “With  five  thousand  men,” 
adds  Magruder,  “ inclusive  of  the  garri- 
sons, we  had  stopped  and  held  in  check 
over  one  hundred  thousand  of  the  ene- 
my.” Difference  of  opinion  has  existed 
as  to  the  actual  strength  of  the  Confed- 
erates in  and  around  Yorktown.  The 
presumption  is  that  when  McClellan 
arrived  and  felt  Magruder’s  outer  lines 
in  front  of  Yorktown,  the  Confederate 
force  did  not  exceed  five  thousand  men, 
exclusive  of  the  garrisons.  It  is  now 
known  that  both  Lee  and  Johnston 
wei'e  opposed  to  holding  the  peninsula, 
their  reasons  being  that  in  the  event  of 
the  York  and  Janies  rivers  falling  into 
the  possession  of  the  Nationals,  as 
seemed  probable,  the  Confederate  army, 
on  both  flanks,  would  be  exposed  to  the 
National  gunboats.  They  had  no  doubt 
that  McClellan  would  capture  York- 
town. Johnston  visited  and  inspected 
the  works  at  Yorktown  soon  after 
McClellan’s  arrival;  and  what  he  saw 
confirmed  him  in  this  opinion.  His  de- 
sire was  to  concentrate  all  his  forces 
near  Fichmond  and  offer  there  a deci- 
sive battle.  These  counsels,  however, 
were  overruled ; and  it  was  decided  to 
hold  the  peninsula,  if  possible,  until 
the  fortifications  at  Norfolk  should  be 
dismantled  and  the  naval  establishment 
at  that  place  destroyed.  In  these  cir- 
cumstances, and  when  it  was  known 
that  McClellan,  instead  of  pressing  for- 
ward, was  intrenching  himself,  rein- 


200 


YOPtKTOW^^. 


forcements  were  sent  down  fi*om  Kich- 
mond;  and,  later,  Johnston  went  to 
Yorktown  and  took  command  in  per- 
son. Hence  we  find  Magruder,  in  the 
same  report  from  which  we  have  already 
quoted,  saying : “ Reinforcements  be- 
gan to  pour  in,  and  each  hour  the  army 
of  the  Peninsula  grew  stronger  and 
stronger,  until  anxiety  passed  from  my 
mind  as  to  the  result  of  an  attack  upon 
us.”  The  conclusion,  therefore,  seems 
inevitable — that  McClellan  lost  his 
golden  opportunity  when  he  failed  to 
make  an  attack  on  Magruder  immedi- 
ately on  his  arrival  at  Yorktown,  and 
that  in  place  of  the  barren  victory  which 
he  reaped  after  a month’s  waiting,  toil 
and  terrible  sacrifice,  he  might  have 
won  a fruitful  victory  by  striking  a 
})low  at  once  with  energy  and  determi- 
nation. 

A feeling  began  again  to  prevail  all 
over  the  North,  as  soon  as  the  details  of 
the  siege  were  made  public,  that  nothing 
was  to  be  expected  from  McClellan. 
Of  course  his  friends  still  clung  to  him 
tenaciously ; but  the  earnest  people  of 
the  North,  who  were  bent  on  putting 
down  the  rebellion  and  preserving  the 
Union  intact,  began  to  feel  that,  if  the 
great  task  was  to  be  accomplished,  it 
must  be  by  other  hands  than  those  of 
the  brilliant  but  hesitating  chief  of  the 
army  of  the  Potomac.  McClellan  was 
not  ignorant  that  the  siege  of  Yorktown 
^vas  a blunder,  and  that  it  was  generally 
so  regarded.  He  had,  of  course,  some- 
thing to  say  in  his  own  defence.  It 
was  impossible,  he  said,  to  ascertain 
the  exact  strength  of  the  enemy;  and 
(here  were  many  indications  that  they 


were  behind  the  works  in  great  force. 
It  was  his  business  to  find  out  the  facts, 
just  as  it  was  his  misfortune  to  be  out- 
generalled.  Some  of  his  excuses  were 
very  lame.  Franklin’s  division  had 
been  promptly  sent  him  when  asked 
for.  Yet  in  his  report  he  said  that  the 
non-arrival  of  that  division  was  the 
cause  of  his  failure  to  attack  Yorktown, 
and  that  the  same  cause  ‘‘made  rapid 
and  brilliant  operations  impossible.” 
The  simple  truth  is  that  when  Frank- 
lin’s division  arrived,  McClellan  de- 
clared that  he  was  not  ready ; and, 
waiting  for  orders,  these  troops  were 
detained  on  the  river,  in  transports,  for 
a whole  fortnight.  It  was  his  intention, 
he  said  in  his  report,  to  turn  Yorktown 
by  an  attack  on  Gloucester;  and  this 
attack  was  not  made  because  Franklin’s 
division  was  not  forward.  What  Mc- 
Clellan’s intention  really  was,  it  is  diffi- 
cult to  know.  It  does  seem  as  if  he  was 
undecided,  feeling  afraid  to  attack  in 
front  and  not  daring  to  attack  in  flank. 
It  certainly  redounds  to  the  credit  of 
the  Confederates  that  they  were  better 
posted  regarding  his  movements  than 
he  was  regarding  theirs.  The  siege 
of  Yorktown  was  no  improvement  on 
McClellan’s  past  record.  It  was  the 
first  tardy  stej)  in  a series  of  tardy 
movements  which  distinguished  his  pe- 
ninsular campaign.  Before  the  end  of 
that  disastrous  campaign  was  I’eached, 
the  storm  of  battle  had  done  much  to 
thin  the  ranks  of  his  army ; but  delay 
led  to  disease ; and  disease  proved  more 
destructive  than  the  bullets  of  the  ene- 
my. The  view  taken  by  President  Lin- 
coln, in  his  letter  to  McClellan  dated 


PROPHETIC  WORDS, 


201 


April  9th,  1862,  was  sustained  in  every 
particular.  In  that  letter  the  president 
says:  “You  will  do  me  the  justice  to 
remember  I always  insisted  that  going 
down  the  bay  in  search  of  a field,  in- 
stead of  fighting  at  or  near  Manassas, 
was  only  shifting  and  not  surmounting 
a difficulty — that  we  should  find  the 


same  enemy  and  the  same  or  equal  in- 
trenchments  at  either  place.  The  coun- 
try will  not  fail  to  note — is  now  noting 
— that  the  present  'hesitation  to  move 
upon  an  intrenched  enemy  is  but  the 
story  of  Manassas  repeated.”  Head 
now,  in  the  light  of  what  took  place, 
these  words  were  really  prophetic. 


\ 


CHAPTER  XIV. 


The  Importance  of  War  Vessels  on  the  Elvers  and  Gulfs. — The  Merrimac. — Her  original  build. — Eeconstructed. — 
A Powerful  Instrument  of  Destruction. — Confederate  Cunning. — The  Merrimac  in  her  new  Form  said  to  be  a 
Failure. — A Strange  Sight. — The  Merrimac  at  Hampton  Eoads. — The  National  Fleet  Attacked. — The  Cumber- 
land and  Congress. — The  Merrimac  Shot-Proof. — The  Cumberland  Laid  Open. — Terrific  Firing. — The  Cumber- 
land Goes  Down. — One  Hundred  Sick  and  Wounded. — The  Patrick  Henry. — The  Congress  Attacked. — 
Heavy  Loss  of  Life. — The  Congress  on  Fire. — Newport  News. — The  Flag  of  the  Congress  Hauled  Down. — Ked 
Hot  Shot. — Her  Magazine  Catches  Fire. — Two  Hours’  Work.  — The  Eoanoke  and  the  Minnesota. — Hurrying  to  the 
Scene  of  Action. — The  Minnesota  Grounded. — The  Merrimac  unable  to  Approach. — The  Guns  of  the  Minnesota 
Skilfully  Handled. — A Cheerless  Prospect. — The  Danger  to  New  York. — Fortress  Monroe. — What  General 
Wool  said. — Relief  at  Hand. — The  Monitor. — Ericsson. — Description  of  the  Monitor. — The  great  Purpose  for 
whichit  was  Built. — A Novelty. — The  Success  of  the  Experiment  Doubted. — Prophets  of  Evil. — The  Launch. — 
The  Trial  Trip. — A Fearful  Storm. — Terrific  Experience  of  the  Crew. — Lieutenant  John  L.  Worden  in  Com- 
mand.— What  Spies  had  Done. — What  Might  Have  Been. — Rejoicing  at  Norfolk. — The  Nationals  Downcast. — 
A Night  to  be  Remembered. — The  Congress  Explodes. — Sunday  Morning. — Wreck  and  Ruin  all  around. — 
Reappearance  of  the  Merrimac. — Worden  Ready. — The  Object  of  the  Confederate  Commander. — The 
Monitor  alongside  of  the  Merrimac. — A Contrast. — David  and  Goliath. — “ Pebbles  thrown  by  a Child.” — A 
Battle  of  Mailed  Giants. — The  Merrimac  Aground. — The  Monitor  Moving  and  Hitting  like  a Skilled  Pugilist. — 
1'he  Merrimac  shows  Signs  of  Punishment.  — Turns  off  and  Renews  the  Attack  on  the  Minnesota. — A Warm  Re- 
ception.— A Tremendous  Shot. — The  Monitor  again  Comes  to  the  Relief. — The  Merrimac  a Second  Time 
Grounded. — The  Merrimac  Retreats. — The  Monitor  Pursues. — A Fierce  Encounter. — Canister  Shot  Compara- 
tively Harmless. — The  Merrimac  Badly  Punished. — Sagging  at  the  Stern. — The  Last  and  Most  Effective  Shot 
of  the  Merrimac. — Worden  Wounded  and  Felled  to  the  Ground. — The  Merrimac  Sheers  Off. — The  Battle 
Ended. — Worden’s  Life  Despaired  Of. — “Did  We  Save  the  Minnesota?” — Saved. — A Great  Victory. — Re- 
joicings in  the  North. — The  “Little  Wonder.” — Pilgrimage  to  Hampton  Roads. — Profound  Interest  Abroad. — 
Lessons  Read  to  the  Nations. — Superiority  of  Turrets. — Honors  to  the  Brave. — Ericsson  Congratulated. — 
The  Importance  of  the  Victory. — Reflections. 


In  tracing  the  history  of  the  great 

1862  campaign,  we  have  seen 

how  important  was  the  part  which 
was  played  by  gunboats  on  the  Tennes- 
see and  Ohio  rivers.  It  was  naturally 
to  be  expected  that  war  vessels,  suitably 
constructed,  would  play  an  equally  im- 


portant part  in  the  bays  and  rivers  more 
to  the  east,  and  which  connect  them- 
selves with  the  waters  of  the  Atlantic. 

One  of  the  great  events  of  the  early 
part  of  1832  was  the  appearance  in 
Hampton  Hoads  of  the  powerful  iron- 
clad man-of-war  Merrimac,  which  had 


202 


THE  MERRIMAO  AND  THE  MONITOR. 


been  reconstructed  by  the  Confederate 
government  and  named  Virginia.  When 
the  Norfolk  Navy  Yard  was  abandoned 
by  the  Nationals,  this  vessel  was  scut- 
tled and  sunk.  In  her  original  form 
she  was  a powerful  steam  frigate  of 
forty  guns ; and  she  had  cost  the  gov- 
ernment, for  building  and  furnishing 
her,  a sum  not  less  than  a million  and 
a quarter  dollars.  The  Confederates 
found  little  difficulty  in  raising  her ; 
and  the  hull  being  in  perfect  condition, 
a substantial  basis  existed  for  the  con- 
struction of  a gigantic  and  dangerous 
vessel.  A plan  was  furnished  by  Lieu- 
tenant John  M.  Brooke,  formerly  of  the 
National  navy ; and,  reconstructed  after 
the  fashion  of  the  shot-proof  raft  which 
had  been  used  in  Charleston  harbor, 
she  became  one  of  the  strongest  and 
most  destructive  engines  of  war  which 
had  ever  been  seen  floating  on  any  wa- 
ters. When  properly  cut  down,  she 
was  covered  with  an  iron  roof  project- 
ing into  the  water.  At  or  below  the 
water  line  the  mail  extended  the  oppo- 
site way,  so  that  a shot  striking  above 
the  water  mark  would  glance  upward, 
and  below  the  water  mark  would  glance 
downward.  She  was  simply  a broadside 
ironclad  with  sloping  armor.  Her  great 
bulk  enabled  her  to  carry  a formidable 
battery.  She  was  armed  with  a power- 
ful steel  beak,  and  carried  eleven  guns, 
with  a one  hundred-pound  rifle^l  Arms- 
trong at  each  end.  Such  a monster  might 
well  be  a terror  as  well  as  a surprise. 
It  was  known  that  the  vessel  was  un- 
dergoing reconstruction,  and  that  it  was 
intended  to  make  her  a terrible  engine 
of  war;  but  strange  rumors  were  circu- 


lated to  her  disadvantage  by  the  Con- 
federate authorities;  and  it  is  probable 
that,  until  she  was  seen  at  Hampton 
Roads,  she  was  somewhat  despised  by 
the  officers  of  the  National  navy.  The 
Southern  newspapers  artfully  circulated 
that  the  Memmac  was  a failure  ; and, 
the  wish  being  father  to  the  thought, 
the  statement  was  too  readily  believed. 

About  noon,  on  Saturday,  the  8th  of 
March,  observers  at  Fortress  Mon-  jjiar, 
roe  saw  a strange  object,  “ looking 
like  a submerged  house,  with  the  roof 
only  above  water,”  moving  down 
the  Elizabeth  River  toward  Hampton 
Roads.  It  was  the  dreadful  Merrimac ; 
and  she  was  under  the  command  of 
Franklin  Buchanan,  an  officer  who  had 
abandoned  the  National  navy.  Two 
smaller  armed  steamboats  accompanied 
her.  Almost  immediately  after  their 
appearance,  two  other  Confederate  gun- 
boats came  down  from  Richmond  and 
took  positions  in  the  James  River,  a bt- 
tle  above  Newport  News.  Signal  guns 
were  at  once  flred  from  the  Union  bat- 
teries and  by  the  ships  Cumberland  and 
Congress,  lying  off  and  blockading  the 
James  River,  to  give  warning  to  the  rest 
of  the  National  fleet.  Accompanied  by 
the  two  smaller  vessels  the  Merrimac 
moved  steadily  on  towards  the  Cumber- 
land and  Congress.  The  Congress,  a 
sailing  frigate,  was  commanded  by  Lieu- 
tenant Joseph  B.  Smith.  Tlie  sloop  of 
war,  Cumberland,  24  guns  and  376  men, 
was  commanded  temporarily  by  Lieu- 
tenant George  Morris.  Pursuing  the 
Congress,  and  giving  and  receiving  a 
broadside,  the  Merrimac  made  straight 
for  the  Cumberland.  This  vessel  had 


THE  CUMBERLAND  SUNK. 


203 


been  placed  across  the  channel  so  as  to 
bring  her  broadside  to  bear  on  her 
antagonist;  and  as  the  Merrimac  ap- 
proached she  opened  upon  the  monster 
and  poured  forth  a rapid  fire.  It  was 
no  use.  The  heavy  shot  from  the  nine 
and  ten  inch  guns  of  the  Cumberland 
glanced  from  her  rival’s  shield  of  iron, 
“like  so  many  peas.”  The  Merrimac 
seemed  stunned  for  an  instant  by  the 
weight  of  the  shot;  but  she  quickly 
recovered ; and  having  increased  her 
speed,  she  rushed  against  the  Cumber- 
land, striking  her  with  her  steel  prow 
about  amidships,  and  “literally  laying 
her  open.”  Before  striking  the  Cumber- 
land, the  Merrimac  had  received  some 
seven  or  eight  broadsides ; but  they  pro- 
duced no  impression  on  her  invulner- 
able coat  of  mail.  As  she  struck,  she 
opened  her  ports  and  poured  in  on  the 
unfortunate  Cumberland,  now  rapidly 
filling  with  water,  a most  destructive 
fire.  The  Cumberland  fought  well; 
but  the  combat  was  unequal.  Buchanan 
gradually  drew  off  the  Merrimac ; and 
again  opening  his  ports,  he  rushed 
against  his  disabled  antagonist,  this 
time  completely  crushing  in  her  side. 
It  was  now  all  over  with  the  Cumber- 
land. Giving  a parting  fire  to  the 
monster  which  was  retiring  from  the 
ruin  it  had  wrought,  with  apparent  in- 
difference, Morris  ordered  his  men  to 
jump  overboard  and  save  themselves. 
This  was  quickly  done;  and  in  a few 
minutes  afterwards,  the  vessel  went 
down  in  fifty-four  feet  of  water,  carry- 
ing with  her  about  one  hundred  of 
dead,  sick  and  wounded,  who  could  not 
be  moved.  The  topmast  of  the  Cum- 


berland remained  partially  above  the 
water,  with  her  flag  flying  from  its  peak. 

It  was  now  nearly  four  o’clock  in  the 
afternoon.  Having  finished  the  Cum- 
berland, the  Merrimac  now  turned  her 
attention  to  the  sailing  frigate  Congress. 
We  have  seen  that  just  as  the  Merri- 
mac appeared  by  the  way  of  the  Eliza- 
beth Biver,  two  other  vessels  came  down 
the  James,  as  if  by  a preconcerted  ar- 
rangement. These  vessels  were  the 
Yorktown  and  the  Jamestown,  or,  as  the 
latter  was  now  called,  Patrick  Henry. 
While  the  Merrimac  was  engaged  with 
the  Cumberland,  the  Yorktown  and 
the  Jamestown,  which  had  successfully 
passed  the  National  batteries  at  New- 
port News,  had  tackled  the  Congress. 
Until  the  Cumberland  went  down,  the 
Congress  made  a gallant  and  success- 
ful resistance.  With  the  help  of  the 
Zouave,  she  then  managed  to  run 
aground  under  cover  of  the  strong  bat- 
teries just  named.  There  she  was  be- 
yond reach  of  the  Merrimac’s  prow, 
but  she  was  not  beyond  the  range  of 
her  guns.  As  soon,  therefore,  as  that 
vessel  came  up,  she  opened  fire  upon 
the  unfortunate  Congress,  which  could 
not  reply  with  her  stern  guns,  one  of 
which  was  soon  dismounted  by  the 
Merrimac’s  shot,  and  the  other  had  the 
muzzle  knocked  off.  Lieutenant  Smith, 
Acting-Master  Moore,  and  Pilot  Wil- 
liam Rhodes,  with  nearly  half  the  crew, 
were  killed  or  wounded.  The  Merri- 
mac moved  backward  and  forward  slow- 
ly, firing  at  a range  of  less  than  a 
hundred  yards.  The  Congress  now 
took  fire  in  several  places.  Further 
resistance  would  have  been  worse  than 


204: 


THE  MERRIMAC  AND  THE  MONITOR. 


foolishness ; and  so  Lieutenant  Prender- 
gast  hauled  down  the  flag.  A tug 
came  alongside  to  haul  her  off ; but  the 
batteries  on  shore  drove  off  the  tug; 
and  the  Merrimac,  despite  the  white 
flag  which  was. flying  over  her  in  token 
of  surrender,  again  opened  fire  upon 
the  battered  and  helpless  vessel.  Later 
in  the  day,  the  Merrimac  returned  and 
set  the  Congress  on  fire  by  red-hot  shot. 
About  midnight  the  fire  caught  her 
magazine ; and  she  exploded  with  a 
tremendous  noise.  Those  of  her  crew 
which  survived  the  first  attack  had 
meanwhile  made  good  their  escape. 
About  one  half  of  the  whole,  218  out 
of  434,  responded  to  the  call  of  their 
names  next  morning  at  Newport  News. 
In  little  more  than  two  hours  the  Merri- 
mac had  destroyed  two  of  the  best  ships 
in  the  National  service ; and  Buchanan, 
her  commander,  had  the  satisfaction — 
if  satisfaction  it  was — of  killing  or 
drowning  more  than  three  hundred  of 
his  old  comrades. 

When  the  Merrimac  first  made  her 
appearance  in  the  early  part  of  the  day, 
the  flag-ship  of  the  National  squadron, 
the  Roanoke,  Captain  John  Marston, 
and  the  steam  frigate  Minnesota,  Cap- 
tain VanBrunt,  were  lying  at  Fortress 
Monroe,  several  miles  distant.  These 
were  at  once  signalled  to  hurry  forward 
to  the  assistance  of  the  CumberkinJ, 
the  Congress,  and  the  other  vessels  now 
so  sorely  menaced.  It  was  not  possible 
for  them  to  be  forward  in  time  to 
render  any  effective  aid.  Flag-officer 
Marston  had  responded  to  the  signal  as 
quickly  as  possible.  His  own  ship  was 
disabled  in  its  machinery;  but,  with 


the  help  of  two  tugs,  he  set  out  for  the 
scene  of  action.  The  Minnesota  was 
ordered  to  hasten  in  the  same  direction. 
When  passing  Sewall’s  Point,  the  Min- 
nesota came  within  range  of  a Confede- 
rate batteiy  there,  and  had  her  main- 
mast crippled.  This,  however,  was  not 
the  only  misfortune  which  she  was  des- 
tined to  experience ; she  drew  tw^enty- 
three  feet  of  water;  and  although  it 
was  known  that  the  water  was  danger- 
ously shallow,  it  was  thought  that,  the 
bottom  being  soft,  it  would  be  possible 
to  push  her  through.  It  was  a mis- 
take. When  within  about  a mile  and 
a half  of  Newport  News,  the  vessel 
grounded  and  stuck  fast.  While  in 
this  helpless  condition,  the  Merrimac 
having  destroyed  the  Cumberland,  and 
having  retired  after  her  first  attack 
on  the  Congress,  came  down  upon  her. 
Fortunately  it  was  not  possible  for 
the  Merrimac  to  get  within  a mile  of 
her  intended  victim,  her  own  heavy 
draught  preventing  a nearer  approach. 
At  this  distance  an  ineffective  fire  was 
opened  by  both  vessels.  Some  of  the 
smaller  armed  steamboats  ventured 
nearer,  and  with  their  rifled  guns  killed 
and  wounded  several  men  on  board  the 
Minnesota.  Some  of  these,  however, 
paid  dearly  for  their  rashness ; for, 
grounded  as  she  was,  her  guns  were 
ably  handled,  and  with  great  rapidity. 
Ifc  was  now  seven  o’clock;  and  count- 
ing, no  doubt,  on  an  easy  victory  on 
the  morrow,  the  Merrimac,  with  her 
companion  ships,  retired  behind  Sew- 
all’s Point.  The  Minnesota  still  lay 
fast  in  the  mud ; and  although  during 
the  night  several  attempts  were  made 


NAVAL  ENGAGEMENT  BETWEEN  THE  MERRIMAO  AND  MONiTOR 


RELIEF  CAME. 


205 


to  get  her  off,  it  was  found  impossible 
to  move  her.  The  Koanoke  and  the  St. 
Lawrence,  on  their  way  to  the  scene  of 
conflict,  had  both  got  aground ; but 
with  the  rising  tide  they  were  relieved, 
and  moved  down  the  Roads.  It  was 
Saturday  night  (March  8),  and,  when 
t he  sun  went  down,  the  prospect  for  the 
following  morning  was  the  reverse  of 
cheering  to  the  National  commanders. 
There  could  be  no  doubt  that  the  Mer- 
rimac  would  renew  the  battle  in  the 
morning.  In  such  a case,  the  result, 
unless  some  unexpected  aid  arrived, 
would  be  disastrous  in  the  extreme. 
The  Minnesota  would  be  the  flrst  victim  ; 
and,  helpless  as  she  was,  her  destruction 
was  certain.  If  any  of  the  other  vessels 
were  spared,  they  would  surely  endeavor 
to  make  their  escape.  The  harbor  of 
Hampton  Roads  would  be  lost.  The 
Merrimac  would  be  free  to  prosecute 
her  work  of  destruction.  Fortress  Mon- 
roe would  be  in  danger;  and  who  could 
say  that  the  harbor  of  New  York  was 
safe,  while  such  a monster  was  afloat  ? 
General  Wool,  commander  of  Fortress 
Monroe,  telegraphed  to  Washington 
that  the  capture  of  the  Minnesota  was 
all  but  certain,  and  that  it  was  thought 
the  Merrimac,  Jamestown,  and  York- 
town  would  pass  the  fort  to-night.”  It 
was  the  opinion  of  that  oflhcer  that  if 
the  Merrimac,  instead  of  passing  on,  at- 
tacked the  fortress,  it  would  not  be 
possible  to  hold  the  place  for  more  than 
a few  days. 

Happily  relief  was  at  hand.  At  nine 
o’clock  that  night,  the  Monitor,  Erics- 
son's new  iron-clad  turret  ship,  arrived 
‘•'t  Fortress  Monroe  from  New  York. 


This  vessel,  which  was  a dwarf  beside 
the  Merrimac,  and  which  was  of  novel 
form  and  appearance,  had  been  built 
at  Green  Point,  Lons;  Island,  New  York, 
under  the  direction  of  its  inventor. 
Captain  John  Ericsson — a Swede  by 
birth,  but  who  had  been  a resi- 
dent of  the  United  States  for  twenty 
years.  Ericsson  had  already  won  dis- 
tinction as  a practical  scientist  in 
Sweden  and  in  England;  and  in  1842, 
having  come  to  the  United  States,  he 
built  for  the  government,  the  U.  S. 
Steamer  Princeton,  the  flrst  screw-pro- 
peller in  the  world.  The  Monitor  was 
one  of  three  vessels — the  other  two 
were  the  Galena  and  the  New  Ironsides 
— which  were  constructed  to  meet  the 
emergency,  and  by  special  requirement 
of  the  government.  Ericsson’s  plan  was 
to  secure  the  greatest  possible  power, 
both  for  attack  and  resistance,  with  the 
least  possible  exposure  of  surface.  The 
hull  of  the  Monitor  admirably  met  all 
those  requirements.  It  was  buoyant, 
yet  it  was  almost  entirely  under  water. 
It  presented  to  the  enemy  a target 
which  was  wonderfully  small,  but 
which  because  of  the  concentration  of 
iron  and  timber  was  absolutely  im- 
pregnable— proof  against  the  heaviest 
artillery  of  the  day.  Concentration  was 
Ericsson’s  object  in  the  construction  of 
the  hull,  so  far  as  defence  or  resistance 
was  concerned.  He  followed  the  same 
plan  in  regard  to  the  offensive  part  of 
the  ship.  In  the  centre  of  his  raft-like 
vessel,  he  fixed  a revolving  cylinder 
of  wrought-iron,  of  sufficient  diameter 
to  allow  of  two  heavy  guns,  and  just 
high  enough  to  give  the  gunners  stand- 


THE  MERRIMAC  AND  THE  MONITOR. 


206 

iiig  room.  When  finished,  the  total 
leno^th  of  the  Monitor  was  172  feet. 
This  covered  the  armor  and  what  is 
called  the  “ overhang.”  The  length 
of  the  hull  proper  was  124  feet.  Her 
total  beani  over  armor  and  backing  was 
41^  feet — the  beam  of  the  hull  proper 
being  34  feet.  Her  depth  was  11  feet; 
her  draught  10  feet.  The  diameter  of 
the  turret  inside  was  20  feet;  the 
height  was  9 feet;  the  thickness,  8 
inches,  there  being  5 inches  of  wrought- 
iron  and  3 feet  of  oak.  The  total 
weight,  with  everything  on  board,  was 
nine  bundled  tons.  As  an  engine  of 
war,  the  Monitor  was  in  the  strictest 
sense  of  the  word  a novelty.  Nothing 
of  the  kind  had  ever  before  existed. 
Not  unnaturally,  therefore,  very  differ- 
ent opinions  prevailed  as  to  the  fitness 
of  the  vessel  for  the  purposes  contem- 
plated. Had  the  Monitor  gone  ’ to 
the  bottom  as  she  slid  from  the 
stocks  at  Greenpoint,  she  would  only 
have  fulfilled  the  predictions  and  justi- 
fied the  expectations  of  many  prominent 
scientific  men  who  were  present  when 
she  was  launched.  The  strange-looking 
little  ship,  as  we  shall  presently  see, 
was  to  have  a different  and  more  glori- 
ous future. 

According  to  the  terms  of  the  con- 
tract the  Monitor  was  not  to  be  accepted 
by  the  government  until  her  sea-going 
powers  were  tested  and  until  she  had 
made  trial  of  her  strength  with  the 
heaviest  guns  of  the  enemy.  This, 
therefore,  was  her  trial  trip  ; and  never, 
perhaps,  in  the  history  of  any  ship  of 
war  was  a trial  trip  more  severely  tested 
or  more  completely  successful.  Lieuten- 


ant John  L.  Woi'den  was  in  command. 
On  her  way  from  New  York  the 
weather  was  extremely  rough.  For 
three  days  the  Monitor  battled  with  the 
storm ; but  more  than  once  victory  was 
doubtful.  The  sea  rolled  over  her  decks, 
the  turret  hlone  being  above  the  water. 
At  one  time  the  tiller-rope  was  thrown 
off  the  wheel,  and  the  situation  was 
really  critical.  The  draft  pipe  was 
choked  by  the  pouring  down  of  the 
water;  and  but  for  the  ventilation 
obtained  through  the  turret,  the  men 
would  have  been  suffocated.  More 
than  once  during  the  voyage  the  fires 
were  extinguished.  After  such  a voy- 
age the  crew,  as  was  to  be  expected, 
were  completely  exhausted.  We  have 
seen  that  the  Monitor  reached  Fortress 
Monroe  at  9 o’clock,  on  the  evening  of 
Saturday,  the  8th  of  March.  But  for 
this  storm  the  Monitor  might  have  been 
up  in  time  to  prevent  the  disaster  of  the 
previous  day ; for  it  is  now  known  that 
the  Confederates,  informed  by  spies  of 
the  forwardness  of  the  Monitor,  had 
made  almost  superhuman  efforts  to  have 
the  work  on  the  Merrimac  finished,  so 
as  to  give  her  an  opportunity  of  destroy- 
ing the  National  fleet  at  Hampton  Hoads 
before  her  great  rival  could  appear  on 
the  scene.  As  it  was,  LieutenantWorden 
lost  no  time  after  his  arrival  at  Fortress 
Monroe.  Within  a few  minutes  he  had 
reported  to  the  flag  officer  in  the  Hoads, 
received  orders  and  sailed  to  join  the 
disabled  fleet.  Soon  after  mid- 
night,  on  the  morning  of  the  9th, 
he  anchored  his  little  vessel  alongside 
the  Minnesota. 

Never  did  relief  arrive  more  oppor- 


THE  MINNESOTA. 


207 


tunely.  It  was  a night  to  be  remem- 
bered— that  of  the  8th  of  March,  1802, 
at  Hampton  Roads.  The  Confederates 
were  Hushed  with  success.  The  Na- 
tionals were  downcast,  as  well  they 
might  be,  but  by  no  means  desperate. 
Norfolk  was  illuminated  ; and  the  Con- 
federate officers  and  sailors  were  rejoic- 
ing and  carousing  with  her  grateful 
citizens.  On  the  one  side,  there  was 
the  certain  conviction  that  to-morrow 
would  bring  with  it  an  easy  victory. 
On  the  other  side  there  was  a sullen 
determination  to  resist  to  the  last,  and 
a dim,  ill-defined  hope  that  some  effec- 
tive aid  was  to  be  expected  from  the 
strange  little  vessel  which  had  just 
arrived.  As  the  night  wore  on,  the 
waters  and  the  adjacent  coast  were  brill- 
iantly lit  up  by  the  fiames  of  the  burn- 
ing Congress ; and  ever  and  anon,  at 
irregular  intervals,  a shotted  gun  would 
boom  over  the  dull  waters  and  startle 
the  quiet  air,  as  the  spreading  fiames 
ignited  its  charge.  The  ship  had  been 
burning  for  ten  hours,  when,  about  one 
o’clock,  the  fire  having  reached  the 
magazine,  she  blew  up  with  a terrific 
noise,  filling  the  air  and  strewing  the 
waters  far  and  wide  with  masses  of 
burninof  timber. 

Sunday  morning  broke  beautiful  and 
clear.  The  Congress  had  disappeared  ; 
but  the  masts  and  yards  of  the  Cumber- 
land projected  above  the  water,  and  her 
ensign  was  fiying  in  its  accustomed 
place.  As  sad  evidences  of  the  sudden- 
ness of  her  destruction,  the  dead  bodies 
of  her  brave  defenders  fioated  in  large 
numbers  around  the  ship.  Before  the 
sun  had  fully  revealed  himself,  and  paled 


by  his  brighter  light  the  lurid  fiames 
of  the  burninor  fragments  of  the  Con- 
gress,  the  Merrimac  was  seen  coming 
down  from  Sew  all’s  Point.  Evidently 
she  was  bent  on  completing  the  work 
of  the  previous  day.  The  drums  of 
the  Merrimac  beat  to  quarters.  Word- 
en was  ready.  Taking  his  position 
at  the  peep-hole  of  the  pilot-house  of 
the  Monitor,  he  gave  orders  for  an  im- 
mediate attack.  The  Merrimac  made 
direct  for  the  Minnesota ; and  from  the 
course  she  took  it  was  apparently  the 
intention  of  her  commander  to  capture 
that  vessel,  if  possible,  and  carry  her 
back  as  a prize  to  Norfolk,  where  hun- 
dreds of  people  lined  the  shores,  await- 
ing his  triumphant  return.  As  she 
approached,  the  stern  guns  of  the  Min- 
nesota opened  upon-  her,  but  to  little 
purpose ; for  the  stacks  and  sloping 
sides  of  the  huge  monster  had  been 
smeared  with  tallow,  and  the  shot, 
heavy  as  it  was,  glanced  harmlessly  off. 
Meanwhile,  the  little  Monitor,  to  the 
astonishment  of  all  who  were  privileged 
to  witness  the  sight,  ran  out  from  under 
the  Minnesota’s  quarter  and  placed  her- 
self alongside  of  the  Merrimac,  com- 
pletely covering  the  Minnesota  ‘‘as  far 
as  was  possible  with  her  diminutive 
dimensions.”  The  contrast  was  striking. 
It  was  more — it  was  almost  ridiculous. 
David  and  Goliath  ! It  seemed  as  if 
the  Merrimac  had  but  to  move  upon 
the  insignificant,  almost  invisible  thing, 
touch  it  with  her  iron  prow,  and  make 
an  end  of  it  forever.  But  it  was  not 
so.  This  other  giant  had  found  more 
than  a match  in  this  other  stiipling. 
The  Merrimac  let  fly  a broadside ; and 


THE  MERRIMAO  AND  THE  MONITOR. 


-^C8 


the  turret  of  the  Monitor  began  to 
revolve.  Both  vessels,  as  we  have 
shown  already,  were  heavily  armed. 
The  Merrimac  had  on  each  side  two  7^- 
inch  rifles  and  four  9-inch  Dahlgrens. 
The  Monitor  had  in  her  turret  two  11- 
inch  guns,  each  capable  of  flinging  a 
shot  of  168  pounds.  The  turret  kept 
revolving ; but  the  ponderous  shot  of 
the  Monitor  i‘attled  in  vain  against  the 
mail-clad  sides  of  the  Merrimac.  Broad- 
side followed  l)roadside  in  rapid  suc- 
cession ; but  the  heavy  metal  discharged 
V)y  the  guns  of  the  Merrimac  made  no 
impression  on  the  wrought-iron  citadel 
of  the  Monitor.  Unlike  as  wei'e  the  two 
ships,  it  was  really  a battle  of  giants. 
“Gun  after  gun,”  says  Captain  Van 
Brunt  of  the  Minnesota,  “ was  tired  by 
the  Monitor,  which  was  returned  with 
whole  broadsides  from  the  rebels,  with 
no  more  elfect  apparently  than  so  many 
pebble-stones  thrown  by  a child  ^ ^ ^ 
clearly  establishing  the  fact  that  wooden 
vessels  cannot  contend  with  iron-clad 
ones ; for  never  before  was  anything 
like  it  dreamed  of  by  the  greatest  en- 
thusiasts in  maritime  warfare.”  After 
the  first  vigorous  onset  there  was  some 
manoeuvring  for  positions,  the  Monitor 
seeking  the  port  holes  of  the  Merrimac, 
the  latter  all  the  while  pouring  her 
heavy  shot  on  the  invulnerable  turret 
of  her  plucky  little  antagonist.  One 
bolt  from  a rifle-gun  struck  the  turret 
squarely,  and  penetrated  the  iron.  “It 
then  broke  short  off  and  left  its  head 
sticking  in.”  Five  times  the  Merrimac 
attempted  to  run  the  Monitor  down ; 
but,  on  each  occasion,  she  received,  at 
the  distance  of  a few  feet,  the  heavy 


shot  of  the  11 -inch  guns.  In  one  of 
these  encounters,  the  Merrimac  got 
aground,  and  the  Monitor,  being  light 
of  draught,  steamed  easily  around,  mov- 
ing and  hitting  like  a skilled  pugilist, 
her  lightning-like  fire  striking  her  an- 
tagonist at  ‘ every  vulnerable  point. 
The  Merrimac  began  to  show  signs  of 
punishment.  Her  armor  plate  was 
bending  and  starting  under  the  heavy 
blows. 

As  if  despairing  of  accomplishing  any- 
thing definite  or  satisfactory  with  the 
Monitor,  the  Merrimac  turned  away 
from  her  agile  and  rather  dangerous 
antagonist  and  renewed  her  attack  on 
the  Minnesota.  Van  Brunt,  as  he  him- 
self tells  us,  was  on  his  guard,  and  gave 
the  monster  a warm  reception.  He 
opened  upon  her  all  his  broadside  guns, 
with  a ten-inch  pivot  gun  besides.  So 
terrific  was  the  broadside  that  “ it  was 
enough,”  to  quote  Van  Brunt’s  lan- 
guage, “ to  blow  out  of  the  water  any 
timber  built  ship  in  the  world.”  It 
produced,  however,  but  very  little  ef- 
fect. The  Merrimac  gave  a hearty  re- 
sponse. From  her  rifled  bow  gun  she 
flung  one  of  her  terrible  shells,  which 
went  crashing  through  the  side  of  the 
Minnesota,  exploding  on  its  way  two 
charges  of  powder,  and  finally  bursting 
in  the  boatswain’s  apartments,  tearing 
four  rooms  into  one  and  setting  the 
ship  on  fire.  Another  shell  burst  the 
boiler  of  the  tugboat  Dragon,  which 
lay  alongside  the  Minnesota.  During 
the  encounter,  which  was  brief,  the 
guns  of  the  Minnesota  had  hit  the  Mer- 
rimac at  least  fifty  times,  producing 
little  or  no  impression. 


A DECIDED  VICTORY. 


209 


A second  time  tlie  Monitor  comes  to 
the  aid  of  the  Minnesota.  The  Merri- 
mac  finds  it  necessary  to  change  her  po- 
sition, and  in  doing  so,  again  gets 
grounded.  The  Minnesota  again  finds 
her  opportunity;  and  her  heavy  guns 
are  opened  on  her  stranded  foe.  The 
broadsides  are  now  telling  on  the  thick 
armor-plates  of  the  Merrimac.  Catesby 
Jones,  who  was  in  command,  Buchanan 
having  been  wounded  the  previous  day, 
evidently  regarded  his  situation  as  criti- 
cal; and,  accordingly,  as  soon  as  he  got 
the  Merrimac  afloat,  he  turned  her  prow 
toward  Norfolk.  The  Monitor  gave 
chase.  Irritated  by  the  pertinacity  of 
the  little  ship,  the  Merrimac  turned 
round  on  her  pursuer  and  rushed  upon 
her  at  full  speed,  as  if  resolved  to  run 
her  down.  It  was  a vain  attempt,  al- 
though, judging  from  the  appearance  of 
things,  it  was  by  no  means  either  un- 
natural or  unwise.  The  huge  beak  of 
the  Merrimac  grated  on  the  deck  of  the 
Monitor  and  was  wrenched.  Such  a 
blow  had  sent  the  Cumberland  down 
on  the  Saturday.  Such  a blow,  had 
it  been  possible  to  deal  it,  would 
doubtless  have  proved  equally  fatal  to 
the  Minnesota,  or  indeed  to  any  wooden 
ship  afloat.  It  left  the  Monitor  un- 
injured. The  little  vessel  glided  nim- 
bly out  from  under  her  antagonist ; and 
in  doing  so,  the  two  ships  being  almost 
in  actual  contact,  she  opened  upon  her 
with  one  of  her  heavy  turret  guns,  strik- 
ing her  with  a force  which  seemed  to 
crush  in  her  armor.  Quick  as  lightning 
the  concentrated  shot  of  the  Merrimac 
rattled  against  the  turret  and  pilot- 
house of  the  Monitor.  The  encounter 


was  terrific;  but  the  armor  of  both 
vessels  was  shot-proof,  and  for  the  first 
time  in  naval  warfare,  heavy  and  well- 
directed  cannon  were  found  to  be  com- 
paratively worthless.  At  this  stage 
the  Monitor  hauled  off  for  the  purpose 
of  hoisting  more  shot  into  her  turret. 
Catesby  Jones,  imagining  that  he  had 
silenced  his  small  but  formidable  an- 
tasronist,  made  another  move  toward 
the  Minnesota.  Before  he  had  time  to 
open  fire,  the  Monitor  was  steaming 
up  towards  him.  He  changed  his  course 
at  once  ; and  it  was  now  noticeable  that 
the  Merrimac  was  sagging  at  her  stern. 
A well  directed  shot  from  the  Monitor 
had  hit  the  Merrimac  at  the  junction 
of  the  casemate  with  the  ship’s  side, 
and  caused  a leak.  Another  shot 
about  the  same  moment  had  penetrated 
the  boiler  of  one  of  the  Merrimac’s 
tenders,  enveloping  her  in  steam,  and 
scalding  a large  number  of  her  crew. 
Latterly  the  Monitor  had  been  firing 
low,  and  every  shot  told  with  greater 
or  less  effect.  The  Monitor,  however, 
was  not  to  be  allowed  to  escape  unin- 
jured. The  last  shot  fired  by  the  Mer- 
rimac was  the  most  effective.  It  struck 
the  pilot-house  of  the  Monitor  opposite 
the  peep-hole  through  which  Worden 
at  that  moment  was  looking.  It  cut 
the  iron  plank  in  two,  inflicted  a severe 
wound  on  Worden,  aud  knocked  him 
senseless  to  the  floor.  Lieutenant  Green, 
who  commanded  the  guns,  and  Chief- 
Engineer  Steiners,  who  worked  the  tur- 
ret, being  at  the  same  moment  stunned 
and  stupefied,  but  not  severely  injured. 
Green  and  Steiners  recovered  quickly 
enough  to  keep  the  gunners  at  work; 


^10 


THE  MERRIMAC  AND  THE  MONITOR. 


but  Worden  did  not  for  some  time  re- 
cover consciousness.  Wlien  he  did  so, 
I. is  first  question  was,  “Did  we  save 
the  Minnesota  ? ” 

The  battle  was  now  ended.  The 
j^.Ierrimac  steered  at  once  for  Norfolk. 
The  Monitor  soon  afterwards  steered  for 
Fortress  Monroe,  the  severe  mishap 
which  had  befallen  her  commander  pre- 
venting her  from  following  up  her  vic- 
tory, and  forcing  the  battle  to  a 
surrender.  Worden  was  really  badly 
injured.  His  face  was  much  disfigured, 
and  he  was  completely  blind.  Removed 
to  the  city  of  Washington,  his  life  for 
a time  was  despaired  of ; but  he  revived ; 
and,  as  we  shall  see  hereafter,  he  ren- 
dered his  country  further  good  service 
before  the  war  was  ended.  As  soon  as 
the  Merrimac  retired,  the  Minnesota 
was  got  afloat  by  throwing  some  of  her 
heavy  guns  overboard.  She  was  saved. 
The  battle  which  began  as  early  as  eight 
o’clock  in  the  morning  was  waged  with 
great  ferocity  until  after  midday.  The 
little  Monitor  did  noble  work  and  won 
a most  decided  victory. 

During  the  two  days  the  Minnesota 
had  fired  247  solid  shot,  282  shells,  and 
more  than  ten  tons  of  powder.  While 
struggling  wdth  the  Merilmac,  the  Mon- 
itor fired  41  shots,  and  was  struck  22 
times.  The  only  serious  injury  done 
to  the  Monitor  was  the  shattering  of 
her  pilot-house.  The  Merrimac  suffered 
considerably.  On  board  two  men  were 
killed  and  some  nineteen  wounded. 
She  had  lost  her  iron  prow,  her  star- 
board anchor  and  all  her  boats.  Her 
armor  was  badly  damaged  ; her  steam- 
pipe  and  smoke-stack  were  riddled ; 


the  muzzles  of  two  of  her  guns  were 
shot  away ; the  wood  work  at  one  of 
her  ports  was  so  exposed  that  it  took 
fire  at  every  discharge ; and  the  water 
was  rushing  in  upon  her  through  one  of 
the  openings  made  by  the  shot  of  the 
Monitor. 

No  battle  by  land  or  sea,  during  the 
whole  war,  created  more  excitement  or 
evoked  more  enthusiasm  than  the  battle 
at  Hampton  Roads.  At  the  close  of  the 
first  day,  victory  was  clearly  on  the  side 
of  the  South.  In  proportion  to  the  joy 
that  prevailed  throughout  the  Confed- 
erate States — and  the  joy  was  great — 
there  was  depression  of  feeling  in  the 
North.  At  the  close  of  the  second  day 
the  situation  was  reversed.  There  was 
depression  of  feeling  in  the  South — all 
the  greater  because  of  the  previous  joy. 
The  hearts  of  the  Confederates,  in  truth, 
sank  within  them.  But  there  were 
great  rejoicings  in  the  North.  Cheers 
and  congratulations  rose  up  on  all  sides. 
The  glad  intelligence  of  the  success  of 
the  Monitor  was  flashed  from  State  to 
State  and  from  city  to  city ; and  from 
the  Cabinet,  from  Congress,  from  State 
Legislatures,  from  Town  Councils,  from 
Chambers  of  Commerce,  from  Boards  of 
Trade,  from  public  bodies  of  all  kinds,  as 
well  as  from  special  meetings  of  the  peo- 
ple, thanks  and  praise  were  poured  out  up- 
on the  Monitor,  upon  her  inventor,  upon 
her  brave  commander,  and  upon  all  the 
officers  and  men  who  took  part  in  the 
heroic  struggle  and  helped  to  bring 
about  the  glorious  result.  The  rejoicing 
was  universal;  and  the  praise  was  as 
unstinted  as  the  gratitude  was  genuine 
and  profound.  Hampton  Roads  became 


THE  LESSON. 


211 


immortal ; and  the  little  Monitor  ac- 
quired a reputation  such  as  was  never 
before  enjoyed  by  any  ship  of  war. 
Pilgrimages  were  organized  and  under- 
taken to  visit  the  scene  of  the  conflict 
and  the  victory;  and  all  ranks  and  classes 
of  the  people,  from  the  President  down- 
ward, rushed  to  see  the  “ little  wonder  ” 
— the  strange  vessel  which  had  done 
such  effective  work.  The  excitement 
was  not  confined  to  this  country  alone. 
The  success  of  the  Monitor  created  a 
profound  interest  throughout  the  civil- 
ized world,  and  nowhere  moi'e  than  in  the 
British  Isles.  It  w^'as  felt  and  confessed 
not  only  that  sea-girt  nations  must  in 
future  depend  for  protection  on  other 
than  wooden  walls,  but  that  a new  and 
terrible  engine  of  war  had  been  con- 
structed. The  battle  at  Hampton  Koads 
had  read  the  world  a lesson.  It  pro- 
claimed the  superiority  of  such  a vessel 
as  the  Merrimac  with  her  sloping  sides 
and  inclined  armor  to  the  ordinary 
iron-clad.  It  also  proclaimed  the  fact 
that  inclined  armor  was  inferior  to  a 
turret.  The  nations  then  busy  with  the 
reconstruction  of  their  ships  for  war  pur- 
poses, and  spending  millions  upon  mill- 
ions upon  new  models,  felt  it  necessary 
to  pause,  to  read  the  lesson  which  came 
from  Hampton  Koads,  and  to  reflect. 

It  would  not  be  easy  to  overestimate 
the  importance  of  these  two  days’  fight- 
ing on  the  general  conduct  of  the  war. 
The  result  was  a heavy  blow  to  the 
Confederates : it  was  a clear  gain  to  the 
National  cause.  There  was,  no  doubt, 
just  cause  for  regret  that  the  Merrimac 
was  allowed  to  escape,  and  that  she  was 
not  hotly  pursued  and  compelled  to 


surrender.  There  can  be  no  doubt  now 
that  the  Monitor  was  quite  equal  to 
such  a task.  It  was  developed  in  an 
investigation  after  the  battle  that  the 
Monitor  had  on  board  wrought-iron 
shot,  each  weighing  184  pounds;  but 
this  shot  was  not  used  as  the  capacity 
and  strength  of  the  11-inch  Dahlgren 
guns  were  as  yet  imperfectly  known. 
In  answer  to  a question  put  by  the  War 
Committee,  as  to  why  the  battle  was 
not  more  promptly  decided  against  the 
Merrimac,  Mr.  Newton,  the  Chief  En- 
gineer of  the  Monitor,  said : It  was 

due  to  the  fact  that  the  power  and 
endurance  of  the  11-inch  Dahlgren  guns, 
with  which  the  Monitor  was  armed, 
w'ere  not  known  at  the  time  of  the 
battle ; hence  the  commander  would 
scarcely  have  been  justified  in  increas- 
ing the  charge  of  povv^der  above  that 
authorized  in  the  Ordnance  Manual. 
Subsequent  experience  developed  the 
important  fact  that  these  guns  could  be 
fired  with  thirty  pounds  of  common 
powder,  with  solid  shot.  If  this  had 
been  known  at  the  time  of  the  action, 
I am  clearly  of  opinion  that  from  the 
close  quarters  at  which  Lieutenant 
Worden  fought  his  vessel,  the  enemy 
would  have  been  forced  to  surrender.” 
According  to  the  same  witness,  if  a 15- 
inch  gun  could  possibly  have  been 
mounted  in  the  turret,  the  action  would 
have  been  short  and  decisive.  Mr. 
Newton  did  not  doubt  that  but  for  the 
injury  received  by  Lieutenant  Worden 
that  oflfieer  would  have  pursued  and 
“badgered  ” the  Merrimac  to  surrender. 
These  reasons,  it  must  be  admitted,  are 
sufficiently  satisfactory.  If  they  do  not 


212 


THE  MERRIMAC  AXD  THE  MONITOR. 


remove  all  cause  of  regret  that  the  Merri- 
mac  made  her  escape,  they  at  least  com- 
pletely exonerate  theNational  command- 
ers. Worden  was  irresponsible;  and 
his  subordinates,  judging  from  the  expe- 
rience they  had  had  that  Sunday  fore- 
noon, thought  it  best  to  content  them- 
selves with  what  they  had  actually  ac- 
complished. If  they  missed  a prize, 
posterity  will  not  judge  them  harshly. 

As  it  was,  the  Nationals  had  won  a 
great  victory,  and  had  just  reason  to 
be  well  pleased.  Had  the  Merrimac 
been  permitted  to  proceed  unchecked 
in  her  work  of  destruction,  the  result 
could  not  but  have  been  most  disastrous 
to  all  the  best  interests  of  the  North. 
It  might  have  seriously  affected  the  en- 
tire future  of  the  war,  and  led  to  re- 
sults very  different  to  what  were  de- 
sired and  to  what  were  ultimately 
achieved.  But  for  the  timely  arrival 
of  the  Monitor,  the  Minnesota  would 
have  shared  the  fate  of  the  Cumberland 
and  the  Congress;  the  entire  Union 
fleet  would  have  been  destroyed  or  cap- 
tured ; the  splendid  harbor  of  Hampton 
Hoads  would  have  been  left  in  the  un- 
disputed possession  of  the  Confederates ; 
Fortress  Monroe  would  have  been  im- 
perilled, and  its  fall  would  have  been 
only  a question  of  days.  Such  a loss, 
in  itself  considered,  would  have  been 
great.  But  it  would  have  been  greater 
still  in  the  consequences  which  must 
necessarily  have  resulted.  The  pos- 
session of  Hampton  Roads,  implying 
of  course  the  possession  of  Fortress 
Monroe,  would  have  given  the  Con- 
federates absolute  control  of  the  James 
and  York  rivers,  and  by  consequence 


would  have  upset  all  McClellan’s  plans, 
and  brought  his  projected  campaign 
against  Richmond  to  premature  and  in- 
glorious defeat.  This,  however,  would 
not  have  been  all.  The  possession  of 
these  waters  by  the  Confederates  would 
have  made  secure,  as  it  would  have 
given  them  the  command  of,  the  Pen- 
insula, and  made  impossible  any  attack 
by  way  of  the  James  River.  Worse 
even  than  this  was  possible.  What 
would  have  hindered  the  Merrimac 
from  running  up  Chesapeake  Bay  and 
steaming  up  the  Potomac,  to  the  terror 
of  the  National  Capitol  ? Or  supposing 
she  had  put  to  sea,  what  was  there  to 
prevent  her  making  her  way  to  the 
harbor  of  New  York,  dealing  de- 
struction among  the  shipping,  and  lay- 
ing under  contribution  the  chief  com- 
mercial city  of  the  Union  ? There  were 
other  possibilities  equally  if  not  even 
more  alarming.  One  other  we  deem  it 
proper  to  mention.  The  expulsion  of  th  e 
National  fleet  from  Hampton  Roads, 
coupled  as  it  would  have  been  with  the 
fall  of  Fortress  Monroe,  would  have 
encouraged  foreign  governments  in  wliat 
they  would  have  been  pleased  to  call 
the  interests  of  peace,  to  grant  recog- 
nition and  even  support  to  the  Con- 
federacy. In  the  spring  of  1862  the 
Confederates  were  not  without  bright, 
and,  as  they  thought,  cheering  pros- 
pects ; if  they  were  not  absolutely 
commanding  confidence  abroad,  they 
were  at  least  inspiring  hope ; and  such 
success  as  that  which  we  have  indicated, 
would  have  been  quite  suflicient  to 
make  ill-concealed  foreign  sympathy 
j assume  an  active  form. 


THE  ADVANCE. 


213 


It  was  a matter  of  some  importance 
to  the  Union  that  all  these  evils  were 
averted.  It  was  something  of  greater 
importance  still,  that  the  Nationals  had 
for  the  time  being,  at  least,  established 
their  superiority  in  naval  warfare,  had 
effectually  secured  possession  of  one  of 
the  largest  and  most  valuable  land- 
locked bays  on  the  Continent,  with  all 
the  connected  rivers  of  the  Peninsula, 
and  had  rendered  necessary  the  aban- 
donment of  Norfolk.  Now  that  the  en- 
emy had  been  driven  from  all  the  neigh- 
boring waters,  McClellan  had  a fair 
opportunity  to  carry  out  his  projected 
plans  on  the  Peninsula,  with  a view 
to  the  capture  of  Richmond.  This 
happy  state  of  things  had  been  brought 


about  mainly  by  the  Monitor.  It  was 
not  without  good  reason  that  Chief-En- 
gineer Steiner,  on  the  day  the  battle  had 
been  fought,  wrote  to  Ericsson  in  the  fol- 
lowing terms : “ I congratulate  you  upon 
your  great  success.  Thousands  have  this 
day  blessed  you.  I have  heard  whole 
crowds  cheer  you.  Every  man  feels 
that  you  have  saved  this  place  to  the 
nation,  by  furnishing  us  with  the  means 
to  whip  an  iron-clad  frigate,  that  was, 
until  our  arrival,  having  it  all  her  own 
way  with  our  most  powerful  vessels.” 

The  Merrimac  was  blown  up  by 
the  Confederates  May  11th,  and,  to- 
wards the  close  of  the  year,  the  Mon- 
itor foundered  in  a storm  off  Cape 
Hatteras. 


CHAPTER  XV. 

Following  np  the  Foe. — The  Confederate  Works  at  Williamsburg. — Fort  Magruder. — Winn’s  Mill  Road. — Hooker 
and  Kearney. — Couch  and  Casey.  —Sumner  in  Command. — General  Stoneman. — The  4th  of  May. — A Fearfiil 
Night. — Hooker  Engages  the  Foe. — The  Confederates  Well  Prepared. — Severe  Fighting. — Fort  Magruder 
Silenced. — Arrival  of  Longstreet. — A Cruel  Piece  of  Deception. — Blaisdell’s  Men. — Private  Doherty. — The 
Seventeenth  New  York. — Bravery  of  Hooker. — The  Pluck  and  Endurance  of  HisMen. — AnUnequal  Struggle. — 
Kearney  Comes  Up. — General  Hancock. — General  Birney. — A Gallant  Charge. — Hancock’s  Advance. — Hancock 
Driven  Back. — Falls  Back  in  Good  Order. — A Halt. — “Gentlemen,  Charge!” — Retreat  of  the  Confederates. — 
The  Key  of  the  Position. — The  Heroes  of  Williamsburg. — An  Unsatisfactory  Fight. — The  Great  Bravery  of  the 
Troops. — Bad  Generalship. — It  Ought  to  Have  Been  Different. — Want  of  Unity. — McClellan’s  Mistake. — Sumner 
not  the  Right  Man  in  the  Right  Place. — Why  was  McClellan  Absent? — Franklin’s  Expedition. — The  Prince  de. 
Joinville. — McClellan  on  the  Field. — ^His  Appearance. — Enthusiasm  of  the  Troops. — “ That  Little  Matter. 
“Bivouac  in  Front  of  Williamsburg.” — Other  Battles  to  Fight. — More  Delay. — What  a Bold  Stroke  Might  Have- 
Accomplished. — Promises  Fair  but  Fruitless. — Lincoln’s  Prophetic  Words. — The  Story  of  Manassas  Repeated. 
— Would  not  Strike  a Blow. 


After  the  evacuation  of  Yorktown, 
McClellan  gave  orders  that  the 
enemy  should  be  followed  up. 
The  Confederates  moved  towards  Will- 
iamsburg, where,  some  months  before, 


they  had  constructed  a line  of  strong 
works,  some  thirteen  in  number,  on  the 
rolling  but  elevated  ground  on  which 
that  city  stands.  These  works  were 
two  miles  in  front  of  Williamsburg,  at- 


214 


WILLIAMSBURG. 


the  naiTowest  part  of  the  Peninsula.  The 
line  stretched  from  a deep  ravine,  near 
the  James  River  on  the  right,  to  Queen’s 
Creek,  near  the  York  River  on  the  left. 
The  principal  work  was  Fort  Magruder, 
close  to  the  junction  of  the  Yorktown 
and  Winn’s  Mill  Road.  This  was  an 
earth- work,  with  bastion ed  front.  Its 
crest  measured  nearly  half  a mile.  It 
was  heavily  armed  and  surrounded  by  a 
ditch.  The  others  were  redoubts  not 
unlike  those  which  were  thrown  up 
around  Washington  City.  These  works 
the  Confederates  placed  under  a strong 
guard  for  the  purpose  of  holding  the 
pursuers  in  check,  while  the  main  body 
pressed  on  so  as  to  place  the  Chicka- 
hominy  between  them  and  the  Na- 
tionals. 

The  pursuing  army  was  headed  by 
General  Stoneman,  with  his  cavalry  and 
horse  artillery.  Stoneman  was  followed 
along  the  Yorktown  Road  by  the  divi- 
sions of  Generals  Joseph  Hooker  and 
Philip  Kearney,  of  Heintzelman’s  corps, 
and  along  the  Winn’s  Mill  Road  by  the 
divisions  of  Generals  W.  F.  Smith, 
Darius  N.  Couch  and  Silas  Casey,  of 
Keyes’  corps.  The  commands  of  Rich- 
ardson, of  Sedgwick,  and  of  Fitz  John 
Porter  were  left  at  Yorktown,  with 
instructions  to  hold  themselves  in  readi- 
ness to  advance  as  a supporting  force,  if 
required,  or,  if  deemed  more  important, 
to  follow  and  co-operate  with  Franklin’s 
division,  which  was  to  move  up  the  York 
River  to  West  Point,  and  take  posses- 
sion of  the  terminus  of  the  Richmond 
and  York  River  Railroad.  General 
Edwin  V.  Sumner,  McClellan’s  second 
in  command,  was  intrusted  with  the 


immediate  direction  of  the  pursuit.  Me 
Clellan  himself  remained  at  Yorktown 
for  the  purpose  of  completing  the 
arrangements  necessary  for  the  depart- 
ure of  Franklin  up  the  York  River. 

General  Stoneman,  who  moved  some 
miles  ahead  of  the  rest  of  the  army, 
touched  the  Confederate  lines  in  the 
neighborhood  of  Fort  Magruder.  Ex- 
posed to  the  guns  of  the  fort,  and  fiercely 
attacked  by  the  Confederate  cavalry,  he 
was  compelled  to  fall  back.  Meanwhile,' 
Hooker  and  Smith’s  divisions,  the  latter 
ahead,  were  pressing  forward  with  all 
haste  on  the  Yorktown  Road.  On  be- 
ing informed  of  Stoneman’s  repulse, 
Hooker,  feeling  the  necessity  of  despatch, 
obtained  leave  from  General  Heintzel- 
man  to  throw  his  division  on  the  Hamp- 
ton or  Warwick  roads.  Having  Smith 
no  longer  in  front,  he  was  able  to  move 
with  greater  ease  and  rapidity.  Sumner, 
having  hurried  forward  with  Smith’s 
division,  reached  the  place  where  Stone- 
man was  halting  about  five  o’clock  in 
the  afternoon.  By  midnight.  Hooker, 
who  had  made  the  best  possible  use  of 
his  time,  had  his  men  in  position  on 
Smith’s  left.  Here  the  troops  rested 
on  their  arms  until  the  morning.  Maj 
The  4th  of  May,  1862,  is  one  of 
the  memorable  Sundays  of  the  war.  It 
had  rained  all  day,  and  the  roads  were 
almost  impassable.  At  night  the  rain 
continued.  That  was  a fearful  night,” 
wrote  one  who  was  present  with  the 
army ; “ and  that  was  a strange,  eventful 
bivouac.  The  roads  being  in  a dread- 
fully muddy  condition,  the  troops  had 
had  a difficult  march ; and  then,  at  night, 
without  shelter  from  the  rain,  which  was 


CRUEL  DECEPTION. 


215 


falling  fast,  without  food  or  nourish- 
ment, they  all,  officers  and  soldiers, 
reposed  that  Sabbath  night,  as  best  they 
could,  on  the  wet  ground  and  among 
the  forest  trees.”  The  position  of  the 
army,  as,  in  these  circumstances,  it 
sought  rest  for  the  night,  was  as  follows : 
General  Hooker’s  division  lay  in  front 
of  the  centre  of  the  Confederate  works ; 
Smith’s  division  and  Stoneman’s  cavalry 
and  artillery  lay  to  the  right.  The 
divisions  of  Kearney  and  Couch  had 
halted  in  the  rear. 

At  break  of  day  on  the  5th,  Hooker 
May  up  and  in  motion.  Before  the 
church  clocks  had  struck  six,  he 
was  in  full  view  of  the  works  which  the 
Confederates  had  thrown  up  for  defense ; 
and  the  towers  and  spires  of  Williams- 
burg were  clearly  revealed  across  the 
open  level  plains.  For  well  nigh  a mile 
in  front,  the  ground  was  obstructed  by 
trees  which  had  been  felled  for  the  pur- 
pose ; and  wherever  the  ground  was  open 
it  was  dotted  with  rifle-pits.  Hooker 
lost  no  time  in  moving  upon  the  foe.  He 
knew  that  there  were  thirty  thousand 
men  within  supporting  distance,  and 
that  the  bulk  of  the  army  of  the  Poto- 
mac was  within  four  hours’  march.  At 
half-past  seven  o’clock,  he  directed  Gen- 
eral Grover,  with  his  brigade,  to  make 
the  attack.  The  First  Massachusetts,  the 
Second  New  Hampshire,  the  Eleventh 
Massachusetts  and  Twenty-Sixth  Penii: 
sylvania  regiments  were  deployed  in 
front,  to  the  left  of  the  Hampton  Road, 
as  skirmishers,  with  orders  * to  pi«k 
off  the  Confederate  sharpshooters  and 
artillerists,  while  Captain  W eber,  with 
liis  battery,  was  pushed  into  the  open 


field,  until  they  were  within  seven 
hundred  yards  of  Port  Magruder.  The 
Confederates  were  not  found  unpre- 
pared. Before  the  disposition  of  the 
National  troops  was  completed,  the 
guns  of  the  fort  and  of  one  of  the  ad- 
joining redoubts  opened  a heavy  fire, 
killing  two  of  Weber’s  officers  and 
several  of  his  men,  and  forcing  the 
battery  to  fall  back.  The  battery, 
however,  was  quickly  re-manned  by 
some  volunteers  from  Osborn’s ; and  the 
guns  were  soon  in  position  and  respond- 
ing to  the  fire  of  the  enemy.  Bram- 
hall’s  New  York  battery  came  up 
opportunely  and  took  a position  to  th« 
right  of  Weber’s.  The  two  batteries 
were  supported  by  the  Fifth  New  Jersey 
regiment  ; and  while  the  batteries 
poured  forth  their  shot  and  shell  with 
terrible  rapidity  and  with  deadly  aim, 
the  rifle  bullets  of  the  infantry  did 
scarcely  less  effective  work.  Within 
an  hour  and  a half  the  Confederate 
troops  which  had  appeared  on  the  plain 
were  dispersed,  and  the  guns  of  their 
works  apparently  silenced. 

The  battle,  however,  was  as  yet  only 
beginning.  The  Confederates,  at  the 
very  moment  victory  seemed  secured  by 
the  Nationals,  began  to  appear  in  great 
force.  We  have  already  seen  that  the 
main  body  of  the  Confederate  army  had 
left  Williamsburg,  and  was  on  its  way 
towards  Richmond  before  Hooker  came 
up.  It  was  only,  therefore,  with  the  rear- 
guard of  the  retreating  army,  and  with 
the  troops  which  had  been  left  behind 
to  man  the  fort  and  the  redoubts,  that 
the  Nationals  had  as  yet  been  engaged. 
After  Hooker  had  sent  out  his  skirm- 


216 


WILLIAMSBURG. 


ishers,  and  the  National  batteries  had 
opened  fire,  Johnston  began  to  perceive 
that  the  pressure  of  the  pursuers  was 
much  greater  than  he  had  been  led  to 
suspect  from  the  ordinarily  dilatory 
movements  of  McClellan.  Longstreet’s 
division  had  already  passed  through 
Williamsburg.  It  was  ordered  back  by 
Johnston  to  give  its  support  to  the  rear- 
guard. It  was  this  division  which  now 
appeared  on  the  scene  of  conflict,  and 
gave  new  life  to  the  struggle.  Long- 
street’s  men  were  fresh  and  full  of 
vigor ; and  when  they  fell  in  force  upon 
Patterson’s  New  Jersey  brigade,  which 
had  been  engaged  all  the  morning,  it 
was  felt  that  the  contest  was  unequal. 
Hooker,  therefore,  sent  to  Patterson’s 
assistance  Brigadier-General  Grover, 
with  the  First  Massachusetts  and  two 
regiments  of  the  Excelsior  brigade,  the 
Twentieth  and  Seventy-Second  New 
York.  At  the  same  time  the  Eleventh 
Pennsylvania  and  Twenty-Sixth  Massa- 
chusetts came  up  to  the  Yorktown 
Road ; and  Colonel  Blaisdell,  who  com- 
manded them,  was  ordered  to  clear  the 
road  and  form  a connection  with  Heint- 
zelman’s  corps. 

Blaisdell  promptly  put  the  order  in 
execution.  His  men  marched  steadily 
forward  until  they  were  within  fifty 
yards  of  the  enemy  ; and  here  occurred 
one  of  those  cruel  pieces  of  deception 
to  which  the  Confederates  on  more  than 
one  occasion  resorted.  “ Don’t  fire  on 
your  friends,”  shouted  a Confederate 
officer,  displaying  a white  flag.  Blais- 
dell ordered  his  men  to  cease  firing; 
and  Private  Doherty  advanced  to  take 
the  flag.  “Now,  give  it  them,”  ex- 


claimed the  same  treacherous  voice ; and 
on  Blaisdell’s  men,  thus  thrown  off 
their  guard,  the  Confederates  opened  a 
destructive  fiie.  Several  of  them  were 
killed.  Among  them  was  poor  Doherty, 
who,  however,  had  managed,  before  he 
fell,  to  put  a bullet  through  the  head  of 
the  wretched  traitor  who  had  lured  him 
to  his  death.  Blaisdell’s  men  did  good 
and  effective  work,  maintaining  the 
struggle  until  their  ammunition  was 
exhausted.  They  were  relieved  by  the 
Seventy-Second  New  York.  This  regi- 
ment, after  an  unsuccessful  attack  on  a 
battery  to  the  left,  and  having  been 
exposed  to  a raking  fire  from  the  ene- 
my’s guns,  was  compelled  to  give  place 
to  the  Seventieth  New  York,  Colonel 
Dwight.  As  this  regiment  came  for- 
ward, it  was  supposed  by  the  Confede- 
rates to  be  one  of  their  own.  The 
Confederate  colonel  displaying  his  own 
flag,  asked  for  a similar  display  on  the 
part  of  the  Seventieth.  Dwight  un- 
furled the  “stars  and  stripes.”  It  was 
the  signal  for  a Confederate  volley, 
which,  of  course,  was  promptly  re- 
sponded to,  and  with  energy  and  effect. 
The  Seventieth  fought  like  heroes ; and 
although  pressed  by  greatly  superior 
numbers,  they  held  their  ground  till 
their  cartridge  boxes  were  empty. 
After  a severe  and  unequal  struggle,  in 
which  twenty-two  of  the  thirty-three 
commissioned  officers  of  the  regiment 
were  killed  or  wounded.  Colonel 
Dwight,  himself  wounded,  was  made 
prisoner,  with  several  of  his  men.  The 
battle  was  now  raging  furiously  all 
along  the  line  ; the  Confederates  were 
continually  being  reinforced,  Pickett 


HOOKER’S  BRAVERY. 


217 


and  Gholson,  and  Pryor  and  others, 
having  hurried  back  from  the  direction 
of  the  Chickahominy ; and  the  increas- 
ing strength  of  Johnston’s  army  was 
steadily  concentrating  on  Hooker’s  left. 
The  situation  was  becoming  critical. 
The  Confederates  had  three  times 
charged  the  National  centre  ; they  had 
made  a bold  dash  from  Fort  Magruder, 
and  captured  five  of  Weber’s  guns; 
they  had  worn  out  some  of  the  best 
National  regiments,  and  thinned  several 
of  the  National  brigades;  but  Hooker, 
still  unaided  against  the  superior  and 
rapidly  increasing  strength  of  his  an- 
tagonist, tenaciously  held  his  ground. 

As  early  as  half-past  eleven  o’clock. 
Hooker  sent  a despatch  to  the  assistant- 
adjutant-general  of  General  Heintzel- 
man,  to  whose  corps  his  division  be- 
longed. In  that  despatch  he  said  : I 
have  had  a hard  contest  all  the  morning, 
but  do  not  despair  of  success.  My  men 
are  all  at  work,  but  a great  deal  exhaust- 
ed. It  is  reported  to  me  that  my  com- 
munication with  you  by  the  Yorktown 
Eoad  is  clear  of  the  enemy.  Batteries, 
cavalry  and  infantry  can  take  part  by 
the  side  of  mine  and  whip  the  enemy.” 
Later  in  the  da}",  and  again  and  again,  he 
addressed  appeals  for  help  to  Sumner, 
but  in  vain.  One  o’clock,  two  o’clock, 
three  o’clock  struck,  and  still  no  help 
came,  with  the  exception  of  Peck’s  bri- 
gade, of  Couch’s  division,  which  arrived 
early  in  the  afternoon,  and  was  posted 
on  his  right,  where  it  helped  to  repel 
several  Confederate  attacks.  Later  in 
the  day  two  more  of  Couch’s  brigades 
came  up;  but  as  Hooker’s  men  were 
completely  exhausted,  and  their  ammu- 


nition failing,  it  was  too  late  to  enable 
him  to  make  any  vigorous  aggressive 
effort.  Between  four  and  five  in  the 
afternoon.  General  Philip  Kearney,  with 
his  division,  appeared  on  the  scene  of 
action,  and,  with  characteristic  energy, 
pressed  to  the  front.  Hooker,  with  his 
thinned  ranks  and  worn-out  men,  with- 
drew from  the  fight  and  rested  as  a 
reserve.  He  had  lost  in  the  battle  one 
thousand  seven  hundred  men.  We  do 
not  much  wonder  that  Hooker  was  in- 
dignant that  his  morning  efforts  were  not 
more  effectively  backed  by  the  strength 
of  the  other  divisions  of  the  army,  and 
that  he  was  allowed,  after  victory  had 
become  impossible  to  him  and  his  brave 
soldiers,  to  fight  so  long  unaided  against 
such  fearful  odds.  ‘‘  History,”  he  after- 
wards wrote,  ^‘will  not  be  believed, 
when  it  is  told  that  the  noble  officers 
and  men  of  my  division  were  permitted 
to  carry  on  this  unequal  struggle  from 
morning  until  night,  unaided,  in  the 
presence  of  more  than  30,000  of  their 
comrades,  with  arms  in  their  hands ; 
nevertheless,  it  is  true.”  Of  this,  how- 
ever, more  anon. 

Kearney,  as  we  have  just  said,  pressed 
to  the  front.  General  Berry,  whose 
brigade  of  Kearney’s  division,  followed 
by  Thomson’s  batteries,  was  the  first  to 
arrive  on  the  ground,  was  immediately 
put  into  action.  The  brigade  consisted 
of  the  Fifth  Michigan,  the  Thirty- 
Seventh  New  York,  and  the  Second 
Michigan.  The  Fifth  Michigan  was 
filed  off  into  the  woods  to  the  left  of 
the  Hampton  Hoad,  and  was  supported 
V)y  the  Thirty-Seventh  New  York.  A 
charge  was  ordered  on  the  left ; and  the 


218 


WILLIAMSBUEG. 


regiments  just  naijied  advanced  in 
splendid  style,  driving  the  enemy  be- 
fore them,  away  from  the  fallen  timber, 
and  out  of  the  rifle-pits  beyond.”  In 
this  charge  the  Fifth  Michigan  suffered 
severely.  Colonel  Terry  and  nearly  all 
his  subordinate  officers  being  wounded ; 
but  they  stoutly  held  the  ground  which 
they  had  so  gallantly  won.  The  Con- 
federates were  now  making  vigorous 
and  determined  efforts  on  the  National 
centre.  They  had  captured  some  of 
Bramhall’s  guns ; and  they  seemed  re- 
solved to  silence  and  capture  the  whole 
battery.  To  check  these  efforts,  a bat- 
teiy  in  charge  of  Captain  Smith  was 
planted,  m echelon^  on  a rising  knoll,  to 
the  rii’ht  of  the  road.  At  the  same 

o 

time,  two  companies  of  the  Second  Mich- 
igan were  ordered  to  charge  on  the 
enemy’s  skirmishers  who  were  tlirong- 
ing  about  the  coveted  guns.  The  charge 
was  gallantly  made ; and  what  wflth  the 
effective  fire  from  Smith’s  battery,  the 
Confederates  were  driven  back.  Gen- 
eral Birney,  who,  with  two  regiments 
of  his  brigade — the  Thirty-Eighth  New 
York  and  the  Fortieth  New  York — had 
been  deployed  on  the  right  to  relieve 
Hancock’s  weary  men,  now  came  for- 
ward. The  Confederates  had  resumed 
firing  from  their  forts ; and  they  were 
again  pressing  forward  with  their  troops. 
Colonel  Ward,  with  two  companies  pf 
the  Thirty-Eighth  New  York,  made  a 
brilliant  dash  down  the  road,  taking 
the  rifle-pits  by  the  flank.  The  charge 
was  completely  successful ; and  the 
Confederates  were  driven  from  their  po- 
sition. Encouraged  by  Colonel  Ward’s 
success,  Kearney  ordered  a portion  of 


the  Fortieth  New  York  to  sustain  him 
in  another  charge  to  the  Confederate 
rear.  This  detachment  was  led  by 
Captain  Mindel,  Birney’s  chief  of  staff. 
The  charge  was  gallantly  made,  and  was 
even  more  effective  than  the  preceding. 
The  Coflfederates  fell  back ; and  there 
was  no  more  firing  either  from  the 
rifle-pits  or  by  the  artillery.  The  rear- 
brigade  of  Kearney’s  division,  under 
General  Jameson,  now  reached  this  por- 
tion of  the  field;  a second  line  was  at 
once  formed ; and  arrangements  were 
made  for  further  vigorous  efforts.  But 
darkness  fell  upon  the  scene ; and  the 
wearied  soldiers,  seeking  repose,  stretch- 
ed themselves  on  the  rain-soaked  and 
blood-stained  battle  field. 

While  these  events  were  taking  place 
on  the  National  left,  events  of  equal 
importance  were  occurring  on  the  ex- 
treme right.  At  an  early  hour  in  the 
day,  fears  were  entertained  that  the 
Confederates  might  make  a dangerous 
movement  in  that  direction;  and  in 
obedience  to  orders  from  Sumner,  the 
general  in  command.  General  Smith 
sent  Hancock,  with  about  twenty-five 
hundred  men,  to  hold  the  enemy  in 
check,  and,  if  possible,  to  make  a flank 
movement  upon  the  works.  Hancock’s 
command  consisted  partly  of  his  own 
and  pai-tly  of  Davidson’s  brigade.  For 
the  special  duty  assigned  him,  Hancock 
selected  from  his  own  brigade  the  Fifth 
Wisconsin,  the  Forty-Ninth  Pennsylva- 
nia, and  the  Sixth  Maine,  and,  from 
Davidson’s  brigade,  the  Seventh  Maine 
and  Thirty-Ninth  New  York  volunteers. 
These  were  accompanied  by  the  batteries 
of  Crowen  and  Wheeler.  One  of  the 


HANCOCK’S  SPLENDID  CHARGE. 


219 


redoubts  which  had  been  thrown  up  by 
Magruder,  and  which  was  near  to  the 
extreme  Confederate  left,  was  discov- 
ered to  be  unoccupied.  Its  existence,  it 
appears,  had  been  unknown  to  Johnston 
and  his  officers.  The  redoubt  occupied 
a conspicuous  and  important  position. 
It  stood  upon  a high  bank,  looking 
down  upon  a ravine,  and  commanded  a 
dam  on  what  is  called  Cut  Dam  Creek, 
a small  tributary  of  Queen’s  Creek,  and 
was  about  a mile  and  a half  eastward  of 
the  Yorktown  Road.  Having  crossed 
this  creek,  Hancock  experienced  no 
difficulty  in  taking  possession  of  the  re- 
doubt. Another  redoubt,  about  twelve 
hundred  yards  in  advance,  was  found  to 
be  unoccupied.  This,  also,  was  taken 
possession  of.  Between  the  redoubts 
now  occupied  by  Hancock’s  men  and 
Fort  Magruder  there  were  other  two 
redoubts ; but  these  were  manned  by 
Confederate  forces,  more  or  less  strong. 
A few  shells  were  flung  at  these  re- 
doubts, and  a brisk  fire  was  opened  upon 
them  at  the  same  time  by  some  sharp- 
shooters ; and  they,  too,  were  soon 
deserted.  General  Hancock  had  ac- 
complished;  without  the  least  difficulty, 
more,  perhaps,  than  he  had  expected  to 
accomplish  by  severe  and  protracted 
fighting.  But  the  evil  genius  of  that 
ill-starred  day  would  not  allow  him  to 
reap  the  full  rewards  of  victory.  He 
had  not  around  him  a sufficient  number 
of  men  to  warrant  his  occupation  of  the 
two  deserted  redoubts.  There  was  no 
lack  of  men  in  the  immediate  neighbor- 
hood; but  they  were  neither  at  hand 
nor  in  hand.  It  was  Hooker’s  experience 
over  again.  He  could  make  no  further 


aggressive  efforts  without  reinforce- 
ments. Meantime,  Johnston  discovered 
the  blunder  he  had  made  in  not  makinoc 
himself  familiar  with  the  ground.  He 
ought  to  have  known  of  the  existence 
of  these  redoubts.  They  were  all-im- 
portant ; for  they  were  in  the  flank  and 
rear  of  his  line  of  defense.  Unless 
speedily  reclaimed,  his  line  would  be 
not  only  menaced  in  its  integrity,  but 
practically  broken.  By  all  means,  the 
Nationals  must  be  driven  from  this 
position.  Such  was  the  necessity  which 
Johnston  felt  laid  upon  him.  With 
this  end  in  view,  he  gave  instructions  to 
General  Hill  to  send  a force  of  sufficient 
strength  to  expel  Hancock  from  the 
redoubts  and  drive  him  back  upon  his 
own  lines.  The  task  was  assigned  to 
General  Jubal  Early,  with  a force  of 
Virginia  and  North  Carolina  troops. 
Hancock,  meanwhile,  had  been  earnestly 
calling  for  reinforcements.  It  was  all 
in  vain.  Sumner  had  been  unable  to 
send  assistance  to  Hooker  because  of 
the  number  of  men  he  had  placed 
under  Hancock ; and  now  he  professes 
himself  unable  to  succor  and  strengthen 
Hancock  from  a fear  that  he  might 
thereby  weaken  his  centre,  and  so  place 
his  whole  army  in  peril.  In  place  of  re- 
ceiving reinforcements,  Hancock  was  or- 
dered to  abandon  the  redoubts  and  fall 
back  upon  his  original  position.  It  was  a 
painful  order  to  execute ; but  he  had  no 
choice.  W ith  the  small  number  of  men 
at  his  command,  it  was  impossible  for 
him  to  retain  the  position  he  had  taken 
in  face  of  the  overwhelmingly  superior 
numbers  of  the  enemy.  If,  however, 
he  must  fall  back,  he  will  fall  back  in 


220 


WILLIAMSBURG. 


good  order,  contesting  every  inch  of 
ground  and  saving  his  command.  About 
five  o’clock  in  the  afternoon,  he  saw  the 
two  redoubts  nearest  Fort  Magruder 
reoccupied  by  the  Confederates.  Their 
forward  movement  was  fairly  begun. 
In  the  most  perfect  order,  and  keeping 
his  ranks  in  line,  Hancock  drew  back 
his  brigade.  Retiring  regiment  by  reg- 
iment, and  carrying  his  artillery  back 
piece  by  piece,  maintaining,  meanwhile, 
a vigorous  fire  upon  the  advancing  foe, 
he  reached  the  crest  of  a ridge  not  far 
from  the  dam  above  mentioned.  There 
he  halted,  and  forming  his  men  in  line 
of  battle,  he  calmly  awaited  Early’s 
approach.  On  came  the  Confederates 
in  great  force,  firing  as  they  advanced, 
shouting  and  yelling  “ Bull  Run,” 
Ball’s  Bluff,”  and  other  offensive  ex- 
pressions. They  had  reached  within 
thirty  paces  of  his  line,  when  Hancock, 
with  as  much  politeness  as  bravery,  ex- 
claimed, “ Gentlemen,  charge  !”  With 
enthusiastic  cheers,  his  gallant  soldiers 
dashed  down  the  slope.  The  attack 
was  irresistible.  The  Confederates 
broke  and  fled  at  the  first  touch  of  the 
bayonet.  The  Nationals,  halting,  fired 
some  ten  or  a dozen  volleys  into  the 
broken  ranks.  When  the  smoke  cleared 
off,  some  five  hundred  of  Early’s  men 
were  found  dead  or  wounded  on  the 
field.  The  remainder  were  in  full  re- 
treat towards  the  Confederate  lines. 
The  battle  of  Williamsburg  was  now 
practically  ended.  Hancock  had  won 
no  great  victory ; he  had  not  dared  to 
follow  the  retreating  foe  ; but  he  had 
secured  the  key  of  the  position.  Here 
he  remained,  waiting  for  reinforcements ; 


but  when  these  were  forwarded  to  him 
by  special  orders  from  McClellan  him- 
self, w’ho  had  now  arrived  on  the  field, 
they  were  no  longer  necessary.  The 
battle  had  ceased  all  along  the  line. 

There  were  other  struggles  during 
the  day,‘  one  particularly  late  in  the 
afternoon,  a little  to  the  right  of  the 
Confederate  works,  on  the  Yorktown 
Road  Here,  in  the  open  space.  Peck’s 
brigade  encountered  the  Confederates 
in  force ; and  after  severe  fighting  they 
were  compelled  to  fall  back.  Generals 
Kleirn  and  Devens,  with  their  respect- 
ive brigades,  of  Casey’s  division,  coming 
to  their  relief.  The  two  great  features 
of  the  day’s  contest  were  the  heroic 
resistance  of  Hooker  on  the  left  and  the 
splendid  charge  made  by  Hancock  on 
the  extreme  right.  Hooker  and  Han- 
cock, and  after  them  Kearney — these 
were  the  men  who  won  the  laurels  at 
Williamsburg.'^ 

♦Joseph  Hooker  was  born  in  1819,  in  Hadley,  Massa- 
chusetts. He  was  appointed  a cadet  at  West  Point  in 
1833.  He  took  part  in  the  Mexican  war,  serving  in  the 
same  regiment  with  “Stonewall”  Jackson,  and  becom- 
ing aide-de-camp  to  Brigadier-General  Hamer.  In  1848, 
having  passed  through  the  various  grades,  he  was  pro- 
moted to  a full  colonelcy,  and  entered  the  Adjutant- 
General’s  Department  at  Washington.  In  18r)8  he 
resigned,  went  to  California,  and  combined  the  duties  of 
farmer  with  those  of  railroad  constructor.  He  super- 
intended the  building  of  the  National  road.  When  the 
war  broke  out  in  1861,  he  returned  and  was  present  as  a 
spectator  at  the  battle  of  Bull  Run.  Soon  afterwards  we 
find  him  appointed  Lieutenant-Colonel  of  a new  regiment 
of  regulars.  Later  he  was  made  Brigadier-General  of 
volunteers.  His  first  active  duties  were  in  Maryland 
and  Eastern  Virginia.  He  made  himself  useful  in  help- 
ing to  clear  the  Potomac  of  the  Confederate  blockading 
batteries.  When  McClellan  moved  to  the  Peninsula, 
Hooker’s  brigade  was  added  to  the  command,  and  he 
himself  placed  at  the  head  of  a division.  At  Williams- 
burg, as  we  have  seen,  he  established  his  reputation  as 
one  of  the  first  soldiers  of  the  republic.  His  name  will 
frequently  again  appear  in  these  annals. 


THE  EETREAT. 


221 


According  to  the  official  reports,  the 
jUay  National  loss  on  Monday,  May 
5th,  was  456  killed,  1411  wound- 
ed, and  about  500  missing.  The  loss 
sustained  by  the  Confederates  was  not 
quite  so  great ; but,  including  killed, 
wounded  and  missing,  it  could  scarcely 
have  been  under  one  thousand  men. 
Hooker’s  division  suffered  most  severe- 
ly of  all,  the  loss  being  in  the  propor- 
tion of  one  to  six — a proportion  of  loss 
equal  to  that  of  the  allied  armies  at 
Alma,  one  of  the  bloodiest  battles  of 
which  history  has  preserved  any  record. 

On  the  night  after  the  battle,  the 


Winfield  Scott  Hancock,  a direct  descendant  of  John 
Hancock  who  signed  the  Declaration  of  Independence, 
was  born  in  Pennsylvania  about  1824.  He  entered 
West  Point  in  1840,  and  graduated  in  1844,  receiving 
his  commission  of  Second  Lieutenant.  One  of  his  class- 
fellows  at  West  Point  was  General  Pleasonton.  He 
served  in  the  Mexican  War,  and  was  promoted  for  his 
gallantry.  At  the  outbreak  of  the  war  he  held  the  post 
of  Assistant-Quartermaster-General.  In  1861  he  was 
appointed  a Brigadier-General  of  volunteers.  In  this 
capacity  he  was  attached  to  the  army  of  the  Potomac. 
We  have  seen  what  services  he  rendered  before  York- 
town  and  at  Williamsburg.  His  gallant  charge  at  the 
close  of  that  day  will  be  remembered  with  pride  so  long 
as  the  history  of  the  Civil  War  is  read.  Hancock's  name 
will  appear  in  many  subsequent  struggles. 

“ When  General  Kearney’s  troops  were  being  brought 
into  action,  they  met  the  lengthened  files  of  General 
Hooker’s  wounded  being  carried  to  the  rear.  The 
shrieks  of  the  lacerated  and  bleeding  soldiers,  who  had 
been  fighting  so  long  and  so  well,  pierced  the  air ; and 
this,  joined  to  the  mud  and  rain,  and  the  exhaustion  of 
those  who  had  come  several  miles  with  so  much  speed, 
was  not  calculated  to  produce  a favorable  impression  on 
them  as  they  were  going  into  action.  General  Heintzel- 
man,  however,  ordered  several  of  the  bands  to  strike  up 
national  and  martial  airs ; and  when  the  strains  of  the 
familiar  tunes  reached  the  ears  of  the  wouuded,  as  they 
were  being  carried  from  the  field,  three  cheers  mingled 
with  those  of  the  soldiers  who  were  just  rushing  into 
battle.  The  effect,  too,  was  great  on  the  other  side ; 
for  some  of  the  prisoners  state  that  when  they  heard 
the  bands  strike  up  the  Star-Spangled  Banner,  and 
heard  our  soldiers  cheer,  they  knew  that  the  victory 
would  be  ours.” — Correspondent  N.  Y.  Herald. 


soldiers  of  tbe  National  army  rested  on 
their  arms  on  the  ground  'where  they 
fought  during  the  day,  some  of  them 
in  front  of  the  Confederate  works,  and 
not  a few  of  them  in  close  proximity 
to  the  bodies  of  their  dead  or  wounded 
companions  in  arms.  It  was  uncertain 
as  yet  what  would  be  required  of  them 
on  the  following  day.  The  Confede- 
rates still  held  their  position ; and  there 
was  no  good  reason  for  believing  that 
they  would  not  renew  the  fight  in  the 
morning.  Shortly  after  midnight  it 
was  rumored  that  the  works  were  be- 
ing evacuated,  and  that  according  to 
appearances  a retreat  would  be  effect- 
ed during  the  night.  When  morning 
dawned,  what  was  report  was  found  to 
be  a fact.  The  defenses  were  aban- 
doned ; and  in  their  march  to  new 
ground  beyond  the  Chickahominy,  the 
Confederates  were  leaving  behind  them 
the  town  of  Williamsburg.  Fort  Ma- 
gruder  and  the  redoubts  were  speedily 
occupied  by  the  Nationals;  and  the 
Confederate  rear-guard  had  not  yet  left 
the  city  on  the  one  side  when  General 
Jameson  entered  it  on  the  other.  Will- 
iamsburg was  found  to  be  deserted. 

Of  all  the  battles  fought  during  the 
continuance  of  the  w^ar,  none  was  more 
unsatisfactory,  so  far  as  the  North  was 
concerned,  than  the  battle  of  Will'iams- 
buig.  It  was  not  that  there  was  any 
lack  of  bravery  on  the  part  of  the  men. 
It  was  not  that  there  was  a want  of 
pluck  or  skill  on  the  part  of  those 
by  whom  they  were  immediately  led. 
On  the  contrary,  never  was  more 
heroism  displayed  than  that  exhibited 
by  Hooker  and  the  men  of  his  division 


222 


WILLIAMSBURG. 


as,  during  the  weary  hours  of  that  day,  j 
they  resisted,  unaided,  the  vastly  su- 
perior forces  of  the  Confederates ; and 
certainly  there  never  was  a more  gal- 
lant charge  than  that  made  by  Hancock 
and  his  little  band  down  the  ridge  by 
the  dam  at  Queen’s  Creek.  Nor  is  it 
possible  to  speak  in  terms  of  too  high 
commendation  of  the  conduct  of  Kear- 
ney and  his  men  when,  after  coming  to 
the  relief  of  Hooker,  they  charged  the 
Confederates  in  front  and  flank  and 
rear,  driving  them  from  their  defenses, 
out  of  the  redoubts,  out  of  the  rifle- 
pits,  and  out  of  the  open  ground,  away 
into  the  woods  beyond.  From  the 
actual  work  done  by  those  commanders, 
and  by  the  men  who  followed  their 
lead,  it  is  clear  that  the  secret  of  the 
bungling  inefficiency  of  that  day  on  the 
outskirts  of  Williamsburg  lay  not  with 
the  army,  properly  so  called,  nor  with 
the  division  leaders,  but  with  those 
who  were  in  supreme  control.  How 
Hooker  could  be  left  so  long  unaided, 
while  whole  divisions,  not  yet  engaged 
or  even  menaced,  were  within  easy 
distance,  we  confess  we  seek  in  vain 
for  a satisfactory  explanation.  And 
why  Hancock,  after  he  had  successfully 
captured  the  redoubts  on  the  extreme 
right,  should  have  been  ordered  to  fall 
back;  is  to  us  beset  with  the  same 
difficulties. 

The  success  which  attended  Kearney 
in  his  repeated  aggressive  efforts,  and 
the  comparative  ease  with  which  Han- 
cock forced  a retreat,  show  that  the  foe 
was  much  less  redoubtable  than  was 
imagined ; and  there  can  be  no  doubt 
that,  if  timely  and  sufficient  aid  had 


I been  sent  to  the  one  and  the  other,  the 
battle  would  have  been  less  enduring, 
and  the  victory  more  complete.  The 
retreat  of  the  Confederates  from  Will- 
iamsburg this  second  time  ought  to  have 
been  impossible.  Their  works,  includ- 
ing Fort  ^agruder,  ought  to  have  been 
cleared,  and  the  Confederate  rear-guard 
captured  or  destroyed,  before  Long- 
street  could  have  had  time  to  return 
to  the  aid  of  his  comrades.  In  that 
case,  the  battle  of  Williamsburg  would 
have  been  unnecessary.  A little  more 
energy  on  the  part  of  the  Nationals, 
with  greater  unity  of  action  and  com- 
munity of  purpose,  and  Johnston  would 
have  found  it  impossible  to  do  what  he 
actually  accomplished  even  after  the 
battle  of  Williamsburg — to  place  the 
Chickahominy  and  its  fever-breeding 
borders  between  himself  and  his  op- 
ponents. A common  purpose  and 
unity  of  action  were  sadly  and  visibly 
wanting  throughout  the  whole  contest. 
How  differently  things  were  managed 
at  Shiloh,  and,  later,  at  luka  and  Cor- 
inth ! How  different  at  Perryville  and 
Murfreesboro ! 

We  have  said  that  the  secret  of  the 
mismanagement  was  to  be  sought  not 
among  the  men,  not  among  the  sub- 
ordinate officers  or  generals  of  divi- 
sions, but  in  higher  places.  McClellan, 
it  must  be  admitted,  made  a mistake  in 
placing  Sumner  in  chief  command  of 
the  pursuing  army.  General  Sumner 
was  undoubtedly  a brave  and  capable 
commander,  as  he  showed  subsequently 
at  Antietain  and  at  Fredericksburg; 
but  it  has  been  known  in  all  time  that 
men  capable  of  great  effort  and  great 


«THAT  LITTLE  MATTER” 


223 


enterprise,  when  acting  in  a secondary 
capacity,  are  not  necessarily  possessed 
of  those  qualities  which  enable  them 
to  force  success,  when  acting  on  their 
own  responsibility.  Many  first-rate 
corps  commanders  and  generals  of 
divisions  have  proved  but  sorry  com- 
manders-in-chief. Our  own  Civil  War, 
on  the  one  side  and  the  other,  revealed 
many  such ; and  it  is  no  serious  charge 
to  make  asrainst  General  Sumner  to 

O 

say  that,  in  the  battle  before  Williams- 
burg, he  did  not  prove  himself  to  be 
possessed  of  those  higher  qualities — 
that  eagle  eye  for  the  situation,  that 
promptitude  in  sending  assistance  to  the 
weak  and  menaced  points,  that  power 
of  holding  the  army  in  hand  and 
utilizing  all  its  strength  towards  the 
desired  result — which  are  absolutely 
essential  in  a general-in-chief  on  the 
field  of  battle.  It  appears  that  Mc- 
Clellan had  some  hesitation  about  the 
appointment.  His  first  intention,  we 
understand,  was  to  appoint  Heintzel- 
man.  Heintzelman  might  have  been  a 
better  appointment ; but  he  might  not ; 
and  what  we  do  know  for  certain  is 
that  Sumner  was  a failure.  This,  how- 
ever, brings  us  to  the  real  source  of 
trouble — the  principal  cause  of  com- 
plaint. 

Why  was  not  McClellan  present  in 
person  ? Why  was  it  necessary  for 
him  to  delegate,  on  such  an  occasion, 
powers  and  responsibilities  so  import- 
ant ? He  had  wasted  a month  before 
Yorktown  laboriously  constructing  ex- 
tensive and  costly  siege  works.  In 
spite  of  his  vast  preparations  and  cost- 
ly care,  the  enemy  had  escaped  from 


his  grasp  before  his  works  were  finish- 
ed, or,  at  least,  before  they  were  turned 
to  any  practical  account.  It  would 
surely  not  have  been  unnatural  for 
him,  yielding  to  feelings  of  mortifica- 
tion and  disappointment,  which  most 
men  would  have  felt  in  the  circum- 
stances, to  seize  the  opportunity  so 
unexpectedly  offered  to  follow  the 
retreating  hosts  of  the  enemy,  and  to 
smite  them  hip  and  thigh  before  they 
had  time  to  cross  the  Chickahominy. 
But  McClellan  did  not  so  feel — did  not 
so  judge — did  not  so  act.  What  did 
he  do?  He  sent  five  divisions  of  his 
army,  under  Sumner,  to  pursue  the 
Confederates.  Ketaining  three  divi- 
sions with  him,  he  remained  at  York- 
town, ostensibly  for  the  purpose  of 
superintending  the  arrangements  neces- 
sary for  the  transport  of  Franklin’s 
division  up  the  York  Biver.  It  would 
not  do  to  belittle  Franklin’s  expedition. 
It  was,  no  doubt,  all-important  that 
West  Point  and  the  Kichmond  and 
York  Biver  Bail  way  Terminus  should 
be  in  the  hands  of  the  Nationals. 
That,  however,  is  not  the  question. 
The  question  rather  is,  whether  the 
general-in-chief  was  more  needed  at 
Yorktown  or  at  the  head  of  the  army 
of  pursuers.  The  mere  statement  of 
the  actual  facts  of  the  case  is  the  best 
answer  which  can  be  given  to  the 
question.  While  McClellan,  with  three 
divisions  of  his  army,  besides  that  of 
Franklin,  was  idling  at  Yorktown, 
Hooker  was  maintaining  an  unequal 
struggle,  his  men  being  cut  to  pieces 
in  the  very  ‘‘presence  of  thirty  thou- 
sand of  their  comrades,”  and  Hancock, 


224 


WILLIAMSBURG. 


after  Laving  won  a substantial  victory, 
was  compelled  to  relinquish  his  prize 
and  fall  back,  for  the  want  of  support 
which  existed  on  the  very  skirts  of  the 
battle  field  in  the  shape  of  whole  di- 
visions. Such  was  the  wretched  man- 
agement of  the  forces  sent  in  pursuit 
that,  when  the  battle  was  ended,  the 
divisions  of  Smith  and  Couch  and  Casey 
had  scarcely  been  called  upon  to  act. 

It  was  near  the  close  of  the  battle 
before  McClellan  appeared  on  the  field. 
It  was  too  late  for  him  to  contribute 
in  any  appreciable  way  to  the  result 
of  the  struggle.  He  gave  orders  to 
Smith,  when  made  aware  of  Hancock’s 
position,  to  forward  reinforcements  at 
once;  but  Hancock  had  accomplished 
his  task  before  the  reinforcements 
arrived.  The  circumstances  which 
brought  McClellan  to  the  field  re- 
dound but  little  to  his  credit.  General 
Sprague  and  the  Prince  de  Joinville, 
during  the  confusion  which  prevailed 
in  front  in  consequence  of  the  absence 
of  a skilful  directing  hand,  rode  in 
haste  to  Yorktown,  and  urged  the 
general  to  hasten  at  once  to  the  scene 
of  action.  The  answer  was  as  cold  as 
it  was  curt.  “I  suppose  those  in  front 
can  attend  to  that  little  matter.”  Ulti- 
mately, however,  he  was  induced  to 
mount  his  horse  and  hasten  forward. 
It  was  about  two  o’clock  when  he 
started  from  Yorktown.  It  was  five 
o’clock  when  he  approached  the  field  of 
action ; Kearney  on  the  left  and  Han- 
cock on  the  right  were  just  about  to 
deal  those  final  blows  which  deter- 
mined the  issue  of  the  contest;  and 
the  sounds  of  battle,  as  well  as  the 


evidences  of  hard  work  which  were 
visible  as  he  drew  near  the  front, 
convinced  him  that  the  day's  struggle 
had  been  something  far  other  than  a 
“skirmish  with  the  rebel  rear-guard,” 
His  appearance  on  the  field  was  the 
occasion  of  the  wildest  demonstration 
of  applause.  Regiment  after  regiment, 
as  he  was  recognized,  tendered  him  a 
welcome,  than  which  none  more  hearty 
was  ever  given  to  the  great  Napo- 
leon himseK.  Mounted  on  a splendid 
charger,  which  he  gracefully  rode,  and 
dressed  in  a plain  blue  coat  and  glaze- 
covered  cap,  himself  and  horse  literally 
covered  with  mud,  his  whole  appear- 
ance was  admirably  suited  to  the  situ- 
ation. It  was,  no  doubt,  the  opinion 
of  many  of  those  brave  men,  who  were 
willing  to  be  led  against  the  enemy, 
that  if  the  general  had  been  present, 
the  day’s  struggle  would  have  had  a 
different  and  more  noble  ending.  The 
enthusiasm  with  which  he  was  greeted 
ought  to  have  been  felt  by  him  as  a 
severe  rebuke  for  his  absence;  for  it 
testified  to  the  existence  on  the  part  of 
his  troops  of  a warm  and  deep-rooted 
affection,  which  he  had  but  poorly 
rewarded. 

When  the  battle  was  ended,  McClel- 
lan countermanded  the  order  which  he 
gave  to  Sedgwick  and  Richardson  on 
leaving  Yorktown ; and  instead  of  ad- 
vancing, with  their  divisions,  to  the 
front,  they  were  directed  to  accompany 
Franklin  to  West  Point.  From  “Biv- 
ouac, in  front  of  Williamsburg,”  he 
telegraphed  to  the  War  Department 
that  the  Confederates  were  before  him 
in  great  force,  that  they  were  probably 


PROPHETIC  WORDS. 


225 


in  point  of  numbers  stronger  than  him- 
self, and  in  all  likelihood  well-entrench- 
ed. In  the  same  message,  he  said  he 
would  “run  the  risk  of  holding  them 
in  check  there.”  On  the  following  day 
he  telegraphed  to  the  secretary  of  war 
the  particulars  of  the  previous  day’s 
struggle.  He  estimated  his  loss  at  two 
thousand  two  hundred  and  twenty- 
eight,  of  whom  four  hundred  and  fifty- 
six  were  killed  and  fourteen  hundred 
wounded.  He  indicated  no  desire  for 
a rapid  forward  movement.  The  last 
words  of  the  despatch  were,  “We  have 
other  battles  to  fight  before  reaching 
Richmond.”  It  was  not  difficult  to 
make  such  a prediction,  especially  as 
his  dilatory  movements  were  multi- 
plying the  opportunities  of  the  Con- 
federates, and  enabling  them  so  to 
concentrate  their  forces  and  so  to  en- 
trench themselves  as  to  make  their 
position  almost  invulnerable.  It  is 


only  fifty  miles  from  Williamsburg  to 
Richmond.  A bold  and  well-directed 
dash  against  the  Confederate  Capitol, 
and  the  fall  of  Richmond  might  have 
been  antedated  nearly  three  years.'  The 
battle  was  fought  on  May  5th.  i^ay 
It  was  not  until  the  8th  that  the 
march  was  resumed ; and  when  it  was 
resumed,  it  was  conducted  in  a manner 
so  dilatory  that  it  may  justly  be  char- 
acterized as  suicidal.  Eleven  days 
were  consumed  in  accomplishing  what 
might  have  been  done  in  three.  It  is 
not  wonderful  that  the  people  became 
impatient  because  of  the  slow  execu- 
tion of  their  desire  and  will,  and 
weary  of  promises  always  fair  but 
always  fruitless.  The  words  of  Presi- 
dent Lincoln  were  now  seen  to  be  more 
and  more  prophetic.  After  Williams- 
burg, as  before  Yorktown,  it  was  “the 
story  of  Manassas  repeated.”  McClel- 
lan would  not  “strike  a blow.” 


226 


FAIR  OAKS. 


CHAPTER  XVI. 

I 

Y^T’est  Point. — York  Eiver. — Franklin’s  Command. — The  Gunboats. — West  Point  Occupied. — Norfolk. — General 
Wool. — Lincoln,  Stanton  and  Chase  at  Fortress  Monroe. — Se wall's  Point. — Colonel  T.  J.  Cram. — Ocean  View. 
— Surrender  of  Norfolk. — General  Huger. — The  Gunboats  on  the  James  Kiver. — Ward’s  Bluff. — The  James 
and  York  Kivers  Both  Open. — McClellan’s  Position  Advantageous. — William  and  Mary  College. — The  Na- 
tional Advance  after  Williamsburg. — Bad  Roads. — The  Pamunkey  River. — Tunstah’s  Station. — The  Chicka- 
hominy. — Bottom  Bridge. — The  Railroad  Bridge. — Gaines’  Mills. — New  Bridge. — Hanover  Court  House. — 
Mechanicsville. — Peake’s  Station. — Cool  Arbor. — Ashland. — Vigorous  Encounter  Near  Hanover  Court  House. 
— A National  Victory. — The  30th  of  May. — The  Williamsburg  Road. — The  Battle  Ground. — Fair  Oaks  and 
Seven  Pines. — McClellan’s  Headquarters. — New  Bridge. — General  Casey. — General  Keyes. — White  Oak 
Swamp. — The  Position  of  the  Two  Armies. — The  Army  of  the  Potomac. — Time  Lost. — A Critical  Position. — 
A Heavy  Rain  Storm. — Johnston’s  Opportunities. — The  Confederates  March  to  the  Attack. — The  Attack. 
The  National  Advance  Driven  In. — The  Battle  of  Fair  Oaks  or  Seven  Pines  Begun. — Casey’s  Division  Fights 
Bravely,  but  Hard  Pressed. — Compelled  to  Fall  Back. — A Furious  Charge. — The  Battle  Raging. — The  Rail 
Fence. — General  Rains. — The  Nationals  Fall  Back  upon  the  Second  Line. — General  Couch. — Couch  Not 
Unprepared. — Heintzelman  Comes  Up  and  Takes  Command. — Berry  and  Jameson. — Birney. — Heintzelman 
Sorely  Pressed. — Couch’s  Command  Severed. — The  Entire  Left  Wing  of  the  National  Army  in  Peril. 
— Couch  Forms  a Double  Line  of  Battle. — Heintzelman ’s  Promptitude. — McClellan  and  Sumner  Warned. 
— The  Chickahominy  Flooded. — The  Grapevine  Bridge. — Sumner  Moves  to  the  Assistance  of  the  Right 
Wing. — A Critical  Moment. — Sumner  on  the  Scene. — A Timely  Arrival. — A Tremendous  Volley. — Morgan, 
of  Sedgwick’s  Division. — Abercrombie  in  Difficulty. — Johnston  Wounded. — Still  the  Battle  Rages. — An  At- 
tempt to  Outflank  Sumner’s  Right. — Night  and  Rest. — The  Second  Day. — The  Order  of  Battle. — The 
Battle  Resumed. — Hooker. — Richardson. — Stoneman. — French. — Howard. — Meagher. — Roger  A.  Pryor. — 
Mahone  Comes  to  the  Aid  of  Pryor. — Meagher  Ordered  Up. — Barriers  of  Bristling  Steel. — General  Howard 
Wounded. — The  Confederates  Fall  Back. — The  Firing  Ceases. — McClellan’s  Purpose. — Fatal  Delay. — Hooker 
Looking  into  Richmond. — Hooker  Rebuked  and  Recalled. — Heavy  Losses  on  Both  Sides.  —No  Glory  to 
McClellan. 


On  the  evening  of  the  day  which 
186‘>  battle  of  Williams- 

burg, McClellan  countermanded 
the  orders  w^hich  he  had  given  to 
Franklin,  Sedgwick  and  Richardson.  It 
was  no  longer  necessary  that  they 
should  advance  towards  the  front. 
Franklin  received  instructions  to  pro- 
ceed to  West  Point,  at  the  head  of  the 
York  River;  and  Sedgwick,  Richard- 
son and  Fitz  John  Porter  were  to  bear 
him  company.  During  the  night  the 
transports  reached  their  destination ; 
l^jay  and  early  on  the  morning  of  May 
6th,  Newton’s  brigade  landed 


and  took  position  on  an  open  plain, 
on  the  right  bank  of  the  Pamunkey, 
one  of  the  principal  affluents  of  the 
York  River.  Within  twenty-four  hours 
Franklin’s  whole  division  had  encamp- 
ed, the  gunboats  had  taken  possession 
of  West  Point,  and  the  National  flag 
was  floating  over  the  little  village. 
The  other  divisions  were  also  promptly 
on  hand. 

During  the  night  of  the  7th,  the 
Confederate  pickets  ventured  to  May 
draw  near  the  National  encamp-  7. 
ment,  and  a guard  belonging  to  the 
latter  was  shot  Franklin  was  thus 


SEWALL’S  POINT. 


227 


admonished  that  the  enemy  was  not 
far  off ; and  preparations  were  made 
for  a possible  engagement  on  the  fol- 
lowing morning.  At  early  dawn, 
skirmishers  were  thrown  out  towards 
the  edge  of  the  woods;  and  the  whole 
force  was  drawn  up  on  the  plains, 
ready  to  welcome  the  foe,  should  he 
make  his  appearance.  As  the  Con- 
federates seemed  in  no  haste  to  show 
themselves,  the  National  troops  were 
recalled  to  breakfast  ; the  Thirty- 
Second  New  York,  and  the  Ninety- 
Fifth  and  Ninety-Sixth  Pennsylvania 
regiments  being  left  as  an  advanced 
guard  near  the  skirts  of  the  woods 
which,  with  the  exception  of  the  side  to- 
wards the  river,  completely  surrounded 
the  plain.  It  was  not  long  until  the 
Confederates  began  to  show  themselves 
more  openly  and  in  greater  strength. 
On  the  west  side  of  the  river,  there 
appeared  a considerable  force;  but  a 
vigorous  tire  having  been  opened  upon 
them  by  the  gunboats,  they  were 
compelled  to  retire.  No  time  was 
now  lost  in  landing  the  troops  from 
the  transports ; and  by  nine  o’clock  in 
the  morning  General  Dana  had  got 
his  brigade  ashore.  The  Confederate 
scouts  were  now  becoming  trouble- 
some; and  the  Sixteenth,  Thirty-First 
and  Thirty-Second  New  York,  and  the 
Ninety-Fifth  and  Ninety-Sixth  Penn- 
sylvania were  ordered  to  enter  and 
clear  the  woods.  The  scouts  retired  at 
their  approach ; but  the  Nationals  soon 
found  themselves  opposed  by  large 
bodies  of  the  retreating  army;  and, 
as  these  were  advantageously  posted, 
and  well  supplied  with  artillery,  it 


was  feared  that  the  above-named  regi- 
ments might  be  overwhelmed.  They 
were  therefore  withdrawn.  Mean- 
while, the  Second  United  States 
battery,  under  Captain  Arnold,  and 
the  First  Massachusetts  battery  were 
ordered  into  position,  the  former  on 
the  right  and  the  latter  on  the  left; 
and  so  vigorous  was  the  fire  of  shell, 
that  the  Confederates  were  dnven  from 
their  shelter  in  the  woods  and  forced 
toward  the  river,  where  they  came  full 
under  the  fire  of  the  gunboats.  They 
had  now  no  choice  but  to  retire.  In  this 
encounter,  the  Nationals  lost  one  hun- 
dred and  ninety-four  men — the  Thirty- 
First  and  Thirty-Second  New  York 
having  suffered  most  severely.  The 
Confederate  loss  was  not  so  great.  The 
Nationals,  however,  had  made  them- 
selves masters  of  the  position ; and 
secured  the  head  of  the  York  River  as 
a base  of  supplies  for  the  army  of  the 
Potomac. 

While  Franklin  was  establishing 
himself  at  West  Point,  and  while  Mc- 
Clellan was  slowly  pressing  forward 
with  the  view  of  establishing  a com- 
munication between  the  main  body  of 
the  army  and  the  divisions  at  the  head 
of  the  York  River,  events  of  the  ut- 
most importance  were  taking  place  at 
Norfolk,  far  to  the  rear  of  the  National 
army.  From  the  time  McClellan  had 
decided  to  march  to  Richmond  by  way 
of  the  Peninsula,  General  Wool,  who 
commanded  at  Fortress  Monroe,  saw 
the  great  advantages  which  would 
result  from  the  possession  of  the 
James  River.  As  a highway  for  the 
supplies  of  the  army,  it  would  be  in- 


228 


FAIR  OAKS. 


valuable.  It  would  be  all  the  more  so 
if  the  York  River  was  also  wrenched 
from  Confederate  control.  Influenced 
by  these  views,  he  had  urged  the  gov- 
ernment to  allow  him  to  attempt  the 
capture  of  Norfolk,  and  so  break  up 
the  blockade  of  the  James.  It  was  not 
until  the  evacuation  of  Yorktown,  and 
until  he  had  renewed  his  request,  that 
his  suggestions  were  regarded  with 
any  degree  of  favor.  The  views  of 
General  Wool  so  impressed  the  gov- 
ernment, that  a visit  was  made  to 
Fortress  Monroe  by  President  Lincoln, 
and  Secretaries  Chase  and  Stanton. 
The  shore  was  carefully  reconnoitred ; 
and  Lincoln,  though  he  saw  some  dif- 
ficulties in  the  way  of  effecting  a 
landing,  in  consequence  of  the  shal- 
lowness of  the  water,  warmly  encour- 
aged the  plan — overcoming  objections 
by  vigorous  and  practical  suggestions, 
which  showed  that  on  the  battle-field, 
as  in  the  council  chamber,  he  was 
capable  of  winning  distinction.  The 
order  was  given  on  the  8th  of  May 
May  for  an  immediate  attempt  to  be 
made  on  Sewall’s  Point  and  a 
march  on  Norfolk.  Arrangements  were 
made  with  Commodore  Goldsborough  ; 
and  a laige  number  of  troops  were 
embarked  on  transports  then  lying  in 
Hampton  Roads.  Goldsborough  moved 
towards  Sewall’s  Point,  and  opened  fire 
upon  the  batteries ; but  the  batteries 
on  the  Point  replied  with  such  spirit, 
and  the  Merrimac  having  come  to  their 
aid,  the  National  vessels  withdrew,  and 
the  troops  were  disembarked. 

On  the  following  day.  General  Wool, 
with  Colonel  T.  J.  Cram  and  Secretary 


Chase,  made  a reconnoissance  along  the 
shore,  when  it  was  decided  to  land  five 
thousand  troops  at  a place  called  Ocean 
View.  A successful  landing  made  at 
this  point  would  enable  the  Nationals 
to  strike  Se wall’s  Point  in  the  rear, 
and  would  open  up  a direct  road  to 
Norfolk.  The  troops  were  again  em- 
barked ; and  while  a bombardment 
was  kept  up  on  the  Point  from  the  Rip 
Raps,  with  the  intention  of  convincing 
the  Confederates  that  the  purpose  still 
was  to  move  direct  on  Sewall’s  Point, 
a landing  was  successfully  made  at 
Ocean  View.  Before  dawn  on  May 
the  10th,  Captain  Davis’  com-  10. 
pany,  of  Richardson’s  light  artillery, 
followed  by  the  Twentieth  New  York 
regiment,  was  safe  on  shore.  General 
Weber  pushed  on  with  the  advance; 
but  no  opposition  was  offered,  the  Con- 
federates having  already  abandoned  the 
position.  About  8 o’clock  in  the  morn- 
ing, General  Wool,  accompanied  by 
the  president  and  by  the  two  secretaries 
above  named,  together  with  Generals 
Mansfield  and  Viele,  arrived  on  the 
scene,  and  took  command  in  person. 
The  infantry  were  now  pushed  on  to- 
wards Turner’s  Creek ; but  the  bridge 
had  been  set  on  fire  by  the  Confede- 
rates ; and  a circuitous  route  to  reach 
Norfolk  was  rendered  necessary.  There 
was  now  a general  advance  ordered ; 
and  at  five  o’clock  in  the  afternoon,  the 
lines  of  the  Confederate  intrenched 
camp  were  reached.  Twenty-nine  can- 
non were  found  in  position,  but  there 
were  no  troops.  On  marched  the  Na- 
tionals; and  just  as  they  were  about 
to  enter  the  city,  the  mayor,  preceded 


ASCENT  OF  THE  JAMES  KIVER. 


229 


by  a flag  of  truce,  and  accompanied 
by  several  members  of  the  Common 
Council,  came  out  to  meet  them  with 
a proposal  of  suiTender.  Huger,  it 
appears,  who  had  charge  of  the  city, 
had  orders  not  to  attempt  to  hold  the 
city  against  any  serious  demonstration 
of  National  troops ; and  when  he  was 
informed  of  the  landing  of  General 
Wool  at  Ocean  View,  he  turned  over 
the  city  of  Norfolk  to  Mayor  Lamb, 
and  fled,  with  his  troops,  towards 
Richmond.  Having  received  the  sur- 
render, General  Wool  issued  an  order 
from  the  City  Hall,  informing  the  in- 
habitants of  what  had  taken  place, 
appointing  General  Egbert  Viele  mili- 
tary governor,  and  directing  that  all 
peaceful  citizens  should  be  protected 
in  the  free  use  and  exercise  of  their 
lawful  rights  and  privileges.  About 
midnight  General  Wool,  who  rode 
back  to  Ocean  View,  had  crossed  to 
Fortress  Monroe  with  the  pleasing 
intelligence  that  Norfolk  had  fallen. 
The  president  and  Secretary  Stanton 
were  there  to  receive  him. 

The  Confederate  commander,  Huger, 
had  evidently  resolved  to  leave  as 
little  behind  him  as  possible.  The 
Navy  Yard  and  works  at  Portsmouth 
were  found  to  be  on  Are ; and  al- 
though every  effort  was  made  to  save 
the  place,  the  fire  gained  the  mastery, 
and  ships,  gunboats,  workshops  and 
machinery  of  various  kinds  were  all 
destroyed.  On  the  morning  of  the 
May  11th,  the  Merrimac,  which,  on 
H*  the  retirement  of  the  Confede- 
rates, had  had  a slow  match  applied 
to  her  magazine,  exploded  with  a tre- 


mendous noise,  the  huge  monster  being 
blown  into  a thousand  fragments.  All 
the  defenses  in  and  about  the  city,  and 
all  the  formidable  works  on  the  Eliza- 
beth River  and  on  the  borders  of 
Chesapeake  Bay,  including  Sewall’s 
Point  and  Craney  Island,  were  aban- 
doned ; and  about  two  hundred  cannon, 
with  a large  quantity  of  ammunition, 
were  left  as  spoil  for  the  victors.  The 
destruction  of  the  Merrimac,  judged 
from  a Confederate  standpoint,  seems 
to  have  been  a great  blunder;  and  it 
was  so  judged  at  the  time.  It  was 
natural  and  proper  enough  for  them, 
in  the  circumstances,  to  destroy  the 
Navy  Yard,  and  to  put  out  of  the 
way  everything  which  should  add  to 
the  strength  of  their  enemy ; but  the 
Merrimac  was  practically  invulnerable ; 
and  she  might  have  been  retained  and 
used  by  the  Confederates  much  to  the 
inconvenience  of  the  Nationals.  As  it 
was,  the  James  River  was  free  for  the 
passage  of  the  gunboats ; and  without 
delay,  and  experiencing  but  little  dif- 
ficulty, they  were  pushed  forward,  day 
by  day,  until  they  were  brought  to  a 
halt  at  Ward’s  Bluff.  At  this  point, 
the  river  was  too  narrow  and  the  Con- 
federate works  too  strong  for  the  gun- 
boats to  pass.  A bold  and  vigorous 
attempt  was  made  on  the  15th,  May 
on  which  day  they  had  worked  15. 
their  way  so  far  up  the  windings  of  the- 
stream;  but  it  was  adjudged  to  be 
“impossible  to  reduce  such  works  ex- 
cept with  the  aid  of  a land  force,”  and 
the  vessels  were  withdrawn.  Up  to- 
this  point  the  river  was  open  ; and 
McClellan,  in  his  advance  up  ther 


^22 


230 


FAIR  OAKS. 


Peninsula  and  towards  Richmond,  had 
now  the  full  advantage  of  both  the 
James  and  the  York. 

W e have  followed  Franklin,  with  his 
own  division  and  those  of  Sedgwick, 
Richardson  and  Fitz  John  Porter,  up 
from  Yorktown,  along  the  York,  to 
West  Point.  We  have  recounted  the 
details  of  the  encounter  which  they 
had  with  the  Confederates  shortly  after 
their  landing  at  w’hat  was  called  Brick 
House  Point.  We  have  also  described 
the  surrender  of  Norfolk,  the  explosion 
of  the  Merrimac,  the  abandonment  of 
the  forts  on  the  Elizabeth  and,  on  the 
borders  of  the  Chesapeake,  and  the 
other  events  which  left  the  James 
River,  like  the  York,  in  the  possession 
of  the  Nationals.  These  two  episodes 
form  a natural,  as  they  are  a neces- 
sary, introduction  to  the  battle  of 
Fair  Oaks,”  or  “ Seven  Pines,”  as  it 
is  sometimes  called.  McClellan  now 
found  himself  in  a really  advanta- 
geous position.  Had  events  resulted 
in  perfect  conformity  with  his  own 
desires  and  interests,  they  could  hardly 
have  been  other  than  they  were.  Free 
from  all  danger  of  attack  in  the  rear, 
and  having  complete  command  of  both 
great  waterways,  he  had  only  to  think 
of  the  foe  in  his  front.  Let  us  now^ 
return  to  the  main  army,  wLich  we 
left  under  the  personal  command  of 
McClellan. 

Having  made  provision  for  his  sick 
and  wounded  in  the  halls  of  the  ven- 
erable college  of  William  and  Mary, 
he  began  to  move  forward  on  the  8th  of 
May  May,  the  third  day  after  the  bat- 
tie  of  Williamsburg.  Stoneman 


w^as  sent  in  advance  to  open  a com- 
munication wuth  Franklin  and  the 
other  divisions  which  had  accompanied 
or  followed  him  up  the  York  River. 
The  roads  were  in  a wretched  con- 
dition ; and  the  march  was  conducted 
in  circumstances  of  more  than  ordinary 
difficulty.  It  was  one  of  the  most 
beautiful  and  fertile  portions  of  Vir- 
ginia; but  the  retreating  army  had 
spared  no  pains  to  injure  the  roads 
and  to  multiply  obstructions.  On  the 
15th,  McClellan  had  advanced  yjay 
to  the  neighborhood  of  White  15. 
House,  at  the  head  of  the  navigation 
of  the  Pamunkey,  and  some  eighteen 
miles  from  Richmond.  On  the  May 
18th,  he  had  reached  Tunstall’s  18* 
Station,  on  the  Richmond  and  York 
River  Railroad;  and  on  the  22d,  May 
he  established  his  headquarters  22. 
at  Cool  Arbor,  not  far  from  the  Chick- 
ahominy,  and  between  eight  and  nine 
miles  from  Richmond.  His  advanced 
light  troops  had  already  reached  Bot- 
tom Bridge,  on  the  Chickahominy,  at 
the  crossing  of  the  New  Kent  Road. 
In  their  retreat,  the  Confederates  had 
turned  the  bridge,  but  had  left  the 
point  uncovered.  Casey’s  division,  of 
Keyes’  corps,  was  soon  across  the  river ; 
and  the  heights  on  the  Richmond  side 
were  occupied.  He  was  followed  close 
by  Heintzelman.  Pressed  by  Stone- 
man,  the  Confederates  had  also  re- 
treated across  the  railroad  bridge 
which  passes  over  the  Chickahominy, 
a little  to  the  north  of  Bottom  Bridge 
— destroying  it  as  they  crossed.  Stone- 
man  halted  and  took  a position  at 
Gaines’  Mills,  whence  active  and  sue- 


HANOVER  COURT  HOUSE. 


231 


cessful  reconnoissances  were  made,  a 
number  of  the  Confederate  scouts  and 
advance  troops,  after  some  skirmishing, 
being  driven  from  their  posts  at  New 
Bridge. 

While  thus  feeling  his  way,  and  get- 
ting his  army  into  position,  McClellan 
detached  Fitz  John  Porter  from  the 
main  body,  which  was  still  on  the  left 
of  the  Chickahominy,  on  an  expedition 
to  Hanover  Court  House.  His  object 
was  to  disperse  the  forces  of  the  Con- 
federates concentrated  at  that  point, 
and  to  cut  otf  their  railroad  com- 
munications between  Kichmond  and 
Fredericksburg.  It  was  hoped,  also, 
that  he  might  facilitate  the  advance 
of  McDowell’s  corps,  whose  approach 
McClellan  anxiously  awaited ; but 
operations  in  the  Shenandoah  Valley, 
hereafter  to  be  described,  made  Mc- 
Dowell’s advance  in  this  direction 
impossible.  This  detachment  moved, 
by  way  of  Mechanicsville,  early  on 
]^ay  morning  of  the  27th.  Gen- 

271  eral  Emory  led  the  advance,  with 
the  Fifth  and  Sixth  Regular  Cavalry 
and  Benson’s  horse  battery,  supported 
by  Morell’s  division,  composed  of  the 
brigades  of  Martindale,  Butterfield  and 
McQuade,  with  Berdan’s  sharpshoot- 
ers and  three  batteries  under  Captain 
Griffin.  Warren,  with  his  provisional 
brigade,  moved  towards  the  same  point 
by  another  road.  The  rain  had  fallen 
heavily  during  the  early  hours  of  the 
morning ; and  the  roads,  in  conse- 
quence, were  in  a fearful  condition. 
The  troops,  however,  bore  bravely  up. 
When  about  six  miles  from  Hanover 
Court  House,  the  mounted  pickets  of 


the  Confederates  came  into  view,  but 
they  speedily  disappeared.  The  Na- 
tionals kept  moving  on  until  they  were 
within  about  two  miles  of  the  Court 
House,  when  they  were  brought  to 
halt  by  a heavy  fire  of  artillery  and 
musketry.  The  Twenty-Fifth  New 
York  suffered  severely;  two  of  their 
companies  were  cut  off  and  captured ; 
and  they  were  compelled  to  fall  back. 
Meanwhile,  the  batteries  were  hurried 
forward;  and  the  main  body  of  the 
Nationals  rushed  to  the  aid  of  the 
advance.  After  holding  the  ground 
obstinately  for  two  hours,  the  Con- 
federates were  forced  to  retire,  one 
of  their  guns  being  captured  by  the 
Seventeenth  New  York.  They  were 
vigorously  pursued  for  some  distance 
by  the  brigades  of  Butterfield  and 
McQuade.  Martindale’s  brigade  was 
pushed  forward  to  Peake’s  Station,  on 
the  Virginia  Central  Railroad,  while 
Porter  himself,  with  the  rest  of  his 
force,  advanced  towards  Hanover  Court 
House.  On  his  way  to  the  railroad, 
Martindale  encountered  a Confederate 
force,  and  drove  it  towards  Ashland. 
In  the  encounter,  one  of  his  mounted 
men  was  shot  by  a concealed  foe ; but 
this  was  the  only  casualty.  Having 
destroyed  a portion  of  the  railroad, 
burned  the  bridge,  and  cut  the  tele- 
graph wires,  Martindale  was  on  his 
way  back  to  join  the  main  body,  when 
the  Confederates,  who  had  been  rein- 
forced by  fresh  troops  from  Richmond, 
and  had  contrived  secretly  to  regain 
the  cover  of  the  woods,  fell  upon  him 
with  tremendous  fury.  His  men  fought 
like  true  heroes,  boldly  maintaining 


232 


FAIR  OAKS. 


tlieir  ground  for  nearly  an  hour,  in 
the  face  of  superior  numbers,  when 
General  Porter,  who  had  reached  the 
Court  House,  came  back  to  their  relief. 
Meanwhile,  the  brigades  of  Butterfield 
and  McQuade,  who  had  gone  in  pur- 
suit of  the  Confederates,  arrived  on  the 
scene.  So,  also,  did  that  of  Warren, 
which  had  been  delayed  in  repairing 
bridges.  Porter  was  therefore  able  to 
meet  his  antagonist  on  equal  terms. 
Planting  his  artillery  to  the  right  and 
left,  and  filling  up  the  centre  with  his 
infantiy,  he  advanced  and  poured  into 
the  woods  a diagonal  fire  of  musketry 
and  shell.  This  terrible  work  was 
kept  up  from  five  o’clock  till  dusk, 
when  the  Confederates  retired — cling- 
ing, however,  so  close  to  the  woods 
that  they  could  not  be  pursued  with 
any  marked  success.  Bivouacking  on 
the  field  he  had  won.  Porter  made 
preparations  for  a renewal  of  the  at- 
tack in  the  morning.  When  morning 
dawned,  it  was  found  that  the  Con- 
federates had  disappeared.  Porter, 
however,  had  reason  to  be  satisfied. 
The  object  of  his  expedition  had  been 
attained,  so  far  as  that  was  now  possi- 
ble. He  had  occupied  Hanover  Court 
House ; and  he  had  destroyed  the 
track  and  bridges  of  the  Virginia 
Central  Railroad.  In  these  various 
encounters  the  Confederates  suffered 
heavily.  In  killed  and  wounded  and 
absent,  their  loss  could  not  have  been 
less  than  one  thousand.  The  National 
loss  was  between  three  hundred  and 
may  fifty  and  four  hundred.  On  the 
29.  29th,  Porter  returned  to  his 

original  camp  on  the  Chickahominy. 


The  30th  of  May  arrived;  and  al- 
though the  two  great  armies  lay  within 
easy  distance  of  each  other,  no  very  seri- 
ous effort  had  been  attempted  on  either 
side.  The  position  of  the  National 
army  was  peculiar,  and  somewhat  beset 
with  peril.  The  ground  occupied  by 
the  two  rival  armies  has  been  compared 
not  unaptly  to  the  letter  V.  It  might 
with  equal  propriety  be  described  as 
bearing  a general  resemblance  to  an 
acute-angled  triangle,  of  which  the 
point,  or  apex,  was  at  Bottom  Bridge, 
and  the  two  larger  sides  were  formed 
respectively  by  the  Chickahominy  and 
Williamsburg  Hoad.  The  Chicka- 
hominy forms  a line  which  runs  from 
Bottom  Bridge  towards  the  southwest. 
The  Williamsburg  Road  forms  a line 
which,  from  the  same  point,  runs  al- 
most due  west.  A little  to  the  north 
of  Bottom  Bridge,  the  York  River 
Railroad  crosses  the  Chickahominy  and 
runs  towards  Richmond  in  a line  very 
nearly  parallel  with  the  Williamsburg 
Road.  Inside  of  this  angle,  but 
towards  Richmond,  and  with  full  com- 
mand of  the  country  in  the  rear,  lay 
the  Confederate  ai'inv.  All  the  bridges 
in  the  neighborhood,  it  will  be  remem- 
bered, were  destroyed  by  the  Confede- 
rates before  the  Nationals  came  up. 
Outside  of  the  angle,  and  along  the 
left  or  northeast  bank  of  the  Chicka- 
hominy, was  ranged  the  great  bulk  of 
the  National  army.  Here,  at  Cool 
Arbor,  near  New  Bridge,  were  the 
headquarters  of  General  McClellan. 
Here,  too,  a little  further  down  the 
stream,  were  Franklin,  Fitz  John 
Porter  and  others.  And  here,  too, 


THE  CHICKAHOMINY. 


233 


was  General  Sumner,  further  on  still, 
towards  the  point  of  the  angle,  at 
Bottom  Bridge.  Bottom  Bridge  hav- 
ing been  repaired,  Keyes’  corps,  as  we 
]|lay  have  seen,  crossed  the  river  on  or 
24  about  the  morning  of  the  24th. 
He  was  followed  by  Heintzelman,  who 
took  up  ground  in  his  rear.  Casey’s 
division  of  the  corps  advanced  as  far 
as  Fair  Oaks  Station,  on  the  York 
River  Railroad,  where  he  took  posi- 
tion, his  line  stretching  from  a point 
a little  to  the  north  of  the  railroad, 
southward  as  far  as  the  Williamsburg 
Road.  The  ground  was  bounded  on 
the  left  and  front  by  dense  woods. 
The  edges  of  these  woods  were  cut 
down  to  form  abatis,  in  order  to  ob- 
struct the  enemy.  A line  of  earth- 
works was  also  thrown  up,  consisting 
of  a redoubt  and  some  rifle-pits.  Be- 
hind these  Casey  posted  his  troops — 
his  first  brigade  on  the  right,  his  second 
in  the  centre,  his  third  on  the  left,  his 
picket-guards  being  pushed  forward 
into  the  woods  in  front.  About  half 
a mile  to  the  rear  of  Casey,  at  a place 
called  Seven  Pines,  Couch  was  simi- 
larly posted,  his  line  lying  across  the 
Williamsburg  turnpike,  and  stretching 
from  a point  slightly  to  the  south  of 
that  road,  northward  towards  the  York 
River  Railroad.  His  right  was  thus 
slightly  in  the  rear  of  Fair  Oaks 
Station.  In  front  of  him  the  Williams- 
burg Road  is  intersected  by  a circu- 
itous highway,  called  the  “ Nine  Mile 
Road.”  Kearney’s  division,  of  Heint- 
zelman’s  corps,  was  further  in  the  rear, 
on  the  York  River  Railroad,  and  in 
the  neighborhood  of  Savage’s  Station. 


Hooker,  with  his  division,  also  of 
Heintzelman’s  corps,  was  guarding 
the  approaches  to  White  Oak  Swamp, 
which  lay  to  the  south  of  the  Will- 
iamsburg Road,  and  stretched  east- 
ward as  far  as  the  Chickahominy. 

Such  was  the  position  of  the  National 
army  on  the  eve  of  the  famous  battle  of 
Fair  Oaks.  We  have  already  said  that 
the  position  was  one  beset  with  con- 
siderable peril.  One  of  the  wings  of 
that  army,  as  we  have  shown,  was  on 
the  right  and  the  other  was  on  the 
left  side  of  the  river.  The  right  wing, 
which  consisted  of  five  divisions  and 
the  reserves,  lay  on  the  outside  of  the 
angle,  on  the  side  formed  by  the 
Chickahominy.  The  left  wing,  con- 
sisting of  four  divisions,  lay,  en  echelon, 
along  the  line  of  the  York  River  Rail- 
road. From  the  extreme  point  of  one 
wing  to  that  of  the  other,  by  way  of 
Bottom  Bridge,  which  was  the  only 
available  connection,  was  a distance  of 
more  than  twelve  miles,  although  by 
an  air  line  the  two  wings  were  not 
at  any  point  very  far  apart.  It  is 
manifest  at  a glance  that  McClellan, 
by  allowing  himself  to  drift  into  the 
position,  gave  the  Confederates  an 
immense  advantage.  Until  he  should 
succeed  in  throwing  up  new  bridges 
across  the  Chickahominy — and  there 
was  no  evidence  that  such  work  was 
going  on — it  naturally  enough  seemed 
to  the  Confederates  a possibility  to 
strike  the  National  left,  drive  it  into 
the  river  or  swamp,  or  both,  and  per- 
haps annihilate  it  before  any  assistance 
could  be  rendered  by  the  right.  This 
was  the  plan  of  action  decided  upon 


234 


FAIR  OAKS. 


by  the  Confederate  leader;  and  the 
delay  of  McClellan  gave  Johnston  his 
opportunity.  On  the  24th,  at  the  head 
of  the  advance,  Keyes  had  crossed 
Bottom  Bridge.  It  was  now  the 
30th.  Six  days  of  comparative  in- 
action had  thus  been  allowed  to 
elapse;  and  the  National  general-in- 
chief seemed  as  yet  in  no  haste  to 
adopt  the  initiative.  He  had  told  his 
troops,  when  giving  instructions  in  re- 
May  gard  to  the  crossing  of  the  river  on 
25.  the  25th,  to  “go  prepared  for  bat- 
tle at  a moment’s  notice.”  He  had,  a 
day  or  two  later,  appealed  to  the  pride 
of  his  soldiers,  and  reminded  them 
“ that  the  army  of  tlie  Potomac  had 
never  yet  been  checked.”  Still,  he 
seemed  unwilling  to  strike  the  first 
blow,  and  so  force  the  fight.  This 
delay  was  all  the  more  reprehensible, 
that  the  waters  of  the  Chickahominy 
were  already  somewhat  swollen,  and 
the  marshy  ground  around  considerably 
flooded.  A heavy  rain  storm,  which 
might  fall  at  any  moment,  would  so 
flood  the  ground  as  to  increase  the 
peril  which  would  attend  the  retreat 
of  the  National  left,  and  would  so 
swell  the  river  as  to  make  communica- 
tion between  the  two  wings  impossible. 

On  this  occasion,  at  least,  the  Fates 
seemed  to  be  on  the  side  of  the  Con- 
IHay  federates.  On  the  night  of  the 
30th  of  May,  there  was  a terrific 
rain  storm  in  and  around  Richmond. 
It  is  described  as  resembling  a tropical 
deluge.  All  the  lower  lands  were 
flooded ; and  the  Chickahominy  over- 
flowed its  banks  and  washed  away 
many  of  the  bridges  by  which  it  was 


spanned.  Johnston’s  opportunity  had 
come.  He  was  not  slow  to  see  it. 
Everything  was  in  readiness,  and  action 
was  taken  at  once.  Longstreet  was 
ordered  to  go  out  by  the  Williamsburg 
Road,  with  his  own  and  D.  H.  Hill’s 
division — Hill,  with  his  division,  to 
attack  the  Nationals  in  front;  General 
Huger  was  ordered  to  move  down  the 
Charles  City  Road,  and  strike  them  on 
the  left ; while  General  G.  W.  Smith 
was  directed  to  follow  the  New  Bridge 
Road  towards  the  “ Old  Tavern,”  and 
then,  by  the  Nine  Mile  Road,  move 
towards  their  right  at  Fair  Oaks.  It 
was  intended  that  all  these  troops 
should  move  simultaneously  at  dawn 
on  the  morning  of  the  31st;  but  ]^fay 
so  heavy  were  the  roads,  in 
consequence  of  the  extraordinary  rain- 
fall, that  it  was  ten  o’clock  before 
Hill’s  division  began  to  move.  Gen- 
eral Casey  was  not  ignorant  of  the 
responsible  and  perilous  position  which 
he  occupied.  He  knew  that  an  attack 
was  meditated ; and  he  had  every 
reason  to  believe  that  the  first  blow 
would  fall  upon  his  division.  He  had 
been  busy  all  the  morning  making  his 
ground  secure.  About  eleven  o’clock 
he  was  made  aware  that  the  Confede- 
rates were  advancing  in  great  force. 
He  ordered  his  men  to  take  to  their 
arms.  Almost  as  he  gave  orders, 
two  shells  came  hissing  along,  too 
unmistakably  announcing  that  the 
Confederates  were  close  at  hand.  The 
spades  and  the  axes  with  which  the  men 
bad  been  working  were  sj>eedily  ex- 
changed for  the  weapons  of  war.  It 
was  not  too  soon.  Shortly  before  one 


REPULSE  OF  GENERAL  CASEY. 


235 


o’clock,  the  strength  of  the  enemy  and 
the  violence  of  the  attack  were  soon 
revealed  by  the  appearance  of  the 
panic-stricken  pickets  of  the  National 
advance,  who  had  been  driven  in.  The 
One  Hundred  and  Third  Pennsylvania 
was  sent  forward  to  aid  in  resisting  the 
attack.  It  was  of  no  avail.  At  the 
first  volley,  two  hundred  men  of  this 
rec^iment  were  struck  down.  The  re- 
mainder  turned  back  and  fled  in  a 
panic,  exclaiming  that  they  had  been 
“ cut  to  pieces.”  Casey’s  entire  divi- 
sion was  now  got  into  line.  Colonel 
Bailey,  Casey’s  chief  of  artilleiy,  soon 
had  his  batteries  in  action.  Spratt’s 
battery  was  posted  in  a field  to  the 
right  of  the  road,  near  the  edge  of  a 
wood,  through  which  the  Confederates 
were  advancing.  Began ’s  battery  was 
stationed  to  the  left  of  Spratt’s.  The 
batteries  were  supported  by  a power- 
ful body  of  infantry,  under  General 
Naglee,  consisting  of  the  One  Hun- 
dredth New  York,  the  Eleventh  Maine, 
the  One  Hundred  and  Fourth  Penn- 
sylvania and  the  Ninety-Third  New 
York.  Bates’  battery,  under  Lieu- 
tenant Hart,  was  in  the  unfinished 
redoubt.  Wessel’s  brigade  was  in 
the  rifle-pits.  Palmer’s  was  held  be- 
hind as  a reserve.  The  batteries 
opened  a vigorou^fire  and  were  well 
served.  The  infantry  fought  bravely, 
firing  with  great  spirit,  and  contest- 
iug  every  inch  of  ground;  but  they 
were  compelled  to  fall  back  towards  the 
rifle-pits.  The  batteries,  however,  con- 
tinued their  fire,  and  succeeded  for  a 
time  in  holding  the  enemy  at  bay. 
Casey  now  began  to  perceive  that  the 


Confederates  were  gaining  on  his  flanks. 
His  artillery  was  in  peril.  With  a 
view  to  prevent  so  great  a disaster,  he 
ordered  a bayonet  charge.  This  was 
gallantly  performed  by  the  regiments 
above  named,  in  immediate  charge  of 
General  Naglee.  With  a tremendous 
yell,  the  National  troops  sprang  for- 
ward, and  drove  the  enemy  back  to 
the  adjacent  woods.  Here,  however, 
they  were  assailed  by  a most  murder- 
ous musket  fire;  and  the  Confederates 
rushed  upon  them,  from  the  cover  of 
the  woods,  in  overwhelming  numbers. 
The  battle  was  now  raging  furiously. 
Spratt’s  battery,  which  had  long  resist- 
ed the  Confederate  advance  at  a rail- 
fence,  and  had  driven  them  back  again 
and  again,  was  under  the  necessity  of 
falling  back  for  the  want  of  ammuni- 
tion. Began’s  battery  held  out  for  a 
little  while  longer.  It  was  now  about 
three  o’clock;  and  the  conflict  had 
been  fierce  since  before  one.  About 
this  time.  General  Bains  forced  his 
way  to  the  rear  of  the  redoubt ; and 
multitudes  of  Confederates  appeared 
at  the  rifle-pits.  Casey,  unable  any 
longer  to  offer  anything  like  effective 
resistance,  ordered  his  troops  to  fall 
back  upon  the  second  line,  in  possession 
of  Couch.  The  retreat  was  well  con- 
ducted. The  Confederates  halted  not, 
but  pressed  vigorously  forward.  Two 
of  Spratt’s  guns  fell  into  their  hands, 
but  happily  they  had  been  spiked ; 
the  cannon  in  the  redoubt  were  seized 
by  General  Bhodes  and  turned  upon 
the  fugitives;  yet,  in  spite  of  the  odds 
which  were  arrayed  against  them,  and 
the  terrific  fire  to  which,  in  their 


236 


FAIR  OAKS. 


retreat,  they  were  exposed,  Casey’s 
men  carried  off  with  them,  and  brought 
safe  to  the  second  line,  three  fourths  of 
their  guns. 

Couch  was  not  unprepared  for  the 
stern  duties  which  now  devolved  upon 
him.  Several  of  his  regiments  had 
been  ordered  forward  to  Casey’s  relief 
by  his  corps  commander.  General 
Keyes.  Four  of  these  regiments — the 
Fifty-Fifth  New  York,  the  Twenty- 
Third,  Sixty-First  and  Ninety-Third 
Pennsylvania — had  been  in  the  thick 
of  the  fight,  when  it  raged  most  vio- 
lently, and  had  been  severely  punished. 
These  regiments,  with  the  Seventh 
Massachusetts  and  Sixty-Second  New 
York,  which  had  been  sent  after  them, 
were  all  pressed  back  again  towards 
the  right  of  the  second  line,  which,  it 
will  be  remembered,  rested  on  the 
York  Fiver  Railroad,  not  far  in  the 
rear  of  Fair  Oaks  Station.  Couch’s 
division,  which,  as  we  have  already 
seen,  lay  across  the  Williamsburg 
Road,  and  reached  northward  to  the 
York  River  Railroad,  had  its  right 
considerably  advanced,  and  presented 
to  the  approaching  enemy  an  oblique 
front,  nearly  parallel  to  the  Nine  Mile 
Road.  Rifle-pits  were  well  arranged 
all  along  the  line ; and  the  batteries  of 
Flood  and  Brady  and  Miller,  with 
battery  C,  of  the  First  Pennsylvania 
artillery,  were  skilfully  and  advanta- 
geously posted. 

Heintzelman,  whose  corps  lay  con- 
siderably in  the  rear,  had  been  notified 
by  Keyes  of  the  perilous  position  in 
which  Casey’s  division  was  placed,  and 
urged  to  send  forward  reinforcements, 


was  hurrying  forward  with  all  possible 
speed.  Shortly  after  four  o’clock, 
Heintzelman  appeared  on  the  field ; 
and,  as  he  outranked  Keyes,  he  as- 
sumed the  command.  About  the  same 
time,  Kearney,  of  Heintzelman’s  corps, 
came  up  with  two  of  his  brigades — 
those  of  Berry  and  Jameson.  His 
other  brigade,  that  of  Birney,  was  also 
on  its  way.  There  was  a pause  in  the 
fight,  after  the  Confederates  occupied 
the  ground  from  which  they  had 
driven  Casey’s  division.  It  was  brief, 
however;  for  before  it  was  yet  half- 
past four  o’clock,  they  bore  down  with 
tremendous  energy  upon  Couch’s  line ; 
and  from  its  oblique  character,  having 
its  right  advanced,  they  came  first  in 
collision  with  the  Twenty-Third  Penn- 
sylvania. The  attack  was  gallantly 
met  by  that  regiment.  Reserving  their 
fire  until  the  Confederates  were  close 
upon  them,  they  opened  with  deadly 
effect  ; and  while  their  opponents 
reeled  and  staggered,  they  charged 
them  with  the  bayonet,  and  drove 
them  back.  The  Twenty-Third  paid 
dearly  for  their  temerity.  Advancing 
too  far,  they  exposed  themselves  to 
the  fire  of  the  enemy’s  artillery,  and 
were  driven  back,  in  their  turn,  in  dis- 
order, and  with  great  loss.  Colonel 
Niele,  having  retained  his  colors,  rallied 
some  one  hundred  of  his  men,  fell 
back  on  the  First  Long  Island,  and 
re-formed.  The  struggle  now  became 
general  on  the  right.  Effort  after 
effort  was  made  to  but  little  purpose. 
The  First  Long  Island  soon  shared  the 
fate  of  the  Twenty-Third  Pennsylvania. 
The  Fifty-Seventh  and  Sixty-Third 


SUMNER  TAKES  COMMAND. 


237 


Pennsylvania  were  also  compelled,  in 
their  turn,  to  yield  to  the  pressure  of 
the  foe.  The  Tenth  Massachusetts, 
after  having  been  surrounded  and 
broken,  re-formed  and  moved  to  the 
right;  but  it  was  to  little  purpose. 
Heintzelman  was  not  proving  himself 
a match  for  Johnston,  who  was  present 
with  his  army,  and  directing  its  every 
movement.  All  along  the  line  on  the 
right,  in  the  centre  and  on  the  left,  the 
Confederates  were  victorious.  Couch’s 
command  was  severed ; the  general 
himself,  with  a portion  of  his  forces, 
was  compelled  to  cross  the  railroad  to 
the  north,  while  the  body  of  his  divi- 
sion was  driven  back  in  the  direction  of 
the  Williamsburg  Road ; and  Kearney 
was  pressed  towards  the  borders  of  the 
flooded  White  Oak  Swamp.  The  day 
was  advancing ; and  as  night  drew  on, 
the  prospect  was  the  reverse  of  cheer- 
ing for  Heintzelman  and  Keyes.  De- 
struction seemed  to  rest  on  the  entire 
left  wing  of  the  National  army. 

In  his  extremity,  and  not  knowing 
which  way  retreat  was  possible,  Couch 
formed  two  lines  of  battle — one  toward 
the  railroad,  with  a section  of  Brady’s 
battery,  supported  by  the  Seventh 
Massachusetts  ; another  toward  the 
wood  to  the  west,  with  the  other  sec- 
tion of  the  battery,  supported  by  the 
Anderson  Zouaves,  with  the  Thirty- 
First  Pennsylvania  and  the  First  Chas- 
seurs. This  latter  line  was  formed  on 
the  edge  of  the  wood,  under  cover  of 
a rail-fence. 

The  situation  had  become  perilous 
in  the  extreme.  Happily,  at  this  criti- 
cal moment,  and  when  most  needed, 


relief  came.  Heintzelman,  when  made 
aware  of  Casey’s  perilous  position,  lost 
no  time  in  conveying  the  information 
to  Generals  McClellan  and  Sumner. 
McClellan  was  at  New  Bridge,  at  the 
extreme  point  of  the  National  right 
wing.  Sumner  was  nearer  the  extrem- 
ity of  the  angle,  in  the  neighborhood 
of  the  railroad  bridge.  Both  were,  as 
the  reader  has  already  been  given  to 
understand,  on  the  further  side  of  the 
now  flooded  Chickahominy.  Sumner, 
fortunately,  had  been  seeing  dangers 
ahead ; and  without  any  special  in- 
structions from  his  chief,  he  had,  i^ay 
as  early  as  the  25th,  commenced  25. 
to  construct  a bridge  across  the  stream, 
in  front  of  his  position.  The  bridge 
was  completed  on  the  evening  of  yfay 
the  30th.  It  was  known  after-  SO. 
wards  as  the  Grape  Vine  Bridge.  It 
was  slender ; but  it  saved  the  army  of 
the  Potomac.  As  soon  as  the  news 
reached  McClellan  of  the  danger  which 
threatened  his  left  wing,  he  ordered 
Sumner  to  be  ready  to  move  at  a 
moment’s  warning.  Sumner  was  ready, 
when,  at  two  o’clock  the  order  reached 
him  to  cross  the  stream  at  once.  The 
passage  was  diflicult ; but  by  caution 
and  care  it  was  successfully  accom- 
plished. Sedgwick,  with  his  division, 
crossed  first,  dragging  with  them  a 
battery  of  twenty-four  Napoleon  guns. 
Richardson  followed — Sumner  last.  At 
the  moment  when  Couch  and  Ileintzel- 
man  were  separated,  Sumner  appeared 
on  the  field  and  assumed  the  command. 
No  change  was  made  in  Sumner’s  dis- 
positions. Sedgwick  formed  in  line  of 
battle  at  the  edge  of  the  wood,  near 


238 


FAIR  OAKS. 


Fair  Oaks,  with  the  First  Minnesota 
on  his  right  flank.  The  Confederates 
began  to  press  on  as  if  they  meant  to 
rush  victoriously  to  Bottom  Bridge. 
The  Napoleon  guns  opened  fire  ; and 
a storm  of  canister  mowed  down  their 
ranks  and  made  them  recoil.  The 
Confederates  made  one  more  attempt 
to  advance ; and  as  they  came  to  the 
edge  of  the  wood,  they  delivered  a 
most  effective  volley  at  the  Anderson 
Zouaves.  Colonel  Biker  was  killed,  and 
the  Zouaves  broke  and  ran.  Speedily 
rallied,  they  resumed  their  position. 
Just  as  the  fatal  volley  was  delivered 
by  the  Confederates,  three  regiments 
— the  Thirty-First  Pennsylvania,  the 
First  Chasseurs  and  the  First  Minne- 
sota— which  were  lying  on  their  faces 
in  front  of  the  battery,  sprang  up,  and 
poured  their  deadly  fire  into  the  very 
faces  of  the  enemy.  In  front  of  that 
line  the  Confederates  lay  in  heaps. 
Brigadier-General  A.  Davis  was  among 
the  killed ; and  Brigadier-General  Pet- 
tigrew, who  was  wounded  and  had 
his  horse  killed  under  him,  was  taken 
prisoner. 

Morgan,  of  Sedgwick’s  division,  had 
meanwhile  been  sent  to  the  relief  of 
Abercrombie,  who  had  been  maintain- 
ing a protracted  and  unequal  struggle 
on  the  extreme  right.  Morgan,  in  his 
turn,  needed  help ; and  the  gallant 
General  Burns,  with  the  Sixty-Nintli 
and  Seventy-Second  Pennsylvania,  was 
sent  to  his  support,  while  Sedgwick 
himself  advanced  for  the  same  purpose, 
taking  with  him  two  other  Pennsylva- 
nia regiments — the  Seventy-Fir^t  and 
the  One  Hundred  and  Sixth.  At  this 


time  the  fighting  was  severe.  It  re- 
quired all  the  nerve  of  Sedgwick  and 
of  Burns  to  keep  the  men  at  their 
work.  The  Confederates,  resolved  to 
win,  seemed  fearless  of  punishment. 
Again  and  again  they  attempted  to 
advance,  and  as  often  were  fearful 
lanes  made  in  their  compact  ranks  by 
the  murderous  fire  of  canister  which 
was  poured  from  the  National  battery. 
It  was  now  sunset;  and  about  this 
time  General  Johnston  was  wounded. 
The  command  devolved  upon  General 
Smith,  who  assumed  its  duties.  The 
loss  of  their  chief  did  not  damp  the 
purpose  of  the  Confederates  or  lessen 
their  energy.  As  darkness  came  on, 
a determined  attempt  was  made  to  out- 
flank Sumner’s  right.  Sumner  ordered 
a bayonet  charge  by  five  regiments. 
The  charge  was  gallantly  made,  and  was 
completely  successful.  The  Confede- 
rate line  was  broken  and  thrown  into 
confusion.  It  was  now  eight  o’clock'; 
darkness  was  falling  upon  the  scene; 
and  the  weary  combatants  on  both 
sides,  resting  on  their  arms,  fell  asleep 
on  the  ground  where  so  many  of  their 
comrades  lay  in  the  cold  embrace  jfjay 
of  death.  Such  was  the  famous  31# 
battle  at  Fair  Oaks,  May  31st,  1862. 

On  the  following  morning  (Sunday, 
June  1st),  both  armies  were  ready  June 
to  resume  the  contest.  The  Na- 
tional  army  had  been  largely  reinforced 
during  the  night  by  troops  from  the 
other  side  of  the  Chickahominy.  Mc- 
Clellan was  himself  on  the  field  and 
made  the  disposition  for  the  day ; but 
with  that  habitual  regard  which  he 
had  for  the  Sabbath,  he  seemed  un- 


THE  BATTLE  ENDED. 


239 


willing  to  provoke  battle.  Sickles’ 
New  York  brigade  was  posted  on  the 
left,  and  stretched  across  the  Williams- 
burg turnpike,  with  Patterson  and  his 
New  Jersey  brigade  on  his  right. 
Both  were  of  Hooker’s  division  and  of 
Heintzelman’s  corps.  To  the  right  of 
Patterson,  and  slightly  in  advance,  was 
Kichardson’s  division,  of  Stoneman’s 
corps.  Sedgwick’s  division,  also  of 
Stoneman’s  corps,  and  also  slightly  in 
advance,  was  on  Bichardson’s  right. 
The  two  last  were  so  placed  along  the 
line  of  railroad  that  they  lay  almost  at 
right  angles  to  the  brigades  of  Sickles 
and  Patterson.  Couch  held  the  posi- 
tion which  he  had  reclaimed  the  day 
before,  and  was  supported  by  Sedgwick. 
Birney  was  also  on  the  railroad,  but 
more  to  the  rear.  The  National  line, 
it  will  thus  be  seen,  formed  a sort  of 
triangle.  Inside  of  the  triangle  were 
the  Confederates,  who  occupied  sub- 
stantially the  ground  which  they  had 
wrenched  from  the  Nationals  on  the 
previous  day.  The  main  body  of  the 
Confederates  faced  the  main  body  of 
the  Nationals  along  the  line  of  railroad. 
The  Nationals  were  on  the  north  of 
this  line;  the  Confederates  were  on 
the  south. 

McClellan,  as  we  have  said,  w^as 
slow  to  provoke  battle ; but  his  dispo- 
sitions were  made,  and  he  was  ready 
for  the  attack  which  he  had  reason  to 
expect  the  Confederates  w^ould  make. 
He  had  not  long  to  wait.  With  the 
first  streak  of  early  dawn,  the  Con- 
federates were  in  motion.  It  ^vas  evi- 
dent that  they  were  nothing  daunted 
by  the  experience  of  the  previous  day, 


and  that  they  meant  to  complete  what 
they  doubtless  regarded  as  their  un- 
finished task.  The  Nationals  were  up 
and  ready,  when  the  Confederates  fell 
upon  Richardson’s  division  with  tre- 
mendous fury.  It  was  a cavalry  attack ; 
and  it  was  as  warmly  received  as  it 
was  vigorously  given.  The  cavalry 
were  driven  back  upon  their  lines  by  a 
well-directed  tire  of  artillery.  It  was, 
however,  only  for  a moment ; for  they 
returned  in  greater  force,  well  sus- 
tained by  companies  of  infantiy.  The 
battle  soon  extended  along  the  whole 
line.  French’s,  Howard’s  and  Meagher’s 
brigades  were  the  first  to  engage  the 
foe  who  was  so  resolute  on  battle. 
To  protect  an  open  field  on  his  right 
front,  Richardson  had  advantageously 
posted  a battery  of  10-pounder  rifle 
Parrott  guns,  under  Captain  Hazard; 
and  directly  in  front  of  his  line  he 
had  placed  the  brigade  of  General 
French  and  a regiment  of  the  brigade 
of  General  O.  O.  Howard.  The  re- 
maining regiments  of  Howard’s  brigade 
formed  a second  line  ; and  the  Irish 
brigade  of  Thomas  F.  Meagher,  with 
eighteen  pieces  of  artillery,  formed  the 
third.  It  was  evidently  the  intention 
of  the  Confederates,  in  attacking  Rich- 
ardson, to  cut  the  National  line  in  two ; 
and,  by  forcing  their  way  between,  to 
destroy  the  army  in  detail.  If  such 
was  their  purpose,  they  had  sadly  mis- 
calculated the  strength  and  spirit  of 
the  National  troops.  General  Roger 
A.  Pryor,  whose  acquaintance,  the 
reader  will  remember,  we  first  made  in 
Charleston  Harbor,  came  up  with  a 
part  of  Huger’s  division,  which  had 


240 


FAIR  OAKS. 


taken  no  part  in  Saturday’s  battle,  and 
fell  heavily  upon  French.  Howard 
rushed  forward  to  the  support  of 
French.  The  fighting  was  severe ; and 
under  the  vigorous  assaults  and  well- 
directed  fire  of  the  Confederates,  the 
National  troops  more  than  once  waver- 
ed, but  were  quickly  rallied  by  their 
officers.  General  Howard  made  him- 
self conspicuous  at  the  head  of  his  men, 
and  did  much  to  cheer  and  sustain  | 
them,  both  by  word  and  deed.  Ma- 
hone  now  came  up  to  the  aid  of  Pryor; 
and  Meagher,  who  had  been  impatient 
to  join  the  fray,  was  ordered  to  the 
front.  He  fell  upon  the  enemy  with 
great  vigor.  For  three  hours  the 
battle  raged  with  great  fierceness.  The 
Confederates  began  to  yield  to  the 
bold  and  impetuous  attacks  of  the 
Nationals  on  the  right.  They  had  no 
better  fortune  on  the  left;  for  in  that 
direction  they  became  engaged  with 
two  brigades  of  Hooker’s  division — 
Patterson’s  New  Jersey  and  Sickles’ 
New  York;  and,  after  sustaining  a 
severe  fire  from  those  brigades,  they 
were  driven  back  at  the  point  of  the 
bayonet.  All  along  the  line,  wherever 
they  attempted  to  penetrate,  they  found 
barriers  of  bristling  steel  and  hearts  of 
iron.  It  was  in  vain  to  make  any 
further  attempt  to  drive  the  Nation- 
als back  into  the  swollen  waters  of 
the  Chickahominy  and  the  adjoining 
swamps,  or  to  force  a way  to  Bottom 
Bridge.  It  was  now  nine  o’clock ; 
and  at  this  early  hour,  the  Confede- 
rates, as  if  convinced  of  the  fruitless- 
ness of  further  efforts,  fell  back,  and 
the  firing  ceased.  The  battle  was  not 


renewed.  Towards  the  close  of  the 
struggle.  General  Howard  received 
those  wounds  which  cost  him  his  right 
arm.  He  did  not,  however,  leave  the 
field.  Binding  his  shattered  limb  in 
his  handkerchief,  he  remained  at  his 
post  till*  the  battle  was  ended. 

Although  they  had  failed  in  their 
second  day’s  efforts,  the  Confederates 
did  not  abandon  the  ground  which  they 
I had  taken  from  Casey  on  Saturday. 
On  this  ground  they  remained  during 
the  whole  of  Monday,  and  some  of 
them  over  Monday  night.  It  was 
General  McClellan’s  purpose  to  pursue 
them  on  the  third  day  and  regain  what 
had  been  lost.  With  this  end  in  view, 
he  had  made  all  necessary  arrange- 
ments to  offer  them  battle.  His  line 
was  drawn  up,  skirmishers  were  sent 
in  advance,  the  artillery  was  posted, 
and  the  army  began  to  move  for\vard. 
It  was  all  unnecessary  work.  Delay 
had  given  the  Confederates  sufficient 
time  to  move  back  their  camp  equi- 
pages and  munitions  of  war  to  their 
lines  at  Eichmond.  This  being  suc- 
cessfully accomplished,  they  themselves 
followed.  When  McClellan  advanced 
there  was  no  enemy  to  encounter.  Fair 
Oaks  and  Seven  Pines  were  reoccupied 
by  the  National  troops;  and  the  two 
armies  resumed  substantially  their  for- 
mer positions.  Hooker,  having  been  or- 
dered forward  by  Heintzelman,  with  a 
reconnoitering  party  toward  Eichmond, 
advanced  within  four  miles  of  the  Con- 
federate capital.  On  hearing  of  his 
temerity,  McClellan  ordered  him  back. 
These  are  the  words  McClellan  used : 
“ General  Hooker  will  return  from  his 


THE  SHENANDOAH  VALLEY. 


241 


brilliant  reconnoissance ; we  cannot  af- 
ford to  lose  his  division.”  Hooker  re- 
turned to  Casey’s  camp,  where,  at  the 
house  of  one  George  Turner,  McClel- 
lan had  established  his  headquarters. 
While  McClellan  busied  himself  again 
at  his  favorite  work  of  throwing  up 
entrenchments  and  constructing  fortifi- 
cations, Hooker,  yielding  to  the  gentler 
impulses  of  a soldier’s  nature,  occupied 
his  hours  of  enforced  inactivity  in  the 
establishment  of  an  hospital  near  Fair 
Oaks  Station. 

In  the  two  days’  fighting  at  Fair 
Oaks  and  Seven  Pines,  both  armies 
sustained  heavy  losses.  It  has  been 
estimated  that  the  loss  on  either  side 
must  have  amounted  to  near  seven 
thousand  men — a heavy  loss,  when  it  is 
considered  that  in  neither  the  one  army 


nor  the  other  were  there  more  than  fif- 
teen thousand  engaged.  Attempts  have 
been  made  to  give  the  actual  figures ; 
but  they  cannot  be  regarded  as  reliable. 

The  battle  of  Fair  Oaks  does  not  re- 
dound to  the  credit  of  General  McClel- 
lan. It  cannot  be  said  that  he  was 
successful  in  his  choice  of  battle 
ground  or  in  the  original  disposition 
of  his  troops.  He  was  neglectful  in 
the  matter  of  bridges.  His  long  delay 
before  the  battle  gave  the  enemy  an 
opportunity;  he  ought  to  have  placed 
more  men  at  Sumner’s  disposal,  and 
most  certainly  he  ought  not  to  have 
been  absent  from  the  first  day’s  fight. 
His  delay,  after  the  battle,  in  pressing 
on  toward  Richmond  has  been  severely 
condemned  by  competent  military  au- 
thorities. 


CHAPTER  XVII. 

The  Old  Policy  of  Delfiy. — McClellan’s  Army  Still  Inactive. — The  Shenandoah  Valley. — Jackson  and  Lander. — 
Blooming  Gap. — Death  of  Lander. — General  Banks  at  Harper’s  Ferry. — General  Shields. — Battle  of  Kerns- 
town. — Shields  Wounded. — Conducting  the  Battle  from  his  Bed. — Tyler’s  Splendid  Charge. — The  “Stone- 
wall Brigade.” — Jackson’s  Defeat. — General  Banks  in  Pursuit. — Shields  the  Hero  of  the  Fight  at  Kernstown. 
— Sketch  of  Shields. — Jackson  Joined  by  Ewell. — Shields  Detached  from  Banks  and  Sent  to  Join  McDowell. 
— Banks  Greatly  Weakened  Thereby. — Jackson  Strikes  Fremont. — Banks’  Retreat. — Jackson  and  Ewell  in 
Pursuit. — Attack  on  Front  Royal. — Kenly  Overpowered. — Banks  Continues  his  Retreat  from  Strasburg. — 
Overtaken  by  Ewell  at  Winchester. — Battle  of  Winchester. — Banks  Compelled  to  Fall  Back. — He  Reaches 
the  Potomac  Opposite  Williamsport. — An  Almost  Unparalleled  March. — Safe  Across  the  River. — Jackson’s 
Mistake. — Consternation  at  Washington. — McDowell’s  Recall. — Fremont  and  Shields. — Jackson’s  Retreat  from 
Harper’s  Ferry. — Ewell’s  Demonstrations. — His  Retreat. — The  Race  up  the  Shenandoah. — Jackson  Eludes  his 
Pursuers. — Burns  the  Bridges  in  his  Rear. — Reaches  Harrisonburg. — Followed  Close  by  Fremont. — A Vigorous 
Encounter. — General  Ashby  Killed. — Capture  of  Colonel  Wyndham. — Battle  of  Cross  Keys. — Ewell  Holds  his 
Ground. — Port  Republic. — Jackson  Across  the  Bridge. — Arrival  of  Shields’  Advance. — Ewell  Joins  Jackson. 
— The  Nationals  Driven  Back. — The  Burning  of  the  Bridge. — Jackson’s  Success. — What  He  Had  Done. — 
Sketch  of  Jackson. — Reflections. — The  Mistake  of  the  Government. 


Tete  battle  of  Fair  Oaks  was  fought 
1862 

first  day  of  June.  For  three 


weeks  the  army  of  the  Potomac  lay 
quietly  along  the  line  of  the  Chicka- 
hominy — McClellan,  pursuing  his  old 


JACXSOK’S  CAMPAIGN. 


policy  of  delay,  and  occupying  the 
thoughts  of  his  men  by  throwing  up 
fortifications  and  otherwise  strengthen- 
ing his  position.  The  three  weeks’ 
delay  proved  fatal,  as  we  shall  soon 
see,  to  the  Peninsular  campaign — a 
campaign  begun  in  splendor  and  pro- 
mise, but,  having  signally  failed  of  its 
purpose,  destined  to  end  in  gloom  and 
disaster. 

In  order,  however,  to  an  intelligent 
appreciation  of  what  may  be  called  the 
second  period  of  the  Peninsular  cam- 
paign, it  is  necessary  for  the  reader  to 
carry  with  him  a knowledge  of  the 
events  which,  at  this  date,  were  in 
progress  in  the  Shenandoah  V^alley  and 
the  adjacent  regions  on  both  sides  of 
the  Blue  Ridge.  While,  therefore, 
McClellan  waits  for  propitious  weather, 
and  for  the  advent  of  McDowell  on 
the  line  of  the  Chickahominy  and  on 
the  malarious  borders  of  White  Oak 
Swamp,  let  us  follow  the  movements  of 
the  National  armies  a little  further  to 
the  north  and  west,  and  witness  their 
vain  endeavors  to  check  the  triumphal 
progress  of  the  Confederate  general, 
“ Stonewall  ” Jackson.  In  a previous 
chapter  it  has  been  shown  that,  when 
it  was  finally  agreed  that  McClellan 
was  to  proceed  to  Richmond  by  way 
of  the  Peninsula,  every  precaution  was 
taken  for  the  protection  of  Washington. 
Early  in  January,  General  Lander,  of 
General  Banks’  corps,  was  placed  in 
command  of  a force  whose  primary 
duty  it  was  to  protect  the  Baltimore 
and  Ohio  Railroad.  Floyd  and  Wise 
and  Lee  had  each  of  them  been  com- 
pelled to  retire  from  that  neighbor- 


hood; and  ‘‘Stonewall”  Jackson,  in 
whom  Lander  found  a skilful  and  ener- 
getic opponent,  was  endeavoring  to 
recover  the  ground  which  they  had 
lost,  and  make  himself  master,  if  pos- 
sible, of  the  Shenandoah  Valley.  With 
a comparatively  small  force,  not  ex- 
ceeding four  thousand  men.  Lander 
executed  a series  of  brilliant  move- 
ments in  presence  of  the  enemy ; and, 
on  the  night  of  February  14th, 
he  made  a dash,  at  the  head  of  IL 
some  four  hundred  horsemen,  and, 
surprising  Jackson  at  Blooming  Gap, 
captured  seventeen  of  his  commissioned 
officers  and  about  sixty  of  his  rank 
and  file,  and  compelled  him  to  retire. 
Lander  died  soon  after,  from  the  effects 
of  a wound  which  he  had  received  in 
October  of  the  previous  year,  a few 
days  after  the  battle  of  Ball’s  Bluff, 
in  a skirmish  at  Edward’s  Ferry.  In 
Lander,  the  country  lost  a brave  sol- 
dier, a capable  general,  and  a truly 
loyal  citizen.  The  troops  commanded 
by  Lander  were  placed  under  General 
Shields,  another  able  ofiicer,  who  had 
already  earned  for  himself  a name  by 
his  services  in  Mexico. 

Early  in  February,  General  Banks, 
to  whom  had  been  assigned  the  duty 
of  covering  the  line  of  the  Potomac 
and  Washington  City,  sent  Colonel 
Geary  forward  with  a force  to  occupy 
Harper’s  Ferry.  This  task  was  easily 
accomplished ; and  towards  the  end  of 
the  month,  General  Banks  arrived  and 
took  command  in  person,  occupying, 
with  his  troops,  all  the  higher  ground 
near  the  ferry,  as  well  as  Charleston 
and  Leesburg.  Jackson,  after  his  en- 


BATTLE  OF  KERNSTOWN, 


243 


counter  with  Lander,  had  retired  to 
Winchester,  where  he  was  lying,  with 
his  division  of  some  eight  thousand 
men,  when,  early  in  March,  Johnston 
evacuated  Manassas.  On  the  11th  of 
I^Iar.  March,  two  days  later,  Jackson 
also  retired,  moving  further  up 
the  Shenandoah  Valley,  and  keeping 
himself  in  ^ easy  communication  with 
Johnston.  He  halted  at  Mount  Jack- 
son,  some  forty  miles  above  Winches- 
ter. Thither  Shields  pursued  him ; 
but  finding  Jackson  well  posted,  and 
believing  him  to  be  too  strong  to 
warrant  an  attack,  he  fell  back  on 
Winchester  for  the  double  purpose  of 
securing  a place  of  safety,  and  of 
decoying  Jackson  from  his  position. 
After  a march  of  thirty  miles,  which 
was  accomplished  in  one  day.  Shields 
posted  his  division  in  a secluded  place, 
about  two  miles  from  Winchester,  on 
the  Martinsburg  Road,  and  about  half 
a mile  north  of  the  village  of  Kerns- 
town.  While  the  division  under 
Shields  was  so  occupied.  General 
Banks,  following  out  the  arrangements 
agreed  upon  at  Fairfax  Court  House, 
put  the  rest  of  his  corps  in  motion 
towards  Centreville,  from  which  the 
Confederates  had  retired  on  March 
nth.  In  his  backward  march  to- 
wards Winchester,  Shields  was  fol- 
lowed closely  by  Ashby’s  cavalry. 
IWan  ftie  22d,  about  five  o’clock 

22*  in  the  afternoon,  Ashby’s  horse- 
men attacked  and  drove  in  Shields’ 
pickets.  Shields  was  well  posted,  and 
had  under  him  a force  of  about  6000 
infantry,  750  cavalry  and  24  guns.  By 
order  of  General  Banks,  who  was  on 


the  ground,  Shields  pushed  forward 
one  brigade  and  two  batteries  of  artil- 
lery; but  the  movement  was  so  con- 
ducted that  the  enemy  could  only  see 
a small  portion  of  that  force.  While 
directing  one  of  the  batteries  to  its 
position.  Shields  was  hit  by  the  frag- 
ment of  a shell,  which  fractured  his 
arm  above  the  elbow,  bruised  his 
shoulder  and  injured  his  side.  Badly 
injured  as  he  was,  he  was  yet  able  to 
attend  to  his  duty,  so  far  as  to  make 
dispositions  for  the  ensuing  days. 
Under  cover  of  the  night,  he  pushed 
forward  Kimball’s  brigade,  nearly 
three  miles  on  the  Strasburg  Road. 
To  support  this  brigade,  if  attacked, 
Daum’s  artillery  was  placed  in  a strong 
position.  In  the  rear  of  Kimball’s, 
and  within  supporting  distance  of  it, 
covering  all  the  approaches  to  the 
town,  was  placed  Sullivan’s  brigade, 
which,  with  Broadhead’s  cavalry,  was 
held  in  reserve.  In  that  order  the 
troops  rested  for  the  night.  Early  on 
the  following  morning  a recon-  |^ar. 
noissance  was  made.  There  was  23. 
no  evidence  of  the  presence  in  front 
of  any  Confederate  force,  except  Ash- 
by’s cavalry.  In  the  belief  that  such 
was  the  fact,  and  taking  it  for  granted 
that  Jackson  would  not  be  daring 
enough  to  attack  Shields,  Banks,  in 
obedience  to  a summons  from  head- 
quarters, left  at  ten  A.  M.  for  Wash- 
ington. 

Shields  was  soon  undeceived;  and 
General  Banks  had  only  reached  Har- 
per’s Ferry,  on  his  way  to  Washington, 
when  he  heard  the  sounds  of  battle, 
and  promptly  retraced  his  steps.  At 


244 


JACKSON’S  CAMPAIGN. 


the  time  the  reconnoissance  was  made,' 
and  when  the  National  scouts  could 
see  nothing  but  Ashby’s  cavalry,  JacI:- 
son’s  whole  army  was  posted  in  battle 
order,  with  artillery  on  each  flank, 
about  half  a mile  south  of  Kernstown, 
and  completely  under  cover  of  the 
woods.  Shortly  after  eleven  o’clock, 
the  Confederate  cannon  opened  fire  upon 
Kimball.  Sullivan’s  brigade  was  or- 
dered forward  to  his  support ; and  the 
fire  of  artillery  on  both  sides  became 
heavy,  although  as  yet  ineffective, 
because  of  the  distance.  Jackson 
seemed  resolved  to  force  the  fighting. 
Pushing  forward  more  guns  to  his 
right,  and  advancing  to  their  support 
a considerable  force  of  infantry  and 
cavalry,  he  made  a vigorous  effort,  as 
if  he  wished  to  enfilade  and  turn  the 
National  left.  At  this  moment,  an 
active  body  of  skirmishers,  under  Col- 
onel Carrol,  consisting  of  his  own  regi- 
ment— the  Eighth  Ohio — and  three 
companies  of  the  Sixty-Seventh  Ohio, 
were  thrown  forward  on  both  sides  of 
the  valley  road,  to  check  the  enemy’s 
advance.  These  skirmishers  were  ad- 
mirably supported  by  four  pieces  of 
artillery,  under  Captain  Jenks,  and 
also  by  Sullivan’s  gallant  brigade. 
At  every  point  the  Confederates  were 
repulsed ; and  Jackson,  as  if  despair- 
ing of  any  success  against  the  National 
left,  massed  his  forces,  and  flung  him- 
self with  great  energy  on  the  right. 
The  movement  was  skilfully  made, 
and  very  narrowly  missed  success.  So 
fierce  was  the  onslaught  that  Daum’s 
batteries,  although  worked  with  skill 
and  energy,  were  powerless  to  offer 


any  effective  resistance.  On  rushed 
the  Confederates,  as  if  nothing  could 
check  them ; and  for  a time  it  seemed 
as  if  they  were  about  to  snatch  the 
prize  of  victory.  Shields,  who  was 
unable  to  be  present  on  the  field,  was 
actually  ' conducting  the  battle  from 
his  bed.  Having  been  informed  by  a 
messenger  from  Kimball  of  the  state 
of  affairs,  he  saw  at  once  that  his 
army  was  in  danger,  and  that  not  a 
moment  was  to  be  lost.  He  gave 
orders  that  all  the  disposable  infantry 
should  be  immediately  thrown  forward 
on  the  right,  and  that  thus  massed,  they 
should  fall  with  all  their  might  on 
Jackson’s  batteries,  capture  them,  then 
turn  his  left  flank  and  hurl  it  ^ back 
on  his  centre.  Kimball  entrusted  this 
movement  to  Colonel  Tyler.  It  was 
admirably  executed,  the  gallant  Tyler 
and  his  splendid  brigade  marching 
forward  with  “ alacrity  and  enthusiastic 
joy  to  the  performance  of  the  most 
perilous  duty  of  the  day.”  The  Con- 
federate skirmishers  yielded  to  the  at- 
tack, and  fell  back  to  the  main  body, 
strongly  posted  on  high  ground,  and 
behind  a high  and  solid  stone  fence. 
Here  the  struggle  became  desperate, 
and,  for  a time,  doubtful.  Tyler’s  bri- 
gade was  soon  joined  by  the  Fifth 
and  Sixty-Second  Ohio  and  Thirteenth 
Indiana,  of  Sullivan’s  brigade,  and 
the  Fourteenth  Indiana,  Eighty-Fourth 
Pennsylvania,  and  several  companies  of 
the  Eighth  and  Sixty-Seventh  Ohio,  of 
Kimball’s  brigade.  This  united  force, 
with  cheers  and  3^ells,  which  rose  high 
above  the  roar  of  battle,  rushed  upon 
the  Confederates;  and  in  spite  of  a 


MAP  SHOWING  THE  SHENANDOAH  VALLEY,  THE  SCENE  OF  SEVERAL 
IMPORTANT  CAMPAIGNS. 


''  ' ' : ' ' . 


'■t'- 


'I  ■ ' 
V."' 


a 


r 


THE  PURSUIT. 


245 


most  heroic  resistance,  which  was  too 
well  attested  by  the  heaps  of  slain  on 
the  field,  Jackson’s  men  were  driven 
back  through  the  woods.  Resting 
upon  the  reserve,  an  attempt  was 
again  made,  chieliy  by  the  famous 
“Stonewall  brigade,”  to  retrieve  the 
fortunes  of  the  day ; but  it  was  of  no 
avail.  Nothing  could  resist  the  on- 
ward rush  of  the  now  triumphant 
Nationals,  as  they  rent  the  air  with 
their  cheers,  and  poured  forth  their 
murderous  volleys.  This  last  attempt 
at  resistance  was  but  of  brief  dura- 
tion. The  Confederates  again  broke; 
and  this  time  they  fled  in  disorder 
from  the  field,  leaving,  in  addition  to 
the  multitude  of  killed  and  wounded, 
three  hundred  prisoners,  two  guns, 
four  caissons,  and  a thousand  stand  of 
small  arms.  “Night  alone,”  said  the 
gallant  Shields,  in  his  graphic  and 
honest  report,  “ saved  them  from  total 
destruction.”  The  Nationals  rested 
on  the  battle  field. 

On  the  following  morning,  in  obedi- 
I^ar,  ence  to  orders  from  General 
24*  Shields,  the  pursuit  was  com- 
menced, the  National  artillery  opening 
fire  upon  the  rear-guard  of  the  retreat- 
ing foe.  General  Banks,  when  he  halt- 
ed at  Harper’s  Ferry,  ordered  back 
Williams,  with  his  whole  division. 
The  general  himself  lost  no  time  in 
returning  to  Winchester ; and  having 
made  a hasty  visit  to  General  Shields, 
he  assumed  command  of  the  forces  in 
pursuit  of  the  enemy.  The  pursuit  was 
continued  as  far  as  Mount  Jackson. 
It  was  there  abandoned,  in  consequence 
of  the  utter  exhaustion  of  the  troops. 


This  victory  at  Kernstown  was  due 
largely,  no  doubt,  to  the  bravery  of 
the  rank  and  file  of  the  National  army 
and  to  the  skill  and  intrepidity  of 
its  officers.  It  is  doubtful,  however, 
whether  even  such  an  army,  in  pres- 
ence of  such  a foe,  could  have  nailed 
victory  to  its  standard,  without  the 
clear  head,  the  firm,  decisive  will  and 
the  prompt  action  of  General  Shields. 
No  more  skilful  generalship  than  that 
displayed  by  General  Shields  on  this 
occasion  was  exhibited  during  the  en- 
tire  progress  of  the  war.*'^ 

Although  Jackson  had  been  defeated 
and  held  for  a time  in  check,  it  was  no 
part  of  the  plan  of  the  Confederates 
to  abandon  the  Shenandoah  Valley. 
They  knew  that  so  long  as  they  were 
able  to  threaten  Washington  by  main- 
taining a large  force  in  the  valley, 
they  would  embarrass  the  movements 
of  McClellan  in  the  Peninsula.  It  was 
not  possible  for  Jackson  to  make  any 
aggressive  efforts,  or  even  to  maintain 
his  position,  if  he  was  not  considerably 

♦General  James  Shields,  the  hero  of  Kernstown,  was 
born  in  1810,  in  the  county  of  Tyrone,  Ireland.  In 
182G,  when  at  the  age  of  sixteen,  he  emigrated  to  the 
United  States.  In  1832,  he  settled  in  Illinois,  where  he 
devoted  himself  to  the  profession  of  law.  After  hav- 
ing filled  several  offices,  he  became  a judge  of  the 
Supreme  Court.  In  184.5,  he  was  appointed  by  Presi- 
dent Polk,  commissioner  of  the  General  Land  Office,  and 
removed  to  Washington.  After  serving  in  the  Mexican 
War  with  distinction,  he  was  elected  United  States  Sen- 
ator from  Illinois.  He  was  living  in  Minnesota  when 
that  Territory  was  admitted  a State  of  the  Union,  and 
was  chosen  United  States  Senator.  When  the  war 
broke  out,  he  had  been  for  some  years  in  California, 
living  in  comparative  retirement.  Congress  made  him 
a brigadier-general,  with  a commission  bearing  date 
August  10,  18(51.  General  Shields  has  always  been  a 
pronounced  Democrat ; but  his  politics  have  never  • 
tempted  him  to  entertain  views  injurious  to  the  unity 
and  integrity  of  the  National  government. 


224 


246 


JACKSON’S  CAMPAIGN. 


reinforced.  Accordingly,  while  he  was 
lying  at  a point  between  the  South 
Fork  of  the  Shenandoah  and  Swift 
Run  Gap,  after  his  retreat  from  Win- 
chester, he  was  joined  by  the  divi- 
sion of  General  R.  S.  Ewell,  and 
also  two  brigades  under  Edward  J. 
Johnston.  The  entire  force  under 
Jackson  was  thus  increased  to  about 
15,000  men.  They  were  surely  all 
needed;  for  he  was  confronting  three 
National  armies — that  of  Fremont  on 
his  left;  that  of  Banks  in  front,  and 
that  of  McDowell  on  liis  right.  Fre- 
mont, it  will  be  remembered,  had 
charge  of  what  was  called  the  Moun- 
tain department;  Banks  had  chai'ge  of 
the  Shenandoah  department ; and  Mc- 
Dowell had  charge  of  the  newly- 
created  department  of  the  Rappahan- 
nock. Towards  the  end  of  April, 
when  Jackson  was  about  to  commence 
offensive  operations,  Fremont,  in  obedi- 
ence to  orders  given  by  the  presi- 
dent, had  come  down  to  Franklin,  in 
Pendleton  County,  near  the  mountains 
west  of  Harrisonburg,  and  had  taken 
a position  there  with  15,000  men; 
General  Banks  was  at  Strasburg,  in 
the  valley,  with  about  16,000  men; 
and  General  McDowell  was  at  Fred- 
ericksburg with  30,000  men.  About 
the  time  Jackson  began  to  move. 
Shields’  division  was  detached  from 
Banks’  command  and  given  to  Mc- 
Dowell, who,  as  Washington  was  no 
longer  menaced  by  Johnston,  was  on 
his  march  to  McClellan,  now  at  the 
head  of  some  41,000  men,  with  100 
guns.  Such  was  the  disposition  and 
such  the  strength  of  the  National 


forces  in  Virginia  in  the  first  weeks 
of  May.  Banks,  it  will  be  observed, 
after  Shields’  division  had  been  trans- 
ferred to  McDowell,  had  not  under 
him  more  than  6000  men. 

Jackspn’s  great  object  was  to  pre- 
vent either  McDowell  or  Fremont 
from  forming  a junction  with  Banks. 
Learning  that  Fremont  was  pressing 
on  to  join  Banks  at  Harrisonburg, 
Jackson  left  Ewell  to  watch  Banks, 
and  advanced  to  meet  Fremont. 
Coming  up  with  his  advance  at  Mc- 
Dowell, some  thirty-six  miles  west  of 
Staunton,  a vigorous  encounter  took 
place.  Both  armies  suffered  severely, 
but  the  Nationals  were  compelled  to 
retire.  Jackson  followed  them  up  as 
far  as  Franklin,  when,  hearing  from 
Ewell  that  Banks  was  evidently  prepar- 
ing to  make  his  escape  from  Harrison- 
burg, he  hastened  back  to  McDowell, 
recrossed  the  Shenandoah  Mountains, 
rested  for  a little  at  Lebanon  Sulphur 
Springs,  and  then  pressed  forward, 
with  the  view  of  falling  upon  Banks. 
Meanw^hile,  Banks  had  fied  to  Stras- 
burg, pursued  by  Ewell.  Jackson 
posted  on  to  New  Market,  where  he 
joined  Ewell.  The  united  forces 
moved  up  the  Luray  Valley,  between 
the  Massanutten  Mountains  and  the 
Blue  Ridge,  towards  Front  Royal, 
their  object  being  to  cut  off  Banks’ 
retreat  in  that  direction,  and  thus  to 
prevent  him  joining  McDowell  by  way 
of  Manassas  Gap.  By  this  movement, 
Jackson  accomplished  a double  object; 
he  created  a panic  in  Washington  and, 
indeed,  throughout  the  whole  North  ; 
and  he  fell  with  overwhelming  force 


RETEEAT  OF  BANKS. 


247 


on  Colonel  Kenly  and  the  little  garri- 
son at  Front  Royal.  Kenly  made  a 
spirited  resistance ; but  he  was  com- 
pletely overpowered,  and,  after  being 
wounded,  he  himself  and  700  of  his 
men,  with  a section  of  rifled  10- 
pounders  and  his  entire  supply  train, 
fell  into  the  hands  of  the  victorious 
Confederates.  This  affair  happened 
iHay  on  the  23d  of  May.  Banks  was 
23.  still  at  Strasburg,  when,  on  the 
evening  of  that  day,  he  heard  of  the 
disaster  at  Front  Roy  ah  Alarm  fol- 
lowed vexation  when  he  learned  that 
Jackson,  at  the  head  of  20,000  men, 
was  moving  rapidly  toward  Winches- 
ter. With  his  reduced  force,  it  was 
vain  to  think  of  offering  resistance  to 
an  army  so  greatly*  superior  in  num- 
bers. As  he  could  not  hope  to  win, 
his  plain  duty  was  to  try  to  save  his 
men  and  his  war  material.  Early  in 
May  the  morning  of  the  24th,  Banks, 
21.  resolved  to  lose  no  time  in  put- 
ting distance  between  himself  and  his 
pursuers,  hastened  down  the  valley. 
By  a forced  march,  he  gained  Winches- 
ter by  midnight.  The  retreat  was 
conducted  in  a masterly  manner,  and  in 
circumstances  of  very  great  diflficulty. 
Banks,  however,  had  little  time  to  rest 
his  weary  troops.  Ewell  was  already 
at  his  heels ; and  Jackson  was  pressing 
forward  in  overwhelming  strength,  not 
far  in  the  rear  of  Ewell.  The  Con- 
federate advance  bivouacked  within 
a mile  and  a half  of  Winchester.  It 
was  evidently  their  expectation  that 
the  next  day  would  witness  the  cap- 
ture or  destruction  of  their  opponents. 
Banks,  as  we  have  seen,  had  only 


about  6000  men,  with  ten  Parrott  guns 
and  a battery  of  six-pounder  smooth 
bore  cannon,  with  which  to  resist  the 
pursuer  and  protect  the  valley.  The 
Confederate  force  had  been  consider- 
ably strengthened,  and  must  have 
numbered,  all  told,  over  20,000  men. 
It  was  not  possible  to  continue  the 
retreat  without  showing  front  to  the 
pursuers. 

By  daylight  on  the  25th  both 
armies  were  in  battle  order ; May 
and  the  fight  opened  furiously  25. 
in  front  of  Winchester.  Banks’  left 
was  commanded  by  Colonel  Donnelly, 
and  his  right  by  Colonel  Gordon, 
while  the  troops  in  the  centre  were 
well  protected  by  stone  fences.  Ewell 
made  a bold  endeavor  to  turn  the  Na- 
tional right,  and  to  shut  Banks  off 
from  Harper’s  Ferry.  The  National 
soldiers,  realizing  their  danger,  fought 
with  great  bravery,  and  for  some  five 
hours  held  the  Confederates  in  check. 
Jackson’s  whole  force  was  now  seen 
to  be  moving  forward.  Banks,  wise- 
ly concluding  that  further  resistance 
might  prove  his  ruin,  issued  orders 
for  a retreat.  He  had  already,  in  an- 
ticipation of  such  an  emergency,  sent 
his  trains  on  to  the  Potomac.  Under 
a most  destructive  fire,  the  troops 
formed  into  three  parallel  columns,  and 
moved  in  the  direction  of  Martins- 
burg,  each  column  being  protected  by 
an  eflicient  rear-guard.  In  passing 
through  Winchester,  they  were  sub- 
jected to  insults  and  violence,  the 
women  pouring  upon  them  hot  water 
from  the  windows  and  flinging  other 
missiles.  In  the  course  of  the  after.* 


248 


JACKSON’S  CAMPAIGN. 


noon  Banks  reached  Martinsburg,  hav- 
ing accomplished  a march  of  twenty- 
two  miles.  There  he  rested  his  foot- 
sore and  battle-worn  troops  for  two 
and  a half  hours.  At  the  end  of  that 
time  the  march  was  resumed ; the 
other  twelve  miles  of  the  journey  were 
accomplished ; and  by  sundown  of  the 
same  day  Banks,  with  his  worn-out 
but  not  yet  disorganized  men,  stood 
on  the  banks  of  the  Potomac,  direct!}^ 
opposite  Williamsport.  Forty-eight 
hours  had  just  elapsed  since  the  news 
had  reached  them  of  the  disaster  of 
Front  Boyal.  It  was  a march  of  fifty- 
three  miles,  thirty-five  of  which  were 
performed  in  one  day.  ‘‘The  scene  at 
the  river,”  says  General  Banks,  in  his 
graphic  report  of  that  retreat,  “ when 
the  rear-guard  arrived,  was  of  the  most 
animating  and  exciting  description.  A 
thousand  camp  fires  were  burning  on 
the  hill-side,  a thousand  carriac^es  of 
every  description  were  crowded  upon 
the  banks,  and  the  broad  river  rolled 
between  the  exhausted  troops  and 
their  coveted  rest.” 

Some  difficulty  was  experienced  in 
getting  across  the  river.  The  ferry 
was  occupied  by  the  ammunition  trains 
— the  ford  by  the  wagons.  The  cav- 
alry was  secure  in  its  own  power  of 
crossing.  But  the  infantry  had  to 
content  themselves  with  some  boats 
w^hich  belonged  to  the  pontoon  train, 
and  which  had  been  brought  along 
from  Strasburg.  With  an  ingenuous- 
ness which  does  no  discredit  to  his 
well-tried  soldierly  qualities.  General 
Banks  tells  us  that  “ there  never  were 
more  grateful  hearts  in  the  same  num- 


ber of  men  than  when,  at  mid- 
day  on  the  26th,  we  stood  on  26. 
the  opposite  shore.”  In  killed  and 
wounded.  Banks’  loss  was  about  200. 
Two  guns,  more  than  9000  small  arms, 
and  some  8000  prisoners  constituted 
Jackson’s  prize. 

It  would  be  unfair  to  refuse  to  Gen- 
eral Banks  the  highest  praise  for  the 
orderly  and  successful  manner  in  which 
he  conducted  this  retreat  from  Stras- 
burg to  the  Potomac.  At  the  same 
time  it  is  undeniable  that,  if  Jackson 
had  pursued  with  the  same  vigor  with 
which  Banks  conducted  his  retreat, 
the  result  might  have  been  very  dif- 
ferent. Jackson  halted  his  infantry 
not  far  from  Winchester ; and  George 
H.  Stewart,  who  .was  sent  after  the 
fugitives,  discontinued  the  pursuit  at 
Martinsburg.  In  the  latter  part  of  his 
retreat,  therefore.  Banks’  danger  was 
more  in  seeming  than  in  reality;  for 
Jackson,  by  giving  up  the  pursuit,  had 
flung  away  his  opportunity.  Superior 
numbers  gave  Jackson  the  victory ; 
but  fortune  smiled  upon  Banks,  and 
enabled  him  to  save  his  army.  The 
National  government  had  reason  to 
honor  Banks  for  saving  his  men  and 
his  ammunition  trains.  The  Confede- 
rate government  had  reason  to  blame 
Jackson  for  not  completing  his  victory 
by  the  annihilation  of  his  antagonist. 

The  reappearance  of  Jackson  in  the 
valley  of  the  Shenandoah,  followed  as 
that  was  by  the  attack  on  Front  Royal 
and  the  retreat  and  pursuit  from  Stras- 
burg, naturally  enough  produced  not 
a little  consternation  in  Washington. 
We  have  seen  that  General  Shields 


I 


THE  CONFEDERATE  RETREAT. 


249 


formerly  of  Banks’  corps,  had  been 
ordered  to  join  the  army  of  McDowell, 
taking  with  him  his  11,000  men.  We 
have  also  seen  that  thus  reinforced, 
and  with  an  army  41,000  strong,  Mc- 
Dowell was  under  instructions  to  move 
toward  Richmond  on  the  26th,  for  the 
purpose  of  co-operating  with  McClel- 
lan. Before  McDowell  began  to  move 
toward  Richmond,  tidings  of  what  had 
happened  in  the  Shenandoah  Valley 
had,  of  course,  reached  Washington. 
The  government  was  alarmed ; the 
National  capital  was  considered  to  be 
in  peril;  and  McDowell,  in  place  of 
being  allowed  to  carry  out  the  orders 
received  earlier  on  the  same  day,  and 
proceed  to  aid  McClellan  before  Rich- 
mond, was  instructed  to  push  20,000 
-men  into  the  valley  by  way  of  Ma- 
nassas Gap,  the  object  being  to  intercept 
Jackson,  if  he  should  attempt  to  re- 
treat. At  the  same  time  instructions 
were  sent  to  Fremont  by  telegraph, 
commanding  him  to  hasten,  with  his 
army,  over  the  Shenandoah  Mountain 
to  Harrisonburg,  the  object  being  the 
same.  It  was  hoped  that  both  armies 
might  effect  a junction  at  Strasburg, 
and  that  they  might  do  so  in  sufficient 
time  to  head  off  Jackson.  Fremont 
lost  no  time  in  complying  with  the 
instructions  which  he  had  received; 
but,  having  taken  a more  northerly 
road  across  the  mountain  to  Strasburg, 
June  reach  that  place 

b till  the  evening  of  the  1st  of 
June.  Jackson  had  passed  through  the 
town  a few  houi’s  before.  McDowell 
was  equally  prompt,  although,  in  let- 
ters addressed  both  to  the  president 


and,  to  the  secretary  of  war,  he  ex- 
pressed his  regret,  in  a dignified  and 
soldierly  manner,  that  it  should  have 
been  necessary  to  countermand  his 
orders  and  compel  him  to  fall  back. 
Shields’  division  vcas  pushed  forward 
in  advance.  On  the  morning  of  June 
the  2d  of  June,  Shields’  cavalry,  2. 
under  General  Bayard,  reached  Stras- 
burg— too  late  also  to  accomplish  their 
intended  purpose. 

In  the  meantime,  the  excitement 
and  anxiety  of  the  government  were 
finding  other  channels  of  expression. 
Alarming  despatches  w^ere  sent  to  the 
governors  of  the  different  States.  They 
were  informed  that  the  enemy  in  great 
force  was  marching  on  Washington; 
and  they  were  exhorted  to  organize, 
and  forward  immediately,  all  the  militia 
and  volunteer  force  in  their  respective 
States.  On  the  same  day  on  which  . 
these  despatches  were  forwarded,  the 
president  took  military  possession  of 
all  the  railroads  in  the  United  States, 
ordering  their  officers  and  servants  to 
hold  themselves  in  readiness  for  the 
transportation  of  troops  and  munitions 
of  war  to  the  exclusion  of  all  other 
business.  It  was  evident  that  the 
government  was  really  alarmed;  but 
it  was  plain  also  that  it  knew  its  duty, 
and  that  it  meant  to  perform  it. 

Jackson  had  advanced,  after  the  re- 
tirement of  Banks,  as  far  as  Harper’s 
Ferry.  There  he  became  aware  of  the 
orders  which  had  been  given  to  Mc- 
Dowell and  Fremont.  He  felt  that 
he  w'as  in  danger.  If  these  generals 
should  succeed  in  forming  a junction 
at  Strasburg  before  he  reaches  that 


350 


JACKSON’S  CAMPAIGN. 


place,  it  will  be  necessary  for  him  to 
offer  battle  to  their  combined  forces ; 
arid  the  result,  as  he  fears,  will  not 
be  favorable.  He  deemed  it  wise  to 
beat  a hasty  retreat.  Leaving  Ewell 
as  a rear-guard,  he  moved  back  from 
Harper’s  Ferry  on  the  night  of  the 
29  th  of  May.  On  the  following  night, 
IHay  with  a view  to  create  a 

false  impression,  Ewell  kept  up 
a heavy  cannonading,  and  otherwise 
acted  as  if  a severe  contest  was  going 
on.  The  night  was  favorable  for  his 
purpose.  It*  was  “intensely  dark;  the 
hills  around  were  alive  with  signal 
lights  ; the  rain  descended  in  torrents ; 
vivid  flashes  of  lightning  illuminated, 
at  intervals,  the  green  and  magnificent 
scenery,  while  the  crash  of  the  thunder, 
echoing  among  the  mountains,  threw 
into  comparative  insignificance  the  roar 
of  the  artillery.”  When  the  sun  rose 
]Way  on  the  morning  of  the  31st,  there 
3L  were  no  traces  of  any  Confede- 
rates in  the  neighborhood  of  Harper’s 
Ferry.  Ewell  was  already  far  ad- 
vanced on  his  way  to  rejoin  Jackson. 
It  was  a race,  as  if  for  sweet  life, 
both  with  Jackson  and  with  Ewell. 
In  order  to  overtake  Jackson,  whom 
he  rejoined  at  Middletown,  Ewell 
marched  in  one  day  thirty-four  miles. 
The  race  up  the  Shenandoah  Valley 
was  now  fairly  begun ; and  the  retreat 
of  Jackson  in  the  one  direction  was 
quite  as  hasty  as  that  of  Banks  had 
been  in  the  other.  Jackson,  in  fact, 
had  exhibited  even  more  celerity 
in  retreat  than  he  had  done  in  pur- 
suit. 

We  have  already  mentioned  that 


when  Fremont  reached  Strasburg  on 
the  1st  of  June,  Jackson  had  passed 
through  the  town  some  hours  before, 
and  that  the  van-guard  of  Shields’  di- 
vision, which  had  been  detached  by 
McDowell,  did  not  arrive  at  Strasburg 
until  a flay  later.  A vigorous  effort 
was  now  made  by  both  of  those  offi- 
cers to  intercept  Jackson  further  to 
the  south.  Shields  moved  vigorously 
along  the  South  Fork  of  the  Shenan- 
doah, between  the  Massanutten  and 
Blue  Bidge  Mountains,  while  Fremont, 
somewhat  in  his  rear,  and  leaning  on 
the  North  Fork,  marched  along  the 
great  turnpike  to  Harrisonburg.  The 
mountain  streams  which  flow  into  the 
Shenandoah  were  all  swollen  with  the 
heavy  rains — so  swollen  as  to  make 
it  perilous  in  most  places  to  attempt 
to  ford  them.  Jackson,  who  was 
also  on  the  South  Fork,  took  the 
precaution  of  destroying  the  bridges 
as  he  passed,  and,  by  means  of  his 
cavalry,  of  breaking  down  or  burn- 
ing all  those  in  the  openings  of  the 
Massanutten  range.  By  so  doing,  he 
greatly  retarded  the  advance  of  his 
pursuers.  On  the  5th  of  June,  June 
and  after  making  the  most  vigor- 
ous  efforts  all  along  his  line  of  march, 
he  reached  Harrisonburg.  Jackson 
now  saw  that  his  one  hope  of  safety 
was  to  cross  the  swollen  Shenandoah 
at  Port  Bepublic,  where  there  was  a 
strong  bridge.  He  would  thus  put  the 
river  between  himself  and  Fremont. 
He  would  do  more.  It  was  all-im- 
portant that  Shields,  who  was  near  at 
hand,  on  the  east  side  of  the  river, 
should  not  be  allowed  to  cross  and 


BATTLE  AT  CROSS  KEYS. 


251 


form  a junction  with  the  other  National 
army.  He  would  make  this  junction 
impossible.  With  these  ends  in  view, 
and  after  allowing  his  wearied  soldiers 
a brief  period  of  repose,  Jackson  be- 
gan to  move  from  Harrisonburg — his 
line  of  march  being  towards  the  river, 
in  a southeasterly  direction,  by  way  of 
Staunton.  Fremont’s  advance  entered 
Harrisonburg  shortly  after  Jackson  left 
it.  They  were  not  allowed  to  halt. 
Pushing  on  after  the  retreating  army, 
a body  of  cavalry,  under  Colonel  Percy 
Wyndham,  came  upon  its  rear-guard 
about  two  miles  from  Harrison bui’g. 
The  Coufederate  rear  was  covered  by 
General  Turner  Ashby’s  cavalry.  With 
the  speed  of  lightning,  Ashby  turned 
upon  the  Nationals  and  smote  them 
with  great  severity.  Wyndham  was 
captured,  together  with  some  sixty- 
three  of  his  men.  At  this  critical 
moment,  Bayard  and  Cluseret  hurried 
forward  cavalry  and  infantry.  Among 
those  engaged  were  Kane’s  Bucktail 
Rifles.  Ashby,  feeling  himself  hard 
pressed,  called  for  an  infantry  support. 
General  Stewart  rushed  to  his  aid. 
Severe  fighting  ensued.  Kane’s  rifle- 
men, after  performing  deeds  of  great 
valor,  were  driven  back  with  a loss 
of  fifty -five  men.  Kane  himself  was 
wounded  and  made  prisoner.  During 
the  brief  encounter,  in  which  both 
sides  sustained  heavy  losses,  General 
Ashby  was  killed.  His  horse  had 
been  shot  under  him ; and  he  was  dis- 
mounted when  the  fatal  bullet  entered 
his  body.  General  Ashby  was  one  of 
the  most  brilliant  generals  developed 
on  either  side  during  the  war.  His 


death  at  this  crisis  was  a great  loss  to 
the  Confederate  cause.* 

Jackson  continued  his  march  toward 
the  Shenandoah  with  the  view  of  at- 
tempting a passage  at  Port  Republic. 
In  the  meantime  he  had  left  Ewell, 
with  the  three  brigades  of  Elzy, 
Trimble  and  Stewart,  well  posted  at  a 
place  called  Cross  Keys,  near  Union 
Church,  about  seven  miles  from  Harri- 
sonburg, and  about  five  miles  from  the 
river.  Ewell’s  force  was  about  5000 
strong,  and  occupied  a ridge  which 
crossed  the  road  near  • the  church. 
There  were  on  either  side  dense  woods 
which  protected  his  flanks.  Trimble 
was  a little  in  advance,  in  the  centre; 
Stewart  was  on  the  right;  and  Elzy 
on  the  left.  On  Sunday  morn-  jnne 
ing,  the  8th  of  June,  as  early  as 
six  o’clock,  Fremont  marched  out  of 
Harrisonburg ; and  by  nine  o’clock 
he  had  his  army  arranged  in  order  of 
battle.  Schenck  was  on  the  right; 
Milroy  in  the  centre ; and  Stahl  on  the 
left.  Between  Milroy  and  Schenck  was 
Cluseret’s  brigade,  composed  of  the 
Sixtieth  Ohio  and  the  Eighth  Virginia, 
supported  by  the  Garibaldi  guard,  of 
Blenker’s  division.  Bohlen’s  brigade 
supported  Stahl ; and  the  remainder  of 
Blenker’s  division  was  held  as  a re- 

* Brigadier-General  Turner  Ashby  was  a middle-sized 
man,  handsomely  built,  and  very  active.  He  was  a dark- 
complexioned  man— had  dark  eyes  and  tine  features, 
and  was  distinguished  by  rather  a benevolent  counte- 
nance. He  was  a man  of  much  piety.  Although  not  a 
soldier  by  profession,  he  soon  gave  proof  that  he  was 
possessed  of  all  those  qualities  which  secure  distinction 
and  success  on  the  tield  of  battle.  He  was  a splendid 
horseman  ; and  he  had  done  good  service  to  the  cause 
which  he  had  represented  in  many  a hard-fought  battle. 
He  had  been  promoted  to  the  rank  of  brigadier-gene- 
ral only  three  weeks  before  his  death. 


252 


JACKSON’S  CAMPAIGN. 


serve.  The  Nationals  moved  to  the 
attack  up  the  rising  ground  under  a 
tremendous  fire.  By  eleven  o’clock 
the  battle  had  become  general.  The 
fighting  was  particularly  severe  in  the 
centre,  where,  in  spite  of  the  terrific 
fire  of  the  Confederates,  Milroy  and 
Schenck  were  gaining  ground.  For 
hours  the  battle  raged  with  great  fury, 
Milroy  and  Stahl  suffering  most  severe- 
ly. The  Eighth  New  York  alone  had 
sixty-five  killed.  On  the  Confederate 
side,  Trimble,  who  was  the  most  ex- 
posed, had  suffered  the  heaviest  loss. 
For  a time  victory  seemed  doubtful. 
After  having  been  driven  back,  the 
Nationals  again  pressed  forward ; and 
Milroy  had  already  penetrated  Ewell’s 
centre,  and  forced  his  way  up  almost 
to  his  guns.  It  was  now  four  o’clock  ; 
and  Stahl’s  troops,  at  the  supreme 
moment  when  Fremont  seemed  on  the 
point  of  grasping  victory,  giving  way, 
the  order  was  given  to  fall  back  along 
the  whole  line. 

Thus  ended  the  battle  of  Cross  Keys 
— one  of  the  best-contested,  and,  con- 
sidering the  numbers  engaged,  severest 
struggles  since  the  war  commenced. 
It  was  fought  with  great  bravery  on 
both  sides ; and  if  victory  remained 
with  the  Confederates,  it  was  because 
of  the  excellency  of  the  position  which 
they  occupied,  rather  than  because  of 
the  greater  endurance  of  their  troops, 
or  the  superior  skill  of  their  command- 
ers. On  both  sides  the  loss  was  heavy. 
It  was  particularly  severe  among  the 
National  officers.  General  Stahl  had 
five  killed  and  seventeen  wounded. 
The  Pennsylvania  Bucktails  lost  all 


their  officers — commissioned  and  non- 
commissioned. 

Both  armies  slept  on  the  ground 
which  they  occupied  in  the  morning 
before  the  battle  commenced.  Ewell 
was  prepared  to  resume  the  con-  jyn^ 
flict  on  the  morning  of  the  9th ; 
but  being  called  to  aid  Jackson  at 
Port  Republic,  he  began  to  move,  as 
soon  as  day  broke,  towards  the  Shen- 
andoah— Fremont  following  in  battle 
order.  Shields’  advance,  under  Colonel 
Carroll,  reached  Port  Republic  on  the 
8th  of  June.  There  he  found  some  of 
Jackson’s  cavalry  guard;  and  falling 
upon  them  with  great  force,  he  drove 
them  out  of  the  town  and  took  posses- 
sion of  the  bridge.  His  true  policy  at 
that  moment  would  have  been  to  burn 
the  bridge ; for  by  that  means  he 
might  have  ruined  Jackson,  by  making 
it  impossible  for  Ewell  to  come  to  his 
aid.  This,  however,  he  neglected  to 
do,  believing,  perhaps,  that  he  could 
hold  it,  and  that  it  might  still  be  use- 
ful in  enabling  the  two  National  armies 
to  form  a junction.  While  waiting 
for  the  arrival  of  his  infantry,  he  was 
joined  by  General  E.  B.  Tyler,  who 
took  command.  After  assuming  com- 
mand, Tyler  was  unwilling  to  act 
until  he  had  received  instructions  from 
Shields.  Ewell,  meanwhile,  had  man- 
aged to  escape  from  Fremont,  had 
brought  his  troops  across  the  river,  and 
had  so  strengthened  Jackson  that  the 
Confederate  had  no  reason  any  longer 
to  fear  his  enemy.  Discovering  that  an 
attempt  was  being  made  by  the  Con- 
federates in  great  strength  to  outflank 
his  left,  Tyler  made  a vigorous  show 


PORT  REPUBLIC. 


253 


of  resistance.  Counteracting  the  flank- 
ing movement  by  employing  his  whole 
force,  Tyler  drove  back  into  the  woods 
about  8000  Confederates.  The  battle 
raged  for  some  time  with  great  sever- 
ity. It  was  impossible,  however,  for 
Tyler  to  maintain  the  struggle  against 
the  fearful  odds  which  were  now  ar- 
rayed against  him.  Fremont,  when 
he  heard  the  sounds  of  battle  and  saw 
the  clouds  of  smoke,  had  hastened 
towards  Port  Republic.  When  he 
reached  the  bridge  he  found  it  in 
flames,  the  water  too  deep  to  be 
forded,  and  the  enemy  safe  beyond  his 
reach.  Tyler  had  no  choice  but  to  order 
a retreat,  which,  covered  by  Carroll  and 
his  cavalry,  was  conducted  in  good  order. 
The  Confederates  pursued  the  retreat- 
ing forces  some  five  miles,  the  “ boys 
preserving  their  places  in  the  ranks, 
and  fighting  every  inch  of  the  way.” 

Port  Republic  added  another  laurel 
to  the  victorious  wreath  which  en- 
circled the  brow  of  General  Jackson. 
His  campaign  in  the  Shenandoah  Val- 
ley bad  been  conducted  with  wonder- 
ful skill  and  with  great  success.  He 
had  not  won,  it  is  true,  any  great  vic- 
tory, but  he  certainly  enjoyed  its  fruits. 
He  had,  by  the  pursuit  of  Banks,  al- 
most threatened  the  National  capital. 
By  his  rapidity  and  dexterity  of  move- 
ment he  had  bafiled  all  the  skill  of 
three  major-generals.  At  the  last  mo- 
ment, when  he  seemed  to  be  shut  in 
between  two  forces,  he  paralyzed  Fre- 
mont with  one  blow  and  Shields  with 
another,  and  finally,  by  the  destruction 
of  the  bridge,  made  their  junction  im- 
possible. This,  however,  was  not  all. 


lie  had  diverted  large  reinforcements 
from  McClellan,  and,  while  he  had 
given  that  general  a cause  for  indulg- 
ing in  his  “masterly  inactivity,”  he 
had  otherwise  neutralized  the  influence 
of  60,000  men.  He  had  taught  the 
National  government  that  it  w^ould 
never  again  be  safe,  while  the  war 
lasted,  to  leave  Washington  unpro- 
tected. That  lesson,  taught  at  that 
time,  was  equal  to  the  adding  of  many 
thousands  of  men  to  the  Confederate 
armies. 

This  chapter  would  be  incomplete 
without  a brief  sketch  of  the  man  who 
is  really  its  hero."^ 

The  National  government  was  un- 
doubtedly primarily  to  blame  for  the 

* Thomas  Jefferson  Jackson  was  born  in  Western 
Virginia,  in  January,  1824.  His  family  was  respect- 
able ; but  in  his  boyhood  he  received  only  a limited  edu- 
cation. At  the  age  of  nineteen,  he  entered,  as  student, 
the  military  academy  of  West  Point,  where,  in  spite  of 
his  homely  dress  and  uncouth  manners,  he  distanced 
many  of  his  competitors,  taking  a prominent  place  in 
several  of  his  classes.  He  served  in  the  Mexican  War 
as  an  artillery  officer  under  Magruder,  and  acquired  the 
reputation  of  being  a good  gunner.  Toward  the  close 
of  that  war  he  was  brevetted  a major.  He  afterwards 
held  for  ten  years  the  chair  of  chemistry  at  the  military 
academy  of  Virginia,  at  Lexington.  On  the  death  of 
his  first  wife  he  visited  Europe  ; and  during  his  stay  in 
England,  he  took  great  delight  in  visiting  the  cathe- 
drals. York  Minster  being  his  special  favorite.  When 
the  Civil  War  broke  out,  he  had  married  a lady  of  a 
Northern  family;  and  it  is  said  he  was  for  some  short 
time  in  doubt  as  to  what  course  he  should  follow.  He 
had,  in  18o2,  resigned  his  rank  in  the  army.  Ultimate- 
ly he  offered  his  sword  to  his  native  State,  and  received 
a commission.  It  was  he  who  turned  the  tide  of  affairs 
at  Bull  Run,  and  secured  the  victory  for  the  Confede- 
rates. His  exploits  in  the  Shenandoah  Valley  speak  for 
themselves.  Jackson’s  life  was  destined  to  be  brief; 
but,  as  we  shall  see  while  this  history  progresses,  be 
filled  it  with  noble  deeds,  and  left  behind  him  a name 
which  the  world  will  not  willingly  let  die.  “Stonewall” 
Jackson  will  ever  be  the  symbol  of  a chivalry  equal  to 
that  of  a Bayard,  and  of  a piety  equal  to  that  of  a saint. 
In  his  life,  he  commanded  the  love  and  confidence  of 
his  men.  In  his  death,  he  was  mourned  by  the  world. 


254 


JACKSON’S  CAMPAIGN. 


humiliation  brought  upon  the  Northern 
aimies  by  Jackson’s  raid.  The  action 
at  Winchester  showed  what  could  be 
done,  even  against  such  a man,  with  a 
force  of  reasonable  strength.  It  was 
the  weakening  of  Shields,  by  the  re- 
moval of  so  many  troops  to  Centre- 
ville,  which  provoked  the  battle  of 
Winchester.  In  the  presence  of  so 
watchful  an  antagonist  as  Jackson,  the 
lesson  ought  not  to  have  been  lost. 
When,  therefore,  the  government  de- 
tached Shields  from  Banks,  and  sent 
him,  with  his  division,  to  swell  the 
army  of  McDowell,  leaving  Banks  with 
only  some  6000  men,  a grave  blunder 
was  committed.  It  was  not  possible 
for  Jackson  to  resist  the  temptation 
which  was  thus  offered.  But  for  that 
temptation,  Jackson  certainly  would 
not  at  that  time  have  ventured  to  at- 
tack Banks ; and  probably  the  famous 
race  through  the  Shenandoah  Valley 
would  never  have  taken  place.  This, 
however,  was  not  all.  The  blunder 
committed  by  the  government  had  an- 
other result.  It  hindered  the  very 
purpose  for  which  Shields  had  been 
detached  from  Banks — it  prevented 
McDowell  from  joining  McClellan  be- 
fore Richmond.  It  is  not  wonderful 
that  McDowell,  when  commanded  to 
fall  back  and  take  part  with  Banks 
and  Fremont  in  the  interception  of 
Jackson,  should  have  done  so  reluctant- 
ly, exclaiming,  with  a heavy  heart,  as 


he  repeated  the  order : It  is  a crush- 
ing blow  to  us  all.”  It  was  unfortu- 
nate that  Shields  and  Fremont  did  not 
meet  at  Strasburg ; and  the  latter  gen- 
eral, though  assuming  a responsibility 
which  success  would  have  justified,  un- 
doubtedly'made  a mistake  in  not  tak- 
ing the  route  across  the  mountains 
which  he  was  ordered  to  take.  If 
he  had  taken  the  appointed  route,  he 
might  have  intercepted  Jackson;  but 
he  might  not,  for  the  mountain  roads 
were  in  a wretched  condition,  in  con- 
sequence of  the  heavy  rains,  which 
had  soaked  the  soil  and  swollen  the 
streams.  As  it  was,  Jackson  had 
passed  through  Strasburg  only  a few 
hours  before  he  arrived.  Supposing 
Fremont  had  been  up  in  time  to  meet 
the  retreating  army,  it  is  by  no  means 
certain  that  he  could  have  hindered 
Jackson’s  onward  march.  Shields  did 
not  arrive  at  Strasburg  till  the  follow- 
ing day;  and  it  is  by  no  means  im- 
probable, judging  from  what  actually 
did  happen,  that  Jackson,  in  the 
interval,  could  have  found  time  to 
punish  Fremont  and  proceed  on  his 
journey.  Fremont  and  Shields  no 
doubt  did  their  best ; and  if  they 
were  outrun,  and  finally  defeated,  they 
had  the  satisfaction  of  knowing  that 
the  task  had  been  accomplished  by  a 
general  who  was  without  a superior, 
either  in  the  armies  of  the  South  or 
in  the  armies  of  the  North. 


ON  THE  CHICKAHOMINY. 


255 


CHAPTER  XVIII. 


The  Army  of  the  Potomac. — A Critical  Period. — McClellan  Still  on  the  Chickahominy. — Masterly  Inactivity. 
— Quiet  Siege  of  Richmond. — Stuart's  Raid. — A Confederate  Council  of  War. — McClellan's  Difficulty. — 
Fight  or  Retreat. — He  Might  Have  Fought  and  Won. — Retreat  to  the  James  River  Resolved  Upon. — The 
Confederates  Move  on  Mechanicsville. — The  Nationals  Well  Posted  at  Beaver  Dam  Creek. — The  Confede- 
rate Attack  at  Mechanicsville. — Night  Closes  the  Struggle. — The  Result  a National  Victory. — McClellan 
Hastens  his  Retreat  — The  Second  Day. — The  Nationals  Still  Well  Posted. — The  Brave  Confederates. — 
“Thundering  Hurrahs.’' — 'Repeated,  but  Vain  Attempts. — Porter  Calls  for  Help. — Slocum  Sent  to  his  Aid. 
— Porter  Again  Calls  for  Help.— Butterfield  Sorely  Pressed. — St.  George  Cooke. — A Pause. — The  Nationals 
Falling  Back  to  the  River. — Arrival  of  Meagher  and  French. — The'  Day  Saved. — White  Oak  Swamp. — The 
Confederates  Deceived. — White  House  Evacuated. — The  Pursuit. — McClellan’s  Despatch. — Savage’s  Station. 
— Fair  Oaks  Abandoned. — Battle  of  Savage’s  Station. — McClellan  at  Malvern  Hills. — The  Battle  at  White 
Oak  Swamp  Bridge. — The  Confederates  in  High  Hopes. — Grand  Massing  of  Troops. — Jackson  at  White 
Oak  Swamp  Bridge. — Frazier's  Farm. — Willis’s  Road. — Battle  of  Glendale. — Determined  Fighting  on  Both 
Sides. — Arrival  of  Hooker  and  Kearney. — A Drawn  Battle. — Meade  Wounded  and  McCall  Captured. — Inci- 
dents of  the  Two  Battles. — White  Oak  Swamp  and  Glendale. — The  Retreat  Continued. — Malvern  Hills. — A 
Strong  Position. — The  Hills  Covered  -with  Artillery  and  Infantry. — Lee's  Plan. — Hill’s  Opinion. — A Bold 
Attack  and  a Fearful  Cannonade. — The  Confederates  Repulsed. — A Lull  in  the  Fight. — The  Attack  Re- 
newed.— The  Quivering  Hills. — Terrible  Slaughter. — Hand-to-Hand  Fighting. — The  Nationals  Hold  Their 
Position. — A Fearful  Night. — The  Retreat  Continued. — Vexation  of  the  National  Officers. — Fitz  John  Porter. 
— Philip  Kearney. — The  Circumstances  Depressing. — McClellan’s  Address  to  his  Soldiers. — Address  of  Jeffer- 
son Davis  to  the  Army  of  Virginia. — Committee  of  Congress. — Heavy  Loss  of  Men. — Poor  Results. — 
McClellan  and  Lincoln. — McClellan  and  Halleck. — Correspondence. — Reluctance  of  McClellan  to  Leave 
Harrison’s  Lauding. — His  Demand  for  More  Troops. — End  of  the  Peninsular  Expedition. — Reflections. 


We  have  now  arrived  at  the  most 

1862  most  perilous, 

period  in  the  entire  history  of 
the  war.  Since  the  disastrous  battle  of 
Bull  Run,  the  National  armies  had  ex- 
perienced no  very  st  rious  reverse.  On 
the  contrary,  in  many  a hard-contested 
fight,  and  on  many  a blood-stained 
battle  field,  victory  had  rewarded  the 
bravery  and  crowned  the  efforts  of  the 
Union  troops.  In  the  West  they  had 
marched  in  triumph  from  Cairo  to  the 
neighborhood  of  Vicksburg;  and  such 
names  as  Henry  and  Donelson,  and 
Shiloh  and  Corinth,  and  Perry ville 
and  Murfreesboro  had  become  separate 
sources  of  National  pride.  Along  the 


coast  and  on  the  inland  waters,  they 
had  been  even  more  successful  than 
they  had  been  on  land ; and  it  was 
with  feelings  of  equal  pride  they 
could  reflect  that  the  entire  seaboard, 
both  of  the  Atlantic  and  of  the  Gulf, 
had  been  restored  to  Federal  authority. 
It  was  only  in  the  Peninsula  and 
over  the  army  of  the  Potomac  that 
the  cloud  of  darkness  hovered.  Here 
alone  fortune  seemed  to  be  chary  of 
her  favors. 

The  siege  of  Yorktown,  the  battle  of 
Williamsburg  and  the  battle  of  Fair 
Oaks  had  shed  but  little  lustre  on  the 
Federal  arms.  The  army  of  the  Poto- 
mac— so  imposing  in  its  strength,  so 


256 


McCLELLAN’S  RETREAT. 


splendid  in  its  equipment,  so  perfect 
in  its  training,  the  pride  of  its  chief, 
the  hope  of  the  nation — had  not  yet 
given  any  earnest  /of  the  fulfillment 
of  its  higli  promise.  We  have  fol- 
lowed it  from  Manassas  to  Yorktown, 
from  Yorktown  to  Williamsburg,  from 
AYilliamsburg  to  the  swamps  of  the 
Chickahominy ; and,  although  we  have 
no  reason  to  blame  either  officers  or 
men  for  lack  of  bravery,  we  have  seen 
precious  time  waited,  blunder  after 
blunder  committed,  and  opportunity 
after  opportunity  flung  to  the  winds 
of  heaven.  A month  had  elapsed 
since  the  battle  of  Fair  Oaks,  and  Mc- 
Clellan was  still  lying  inactive  along 
the  line  of  the  Chickahominy.  While 
he  waited  for  reinforcements,  and  oc- 
cupied himself  and  his  men  in  the 
construction  of  bridges  and  batteries, 
the  enemy  was  multiplying  his  own 
forces,  and  mightily  increasing  the  dif- 
ficulties of  the  National  commander. 
Had  McClellan  moved  on  Richmond 
immediately  after  the  battle  of  Fair 
Oaks,  the  presumption  is  that  he 
would  have  won  an  easy  victory.  As 
it  was,  he  gave  General  Jackson 
abundant  time,  after  his  brilliant  cam- 
paign in  the  valley,  to  come  up  and, 
with  his  army  of  35,000  men,  to 
join  General  Lee,  who  had  succeeded 
General  Joseph  E.  Johnston  in  the 
supreme  command.  This,  however, 
was  not  all.  Time  was  given  the  gov- 
ernment at  Richmond  to  reap  the  full 
benefit  of  the  new  Conscription  Act, 
and  to  huriy  forward,  at  the  same 
time,  detachments  from  the  West.  Mc' 
Clellan’s  army  had  no  doubt  suffered 


since  it  first  landed  on  the  Peninsula. 
The  ranks  of  the  regiments  had  been 
thinned.  Some  had  died  in  battle; 
and  not  a few  had  perished  from  the 
malarious  fevers  of  the  swamps.  De- 
tachments, too,  had  been  left  respective- 
ly at  Yorkitown  and  at  Williamsburg. 
But  he  had  been  joined  by  five  regi- 
nijiits  fi’oni  Baltimore;  General  Wool's 
disposable  force  at  Fortress  Monroe 
was  at  his  call;  McCall’s  division,  of 
McDowell’s  corps,  had  already  arrived 
from  Fredericksburg;  and  if  McDowell 
himself,  with  the  remainder  of  his 
army,  had  been  prevented  from  coming 
to  his  aid,  McClellan  had  the  less  rea- 
son to  complain  that  his  own  dilatory 
conduct  had  given  Stonewall  Jackson 
the  opportunity  of  teaching  the  Fede- 
ral authorities  the  propriety  of  securely 
guarding  the  National  capital.  A vail 
of  mystery  hangs  over  some  of  the 
doings  of  this  period;  and  it  may  be 
that  there  are  some  things  which  will 
yet  find  a fuller  explanation ; but  in  the 
meantime,  with  all  the  light  we  now 
enjoy,  the  evidence  seems  conclusive 
that  McClellan  sacrificed  his  chances 
by  his  habitual  caution,  or  rather  by 
his  incorrigible  habit  of  delay. 

The  National  army  was  strongly 
fortified  on  the  Chickahominy.  The 
left  wdiig  w^as  on  the  south  of  that 
stream,  between  White  Oak  Swamp 
and  New  Bridge.  The  roads  towards 
Richmond  were  commanded  by  heavy 
guns.  The  right  wing  was  north  of 
the  Chickahominy,  and  extended  be- 
yond Mechanicsville.  Several  solid 
bridsres  had  been  thrown  over  the 
stream,  thereby  bringing  the  two 


HANOVER  COURT  HOUSE. 


257 


wings  into  easier  communication.  The 
one  fault  of  McClellan’s  arrangement 
was  that  his  line  was  too  long,  and, 
consequently,  greatly  attenuated.  The 
Confederates  were  not  slow  to  dis- 
cover this  weakness  of  their  adversary. 
June  1^6  1^^^  June,  General  J. 

E.  B.  Stuart,  with  some  1500  cav- 
alry and  four  pieces  of  horse  artillery, 
made  a bold  dash  on  the  National 
right,  and,  after  some  severe  fight- 
ing at  Hanover  Court  House,  swept 
around  the  entire  army,  working  terri- 
ble destruction,  and  capturing  1G5 
prisoners  and  260  mules  and  horses. 
After  resting  three  hours  at  Talley s- 
ville,  he  returned  next  morning  to 
Richmond,  unopposed.  This  audacious 
movement  of  Stuart  actually  created 
great  commotion  in  the  army  of  the 
’Potomac.  For  some  days  more  all 
was  quiet  on  the  Chickahominy.  On 
June  25th  of  June  the  army,  then 
25*  numbering  115,000  men  present 
for  duty,  heard  with  delight  that  they 
were  to  be  led  out  of  the  pestilential 
swamps.  On  that  day  a forward 
movement  was  made  by  Heintzelman’s 
corps,  with  a part  of  Keyes’  and 
Sumner’s,  on  the  Williamsburg  Road. 
At  a place  called  Oak  Grove  the 
enemy  was  encountered  in  considerable 
strength,  when  a severe  fight  ensued, 
the  Nationals  losing  some  516  men  in 
killed  and  wounded.  The  coveted 
point  was  gained,  but  it  was  not  to  be 
turned  to  much  account.  On  that  very 
night  the  unwelcome  tidings  arrived 
that  Stonewall  Jackson  was  at  Han- 
June  c)ver  Court  House.  On  the  fol- 
26.  lowing  morning  the  advance  was 


recalled ; and  for  the  army  of  the  Po- 
tomac there  was  something  else  to  do 
than  to  march  in  triumph  to  the  Con- 
federate capital. 

On  the  same  day  on  which  the  above- 
mentioned  encounter  took  place,  June 
a Confederate  council  of  war  was  25. 
held,  and  it  was  resolved  that,  as  the 
Confederate  lines  around  the  city  were 
now  completed,  the  greater  portion  of 
the  army  might  now  be  spared  for  a 
forward  movement  on  the  National  line. 
Jackson  was  to  cross  to  the  north  of 
the  Chickahominy,  and  move  on  the 
right  flank  of  the  National  army ; and 
in  the  event  of  McDowell  remaining 
inactive  at  Fredericksburg,  a general 
and  simultaneous  attack  was  to  be 
made  along  McClellan’s  whole  line. 
The  National  army  was  now  in  a peril- 
ous position.  It  was  evident  that  the 
object  was  to  cut  McClellan  off  from 
his  communications  with  the  York 
River.  He  must  either  retreat  or  give 
battle  out  of  his  intrench ments.  Mc- 
Clellan had  now  to  resolve  what  he 
would  do.  There  was  no  time  for  de- 
lay. His  decision  was  quickly  taken. 
The  bridge  which  he  had  thrown  across 
the  Chickahominy  gave  him  the  oppor- 
tunity of  throwing  over  either  wing  to 
the  assistance  of  the  other.  He  might 
concentrate  on  the  north  side  or  the 
south  side,  as  he  thought  fit.  But  if 
he  concentrated  on  the  north  bank,  it 
implied  an  abandonment  of  the  idea  of 
capturing  Richmond,  and  exposed  him 
to  the  risk  of  an  unsupported  retreat 
to  Yorktown.  If  he  concentrated  on 
the  south  bank,  he  lost  his  communica- 
tions with  White  House,  and  he  would 


258 


McClellan’S  retreat. 


have  to  execute  the  perilous  operation 
of  changing  his  base  by  a flank  move- 
ment It  was  seventeen  miles  from 
Fair  Oaks  to  James  River,  and  there 
was  only  one  road — a road  which  was 
exposed  to  many  others  radiating  from 
Richmond.  The  southern  movement 
had  this  one  advantage:  that  since  the 
destruction  of  the  Merrimac,  the  James 
River  was  open,  and  some  transports 
had  already  found  their  way  to  City 
Point.  The  movement  to  James  River 
was  determined  upon ; and  arrange- 
ments for  a retreat  were  made  at  once. 
Happily,  the  only  bridges  in  possession 
of  the  Confederates  were  about  ten 
miles  above,  at  Mechanicsville.  As 
the  Confederates  must  needs  go  round 
by  that  way,  time  would  be  gained  by 
the  Nationals  to  make  good  their  re- 
treat to  Harrison’s  Landing,  where 
they  would  come  under  the  shelter  of 
the  gunboats.  Military  writers  have 
expressed  the  opinion  that  a more 
daring  general  might,  by  a judicious 
concentration  of  his  troops  on  the 
south  side  of  the  Chickahominy,  have 
marched  in  triumph  to  Richmond.  It 
is  true  that  the  Confederate  capital 
was  left  comparatively  unprotected ; 
and  it  is  undeniable  that  the  bravery 
of  the  troops  and  the  skill  of  the 
officers,  from  the  commander-in-chief 
downward,  as  displayed  in  the  retreat, 
encourage  the  belief  that  if  the  at- 
tempt had  been  made,  it  might  have 
resulted  in  complete  success.  Such  a 
course,  however,  necessarily  implied 
a great  risk.  Defeat  was  not  impossi- 
ble ; and  defeat  in  such  circumstances 
would  have  been  ruinous  to  the  Na- 


tional army.  True  to  his  instincts, 
faithful  to  the  character  which  he  had 
already  established,  McClellan  ch(5se, 
as  might  have  been  predicted,  the  less 
hazardous  course. 

On  the, afternoon  of  the  26th  began 
that  series  of  engagements  which  June 
culminated  in  retreat — a retreat  26. 
which,  whether  regard  be  had  to  the 
protracted  character  of  the  struggle, 
the  severity  of  the  fighting,  or  the  skill 
with  which  it  was  conducted,  must 
be  considered  one  of  the  most  memo- 
rable in  history.  Shortly  after  two 
o’clock  on  that  day,  the  Confederate 
general,  A.  P.  Hill,  crossed  to  the 
north  side  of  the  Chickahominy  and 
moved  on  Mechanicsville.  The  right 
wing  of  McClellan’s  army  which,  as 
we  have  seen,  stretched  beyond  Me- 
chanicsville, was  under  the  command 
of  General  Fitz  John  Porter,  and  con- 
sisted of  the  divisions  of  Morell,  Sykes 
and  McCall.  McClellan  had  long  be- 
fore seen  and  recogriiz-d  the  strategic 
importance  of  Beaver  Dam  Creek,  near 
Mechanicsville.  The  place  was  natu- 
rally strong ; and  its  strength  had  been 
increased  by  some  rifle-pits  and  abatis. 
Here  were  posted  McCall’s  Pennsylva- 
nia reserves,  8500  strong,  with  five 
batteries.  The  batteries  were  so  dis- 
posed as  to  command  the  stream  and 
the  open  fields  beyond,  through  which 
the  Confederates  must  approach.  In 
the  face  of  a heavy  fire  from  the  bat- 
teries and  from  the  infantry.  Hill’s 
brigades,  followed  by  those  of  Long- 
street,  advanced  to  the  attack.  They 
fell  with  tremendous  force  upon  Mc- 
Call’s division.  Making  but  little  im- 


MECHANICSVILLE. 


259 


pression  at  first,  they  massed  and  fell 
successively  on  his  right  and  on  his 
left,  doing  terrible  damage ; but  it  was 
all  of  no  avail.  The  Nationals  stood 
firm.  McCall,  receiving  some  effective 
aid  from  Martindale  and  Griffin,  of  the 
division  of  Morell,  and  his  orders  be- 
ing admirably  carried  out  by  Generals 
Reynolds  and  Seymour,  repelled  the 
enemy  at  every  point.  From  their 
superior  position,  the  National  guns  did 
terrible  execution.  The  battle  lasted 
until  nine  o’clock,  when  the  Confede- 
rates were  driven  back  with  a loss  of 
1500  men.  The  National  loss  was 
trifling;  and,  at  the  close  of  the  fight, 
McClellan’s  men  were  in  full  posses- 
sion of  every  point  of  the  battle  field. 
The  fight  of  the  26th  is  known  as  the 
battle  of  Mechanicsville. 

McClellan  had  won  the  battle  of  Me- 
chanicsville ; but  he  felt,  even  more 
than  before,  the  necessity  of  making 
a hurried  retreat  to  the  James  River. 
Jackson  had  at  last  come  up.  He  had 
already  crossed  Beaver  Dam  Creek  ; 
and  he  was  moving  down  towards  the 
National  right.  McClellan  could  no 
longer  doubt  that  it  was  Lee’s  inten- 
tion to  cut  him  off  from  his  communi- 
cations at  the  White  House.  Retreat, 
in  his  judgment,  must  be  commenced 
at  once ; and,  in  his  own  words,  ‘‘  to 
that  end,  from  the  evening  of  the  26th, 
every  energy  of  the  army  was  bent.” 
Quarter-master  Ingalls  was  ordered  to 
forward  the  stores  and  munitions  of  war 
to  Savage’s  Station,  to  burn  what  he 
could  not  remove,  and  to  do  his  utmost 
to  have  supplies  sent  up  the  James. 
Having  sent  his  wounded  also  to  Sa- 


vage’s Station,  he  prepared  to  cross 
the  Chickahominy  with  his  right  wing, 
for  the  flight.  During  the  night  most 
of  the  heavy  guns  and  wagons  were 
thrown  across  the  river,  and  shortly 
before  dawn  the  troops  were  skilfully 
withdrawn  to  a strong  position  near 
Gaines’  Mills,  between  Cool  Arbor  and 
the  Chickahominy.  There,  in  the  form 
of  an  arc  of  a circle,  the  left  resting 
on  the  Chickahominy,  the  right  to- 
wards Cool  Arbor,  and  covering  the 
two  bridges — Woodbury’s  and  Alex- 
ander’s— the  Fifth  corps  on  the  jnne 
morning  of  the  27th  awaited  the  27. 
attack.  Some  of  the  siege  guns  were 
yet  in  position  there ; and  those  which 
had  been  taken  over  the  stream  were 
planted  so  as  to  cover  the  approaches 
to  the  bridges.  Morell ’s  division  was 
on  the  left;  and  Sykes’  division  of 
Regulars  and  Duryea’s  Zouaves  were 
on  the  right,  extending  towards  Cool 
Arbor.  The  extreme  point  of  the 
right  wing,  which  rested  on  a swamp 
on  the  Cool  Arbor  Road,  was  held 
by  Battery  I,  Fifth  United  States  ar- 
tillery, Captain  J.  H.  Weed.  Mean- 
while, Stoneman  had  been  sent  to  the 
White  House  with  a column  of  cavalry, 
to  evacuate  the  depot  and  to  destroy 
there  what  could  not  be  used. 

About  noon  the  Confederates  were 
discovered  approaching  in  force,  under 
A.  P.  Hill ; and  soon  the  artillery 
opened  a heavy  fire.  Sykes  was  the 
first  to  feel  the  severity  of  the  ene- 
my’s attack ; but  he  rose  upon  them 
in  his  might  and  hurled  them  back  in 
confusion,  and  with  heavy  loss.  Long- 
street  n©w  came  forward  to  the  relief 


260 


McCLELLAN’S  RETREAT. 


of  Hill.  His  first  intention  was  to 
make  a feint  on  Porter’s  left;  but  the 
situation  was  too  serious;  and  he  was 
compelled  to  make  a real  attack,  or  do 
nothing  at  all.  He  resolved,  therefore, 
to  carry  the  heights  on  which  the 
Nationals  were  posted;  and  while  he 
was  preparing  to  do  so,  Jackson  and 
E).  H.  Hill  arrived  and  took  positions. 
The  order  w^as  now  given  for  the  whole 
Confederate  line  to  advance,  except 
the  right  wing  under  Magruder,  which 
was  confronting  McClellan  on  the  right 
bank  of  the  Chickahominy.  The  brave 
masses  rushed,  with  ‘thundering  hur- 
rahs,” upon  the  musketry  of  Porter’s 
troops ; and  whole  ranks  went  down 
under  the  terrible  fire.  After  a tre- 
mendous struggle,  in  which  the  Con- 
federates vainly  attempted  to  get  pos- 
session of  the  rising  ground  on  which 
the  Nationals  were  posted,  the  former 
began  to  give  way.  They  were  al- 
ready falling  back  in  disorder.  At 
this  critical  juncture.  General  Cobb 
appeared  on  the  field  with  his  legion, 
together  with  the  Fourteenth  Virginia 
and  the  Nineteenth  North  Carolina,  and 
vainly  attempted  to  renew  the  fight. 
His  legion  was  sent  rolling  back  in 
broken  fragments  from  the  charge ; 
and  the  Nineteenth  North  Carolina 
lost  eight  standard  bearers,  with  most 
of  their  officers  killed  or  wounded. 

At  two  o’clock.  Porter,  feeling  the 
pressure  which  was  brought  to  bear 
upon  him,  sent  to  McClellan  for  rein- 
forcements. McClellan,  dreading  the 
army  under  Magruder  in  his  immediate 
front,  could  only  spare  Slocum’s  divi- 
sion, of  Franklin’s  corps.  He  did  not 


know  that  Magruder  had  not  more 
than  25,000  to  oppose  to  his  60,000, 
all  of  whom  were  well  entrenched. 
Slocum  arrived  about  half-past  three, 
when  the  battle  was  raging  most  fierce- 
ly. Porfer’s  force  now  amounted  to 
35,000  men.  For  hours  afterwards  the 
fighting  was  desperate,  and  the  issue 
doubtful.  The  Confederates  continued 
to  hurl  brigade  after  brigade  against 
the  National  line ; but  tliey  came  up, 
one  after  another,  only  to  be  broken 
like  the  angry  waves  on  the  rock- 
bound  shore.  Later  in  the  day  Porter 
again  sent  for  reinforcements  ; and  the 
brigades  of  French  and  Meagher,  of 
Richardson’s  division,  were  sent  to  his 
aid.  They  arrived  just  in  time.  Jack- 
son,  with  the  divisions  of  Longstreet 
and  Whiting,  had  fallen  with  terrific 
energy  on  the  National  left.  With 
fierce  yells  they  crossed  the  interven- 
ing swamp,  and  rushed  up  to  the  very 
muzzles  of  Porter’s  guns.  Cut  down 
like  grass  before  the  scythe,  the  surviv- 
ors nevertheless  still  pressed  forward 
over  the  dead  bodies  of  their  comrades. 
It  seemed  as  if  nothing  could  check  their 
advance.  Butterfield’s  gallant  brigade, 
which  had  been  repelling  the  heaviest 
attacks  of  the  Confederates  for  more 
than  an  hour  without  any  assistance, 
was  no  longer  able  to  resist  those  furi- 
ous onsets.  Sorely  pressed,  it  yielded, 
and  fell  back  to  the  woods.  By  this 
movement,  the  batteries  of  Allen, 
Weedon,  Hart  and  Edwards  were  left 
exposed.  In  spite  of  a most  heroic  re- 
sistance, they,  too,  were  forced  to  fall 
back,  with  the  loss  of  several  guns. 
At  five  o’clock.  Porter  reported  his 


GAINES’  MILL. 


261 


position  as  critical.  His  opponents 
had  now  double  his  streno:th.  At  this 
supreme  moment  an  untoward  circum- 
stance aggravated  the  difficulties  of  his 
position.  Porter  was  calling  up  all  his 
reserved  artillery — about  eighty  guns 
in  all — and  was  effectually  covering 
the  retreat  of  his  infantry,  when  Gen- 
eral St.  George  Cooke,  acting  without 
orders,  attacked  the  Confederates  on 
their  flank  with  his  cavalry,  repulsing 
them  in  great  disorder.  His  horses, 
terrified  by  the  roar  of  two  hundred 
guns  and  the  shrill,  sharp  sounds  of 
thousands  of  muskets,  rushed  back 
through  the  Union  batteries,  giving 
the  impression  that  it  was  an  attack 
of  Confederate  cavalry,  and  producing 
all  the  effects  of  a panic.  But  for  this 
unhappy  circumstance,  Porter  might 
have  been  able  to  hold  the  field  and 
get  all  his  guns  across  the  river.  As 
it  was,  his  entire  force  was  pressing 
towards  the  bridges,  the  Confederates, 
in  great  force,  close  upon  their  heels. 
It  had  almost  become  a rout.  At  this 
extreme  moment,  when  all  seemed  lost, 
the  brigades  of  French  and  Meagher, 
who  had  crossed  from  the  other  side, 
came  rushing  up  from  the  bridges  and 
dashed  to  the  front.  Wild  hurrahs 
rent  the  air  as  they  appeared  on  the 
field.  The  retreating  Nationals  halted 
and  re-formed.  The  Confederates,  see- 
ing fresh  troops,  and  ignorant  of  their 
number,  paused,  and  rested  on  the 
field  they  had  won.  It  was  now  after 
sunset;  and  darkness  soon  fell  upon 
the  scene  of  carnage.  Such  was  the 
battle  of  Gaines’  Mill.  Prodigies  of 
valor  were  performed  by  both  armies. 


Weed’s  battery,  above  referred  to,  was 
under  fire  for  eight  and  a half  hours ; 
and  it  was  only  when  some  of  the 
guns  were  disabled,  and  when  pressed 
by  the  overwhelming  masses  of  the 
enemy,  that  the  position  was  aban- 
doned. On  both  sides  the  losses  were 
heavy.  The  Confederate  loss  must 
have  been  great;  for  in  Jackson’s  corps 
alone  there  were  589  killed  and  2671 
wounded.  McClellan’s  loss  was  9000 
men  and  twenty-two  guns. 

Although  he  had  suffered  severely, 
and  been  driven  from  his  position. 
Porter  had  yet  won  a substantial  vic- 
tory. He  had  accomplished  the  great 
purpose  for  which  he  fought.  He  was 
still  master  of  the  position  in  front 
of  the  bridges.  During  the  night, 
carried  his  thinned  and  exhausted  regi- 
ments across  the  Chickahominy,  and 
destroyed  the  bridges  in  his  rear.  It 
was  found  impossible  to  care  for  the 
dead  and  the  seriously  wounded ; and 
a few  guns  and  some  prisoners  were 
left  behind.  McClellan  applied  his 
whole  energies  more  and  more  towards 
the  successful  accomplishment  of  his 
retreat.  Flight,  not  fight,  was  now 
his  fixed  purpose.  General  Keyes  was 
ordered  forward  to  take  possession  of 
the  road  across  the  White  Oak  Swamp, ^ 
and  of  all  communicatory  approaches. 
By  noon  of  the  28th  Keyes  was  juue* 
in  the  position  prescribed.  Dur-  28. 
ing  the  day  Porter  and  McCall,  with; 
their  shattered  bands,  took  positions 
on  the  roads  leading  from  Bichmond  to* 
White  Oak  Swamp  and  Long  Bridge. 
Sumner  and  Heintzelman,  with  Smith’s, 
division,  of  Franklin’s  corps,  formed 


262 


McClellan’S  eetreat. 


an  interior  line,  guarding  the  Rich- 
mond roads.  Slocum’s  division  was 
left  as  a reserve  at  Savage’s  Station. 
While  the  troops  were  in  this  posi- 
tion, 5000  wagons,  a siege  train,  a 
herd  of  2500  oxen  and  vast  quantities 
of  material  were  successfully  moved 
across  the  swamp,  on  the  way  towards 
the  James  River. 

It  was  not  until  the  afternoon  of  the 
28th  that  the  Confederates  fully  under- 
stood the  situation.  They  had  sup- 
posed, from  the  manner  in  which  the 
ground  had  been  vacated,  that  McClel- 
Ian  had  been  cut  oif  from  his  line  of 
retreat  ; and  the  capture  or  destruction 
of  the  entire  National  army  was  re- 
garded as  certain.  The  Confederates 
were  wild  with  delight.  The  day  was 
spent  in  burying  the  dead  and  caring 
for  the  wounded.  A demonstration 
was  made  towards  White  House,  where 
it  w'as  expected  immense  stores  of  all 
kinds  would  be  found.  But  Stoneman 
and  Emory  had  already  done  their 
work,  and  proceeded  by  way  of  York- 
town  to  rejoin  the  army  on  the  James 
River.  In  place,  therefore,  of  finding 
rich  and  abundant  supplies  at  White 
House,  the  Confederates  found  nothing 
but  blackened  ruins.  What  the  Na- 
tionals had  not  been  able  to  carry  off, 
they  had  committed  to  the  flames. 
When  the  state  of  things  at  White 
House  was  reported  to  General  Lee,  he 
at  once  comprehended  the  situation. 
McClellan,  he  knew,  was  on  his  way 
to  the  James  River,  to  form  a junction 
with  the  fleet.  Singularly  enough,  it 
does  not  appear  that  the  plan  of.  re- 
treat conceived  and  carried  out  by 


McClellan  had,  up  to  that  moment, 
entered  the  minds  of  the  Confederate 
leaders.  When  it  became  known  to 
them,  they  did  not  dream  of  the  pos- 
sibility of  its  success.  It  was  their 
decided  conviction  that,  as  he  had  been 
driven  from  all  his  strongholds  on  the 
north  side  of  the  Chickahominy,  and 
been  cut  off  from  all  communications 
with  White  House,  his  base  of  sup- 
plies, the  Chickahominy  in  his  rear, 
and  the  divisions  of  Magruder,  Long- 
street  and  Huger  in  his  front,  it  would 
be  impossible  for  the  National  com- 
mander to  save  his  army.  Arrange- 
ments were  made  at  once  for  a vigorous 
pursuit. 

McClellan,  not  unnaturally,  was 
greatly  elated  by  the  success  which 
had  so  far  attended  the  retreat.  His 
despatch  to  the  secretary  of  war,  bear- 
ing date  June  28th,  was  boastful  and 
extravagant.  He  truly  declared  that 
no  one  need  blush  for  the  army  of  the 
Potomac.  It  was  a little  absurd,  how- 
ever, for  him  to  say,  considering  the 
many  opportunities  he  had  flung  away, 
that  with  10,000  additional  men  he 
could  take  Richmond  to-morrow ; and 
surely  his  better  sense  had  deserted 
him  when  he  allowed  himself  to  write 
to  the  secretary  of  war:  ‘‘If  I save  this 
army  now,  I tell  you  plainly  that  I 
owe  no  thanks  to  you  or  to  any  other 
person  in  Washington.  You  have  done 
your  best  to  sacrifice  this  army.” 

McClellan  had  spent  the  whole  of 
the  28th  at  Savage’s  Station,  superin- 
tending the  retreat,  and  so  disposing 
his  troops  as  effectually  to  block  the 
1 way  of  his  pursuers.  Early  on  the 


SAVAGE’S  STATION. 


263 


June  raorning  of  tbe  29th,  he  caused 
29.  to  be  destroyed  all  that  could 
not  be  carried  away  from  the  camps. 
A complete  railroad  train,  locomotive, 
tender  and  cars,  which  had  been  left 
on  the  track,  the  cars  filled  with  sup- 
plies and  shells,  was  turned  loose,  and 
went  rolling  headlong  over  the  broken 
bridge  into  the  Chickahominy.  The 
train  had  been  set  on  fire  at  starting ; 
and,  as  car  after  car  went  crashing 
over  the  broken  bridge,  the  shells 
bursting  in  rapid  succession,  added 
grandeur  to  the  work  of  destruction. 
This  done,  the  general-in-chief  moved 
across  the  White  Oak  Swamp  towards 
the  front  of  his  retreating  columns. 
About  the  same  hour  that  McClellan 
left  Savage’s  Station,  Lee  commenced 
his  pursuit.  In  the  race,  McClellan 
had  the  advantage  of  twenty-four  hours. 
Magruder  and  Huger,  who,  as  we  have 
seen,  were  posted  south  of  the  Chick- 
ahominy and  in  front  of  the  works  at 
Fair  Oaks,  were  ordered  to  push  along 
the  Williamsburg  and  Charles  City 
Roads;  Longstreet  and  Hill  were  to 
cross  the  Chickahominy  at  New  Bridge; 
and  Jackson  was  to  cross  at  the  Grape 
Vine  Bridge,  and  sweep  down  the 
right  bank  of  the  river.  Provision  was 
thus  made  to  intercept  the  retreating 
army  if  possible ; and,  in  any  case,  to 
fall  with  great  force  on  both  fianks, 
and  on  the  rear.  Magruder,  as  he 
moved  along  the  Williamsburg  Turn- 
l)ike,  found  that  the  works  at  Fair  Oaks 
liad  been  abandoned.  Sumner  and 
Ileintzelman,  with  Smith’s  division,  of 
Franklin’s  corps,  had  fallen  back  to- 
ward Savage’s  Station.  Made  aware 


of  the  approach  of  Magruder,  Sumner 
prepared  to  offer  resistance.  The  di- 
visions of  Richardson  and  Sedgwick 
were  formed  on  the  right  of  the  rail- 
road— Sedgwick’s  right  touching  Heint- 
zelman’s  left.  Magruder  fell  with 
great  fury  on  Sedgwick  as  early  as 
nine  o’clock,  but  he  was  compelled  to 
fall  back.  Unfortunately  at  this  stage 
Heintzelman,  giving  way  to  some  mis- 
apprehension of  the  orders  given  him, 
moved  towards  White  Oak  Swamp, 
and  crossed  the  bridge,  thus  leaving  a 
gap  of  some  three-quarters  of  a mile 
between  Sumner  and  Smith.  ' Magru- 
der saw  his  opportunity;  and,  after 
some  manoeuvreing,  rushed  upon  the 
Nationals  with  tremendous  violence. 
The  brigades  of  Generals  Burns,  Brooke 
and  Hancock  were  soon  engaged.  The 
New  York  Sixty-Ninth  came  to  their 
aid;  while  splendid  service  was  ren- 
dered by  the  batteries  of  Pettit,  Osborn 
and  Bramhall,  who  promptly  took 
part  in  the  action.  Magruder  was  thus 
kept  at  bay,  the  National  troops  hold- 
ing their  ground  until  darkness  fell 
upon  the  scene  and  made  an  end  of  the 
battle.  Magruder  had  counted  with 
confidence  on  being  joined  by  Jackson, 
but  that  officer  had  been  too  long  de- 
layed in  rebuilding  Grape  Vine  Bridge. 
During  the  night  Sumner,  leaving  be- 
hind him  in  the  hospitals  some  2500 
sick  and  wounded,  moved  towards 
White  Oak  Swamp ; and  before  sun- 
rise on  the  following  morning,  the  Na- 
tional troops  had  passed  over  White 
Oak  Bridge,  and  the  bridge  had  been 
destroyed.  Over  this  one  bridge  had 
passed  almost  the  entire  army  of  the 


364 


MCCLELLAN’S  RETREAT. 


Potomac,  witL  all  its  trains  and  herds 
of  cattle.  By  its  destruction,  a fresh 
obstacle  was  placed  in  the  way  of  the 
pursuing  army.  The  fight  of  the  29th 
is  known  as  the  battle  of  Savage’s 
Station.  The  one  sad  feature  of  the 
day  was  the  leaving  behind  so  many 
sick  and  wounded.  It  was  one  of  those 
terrible  necessities  which  bring  out  into 
striking  relief  the  horrors  of  war. 

On  Monday  morning,  the  30th  of 
June  June,  McClellan  had  reached 
Malvern  Hills.  This  is  “ an  ele- 
vated plateau,  cleared  of  timber,  about 
a mile  and  a half  long  by  three-fourths 
of  a mile  wide,  with  several  converg- 
ing roads  running  over  it.  In  front 
are  numerous  defensible  ravines,  the 
ground  sloping  gradually  toward  the 
north  and  east  to  the  woodland,  giv- 
ing clear  ranges  for  the  artillery  in 
those  directions.  Towards  the  north- 
west, the  plateau  falls  off  more  abrupt- 
ly to  a ravine  which  extends  to  James 
River.  From  the  position  of  the  ene- 
my, his  most  obvious  lines  of  attack 
were  from  the  direction  of  Richmond 
and  White  Oak  Swamp,  and  would 
almost  of  necessity  strike  the  Na- 
tional army  on  its  left  wing.”  This 
place  McClellan  regarded  as  the  key  to 
his  contemplated  new  position.  Here, 
therefore,  in  the  mansion  house  of  the 
estate,  he  established  his  headquarters ; 
and  here  he  resolved  to  mass  his  troops 
and  collect  his  artillery.  He  lost  no 
time  in  establishing  communication 
between  the  army  and  the  gunboats, 
which  were  in  charge  of  Commodore 
Rodgers.  Meanwhile  a large  part  of 
^he  army,  having  emerged  from  White 


Oak  Swamp,  were  beginning  to  appear 
on  the  high,  open  ground  of  Malvern 
Hills,  the  van  reaching  as  far  forward 
as  Turkey  Bend.  It  was  not,  however, 
without  a severe  struggle  that  this 
position  ihad  been  gained.  The  morn- 
ing of  the  30th  was  exceedingly  hot; 
but  there  was  to  be  no  rest  for  the 
weary  and  foot-sore  men  on  either 
side.  The  retreating  army  must  con- 
tinue its  retreat : the  pursuing  army 
must  continue  its  pursuit.  Generals 
Sumner  and  Franklin  were  left  to  act 
as  a rear-guard,  and  to  hold  the  pas- 
sage of  White  Oak  Swamp  Biidge. 
General  Heintzelman,  with  the  divi- 
sions of  Hooker,  Kearney,  Sedgwick 
and  McCall,  took  a position  at  the  point 
of  intersection  of  the  roads  which  lead 
from  Richmond,  called  Charles  City 
Cross  Roads.  The  Confederates  re- 
sumed the  advance  the  following  morn- 
ing. Generals  D.  H.  Hill,  Whitney 
and  Ewell,  with  their  divisions,  un- 
der command  of  Jackson,  had  crossed 
the  Chickahominy  by  the  Grape  Vine 
Bridge,  and  followed  the  retreating 
Nationals  by  the  Williamsburg  Road 
and  Savage’s  Station.  Generals  Long- 
street  and  A.  P.  Hill  had  crossed  at 
New  Bridge,  and,  having  moved  around 
the  head  of  the  swamp,  made  a rapid 
march  down  the  Central  Road,  in  the 
hope  of  being  able  to  strike  McClel- 
lan’s flank.  Meanwhile,  Magruder  and 
Huger  had  been  marching  on  a parallel 
line  with  Longstreet  along  the  New 
Market  Road.  The  Confederates  were 
in  high  hopes  that  they  would  be  able 
to  penetrate  McClellan’s  line;  and  to 
make  matters  absolutely  certain,  a bri- 


WHITE  OAK  SWAMP  AND  GLENDALE. 


265 


gade  had  been  ordered  to  come  across 
the  James  River  from  Fort  Darling. 
It  was  expected  that  at  least  80,000 
Confederates  would  be  brought  into 
action ; and  Jefferson  Davis  had  come 
on  from  Richmond  to  witness  the  cap- 
ture or  destruction  of  the  army  of  the 
Potomac.  About  noon  Jackson  came 
up  to  White  Oak  Swamp  and  found 
the  bridge  destroyed.  Sumner  and 
Franklin  were  there  in  force.  A fierce 
artillery  fight  commenced  at  once.  It 
lasted  during  the  entire  day,  the  Con- 
federates massing  their  forces  and  put- 
ting forth  almost  superhuman  efforts 
to  force  a passage.  It  was  found  to 
be  impossible,  however,  to  make  any 
lieadway  against  the  batteries  of  Ayres 
and  Hazard.  During  the  struggle 
Hazard  was  mortally  wounded,  and 
his  force  was  so  cut  up  that  his  bat- 
tery had  to  be  withdrawn.  Ayres 
continued  the  fire  without  intermission 
until  night  closed  upon  the  scene.  The 
Confederates  failed  in  their  purpose 
to  force  a passage  across  the  swamp. 
During  the  night  the  Nationals  retired, 
leaving  on  the  ground  some  350  sick 
and  wounded,  and  several  disabled 
guns. 

While  the  contest  was  raging  at  the 
broken  bridge,  and  the  Confederates 
were  prevented  from  crossing  or  making 
any  attempt  at  reconstruction,  another 
and  even  more  fearful  battle  was  raging 
in  another  direction,  although  at  no  great 
distance.  Later  on  the  same  day,  about 
four  o’clock  in  the  afternoon,  Longstreet 
and  A.  P.  Hill,  who  had  been  waiting 
for  Magruder  and  Huger,  fell  upon 
Heintzelman  and  his  forces  at  the  point 


where  the  Long  Bridge  Road  intersects 
the  Quaker  or  Willis  Road,  not  far 
from  Willis  Church.  There  were  two 
farms  in  the  immediate  neighborhood, 
one  called  Frazier’s  and  the  other  called 
Nelson’s,  both  of  which  have  given 
names  to  the  battle.  The  Nationals 
were  strongly  posted,  their  heavy  guns 
particularly  being  in  good  position. 
Longstreet  having  been  called  away, 
the  Confederate  command  devolved 
upon  A.  P.  Hill.  It  seemed  to  be 
Hill’s  intention  to  drive  the  Nationals 
before  him  by  the  first  onslaught. 
Massing  his  forces,  therefore,  on  he 
came,  as  if  with  the  speed  of  the 
whirlwind  and  the  force  of  the  ava- 
lanche. He  had  not  properl}^  reckoned 
regarding  his  foe.  A terrific ' shower 
of  artillery  and  musketry  decimated 
his  ranks  and  threw  his  troops  into 
disorder.  The  crushing  blow  dealt  by 
the  Confederates  fell  most  heavily 
upon  McCall.  His  division — the  Penn- 
sylvania Reserves — originally  10,000 
strong,  had  been  reduced  since  he 
reached  the  Pamunkey  to  6000.  But 
the  men  were  in  excellent  trim,  and 
full  of  spirit.  Colonel  Simmons,  with 
the  Fifth,  Eighth,  Ninth  and  Tenth 
Reserves,  rushed  upon  the  Confederates, 
when  reeling  and  broken  under  the 
terrific  fire,  driving  them  back  to  the 
woods  and  making  200  of  them  pris- 
oners. Lee  hurried  forward  reinforce- 
ments; and  the  victorious  Nationals 
were  driven  back  to  their  original 
ground  with  terrible  slaughter,  Sim- 
mons himself  being  mortally  wounded. 
For  two  hours  more  the  battle  rasred, 
victoiy  yielding  now  to  the  one  side 


266 


McCLELLAITS  RETREAT. 


and  now  to  the  other.  It  seemed  to 
be  the  determined  purpose  of  the  Con- 
federates to  break  the  National  line 
and  to  capture  its  batteries.  At  one 
time  Cooper’s  battery  in  the  centre 
was  captured.  By  a dashing  effort  it 
was  retaken,  together  with  the  stand- 
ard of  an  Alabama  regiment.  At  a 
critical  moment  Meagher  rushed  for- 
ward with  his  Irish  brigade  ; and  such 
was  the  fury  of  the  onset  that  the 
Confederates  were  driven  back  again 
to  the  woods.  One  of  the  most  brill- 
iant charges  of  the  day  was  made  by 
the  Fifty-Fifth  and  Sixtieth  Virginia. 
They  captoed  Randall’s  battery,  and 
drove  back  in  confusion  the  supporting 
regiments.  Determined  to  recapture 
it,  McCall  and  Meade  rallied  their  in- 
fantry. A terrific  and  protracted  hand- 
to-hand  fight  ensued ; and,  although 
the  reserves  were  repulsed,  they  car- 
ried back  with  them  the  recaptured 
guns.  The  darkness  was  setting  in. 
During  the  fierce  struggle,  the  officers 
had  recklessly  exposed  themselves. 
Meade  was  severely  wounded,  and  a 
little  later  McCall  was  captured.  Sey- 
mour assumed  command,  and  the  bat- 
tle continued.  The  sounds  of  battle 
had  attracted  the  attention  of  Hooker 
and  Kearney ; and  as  night  was  clos- 
ing upon  the  scene,  their  divisions 
arrived  upon  the  field.  They  were 
soon  joined  by  the  First  New  Jersey 
bi  igade.  Some  of  the  lost  ground  was 
immediately  reclaimed.  Joyful  shouts 
arose  from  the  National  ranks.  The 
Confederates,  worn  out  and  perplexed 
by  this  fresh  accession  of  strength  on 
the  part  of  the  Nationals,  retired  to  the 


shelter  of  the  woods.  It  was  not  an- 
other victory  to  either  side;  but  it 
was  another  great  battle;  and  to  the 
Nationals  it  was  equal  to  a victory, 
for  it  was  a successful  resistance.  On 
this  day,  as  the  reader  now  knows, 
there  were  two  separate  fights.  The 
one  is  best  known  as  the  battle  of 
White  Oak  Swamp ; the  other  as  . the 
battle  of  Glendale.  The  latter  is 
known  also  as  the  battle  of  Frazier’s 
Farm. 

In  no  previous  battle  of  the  war, 
perhaps,  was  the  martial  spirit  so  keen- 
ly and  so  bitterly  developed  as  on  this 
day,  and  particularly  at  the  battle  of 
Glendale.  The  wounding  of  Meade 
and  the  capture  of  McCall  give  evi- 
dence of  the  feeling  on  the  National 
side.  On  the  30th  of  June,  the  real 
sentiment  of  the  rank  and  file  of  the 
Nationals  was  several  times  revealed 
by  the  loud  and  universal  cry,  “ On  to 
Richmond.”  On  the  Confederate  side 
there  was  equal  determination  and  more 
bitterness.  It  was  no  uncommon  thing 
on  that  day  for  cavalry  ofiScers  to  leap 
from  their  saddles  and  lead  to  the 
charge  infantry  regiments  who  had  lost 
their  commanders.  At  one  time  Gen- 
eral Hill,  when  the  Confederates  were 
in  full  retreat,  seized  the  standard  of 
the  Fourth  North  Carolina,  a regiment 
which  he  had  formerly  commanded, 
and  shouted  to  the  retreating  soldiers : 
“ If  you  will  not  follow,  I will  perish 
alone.”  ‘‘Lead  on.  Hill:  head  your 
old  North  Carolina  boys !”  rang  over 
the  field,  while  fifty  ofiicers  dashed  to 
his  side.  The  result  was  that  the  Con- 
federates halted  and  turned,  and  the 


MALVERN  HILLS. 


267 


pursuit  was  checked.  Major  Peyton 
had  a son  who  had  both  his  legs  shat- 
tered. ^ He  called  to  his  father  for  help. 
^‘When  we  have  beaten  the  enemy, 
then  I will  help  you.  1 have  other 
sons  to  lead  to  glory.  Forward.” 
Such  was  the  answer.  In  a few  sec- 
onds more  the  father  was  dead.  Such 
incidents  might  easily  be  multiplied  on 
both  sides ; but  these  are  sufficient  to 
show  the  intensity  of  feeling  which 
influenced  both  armies  at  this  particu- 
lar juncture.  Of  McCall’s  division, 
nearly  one-fourth  had  been  killed  or 
wounded ; and  General  Pryor  tells  us 
that  he  crossed  the  Chickahominy  with 
1400  men,  and  that  in  the  flghts  that 
followed  he  suffered  a loss  of  859 
killed  and  wounded,  and  eleven  miss- 
ing. 

It  was  the  confident  expectation  of 
the  Confederates  that  the  battle  would 
be  resumed  next  day.  In  this,  however, 
they  were  doomed  to  disappointment. 
During  the  darkness  the  retreat  was 
July  continued ; and  on  the  morning 
b of  the  1st  of  July,  the  army  of 
the  Potomac  was  again  a unit,  and 
strongly  posted — infantry,  cavalry  and 
artillery — on  the  high  grounds  of  Mal- 
vern Hills,  the  James  Kiver  in  view, 
and  its  communication  with  that  river 
secured.  The  character  of  that  ground 
has  been  already  described.  The  posi- 
tion was  naturally  strong,  and  Mc- 
Clellan had  arrayed  his  forces  with 
admirable  skill.  Both  flanks  of  the 
army  rested  on  James  Biver,  under 
protection  of  the  gunboats.  The  ar- 
rangement of  the  troops  from  left  to 
right  was  thus:  Porter,  Heintzelman, 


Sumner,  Franklin,  Keyes.  The  ap- 
proaches to  the  position  were  com- 
manded by  about  seventy  guns,  several 
of  them  heavy  siege  cannon.  “ There 
were  crouching  cannon  waiting  for 
the  enemy,  and  ready  to  defend  all 
the  approaches.  Sheltered  by  fences, 
ditches,  ravines,  were  swarms  of  in- 
fantry. There  were  horsemen  pictur- 
esquely careering  over  the  noon-tide 
and  sun-scarred  field.  Tier  after  tier  of 
batteries  were  grimly  visible  upon  the 
slope  which  rose  in  the  form  of  an  am- 
phitheatre. With  a fan-shaped  sheet 
of  fire,  they  could  sweep  the  incline — a 
sort  of  natural  glacis — up  which  the 
assailants  must  advance.  A crown  of 
cannon  was  on  the  brow  of  the  hill. 
The  first  line  of  batteries  could  only 
be  reached  by  traversing  an  open  space 
of  from  three  to  four  hundred  yards, 
exposed  to  grape  and  canister  from 
the  artillery,  and  musketry  from  the 
infantry.  If  that  were  carried,  another 
and  still  another  more  difficult  re- 
mained in  the  rear.”  Such  was  the 
position,  and  such  were  the  forces 
against  which  Lee  was  now  to  direct 
all  his  strength.  It  was  not  without 
reason  that,  when  the  attack  was  about 
to  be  made.  Hill  expressed  to  Lee 
his  strong  disapproval.  Lee,  however, 
had  made  up  his  mind  to  take  the 
position  by  storm;  and  he  gave  his 
orders  accordingly. 

The  Confederate  chief  had  massed 
his  troops  on  the  right;  and  he  so 
posted  his  artillery  as  to  be  able  to 
bring  upon  the  National  batteries  a 
concentrated  fire.  It  was  his  belief 
that  by  this  means  he  would  silence 


268 


McCLELLAN’S  RETREAT. 


the  guns  of  McClellan ; and  be  had 
given  orders  that,  whenever  the  expect- 
ed result  was  produced,  Armistead’s 
brigade,  of  Huger’s  division,  should 
advance  with  a shout  and  capture  the 
battery  immediately  before  it.  This 
shout  was  to  be  the  signal  for  a gen- 
eral advance  with  fixed  bayonets  to 
“drive  the  invaders  into  the  James.” 
Lee  found  more  difiiculty  in  carrying 
out  his  plan  than  he  had  anticipated. 
The  day  was  far  advanced  before  the 
first  gun  was  fired.  Between  three  and 
four  o’clock  a heavy  artillery  fire  was 
opened  upon  Couch,  of  Keyes’  division, 
and  Kearney,  of  Heintzelman’s.  A 
little  later  D.  H.  Hill,  believing  that 
he  heard  the  preconcerted  signal  for  a 
general  advance,  made  a vigorous  rush 
towards  Couch’s  front.  Instead  of  being 
supported  by  one  hundred  guns,  as  he 
had  expected,  only  a single  battery  was 
ordered  up — that  of  Moorman ; and  it 
was  knocked  to  pieces  in  a few  min- 
utes. One  or  two  others  shared  the 
same  fate — that  of  being  beat  in  detail. 
Hill  was  driven  back  in  confusion  to 
the  woods  near  the  Quaker  Road.  On 
his  retreating,  the  National  right  ad- 
vanced several  hundred  yards  and  took 
a stronger  position.  Magruder,  mean- 
while, had  made  a furious  attack  on 
Porter,  who  commanded  on  the  Na- 
tional left.  Two  brigades  of  McLaws’ 
division,  charging  through  a dense 
wood,  rushed  up  to  the  very  muzzles 
of  Porter’s  guns.  Attacks  equally 
furious  were  made  a little  further  to 
the  right,  and  also  on  the  centre.  It 
was  to  no  purpose.  The  attacking  col- 
umns, one  and  all,  shared  the  same 


fate.  They  were  driven  back  in  con- 
fusion, and  with  heavy  loss.  Nothing 
could  withstand  the  terrific  fire  of  the 
National  batteries.  Malvern  Hills  lit- 
erally blazed,  as  if  one  sheet  of  solid 
fiame;  and  the  guns,  which  crowned 
every  rising  knoll,  from  their  many 
mouths  belched  forth  shot  and  shell 
which  fell  in  showers  on  the  bewil- 
dered masses  who  from  time  to  time 
pressed  forward,  only  to  be  torn  to 
pieces,  or  to  be  driven  back  in  wildest 
confusion.  There  was  a lull  in  the 
battle.  The  fighting  ceased  for  a time, 
the  Confederates  having  all  fallen  back 
and  taken  shelter  in  the  pine  forest. 
Lee,  however,  was  not  to  be  driven 
from  his  purpose.  He  had  made  up 
his  mind  that  Malvern  Hills  must  be 
taken  by  storm ; and  no  matter  what 
the  cost,  no  matter  how  great  the  sacri- 
fice, the  attempt  must  be  repeated. 
He  spent  the  interval  in  re-forming  his 
battalions ; and  at  about  six  o’clock  he 
opened  a general  artillery  fire  on  the 
right  and  left  of  the  National  position, 
bis  infantry  rushing  from  their  cover- 
ing at  the  double-quick,  sweeping  over 
the  undulating  fields  and  boldly  up  the 
hill  in  the  direction  of  the  batteries. 
As  they  advanced,  their  ranks  were 
torn  and  ploughed  by  musketry  as 
well  as  by  the  heavy  guns.  Brigade 
after  brigade  was  cut  up  and  driven 
back;  but  their  places  were  speedily 
filled,  with  a like  result.  As  the  even- 
ing advanced,  the  fighting  became  at 
once  more  general  and  more  severe. 
The  batteries  on  the  hill  redoubled  their 
fire,  the  Confederates  replying  with 
equal  boldness.  The  gunboats  on  the 


AN  OPPORTUNITY  LOST. 


269 


river  now  began  to  fling  shot  and  shell, 
which  fell  with  deadly  effect  on  the 
Confederate  masses.  For  two  hours 
the  hills  absolutely  shook  under  the 
fierce  cannonade.  It  was  not  until 
nine  o’clock  that  the  attempt  to  cap- 
ture the  National  position  was  aban- 
doned, and  that  the  firing  ceased.  In 
his  report  of  the  engagement  at  Mal- 
vern Hills,  General  McClellan  gives  a 
graphic  picture  of  the  struggle  when  it 
was  most  fierce.  Brigade  after  bri- 
gade,” he  says,  “formed  under  cover 
of  the  woods,  started  at  a run  to  cross 
the  open  space  and  charge  our  bat- 
teries, but  the  heavy  fire  of  our  guns, 
with  the  cool  and  steady  volleys  of  our 
infantry,  in  every  case  sent  them  reel- 
ing back  to  shelter,  and  covered  the 
ground  with  their  dead  and  wounded. 
In  several  instances  our  infantry  with- 
held their  fire  until  the  attacking  col- 
umns— which  rushed  through  the  storm 
of  canister  and  shell  from  our  artillery — 
had  reached  within  a few  yards  of  our 
lines.  They  then  poured  in  a single 
volley,  and  dashed  forward  with  the 
bayonet,  capturing  prisoners  and  colors, 
and  driving  the  routed  columns  in  con- 
fusion from  the  field.”  Such  was  the 
battle  of  Malvern  Hills.  It  was,  al- 
though not  in  any  sense  decisive,  one 
of  the  bloodiest  and  most  fiercely  con- 
tested battles  of  the  war. 

The  night  that  followed  was  dark 
and  stormy.  The  rain  fell  in  absolute 
torrents.  During  such  a night  the 
sufferings  of  the  wounded  must  have 
been  fearful.  The  wearied  Confede- 
rates sought  a brief  repose  on  the  rain- 
soaked  and  blood-stained  soil,  some  of 


them  lying  within  one  hundred  yards 
of  the  National  batteries. 

When  the  morning  of  the  2d  of  July 
dawned,  and  the  half-slept  Con-  jujy 
federates  began  to  open  their  2. 
eyes,  they  discovered  with  some  amaze- 
ment that  the  Nationals  were  gone, 
and  that  Malvern  Hills,  the  scene  the 
evening  before  of  so  much  tempestuous 
life — their  heights  crowned  with  frown- 
ing cannon,  brilliant  with  gay  uniforms, 
and  refulgent  with  thousands  of  bay- 
onets, which  caught  on  their  glittering 
points  the  rays  of  the  setting  sun — were 
deserted  and  silent  as  the  grave.  In 
the  Confederate  camp  all  was  dire  con- 
fusion. The  following  picture  is  by 
one  of  their  own  generals  : “ The  next 
morning,  by  dawn,”  he  says,  “I  went 
off  to  ask  for  orders,  when  I found  the 
whole  army  in  the  utmost  disorder. 
Thousands  of  straggling  men  were  ask- 
ing every  passer-by  for  their  regiments; 
ambulances,  wagons  and  artillery  ob- 
structing every  road,  and  all  together 
in  a drenching  rain  presenting  a scene 
of  the  most  woful  and  heart-rending 
confusion.”  It  is  not  wonderful,  when 
these  things  are  known  to  us,  that 
many  competent  critics  have  ques- 
tioned the  propriety  of  McClellan’s 
conduct  in  continuing  the  retreat.  The 
words,  “ On  to  Bichmond,”  if  uttered 
by  him,  wmuld  have  been  gladly  obeyed 
by  most  of  his  officers,  and  by  thou- 
sands of  his  men.  This  perpetual 
fighting,  with  no  result  but  further 
retreat,  was  breaking  the  spirits  of  his 
soldiers.  Such  an  order  on  the  morn- 
ing of  the  2d  would  have  filled  them 
with  newness  of  life  ; and  even  at  the 


270 


McClellan’S  retreat. 


last,  worn  and  weary  as  they  were, 
they  might  have  marched  in  triumph 
to  the  Confederate  capital.  McClellan 
thought  otherwise;  and  he  otherwise 
ordered. 

It  is  hardly  possible  to  conceive  of 
circumstances  more  depressing,  than 
those  in  which  McClellan’s  army 
was  placed  on  the  night  of  the  1st 
of  July,  1862.  For  six  days  they 
had  been  struggling  with  a powerful 
foe,  each  successive  fight  being  fol- 
lowed by  a fresh  retreat.  During 
three  days  it  had  been  continuous 
fighting  and  marching.  The  men  had 
had  no  rest.  Foot-sore  and  battle- 
worn,  they  were  not  to  be  allowed  even 
on  this  night  even  an  hour’s  repose. 
The  roar  of  the  conflict  had  not  ceased 
more  than  two  hours,  when  orders 
were  given  to  resume  the  retreat.  The 
night,  as  we  have  said,  was  dark,  and 
the  storm  raged  fiercely.  We  cannot 
wonder  that  the  order  gave  general 
dissatisfaction.  Some  of  them  openly 
and  loudly  protested.  Fitz  John  Porter 
was  indignant ; and  his  faith  in  his 
chief  was  at  least  temporarily  shaken. 
Phil.  Kearney  was  more  plain-spoken 
than  most  of  his  brother-officers.  “I, 
Philip  Kearney,”  he  said,  “an  old  sol- 
dier, enter  my  solemn  protest  against 
this  order  for  a retreat.  We  ought, 
instead  of  retreating,  to  follow  up  the 
enemy,  and  take  Kichmond;  and  in 
full  view  of  all  the  responsibilities  of 
such  a declaration,  I say  to  you  all, 
such  an  order  can  only  be  prompted 
by  cowardice  or  treason.”  The  order, 
ju’y  however,  was  obeyed ; and  by 
midnight  the  utterly  exhausted 


soldiers  were  groping  their  way  along 
a road  which  is  described  as  desperate. 
There  was  only  a narrow  pass  along 
which  the  army  could  retreat.  The  mud 
was  ankle  deep  all  over  the  ground. 
It  was  only  seven  miles  to  Harrison’s 
Landing ; and  yet  such  was  the  nature  of 
the  road  and  the  condition  of  the  ground, 
that  it  was  not  till  the  middle  jniy 
of  the  next  day  that  the  landing  2. 
was  reached.  It  was  the  evening  of  the 
3d  before  the  wagons  were  all  for-  jnjy 
ward  and  in  their  places.  The  Con- 
federates,  after  a fourth  attempt  at  pur- 
suit, turned  their  backs  on  the  National 
army  and  on  they  moved  to  Richmond. 

On  the  4th  of  July  General  Me-  jniy 
Clellan  issued  the  following  ad-  4. 
dress  to  his  army : 

“Soldiers  of  the  army  of  the 
Potomac — Your  achievements  of  the 
past  ten  days  have  illustrated  the  valor 
and  endurance  of  the  American  soldier. 
Attacked  by  superior  forces,  and  with- 
out hopes  of  reinforcements,  you  have 
succeeded  in  changing  your  base  of 
operations  by  a flank  movement,  always 
regarded  as  the  most  hazardous  of  mil- 
itary operations.  You  have  saved  all 
your  guns,  except  a few  lost  in  battle. 
Upon  your  march  you  have  been  as- 
sailed, day  after  day,  with  desperate 
fury,  by  men  of  the  same  race  and 
nation,  skilfully  massed  and  led.  Un- 
der every  disadvantage  of  number,  and 
necessarily  of  position  also,  you  have 
in  every  conflict  beaten  back  your  foes 
with  enormous  slaughter.  Your  con- 
duct ranks  you  among  the  celebrated 
armies  of  history.  None  will  now  ques- 
tion what  each  of  you  may  always,  wkh 


NATIONAL  DISAPPOINTMENT. 


271 


pride,  say : ‘ I belonged  to  the  army  of 
the  Potomac.’  You  have  reached  this 
new’  base  complete  in  organization  and 
unimpaired  in  spirit.  The  enemy  may  at 
any  time  attack  you — we  are  prepared 
to  meet  them.  I have  personally  es- 
tablished your  lines.  Let  them  come, 
and  we  will  convert  their  repulse  into 
a final  defeat. 

“ Your  government  is  strengthening 
you  wdth  the  resources  of  a great  people. 
On  this,  our  nation’s  birthday,  we  de- 
clare to  our  foes,  who  are  rebels  against 
the  best  interests  of  mankind,  that  this 
army  shall  enter  the  capital  of  the  so- 
called  Confederacy ; that  our  National 
constitution  shall  prevail,  and  that  the 
Union,  which  can  alone  insure  internal 
peace  and  external  security  to  each 
State,  must  and  shall  be  preserved,  cost 
w’hat  it  may  in  time,  treasure  and  blood. 

‘‘  Geo.  B.  McClellan, 
Major-General  Commanding.” 

On  the  5th,  President  Davis  issued 
July  the  following  address  to  the 
army  in  Eastern  Virginia : 

“ Soldiers — I congratulate  you  on 
the  series  of  brilliant  victories  which, 
under  the  favor  of  Divine  Providence, 
you  have  lately  won,  and,  as  the  presi- 
dent of  the  Confederate  States,  do 
heartily  tender  to  you  the  thanks  of 
the  country,  whose  just  cause  you  have 
so  skilfully  and  heroically  served.  Ten 
days  ago  an  invading  army,  vastly 
superior  to  you  in  numbers  and  the 
material  of  war,  closely  beleaguered 
your  capital  and  vauntingly  proclaimed 
its  speedy  conquest ; you  marched  to 
attack  the  enemy  in  his  intrenchments ; 
with  well-directed  movements  and 


death-defying  valor,  you  charged  upon 
him  in  his  strong  positions,  drove  him 
from  field  to  field  over  a distance  of 
more  than  thirty-five  miles,  and,  despite 
his  reinforcements,  compelled  him  to 
seek  safety  under  the  cover  of  his  gun- 
boats, where  he  now  lies  cowering 
before  the  army  so  lately  derided  and 
threatened  with  entire  subjugation. 
The  fortitude  wdth  which  you  have 
borne  toil  and  privation,  the  gallantry 
wdth  which  you  have  entered  into  each 
successive  battle,  must  have  been  wit- 
nessed to  be  fully  appreciated;  but  a 
grateful  people  will  not  fail  to  recog- 
nize you,  and  to  bear  you  in  loved  re- 
membrance. Well  may  it  be  said  of 
you  that  you  have  ‘done  enough  for 
glory’;  but  duty  to  a suffering  country 
and  to  the  cause  of  constitutional  lib- 
erty, claims  from  you  yet  further  effort. 
Let  it  be  your  pride  to  relax  in  nothing 
which  can  promote  your  future  efifi- 
ciency ; your  one  great  object  being  to 
drive  the  invader  from  your  soil,  and, 
carrying  your  standards  beyond  the 
outer  boundaries  of  the  Confederacy, 
to  wring  from  an  unscrupulous  foe  the 
recognition  of  your  birthright,  com- 
munity and  independence. 

“Jefferson  Davis.” 

Cheery  and  hopeful  as  were  General 
McClellan’s  words,  the  complete  failure 
of  the  Peninsular  expedition  filled  the 
nation  with  sorrow’.  There  was  gen- 
eral gloom ; and  but  for  the  successes 
which  had  attended  the  armies  in  the 
West,  the  situation  would  have  been 
desperate  enough.  The  Confederates, 
of  course,  were  jubilant;  and  there 
were  many  who  thought  that  they  had 


272 


McClellan’S  retreat. 


good  reason  for  their  joy.  In  his  re- 
port, General  Lee  said:  “The  siege  of 
Richmond  was  raised,  and  the  object 
of  a campaign  which  had  been  prose- 
cuted after  months  of  preparations,  at 
an  enormous  expenditure  of  men  and 
money,  completely  frustrated.  More 
than  ten  thousand  prisoners,  including 
officers  of  rank,  fifty-two  pieces  of 
artillery  and  upwards  of  thirty-five 
thousand  stand  of  small  arms,  were 
captured.  The  stores  and  supplies,  of 
every  description,  which  fell  into  oui* 
hands  were  great  in  amount  and  value, 
but  small  in  comparison  with  those 
destroyed  by  the  enemy.  His  losses 
in  battle  exceeded  our  own,  as  attested 
by  the  thousands  of  dead  and  wounded 
left  on  every  field,  which  his  subse- 
quent inaction  shows  in  what  condition 
the  survivors  reached  the  protection  to 
which  they  fled.”  Boastful  and  oifen- 
sive  as  this  report  was  felt  to  be  at  the 
time,  it  was  nevertheless  admitted  to 
be  a not  distant  approximation  to  the 
truth.  The  committee  of  Congress  on 
the  conduct  of  the  war  gave  in  a re- 
port which  was  not  altogether  favor- 
able to  McClellan.  “The  retreat  of 
the  army  from  Malvern  to  Harrison’s 
Bar,”  it  declared,  “was  very  precipi- 
tate. The  troops,  upon  their  arrival 
there,  were  huddled  together  in  great 
confusion,  the  entire  army  being  col- 
lected within  a space  of  about  three 
miles  along  the  river.  No  orders  were 
given  the  first  day  for  occupying  the 
heights  which  commanded  the  position, 
nor  were  the  troops  so  placed  as  to  be 
able  to  resist  an  attack  in  force  by  the 
enemy,  and  nothing  but  a heavy  rain. 


thereby  preventing  the  enemy  from 
bringing  up  their  artillery,  saved  the 
army  from  destruction.”  There  had 
been  sent  to  the  Peninsula  from  first 
to  last  about  160,000  men.  On  the  3d 
of  July,  when  this  army  had  reached 
Han  ison^s  Landing  and  was  under  the 
protection  of  the  gunboats,  McClellan 
telegraphed  to  the  president  that  he 
had  not  “over  50,000  left  with  their 
colors.”  The  actual  number,  however, 
was  about  86,000,  as  was  found  on  close 
inspection,  when  President  Lincoln,  on 
July  the  7th,  made  a visit  to  McClellan’s 
headquarters.  These  figures  speak  vol- 
umes. So  large  a sacrifice  of  human 
life  ought  to  have  produced  greater 
and  more  beneficial  results. 

This  chapter  would  be  incomplete 
without  a reference  to  the  correspond- 
ence which  took  place  between  General 
McClellan  and  the  government,  in  re- 
gard to  his  future  movements  and  the 
use  to  be  made  of  his  army.  On  the 
morning  of  the  day  on  which  was 
fought  the  battle  of  Malvern  June 
Hills,  McClellan  telegraphed  to 
Washington  for  fresh  troops,  adding 
that  it  might  be  necessary  for  him  to 
fall  back  to  the  river.  The  president 
promptly  replied  that  he  had  no  men 
to  send,  but  that  if  he  had  a million 
at  his  disposal,  it  would  be  impossible 
to  forward  them  in  time  to  meet  the 
emergency,  urging  him  at  the  same 
time  to  save  his  army,  even  if  he  should 
be  compelled  to  fall  back  to  Fort- 
ress Monroe.  The  president  added.: 
“ We  still  have  strencrth  enoimh  in  the 
country,  and  will  bring  it  oifi.”  jul} 

1 On  the  following  day  McClellan 


DEMAND  FOR  MORE  TROOPS. 


2?3 


asked  for  50,000  troops,  when  he  had 
for  reply  that  the  demand  could  not  be 
complied  with,  as  15,000  more  men 
were  needed  to  defend  the  National 
capital.  If  he  was  not  strong  enough 
to  take  Richmond,  the  president  did 
not  ask  him  to  attempt  an  impossi- 
bility. Strange  to  say,  in  spite  of  all 
jnjy  this,  McClellan  made  a demand 
on  the  3d  for  100,000  men — 
a demand  which  he  repeated  on  the 
July  4th,  that  he  might,  as  he  said, 
take  Richmond  and  the  re- 
bellion.” It  was  at  this  time,  too, 
that  he  wrote  that  foolish  letter  which 
is  destined  to  be  remembered  against 
him,  offering  the  president  political 
advice,  particularly  in  the  matter  of 
slavery. 

McClellan  could  not  bear  the  idea  of 
being  overruled  in  his  plans — if  Rich- 
mond was  to  be  captured,  he  must 
have  the  glory ; nor  could  he  for  one 
moment  find  a place  for  the  thought 
that  he  should  cease  to  be  the  chief  of 
July  the  army  of  the  Potomac.  On 
23*  the  23d  of  July,  General  Halleck, 
having  resigned  his  command  of  the 
army  of  the  West,  assumed  the  duties 
of  general-in-chief  of  the  entire  army 
of  the  United  States.  The  first  thin«: 
to  which  his  attention  was  called,  was 
the  condition  of  the  army  of  the  Po- 
tomac. Halleck,  without  delay,  visited 
Harrison’s  Landing.  Lincoln  had  been 
there  on  the  7th.  McClellan  was  thus 
receiving  sufficient  attention.  Halleck 
found  McClellan  bent  on  moving  to 
Richmond,  but  imperious  in  his  de- 
mands for  more  troops.  To  accomplish 
his  purpose,  he  would  require  at  least 


50,000  additional  troops.  So  large 
a number,  Halleck  assured  him,  was 
altogether  out  of  the  question.  He 
was  not  authorized  to  promise  more 
than  20,000,  and  to  let  him  have 
even  that  number  implied  the  weak- 
ening of  other  places.  McClellan  took 
the  night  to  consider  the  matter.  In 
the  morning  he  had  come  to  the 
conclusion  that  he  would  make  an  at- 
tempt on  Richmond  with  the  ad- 
ditional 20,000.  With  this  under- 
standing Halleck  left  for  Washington. 
Almost  immediately  after  his  arrival 
there,  he  received  from  McClellan  a 
telegram,  stating  that  he  could  not 
undertake  a movement  upon  Richmond 
with  any  hope  of  success,  unless  he 
was  reinforced  to  the  extent  of  35,000 
men.  So  large  a body  of  men  was  not 
at  the  moment  disposable.  It  was  re- 
solved, therefore,  to  withdraw  the 
army  of  the  Potomac  to  some  position 
where  it  could  unite  with  that  of  Gen- 
eral Pope,  and  cover  Washington  at 
the  same  time  that  it  operated  against 
the  enemy.  On  the  30th  of  July,  ju]y 
McClellan  received  instructions  30. 
to  send''  away  his  sick  as  quickly  as 
possible,  and  to  prepare  for  a movement 
of  his  troops.  On  the  3d  of  A u-  Auj. 
gust  he  was  ordered  by  telegraph 
to  withdraw  his  entire  army  to  Acquia 
Creek.  This  he  most  reluctantly 
proceeded  to  do.  On  the  4th  Ah,?, 
he  wrote  to  Halleck,  protesting  4. 
against  the  withdrawal  of  his  army. 
The  telegram  of  the  commander-in-chief 
had  given  him  great  pain.  The  with- 
drawal of  the  army  to  Acquia  Creek 
could  not  but  prove  disastrous.  It  w^us 


274 


MCCLELLAN’S  RETREAT. 


removing  the  army  further  from  Rich- 
mond, and  from  a base  of  operations 
^vhich  had  all  the  advantage  of  the  co- 
operation of  the  gunboats  on  the  river. 
I:  would  prove  demoralizing  to  the 
army — both  men  and  officers ; it  would 
1 ave  a depressing  effect  upon  the  peo- 
ple-; and  it  would  have  a powerful 
influence  in  inducing  foreign  govern- 
ments to  recognize  the  independent 
sovereignty  of  the  Southern  Confede- 
racy. By  implication  he  denied  that 
the  government  was  unable  to  send 
him  reinforcements.  “I  point  you,” 
he  said,  ‘‘to  General  Burnside’s  force, 
to  that  of  General  Pope — not  necessary 
to  maintain  a strict  defense  in  front  of 
Washington  and  Harper’s  Ferry;  to 
those  portions  of  the  army  of  the  West — 
not  required  for  a strict  defense  there. 
Here,  directly  in  front  of  the  army,  is 
the  heart  of  the  rebellion.  It  is  here 
that  all  our  resources  should  be  col- 
lected to  strike  the  blow  which  will 
determine  the  fate  of  this  nation.  All 
points  of  secondary  importance  else- 
where should  be  abandoned,  and  every 
available  man  brought  here.  A decided 
victory  here,  and  the  military  strength 
of  the  rebellion  is  crushed.  It  matters 
not  what  reverses  we  may  meet  with 
elsewhere — here  is  the  true  defense  of 
Washington  ; it  is  here,  on  the  bank  of 
the  James  River,  that  the  fate  of  the 
Union  should  be  decided.”  There 
were  both  truth  and  eloquence  in  Mc- 
Clellan’s words ; but  coming  from  him 
at  this  particular  juncture,  they  were 
powerless  and  without  effect.  They 
failed  to  convince  Halleck.  They 
equally  failed  to  make  any  change  in  | 


the  purpose  of  the  government.  Hal- 
leck’s  reply  was  vigorous.  It  left  un- 
heeded none  of  the  points  which  Mc- 
Clellan had  raised.  He  differed  fi*om 
McClellan  entirely  as  to  the  value  of 
his  position,  at  least  in  the  circum- 
stances in  which  the  National  army,  as 
a whole,  found  itself.  He  made  a 
strong  point  of  the  fact  that  he  found, 
on  his  arrival  at  Washington,  the  orig- 
inal army  of  the  Potomac  split  into 
two  parts,  with  the  entire  force  of  the 
enemy  directly  between  them.  It  was 
desirable — it  was  necessary — that  they 
be  again  united ; and,  as  this  union 
could  not  be  effected  on  the  banks  of 
the  James,  it  must  be  attempted  in  the 
neighborhood  of  Fredericksburg.  The 
question  of  demoralization  was  easily 
disposed  of.  “Your  change  of  front,” 
said  Halleck,  “from  your  extreme  right 
at  Hanover  Court  House  to  your  pres- 
ent position  was  over  thirty  miles,  but 
I have  not  heard  that  it  demoralized 
your  troops,  notwithstanding  the  severe 
losses  they  sustained  in  effecting  it.” 
He  referred  with  effect  to  McClellan's 
fickleness  of  purpose,  now  demanding 
50,000  men,  now  20,000,  and  then  dis- 
covering that  nothing  could  be  done 
without  an  addition  of  at  least  35,000. 
He  reminded  him  also  of  the  dangerous 
character  of  the  climate  on  the  James 
River — a climate  fatal  to  whites  in  the 
months  of  August  and  September.  He 
finally  assured  him  that  no  change 
could  be  made  in  the  orders  issued, 
and  that  the  wishes  of  the  govern- 
ment must  be  carried  out.  Hal- 
leek’s  letter  was  written  on  the 
I Gth  of  August.  It  was  not  until  the 


INEXCUSABLE  DELAYS. 


275 


An^.  14 til  that  the  evacuation  of  Har- 
14.  rison’s  Landing  commenced.  Mc- 
Clellan left  himself  on  the  23d,  and 
arrived  at  Acquia  Creek  on  the 
23.  day  following. 

Thus  ended  the  ill-starred  Peninsular 
expedition.  From  first  to  last  it  had 
been  unfortunate.  Whatever  the  cause, 
that  magnificent  army  which  liad  been 
organized  with  so  much  pomp  and 
pageantry  at  Washington,  and  from 
which  so  great  things  were  expected, 
had  virtually  exhausted  itself  and  ac- 
complished nothing.  No  finer  soldiers 
ever  went  to  give  battle  to  an  enemy. 
But  they  were  allowed  to  sicken  in  the 
trenches  at  Yorktown,  and  to  perish 
by  thousands  in  the  woods  and  swamps 
of  the  blood-stained  Chickahominy. 
Once  only  during  the  campaign  was 
the  government,  in  our  judgment,  to 
blame.  It  might  have  given  an  entire- 
ly new  feature  to  the  campaign  if,  on 
the  eve  of  the  battle  of  Mechanicsville, 
McDowell  had  been  ordered  to  make 
a demonstration  along  the  Richmond 
Road.  Such  a demonstration,  as  we 
have  already  had  occasion  to  observe, 
was  dreaded  by  Lee,*  as  it  would  have 
rendered  entirely  impracticable  the 
flank  movement  of  General  Jackson. 
In  the  circumstances,  however,  and 
after  the  experience  it  had  had,  the 

* General  Robert  Edmund  Lee,  to  whom  belongs 
the  chief  glory  of  this  campaign,  and  who  had  already 
proved  himself  one  of  the  greatest  commanders  devel- 
oped by  the  war  on  either  side,  was  son  of  General  Henry 
Lee,  and  was  bom  in  Washington,  in  1808.  Graduating 
at  West  Point,  he  entered  the  army  in  1829  ; rising  to 
the  rank  of  captain  in  1838  ; major  in  1846  ; and  lieu- 
tenant-colonel in  1847.  He  was  promoted  to  the  post 
of  superintendent  of  the  West  Point  Military  Academy 
in  1852.  In  1854,  he  accompanied  General  George  B. 
McClellan  on  the  commission  sent  by  the  United  States 


government  was  not  without  abundant 
reason  for  the  justification  of  its  con- 
duct. It  trembled  for  the  safety  of 
Washington,  and  it  called  McDowell 
to  its  protection.  McClellan,  however, 
was  to  blame  throuj^hout.  We  have 
no  desire  to  repeat  w^hat  we  said  when 
treating  of  Yorktown  and  of  Williams- 
burg and  of  Fair  Oaks,  and  what  we 
said  over  again  at  the  commencement 
of  this  chapter.  The  army  of  the  Po- 
tomac, as  one  has  well  put  it,  was 
without  a presiding  genius — a control- 
ling mind.  The  delays,  w'hich  proved 
ruinous,  were  absolutely  inexcusable. 
It  would  be  ungenerous  to  say  that  Mc- 
Clellan was  wanting  in  bravery,  or  that 
he  lacked  the  higher  qualities  essential 
in  a great  commander.  But  it  is  noto- 
rious that  he  lingered  at  Yorktown 
when  he  had  no  enemy  to  oppose  his 
advance,  that  he  was  not  present  till 
the  battle  of  Williamsbursr  was  fous^ht 
and  won,  that  he  w^as  not  present  at 
all  at  the  battle  of  Fair  Oaks,  that 
when  the  great  battle  was  fought  at 
Gaines’  Mill  he  was  on  the  south  side 
of  the  Chickahominy,  that  he  was  not 
present  at  White  Oak  Swamp  or  at 
Glendale,  and  that  when  Malvern  Hills 
were  shaking  as  if  to  their  foundations 
with  the  thunder  of  cannon,  he  was  safe 
on  board  the  gunboats  on  James  River. 

Government  to  the  seat  of  war  in  the  Crimea.  On  the 
25th  of  April,  1861,  he  resigned  his  commission  in  the 
United  States  army,  and  offered  his  sword  to  his  native 
State  of  Virginia.  During  that  summer,  he  conducted 
the  military  operations  in  the  mountain  regions  of  Vir- 
ginia. Returning  to  Richmond,  he  was  occupied  till 
June,  1862,  with  the  general  disposition  and  equipment 
of  the  Confederate  forces.  When  Johnston  was  wound- 
ed at  Fair  Oaks,  Lee  assumed  command  of  the  army, 
and  pressed  McClellan  from  point  to  point,  until  he  took 
his  ffnal  stand  at  Malvern  Hills  and  Harrison’s  Landing. 


POPE  AND  LEE  IN  VIRGINIA. 


276 


CHAPTER  XIX. 


The  Army  of  Virginia. — Pope  in  Command. — Fremont  Resigns. — Burnside  Ordered  to  Alexandria. — Pope’s  In- 
structions.— Pope  Opposed  to  McClellan’s  Retreat. — Pope’s  Address  to  his  Soldiers  — He  Asks  to  be  Re- 
lieved of  his  Command. — McClellan  at  Acquia  Creek. — The  Plans  of  the  Confederates. — Pope’s  Orders, — 
Measures  of  Retaliation  by  the  Confederates. — A Call  for  Militia. — The  Unpopular  Orders  Modified. — The 
Confederates  at  the  Rappahannock. — Pope’s  Army  Begins  to  Move. — Position  of  the  Nationals. — Pope  at 
Culpepper  Court  House. — Banks  at  Cedar  Mountain. — The  Confederates  Approaching. — Battle  of  Cedar 
Mountain. — Banks  Begins  the  Attack. — Pope  on  the  Ground. — A Severe  Encounter. — Banks  Driven  Back. — 
American  Obstinacy. — The  Losses  on  Both  Sides. — The  Confederates  Fall  Back. — Intercepted  Letters. — 
Lee’s  Plan. — Pope  Reinforced. — A Retreat  Ordered. — The  Retreat  Successfully  Conducted. — No  Rest  for 
the  Wearied  Army. — The  Confederates  at  the  Heels  of  the  Nationals. — Across  the  Rappahannock. — Fight- 
ing at  the  Bridges  and  the  Fords. — Stuart’s  Raid. — The  Nationals  Humiliated. — Character  of  the  Retreat. — 
The  Object  of  the  Confederates. — Pope’s  Danger. — McClellan’s  Delay. — Warren  ton  Evacuated. — Pope’s  Dis- 
position of  his  Troops. — Jackson  Across  the  Rappahannock. — Jackson  Through  Thoroughfare  Gap. — At 
Bristow  Station. — Capture  of  Manassas  Junction. — Pope’s  Communication  Intercepted. — Activity  of  Jackson. — 
Both  Armies  in  Critical  Circumstances. — Pope  Prepares  to  Strike  Jackson  Before  the  Arrival  of  Long- 
street. — Movement  Toward  Gainesville. — An  Encounter  at  Bristow  Station. — Hooker  Successful. — Retreat 
of  Ewell. — Jackson  Evacuates  Manassas. — Delays  Again. — Porter  at  Bristow  Station. — His  Troops  Need 
Rest. — Merritt  at  Warrenton  Junction. — McClellan’s  Officers  Lukewarm. — Pope  at  Manassas. — Jackson’s 
Retreat  by  Way  of  Centreville. — The  Pursuit. — Kearney  at  Centreville. — Bull  Run. — The  Old  Battle- 
Ground. — Jackson  Pressing  Toward  Thoroughfare  Gap. — King's  Division. — Gallantry  of  Gibbons  and 
Doubleday. — A Severe  Encounter. — Ewell  Loses  a Leg. — King  Holds  his  Ground. — Ricketts’  Division  at 
Thoroughfare  Gap. — Arrival  of  Longstreet. — Ricketts’  Division  Driven  Back. — King  Falls  Back. — The  Situ- 
ation Changed. — A New  Disposition  of  the  Nationals — Battle  of  Groveton  or  Gainesville. — The  Confede- 
rates Well  Posted. — Arrival  of  Pope. — Severe  Fighting  in  the  Morning. — Pause  in  the  Battle. — Pope  Waits 
for  Reinforcements. — Battle  Resumed. — Terrific  Fighting. — The  Confederate  Left  Doubled  Back  on  the 
Centre. — The  Nationals  Hold  the  Ground. — Remarks  on  the  Battle. — Porter  Blamed. — The  National  Army 
Exhausted. — Ammunition  Scarce. — Pope  Calls  for  Supplies. — McClellan’s  Reply. — Pope  Resumes  the  At- 
tack.— Porter  Arrives. — A Tempest  of  Shot  and  Shell. — Porter  Driven  Back. — A Severe  Attack  on  the  Na- 
tional Left. — The  Nationals  Forced  Back. — Pope  Retires  Across  Bull  Run. — Destruction  of  the  Stone 
Bridge. — The  Nationals  at  Centreville. — Reports  of  Lee  and  Pope. — Preparations  for  Another  Engage- 
ment.— Excitement  in  Washington. — Lee’s  Purpose. — The  First  of  September. — Battle  of  Chantilly. — A 
Severe  Thunder  Storm. — Bravery  of  Stevens  and  Kearney. — Death  of  Stevens. — Death  of  Kearney. — The 
Gallant  Seventy-Ninth. — The  Brave  Birney. — Kearney’s  Body  Sent  to  Pope’s  Headquarters. — The  Losses 
During  the  Campaign. — Difficult  Creek. — The  National  Army  Ordered  Inside  the  Fortifications  at  Washing- 
ton.— Resignation  of  Pope. — Disappearance  of  the  Army  of  Virginia. — ^Restoration  of  the  Army  of  the  Po- 
tomac.— Reappointment  of  McClellan. — ^Vindication  of  Pope. 


At  the  time  McClellan  was  continu- 
ing his  disastrous  retreat  towards 
1862*  ^ . 

Harrison’s  Landing,  important 
events  were  taking  place  in  the  nearer  I 
neighborhood  of  the  National  capital; 
and  public  interest  and  expectation 
were  both  excited  by  the  active  and 
vigorous  measures  of  General  Pope, 


who  had  been  called  from  the  West 
and  placed  in  command  of  the  army  of 
Virginia.  As  early  as  the  27th  June 
I of  June,  1862,  the  following  or-  27. 
der  had  been  issued  by  the  president : 

“ 1.  The  forces  under  Major-Generals 
Fremont,  Banks  and  McDowell,  includ- 
ing the  troops  now  under  Brigadier* 


GENERAL  JOHN  POPE. 


277 


General  Sturgis,  at  Washington,  shall 
be  consolidated  and  form  one  ai*my,  to 
be  called  the  army  of  Virginia. 

‘^II.  The  command  of  the  army  of 
Virginia  is  specially  assigned  to  Major- 
General  John  Pope,  as  commanding 
general. 

“The  troops  of  the  Mountain  Depart- 
ment, heretofore  under  command  of 
General  Fremont,  shall  constitute  the 
First  army  corps,  under  the  command 
of  General  IVemont. 

“The  troops  of  the  Shenandoah  De- 
partment, now  under  General  Banks, 
shall  constitute  the  Second  army  corps, 
and  be  commanded  by  him. 

“The  troops  under  the  command  of 
General  McDowell,  except  those  within 
the  fortifications  and  the  city  of  Wash- 
ington, shall  form  the  Third  army  corps, 
and  be  under  his  command.” 

Major-General  Pope,  who  now  comes 
prominently  to  the  front,  had,  as  the 
reader  already  knows,  won  some  dis- 
tinction in  the  West.  He  was  a native 
of  Illinois,  having  been  born  at  Kas- 
kaskia,  in  that  State,  in  March,  1823. 
His  father  was  Judge  Pope,  of  Illinois. 
Having  received  a liberal  education, 
the  younger  Pope  entered  West  Point 
in  1838.  He  graduated  with  Rose- 
cranz  in  1842,  and  in  August,  1846, 
joined  the  army,  under  General  Taylor, 
in  Mexico.  From  the  close  of  the 
Mexican  War  up  until  1861,  he  was 
engaged  chiefly  in  surveying  expedi- 
tions. When  the  Civil  War  broke  out, 
he  held  only  the  rank  of  captain.  He 
was  soon,  however,  appointed  briga- 
dier-general of  volunteers.  In  De- 
cember of  1861,  he  was  despatched  by 


General  Halleck  into  central  and  west- 
ern Missouri,  then  being  harassed  by 
Confederate  raiders.  In  this  mission 
Pope  was  completely  successful.  Sub- 
sequently, in  March,  1862,  he  was 
appointed  major-general  of  volunteers, 
and  soon  afterwards  captured  New 
Madrid  and  Island  No.  10.  He  took 
part,  also,  in  tbe  siege  of  Corinth,  and 
followed  up  the  retreating  Confede- 
rates. 

The  consolidation  of  these  various 
forces  into  one  command  was  favorably 
regarded  by  the  public.  It  was  be- 
lieved that  the  combination  would  con- 
duce alike  to  strength  and  usefulness. 
The  new  aiTangement  did  not  prove 
agreeable  to  General  Fremont,  as  Pope 
had  been  his  junior  in  Missouri.  It 
was  Fremont’s  opinion  that  the  effect 
of  the  appointment  of  Pope  to  the  su- 
preme command,  while  he  himself  re- 
mained in  a subordinate  position,  would 
be  greatly  to  reduce  his  rank  and  con- 
sideration in  the  service ; and  conse- 
quently he  asked  to  be  relieved  from 
command.  He  was  relieved  according- 
ly; and  his  corps  was  given  first  to 
General  King,  and  then  to  General 
Sigel.  In  addition  to  these  three  corps, 
a small  and  unorganized  force,  under 
Brigadier-General  Sturgis,  was  posted 
in  the  neighborhood  of  Alexandria; 
and  thither,  also,  Burnside,  who  had 
arrived  at  Newport  News  from  Roan- 
oke, was  ordered  to  proceed  with  his 
troops.  The  disposable  movable  forces, 
consisted  of  the  three  corps  first  named 
— that  of  Sigel;  that  of  Banks;  and 
that  of  McDowell ; — about  40,000  in  all. 
The  cavalry  numbered  about  5000 


928 


278 


POPE  AXD  LEE  IX  VIRGINIA. 


but  the  horses  were  in  wretched  con- 
dition, and  the  men  were  poorly  pro- 
vided with  arms.  These  forces  were 
scattered  over  a wide  surface,  and  along 
a line  which  extended  from  Fredericks- 
burg to  Winchester  and  Harper’s  Ferry, 
in  the  Shenandoah  Valley ; and  General 
Pope  was  charged  with  the  three-fold 
duty  of  covering  the  National  capital, 
of  guarding  the  valley  entrance  to  Mary- 
land, in  the  rear  of  Washington,  and  of 
menacing  Kichmond  from  the  North, 
as  a diversion  in  favor  of  McClellan. 

Pope  assumed  command  on  the  28th 
June  June,  Colonel  George  D.  Pug- 
28*  gles  being  his  chief  of  staff. 
Having  disposed  of  his  troops  as  he 
best  could,  for  the  purpose  of  carrying 
out  the  ^wishes  of  the  government,  he 
was  prepared  to  move  toward  Rich- 
mond with  the  view  of  aiding  McClel- 
lan when  began  that  series  of  battles 
which  preceded  and  attended  the  re- 
treat of  the  army  of  the  Potomac  from 
the  Chickahominy  to  Harrison’s  Land- 
ing. It  was  Pope’s  intention  to  ad- 
vance by  way  of  Charlottesville  upon 
the  James  River,  above  Richmond, 
compelling  Lee  to  detach  a part  of  his 
army  from  the  front  of  Richmond,  and 
thus  enabling  McClellan  to  complete 
his  movement  successfully.  McClel- 
lan’s retreat  changed  the  entire  plan  of 
the  campaign.  A cabinet  council  was 
called;  and  Pope  was  summoned  be- 
fore it.  Pope  was  seriously  opposed  to 
McClellan’s  retreat ; and  strongly  urged 
its  impolicy  upon  the  president  and  the 
secretary  of  war.  He  offered  to  march 
from  Fredericksburg  upon  Richmond 
direct  with  his  whole  force,  insisting 


only  on  one  condition — that  peremptory 
orders  should  be  sent  to  McClellan,  and 
such  measures  taken  in  advance,  that  it 
would  not  be  possible  for  him  to  evade, 
on  any  pretext,  making  a vigorous  at- 
tack upon  the  enemy  with  his  whole 
army  th^  moment  he  heard  that  Pope 
was  engaged.  This  proposal  of  Pope 
was  the  more  honorable  that  it  implied 
a very  considerable  risk : it  would  have 
placed  Lee  between  the  two  National 
armies,  and  given  him  the  opportunity 
of  striking  each  in  turn,  with  the  pos- 
sibility of  destroying  both.  After  Mc- 
Clellan arrived  at  Harrison’s  Landing, 
Pope  clung  to  his  conviction  that  it 
would  be  impolitic  for  him  to  abandon 
the  Peninsula,  and  wrote  to  him  a per- 
sonal note,  offering  every  assistance  in 
his  power,  and  inviting  a free  exchange 
of  opinions.  To  this  letter  McClellan 
returned  a chilling  reply.  On  jujy 
the  14th  of  July,  when  about  H. 
to  commence  active  operations.  Pope 
issued  to  his  soldiers  an  address  which 
revealed  something  like  vanity,  with 
not  a little  irritation  of  feeling — an  ad- 
dress which  could  not  have  been  other- 
wise conceived  and  expressed  if  the 
object  had  been  to  embitter  sentiment 
already  known  to  exist,  and  to  di- 
vide the  discordant  s}Tnpathies  of  the 
army  of  the  Potomac  and  the  army  of 
Virginia.  “ By  special  assignment  of 
the  president,”  said  Pope,  “ I have  as- 
siuned  command  of  this  army.  I have 
spent  two  weeks  in  learning  your 
whereabouts,  your  condition  and  your 
wants,  in  prepai’ing  you  for  active  oper- 
ations, and  in  placing  you  in  positions 
from  which  you  can  act  promptly  and 


POPE’S  ADDRESS. 


579 


to  the  purpose.  These  labors  are  near- 
ly completed,  and  I am  about  to  join 
you  in  the  field.  Let  us  understand 
each  other.  I have , come  to  you  from 
the  West,  where  we  have  always  seen 
the  backs  of  our  enemies — from  an  army 
whose  business  it  has  been  to  seek  the 
adversary,  and  beat  him  when  found; 
whose  policy  has  been  attack,  and  not 
defense.  In  but  one  instance  has  the 
enemy  been  able  to  place  our  W estern 
armies  in  a defensive  attitude.  I pre- 
sume I have  been  called  here  to  pursue 
the  same  system,  and  to  lead  you 
against  the  enemy.  It  is  my  purpose 
to  do  so,  and  that  speedily.  I am  sure 
you  long  for  an  opportunity  to  win  the 
distinction  you  are  capable  of  achiev- 
ing; that  opportunity  I shall  endeavor 
to  give  you.  In  the  meantime  I desire 
you  to  dismiss  certain  phrases  I am 
sorry  to  find  much  in  vogue  amongst 
you.  I hear  constantly  of  taking  strong 
positions,  and  holding  them — of  lines  of 
retreat  and  bases  of  supplies.  Let  us 
discard  such  ideas.  The  strongest  po- 
sition a soldier  should  desire  to  occupy 
is  one  from  which  he  can  most  easily 
advance  against  the  enemy.  Let  us 
study  the  probable  line  of  retreat  of 
om'  opponents,  and  leave  our  own 
to  take  care  of  itself.  Let  us  look 
before  us,  and  not  behind.  Success 
and  glory  are  in  the  advance — disaster 
and  shame  lurk  in  the  rear.  Let  us 
act  on  this  understanding,  and  it  is  safe 
to  predict  that  your  banners  shall  be 
inscribed  with  many  a glorious  deed, 
and  that  your  names  will  be  dear  to 
your  countrymen  forever.”  Such  lan- 
guage was  certainly  not  fitted  to  en- 


f 

courage  good  feeling  and  unity  of 
purpose.  It  is  painful  to  have  to  al- 
lude to  these  personal  differences ; but 
it  is  useless  to  make  any  attempt  to 
conceal  the  fact  that  these  same  differ- 
ences had  much  to  do  with  the  disas- 
ters which  had  befallen,  and  which 
were  soon  again  to  befall,  the  National 
arms — disasters  which  for  a time  threat- 
ened the  ruin  of  the  Union  cause. 
These  difiiculties  showed  the  govern- 

O 

ment  the  necessity  for  a commander-in- 
chief of  all  the  forces  of  the  Union ; 
and  on  the  23d  of  July  Gieneral  juiy 
Halleck,  having  resigned -his  com-  23. 
mand  of  the  army  of  the  West,  as- 
sumed, in  obedience  to  an  order  from 
the  president,  the  duties  of  this  high  and 
res2:>onsible  position.  Pope,  foreseeing 
the  inconveniencies,  not  to  say  injuries 
to  the  Union  cause,  which  must  inevita- 
bly result  from  the  inharmonious  action 
already  manifest  on  the  part  of  the  dif- 
ferent generals,  asked  to  be  relieved  from 
his  command  in  Virginia  and  returned 
to  the  Western  country.  His  request, 
however,  was  not  complied  with.  In 
such  circumstances  began  Pope’s  cam- 
paign in  northeastern  Virginia — ground 
made  memorable  by  the  fii’st  battle  of 
Bull  Run,  and,  more  recently,  by  the 
successful  raid  of  General  Jackson 
and  by  the  comparatively  unsuccessful 
efforts  of  Banks,  Fremont  and  Shields. 

We  have  seen  in  a previous  chapter 
that  the  withdrawal  of  McClellan’s 
army  was  definitely  decided  upon  at 
Washington.  It  had  become  a neces- 
sity. On  the  14th  of  August, 
therefore,  that  army  began  to  H.  ' 
move  towards  Acquia  Creek,  with  a 


280 


POPE  AND  LEE  IN  VIRGINIA. 


view  to  reinforce  General  Pope,  and 
to  act  under  his  command.  It  was 
Pope’s  object,  therefore,  so  to  act  that, 
while  he  would  cover  Washington  and 
assure  the  safety  of  the  Shenandoah 
Valley,  he  would  also  facilitate  the 
Aug,  movements  of  McClellan.  On 
23*  the  23d  McClellan  himself  left 
the  landing ; and  on  the  following  day 
he  reached  Acquia  Creek. 

It  is  not  much  to  be  wondered  at 
that  the  Confederate  government  had 
found  great  encouragement  from  the 
failure  of  the  Peninsular  campaign,  and 
had,  in  consequence,  resolved  to  aban- 
don the  merely  defensive  attitude 
with  which  hitherto  they  had  for  the 
most  part  contented  themselves,  and 
to  push  forward  upon  the  foe,  striking 
him  boldly  in  his  own  territory.  The 
conscription  had  proved  singularly  suc- 
cessful; their  armies  had  been  largely 
increased ; and  victory  had  wonderfully 
improved  the  spirits  of  their  men. 
Conscious  of  sti’ength  and  full  of  high 
hopes,  the  Richmond  authorities  made 
up  their  minds  that  the  time  had  come 
for  the  adoption  of  vigorous,  aggressive, 
measures.  It  was  resolved  that  Bragg 
should  push  his  way  through  Kentucky, 
and  capture  Louisville  and  Cincinnati, 
while  Lee  should  make  a rush  through 
the  Shenandoah  Valley,  cross  Maryland, 
and  make  himself  master  of  Philadel- 
phia in  the  hope  that,  by  two  simultane- 
ous movements,  both  of  them  proving 
eminently  successful,  they  would  be 
able  to  compel  the  government  at 
Washington  to  come  to  terms.  In  a 
previous  chapter,  when  treating  of  some 
of  the  important  operations  in  the 


West,  we  have  shown  what  success  at- 
tended the  sortie  of  General  Bragg. 
We  have  now  to  consider  the  success 
which  attended  that  of  General  Lee. 
As  soon  as  it  became  known  at  Rich- 
mond that  an  attempt  was  about  to  be 
made  to  unite  the  forces  of  McClellan 
to  the  command  of  Pope,  it  was  de- 
termined to  act  at  once,  and  to  make  a 
bold  attempt  to  force  a way  to  Wash- 
ington before  the  junction  of  the  two 
armies  could  be  effected.  The  exploit 

of  Jackson  in  the  Shenandoah  Valiev 

«/ 

was  to  be  repeated  on  a grander  scale. 
There  was  much  high-sounding  talk  at 
the  time.  All  that  was  predicted  was 
not  destined  to  be  fulfilled ; but  for  a 
time  matters  looked  black  enough  for  the 
Nationals;  and  the  Confederates  were 
not  wholly  vdthout  reason  for  the  hopes 
which  they  indulged  and  for  the  lan- 
guage which  they  used.  There  were  at 
least  150,000  fighting  men  centred  at 
and  around  Richmond.  With  the  ex- 
ception of  a strong  corps  of  observation, 
all  these  were  at  once  to  be  precipitated 
upon  Maryland. 

At  this  stage  of  our  narrative,  and 
while  the  armies  of  Lee  and  the  armies 
of  Pope  are  preparing  to  rush  into 
deadly  collision — the  first  resolute  for 
attack,  the  second  resolute  for  resist- 
ance— it  is  necessary  to  pause  and  di- 
rect the  attention  of  the  reader  to 
certain  measures  which  had  been  adopt- 
ed for  the  more  successful  prosecution  of 
the  war — measures  which  at  this  very 
moment  were  largely  occupying  the 
public  mind.  We  refer  to  the  orders  of 
General  Pope,  dated  July  18th,  1862, 
and  the  orders  of  the  War  Department, 


SEVERE  MEASURES. 


281 


bearing  date  August  4tli,  August  8th 
and  August  11th.  On  the  18th  of 
J uly  Pope  issued  the  following  orders : 

“ Headquarters  of  the  Army  of  Yihqinia,  ) 
Washington,  July  18,  1862.  ) 

General  Orders^  No,  5. 

“ Hereafter,  as  far  as  practicable,  the 
troops  of  this  command  will  subsist 
upon  the  country  in  which  their  oper- 
ations are  carried  on.  In  all  cases,  sup- 
plies for  this  purpose  will  be  taken  by 
the  officers  to  whose  department  they 
properly  belong,  under  the  orders  of 
the  commanding  officer  of  the  troops 
for  whose  use  they  are  intended.  Vouch- 
ers will  be  given  to  the  owners, 
stating  on  their  face  that  they  will  be 
payable  at  the  conclusion  of  the  war 
upon  sufficient  testimony  being  fur- 
nished that  such  owners  have  been 
loyal  citizens  of  the  United  States  since 
the  date  of  the  vouchers. 

^‘Whenever  it  is  known  that  supplies 
can  be  furnished  in  any  district  of  the 
country  where  the  troops  are  to  operate, 
the  use  of  trains  for  carrying  subsist- 
ence will  be  dispensed  with  as  far  as 
possible. 

“By  command  of 

“ Major-Gei^^eral  Pope. 
“Geo.  D.  K-uggles, 

“ Col.  A.  A.-G.  and  Chief  of  Staff.” 

“ Headquarters  of  the  Army  of  Virginia,  ) 
Washington,  July  18,  1862.  ) 

“ General  Orders,  No,  6. 

“ Hereafter,  in  any  operations  of  the 
cavalry  forces  in  this  command  no  sup- 
ply or  baggage  trains  of  any  descrip- 
tion will  be  used,  unless  so  stated 
especially  in  the  order  for  the  move- 
ment. Two  days’  cooked  rations  will 


be  carried  on  the  persons  of  the  men ; 
and  all  villages  and  neighborhoods 
through  which  they  pass  will  be  laid 
under  contribution  in  the  manner  specb 
fied  by  General  Orders,  No.  5,  current 
series,  from  these  headquarters,  for  the 
subsistence  of  men  and  horses. 

“ Movements  of  cavalry  must  always 
be  made  with  celerity,  and  no  delay  in 
such  movements  will  be  excused  here- 
after on  any  pretext. 

“ Whenever  the  order  for  the  move- 
ment of  any  portion  of  the  army  ema- 
nates from  these  headquarters,  the  time 
of  marching,  and  that  to  be  consumed 
in  the  execution  of  the  duty,  will  be 
specifically  designated,  and  no  de- 
parture therefrom  will  be  permitted  to 
pass  unnoticed  without  the  gi*avest  and 
most  conclusive  reasons. 

“ Commanding  officers  will  be  held  re- 
sponsible for  strict  and  prompt  compli- 
ance with  every  provision  of  this  order. 

“ By  command  of 

“Major-General  Pope. 

“ Geo.  D.  Buggles, 

“ Col.  A.  A.-G.  and  Chief  of  Staff.” 

On  the  same  day  was  issued  another 
order,  declaring  that  the  inhabitants 
along  the  lines  of  railroads  and  tele- 
graphs and  the  routes  of  travel  would 
be  held  responsible  for  any  injury  done 
to  track,  line  or  road,  or  for  any  at- 
tacks on  trains  or  stragglers  by  bands 
of  guerrillas  in  their  neighborhood.  In 
cases  of  damage  to  roads,  the  citizens 
within  five  miles  would  be  turned  out 
in  mass  to  repair  the  damage.  If  a 
soldier  or  legitimate  follower  of  the 
army  was  fired  upon  from  any  house, 
the  same  should  be  razed  to  the  ground. 


282 


POPE  AND  LEE  IN  VIRGINIA. 


By  anotlier  order,  all  disloyal  citizens 
within  the  lines  of  the  army  or  within 
the  reach  of  its  respective  officers,  were 
to  be  arrested  at  once.  Those  taking 
the  oath  of  allegiance,  and  giving  suffi- 
cient security  for  its  observance,  were 
to  be  allowed  to  remain ; all  others 
were  to  be  conducted  to  the  South,  be- 
yond the  extreme  pickets,  and  if  again 
found  anywhere  within  the  lines,  were 
to  be  treated  as  spies,  and  subjected  to 
the  extreme  rigor  of  military  law.  These 
orders  of  General  Pope  were  followed 
by  the  pillaging  of  private  property, 
and  by  insults  to  females,  to  a degree 
unknown  heretofore  during  the  war. 

The  Confederate  government,  by 
way  of  retaliation,  issued  an  order  de- 
claring that  General  Pope  and  the 
commissioned  officers  serving  under 
him  were  “not  entitled  to  be  con- 
sidered as  soldiers,  and  therefore  not 
entitled  to  the  benefit  of  cartel  for  the 
parole  of  future  prisoners  of  war.  Or- 
dered, further,  that  in  the  event  of 
the  capture  of  Major-General  Pope,  or 
any  commissioned  officers  serving  under 
him,  the  captive  so  taken  shall  be  held 
in  close  confinement  so  long  as  the 
orders  aforesaid  shall  continue  in  force 
and  unrepealed  by  the  competent  mili- 
tary authonty  of  the  United  States, 
and  that  in  the  event  of  the  murder  of 
an  unarmed  citizen  or  inhabitant  of  this 
Confederacy,  by  virtue  or  under  pre- 
tense of  the  order  hereinbefore  recited, 
it  shall  be  the  duty  of  the  commanding 
general  of  the  forces  of  this  Confede- 
racy to  cause  immediately  to  be  hung, 
out  of  commissioned  officers,  prisoners 
as  aforesaid,  a number  equal  to  that  of 


our  own  citizens  thus  murdered  by  the 
enemy.”  It  was  manifest  from  the 
orders  of  General  Pope  that  he  meant 
to  conduct  the  war  on  very  different 
principles  from  those  which  had  guided 
Generah  McClellan.  The  action  taken 
by  the  Confederate  government  showed, 
on  the  other  hand,  that  through  them 
Pope  had  added  bitterness  to  the  con- 
test. Pope’s  orders  were  afterwards 
considerably  modified. 

After  the  failure  of  the  Peninsular 
campaign  became  fully  apparent,  and 
McClellan  had  commenced  his  retreat, 
the  government  at  Washington  natural- 
ly enough  felt  the  danger  to  which  the 
country  was  in  consequence  exposed, 
and  proceeded  to  do  their  utmost  to 
provide  against  the  emergency.  A call 
had  just  been  made  for  300,000  volun- 
teers. It  was  now  deemed  necessary  to 
call  upon  the  several  States  to  furnish 
an  equal  number  of  militia,  to  serve  for 
nine  months.  . It  was  found  extremely 
difficult  to  raise  by  voluntary  enlist- 
ment as  many  as  600,000  men.  Great 
efforts  were  therefore  made  to  arouse 
the  enthusiasm  of  the  people.  Burning 
words  went  forth  from  pulpit  and  plat- 
form ; and  the  press  lent  the  weight  of 
its  mighty  influence  to  the  advancement 
of  the  common  cause.  Liberal  bounties 
were  offered  by  the  government;  and 
large  sums  of  money  were  contributed 
from  private  sources  for  the  purpose  of 
promoting  enlistment.  All  these  efforts, 
however,  were  found  to  be  insufficient ; 
and  the  president  at  last  found 
himself  under  the  necessity  of 
having  recourse  to  a draft.  The  fol- 
lowing orders  were,  therefore,  issued: 


GENERAL  ORDERS. 


283 


“ War  Department,  j 
Washington,  August  4,  1862.  ) 

‘‘Ordered,  First — That  a draft  of 
300,000  militia  be  immediately  called 
into  the  service  of  the  United  States, 
to  serve  for  nine  months,  unless  sooner 
discharged.  The  secretary  of  war  will 
assign  the  quotas  to  the  States,  and 
establish  regulations  for  the  draft. 

Second — That  if  any  State  shall  not, 
by  the  15th  of  August,  furnish  the 
quota  of  the  additional  300,000  volun- 
teers authorized  by  law,  the  deficiency 
of  volunteers  in  that  State  will  also  be 
made  up  by  a special  draft  from  the 
militia.  The  secretary  of  war  will 
establish  regulations  for  this  purpose. 

“ Third — Regulations  will  be  pre- 
pared by  the  War  Department,  and 
presented  to  the  president,  with  the 
object  of  securing  the  promotion  of 
ofiicers  of  the  army  and  volunteers  for 
meritorious  and  distinguished  services, 
and  of  preventing  the  nomination  and 
appointment  in  the  military  service  of 
incompetent  or  unworthy  officers.  The 
regulations  will  also  provide  for  ridding 
the  service  of  such  incompetent  persons 
as  now  hold  commissions. 

“By  order  of  the  president. 

“ Edwin  M.  Stanton, 

“Secretary  of  War.” 

These  orders  were  submitted  to  with 
a reasonably  good  grace,  considering 
the  natural  repugnance  of  the  Ameri- 
can citizen  to  compulsory  military  ser- 
vice. Subsequent  orders,  however, 
Aug,  dated  the  8th  of  August,  and 
seriously  interfering  with  the 
principles  involved  in  the  writ  of 
habeas  corpus — orders,  for  example, 


authorizing  the  arrest  and  imprison- 
ment of  any  person  or  persons  who 
should  by  act,  speech  or  writing  dis- 
courage volunteer  enlistments,  or  who 
should  aid  and  comfort  the  enemy,  or 
who  should  be  discovered  in  any  other 
disloyal  practice ; authorizing,  also,  the 
arrest  and  imprisonment  of  any  person 
or  persons  who  should  attempt  to  leave 
the  United  States,  and  thus  seek  to 
avoid  military  duty — these  raised  a 
perfect  tempest  of  excitement.  They 
placed  the  foreigner  resident  on  these 
shores  under  great  inconveniences ; and 
they  forbade  the  American  citizen,  who 
was  liable  to  be  drafted,  to  go  out  of 
the  country  or  even  to  absent  himself 
from  his  State  or  county.  It  was  found 
to  be  impossible  to  carry  out  these 
orders  according  to  the  strict  letter; 
and,  consequently,  another  order  from 
the  War  Department,  dated  the  Au^. 
11th  of  August — some  days  after  D. 
the  fighting  between  Pope  and  Lee  had 
fairly  commenced — took  the  edge  off 
their  offensiveness,  by  advising  the  ex- 
ercise of  great  caution  and  sound  judg- 
ment in  carrying  them  into  execution. 
The  difficulty  was  thus  got  over;  and 
the  manifestations  of  patriotism  on  the 
part  of  the  people  were  such  as  to  teach 
the  government  that  such  measures 
were  as  unnecessary  as  they  were  un- 
wise 

The  reader  is  now  in  a position  in 
which  he  can  comprehend  the  state  of 
thiiiofs  North  and  South  at  this  critical 
moment  in  the  history  of  the  war. 
With  a knowledge  of  these  details,  he 
will  be  able  the  more  easily  to  enter 
into  the  feelings  of  the  rival  armies 


284 


POPE  AND  LEE  IN  VIRGINIA. 


which  now  confronted  each  other  and 
were  ready  to  rush  into  deadly  strife, 
as  well  as  to  appreciate  the  special  ad- 
vantages which  belonged  to  each.  It 
is  important,  also,  for  the  reader  to  re- 
member that,  at  this  particular  junc- 
ture, McClellan  had  not  yet  left  Harri- 
son’s Landing. 

Early  in  the  month  of  August  the 
divisions  of  Ewell,  Hill  and  Jackson 
were  hurried  forward  to  the  Rapi- 
dan  River,  which  is  the  south  fork 
of  the  Rappahannock.  General  Pope 
made  immediate  preparations  to  meet 
the  enemy,  and  to  hinder  his  ad- 
vance. Hitherto  he  had  been  giv- 
ing his  instructions  from  Washington, 
the  capital  of  Rappahannock  County. 
General  Rufus  King  had  been  ordered 
to  send  forward  detachments  of  cavalry, 
and  break  up,  if  possible,  the  Virginia 
Central  Railroad.  In  this  mission  King 
had  been  successful ; and  the  road  was 
broken  up  in  several  places.  General 
Banks  had  been  instructed  to  move 
forward  and  take  post  where  the  turn- 
pike from  Sperryville  to  Culpepper 
crosses  Hazel  River.  Previous  to  this. 
Banks  had  been  instructed  to  send 
General  Hatch,  with  some  2000  of  his 
best  mounted  men,  to  proceed  from 
Madison  Court  House  around  the  west 
side  of  the  Blue  Ridge,  and  make  a 
descent  upon  Gordonsville  and  destroy 
the  railroad  leading  to  Richmond,  and 
then  to  push  forward  to  Charlottesville 
and  break  up  the  railroad  between 
that  place  and  Lynchburg.  Hatch 
was  despatched  accordingly.  But  both 
movements  failed.  Platch  was  dis- 
graced; and  the  cavalry  of  General 


Banks  was  placed  in  charge  of  General 
John  Buford.  McDowell  had  been 
ordered  from  Waterloo  Bridge  to  Cul- 
pepper Court  House  ; and  General 
Sigel  was  already  encamped  at  Sperry- 
ville, soipe  twenty  miles  from  Cul- 
pepper. On  the  7th  of  August, 

Pope  himself  tells  us,  all  the  in-  7. 
fan  try  and  artillery  forces  of  the  orig- 
inal army  of  Virginia  were  assembled 
along  the  turnpike  from  Sperryville 
to  Culpepper,  and  numbered  about 
28,000  men.  The  cavalry  were  well 
arranged,  both  for  observation  and  de- 
fense. Buford,  with  five  regiments, 
was  posted  at  Madison  Court  House, 
with  his  pickets  stretching  along  the 
line  of  the  Rapidan  from  Barnett’s 
Ford  to  the  Blue  Ridge.  Sigel,  ac- 
cording to  instructions,  had  posted  a 
brigade  of  infantry  and  a battery  of 
artillery  at  the  point  where  the  road 
from  Madison  Court  House  to  Sperry- 
ville crosses  the  Robertson  River. 
These  were  intended  as  a support  for 
Buford.  Bayard,  with  four  regiments 
of  cavalry,  was  posted  near  Rapidan 
Station,  at  the  point  where  the  Orange 
and  Alexandria  Road  crosses  the  Rapi- 
dan, his  pickets  extending  as  far  east 
as  Racoon  Ford,  and  connecting  with 
Buford  at  Barnett’s  Ford.  There  was 
a signal  station  on  the  suimnit  of 
Thoroughfare  Mountain,  commanding  a 
view  of  the  entire  country  as  far  south 
as  Orange  Court  House.  Having  com- 
mand of  this  station.  Pope  could  count 
with  confidence  on  being  informed  of 
the  first  appearance  of  the  enemy,  as 
well  as  of  the  direction  of  his  move- 
ments. Burnside  and  his  troops,  of 


CEDAR  MOUNTAIN. 


285 


which  no  account  is  here  taken,  were 
left  in  charge  of  Fredericksburg.  The 
two  main  points  of  Pope’s  line  of  de- 
fense were  thus  Fredericksburg  and 
Culpepper  Court  House.  Culpepper 
is  about  seventy  miles  from  Washing- 
ton. The  route  crosses  the  Long  Bridge 
at  Washington,  thence  through  Alex- 
andria, Fairfax,  Manassas  and  Warren- 
ton.  It  is  equally  distant  from  Rich- 
mond. Fredericksburg  is  connected 
with  Washington  by  steamboat  naviga- 
tion on  the  Potomac  to  Acquia  Creek, 
thence,  by  railroad,  fifteen  miles  to 
Fredericksburg,  which  is  sixty  miles  by 
railroad  from  Richmond. 

On  the  morning  of  the  8th  of  Au- 
Aug.  gusb  after  having  inspected  the 
8*  different  corps,  and  seen  and 
given  orders  to  the  different  generals, 
Pope  arrived  in  person  at  Culpepper. 
Here  he  found  that  his  orders  had 
been  attended  to,  and  that  all  things 
were  in  a satisfactory  condition.  Craw- 
ford’s brigade,  of  General  Banks’  corps, 
had  already  arrived.  So,  too,  had 
Ricketts’  division,  of  General.  McDow- 
ell’s corps.  At  an  early  hour  he  had 
learned  from  General  Bayard,  who  was 
slowly  falling  back  towards  Culpepper, 
that  the  enemy  was  approaching.  The 
same  information  came  from  General 
Buford,  who  was  stationed  more  to  the 
west.  It  was  impossible  during  the 
whole  of  the  8th  to  decide  whether 
the  intended  movement  of  the  enemy 
was  in  the  direction  of  Culpepper  or 
Madison  Court  House.  As  he  had 
been  specially  instructed  to  preserve 
his  communication  with  the  Rappahan- 
nock at  Fredericksburg,  he  regulated 


his  movements  with  that  end  in  view. 
Early  in  the  day  he  pushed  forward 
Crawford’s  brigade  in  the  direction  of 
Cedar  or  Slaughter  Mountain,  to  the 
support  of  Bayard,  who  was  falling 
back  in  that  direction.  Meanwhile  he 
concentrated  his  forces,  bringing  them 
closer  toocether  in  the  neighborhood  of 
Culpepper.  Banks  was  summoned  to 
that  place  from  Hazel  River.  Sigel 
was  ordered  to  hurry  forward  from 
Sperryville.  Banks  arrived  in  good 
time ; but  Sigel,  from  some  cause, 
blundered  as  to  the  road  he  should 
take,  and  was  by  that  means  prevented 
from  coming  up  until  late  in  the  after- 
noon of  the  following  day.  On  the 
morning  of  the  9th,  Pope  ordered 
General  Banks,  with  the  remain- 
der  of  his  corps,  to  advance  towards 
Cedar  Mountain — a sugar-loaf  eminence 
about  seven  miles  south  of  Culpepper, 
and  about  two  miles  west  of  the  Orange 
and  Alexandria  Railroad.  Banks  was 
to  join  Crawford,  who  was  stationed  in 
the  rear  of  Bayard,  and  to  take  com- 
mand of  all  the  forces  present.  He  had 
special  instructions  to  check  the  ad- 
vance of  the  enemy  and  to  ascertain  his 
strength,  as  well  as,  if  possible,  to  dis- 
cover his  immediate  purpose. 

The  Confederates  had,  meanwhile, 
been  pressing  forward  in  very  consider- 
able strength;  and  before  Banks  ar- 
rived, Jackson  had  taken  possession  of 
Cedar  Mountain,  and,  from  that  com- 
manding eminence,  had  taken  in  the 
entire  view  and  made  himself  acquaint- 
ed with  the  position  and  strength  of 
the  National  army.  Ewell  was  thrown 
forward  with  his  division ; and  care 


286 


POPE  AND  LEE  IN  VIRGINIA. 


was  taken  to  conceal  the  troops  as 
much  as  possible  under  the  cover  of  the 
woods.  Early’s  brigade,  of  Ewell’s 
division,  was  posted  on  the  road  lead- 
ing from  Culpepper.  The  other  divi- 
sions took  position  on  the  western  slope 
of  the  mountain,  and  planted  batteries 
on  every  available  spot.  Some  of  the 
batteries  were  as  high  as  a hundred  feet 
above  the  common  level  of  the  ground. 
Four  guns  were  advanced  to  the  front ; 
and  these,  with  some  of  the  more  ele- 
vated batteries,  opened  fire  upon  Craw- 
ford’s batteries.  Simultaneously  with 
the  opening  of  this  fire  on  Crawford, 
General  Winder,  with  a portion  of 
Jackson’s  corps,  moved  out  towards 
the  left,  carefully  keeping  under  cover. 
A little  later  in  the  day.  Hill  came  up 
with  his  division ; and  when  about  five 
o’clock  they  began  to  throw  out  skirm- 
ishers, the  Confederates,  strongly  post- 
ed, numbered  about  20,000  veterans. 

It  was  about  five  o’clock  in  the  after- 
noon when  General  Banks  advanced  to 
the  attack.  Up  to  that  hour  he  did 
not  believe  that  the  enemy  were  in 
sufficient  force  to  make  any  vigorous 
demonstration;  and  he  so  reported  to 
General  Pope.  The  battle  at  once  be- 
came general  ; it  began  to  rage  more 
fiercely  after  six  o’clock ; and  from 
that  time  till  darkness  came  on  the 
fighting  was  furious  and  incessant. 
About  seven  o’clock  Pope  himself 
came  on  the  field,  bringing  with  him 
Ricketts’  division.  On  his  arrival  on 
the  ground,  Pope  saw  at  once  that 
Banks’  right  wing  was  too  much  ex- 
tended. Directing  Banks  to  draw  in 
his  right  wing  and  mass  it  upon  his 


centre,  he  pushed  forward  Ricketts’ 
division  to  occupy  the  ground  thus 
vacated.  As  Banks  retired  his  men 
with  great  caution,  the  Confederates 
pressed  close  upon  them  and  began  to 
emerge  from  the  woods.  The  batteries 
of  Ricketts’  division  opened  upon  them 
a tremendous  fire,  and  compelled  them 
to  fall  back  under  cover.  Night  now 
fell  upon  the  scene ; and  the  close,  and, 
in  some  cases,  hand-to-hand  fighting 
ceased;  but  the  artillery  firing  was 
kept  up  until  near  midnight.  General 
Sigel  did  not  arrive  in  time  to  take  any 
active  part  in  the  fight ; but  his  ap- 
pearance helped  to  give  courage  against 
the  possibilities  of  the  coming  day. 
General  Banks  held  the  ground  he 
took  early  in  the  morning.  His  mis- 
take, if  he  made  any,  was  that  he  ad- 
vanced against  a foe  whose  strength  he 
had  no  means  of  knowing.  He  had 
been  driven  back  one  mile  from  the 
spot  where  the  fighting  commenced. 
Such  was  the  battle  of  Cedar  Mountain, 
or,  as  it  is  named  by  the  Confederates, 
Cedar  Run.  Not  on  so  large  a scale, 
or  so  protracted  as  some  of  the  battles 
which  we  have  described,  it  was  yet 
one  of  the  bloodiest  and  most  keenly 
contested.  ‘‘I  have  witnessed,”  writes 
one  who  was  present,  “many  battles 
during  the  war;  but  I have  seen  none 
where  the  tenacious  obstinacy  of  the 
American  character  was  so  fully  dis- 
played.” It  was  a fight  of  one  against 
two.  The  Nationals  w^ere  in  the  mi- 
nority ; but  it  can  hardly  be  said  that 
they  were  robbed  of  the  honors  of  the 
day.  The  loss  on  both  sides  ^vas  very 
heavy.  General  Banks’  corps  was  so 


THE  RETREAT. 


287 


cut  up  as  to  be  reduced  at  least  oue- 
half.  Brigadier-Generals  Geary,  Augur 
and  Carroll  were  badly  wounded,  and 
Brigadier-General  Prince  was  captured. 
Pope  estimated  his  entire  loss  at  1800 
men.  The  confederate  loss  was  heavy, 
and  included  some  of  the  best  officers. 

The  10th  was  Sunday.  At  day- 
Aug,  break  the  Confederates  fell  back 
10.  about  two  miles.  The  National 
pickets  advanced  and  occupied  the 
ground.  During  the  remainder  of  the 
day  the  army  rested.  The  day 
D*  following  was  spent  in  burying 
the  dead ; and  on  the  same  night  the 
enemy  disappeared,  leaving  his  dead 
unburied,  and  his  wounded  to  the 
mercy  of  the  Nationals. 

On  the  16th  a party  of  Confederate 
Aug.  cavalry  were  surprised  and  cap- 
10*  tured  at  Louisa  Court  House. 
On  their  persons  were  found  some  im- 
portant letters,  one  of  them  being  an 
autograph  letter  from  Lee,  intimating 
that  he  was  moving  the  main  body  of 
his  army,  by  forced  marches,  to  attack 
General  Pope  before  a junction  could 
be  formed  between  him  and  the  army 
of  the  Potomac.  This  information  hav- 
ing been  sent  to  Washington,  Pope 
received  instructions  from  the  com- 
mander-in-chief not  to  cross  the  Kapi- 
dan,  but  to  fall  back  and  take  post 
behind  the  north  fork  of  the  Bappa- 
hannock,  where  reinforcements  could 
be  more  easily  sent  him.  This  move- 
Aug,  ment  was  commenced  on  the 
18.  18th.  On  the  following  day  Lee, 

with  a large  force,  crossed  the  Bapidan. 
Meanwhile  Pope  had  been  consider- 
ably reinforced.  He  had  been  joined 


by  8000  of  Burnside’s  soldiers,  under 
General  Beno ; by  ten  regiments,  under 
General  Stevens,  which  had  just  re- 
turned from  Port  Boyal ; and  by  Gen- 
eral King,  with  some  regiments  from 
McDowell’s  corps.  He  was  also  author- 
ized to  call  the  main  portion  of  General 
Cox’s  forces  from  Western  Virginia. 
With  the  greater  portion  of  these  forces 
already  on  hand — about  forty  regi- 
ments in  all — the  retreat  began.  Gen- 
eral Sigel  led  the  advance;  General 
Beno  had  charge  of  the  left ; and  Gen- 
eral McDowell,  supported  by  General 
Banks,  occupied  the  centre.  In  this 
order  the  retreat  was  commenced  on 
the  night  of  the  18th  of  August.  The 
night  was  dark  and  cold  for  the  season 
of  the  year.  The  usual  camp  fires 
were  extinguished,  and  all  unnecessary 
noise  was  avoided.  Considering  the 
immense  train  of  wagons  in  advance  of 
the  troops,  the  progress  made  during 
the  night  was  marvellous.  On  the 
morning  of  Tuesday  the  19th  a 
large  portion  of  the  army  had  1^* 
passed  through  Culpepper.  The  sight 
presented  by  the  moving  masses  of  in- 
fantry, cavalry  and  artillery,  together 
with  the  multitudes  of  white-covered 
wagons  winding  slowly  up  the  distant 
hills,  was  imposing  in  the  extreme,  and 
one  which  it  rarely  falls  to  the  lot  of 
even  military  men  to  witness.  It  was 
unfortunate  for  the  country,  however, 
that  two  such  spectacles  should  have 
been  witnessed  by  the  same  men  within 
so  limited  a period.  By  noon  on  the 
19th  the  advance  had  reached  the  one 
bridge — the  railroad  bridge  at  the  Bap- 
pahannock  Station — over  which  th.e 


288 


POPE  AND  LEE  IN  VIRGINIA. 


entire  army  must  pass.  All  day  long, 
and  all  night  through,  this  gi*eat  army, 
with  all  its  encumbrances,  continued  to 
pass  over  the  bridge;  and  by  one 
o’clock  on  the  20th,  the  mighty 
20.  moving  mass  was,  if  not  absolute- 
ly safe,  at  least  on  the  other  side  of  the 
North  Fork.  They  were  not  a moment 
too  soon  across;  for  the  Confederates 
were  already  in  great  force  at  their 
heels.  Bayard,  who  had  charge  of  the 
rear,  had  been  skirmishing  with  their 
advance  since  he  had  passed  Cedar 
Mountain.  At  the  last  moment  the 
Confederate  cavalry  made  a vigorous 
charge  on  the  National  rear;  a few 
men  were  killed;  but  the  complete 
success  of  the  retreat  was  not  hindered. 
It  was  with  good  reason  that  Pope  was 
proud  of  the  manner  in  which  the  re- 
treat had  been  conducted. 

After  an  etfort  so  exhaustive,  it  might 
be  expected  that  the  army  would  need 
j’est.  But  there  was  to  be  no  rest : 
the  toil  must  be  severe  and  continuous 
for  days  and  weeks  to  come.  Pope 
posted  his  army  along  the  line  of  the 
Rappahannock,  so  as  to  guard  the  rail- 
j*oad  bridge  and  all  the  fords.  On  the 
Aug,  morning  of  the  21st,  the  Confede- 
21*  rates  were  forward  in  full  force ; 
and  a series  of  attempts  at  different 
places  were  made  to  cross  the  river. 
There  were,  in  consequence,  a number 
of  fierce  artillery  duels.  But  the 
bridge  and  all  the  fords  were  well 
guarded ; and  every  attempt  at  forcing 
a passage  completely  failed.  These 
attempts  were  repeated,  and  heavy 
artillery  firing  was  maintained  at  the 
different  fords  on  the  23d  and  24th, 


but  with  no  special  results.  On  Aug. 
the  23d  Ricketts  destroyed  by  fire  23. 
the  bridge  at  the  Rappahannock.  Lee 
now  resolved  on  a flank  movement ; and, 
with  this  end  in  view,  he  advanced 
about  twelve  miles  further  up  the  river, 
and  made  a bold  attempt  to  cross  at 
Waterloo  Bridge.  This  attempt  was 
also  resisted ; but  it  was  only  par- 
tially defeated.  Meanwhile,  General 
Stuart,  at  the  head  of  a body  of  Con- 
federate cavalry,  had  succeeded  in 
crossing  the  river,  and,  haviug  made  a 
bold  dash  on  Catlett’s  Station,  on  the 
Orange  and  Alexandria  Railroad,  some 
thirty -five  miles  from  Washington  and 
some  thirteen  miles  in  the  rear  of  the 
Rappahannock  Station,  where  he  ran- 
sacked Pope’s  army  trains,  seized  his 
baggage,  with  the  property  of  his  staff 
officers,  captured  more  than  two  hun- 
dred horses,  and  destroyed  much  that 
he  could  not  carry  away,  then  found 
his  way  back  again  to  the  Confederate 
lines  with  all  his  booty,  encountering 
during  the  entire  raid  almost  no  oppo- 
sition. This  raid  of  Stuart  was  ex- 
tremely discouraging  to  the  people  of 
the  North,  and  to  the  government  at 
Washington.  It  was  not  less  dis- 
couraging to  the  National  army,  and  to 
Pope  himself.  It  revealed  to  the  world 
what  Pope  and  many  of  his  officers 
well  knew — that  but  little  was  accom- 
plished when,  after  his  retreat  from 
Cedar  Mountain,  he  had  put  the  Rap- 
pahannock between  his  own  army  and 
that  of  General  Lee.  It  showed  that 
Washington,  unless  some  manifestation 
of  strength  was  quickly  made,  was 
again  at  the  mercy  of  the  Confederacy, 


REINFORCEMENTS. 


289 


and  that  General  Lee  was  not  ignorant 
of  the  way  by  which  he  might  pass 
through  Maryland  and  dictate  terms  of 
peace  in  the  city  of  Brotherly  Love. 

The  retreat  across  the  Bappahannock 
was,  in  fact,  partly  a temporary  expedi- 
ent and  partly  a military  necessity.  It 
was  a military  necessity  because  Pope, 
with  the  forces  at  his  command,  could 
not  continue  the  struggle  so  far  from 
his  base  of  supplies,  and  against  such 
fearful  odds.  It  was  a temporary  ex- 
pedient because  it  was  believed  that, 
by  putting  the  Rappahannock  between 
the  two  opposing  armies,  Lee  would  be 
so  hindered  in  his  operations  that  he 
would  be  unable  to  strike  with  his  su- 
perior numbers  before  the  proposed 
junction  had  been  effected  between  the 
army  of  the  Potomac  and  the  army  of 
Virginia.  Pope  was  not  ignorant  of 
the  danger  to  which  he  was  exposed 
from  an  attack  on  his  right  flank,  un- 
less he  were  speedily  reinforced — a 
danger  greatly  aggravated  by  the  fact 
that  he  was  bound  by  strict  orders  to 
preserve  intact  his  communication  with 
Fredericksburg. 

Pope  had  now  become  fully  alive  to 
the  danger  of  his  position.  Convinced 
that  the  main  body  of  Lee’s  army  was 
being  moved  further  up  the  liver,  where 
there  was  little  difficulty  in  crossing, 
and  that  the  object  was  to  turn  his 
right,  get  in  his  rear,  and  cut  off  his 
supplies  from  Washington,  he  tele- 
graphed again  and  again  that,  if  not 
reinforced,  he  would  be  compelled  to 
retreat;  that,  with  the  enemy  moving 
in  force  to  his  right,  it  was  impossible 
for  him  to  offer  effective  resistance 


without  abandoning  Fredericksburg. 
He  was  assured  that  if  he  could  only 
hold  on  two  days  longer,  he  would  be 
so  reinforced  that  he  would  be  able  to 
resume  the  offensive.  Day  after  day 
from  the  21st  of  August  were  these  as- 
surances repeated.  On  the  25th, 
of  the  30,000  or  40,000  men  25. 
promised  him,  only  7000  had  yet  got 
forward  so  far  as  Warrenton  Junction. 
It  was  out  of  the  question  to  think 
of  waiting  any  longer.  The  situation 
was  pregnant  with  peril.  Delay  one 
day  more  might  be  attended  with 
the  most  disastrous  consequences.  Ar- 
rangements were,  in  consequence,  made 
for  immediate  retreat.  Breaking  up 
his  camp  at  Warrenton  and  Warrenton 
Junction,  Pope  began  to  march  rapidly 
back  in  three  columns.  General  Heint- 
zelman,  from  McClellan’s  army,  had 
arrived;  but  he  was  without  wagons, 
without  artillery,  without  even  horses 
for  the  general  and  field  officers,  with- 
out provisions,  and  with  only  forty 
rounds  of  ammunition  to  the  man. 
Porter,  too,  had  arrived  at  Bealston 
with  a portion  of  his  division.  His 
men  were  fresh,  but  poorly  provided 
either  with  provisions  or  with  ammuni- 
tion. Sturgis  and  Cox  were  hourly 
expected  at  Warrenton  Junction — the 
former  with  10,000,  the  latter  with 
7000  men.  Franklin,  too,  was  on  his 
way  with  10,000  more.  Before  the 
arrival  of  Heintzelman,  Pope  estimated 
his  entire  force  at  about  40,000.  The 
Confederate  force  amounted  to  at  least 
80,000.  On  evacuating  Warrenton, 
Pope  resolved  to  offer  the  enemy  battle 
in  the  neighborhood  of  Gainesville,  the 


290 


POPE  AND  LEE  IN  VIRGINIA. 


first  station  to  the  west  of  Manassas 
Junction,  on  what  is  called  the  Gap 
Eailroad.  With  this  end  in  view,  he 
disposed  his  forces,  sending  McDowell, 
with  his  own  corps  and  that  of  Sigel, 
by  the  turnpike  toward  Gainesville, 
Reno  toward  Sudley  Springs,  and 
Heintzelman  toward  Greenwich,  assign- 
ing at  the  same  time  suitable  positions 
to  the  expected  reinforcements  as  they 
should  come  up.  Porter  was  to  push 
forward  and  join  Reno  ; Franklin  was 
to  push  forward  with  all  possible  speed 
to  Gainesville ; and  Haupt,  who  com- 
manded at  Manassas  Junction,  was 
authorized  to  retain  one  of  the  strong- 
est divisions  that  should  arrive,  for  the 
protection  of  the  works,  and  to  push 
forward  its  cavalry  to  Thoroughfare 
Gap.  General  Sturgis,  also,  received 
instructions  to  post  strong  guards  along 
the  railroad  from  Manassas  Junction  to 
Catlett’s  Station,  and  to  superintend 
them  in  person.  Pope’s  command,  in- 
cluding all  these  expected  reinforce- 
ments, now  amounted  to  60,000  men. 

While  Pope’s  forces  are  moving 
steadily  to  the  positions  assigned  them, 
the  Confederates  are  not  idle.  Jack- 
son  has  crossed  the  Rappahannock  at 
Hinson’s  Mill,  four  miles  above  Water- 
loo Bridge,  has  rested  his  men  for  the 
night  at  Salem ; and  before  to-morrow 
at  noon  he  will  have  crossed  the  Bull 
Run  Ridge,  at  Thoroughfare  Gap,  and 
forced  his  way  to  Gaines^dlle.  In 
point  of  fact  he  reached  Gainesville 
when  the  day  was  yet  young,  and  was 
joined  by  Stuart,  with  two  cavalry  bri- 
gades ; and  before  midnight,  while  he 
was  destroying  Bristow  Station,  where 


he  had  arrived  a little  after  sundown, 
Stuart,  in  obedience  to  his  instructions, 
had  surprised  the  post  at  Manassas 
Junction,  captured  300  men,  eight  guns, 
stores  in  large  quantity,  and  much  pub- 
lic property.  Intelligence  of  what  had 
happened*  at  the  Junction  reached  Col- 
onel Scammon,  at  Union  Mills,  on  Bull 
Run,  who  was  stationed  there  with  the 
Eleventh  and  Twelfth  Ohio,  of  General 
Cox’s  division.  Scammon  hasted  to  the 
Junction;  a severe  skirmish  en- 
sued  at  dawn  on  the  27th;  but  27. 
he  was  driven  back  and  compelled  to 
retreat  toward  Alexandria.  Brigadier- 
General  Taylor,  with  the  Second,  Third 
and  Fourth  New  Jersey  Infantry,  hur- 
ried from  Alexandria  by  railroad  to  the 
assistance  of  Scammon ; but  these,  too, 
were  soon  routed ; and  in  the  brief 
conflict  Taylor  lost  a leg.  It  is  quite 
manifest  that  Pope  had  not  counted  on 
the  appearance  of  the  enemy  on  the 
eastern  side  of  Thoroughfare  Gap  so 
early,  and  in  so  great  numbei’s.  Jack- 
son  had,  in  reality,  effected  a surpi-ise. 
It  is  true  that  Pope’s  report  says : “ The 
movement  of  General  Jackson  in  the 
direction  of  Thoroughfare  Gap,  while 
the  main  body  of  the  enemy  confronted 
me  at  Sulphur  Springs  and  Waterloo 
Bridge,  was  well  known  to  me,  but  I 
had  relied  confidently  on  the  forces 
which  I had  been  assured  would  be 
sent  from  Alexandria,  and  one  strong 
division  of  which  I had  ordered  to  take 
post  on  the  works  at  Manassas  Junc- 
tion. I was  entirely  under  the  belief 
that  these  would  be  there,  and  it  was 
not  until  I found  my  communication 
intercepted  that  I was  undeceived.  I 


BRISTOW  STATION. 


291 


knew  that  this  movement  was  no  raid, 
and  that  it  was  made  by  not  less  than 
25,000  men.”  It  is  also  true,  however, 
that  when  Jackson  was  reposing  a.t 
Salem,  between  Thoroughfare  and  Ma- 
nassas Gaps,  Pope  sent  word  to  Mc- 
Dowell at  Warrenton  that  he  believed 
“the  whole  force  of  the  enemy  had 
marched  for  the  Shenandoah  Valley  by 
way  of  Luray  and  Front  Royal.”  Banks, 
it  would  seem,  was  of  the  same  opinion. 
So  thoroughly  ignorant  were  the  Na- 
tionals of  the  whereabouts  of  Jackson 
that,  when  he  was  already  at  Bristow 
Station,  a train  of  cars  came  up  and,  of 
course,  was  captured — a train  on  which 
a short  time  before  Hooker  and  his 
division  had  passed  for  Warrenton. 

On  the  27th  of  August,  the  army  of 
Pope  and  the  army  of  Lee  were  both 
in  critical  circumstances.  Pope  was  cut 
off  from  his  supplies  and  reinforcements. 
This  was  serious  enough  in  the  presence 
of  such  a general  as  Jackson,  and  in 
view  of  the  speedy  arrival  of  Longs  tree  t 
and  Lee.  On  the  other  hand,  however. 
Pope  had  a splendid  opportunity — an 
opportunity  which,  if  it  could  be  seized 
and  acted  upon  in  time,  might  prove 
the  ruin  not  only  of  Jackson,  but  of 
the  whole  Confederate  army.  If  he 
could  block  Thoroughfare  Gap,  and 
thus  prevent  the  passage  of  Longstreet, 
he  might  fall  with  overwhelming  force 
upon  Jackson.  Pope  saw  his  opportu- 
nity, and  began  to  turn  it  to  account. 
The  instructions  already  given  in  re- 
gard to  Gainesville  were  repeated  and 
emphasized.  He  ordered  McDowell, 
with  Sigel  and  Reynolds,  to  hasten  to 
Gainesville  that  night,  and  there  inter- 


cept Longstreet  at  the  head  of  Lee’s 
main  column.  Reno  was  to  hurry  for- 
ward to  Greenwich  with  his  corps  and 
with  Kearney’s  division,  of  Heintzel- 
man,  to  report  to  and  assist  McDowell, 
if  necessary.  Porter  was  to  remain  at 
Warrenton  Station  until  the  arrival  of 
Banks,  who  was  marching  to  that  place 
from  Fayetteville.  So  soon  as  he  was 
relieved,  he  was  to  push  forward  to 
Gainesville.  Pope  himself,  with  Hook- 
er’s division,  of  Hein tzel man’s  corps — 
a division  which  had  now  become 
famous,  and  which  could  always  be 
relied  upon — proceeded  along  the  rail- 
road to  Manassas  Junction.  McDowell 
reached  his  destination  without  the 
necessity  of  fighting.  Hooker  had 
been  less  fortunate.  On  approaching 
Bristow  Station,  somewhat  late  in  the 
afternoon,  he  came  into  contact  with 
Ewell.  It  was  the  advance  of  the  same 
force,  a portion  of  which  had  attacked 
Scammon  and  Taylor  in  the  forenoon. 
A vigorous  action  ensued,  with  a loss 
to  each  of  about  300  men.  Ewell  was 
driven  from  the  field  with  the  loss  of 
all  his  camp  equipage  ; but  he  succeed- 
ed in  destroying  the  bridge  and  railroad 
track,  and  thus  hindered  pursuit.  He 
hastened  to  join  Jackson  at  Manassas. 
When  this  action  commenced.  Hooker 
had  only  forty  rounds  of  ammunition 
to  each  man.  When  it  ended,  the  forty 
had  been  reduced  to  four.  Pope  was 
put  in  high  spirits  by  the  success  of 
Hooker.  He  believed  that,  by  a vigor- 
ous effort  on  the  morning  of  the  28th, 
he  might  “ bag  the  whole  crowd  ” at 
Manassas  Junction.  Jackson  was  al- 
ready, after  the  defeat  of  Ewell,  in  a 


292 


POPE  AND  LEE  IN  VIRGINIA. 


tight  place.  There  were  but  two 
routes  by  which  he  could  retreat — 
the  one  through  Gainesville  and  the 
other  through  Centreville.  Retreat  by 
Gainesville  was  impossible ; for  Mc- 
Dowell was  there  with  a force  equal, 
if  not  superior,  to  his  own.  He  must, 
therefore,  retreat  through  Centreville, 
or  mass  his  forces  and  attack  Pope, 
with  the  view  of  turniim  the  National 

O 

right  at  Bristow  Station.  Jackson  chose 
the  former  course,  and  proceeded  to 
retire  through  Centreville.  Meanwhile, 
in  consequence  of  the  exhausted  con- 
dition of  Hooker’s  troops,  and  knowing 
that  they  were  without  ammunition. 
Pope  had  sent  special  orders  to  Porter 
on  the  evening  of  the  27th,  instructing 
him  to  move  forward  at  one  o’clock  in 
the  morning,  and  to  report  at  Bristow 
by  daylight.  In  the  event  of  Banks 
not  having  yet  arrived,  he  was  to  leave 
him  some  instructions  in  detail.  This 
order  was  not  obeyed.  If  Jackson  had 
not  retired — if,  on  the  contrary,  he 
had  massed  his  men  and  offered  fight — 
the  consequences  might  have  been  dis- 
Aug,  astrous.  At  three  o’clock  on  the 
28.  morning  of  the  28th  Jackson, 
believing  himself  to  be  in  danger, 
evacuated  Manassas,  and  sought  to 
effect  a junction  with  Lee  by  way  of 
Centreville.  As  it  was.  Pope  resolved 
to  pursue  the  retreating  foe  with  all 
the  forces  at  his  command. 

McDowell  had  been  ordered  on  the 
evening  of  the  27th  to  push  forward, 
at  the  very  earliest  dawn,  from  Gaines- 
ville toward  Manassas  Junction.  He 
was  to  rest  his  right  on  Manassas  Gap 
Railroad,  and  throw  his  left  to  the 


west.  Reno  had  orders  to  march  at 
the  same  hour  from  Greenwich,  also 
upon  Manassas;  and  Kearney  was  to 
march  upon  Bristow.  Kearney  was 
promptly  on  hand,  and,  with  Hooker 
following,  was  pushed  forward  to  Ma- 
nassas in 'pursuit  of  Ewell.  Sigel,  with 
McDowell’s  advance,  was  not  forward 
until  three  hours  after  the  time  ap- 
pointed. Porter  did  not  arrive  at 
Bristow  Station  until  after  ten  o’clock, 
when,  instead  of  being  willing  and 
anxious  to  push  forward,  he  asked 
permission  to  halt  and  rest  his  men. 
Sykes’  division,  of  Porter’s  corps,  had 
spent  the  whole  day  of  the  27th,  from 
ten  o’clock  in  the  morning  until  day- 
light of  the  28th,  in  camp  at  Warren- 
ton  Junction.  Merritt’s  division,  of 
the  same  corps,  arrived  at  Warrenton 
Junction  later  on  the  day  of  the  27th, 
and  also  remained  there  during ' the 
whole  of  the  night.  It  was  Pope’s 
opinion  that  Porter’s  troops  were  the 
freshest  in  the  whole  army.  It  is,  it 
must  be  confessed,  exceedingly  difficult 
for  the  impartial  mind  to  take  in  all  the 
facts,  even  at  this  early  stage  of  the 
campaign,  and  yet  resist  the  conviction 
that,  in  the  service  of  Pope,  some  of 
McClellan’s  officers  were  not  only  want- 
ing in  enthusiasm,  but  haK- hearted, 
lukewarm,  indifferent.  Either  that,  or 
the  demon  of  delay,  which  held  their 
former  master  in  bondage,  bad  extend- 
ed its  baleful  influence  to  them.  Pope 
arrived  at  Manassas  Junction  about 
noon  of  the  28th,  shortly  after  Jackson 
in  person  bad  left.  He  immediately 
pushed  forward  Hooker,  Kearney  and 
Reno  upon  Centreville.  McDowell, 


WARRENTON"  TURNPIKE. 


293 


also,  was  ordered  to  recall  that  portion 
of  his  force  which  had  moved  in  the 
direction  of  Manassas  Junction,  and  to 
march  with  his  whole  strength  towards 
Centreville.  McDowell  had,  unfortu- 
nately, sent  Ricketts’  division  toward 
Thoroughfare  Gap.  For  this  new  move- 
ment it  was  not,  therefore,  available. 
Instructions  were  sent  to  Porter  to  take 
post  at  Manassas  J unction. 

Late  in  the  afternoon  of  the  28th, 
Kearney  came  up  with  the  rear-guard 
of  Jackson’s  retreating  columns,  and 
drove  them  out  of  Centreville,  one  por- 
tion of  the  Confederates  falling  back 
by  the  Sudley  Springs  Road,  the  other 
portion  ^by  the  Warrenton  Turnpike, 
toward  Gainesville.  Kearney  remained 
in  occupation  of  Centreville.  The  Con- 
federates destroyed  the  bridges  over 
the  streams  as  they  passed.  The 
ground  which  the  pursued  and  the 
pursuers  were  now  treading  was  that 
made  famous  by  the  first  great  battle 
of  the  war.  They  were  passing  over 
Bull  Run.  In  spite  of  the  eager  anx- 
iety of  the  moment  and  the  all-absorb- 
ing interest  of  the  situation,  stirring 
memories  must  have  been  awakened  in 
the  minds  of  the  rank  and  file,  as  well 
as  of  the  officers,  of  both  armies.  After 
more  than  a year’s  incessant  fighting, 
the  two  great  representative  armies  of 
the  divided  nation  were  again  in  bloody 
conflict  on  the  same  battle  field,  about 
to  attempt  to  settle  the  question  whether 
freedom  should  or  should  not  be  the 
inalienable  birthright  of  all  the  child- 
ren of  the  Republic.  The  Confede- 
rates had  their  faces  turned  toward 
Thoroughfare  Gap,  where  they  knew 


Longstreet  was  coming  to  their  aid. 
Suddenly  Jackson’s  advance  came  into 
contact,  on  the  Warrenton  Turnpike, 
with  King’s  division,  of  McDowell’s 
corps,  which  was  p:ess‘ing  vigorously 
forward  to  intercept  the  retreat.  It 
was  about  six  o’clock  in  the  evening. 
The  struggle  which  ensued  was  severe 
and  sanguinary,  and  was  terminated 
only  by  the  darkness.  In  this  action 
noble  work  was  done  by  the  brigades 
of  Gibbon  and  Doubleday,  both  of 
the  gallant  commanders  covering  them- 
selves with  glory.  The  Confederate 
general,  Taliaferro,  was  badly  wound- 
ed; and  Ewell,  who  was  in  the  thick 
of  the  fight,  lost  a leg. 

Made  aware  of  this  engagement 
that  evening  about  ten  o’clock.  Pope 
concluded  that  he  had  caught  Jackson 
in  a trap,  and  that  if  King,  McDowell 
with  his  other  divisions  sustaining  him, 
could  hold  out  till  the  morning,  he 
would  be  able  so  to  concentrate  his 
forces  as  to  crush  and  destroy  the  Con- 
federate army  before  Longstreet  could 
arrive  with  the  expected  relief.  Mc- 
Dowell and  King  were  accordingly 
urged  to  hold  on,  at  all  hazards,  and 
by  no  means  to  allow  Jackson  to  pass 
to  the  west  through  Thoroughfare  Gup, 
Pope  assuring  them  that  by  daylight 
the  entire  National  forces  would  be 
forward  both  from  Centreville  and  Ma- 
nassas, and  that  the  enemy  must  be 
crushed  between  them.  Kearney  was 
ordered  to  move  cautiously,  after  mid- 
night, from  Centreville  along  the  War- 
renton Turnpike,  to  keep  close  to  the 
enemy’s  lines,  resting  his  left  on  the 
Warrenton  Turnpiku,  and  throwing  hii 


230 


294 


POPE  AND  LEE  IN  VIRGINIA. 


right  well  to  the  north,  and,  at  daylight, 
to  assault  him  vigorously  with  his  right 
advance.  Reno  and  Hooker,  he  was 
told,  would  join  him  shortly  after  dawn. 
Pope’s  instructions  to  Kearney  were 
even  more  than  usually  particular,  be- 
cause he  dreaded  lest  Jackson  should 
make  an  attempt  to  retreat  to  the  north 
in  the  direction  of  Leesburg.  Porter, 
who  was  supposed  to  be  at  Manassas 
Junction,  was  ordered  to  move  upon 
Centreville  at  the  earliest  dawn.  On 
the  night  of  the  28th,  therefore,  Mc- 
Dowell, Sigel  and  Reynolds,  whose 
united  strength  was  2."), 000  men,  were 
immediately  west  of  Jackson,  and  be- 
tween him  and  Thoroughfare  Gap.  On 
the  following  morning,  as  soon  as  it 
was  light,  Porter’s  corps  and  Heintzel- 
man,  with  Kearney,  Hooker  and  Reno, 
were  simultaneously  to  fall  upon  him 
from  the  east.  Such  was  the  dispo- 
sition Pope  had  made  of  his  forces ; 
and  it  was  his  conviction  that  Long- 
street  was,  as  yet,  so  far  off  that  he 
would  be  able  to  defeat  Jackson  before 
the  former  could  come  to  his  aid. 

Longstreet,  however,  was  fully  aware 
of  the  perilous  situation  of  his  compan- 
ion in  arms;  and,  by  forced  marches, 
made  with  almost  incredible  activity, 
he  had,  on  the  evening  of  the  28th, 
reached  Thoroughfare  Gap.  There  he 
encountered  Ricketts’  division,  of  Mc- 
Dowell’s corps ; and,  after  some  sharp 
fighting,  drove  it  back  in  the  direction 
of  Manassas  Junction.  The  gap  was, 
therefore,  left  undefended,  and  Long- 
street  was  able  to  pass  through  without 
further  hindrance.  Prior  to  this,  on  dis- 
covering that  Thoroughfare  Gap  was 


well  guarded,  he  had  sent  a portion  of 
his  troops  up  to  Hopeville  Gap,  a little 
further  to  the  north,  about  three  miles 
above  White  Plains.  Through  both 
these  gaps,  therefore,  Lee’s  men  were 
rushing  j to  the  assistance  of  Jackson. 
This,  however,  was  not  the  only  calam- 
ity which,  at  this  critical  moment,  oc- 
curred to  thwart  Pope’s  designs, 

Early  on  the  morning  of  the  29th,  29. 

before  daybreak,  the  National  com- 
mander, greatly  to  his  mortification, 
learned  that  King,  unable  to  resist  the 
pressure  brought  to  bear  upon  him  by 
Jackson,  had  fallen  back  in  the  same 
direction  vdth  Ricketts.  A new  dispo- 
sition of  his  forces  was,  therefo^’e,  neces- 
sary. Pope  lost  no  time  in  endeav- 
oring to  meet  the  emergency.  Sigel, 
supported  by  Reynolds,  was  ordered 
to  advance  from  Groveton  and  at- 
tack Jackson  in  the  wooded  heights 
close  bv,  while  the  remainder  of  the 
forces  were  being  got  well  in  hand. 
Quickly  thereafter  Heintzelman,  with 
the  divisions  of  Hooker  and  Kearney, 
was  pushed  forward  from  Centreville 
toward  Gainesville.  Reno  was  to  fol- 
low. Their  instructions  were  to  strike 
promptly,  and  with  all  their  weight. 
Porter,  with  his  own  corps  and  the  di- 
vision of  King,  was  ordered  to  move 
from  Manassas  toward  the  same  plac43. 
Porter’s  instructions  were  to  strike 
Jackson’s  flank  at  the  point  where  the 
Warrenton  Turnpike  is  intersected  by 
the  road  from  Manassas  Junction  to 
Gainesville,  to  turn  it,  and  then  fall 
heavily  upon  his  rear. 

Pope’s  instructions,  with  one  excep- 
tion, were  well  carried  out.  Sigel,  with 


GAINESVILLE. 


295 


the  division  of  Carl  Schurz  on  his 
right,  that  of  Schenck  on  his  left,  and 
the  division  of  Milroy  in  the  centre, 
about  five  o’clock  on  the  morning  of 
the  29th,  fell  heavily  on  the  Confede- 
rates, a mile  or  two  east  of  Groveton. 
They  were  soon  joined  by  Hooker  and 
Kearney.  The  battle  became  furious 
all  at  once.  Jackson,  feeling  the 
weight  of  the  onset,  fell  back  some  dis- 
tance; but  he  was  so  closely  pressed, 
that  he  was  compelled  to  halt  and 
make  the  best  defense  possible.  Ac- 
cordingly he  took  up  a position  with 
his  left  on  Sudley  Springs,  his  right  a 
little  to  the  south  of  the  Warrenton 
Turnpike,  his  line  being  covered  by  an 
old  railroad  grade  w’hich  leads  from 
Gainesville  in  the  direction  of  Lees- 
burg. His  batteries  were  numerous ; 
and  some  of  them  were  of  heavy  cali- 
bre. They  were  for  the  most  part 
behind  ridges  in  the  open  ground  on 
both  sides  of  the  turnpike.  His  troops, 
too,  were  well  sheltered  in  dense  woods 
behind  the  railroad  embankment.  It 
was  about  noon  when  Pope  appeared 
on  the  field.  He  had  hurried  forward 
from  Centre ville  with  all  possible  de- 
spatch. He  found  both  armies  much 
cut  up  by  the  sharp  action  in  which 
they  had  been  engaged  since  daylight. 
Heintzelman  was  on  the  risrht  of  the 

O 

line,  in  front  of  Sudley  Springs  Load. 
Sigel  was  on  Heintzelman’s  left,  with 
his  line  extended  a short  distance  south 
of  the  Warrenton  Turnpike,  Schenck’s 
division  occupying  the  high  ground  to 
the  left  of  that  road.  Reynolds  was  on 
the  extreme  left.  Reno’s  corps  had 
reached  the  field,  and  some  of  his  regi- 


ments had  already  been  pushed  into 
action.  Four  regiments  of  this  corps, 
however,  were  held  in  reserve  in  the 
rear  of  the  centre.  Heintzelman  in- 
formed Pope  that  his  line  was  weak, 
and  that  two  of  his  divisions — those  of 
Schurz  and  Steinwehr — were  so  cut  up 
that  they  ought  to  be  drawn  back  from 
the  front.  To  this  Pope  could  not  con- 
sent, but  he  cheered  him  with  the  in- 
formation that  McDowell  and  Porter 
,were  both  on  the  road  to  Gainesville, 
and  would  soon  be  in  position  to  fall 
upon  Jackson’s  right  flank,  and  prob- 
ably also  on  his  rear.  Riding  along 
the  whole  front  of  his  line,  he  cheered 
the  different  commanders  by  the  same 
comforting  assurance.  From  twelve 
until  four  o’clock,  the  skirmishing  was 
frequent  and  severe,  but  the  fighting 
was  neither  general  nor  continuous. 

About  two  o’clock,  firing  was  heard 
in  the  direction  of  Jackson’s  right; 
and  Pope  naturally  supposed  that  Mc- 
Dowell and  Porter  had  reached  their 
position.  The  firing,  however,  was  not 
long  continued.  Soon  afterwards,  he 
learned  that  McDowell  was  advancing 
by  the  Sudley  Springs  Road,  and  that 
he  would  probably  be  up  in  two  hours. 
As  yet  there  was  no  information  regard- 
ing Porter.  At  half-past  four  o’clock 
Pope,  utterly  impatient,  sent  him  per- 
emptory orders  to  push  forward  at  once 
into  action  on  the  enemy’s  light,  and, 
if  possible,  turn. his  rear.  He  at  the 
same  time  stated  to  him  generally  the 
condition  of  things  on  the  field.  After 
allowing  what  he  thought  a sufiicient 
time  for  the  execution  of  these  orders 
by  Porter,  and  knowing  that  McDowell 


296 


POPE  AND  LEE  IN  VIRGINIA. 


was  close  at  hand,  the  order  was  given 
to  Heintzelman  and  Reno  to  make 
the  attack  in  front.  It  was  half-past 
live  o’clock.  The  order  was  promptly 
obeyed,  and  with  a will.  Never  was 
onslaught  more  vigorous  or  more  gal- 
lantly made.  They  fell  upon  the  ene- 
my with  the  swiftness  of  lightning  and 
with  the  force  of  an  avalanche.  Jack- 
son’s men  could  not  resist  the  fury  of 
the  onset.  Fighting  bravely,  and  con- 
testing every  inch  of  ground,  they  were 
yet  steadily  pressed  back  into  the 
woods.  On  both  sides  the  fighting 
was  desperate  and  gallant.  Regiment 
vied  with  regiment,  and  soldier  with 
soldier.  Nor  did  the  ofiScers  spare 
themselves.  Everywhere  they  were 
seen  in  the  front,  in  the  thickest  of 
the  fight,  urging  the  contest  by  voice 
and  gesture.  Hooker  and  Kearney,  of 
Heintzelman’s  corps,  justified  the  con- 
fidence reposed  in  them,  and  established 
on  a firmer  basis  their  well-won  fame. 
One  of  the  most  brilliant  efforts  of  the 
day  was  made  by  Grover’s  brigade,  of 
Hooker’s  division.  In  the  fury  of  the 
first  onset  this  brigade  penetrated,  by  a 
bayonet  charge,  first  one,  then  another 
of  Jackson’s  lines,  and  was  well  up 
to  the  third  line  before  it  could  be 
checked.  After  a severe  hand-to-hand 
struggle,  it  got  possession  of  the  rail- 
way embankment  on  the  Confederate 
left,  but  not  until  it  had  sacrificed 
thirty  per  cent,  of  its  strength.  Hook- 
er’s other  brigades  gallantly  joined  in 
the  struggle.  Meanwhile,  Kearney  had 
struck  Jackson’s  left  at  the  point  occu- 
pied by  A.  P.  Hill ; and,  by  the  joint 
efforts  of  the  two  divisions,  Jackson’s 


left  was  doubled  back  upon  his  centre, 
and  the  railway  entrenchment  was  se- 
cured. While  Heintzelman  was  thus 
pressing  back  the  enemy’s  extreme  left, 
Reno  was  fii-mly  holding  his  position 
more  to  the  centre ; and  after  an  hour 
and  a half  from  the  first  onset,  this 
portion  of  the  Confederate  army  was 
driven  off  the  original  battle  ground — 
the  dead  and  wounded  being  left  in 
the  hands  of  the  Nationals. 

It  was  now  sunset.  McDowell  had 
arrived  on  the  field.  His  corps  was 
pushed  to  the  front  along  the  Warrenton 
Turnpike,  his  instructions  being  to  fall 
upon  the  enemy  who  was  retr  ating  to- 
wards the  turnpike  from  Sudley  Spi*ings. 
With  this  end  in  view,  King’s  division, 
of  McDowell’s  corps,  advanced  beyond 
the  general  line  of  the  Nationals.  The 
advance  of  the  main  body  of  the  enemy, 
under  Longstreet,  had  begun  to  reach 
the  field.  With  these  King  came  into 
contact  about  three  cpiarters  of  a mile 
in  front  of  the  line  of  battle.  Some 
severe  fighting  ensued,  but  neither 
gained  upon  the  other.  With  this 
advance  of  Longstreet,  Kearney,  who 
had  pressed  back  the  Confederate  left 
toward  the  Warrenton  Turnpike,  also 
came  into  collision.  Kearney  was  com- 
pelled to  fall  back  with  the  loss  of  a 
gun,  four  flags,  and  100  men  made 
prisoners.  Porter  now  came  up,  and 
made  a disposition  for  attack;  but  it 
wa§  too  late.  Darkness  fell  upon  the 
scene ; and  the  battle  of  Groveton,  or, 
as  it  is  more  generally  called,  the  battle 
of  Gainesville,  was  ended.  On  the 
whole,  it  was  a victory  for  Pope ; for 
he  had  driven  the  enemy  back  from  his 


PORTER  BLAMED. 


297 


original  position;  and  almost  the  en- 
tire battle  field  was  occupied  by  the 
National  troops.  The  loss  on  either 
side  was  about  7 000  men.  Both  armies 
slept  that  night  on  their  arms,  near  the 
old  battle  ground  of  Bull  Bun. 

Judged  from  a National  standpoint, 
the  battle  of  the  29th  of  August,  at 
Gainesville,  must  be  pronounced  in  the 
last  degree  unsatisfactoiy.  There  was 
no  lack  of  bravery  on  the  part  of  the 
men.  In  the  conflict,  both  bravery  and 
ability  were  displayed  by  the  officers, 
higher  and  lower.  But  somehow  there 
was  a want  of  harmony  on  the  part  of 
the  higher  officials.  Either  there  was 
a defect  in  the  orders,  or  time  was 
badly  kept.  The  result  certainly  might 
have  been  different  if  McDowell  and 
Porter  had  come  up  at  an  earlier  hour. 
Those  precious  hours — from  noon  to 
half -past  five — during  which  Pope 
waited  to  hear  from  those  two  gen- 
erals, saved  Jackson’s  army,  and  ruined 
the  National  prospect.  They  allowed 
Longstreet  to  come  up  and  unite  with 
Jackson,  thus  making  the  Confederate 
araiy  greatly  superior  to  that  of  Pope. 
The  battle,  it  is  true,  was  not  lost ; but 
it  was  indecisive.  It  settled  nothing. 
It  was  already  manifest  that  Pope 
must  retreat,  and  that  Lee  would  be 
able  to  carry  out  his  purpose  of  driving 
the  Nationals  inside  of  the  fortifica- 
tions at  Washington,  of  passing  across 
through  Maryland,  and  of  entering 
Pennsylvania.  In  his  report.  Pope 
greatly  blamed  Porter.  “I  do  not 
hesitate  to  say,”  he  says,  “ that  if  he 
had  discharged  his  duty,  as  became  a 
soldier  under  the  circumstances,  and 


had  made  a vigorous  attack  on  the  ene- 
my, as  he  was  expected  and  directed 
to  do,  at  any  time  up  to  eight  o’clock 
that  night,  we  should  have  utterly 
crushed  and  captured  the  larger  por- 
tion of  Jackson’s  force  before  he  could 
have  been  by  any  possibility  sufficient- 
ly reinforced  to  have  made  an  effective 
resistance.”  Porter  says  he  did  not 
receive  the  order  until  it  was  dusk,  and 
that  he  had  not  time  to  come  up.  The 
evidence  is,  no  doubt,  conflicting.  In 
our  judgment,  the  balance  of  the  evi- 
dence is  against  Porter ; and  we  do  not 
see  how,  when  subsequently  he  was 
tried  on  the  charges  preferred  against 
him  by  Pope,  found  guilty,  and  dis- 
missed the  service,  the  verdict  or  the 
punishment  could  have  been  other  than 
they  were.  His  dilatory  conduct,  as 
we  have  seen,  had  become  painfully 
conspicuous,  even  before  the  battle  of 
Gainesville.  His  particular  defense — 
that  it  was  dusk  on  the  evening  of  the 
29th,  when  he  received  the  order — is 
weak  in  view  of  all  the  facts  of  the 
case.  On  the  afternoon  of  the  28th,  he 
was  ordered  to  move  from  Manassas  to 
Centreville  at  the  earliest  dawn,  Pope 
assuring  him  that  a battle  would  un- 
doubtedly be  fought  on  the  following 
morning.  Early  on  the  morning  of  the 
29th,  on  hearing  of  the  withdrawal 
of  Ricketts  and  King,  and  the  con- 
sequent opening  of  Thoroughfare  Gap, 
and  before  Porter  had  time  to  leave 
Manassas  Junction,  he  was  ordered  to 
move  forward  from  that  place  by  the 
direct  road  to  Gainesville.  The  order 
was  repeated  in  the  most  urgent  man- 
ner at  half-past  four  o’clock,  on  the 


298 


POPE  AND  LEE  IN  VIRGINIA. 


afternoon  of  the  29  th.  His  explana- 
tion, even  if  it  covers  the  last  order, 
does  not  certainly  touch  the  other  two. 
His  apologists  have  endeavored  to  vin- 
dicate him,  by  saying  that  nearly  the 
whole  of  Longstreet’s  corps  had  been 
directly  in  front  of  him  for  several 
hours  when  Pope’s  last  order  reached 
him.  This,  we  think,  creates  diffi- 
culties, rather  than  removes  them.  It 
is  not  claimed  that  Porter  was  engaged 
with  any  portion  of  Longstreet’s  corps — 
only  that  this  corps  was  lying  in  front 
of  him.  If  Longstreet  was  so  early  on 
tlie  ground,  it  is  natural  to  conclude 
that  he  would  have  heard  the  sounds 
of  battle  in  the  forenoon,  and,  instead 
of  moving  so  far  to  the  south,  would 
have  moved  in  the  direction  whence 
these  sounds  came.  It  is  notorious, 
too,  that  although  after  twelve  o’clock 
there  was  a lengthened  pause  in  the 
fight,  there  were  between  that  hour  and 
four  in  the  afternoon  frequent  skirm- 
ishes— skirmishes  no  doubt  noisy  and 
demonstrative  enough  to  indicate  to 
Longstreet  where  he  was  most  needed. 
And  is  it  conceivable  that  Longstreet 
could  have  been  for  several  hours  so 
far  on  the  eastern  side  of  Thoroughfare 
Gap,  and  Jackson  not  have  known  it  ? 
How,  in  fact,  on  the  supposition  that 
Longstreet  was  already  in  force  on  the 
held,  are  we  to  account  for  the  prac- 
tical suspension  of  hostilities  which 
existed  from  twelve  noon  until  half- 
past five  o’clock,  when  Heintzelman 
and  Peno  resumed  the  attack  ? 

After  the  battle  of  the  29th,  Pope’s 
army  was  in  no  fit  condition  to  resume 
the  struggle  with  fresh  and  vastly 


superior  forces.  For  the  last  fortnight 
his  men  had  been  continually  marching 
or  fighting.  There  had  been  positively 
no  rest.  The  cavalry  and  artillery  had 
been  ten  days  in  harness ; and  the 
entire  army  had  been  two  days  with- 
out food.  On  the  28th,  Pope  had  tele- 
graphed to  the  commander-in-chief  to 
have  rations  and  forage  sent  forward 
from  Alexandria  with  all  despatch. 
Halleck  communicated  with  McClellan, 
who  was  then  at  Alexandria,  ordering 
him  to  send  the  needed  supplies  at 
once.  On  the  morning  of  the  Au^. 
30th,  the  day  after  the  first  bat- 
tie,  about  daylight.  Pope  received  from 
McClellan  a letter,  dated  at  eight 
o’clock,  P.  M.,  on  the  29th,  stating  that 
“rations  and  forage  would  be  loaded 
into  the  available  wagons  ” as  soon  as 
he  would  send  a cavalry  escort  to  bring 
out  the  trains.  It  is  not  wonderful 
that  Pope  should  thus  express  himself 
in  his  report:  “I  do  not  see,”  he  says, 
“ what  service  cavalry  could  have  ren- 
dered in  guarding  railroad  trains.  It 
was  not  until  I received  this  letter  that 
I began  to  feel  discouraged  and  nearly 
hopeless  of  any  successful  issue  to  the  op- 
erations with  which  I was  charged.”  On 
the  30th,  Pope  made  a request  for  more 
ammunition — a request  which,  strange 
to  say,  had  to  go  the  same  round ; and  the 
answer  which  was  given  by  McClellan 
was,  “I  know  nothing  of  the  calibres 
of  Pope’s  artillery.”  There  is  one  other 
story,  which  strikingly  illustrates  the 
want  of  harmony  among  some  of  the 
leading  National  commanders  at  this 
critical  juncture.  On  the  afternoon 
of  the  29th,  at  the  time  Pope  was 


MANASSAS. 


299 


heroically  engaged  with  Jackson,  and 
dreading  the  arrival  of  Longstreet,  Mc- 
Clellan, in  a communication  to  the 
government,  suggested  that  one  of  the 
best  things  to  do  in  the  circumstances 
would  be  “to  leave  Pope  to  get  out  of 
his  scrape,  and  at  once  use  all  our 
means  to  make  the  capital  perfectly 
safe.”  Anything  more  heartless  than 
this  suggestion  could  hardly  be  con- 
ceived. It  is  said  that  when  President 
Lincoln  had  read  the  despatch  which 
contained  it,  he  fell  back  horror- 
stricken  in  his  chair.  It  is  not  won- 
derful that  Pope’s  campaign  proved  a 
failure.  The  wonder  rather  is  that  the 
National  cause,  whose  representatives 
on  the  held  were  so  divided  in  sympa- 
thy, did  not  utterly  perish. 

In  these  circumstances,  on  the  morn- 
ing of  the  30th,  Pope  found  himself  in 
presence  of  the  enemy.  Lee’s  forces 
had  been  coming  up  in  great  numbers 
during  the  night  and  early  morning 
from  the  direction  of  Thoroughfare 
Gap.  By  noon  the  Confederates  great- 
ly outnumbered  the  Nationals.  To 
confront  the  mighty  and  rapidly  in- 
creasing forces  of  Lee,  Pope  had  not 
more  than  40,000  men ; and  many  of 
them  were  comparatively  useless  from 
fatigue  and  want  of  food.  It  seemed 
to  him,  however,  that  he  had  no  choice 
but  fight.  He  could  hardly  hope  to 
win ; but  he  “ determined  to  give  bat- 
tle to  the  enemy,  and  at  least  to  lay  on 
such  blows  as  would  cripple  him  as 
much  as  possible,  and  delay  as  long  as 
practicable  any  further  advance  toward 
the  capital.”  Pope  felt  the  necessity 
of  immediate  and  vigorous  action  ; for 


every  moment  of  delay  was  increasing 
the  odds  against  him.  It  was  his  in- 
tention to  attack  the  Confederate  left ; 
and  he  had  made  his  disposition  ac- 
cordingly. It  soon  became  apparent, 
however,  that  the  Confederate  general 
was  massing  his  troops  on  his  right,  as 
fast  as  they  arrived  on  the  field,  and 
that  his  purpose  was  to  fall  back,  and, 
if  possible,  turn  the  National  left.  It 
would  appear  as  if,  for  a moment.  Pope 
had  been  deceived  by  the  movement  of 
the  Confederates  towards  their  own 
right.  In  the  moment  of  exultation, 
he  telegraphed  to  W ashington  that  the 
Confederates  were  “retreating  to  the 
mountains.”  He  quickly,  however, 
discovered  his  mistake,  and  arranged 
his  troops  as  he  best  could  to  meet  the 
requirements  of  the  situation.  Mc- 
Dowell was  ordered  forward  with  three 
corps.  Porter’s  in  advance,  along  the 
Warrenton  Turnpike;  and  Picketts’ 
division,  which  had  been  sent  to  the 
right,  was  brought  back  and  posted  on 
the  left  of  the  National  line.  As  Porter 
moved  forward,  his  advance  was  re- 
ceived by  a perfect  tempest  of  shot, 
shell  and  bullet,  which  came  from  the 
wooded  eminence  near  Groveton,  where 
the  Confederates  were  swarming  in 
thousands.  Porter’s  men,  unable  to 
face  this  terrific  storm,  reeled,  stag- 
gered, and  fell  back.  At  the  same 
moment  almost,  the  Confederates  fell 
with  tremendous  force  on  the  National 
left.  Recognizing  the  fact  that  the 
main  attack  was  to  be  made'  in  this 
direction,  McDowell  ordered  Reynolds 
from  Porter’s  left  to  the  assistance  of 
Schenck  and  Milroy,  on  whose  divisions 


300 


POPE  AND  LEE  IN  VIRGINIA. 


the  blow  was'  about  to  fall.  This 
movement  was  attended  with  consider- 
able peril,  as  it  exposed  Porter’s  key- 
point;  but,  with  singular  presence  of 
mind,  and  with  great  promptitude  of 
action.  Colonel  G.  K.  Warren,  seeing 
the  danger,  pushed  forward  his  little 
brigade  of  a thousand  men  and  occu- 
pied the  vacant  place.  Had  he  waited 
for  orders,  the  National  line  might 
have  been  cut  in  two.  The  battle  was 
already  raging  furiously  on  the  Na- 
tional left,  Schenck,  Milroy  and  Reyn- 
olds, in  spite  of  superior  numbers, 
offering  a gallant  and  stubborn  resist- 
ance. Porter’s  men  were  rallied  and 
brought  to  a halt  as  they  were  retiring 
to  the  rear ; and  as  soon  as  order  was 
restored  among  them,  they  were  pushed 
forward  to  the  support  of  the  left, 
where  they  rendered  splendid  service, 
Warren’s  little  band  of  Volunteers 
and  Buchanan’s  brigade  of  Regulars 
particularly  distinguishing  themselves. 
Ricketts’  division  had  also  gone  to 
the  assistance  of  Schenck,  Milroy  and 
Reynolds,  and  had  greatly  strengthened 
them,  both  on  their  left  and  in  their 
rear.  Towers,  of  Ricketts’  division, 
who  went  to  the  support  of  Reynolds, 
and  led  his  brigade  in  person,  made 
himself  conspicuous  alike  by  his  skill 
and  by  his  daring.  Such  was  the  con- 
duct of  this  brigade  that  it  drew  forth 
enthusiastic  and  repeated  cheers.  “ Its 
example,”  says  Pope,  “was  of  great 
service,  and  infused  new  spirit  into  all 
the  troops  who  witnessed  their  intrepid 
conduct.”  For  a time  it  seemed  as  if 
the  Nationals  might  carry  the  day.  In 
spite  of  all  his  strength  and  the  pertina- 


city of  his  attack,  Jackson’s  advanced 
line  was  being  steadily  pushed  back. 
It  was  not  until  five  o’clock  that  the 
tide  began  to  turn.  About  that  hour 
the  battle  commenced  to  rage  more 
furiously  than  before.  Longs treet  had 
found  a commanding  position  on  Jack- 
son’s right;  and  with  four  batteries 
he  poured  a most  destructive  fire 
upon  the  National  troops.  Line  after 
line  was  cut  down  by  the  raking 
fire,  like  grass  by  the  scythe  of  the 
mower.  The  slaughter  on  both  sides 
was  terrific.  Late  in  the  afternoon, 
Reno’s  corps  was  withdrawn  from  its 
position  on  the  right  centre  and  thrown 
into  the  action  on  the  left.  This  corps, 
coming  up  as  the  tide  of  battle  began 
to  turn,  behaved  with  great  gallantry. 
For  hours  this  mutual  slaughter  con- 
tinued, the  Confederates  showing  their 
superior  strength  by  falling  hea\dly  on 
the  National  right  as  well  as  upon  the 
left,  the  latter  presenting  a bold  and 
determined  front,  gallantly  contesting 
every  inch  of  ground,  but  gradually 
yielding  to  the  fierce  onsets  and  tre- 
mendous pressure  of  the  foe.  The 
contest  ended  only  when  darkness  fell 
upon  the  scene.  The  losses  on  both 
sides  had  been  very  severe.  The  Na- 
tional left  had  been  pushed  back  well 
nigh  three  quarters  of  a mile ; but  its 
ranks  were  unbroken,  and  it  still  held 
the  Warrenton  Turnpike.  The  Na- 
tional right,  on  which  the  pressure  had 
been  less  heavy,  still  held  its  ground. 
Pope  had  now  no  choice  but  fall  back 
upon  Washington.  Happily  he  had 
been  able  to  hold  command  of  the 
turnpike  in  his  rear.  At  about  six 


THE  RETREAT. 


301 


o’clock  in  the  evening,  he  had-  acci- 
dentally learned  that  Franklin  was 
approaching  Centreville,  about  four 
miles  to  the  east  of  that  place,  and 
that  Sumner  was  about  four  miles  in 
the  rear  of  Franklin.  To  Centreville 
he  resolved  to  fall  back.  At  eight 
o’clock,  he  accordingly  issued  an  order 
to  the  effect  that  the  whole  anny 
should  withdraw  during  the  night 
across  Bull  Bun,  and  take  position  on 
the  heights  of  Centreville.  The  retreat 
was  conducted  for  the  most  part  by 
way  of  the  Stone  Bridge.  When  the 
passage  was  completed,  the  bridge  was 
destroyed.  The  night  was  excessively 
dark ; and  Lee  did  not  pursue.  When 
Anw,  daylight  broke  on  the  morning  of 
3b  the  3ist,  Bull  Bun  once  more  di- 
vided the  two  great  armies.  The  engage- 
ment of  the  30th  is  sometimes  spoken 
of  as  the  second  battle  of  Bull  Bun."^ 
On  the  morning  of  the  31st,  the  en- 
tire Union  army,  under  General  Pope, 
was  at  or  near  Centreville,  with  the 
exception  of  two  brigades,  about  4000 
strong,  which  had  been  sent  on  to  Fair- 
fax Station  to  guard  the  train  and  the 

* In  his  report  of  the  second  day’s  fighting  in  the 
neighborhood  of  Gainesville  and  Groveton,  General 
Lee  says : “ The  enemy,  being  reinforced,  renewed  the 
attack  on  the  afternoon  of  the  30th,  when  a general 
advance  of  both  wings  of  the  army  was  ordered,  and 
after  a fierce  combat,  which  raged  until  after  nine 
o’clock,  he  was  completely  defeated,  and  driven  be3'ond 
Bull  Kun.  The  darkness  of  the  night,  his  destruction 
of  the  Stone  Bridge  after  crossing,  and  the  uncertainty 
of  the  fords,  stopped  the  pursuit.” 

The  following  is  Pope’s  account  of  the  doings  of  the 
30th:  “The  enemy’s  heavy  reinforcements, ” he  says, 
“ having  reached  him  on  Friday  afternoon  and  night, 
he  began  to  mass  on  his  right  for  the  purpose  of  crush- 
ing our  left,  and  occupying  the  road  to  Centreville  in 
our  rear.  His  heaviest  assault  was  made  about  five 
o’clock  in  the  forenoon,  when,  after  overwhelming  Fitz 


depot.  Generals  Franklin  and  Sumner 
had  arrived ; and  General  Banks,  after 
destroying  a large  amount  of  property 
which  he  could  not  bring  with  him, 
was  pressing  forward  from  Bristow 
Station.  On  the  following  day  Burn- 
side evacuated  Fredericksburg;  and 
Falmouth  Station,  with  all  the  bridges, 
was  destroyed  by  tire.  Acquia  Creek 
was  soon  also  deserted.  The  Nationals 
from  all  points  were  pressed  back  to- 
wards Washington.  The  strength  of 
the  army,  as  reported  by  the  different 
corps  commanders,  was  as  follows  : Mc- 
Dowell’s corps,  10,000;  Sigel’s  corps, 
about  7000;  Heintzelman’s,  6000;  Be- 
no’s,  6000 ; Banks’,  5000 ; Sumner’s, 
11,000;  Franklin’s,  8000.  Large  num- 
bers had  straggled  from  •the  ranks; 
and  many  had  been  left  on  the  battle 
field.  The  retreat  of  Pope  behind 
Bull  Bun  created  the  wildest  excite- 
ment throughout  the  North.  It  was 
matter  of  universal  regret  and  humili- 
ation that  so  many  of  the  wounded 
brave  should  be  left  on  the  battle 
field  to  the  tender  mercy  of  the  Con- 
federates, and  so  near  the  National 

John  Porter,  and  driving  his  forces  back  in  the  centre 
and  left,  mass  after  mass  of  his  forces  was  pushed 
against  our  left.  A terrible  contest,  with  great  slaugh- 
ter, was  carried  on  for  several  hours,  our  men  behaving 
with  firmness  and  gallantry,  under  the  immediate  com- 
mand of  General  McDowell.  When  night  closed,  our 
left  had  been  forced  back  about  half  a mile,  but  still 
remained  firm  and  unshaken,  while  our  right  held  its 
ground.  General  Franklin,  with  his  corps,  arrived  after 
dark  at  Centreville,  six  miles  in  our  rear,  while  Sumner 
was  four  miles  behind  Franklin.  I could  have  brought 
up  three  corps  in  the  morning  in  time  to  renew  the 
action,  but  starvation  stared  both  men  and  horses  in 
the  face ; and,  broken  and  exhausted  as  they  were, 
they  were  in  no  condition  to  bear  hunger  also.  I 
accordingly  retired  to  Centreville  that  night  in  per- 
fect order.  ” 


302 


POPE  AND  LEE  IN  VIRGINIA. 


capital.  An  invitation  was  issued  by 
the  War  Department,  calling  on  citizens 
to  go  out  to  the  battle  field  and  assist 
in  taking  care  of  the  wounded.  On 
the  afternoon  of  the  30th,  the  streets 
of  Washington  were  crowded  with 
people  and  conveyances  loaded  with 
blankets  and  baskets  and  rolls  of  lint, 
all  pressing  forward  to  the  scene  of 
distress.  In  some  respects  the  move- 
ment was  ill-advised ; for  very  few  of 
those  who  went  out  were  allowed  to 
get  near  the  wounded,  and  some  were 
made  prisoners  by  the  Confederates. 
On  the  following  morning  the  invita- 
tion vras  recalled.  At  the  same  time, 
the  movement  thus  begun  at  Washing- 
ton, although  not  immediately  of  any 
practical  value,  produced  good  and 
wholesome  fruit.  The  example  set  by 
the  capital  was  imitated  by  Boston,  by 
Philadelphia,  by  New  York,  and  by 
all  the  cities  of  the  North ; and  from 
that  day  until  the  close  of  the  war, 
the  wounded  soldier  became  more  and 
more  the  object  of  the  nation’s  care. 
It  is  only  just  to  remark  that,  while 
General  Lee  w’ould  not  consent  to  a 
truce  or  a suspension  of  military  opera- 
tions, he  interposed  no  obstacles  to  the 
removal  of  the  wounded. 

The  31st  was  Sunday.  On  that  day 
the  Confederate  army  began  to  move 
forward.  It  was  evident  to  Pope,  from 
the  direction  in  which  the  enemy  was 
moving,  that  it  was  Lee’s  intention  to 
fall  wdth  force  on  his  right  flank.  At 
an  early  hour  in  the  morning  Jackson, 
taking  with  him  his  own  and  Ewell’s 
divisions,  crossed  Bull  Run  at  Sudley 
Springs,  and  pushed  towards  the  Little 


River  Turnpike.  His  object  clearly 
was  to  cut  the  rear  of  Pope  in  the 
direction  of  Fairfax  Court  House. 
Pope,  not  unprepared  for  some  such 
movement,  disposed  his  forces  so  as  to 
meet  the  requirements  of  the  situation. 
Chauging‘his  entire  front,  and  flinging 
his  right  wing  back  to  the  heights  of 
Germantown,  he  occupied,  on  the  sept. 
morning  of  the  1st  of  September,  L 
when  the  Confederates  came  up,  an 
entirely  new  position.  Pope  had  no 
intention  to  strike  the  enemy  until  the 
morning  of  the  2d ; but  Lee’s  purpose 
became  so  developed  by  the  afternoon 
of  the  1st,  that  he  resolved  to  hazard  a 
battle  between  the  Little  River  Turn- 
pike and  the  road  from  Centre ville  to 
Fairfax  Court  House.  Hooker  was 
ordered  forward  to  the  latter  place,  to 
assemble  the  troops  there  and  to  move 
towards  Germantown.  McDowell  was 
directed  to  take  a position  on  the  War- 
ren ton  Turnpike,  about  two  miles  west 
of  Fairfax.  He  was  to  connect  with 
Hooker  by  his  right.  Reno  was  pushed 
forward  to  the  north  of  the  turnpike, 
in  the  direction  of  Chantilly,  about 
two  and  a half  miles  east  of  Centre- 
ville.  Heintzelman  was  posted  in  the 
rear  of  Reno;  Franklin  was  on  Me- 
Dow^ell’s  left  and  rear  ; Sumner  was  on 
the  left  of  Heintzelman ; while  Sigel 
and  Porter  had  orders  to  unite  with 
Sumner’s  right.  Banks,  who  had 
charge  of  the  wagon  trains,  was  to 
come  by  the  old  Braddock  Road  into 
the  Alexandria  Turnpike,  in  rear  of 
Fairfax  Court  House.  Just  before 
sunset,  Hooker  and  Reno  came  simul- 
taneously in  contact  with  the  enein^ 


CHANTILLY. 


303 


advance — the  one  on  the  Little  River 
Turnpike,  close  by  Germantown,  the 
other  a little  more  to  the  west,  near 
Chantilly.  The  day  was  in  the  last 
degree  unfavorable  for  warlike  oper- 
ations. The  wind  was  cold,  and  a 
drenching  rain  was  falling.  But  neither 
wind  nor  rain  could  now  deter  the  com- 
batants. The  battle  became  furious 
all  at  once.  After  it  had  raged  for 
nearly  an  hour,  the  Confederates  con- 
centrated on  Reno’s  left,  and  fell 
heavily  on  his  second  division,  which 
was  commanded  by  General  Isaac  I. 
Stevens,  of  Port  Royal  Ferry  fame. 
Hooker,  McDowell  and  Kearney,  of 
Heintzelman’s,  rushed  to  Reno’s  assist- 
ance. At  this  point  the  battle  was 
raging  with  tremendous  fury,  when 
General  Stevens,  who  had  ordered  a 
charge,  and  was  leading  it  in  person, 
was  shot  dead.  When  their  general 
fell,  this  division  fell  back  in  disorder. 
The  remainder  of  Reno’s  force  were 
showing  signs  of  confusion,  when  Kear- 
ney, descrying  the  danger,  advanced 
with  his  division,  and,  sending  Birney’s 
brigade  to  the  front,  boldly  renewed 
the  action.  A thunderstorm,  which 
had  for  some  time  been  raging,  had 
now  reached  its  height.  It  was  dan- 
gerous to  expose  the  ammunition  ; but 
Kearney,  personally  regardless  of  con- 
sequences, brought  forward  a battery 
and  put  it  in  position  himself.  It  was 
the  last  heroic  act  of  a brave  life.  Dark- 
ness was  now  setting  in.  As  if  anxious 
to  know  the  character  of  the  ground, 
he  pushed  forward  to  reconnoitre ; and 
having  inadvertently  passed  beyond 
the  line  of  his  own  pickets,  and  ap- 


proached too  close  to  those  of  the 
enemy,  a Confederate  bullet  laid  him 
low.  As  soon  as  he  was  missed,  the 
gallant  Birney  assumed  command  of 
the  division  ; and  by  means  of  a bay- 
onet charge  of  his  own  brigade,  com- 
posed of  the  First,  Thirty-Eighth  and 
Fortieth  New  York,  and  led  by  Col- 
onel Egan,  he  drove  the  Confederates 
back  for  a considerable  distance,  and 
held  the  field  for  the  night.  The  dark 
hours  were  spent  in  burying  the  dead. 
Such  was  the  battle  of  Chantilly — the 
last  battle  of  Pope’s  unfortunate  cam-‘ 
paign.  It  was  a battle  by  no  means 
inglorious  to  the  National  arms;  but, 
like  all  the  other  battles  of  the  cam- 
paign, it  was  fruitless  of  good.  It  was 
the  last  of  a series  of  disasters. 

In  the  battle  of  Chantilly  many 
precious  lives  were  lost.  Kearney  and 
Stevens  left  behind  them  vacant  places 
which  could  not  be  easily  filled.  In 
the  charge  in  which  he  fell,  shot 
through  the  head,  Stevens  led  the  attack 
in  person  at  the  head  of  the  brave  Sev- 
enty-Ninth (Highlanders)  New  York, 
bearing  with  him  the  colors  of  that 
regiment,  which  had  fallen  from  the 
hands  of  a wounded  sergeant.  The 
army  had  no  braver  officer.  Kearney 
had  already  won  great  distinction  and 
become  a popular  favorite.  He  was  one 
of  the  few  men  on  whom  the  hopes  of 
the  North  were  centred.  He  had 
often  been  tried : he  had  never  been 
found  wanting.  ‘‘Words,”  said  Pope, 
“cannot  express  my  sense  of  the  zeal, 
the  gallantry,  and  the  sympathy  of  that 
most  earnest  and  accomplished  soldier, 
Major-General  Kearney.  He  died  as 


304 


POPE  AND  LEE  IN  VIRGINIA. 


lie  would  have  wished  to  die,  and  as 
became  his  heroic  character.”  Kearney 
was  well  known  to  General  Lee ; and 
next  morning  the  Confederate  com- 
mander sent  the  body  of  the  unfortu- 
nate general,  with  a flag  of  truce,  to  the 
headquarters  of  Pope.  Kearney’s  body 
was  conveyed  to  New  York,  where  it 
was  deposited  in  the  family  vault  in 
the  quiet  church-yard  of  old  Trinity. 
The  same  terriflc  encounter  in  which 
Kearney  and  Stevens  lost  their  lives, 
proved  fatal,  also,  to  Major  Tilden,  of 
the  Thirty-Eighth  New  York — a brave 
soldier  and  a gallant  and  skilful  oflicer. 

Pope’s  losses,  since  the  commence- 
ment of  the  campaign,  were  about 
30,000  men,  30  guns,  20,000  small 
arms,  and  vast  quantities  of  supplies 
and  war  material.  Lee  must  have  lost 
at  least  15,000  men.  On  the  morning 
Sept,  of  the  2d  of  September,  Pope’s 
army  was  massed  behind  Difiicult 
Creek,  between  Germantown,  Flint 
Hill  and  Fairfax.  It  was  a strong 
position;  but,  exhausted  with  continu- 
ous marching  and  fighting  for  three 
weary  weeks,  broken  and  demoral- 
ized, it  would  have  been  cruel,  as  well 
as  impolitic,  to  prolong  the  contest. 
About  noon  of  that  day,  therefore, 
orders  were  given  by  General-in-Chief 
Halleck  for  the  army  of  Virginia  to 
fall  back  within  the  defenses  of  Wash- 
ington. McClellan  had  the  proud  sat- 
isfaction of  seeing  the  fortifications  on 
which  he  had  spent  so  much  time,  labor 
and  care — works  of  which  he  was  per- 
sonally so  proud,  but  which  had  been 
made  the  subject  of  so  much  ridicule — 
at  last  protecting  the  National  capital, 


and  shielding  a National  army.  At  his 
own  request,  Pope  was  relieved  from 
the  command,  and  allowed  to  return  to 
the  West.  The  army  of  Virginia  dis- 
appeared as  a separate  and  distinct 
organization,  and  was  merged  in  the 
army  of  the  Potomac ; and,  in  compli- 
ance with  the  wishes  of  a large  body 
of  the  people,  as  well  as  with  the 
wishes  of  his  surviving  officers  and 
men,  by  whom  he  was  greatly  beloved. 
General  McClellan  was  placed  in  com- 
mand of  all  the  troops  entrusted  with 
the  defense  of  Washington. 

It  would  not  be  difficult  for  the  mili- 
tary critic  to  point  out  professional  mis- 
takes in  Pope’s  campaign.  It  is  possible 
that  he  might  have  done  better  with 
the  forces  at  his  command.  It  is  ungen- 
erous, however,  to  judge  him  harshly, 
in  view  of  the  disappointments  he  was 
from  first  to  last  called  upon  to  endure. 
He  was  certainly  most  unfortunate; 
but  his  misfortunes  were  not  always  of 
his  own  creating.  It  was  natural, 
after  the  high  expectations  which  had 
been  formed,  first  of  the  army  of  the 
Potomac,  and  then  of  the  army  of  Vir- 
ginia, and  after  the  disastrous  failure 
of  both,  that  popular  indignation  should 
have  been  aroused,  and  that  Pope 
should  come  in  for  a share  of  that  abuse 
at  the  beginning  of  September,  which 
was  heaped  upon  McClellan  at  the  be- 
ginning of  August.  To  this  day  Pope 
has  not  received  justice.  We  have  al- 
ready called  the  reader’s  attention  to 
the  feelings  of  jealousy  and  dislike 
which  McClellan  entertained  towards 
Pope,  to  the  want  of  sympathy  between 
McClellan’s  officers  and  the  commander 


POPE’S  COMPLAINT. 


305 


in  the  field,  to  McClellan’s  “Leave 
Pope  to  get  out  of  his  scrape,”  and  his 
“ I know  nothing  of  the  calibres  of 
Pope’s  artillery,”  to  the  failure  of  the 
army  of  the  Potomac  to  join  Pope  in 
time,  to  the  dilatory  conduct  of  most 
of  McClellan’s  ofiicers,  and  to  the  posi- 
tive refusal  of  some  of  them  to  obey 
orders ; and  having  done  so  once,  it  is 
unnecessary  again  to  enter  into  details. 
The  charges  made  by  Pope  have  not 
yet  been  refuted.  Where  they  have 
been  brought  to  the  test,  they  have 
been  sustained,  rather  than  disproved. 
“The  small  fraction  of  20,500  men,” 
says  Pope,  “was  all  of  the  91,000 
veteran  troops  from  Harrison’s  Land- 
ing who  ever  drew  trigger  under  my 
command,  or  in  any  way  took  part  in 
this  campaign.  Some  of  the  corps,”  he 
goes  on  to  say,  “moved  with  becom- 
ing activity,  but  the  delays  of  others 


were  neither  creditable  nor  excusable.” 
Most  of  the  troops  actually  engaged  in 
these  battles  fought  with  great  bravery, 
but  some  of  them  could  not  be  brought 
into  action  at  all.  Many  thousands 
straggled  away  from  their  commands ; 
and  it  is  said  that  not  a few  voluntarily 
surrendered  to  the  enemy,  so  as  to  be 
paroled  prisoners  of  war.  These  are 
serious  charges ; and  until  they  are  dis- 
proved the  presumption  must  remain 
that  the  judgment  of  history  will  coin- 
cide with  that  which  Pope  himself  has 
pronounced — that  “the  complete  over- 
throw of  Lee’s  army,  or,  at  least,  the 
entire  frustration  of  his  movement 
towards  the  Potomac,  was  defeated 
by  the  failure  of  the  army  of  the 
Potomac  to  effect  a junction  in  time 
with  the  army  of  Virginia  on  the  line 
of  the  Rappahannock,  or  even  so  far 
back  as  the  line  of  Bull  Run.” 


The  battle  of  Chantilly  will  be  remembered  in  con- 
nection with  the  loss  of  Generals  Kearney  and  Stevens. 

Philip  Keakney  was  l^orn  in  New  York,  June  21, 
1815.  In  1837  he  was  commissioned  second  lieutenant 
in  the  First  Dragoons.  Shortly  afterwards  he  was  sent 
to  Euro[)e  by  the  government  to  study  and  report  upon 
French  military  tactics.  For  a time  he  pursued  his  studies 
in  the  military  school  at  Saumur.  He  went  thence  to 
Algeria,  joined  the  First  Chasseurs  d'Afrique.  and,  for  his 
services,  received  the  Cross  of  the  Lemon  of  Honor.  He 
returned  to  his  home  in  1810.  During  the  Mexican  War 
he  was  brevet  ted  major  for  gallant  conduct  at  Contreras 
and  Churul)usco ; and,  in  a charge  at  the  San  Antonio 
Gate,  he  lost  his  left  arm.  In  1841,  having  resigned  his 
position  in  the  army,  he  went  again  to  Europe,  with 
the  view  of  resuming  his  military  studies  When  the 
Italian  War  broke  out,  in  1850,  Kearney  took  a position 
on  the  staff  of  General  Maurier,  and  was  present  at  the 
battles  of  Magenta  and  Solferino,  receiving  for  his 
services,  a second  time,  the  Cross  of  the  Legion  of 
Honor.  On  the  outbreak  of  the  Civil  War,  he  hurried 
home,  and  offered  his  sword  to  his  country.  His  sub- 
sequent career  was  rendered  famous  by  his  actions  in 
the  engagements  at  Williamsburg,  at  Fair  Oaks,  at 
Frazier's  Farm,  and  at  Chantilly,  where  he  met  his  un- 
timely death. 


Isaac  Ingalls  Stevens  was  born  in  Andover,  Mass., 
in  1817,  and  graduated  at  West  Point  in  1839.  As  an 
engineer,  he  had  few  equals  in  the  service.  When  the 
Mexican  War  broke  out,  he  was  employed  in  the 
fortifications  of  the  New  England  Coast.  During  the 
Mexican  War  he  served  on  the  staff  of  General  Scott, 
who  pronounced  him  “the  most  promising  officer  of 
his  age.”  In  the  organization  of  Washington  Territory 
he  took  an  active  part,  first  in  the  capacity  of  gover- 
nor, and  later  as  delegate  to  Congress.  A sincere 
friend  of  President  Buchanan,  he  was  yet  opposed  to 
the  policy  he  pursued  towards  the  South;  and,  when 
the  war  broke  out,  he  hurried  from  the  Territory,  and 
offered  his  sword  to  his  country.  Appointed  colonel 
of  the  Seventy-ninth  New  Y^ork  Highlanders  after  the 
death  of  Cameron,  he  was  soon  afterwards  com- 
missioned brigadier-general  c f volunteers.  He  accom- 
panied Gen.  Thos.  W.  Sherman  to  Port  Koyal  in  the 
fall  of  18G1.  Having  been  transferred  to  North  Caro- 
lina, we  soon  find  him  in  Virginia,  in  the  corps  of 
General  Keno;  and,  as  major-general,  he  figured 
prominently  in  Pope’s  famous  but  unfortunate  cam- 
paign. At  Centreville,  where  he  was  shot  through 
the  head  by  a Minie  ball,  he  was  leading  a charge, 
and  bearing  aloft  the  colors  of  his  favorite  Seventy- 
ninth. 


306 


ANTIETAM. 


CHAPTER  XX. 

State  of  Feeling  in  the  North. — The  Army  of  the  Potomac  and  the  ‘Army  of  Virginia. — Lee’s  Opportunity.  — 
His  Plan. — Invasion  of  Maryland. — His  Address  to  the  People  of  Maryland. — Disappointment. — Excitement 
in  Pennsylvania  and  in  Maryland. — High  Hopes  of  the  South. — McClellan’s  Army  in  Motion. — Lee's 
Order. — Important  Discovery. — Lee’s  Blunder. — McClellan  Hurries  Forward. — Catoctin  Range.— The  Catoc- 
tin  Valley. — Turner’s  Gap. — Crampton  Gap. — Harper’s  Ferry. — McClellan’s  Advice  Regarding  it. — D.  S. 
Miles. — Thomas  H.  Ford. — Jackson  at  Harper’s  Ferry. — McLaws  and  Walker — Ford  Falls  Back. — Maryland 
Heights  Captured. — Miles’  Difficulty. — McClellan’s  Advice. — The  White  Flag. — Death  of  Miles. — The  CapiL 
ulation. — A Disgraceful  Affair. — The  Committee  of  Investigation. — The  Two  Armies  Come  into  Collision. — 
D.  H.  Hill  Retires  up  the  Mountain. — Turner’s  Gap. — The  Battle  of  South  Mountain  Begun. — Hooker  on 
the  Right. — Reno  on  the  Left. — Longstreet  Arrives  and  Takes  Command  of  the  Confederates. — National 
Victory. — Death  of  Reno. — Franklin  at  Crampton’s  Gap. — Howell  Cobb. — A Three  Hours’  Fight. — The  Na- 
tionals Victorious. — Lee’s  Purpose  Accomplished. — A Great  R.sk. — Lee  Falls  Back. — Antietam  Creek. — 
Sharpsburg. — The  Heights. — The  Battle  Ground. — The  Potomac. — The  Shepherdstown  Ford. — Lee’s  Po- 
sition.— His  Reasons  for  Offering  Battle. — McClellan  Advances. — His  Line  of  Battle. — Time  Lost. — Lee 
Reinforced. — Arrival  of  “Stonewall”  Jackson. — The  Confederate  Line. — The  Three  Stone  Bridges. — 
McClellan’s  Plan  of  Attack. — Lee  Strongly  Posted. — The  Dunker  Church. — The  Woods. — The  Open 
Ground. — The  Battle  Area. — Hooker  Advances  by  Bridge  No.  1. — The  Battle  of  Antietam  Begun. — The 
Darkness. — The  Battle  Resumed. — The  Confederates  Driven  Back. — A Fearful  Struggle. — Hartsulf  Wound- 
ed.— Terrible  Slaughter. — Mansfield  Comes  Up. — A Pandemonium. — Mansfield  Killed. — Hooker  Sorely 
Pressed,  but  Hopeful. — The  Key  of  the  Position. — Hooker’s  Reckless  Daring. — The  Air  Alive  with  Bul- 
lets.— Hooker  Shot  in  the  Foot. — Sumner  Arrives  and  Takes  Command. — General  Sedgwick  Advances. — 
French  and  Richardson. — Sedgwick  Wounded. — Struggle  at  the  Dunker  Church. — The  Nationals  Again 
Driven  Back. — Arrival  of  Franklin. — Irwin’s  Brigade,  of  Smith’s  Division. — Gallant  Efforts. — The  Maine 
and  Vermont  Regiments. — Havoc.— A Ghastly  Spectacle. — Sumner’s  Bravery. — Fighting  on  Sumners 
Left. — Gallant  Movement  of  Meagher. — Colonel  Cross. — The  “Fighting”  Fifth  New  Hampshire. — The 
Confederates  Driven  Back. — Death  of  Richardson. — Meagher  Wounded  — The  National  Right  at  Last  Vic- 
torious.— Porter  and  Burnside. — Burnside  Ordered  to  Attack. — His  Delay. — The  Attack  Succes:>fulh'  Made. — 
Burnside’s  Blunder. — Arrival  of  A.  P.  Hill. — Burnside  Driven  Back  to  the  Bridge. — Darkness. — The  Battle 
Ended. — Heavy  Losses  on  Both  Sides. — A National  Victory. — Lee’s  Plan  had  Failed. — The  Battle  Ought  to 
Have  Been  More  Decisive. — The  Comte  de  Paris. — McClellan’s  Mistakes. — The  Morale  of  Lii  Men. — Burn- 
side to  Blame — McClellan  Vindicated. — Reinforcements. — The  18th  of  September. — The  BaTle  Field. — A 
Sad  Picture. — The  19th. — Preparations  for  an  Advance. — Lee’s  Retreat. — Porter  in  Pursuit. — The  Pursuit 
Feeble  and  Ineffective.  Lincoln  Visits  the  Army. — McClellan’s  Inactivity. — The  Government  Impatient. — 
Stuart’s  Raid. — The  People  Indignant. — The  1st  of  October. — The  Army  in  Motion. — McClellan  Removed 
from  Command. — The  Proclamation  of  Emancipation. — The  President’s  Purpose. — Secretary  Seward. 


In  the  first  week  of  September,  1862, 
1862  state  of  affairs  at  Washington 
was  not  encouraging.  A shadow 
of  gloom  seemed  to  rest  on  the  National 
cause.  There  were  many  men  loyal  and 
true  to  the  Union — men  who,  for  its 
preservation,  had  given  their  best,  their 
means,  their  strength,  the  fruit  of  their 
bodies,  everything  which  they  held  most 


dear — who  had  come  to  the  conclusion 
that  the  war  which  had  now  extended 
over  the  better  part  of  two  years,  and, 
to  outward  appearance,  accomplished 
nothing,  should  be  abandoned.  If  the 
South  could  not  be  subdued,  it  was 
useless,  they  thought,  to  prolong  the 
contest.  If  they  could  not  live  together 
in  the  same  household,  surely  there  was 


“ MY  MARYLAND ” 


307 


no  reason  why  North  and  South  should 
not  get  along  as  neighbors. 

These  sentiments  prevailed  exten- 
sively throughout  the  North ; and  it  is 
not  wonderful  that  they  should  have 
prevailed.  Within  a few  weeks  the 
hopes  of  the  people  had  twice  been 
raised  to  the  highest  point,  only  to  be 
rewarded  with  the  bitterest  disappoint- 
ment. The  army  of  the  Potomac,  in 
many  respects  one  of  the  finest  armies 
the  v/orld  had  ever  witnessed,  had  not 
only  failed  of  its  purpose,  but  had  prac- 
tically ceased  to  exist  as  a separate 
organization.  The  army  of  Virginia  had 
similarly  inspired  hope,  and  similarly 
failed'.  After  well-nigh  two  years  of 
costly  and  bloody  warfare,  the  enemy 
was  literally  knocking  at  the  gates  of 
the  capital.  Two  months  before,  the 
army  of  the  Potomac  was  lying  in 
strength  before  Richmond  ; one  month 
before,  the  army  of  Virginia  promised 
to  do  what  the  army  of  the  Potomac 
had  failed  to  accomplish ; but  now, 
after  having  been  driven,  inch  by  inch, 
from  the  soil  of  Virginia,  all  that  re- 
mained of  those  two  magnificent  armies 
was  sheltered  behind  the  fortifications 
at  Washington. 

Widely  as  these  sentiments  prevailed, 
they  were  not  by  any  means  universal ; 
nor  did  they  represent  the  pith  and 
backbone  of  the  North.  There  were 
still  men  who  were  willing  to  fight; 
there  were  still  sources  of  revenue 
which  had  been  left  untouched;  and 
while  money  could  be  had,  and  men 
could  be  found,  the  Union  cause  was 
not  to  be  regarded  as  desperate. 

The  withdrawal  of  the  army  of  Pope 


left  the  field  clear  for  the  Confederates. 
Lee  had  a choice  of  two  courses.  He 
might  assault  the  fortifications  of  W ash- 
ington,  or  cross  the  Potomac  and  enter 
into  Maryland.  The  first  course  was 
not  to  be  thought  of.  It  would  con- 
sume too  much  time,  and,  besides,  there 
was  but  small  hope  of  success.  The 
invasion  of  Maryland  promised  richer 
results.  It  was  known  that  in  that  State 
there  were  many  who,  at  heart,  were 
deeply  in  sympathy  with  the  Southern 
cause.  It  was  believed  by  many  in  the 
South  that  Maryland  was  held  in  the 
Union  by  sheer  force,  and  that  the 
appearance  of  Confederate  troops  on 
her  soil  would  be  the  signal  for  a gen- 
eral uprising  of  the  people.  “Mary- 
land ! my  Maryland  ! ’’  was  the  burden 
of  one  of  the  most  beautiful  lyrics  of 
the  time ; it  was  supposed  to  express 
the  sentiments  of  the  entire  South — 
Maryland  included ; and  nowhere  was 
that  song  more  rapturously  sung  than 
at  the  firesides  of  Virginia.  Lee  con- 
fidently expected  that  he  would  be 
warmly  received  by  the  people  of  Mary- 
land, and  that  once  firmly  established 
in  that  State,  he  would  be  able  to  at- 
tack Washington  in  the  rear,  and  pos- 
sibly invade  Pennsylvania.  In  any 
case,  such  a movement  could  not  fail  to 
be  productive  of  good  fruit.  It  would 
demonstrate  to  the  governments  of 
Europe  the  inherent  strength  of  the 
Confederacy ; and,  if  it  did  not  compel 
recognition,  it  would,  at  least,  command 
sympathy  and  encouragement. 

On  the  2d  of  September,  D.  H.  Hill 
came  up  with  his  fresh  divisions  gepf. 
from  Richmond.  He  was  imme-  2* 


308 


ANTIETAM. 


diately  sent  forward  as  a vanguard  to 
Leesburg.  Between  the  4th  and  the 
Sept,  ^th,  the  entire  Confederate  army 
5*  had  crossed  the  Potomac  by  the 
fords,  in  the  neighborhood  of  what  is 
called  Point  of  Rocks,  and  encamped 
near  the  city  of  Frederick,  on  the  Mono- 
cacy  River.  The  Confederate  general 
lost  no  time  in  bringing  to  a test  the 
sentiments  of  the  Marylanders.  On 
the  8th  of  September  he  issued  the 
following  address : 

“Headquarters  Army  of  Northern  Yirginia,  1 
Near  Frederick,  September  8,  1862.  f 

To  THE  People  of  Maryland  : 

“ It  is  right  that  you  should  know 
the  purpose  that  has  brought  the  army 
under  my  command  within  the  limits 
of  your  State,  so  far  as  that  purpose 
concerns  yourselves. 

“ The  people  of  the  Confederate 
States  have  long  watched  with  the 
deepest  sympathy  the  wrongs  and  out- 
rages that  have  been  inflicted  upon  the 
citizens  of  a Commonwealth  allied  to 
the  States  of  the  South  by  the  strong- 
est social,  political  and  commercial  ties, 
and  reduced  to  the  condition  of  a con- 
quered province. 

‘‘Under  the  pretense  of  supporting 
the  Constitution,  but  in  violation  of  its 
most  valuable  provisions,  your  citizens 
have  been  arrested  and  imprisoned, 
upon  no  charge,  and  contrary  to  all  the 
forms  of  law. 

“A  faithful  and  manly  protest  against 
this  outrage,  made  by  a venerable  and 
illustrious  Marylander,  to  whom,  in  his 
better  days,  no  citizen  appealed  for 
right  in  vain,  was  treated  with  scorn 
and  contempt. 


“ The  government  of  your  chief  city 
has  been  usurped  by  armed  strangers ; 
your  legislature  has  been  dissolved  by 
the  unlawful  arrest  of  its  members; 
freedom  of  the  press  and  of  speech  has 
been  suppressed ; words  have  been  de- 
clared offenses  by  an  arbitrary  decree 
of  the  Federal  executive;  and  citizens 
ordered  to  be  tried  by  military  com- 
missions for  what  they  may  dare  to 
speak. 

“Believing  that  the  people  of  Mary- 
land possess  a spirit  too  lofty  to  submit 
to  such  a government,  the  people  of  the 
South  have  long  wished  to  aid  you  in 
throwing  off  this  foreign  yoke,  to  en- 
able you  again  to  enjoy  the  inalienable 
rights  of  freemen,  and  restore  the  in- 
dependence and  sovereignty  of  your 
State. 

“In  obedience  to  this  wish,  our  army 
has  come  among  you,  and  is  prepared 
to  assist  you  with  the  power  of  its  arms 
in  regaining  the  rights  of  which  you 
have  been  so  unjustly  despoiled. 

“This,  citizens  of  Maryland,  is  our 
mission,  so  far  as  you  are  concerned. 
No  restraint  upon  your  free-will  is 
intended,  no  intimidation  will  be 
allowed,  within  the  limits  of  this  army 
at  least.  Marylanders  shall  once  more 
enjoy  their  ancient  freedom  of  thought 
and  speech.  We  know  no  enemies 
among  you,  and  will  protect  all  of  you 
in  every  opinion. 

“ It  is  for  you  to  decide  your  destiny, 
freely  and  without  restraint.  This  arm^y 
will  respect  your  choice,  whatever  r 
may  be ; and,  while  the  Southern  pec 
pie  will  rejoice  to  welcome  you  to  you 
natural  position  among  them,  they  will 


EXCITEMENT  IN  PENNSYLVANIA. 


309 


only  welcome  you  when  you  come  of 
youi'  own  free  will. 

“R.  E.  Lee, 

General  Commanding.” 

Lee  had  counted  too  confidently  on 
Maryland  sympathy.  His  expectations 
were  not  realized.  His  address,  which 
was  well  conceived  and  carefully  ex- 
pressed, fell  flat  on  the  people.  A few 
Southern  sympathizers  joined  his  ranks  ; 
but  he  soon  discovered  that  his  recruits 
were  few  in  comparison  with  the  num- 
bers who  took  advantage  of  the  circum- 
stances in  which  they  found  themselves, 
to  reclaim  that  liberty  of  which,  by  the 
conscription,  they  had  been  deprived. 
Maryland,  in  fact,  was  lukewarm ; and 
Lee  was  too  sharp  not  to  see  that  the 
invasion  of  Pennsylvania  would  not  be 
free  from  peril,  with  a doubtful  or 
hostile  State  in  his  rear.  His  appear- 
ance in  Maryland,  however,  naturally 
enough  created  the  wildest  excitement 
in  Pennsylvania.  In  York  and  Adams 
counties,  and  in  the  valleys  of  the  Sus- 
quehanna and  the  Cumberland,  the  peo- 
ple were  seized  with  a panic;  but  it 
was  not  the  panic  which  comes  of  fear 
or  cowardice.  The  farmers  and  vil- 
lagers realized  their  difficulty,  and  pre- 
pared to  meet  it.  Sending  away  their 
wives  and  children,  and  removing  their 
cattle  to  regions  where  they  would  be 
less  at  the  mercy  of  the  enemy,  they 
themselves  hastened  to  take  up  arms. 
In  many  of  the  townships  of  the  State 
the  stores  were  closed,  bells  were  rung, 
guns  were  fired,  public  meetings  were 
held,  and  citizens  assembled  in  large 
masses  to  drill.  Governor  Curtin  issued 
an  order,  calling  upon  all  the  able-bodied 


men  of  Pennsylvania  to  organize  im- 
mediately for  the  defense  of  the  State, 
and  to  be  ready  for  marching  orders 
upon  an  hour’s  notice.  On  the  gept. 
11th,  he  issued  a call  for  50,000  H# 
of  the  freemen  of  the  State  to  enter 
immediate  service,  in  order  to  repel  the 
imminent  danger  of  invasion.  On  the 
same  day  he  transmitted  the  following 
despatch  to  the  mayor  of  Philadelphia : 
“We  have,”  he  said,  “reliable  informa- 
tion this  evening  that  the  rebel  gen- 
erals have  moved  their  entire  army 
from  Frederick  to  Cumberland  Valley, 
and  their  destination  is  now  Harrisburg 
and  Philadelphia.  We  need  every 
available  man  immediately.  Stir  up 
your  population  to-night.  Form  them 
into  companies,  and  send  us  20,000  to- 
morrow. No  time  can  be  lost  in  mass- 
ing a force  on  the  Susquehanna  to  de- 
fend the  State  and  your  city.  Arouse 
every  man  possible,  and  send  him  here.” 
The  governor  of  Maryland  followed  a 
similar  course.  To  these  appeals  the 
people  made  hearty  response.  Penn- 
sylvania acted  nobly.  The  excitement 
produced  by  the  governor’s  words  knew 
no  bounds.  Seventy-five  thousand  men 
were  soon  converging  from  all  parts  of 
the  State  to  Harrisburg.  Volunteers, 
came  pouring  in  from  the  adjacent  States ; 
and  in  a brief  space  both  Harrisburg 
and  Washington  were  overflowing  with, 
troops.  The  Confederates  were  still  in 
high  spirits ; and  some  of  them  openly' 
expressed  their  belief  that  in  a few  days- 
they  would  be  able  to  dictate  terms  of 
peace  in  the  city  of  Philadelphia.  The 
same  old  hall  which  had  witnessed  the; 
signing  of  the  Declaration  of  Inde? 


232 


310 


ANTIETAM. 


pendence  of  the  United  States  was  to 
witness  the  signing  of  a treaty  ac- 
knowledging the  independence  of  the 
South.  General  Lee  had  already  ar- 
rived at  a different  conclusion ; but 
these  sentiments  were  largely  shared 
by  the  rank  and  file  of  the  Confederate 
army. 

We  have  already  seen  McClellan 
placed  at  the  head  of  the  reconstructed 
army  of  the  Potomac,  or  rather,  as  it 
was  now  called,  the  army  of  Northern 
Virginia.  McClellan  had  always  been 
a great  favorite  with  the  men,  from 
the  ofiScers  down  to  the  common  sol- 
dier. His  reappearance  among  them 
was  hailed  with  enthusiasm.  The  army 
was  in  a wretched  condition.  It  was 
not  slow,  however,  to  assume  something 
like  order.  The  absentees,  in  great 
numbers,  rallied  to  their  standards ; 
discipline  recovered  its  sway;  and  the 
shapeless,  disorganized  mass  became 
once  again  the  army  of  the  Potomac. 
As  soon  as  it  became  known  that  Gen- 
eral Lee  had  crossed  into  Maryland, 
McClellan  was  ordered  to  follow  him 
with  all  the  troops  not  needed  for  the 
Sept,  defense  of  Washington.  On  the 
following  day,  he  set  his  troops 
in  motion ; and  on  the  7th,  leaving 
Sept.  General  Banks  in  command  at 
L the  National  capital,  he  hastened 
to  the  field,  and  made  his  headquarters 
that  night  with  the  Sixth  corps  at 
Rockville.  His  army,  comprising  his 
own  old  forces  and  those  of  Pope  and 
Burnside,  numbered  over  87,000  effect- 
ive men.  On  the  morning  of  the  10th 
Sept.  McClellan  was  at  Damascus  ; and 
12.  on  the  12th,  his  army  having 


marched  by  five  parallel  roads,  he  had 
reached  Fi’ederick.  The  first  move- 
ments of  McClellan  were  conducted 
with  a view  to  command  all  the  lower 
fords  of  the  Potomac,  thus  giving 
Lee  the  choice  of  meeting  him  in  bat- 
tle, or  of  retiring  before  him  and 
crossing  the  river  further  up,  with  the 
view  of  retreating  through  the  Shen- 
andoah Valley.  Great  caution  was 
necessary,  as  the  real  intentions  of  Lee 
were  not  known.  Happily,  however, 
a copy  of  his  order  of  march,  issued 
on  the  9th,  was  found  at  Fred-  sppt, 
erick  on  the  13th.  The  follow- 
ing  is  the  order : 

“ Headquarters  Army  of  Northern  ) 
Virginia,  Se2)t.  9,  18G2.  j 

Special  Order ^ No.  119. 

“ III.  The  army  will  resume  its  march 
to-morrow,  taking  the  Hagerstown  Road. 
General  Jackson’s  command  will  form 
the  advance,  and,  after  passing  Middle- 
ton  with  such  portion  as  he  may  select, 
take  the  route  toward  Sharpsburg,  cross 
the  Potomac  at  the  most  convenient 
point,  and,  by  Friday  morning,  take  pos- 
session of  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  Rail- 
road, capture  such  of  the  enemy  as  may 
be  at  Martinsburg,  and  intercept  such 
as  may  attempt  to  escape  from  Harper’s 
Ferry. 

“IV.  General  Longstreet’s  command 
will  pursue  the  main  road  as  far  as 
Boonsboro’,  where  it  will  halt  with  re- 
serve, supply  and  baggage  trains  of  the 
army. 

“ V.  General  McLaws,  with  his  own 
division  and  that  of  General  R.  H.  An- 
derson, will  follow  General  Longstreet; 
on  reaching  Middleton,  will  take  the 


LEE’S  PLAN  DISCOVERED. 


317 


route  to  Harper’s  Ferry,  and,  by  Friday 
morning,  possess  himself  of  the  Mary- 
land Heights,  and  endeavor  to  capture 
the  enemy  at  Harper’s  Ferry  and  vi- 
cinity. 

“VI.  General  Walker,  vrith  his  divi- 
sion, after  accomplishing  the  object  in 
which  he  is  now  engaged,  will  cross  the 
Potomac  at  Check’s  Ford,  ascend  its 
right  bank  to  Lovettsville,  take  posses- 
sion of  Loudon  Heights,  if  practicable, 
by  Friday  morning,  keep  the  ford  on 
his  left,  and  the  road  between  the  end 
of  the  mountain  and  the  Potomac  on  his 
right.  He  will,  as  far  as  practicable, 
co-operate  with  General  McLaws  and 
General  Jackson  in  intercepting  the  re- 
treat of  the  enemy. 

“VIL  General  D.  H.  Hill’s  division 
will  form  the  rear-guard  of  the  army, 
pursuing  the  road  taken  by  the  main 
body.  The  reserve  artillery,  ordnance, 
and  supply  trains  will  precede  General 
Hill. 

“VHI.  General  Stuart  will  detach  a 
squadron  of  cavalry  to  accompany  the 
commands  of  Generals  Longstreet,  Jack- 
son  and  McLaws,  and,  with  the  main 
body  of  the  cavalry,  will  cover  the 
route  of  the  army,  and  bring  up  all 
stragglers  that  may  have  been  left  be- 
hind. 

“IX.  The  commands  of  Generals 
Jackson,  McLaws  and  Walker,  after 
accomplishing  the  objects  for  which 
they  have  been  detached,  will  join  the 
main  body  of  the  army  at  Boonsboro’ 
or  Hagerstown. 

“X.  Each  regiment  on  the  march, 
will  habitually  carry  its  axes  in  the 
regimental  ordnance  wagons  for  use  of 


the  men  at  their  encampments  to  pro- 
cure wood,  &c. 

“ By  command  of 

“ General  R.  E.  Lee. 

“ R.  H.  Chilton,  A.-A.-General, 

“ For  Maj.-Gen.  D.  H.  Hill,  Comd’g,  Division.” 

The  secret  which  this  document  re- 
vealed was  of  priceless  value  to  Mc- 
Clellan. It  was  evident  that  Lee  had 
no  intention  to  leave  Maryland  until 
necessity  compelled  him.  His  object,’ 
as  he  himself  afterwards  put  it,  was 
“to  move  the  army  into  Western  Mary- 
land, establish  our  communications  with 
Richmond  through  the  valley  of  the 
Shenandoah,  and,  by  threatening  Penn- 
sylvania, induce  the  enemy  to  follow, 
and  draw  him  back  from  his  base. 
Now,  it  had  been  supposed  that  the 
advance  upon  Frederick  would  lead  to 
the  evacuation  of  Martinsburg  and 
Harper’s  Ferry,  thus  opening  the  line 
of  communication  through  the  valley. 
But  this  not  having  occurred,  it  became 
necessary  to  dislodge  the  enemy  from 
these  positions,  before  concentrating  the 
army  west  of  the  mountains.  To  ac- 
complish this  with  the  least  delay.  Gen- 
eral Jackson  was  directed  to  proceed 
with  his  command  to  Martinsburg,  and, 
after  driving  the  enemy  from  that  place, 
to  move  down  the  south  side  of  the 
Potomac  upon  Harper’s  Ferry.  Gen- 
eral McLaws,  with  his  own  and  R.  H. 
Anderson’s  divisions,  was  ordered  to 
besiege  Maryland  Heights,  on  the  north 
side  of  the  Potomac,  opposite  Harper’s 
Ferry,  and  Brigadier-General  Walker 
to  take  possession  of  Loudon  Heights, 
on  the  east  side  of  the  Shenandoah, 
where  it  unites  with  the  Potomac. 


312 


ANTIETAM. 


These  several  commands  were  directed, 
after  reducing  Harper’s  Ferry  and  clear- 
ing the  valley  of  the  enemy,  to  join 
the  rest  of  the  army  at  Boonsboro’  or 
Hagerstown.” 

Lee’s  plan  was  undoubtedly  bold. 
It  cannot,  however,  be  called  wise.  He 
was  far  away  from  his  supplies;  and 
yet  he  was  cutting  his  army  into  two 
parts,  and  placing  between  those  parts 
a river  which  was  liable  to  be  made 
impassable  in  a few  hours  by  a heavy 
rain.  In  addition  to  all  this,  he  was 
closely  pursued  by  an  enemy  who  was 
considerably  superior  in  numbers.  It 
is  difficult  to  acquit  Lee  of  the  charge 
of  having,  at  this  particular  crisis,  com- 
mitted a grave  blunder.  He  has  him- 
self tried  to  explain  what  seemed  a 
gross  violation  of  the  fundamental  prin- 
ciples of  military  tactics.  The  advance 
of  the  Federal  army,”  he  says,  “was  so 
slow,  at  the  time  we  left  Frederick,  as 
to  justify  the  belief  that  the  reduction 
of  Harper’s  Ferry  would  be  accom- 
plished, and  our  troops  concentrated 
before  they  would  be  called  to  meet  it. 
In  that  event,  it  was  not  intended  to 
oppose  its  passage  through  the  South 
Mountain,  as  it  was  desired  to  engage 
it  as  far  from  its  base  as  possible.”  Lee 
was  evidently  judging  McClellan  by  his 
experience  in  the  Peninsula.  On  this 
occasion,  however,  the  National  com- 
mander had  made  good  use  of  his  time. 
The  discoveiy  of  Lee’s  purpose  had  led 
Sept,  to  both  vigor  and  promptitude  of 
H.  action;  and  on  the  14th,  the 
Confederates  were  startled  to  perceive 
the  Nationals,  in  great  force,  coming 
streaming  down  the  western  sides  of 


the  Catoctin  Hills.  Such  an  apparition 
was  all  the  more  alanning  that  the 
operations  at  Harper’s  Ferry  had  not 
yet  been  crowned  with  success;  and 
that,  if  the  National  forces  should  pene- 
trate the  ^South  Mountain,  they  would 
find  themselves  in  Pleasant  Valley,  di- 
rectly in  the  rear  of  McLaws,  who,  from 
the  side  of  the  Maiyland  Heights,  was 
co-operating  with  Jackson  in  the  reduc- 
tion of  Harper’s  Ferry.  This  was  not 
a state  of  things  which  Lee  could  have 
any  special  desire  to  see  brought  about. 
It  could  hardly  fail  to  prove  destructive 
of  his  whole  plan  of  campaign. 

The  Catoctin  range  is  a continuation 
of  the  Blue  Kidge.  On  the  south,  it 
terminates  in  Maryland  at  the  Point  of 
Bocks.  On  the  north,  it  unites  at  the 
Pennsylvania  State  line  with  the  South 
Mountain  range  which,  trending  to  the 
southwest,  slopes  down  to  the  Potomac 
at  Knoxville,  about  four  miles  to  the 
east  of  Harper’s  Ferry.  Between  these 
two  ranges  nestles  the  most  beautiful 
valley  in  Maryland — the  valley  of  Ca- 
toctin. In  the  centre  of  the  valley, 
and  about  ten  miles  from  Frederick,  is 
the  village  of  Middletown.  Few  vil- 
lages in  the  whole  world  are  more  high- 
ly favored  for  situation  than  the  village 
of  Middletown.  At  this  season  of  the 
year  Nature,  clad  in  her  rich,  autumnal 
robes,  presents  in  this  region  unusual 
attractions.  To  prevent  any  possibility 
of  disaster  resulting  from  the  unfortu- 
nate  division  of  his  army,  Lee  made 
such  disposition  of  his  forces  as  would 
cover  the  siege  of  Harper’s  Ferry.  He 
had  fallen  back  upon  South  Mountain, 
which  running  north,  as  it  does  from 


HARPER’S  FERRY. 


313 


the  ferry,  forms  a sort  of  natural  cur- 
tain and  furnishes  an  excellent  line  of 
defense.  This  line  can  only  be  pene- 
trated by  Turner’s  Gap,  in  front  of 
Middletown,  and  by  Crampton’s  Gap, 
some  five  miles  further  to  the  south. 
Master  of  these  natural  passes,  Lee 
could  hold  back  the  Union  army  with 
one  hand,  while  with  the  other  he  was 
securing  the  rich  prize  of  Harper’s 
Ferry.  Here,  therefore,  he  posted  his 
troops.  Meanwhile,  the  Nationals, 
whom  we  have  just  seen  streaming 
down  the  western  slopes  of  the  Catoc- 
tins,  were  moving  in  two  columns  across 
the  valley — the  right  and  centre — to- 
wards Turner’s  Gap,  Burnside  leading 
the  way ; and  the  left,  composed  of 
Franklin’s  corps,  towards  Crampton’s 
Gap,  more  to  the  south. 

While  the  forces  of  North  and  South 
are  thus  nearing  each  other  at  South 
Mountain,  and  while  a great  battle  is 
hourly  becoming  more  imminent,  let  us 
see  what  is  taking  place  in  the  immediate 
neighborhood  of  Harper’s  Ferry.  This 
place  is  highly  favored  by  nature,  the 
entire  hollow  being  commanded  by  the 
three  mountains,  named,  respectively, 
Bolivar,  Maryland  and  Loudon  Heights. 
A large  amount  of  artillery  and  stores 
had  been  collected  at  Harper’s  Ferry 
by  the  Federal  government.  In  the 
event  of  its  being  found  necessary  to 
evacuate  the  ferry,  it  would  be  neces- 
sary to  destroy  all  the  stores  and  other 
property,  or  leave  them  to  the  enemy. 
It  was  McClellan’s  opinion,  when  he 
started  to  follow  Lee  into  Maryland, 
that  Harper’s  Ferry  could  not  be  held. 
He  therefore  advised  its  evacuation. 


and  the  employment  of  its  garrison  in 
co-operation  with  his  army.  Four  days 
later  he  repeated  the  same  advice  to 
Halleck.  But  Halleck  was  unwilling 
to  make  so  great  a sacrifice.  He  re- 
solved, therefore,  to  hold  the  position 
until  McClellan  should  be  able  to  re- 
lieve it,  or  until  communication  would 
be  open,  so  that  it  could  be  evacuated 
in  safety.  The  place  had  been,  since 
the  15th  of  August,  in  charge  of  D.  S. 
Miles,  who  had  been  sent  thither  by 
General  Wool,  with  special  instructions 
to  fortify  Maryland  Heights — the  key 
of  the  position.  Miles  had  been  singu- 
larly remiss  in  the  discharge  of  his  duty. 
He  had  done  nothing  to  strengthen  the 
position.  On  the  5th  of  September, 
Colonel  Thomas  H.  Ford  w^as  placed 
by  Miles  in  command  of  the  heights. 
Ford  saw  the  danger  to  which  the  Na- 
tionals were  exposed  from  the  unpro- 
tected nature  of  the  position.  He 
therefore  called  for  reinforcements,  and 
for  intrenching  tools.  The  reinforce- 
ments came,  but  not  the  tools.  With  a 
few  borrowed  axes  and  other  imple- 
ments, Ford  went  to  work,  and  was 
successful  in  constructing  a slight  breast- 
work of  trees  near  the  crest  of  the  hill. 
This  was  finished  the  very  day  that 
Jackson  appeared  with  his  advance. 
Miles  had  fortified  Bolivar  Heights 
behind  the  town;  but  these  are  com- 
manded by  both  Loudon  and  Maryland 
Heights.  The  garrison  at  Harper’s 
Ferry  had  been  increased  to  about 
13,000  men  by  the  arrival  of  General 
Julius  White  with  the  garrison  from 
Martinsburg.  At  noon  of  the  13th, 
Jackson  was  in  full  force  in  the  rear  of 


314 


ANTIETAM. 


Harper’s  Ferry,  and  at  once  put  him- 
self in  communication  with  Walker  and 
McLaws.  Walker  was  already  in  pos- 
session of  Loudon  Heights;  and  Mc- 
Laws was  exerting  himself  to  the 
utmost  to  get  hold  of  the  Maryland 
Heights  on  the  other  side  of  the  Po- 
tomac. The  summits  of  these  ditferent 
mountains  are  within  cannon  shot  of 
each  other.  Ford  had  been  attacked 
on  the  12th,  but  had  managed  to  hold 
his  ground.  On  the  13th  again,  early 
in  the  day,  he  had  repelled  a fierce  as- 
sault ; but  later  on  the  same  day,  the 
attack  was  resumed  by  Kershaw,  and 
the  Nationals  were  driven  back  in  some 
confusion.  At  two  o’clock  next  morn- 
ing Ford,  hopeless  of  aid  from  Miles, 
spiked  his  guns,  and,  under  cover  of  the 
darkness,  retired  to  Harper’s  Ferry. 
All  now  depended  upon  Miles.  Could 
he  hold  out  till  McClellan  should  be 
able  to  send  him  aid?  It  was  a difficult 
and  dangerous  task.  But  with  the 
forces  at  his  command,  and  considering 
the  advantages  of  the  position,  it  was 
not  by  any  means  impossible  of  ac- 
complishment. Early  on  the  14th,  Har- 
per’s Ferry  was  completely  invested, 
the  Confederates  being  in  command  of 
both  Loudon  and  Maryland  Heights. 
At  the  foot  of  the  latter,  GeneralWright 
was  Avell  posted  with  artillery;  and 
McLaws,  who  had  pushed  forward  to 
the  Potomac,  at  Sandy  Hook,  was  bar- 
ling all  way  of  escape  down  the  river. 
In  the  afternoon  an  artilleiy  fire  was 
opened.  On  the  same  day  a message 
came  from  McClellan  to  Miles,  saying, 
“ Hold  on  to  the  last  extremity,  and,  if 
possible,  reoccupy  Maryland  Heights 


with  your  whole  force.  The  Catoctin 
Valley  is  in  our  possession,  and  you 
can  safely  cross  the  river  at  Berlin.” 
This  Miles  could  not  or  would  not  do. 
At  nine  o’clock  that  night  he  allowed 
his  cavalry,  2000  strong,  under  Col- 
onel Dav^is,  to  depart.  When  morning 
dawned,  it  was  found  that  Bolivar 
Heights  were  also  in  the  hands  of  the 
Confederates.  With  the  early  light, 
no  fewer  than  nine  batteries  opened 
fire  upon  the  now  comparatively  help- 
less garrison.  Miles  could  not  prolong 
the  resistance.  He  soon  hoisted  a 
white  flag ; but  as  it  was  not  perceived 
by  the  Confederates,  the  firing  con- 
tinued for  some  thirty  or  forty  minutes 
afterwards.  During  this  time  Miles 
was  mortally  wounded  by  the  fragment 
of  a shell.  The  duty  of  surrendering 
devolved  upon  General  White.  Eleven 
thousand  five  hundred  and  eighty-three 
men  were  made  prisoners  of  war ; and 
73  guns,  13,000  small  arms,  200  wagons, 
and  large  quantities  of  supplies  fell 
into  the  hands  of  the’  Confederates. 
The  officers  were  allowed  to  go  on 
parole  with  their  side  arms  and  private 
property.  The  private  soldiers  were 
permitted  to  take  everything  with  them 
except  their  equipments  and  guns.  The 
surrender  of  Harper’s  Ferry  was  felt 
to  be  a disgrace  to  the  National  arms. 
Later  in  the  year  it  was  made  the  sub- 
ject of  examination  by  a Court  of  In- 
quiry at  Washington.  The  evidence 
produced  was  of  the  most  damning 
kind.  Ford  and  other  officers  were  dis- 
missed from  the  army  of  the  United 
States ; and  a lasting  stigma  was  affixed 
to  the  name  and  memory  of  Miles,  who 


SOUTH  MOUNTAm. 


no 


was  declared  to  have  exhibited  ‘^an 
incapacity  amounting  almost  to  imbe- 
cilit}^.” 

Let  us  now  see  what  was  taking 
place  a little  further  to  the  northeast. 
We  left  the  National  army  under  Mc- 
Clellan marching  across  the  beautiful 
valley  through  which,  as  seen  from  the 
neighboring  heights,  runs,  like  a silver 
thread,  the  little  river  Catoctin.  They 
were  moving  towards  the  two  passes 
which  lead  through  the  South  Moun- 
tain— Turner’s  Gap  and  Crampton’s 
Gap — both  of  which  the  Confederates 
had  carefully  guarded,  and  each  of 
which  they  were  resolved  to  defend  to 
the  very  uttermost.  McClellan  knew 
that  the  garrison  at  Harper’s  Ferry  was 
reduced  to  great  straits ; and  being  eager 
to  afford  relief,  he  pressed  forward 
wuth  unwonted  speed.  On  the  morn- 
ing of  Sunday,  the  14th  of  September, 
the  two  rival  armies  came  into  collision 
at  a bridge  which  traverses  the  Catoc- 
tin about  half  a mile  west  of  Middle- 
town,  and  where  the  Confederates  had 
posted  some  artillery.  Finding  it  im- 
possible to  resist  the  heavy  and  resolute 
pressure  of  the  Nationals,  D.  H.  Hill, 
who  was  in  command,  fell  back,  retiring 
further  up  the  mountain,  and  posting 
his  men  on  the  three  roads  which  lead 
through  Turner’s  Gap.  In  addition  to 
the  main  road,  there  are  two  country 
roads — one  to  the  right  and  one  to  the 
left.  All  these  approaches  were  well 
guarded  by  artillery.  Cox’s  Kanawha 
division,  of  Keno’s  corps  of  Burnside’s 
column,  moved  along  the  road  to  the 
left  or  south  of  the  gap.  They  soon 
discovered  that  the  Confederates  occu- 


pied the  crest  in  their  front  in  great 
force.  Reno  immediately  ordered  an 
advance,  promising  the  support  of  his 
whole  corps.  Cox  was  promptly  sup- 
ported by  Wilcox,  Rodman  and  Stur- 
gis. At  this  point,  the  battle  now 
began  to  rage  with  great  fierceness,  the 
Nationals  not  only  holding  their  own, 
but  gradually  pressing  the  enemy  back- 
ward, and  gaining  a foothold  on  the 
crest.  Between  two  and  three  o’clock. 
Hooker’s  corps,  of  Burnside’s  column, 
moved  along  the  road  to  the  right,  his 
object  being  to  crush  the  Confederate 
left  at  the  higher  crest.  Meade  pressed 
toward  the  eminence  on  the  one  side  of 
this  road ; and  Patrick,  supported  by 
Houbleday  and  Phelps,  was  pressing 
toward  the  eminence  on  the  other  side. 
Duryee  advanced  to  the  assistance  of 
Meade  with  his  fine  brigade,  of  Rick- 
etts’ division,  arriving  just  in  time  to 
witness  the  close  of  the  contest.  About 
four  o’clock,,  when  the  battle  had 
reached  a climax,  Longstreet  came  up 
from  Hagerstown  with  reinforcements ; 
and,  as  he  outranked  Hill,  he  assumed 
the  command.  While  victory  wsis 
crowning  the  efforts  of  Reno  on  the 
left,  and  those  of  Hooker  on  the  right, 
Burnside,  somewhat  late  in  the  after- 
noon, pushed  Gibbon’s  brigade  forward 
on  the  main  road  which  leads  along 
through  the  gap.  This  brigade,  com- 
ing into  contact  with  the  Confederate 
centre,  encountered  a stubborn  resist- 
ance; but  they  pressed  on,  fighting 
bravely,  and  steadily  gaining  ground. 
At  nine  o’clock,  when  they  had  all  but 
reached  the  summit  of  the  pass,  their 
ammunition  failed  them ; but  the  vie- 


bl6 


ANTIETAM. 


tory  was  secure ; and  they  were  soon 
afterwards  relieved.  When  the  contest 
closed,  the  Nationals  had  carried  the 
mountain  sides  on  the  right  and  left 
of  the  gap;  and  the  main  road  or 
turnpike  was  also  in  their  hands.  Such 
was  the  battle  of  South  Mountain.  It 
was  a decided  victory  for  the  National 
arms.  It  was  not  won,  however,  with- 
out very  considerable  loss — a loss  in 
killed  and  wounded  amounting  to  2325 
men.  Among  the  killed  was  General 
Reno — one  of  the  bravest  of  the  brave — 
a soldier  who  had  done  much  during 
the  dark  hours  of  adversity  to  sustain 
the  sinking  spirit  of  the  North. 

Simultaneously  with  this  struggle  at 
Turner’s  Gap,  the  Nationals,  under 
Franklin,  were  making  a bold  effort  to 
secure  possession  of  Crampton’s  Gap, 
some  six  miles  further  to  the  south. 
The  position  was  held  by  Howell  Cobb, 
who,  the  reader  will  remember,  was 
secretary  of  the  treasury  under  Bu- 
chanan. Cobb  had  under  him  three  of 
McLaws’  brigades.  Franklin,  follow- 
ing out  McClellan’s  instructions,  ap- 
peared at  Barkittsville,  in  front  of  the 
pass,  at  noon  on  the  14th,  with  a fine 
body  of  men  from  New  York,  New 
Jersey  and  Pennsylvania.  He  found 
the  Confederates  well  posted  behind 
stone-wall  defenses.  Forming  his  line 
of  battle  with  Slocum’s  division  on  the 
right  of  the  road  running  through  the 
gap,  and  with  Smith’s  on  the  left,  he 
advanced  upon  Cobb,  steadily  driving 
him  back  from  his  defenses  up  the 
slope ; and  after  an  action  which  lasted 
some  three  hours,  he  gained  the  crest 
of  the  hilL  The  Confederates  fled 


down  the  western  side  of  the  mountain, 
leaving  400  prisoners,  three  regimental 
colors,  two  pieces  of  artillery  and  3000 
stand  of  arms.  Franklin  was  now  only 
six  miles  from  Harper’s  Ferry.  He 
was  in  a position  to  go  to  the  assistance 
of  Miles.*  But,  as  the  reader  has  al- 
ready learned,  it  was  too  late.  In  this 
engagement,  Franklin  lost  115  killed 
and  418  wounded  and  missing.  In  the 
two  engagements,  the  Nationals  had 
actually  come  off  victorious ; but  Lee 
had  accomplished  his  purpose — he  had 
secured  time  for  Jackson  to  complete 
the  enterprise  at  Harper’s  Ferry. 

Maryland  Heights  and  Harper’s 
Ferry,  with  its  stores,  were  in  the 
hands  of  the  Confederates.  In  one 
sense  it  was  a great  prize  which  Lee 
had  won.  It  was  a prize,  however, 
more  in  seeming  than  reality.  To  gain 
it  he  had  divided  his  army  into  two 
parts,  in  presence  of  united  and  power- 
ful forces,  and  had  thereby  exposed 
himself  to  the  terrible  risk  of  being  cut 
up  in  detail.  This  danger  was  im- 
minent on  the  14th,  when  Harper’s 
Ferry  was  still  engaging  Jackson’s  at- 
tention, and  employing  all  his  strength. 
It  was  still  imminent  on  the  morn-  sept. 
ing  of  the  15th,  when  Franklin,  15. 
having  forced  his  way  through  Cramp- 
ton’s  Gap,  appeared,  like  a spectre,  in 
Pleasant  Valley.  Jackson  had  hurried 
off  that  morning  from  Harper’s  Ferry, 
leaving  A.  P.  Hill  to  carry  out  the  ar- 
rangements rendered  necessary  by  the 
surrender ; but  some  time  must  elapse 
before  Lee  could  count  on  Jackson’s 
presence  with  any  number  of  his  troopa 
The  Confederate  commander  lost  no 


THE  BATTLE  GROUND. 


317 


time  in  making  the  necessary  disposi- 
tion of  his  forces.  Withdrawing  from 
South  Mountain,  he  crossed  Pleasant 
Valley,  and  took  position  on  the  slop- 
ing ground  to  the  west  of  Antietam 
Creek,  in  the  vicinity  of  Sharpsburg. 
Sept.  16th,  the  larger  portion  of 

the  Confederate  forces  left  Har- 
per’s Ferry  in  great  haste,  crossed  the 
pontoon  bridge  into  Maryland,  and,  by 
forced  marches,  succeeded  in  joining 
Lee  at  Antietam  in  time  for  the  great 
battle  of  the  17th.  Jackson,  who,  as 
has  been  mentioned,  left  on  the  16th, 
rejoined  Lee  on  the  16th.  McLaws 
had  abandoned  the  Maryland  Heights 
when  he  became  aware  of  the  near 
presence  of  Franklin.  Walker  at  the 
same  time  abandoned  Loudon  Heights. 
These  last  reached  Lee  by  way  of  Shep- 
herdstown,  about  nine  o’clock  on  the 
morning  of  the  17th.  On  the  night  of 
the  16th,  the  Confederates  were  well 
posted  on  the  heights  near  Sharpsburg. 

A few  words  here,  descriptive  of  the 
ground  on  which  two  great  armies  were 
about  to  come  into  deadly  collision, 
will  enable  the  reader  to  understand 
more  clearly  the  battle  picture  which 
follows.  As  the  traveler,  after  reach- 
ing the  summit  of  South  Mountain,  be- 
gins to  descend  the  western  slope,  there 
bursts  upon  his  view  one  of  the  love- 
liest landscapes  in  the  United  States— 
a scene  quite  as  attractive  as  the  valley 
of  the  Catoctin  which  he  has  just  left 
behind.  In  the  distance,  some  eight  or 
twelve  miles  in  front  of  him,  rolls 
lazily  along  on  its  tortuous  bed  the 
dark  current  of  the  Potomac.  On  this 
side  of  the  Potomac,  and  fi’om  six  to 


eight  miles  from  the  mountain  passes 
runs  the  drowsy  stream  called  Antietam 
Creek.  This  creek,  which,  flowing  al- 
most due  south  and  falling  into  the 
Potomac  some  eight  miles  above  Har- 
per’s Ferry,  forms  with  that  river  a 
sort  of  irregular  acute  angle.  Between 
these  two  streams  there  is  an  enclosed 
space  which,  of  course,  widens  consider- 
ably towards  the  north,  but  which,  at 
this  point  nov/  particularly  claiming 
attention  is  from  two  to  three  miles 
broad,  and  about  seven  or  eight  miles 
long.  From  the  western  margin  of  the 
Antietam  the  ground  rises  until  it  be- 
comes a bold  crest,  the  entire  slope 
being  covered  by  woods  and  cultivated 
fields;  it  then  falls  back  to  the  Po- 
tomac in  rugged  and  broken  outlines  of 
rock.  Almost  in  the  centre  of  this 
space,  and  just  behind  the  ridge  to  the 
west,  nestles  the  town  of  Sharpsburg; 
and  behind  Sharpsburg,  a little  to  the 
south,  is  the  Shepherdstown  Ford  across 
the  Potomac. 

Such  was  the  position  which  the 
Confederate  general  had  chosen,  and  on 
which  he  proposed  to  await  the  attack 
of  McClellan.  The  creek  was  in  his 
front;  the  Potomac  was  in  his  rear; 
and  behind  and  near  the  middle  of  his 
line  was  the  little  town  of  Sharpsburg, 
about  a mile  from  the  creek.  The 
position  unquestionably  offered  several 
advantages;  but  it  is  always  dangerous 
to  hazard — what  in  the  circumstances 
this  could  not  but  be — a great  and  pos- 
sibly decisive  battle,  with  a river  in  the 
rear.  The  truth  is,  Lee’s  original  plan 
had  failed.  He  was  no  longer  offensive, 
but  defensive.  His  great  object,  from 


318 


ANTIETAM. 


the  failure  at  South  Mountain,  had 
been  to  gain  time  for  the  concentration 
of  his  troops.  This,  however,  he  could 
have  accomplished  with  equal  ease  on 
the  other  side  of  the  Potomac.  Why, 
then,  did  he  remain  on  the  Maryland 
side  ? The  answer  is  simple.  He  could 
not  have  recrossed  the  Potomac  without 
covering  himself  with  odium — without 
making  his  expedition  to  a certain  ex- 
tent ridiculous.  He  had  marched  North 
wdth  a great  flourish  of  trumpets;  his 
plans  and  purposes  had  become  known ; 
it  was  absolutely  necessary,  in  short, 
that  in  a fair  fight  he  should  test  the 
skill  and  strength  of  his  antagonist; 
and  judging  from  the  past,  he  was  not 
without  reason  to  hope  that  victory 
might  crown  his  effort.  If  defeated, 
he  might  still  be  able  to  make  good  his 
retreat  across  the  Potomac.  If  success- 
ful, he  might  yet  march  in  triumph  to 
Baltimore  and  Washington. 

On  the  morning  of  the  15th,  the  Na- 
tional army  had  defiled  from  the  South 
Mountain,  and  moved  in  long,  shining- 
columns  athwart  the  valley.  By  the 
evening  of  that  day,  the  advance  had 
arrived  at  Antietam  Creek;  and  the 
enemy  was  discovered  well  posted  be- 
hind the  crest  of  the  opposite  slope. 
There  was  some  slight  skirmishing 
with  cavalry ; but  neither  of  the  com- 
manders was  quite  willing  to  open  the 
fight.  Lee,  while  actually  waiting  for 
the  arrival  of  reinforcements  from  Har- 
per’s Ferry,  made  such  a show  of 
strength  as  imposed  upon  McClellan. 
The  National  forces  were  not  well  for- 
ward, when  darkness  set  in.  There 
had  been  on  the  part  of  some  of  the 


commands  unnecessary  delay — a delay 
but  for  which  McClellan  might  have 
been  able  to  attack  Lee  with  success 
on  the  afternoon  of  the  15th.  During 
the  morning  of  the  16th,  the  whole 
of  the  National  army  arrived,  with  the 
exception  of  Franklin’s  command,  which 
was  still  in  Pleasant  Valley.  By  that 
time,  however,  Lee  was  equally  pre- 
pared for  battle;  for  Jackson  had  al- 
ready arrived,  and  with  him  almost  the 
entire  Confederate  strength  from  Har- 
per’s Ferry. 

On  the  morning  of  the  16th,  there 
was  some  artillery  firing;  but  it  did 
not  seem  to  indicate  that  either  side 
was  yet  fully  ready  for  the  fight.  Both 
armies,  however,  were  busy  making 
preparations  for  the  attack  which  could 
not  now  be  long  delayed.  The  Con- 
federates were  so  arranged  that  Long- 
street  w’as  on  the  right,  with  his  right 
flank  resting  on  a curve  of  the  Antie- 
tam, D.  H.  Hill  being  on  his  left,  and 
one  of  Longstreet’s  divisions,  com- 
manded by  Hood,  being  on  the  left 
of  Hill.  In  a general  manner  their 
line  stood  north  and  south;  but  Hood’s 
division  made  an  angle  with  the  rest, 
and,  facing  northward,  stood  across  the 
Hagerstown  Boad.  The  object  of  this 
arrangement  was  to  oppose  any  flank 
movement  which  might  be  made  in 
that  direction.  Close  to  that  point,  and 
in  the  rear  of  Hood,  Jackson’s  exhaust- 
ed troops,  which  had  just  arrived  from 
Haiq^er’s  Ferry,  were  posted  in  reserve, 
his  line  stretching:  from  the  Has-erstown 
Road  toward  the  Potomac,  and  pro- 
tected by  Stuart,  with  cavalry  and 
artillery.  Walker  was  posted  on  Long- 


THE  BUNKER  CHURCH. 


319 


street’s  right  with  two  brigades,  near 
what  was  called  Shaveley’s  Farm.  Lee 
had  his  headquarters  in  a tent  on  the 
hill  where  the  National  cemetery  now  is. 
McClellan’s  forces,  on  the  morning  of 
that  day,  were  posted  along  the  eastern 
bank  of  the  Antietam.  Hooker’s  corps 
was  placed  on  the  extreme  right.  Next 
to  him  was  Sumner,  with  his  corps. 
Porter  was  placed  in  the  centre,  and 
Burnside  on  the  left.  Mansfield  was 
stationed  in  the  rear  of  Hooker.  Frank- 
lin had  not  yet  come  up  from  Pleasant 
Valley.  General  McClellan’s  head- 
quarters were  at  the  fine  brick  mansion 
of  Philip  Pry,  on  the  east  side  of  the 
Antietam,  and  about  two  miles  north- 
east of  Sharpsburg.  From  this  point 
he  had  a commanding  view  of  the  en- 
tire line  of  battle.  In  front  of  the  Na- 
tional line  were  three  stone  bridges. 
These  bridges  have  been  described  as 
Nos.  1,2  and  3.  No.  1 was  in  front  of 
the  National  right,  near  which  were 
stationed  Hooker,  Sumner  and  Mans- 
field. No.  2 was  in  front  of  Porter, 
who  commanded  the  National  centre. 
No.  3 was  opposite  Burnside,  v^ho  had 
charge  of  the  National  left.  Near 
bridge  1 was  a ford,  which  was  turned 
to  good  account  during  the  progress  of 
the  fight.  McClellan’s  plan  was  to  at- 
tack the  enemy’s  left  with  the  corps  of 
Hooker  and  Mansfield,  supported  by 
Sumner’s,  and,  if  necessary,  by  Frank- 
lin’s; and,  as  soon  as  matters  looked 
favorable  in  that  direction,  to  move  the 
corps  of  Burnside  against  the  enemy’s 
extreme  right,  upon  the  ridge  running 
to  the  south  and  rear  of  Sharpsburg, 
and,  having  carried  that  position,  to 


press  along  the  crest  toward  his  left. 
Whenever  either  of  these  fiank  move- 
ments should  be  successful,  he  proposed 
to  advance  the  centre  with  all  the 
forces  then  disposable. 

We  have  already  referred  to  the 
careful  disposition  which  Lee  had  made 
of  his  troops  on  his  own  left,  on  and 
around  the  Hagerstown  Hoad.  On  the 
west  side  of  that  road,  about  a mile 
from  Sharpsburg,  and  about  half  a mile 
from  the  rear  of  the  Confederate  left, 
there  was  a small  meeting-house,  known 
as  the  Hunker  Church.  This  church  was 
enveloped  in  woods.  In  the  immediate 
neighborhood  of  the  church  there  was 
an  open,  cultivated  area,  extending  from 
the  north,  for  the  most  part  skirted 
with  woods,  but  part  of  which  was 
traversed  by  the  Hagerstown  Road. 
In  the  woods  near  the  church  were 
numerous  ledges  of  limestone,  which 
atforded  an  excellent  cover  for  troops. 
It  was  here,  among  these  limestone 
ledges,  where  Jackson  had  posted  his 
men.  The  middle  part  of  this  open 
ground  was  a cornfield.  A portion  of 
it  toward  the  east  had  been  recently 
ploughed.  It  was  in  the  woods,  near 
the  church,  and  in  that  open  ground, 
that  the  battle  of  Antietam  most  fierce- 
ly raged  and  was  principally  fought. 
This  was  the  focus  of  the  fight. 

On  the  afternoon  of  the  16th,  about 
two  P.  M.,  General  McClellan  began  to 
put  his  plans  into  operation.  General 
Hooker,  ever  ready  and  always  equal 
to  the  situation,  with  his  corps,  consist- 
ing of  Ricketts’,  Meade’s  and  Double- 
day’s  divisions,  in  prompt  obedience  to 
orders,  crossed  the  Antietam  at  bridge 


320 


ANTIETAM. 


No.  1,  and  by  the  adjoining  ford.  Gen- 
eral Mansfield  was  to  follow  Hooker 
during  the  night,  and  to  be  in  a posi- 
tion to  render  him  assistance  by  day- 
break. Sumner  was  to  follow  in  the 
same  direction  in  the  morning.  Hooker, 
encountering  no  opposition  in  crossing 
the  river,  advanced  in  a southward  di- 
rection, and  came  to  the  eastern  edge 
of  what  we  have  described  as  the  battle 
area.  As  he  approached  the  house  of 
a Mr.  D.  Miller,  his  advance — Meade’s 
Pennsylvania  Peserves — came  into  con- 
tact with  a portion  of  the  enemy’s  left. 
The  contest  thus  begun  was  sharp  and 
severe,  and  lasted  until  dark,  when  the 
Confederates  fell  back.  Hooker’s  men 
rested  that  night  on  their  arms  on  the 
ground  they  had  won.  Mansfield’s 
corps,  consisting  of  the  divisions  of 
Williams  and  Green,  were  also  success- 
ful in  crossing  the  Antietam ; and  upon 
the  farm  of  Poffenberger,  about  a mile 
in  Hooker’s  rear,  they  bivouacked  till 
dawn. 

Hooker,  impatient  to  resume  the 
Sept,  attack,  was  ready  and  in  action 
H.  by  the  first  streak  of  early  day. 
The  Pennsylvania  Reserves  were  again 
the  first  to  be  engaged.  Soon,  how- 
ever, the  whole  of  his  corps  were  in 
deadly  conflict  with  the  enemy,  Jackson 
being  in  command.  Hooker  advanced, 
with  Doubleday  on  his  right,  Meade  on 
his  left,  and  Ricketts  in  the  centre. 
Such  was  the  vigor  of  the  onslaught, 
and  so  effective  was  the  assistance  ren- 
dered by  the  batteries  on  the  east  side  of 
the  Antietam,  that  Jackson’s  brigades, 
terribly  cut  up,  were  driven  across  the 
cornfield,  in  the  open  ground,  over  the 


Hagerstown  Road,  and  into  the  woods 
beyond  the  Dunker  Church,  where  were 
their  reserves.  Eager  to  accomplish  his 
purpose,  and  to  obtain  possession  of 
the  woods  beyond.  Hooker  now  pushed 
forward  his  left  and  centre.  At  this 
point,  where  the  ground  rises  to  some- 
what of  an  elevation,  they  were  met 
by  a murderous  fire.  The  broken  bat- 
talions were  re-formed ; and  Jackson 
brought  forth  his  reserves.  A fearful 
struggle  ensued.  At  short  range,  and 
in  the  open  ground,  and  with  the  ardor 
of  desperation,  they  plied  their  deadly 
work.  It  was  a fight  in  which  there 
was  no  desire  for  quarter — no  wish  to 
save  or  be  saved.  Two  great  com- 
manders were  pitted  against  each  other; 
and  the  men  were  animated  by  the 
spirit  of  their  chiefs.  In  his  extremity, 
Hooker  called  on  Doubleday  for  aid; 
and  a brigade  under  Hartsuff  was  for- 
warded at  the  double-quick.  This  bri- 
gade was  terribly  punished  in  pushing 
its  way  across  the  cornfield.  It  offered 
a gallant  resistance;  but  it  could  not 
turn  the  tide  of  battle.  In  the  brief 
struggle  of  half  an  hour  Hartsuff  fell, 
severely  wounded.  The  opposing  forces 
were  literally  torn  to  shreds.  In  his 
official  report  of  this  fierce  encounter. 
General  Jackson  says:  “The  carnage 
on  both  sides  was  terrific.  At  an 
early  hour.  General  Starke,  command- 
ing the  Stonewall  division,  was  killed ; 
Colonel  Douglas,  commanding  Law- 
ton’s brigade,  was  also  killed.  Gen- 
eral Lawton,  commanding  division,  and 
Colonel  Walker,  commanding  brigade, 
were  severely  wounded.  More  than 
half  the  brigades  of  Lawton  and  Hays 


THE  AIR  ALIVE  WITH  BULLETS. 


321 


were  either  killed  or  wounded,  and 
more  than  a tliird  of  Trimble’s.  All 
the  regimental  commanders  in  those 
brigades,  except  two,  were  either  killed 
or  wounded.  Thinned  in  their  ranks, 
and  their  ammunition  exhausted,”  it 
was  necessary  to  withdraw  the  shattered 
regiments  to  tlie  rear,  when  ‘‘Hood’s  di- 
vision, of  Longstreet’s  command,  took 
their  place.”  Hooker’s  corps  had  simi- 
larly sulfered.  Indeed,  General  Sum- 
ner, who  arrived  on  the  field  a little 
later,  testified  that  when  he  came  up 
he  “ saw  nothing  of  Hooker’s  corps 
at  all.” 

It  was  now  half-past  seven  o’clock. 
Mansfield  had  just  come  up  to  the  sup- 
port of  Hooker.  He  had  pushed  his 
way  to  the  Hagerstown  Road.  At  that 
moment  the  battle  din  was  fearful. 
What  with  the  yells  of  the  Confede- 
rates, the  ringing  cheers  of  the  Na- 
tionals, the  shaj*p,  penetrating  fire  of 
musketry,  the  loud  booming  of  can- 
non, and  the  ghastly  procession  of  the 
wounded  as  they  came  out  from  the 
thick  of  the  fight,  it  seemed  a very  pan- 
demonium. But  it  was  no  time  for  idle 
moralizing.  While  attempting  to  de- 
ploy his  corps — the  divisions  of  Will- 
iams and  Green — Mansfield  was  fiercely 
set  upon  by  the  division  of  D.  H.  Hill, 
which  had  just  come  out  of  the  woods 
at  the  Dunker  Church.  In  the  struggle 
which  ensued,  and  in  which  his  corps 
were  driven  back  to  the  woods,  brave 
old  Mansfield  was  killed.  His  com- 
mand devolved  on  General  Williams, 
who  left  his  division  to  the  care  of 
General  Crawford,  one  of  his  brigade 
commanders.  Hooker,  nothing  daunted 


by  his  terrible  losses,  was  still  hopeful 
of  success.  Ricketts  was  unable  to  ad- 
vance ; but  he  assured  the  general  that 
he  could  hold  his  ground.  Doubleday 
had  succeeded  in  silencing  a battery 
which  for  half  an  hour  had  been  pour- 
ing enfilading  fire  on  Hooker’s  central 
line.  Near  the  Dunker  Church  was 
a wood-crowned  elevation,  which  was 
really  the  key  of  the  position.  This 
Hooker  determined  to  take.  With  this 
end  in  view,  he  ordered  forward  two  of 
the  Mansfield  brigades — Crawford  and 
Gordon — Hooker  himself  advancing  to 
the  front,  and  recklessly  exposing  him- 
self to  the  enemy’s  bullets,  which  fell 
in  showers  around  him.  For  a time  he 
moved  about  on  foot,  examining  the 
ground  in  his  front,  and  seeking  a 
favorable  site  for  a battery.  As  he 
remounted  on  a piece  of  rising  ground, 
the  air  was  literally  alive  with  bullets. 
He  was  scarcely  in  the  saddle  when 
three  men  were  shot  by  his  side,  and 
when  he  himself  was  shot  in  the  foot. 
Suffering  dreadfully  from  the  wound, 
and  sitting  unsteadily  in  his  saddle,  he 
turned  and  fixed  his  eyes  on  the  coveted 
position.  “There  is  a regiment  to  the 
right,”  said  he;  “order  it  forward. 
Crawford  and  Gordon  are  coming  up; 
tell  them  to  carry  these  works,  and  hold 
them,  and  it  is  our  fight.”  On  exam- 
ination, it  was  found  that  the  bullet 
had  completely  passed  through  his  foot. 
Soon  afterwards  he  was  carried  off  the 
field  to  McClellan’s  headquarters  at 
Pry’s,  but  not  until  he  felt  satisfied 
that  he  had  won  the  field,  so  far  as  it 
was  the  duty  or  in  the  power  of  the 
National  right  to  win  it.  In  carrying 


322 


ANTIETAM. 


out  the  orders  given  them,  Crawford 
and  Gordon  were  fairly  successful. 
They  had  reached  the  woods,  and  were 
holding  them  against  heavy  odds. 

It  was  only  nine  o’clock.  It  seemed 
as  if  the  battle  had  been  raging  for  the 
greater  part  of  a day.  Just  as  Hooker 
was  leaving  the  field,  Sumner  arrived 
and  assumed  command.  Discovering  at 
once  the  dangerous  position  held  by 
the  two  Mansfield  brigades,  Sumner 
ordered  Sedgwick,  whose  division  was 
in  advance,  to  move  forward  to  their 
support.  It  was  a hazardous  operation. 
It  was  necessary  to  cross  the  cornfield ; 
and  if  the  enemy’s  line  was  complete, 
he  was  in  immediate  danger  of  being 
flanked.  Simultaneously,  with  the  ad- 
vance of  Sedgwick,  French  and  Rich- 
ardson, who  had  also  arrived  on  the 
field,  moved  down  upon  the  foe  a little 
more  to  the  left.  Sedgwi(;k  suffered 
terribly;  but  the  Nationals,  having 
again  pressed  across  the  open  and  now 
blood-stained  area,  were  holding  the 
ground  around  the  Dunker  Church.  It 
seemed  for  a moment  as  if  victory  had 
pronounced  in  their  favor.  But  no. 
The  backward  and  forward  struggle 
must  be  repeated.  The  blood-stained 
field  must  be  crossed  and  recrossed. 
McLaws  and  Walker,  who  had  arrived 
with  their  troops  from  Harper’s  Ferry, 
were  moved  at  once  to  Jackson’s  sup- 
port, with  Early  on  their  left.  Posted 
behind  the  rocky  bulwarks,  they  await- 
ed the  approach  of  the  Nationals;  and, 
as  they  drew  near,  they  leaped  from 
their  hiding-places  and  fell  upon  them 
with  tremendous  fury,  forcing  them 
from  the  Dunker  Woods,  and  driving 


them  across  the  cornfield,  and  into  the 
woods  beyond.  At  this  moment,  affairs 
looked  sufficiently  gloomy  for  the  Na- 
tional right.  Sumner’s  headquarters 
were  now  in  the  narrow  field  where 
Hooker  in  Jhe  morning  had  begun  the 
fight.  Sedgwick,  who  had  been  three 
times  wounded,  was  at  last  obliged 
to  leave  the  field.  Dana,  Crawford 
and  other  officers  had  been  wounded. 
What  remained  of  Hooker’s  troops 
were  terribly  exhausted ; and  their 
general  was  off  the  field.  Mansfield 
was  gone;  and  what  remained  of  his 
troops  were  in  little  better  condition 
than  those  of  Hooker.  It  was  Sum- 
ner’s conviction  that  further  aggressive 
effort  without  reinforcements  was  im- 
possible. He  might  hold  his  own ; but 
he  could  do  no  more.  The  Confede- 
rates at  this  stage  did  not  seem  to  be 
in  any  better  plight,  than  their  antago- 
nists. They  had  suffered  terribly  from 
the  National  artillery;  and  as  they 
were  exposed  in  their  advanced  position 
to  the  batteries  of  Doubleday,  who 
held  his  place  on  the  right  with  in- 
flexible tenacity,  they  fell  back  to 
their  original  ground  near  the  Dunker 
Church.  Some  of  them,  however, 
were  still  engaged ; nor  was  there 
any  evidence  that  they  were  unwill- 
ing to  continue  the  fight. 

It  was  now  shortly  after  midday. 
Franklin,  who  had  left  Crampton’s  Pass 
in  the  morning  about  six  o’clock,  had 
just  arrived  on  the  field.  It  was  Mc- 
Clellan’s intention  to  retain  that  corps 
on  the  east  side  of  the  Antietam,  to  be 
ready  to  operate  on  either  flank  or  on 
the  centre,  as  cii'cumstances  might  re- 


ARRIVAL  OF  FRANKLIN. 


323 


quire.  The  terrible  condition  of  the 
National  right,  however,  left  the  gen- 
eral-in-chief  no  choice.  McClellan  had 
been  an  anxious  spectator  of  the  fight 
all  the  morning  and  forenoon.  He 
knew  how  critical  was  the  situation  in 
which  Sumner  found  himself.  Franklin 
was,  therefore,  ordered  at  once  to  his 
assistance.  He  made  no  delay.  Hast- 
ening forward,  he  reached  the  point  of 
danger  not  a moment  too  soon.  An 
attack  was  being  made  on  battery 
A,  Fourth  United  States  Artillery, 
commanded  by  Lieutenant  Thomas. 
Smith’s  division  led  the  column,  fol- 
lowed by  Slocum’s.  Smith  received 
general  instructions  to  retake  the  ground 
on  which  the  battle  had  all  day  long 
raged  so  fiercely.  Slocum  was  ordered 
to  move  more  to  the  centre.  The  or- 
ders were  promptly  executed.  Smith’s 
men  were  soon  in  the  thick  of  the  fight. 
Battery  A was  immediately  relieved  by 
Hancock’s  brigade ; and,  as  he  observed 
that  the  enemy  was  still  disposed  to 
advance.  Smith  ordered  up  his  third 
brigade,  commanded  by  Colonel  Irwin. 
Passing  through  Thomas’s  battery,  this 
brigade  rushed  upon  the  foe  wdth  in- 
trepid energy,  and  with  a violence 
which  was  irresistible ; and  by  a series 
of  gallant  charges,  made  in  the  face  of 
a most  destructive  fire,  which  ploughed 
through  their  ranks,  the  men  cheering 
as  they  advanced  on  the  run,  they 
drove  the  Confederates  across  the  open 
field,  and  beyond  the  Hagerstown 
Road,  compelling  them  to  seek  shelter 
in  the  woods  to  the  west  of  the  Hunker 
Church.  On  this  day  of  brilliant  effort 
and  heroic  self-sacrifice,  nothing  was 


more  brilliant,  more  heroic  or  more  full 
of  self-sacrifice  than  this  last  and  crown- 
ing effort  of  Smith’s  division,  of  Frank- 
lin’s corps.  The  grandest  work  was 
done  by  the  Maine  and  Vermont  regi- 
ments. They  literally  covered  them- 
selves with  glory.  It  was  only  fifteen 
minutes  from  the  time  the  order  was 
given,  when  the  field  was  reclaimed, 
and  the  work  was  done.  “The  field 
and  its  ghastly  harvest,”  says  an  eye- 
witness, “which  the  reaper  had  gath- 
ered in  those  fatal  hours,  remained 
finally  with  the  Nationals.  Four  times 
it  had  been  lost  and  won.  The  dead 
are  strewn  so  thickly  that,  as  you  ride 
over  it,  you  cannot  guide  your  horse’s 
steps  too  carefully.  Pale  and  bloody 
faces  are  everywhere  upturned.  They 
are  sad  and  terrible ; but  there  is  noth- 
ing which  makes  one’s  heart  beat  so 
quickly  as  the  imploring  looks  of  some 
sorely- wounded  men,  who  beckon  weari- 
ly for  help  which  you  cannot  stay  to 
give.” 

The  arrival  of  Franklin  on  the  field 
was  singularly  opportune.  A few 
minutes  later,  the  Confederates  might 
have  penetrated  the  National  line  be- 
tween the  division  of  Sedgwick  and 
that  of  French.  Such  a result  would 
have  been  disastrous  in  the  extreme. 
His  efforts  had  been  attended  with  so 
much  success,  that  he  felt  emboldened 
to  assault  the  woods  near  the  Hunker 
Church,  where  the  Confederate  left  had 
again  sought  shelter — a position  which 
had  been  vainly  assaulted  by  both 
Hooker  and  Sumner.  Franklin  had 
given  the  order ; but  Sumner  having 
come  up,  it  was  countermanded.  It 


324 


ANTIETAM. 


was  Slocum’s  brigade  that  was  to  make 
the  intended  assault.  Franklin,  confi- 
dent of  success,  was  anxious  that  it 
should  be  made;  but  Sumner,  “the 
old  bull  of  the  woods,”  as  they  called 
him  at  Fair  Oaks,  who  was  as  stubborn 
as  he  was  brave,  and  as  cautious  as  he 
was  daring,  could  not  be  persuaded  to 
give  his  consent.  Franklin’s  was  the 
only  remaining  corps  available  for  at- 
tack. In  the  meditated  assault  on  the 
enemy,  strongly  posted  on  ground 
which  hitherto  had  proved  impregna- 
ble, a repulse  was  at  least  possible; 
and  a repulse,  in  Sumner’s  judgment, 
would  peril  the  safety  of  the  whole 
army.  Sumner’s  caution  at  this  crisis 
of  the  fight  was  the  more  entitled  to 
respect  that  that  day  he  proved  himself 
to  be  the  bravest  of  the  brave.  He 
was  ever  at  the  post  of  danger,  and 
where  the  battle  raged  most  fiercely. 
Mounted  on  his  spirited  charger,  and 
careering  through  the  woods,  his  head 
bare,  his  white  hair  streaming  in  the 
wind,  the  fire  of  battle  in  his  eye,  he 
seemed  the  very  impersonation  of  the 
god  of  war.  Few  that  saw  him  that 
day  in  the  thick  of  the  fight  believed  he 
could  leave  the  field  alive.  But  the 
bullets  fell  mercifully  around  the  brave 
old  warrior. 

While  these  events  were  taking  place 
on  Sumner’s  right,  severe  fighting  was 
going  on  also  on  his  left.  French  and 
Richardson  had  not  been  idle.  The  for- 
mer, with  the  brigades  of  Weber,  Kim- 
ball and  Morris,  pushed  on  where  the 
Confederate  general,  D.  H.  Hill,  was 
posted  in  considerable  strength.  Weber 
led  the  advance,  while  hotly  engaged 


with  the  enemy.  French  received  orders 
to  press  on  with  the  utmost  vigor,  and 
make  a diversion  in  favor  of  the  rio-ht. 

o 

The  Confederates  were  pressed  back 
towards  a hollow  or  sunken  road  in 
much  disorder.  At  this  point,  Rich- 
ardson came  up,  with  the  brigades  of 
Meagher,  Caldwell  and  Brooks,  and 
took  position  on  the  left  of  French. 
Meagher  fought  his  way  to  the  crest  of 
a hill  which  overlooked  the  Confede- 
rate position.  The  battle  now  raged 
furiously.  A vigorous  effort  was  made 
by  the  Confederates,  who  at  this 
time  were  reinforced  by  about  4000 
men  under  R.  H.  Anderson,  to  obtain 
possession  of  a piece  of  rising  ground 
on  the  left  of  the  National  right  wing, 
with  the  view  of  turning  that  flank. 
The  ground,  however,  after  what  might 
be  called  a fighting  race,  was  seized  and 
held  by  Colonel  Cross  and  his  famous 
“fighting”  Fifth  New  Hampshire. 
Cross  was  speedily  joined  by  the 
Eighty-First  Pennsylvania ; and  the 
Confederates  were  driven  back,  leaving: 

f O 

behind  them  the  colors  of  the  Fourth 
North  Carolina.  An  effort  was  made 
at  the  same  time  to  push  towards  and 
flank  the  National  right.  It  was  made 
with  great  energy  and  stubbornness. 
Resisted,  however,  by  French  and  by 
Richardson,  the  Confederates  were 
brought  to  a standstill,  and  finally 
driven  back  to  Dr.  Piper’s  house,  near 
the  Sharpsburg  Road.  There  they  came 
to  a halt,  and  made  an  obstinate  attack. 
Richardson  now  brought  up  his  artil- 
lery. It  was  at  this  moment,  and 
while  directing  one  of  the  batteries,  that 
this  brave  officer  was  felled  to  the 


« tattered  fragments.” 


325 


earth  by  a cannon  ball.  General  Han- 
cock immediately  took  command ; and, 
by  a desperate  charge,  he  drove  the 
Confederates  from  Dr.  Piper’s  house, 
and  pressed  them  so  closely  that  it  was 
only  by  the  merest  chance  that  Lee’s 
line  was  not  completely  severed.  A 
.vigorous  and  more  general  effort  at 
this  moment  might  have  given  a new 
aspect  to  the  entire  struggle,  and  even 
crowned  the  day  with  a decisive  vic- 
tory. As  it  was,  the  Nationals  held 
the  ground  on  the  right  and  toward  the 
centre  when  darkness  fell.  In  this 
closing  struggle.  General  Meagher,  who 
performed  deeds  of  valor,  was  wounded 
and  carried  from  the  field. 

Thus  far  our  attention  has  been  di- 
rected exclusively  to  the  operations  on 
the  National  right.  This  has  been  un- 
avoidable. It  was  by  his  right  wing 
McClellan  intended  to  fight  the  battle 
of  Antietam ; and  it  was  by  that  wing 
the  battle  was  really  fought.  It  was 
not  the  general’s  intention,  however, 
that  either  the  centre  or  the  left,  or 
both,  should  be  mere  armed  spectators 
of  the  scene.  The  reader  will  remem- 
ber that  General  Fitz  John  Porter,  who 
had  command  of  the  National  centre, 
occupied  a position  on  the  east  of  Antie- 
tam, commanding  bridge  No.  2.  The 
left  wing,  it  will  also  be  remembered, 
was  under  General  Burnside,  and  held 
a position  also  on  the  east  side  of 
the  creek,  commanding  bridge  No.  3. 
While  this  murderous  work  was  going 
on  to  the  right  of  the  National  line, 
what  was  being  done  by  the  centre  and 
left  ? Let  us  see. 

McClellan  deemed  the  position  held 


by  Porter  of  the  utmost  importance; 
and,  consequently,  it  was  not  until  the 
afternoon  was  somewhat  advanced  that 
he  could  be  induced  to  take  any  steps 
which  should  have  the  effect  of  weak- 
ening his  centre.  Hooker  had  been 
taken  from  the  .field  wounded;  his 
corps  had  been  cut  to  pieces.  Mansfield 
had  fallen  in  battle ; and  there  remained 
but  tattered  fragments  of  his  once 
splendid  regiments.  Sumner  was  still 
giving  directions  in  the  field ; but  his 
own  corps  had  shared  the  fate  of 
those  of  Hooker  and  Mansfield.  It  was 
“towards  the  middle  of  the  afternoon,” 
McClellan  tells  us,  that,  discovering 
the  desperate  state  of  things  on  his 
right,  he  detached  two  of  Porter’s  bri- 
gades, and  sent  them  to  Sumner’s  assist- 
ance. About  the  same  time  he  caused 
six  battalions,  of  Sykes’  regulars,  to  be 
thrown  across  bridge  No.  2,  in  order  to 
attack  and  drive  away  the  Confederate 
sharpshooters,  who  were  giving  great 
annoyance  to  Pleasonton’s  horse  bat- 
teries, which  were  stationed  a little  in 
advance  of  the  bridge.  At  the  same 
time,  also,  he  detached  Warren’s  bri- 
gade from  the  same  corps,  and  sent 
them  to  hold  a position  on  the  right 
and  rear  of  Burnside.  In  consequence 
of  these  repeated  withdrawals  of  troops. 
Porter’s  corps  was,  at  one  time  during 
the  day,  reduced  to  fewer  than  4000' 
men. 

And  what  was  taking  place  on  the 
left?  It  was  McClellan’s  design,  as  has 
been  indicated,  to  support  his  right  by 
making  an  attack  on  the  enemy  with 
his  left.  With  this  end  in  view,  Burn- 
side’s corps,  on  the  evening  of  the  IGth,. 


H34 


326 


ANTIETAM. 


was  moved  into  position  near  the  bridge. 
On  that  day  McClellan  visited  Burnside, 
and,  after  pointing  out  the  proper  dis- 
position to  be  made  of  his  troops,  in- 
formed him  that  he  would  probably 
be  required  to  make  an  attack  on  the 
enemy’s  right  on  the  following  morning. 
He  was  instructed,  also,  to  make  care- 
ful reconnoissances.  Burnside’s  corps 
consisted  of  the  divisions  of  Generals 
Cox, Wilcox,  Rodman  and  Sturgis.  Col- 
onel Brooks’  brigade,  of  Cox’s  divi- 
sion, was  on  the  right;  Sturgis’  divi- 
sion was  immediately  in  the  rear;  while 
Rodman’s  division,  with  Scammon’s 
brigade,  of  Cox’s  division,  in  support, 
was  stationed  on  the  left.  The  division 
of  Wilcox  was  held  in  reserve.  On  the 
night  of  the  16th  the  corps  bivouacked 
in  position.  At  eight  o’clock  on  the 
morning  of  the  17th,  McClellan  sent 
instructions  to  Burnside  to  force  the 
lower  stone  bridge,  to  gain  possession 
of  the  heights  beyond,  and  to  advance 
along  their  crest  upon  Sharpsburg  and 
its  rear.  The  position  was  held  by 
Toombs’  brigade,  supported  by  sharp- 
shooters and  batteries,  under  the  com- 
mand of  D.  R.  Jones.  Burnside  was 
singularly  tardy  in  carrying  out  the 
instructions  given  him.  It  is  to  be  ad- 
mitted that  the  task  imposed  upon  him 
was  one  of  more  than  ordinary  diffi- 
culty. The  approaches  to  the  bridge 
partook  of  the  character  of  a defile, 
which  was  completely  commanded  by 
the  Confederate  batteries.  Burnside 
made  repeated  attempts ; but  they  were 
feeble,  and  without  effect.  He  was 
evidently  impressed  with  the  idea  that, 
however  important  it  might  be  to  cap- 


ture the  bridge  and  the  heights  beyond, 
the  risk  to  be  run  was  too  great.  Again 
and  again  imperative  orders  were  sent 
to  him  to  push  forward  his  troops  with- 
out delay,  and,  if  necessaiy,  to  carry 
the  bridge  at  the  point  of  the  bayonet. 
It  was  ‘not  until  about  one  o’clock, 
when  Colonel  Sackett  had  been  sent  to 
Burnside  with  instructions  to  remain 
and  see  the  order  executed,  that  a 
really  vigorous  effort  was  made.  The 
Fifty-First  New  York  and  the  Fifty- 
First  Pennsylv^ania  charged  with  tre- 
mendous energy,  driving  the  Confede- 
rates from  the  bridge,  and  back  to  the 
heights  in  their  rear.  Other  troops  fol- 
lowed, and  the  position  was  secured. 
Unhappily,  however,  Burnside  did  not 
pursue  the  advantage  thus  gained.  In 
getting  his  troops  and  batteries  across 
the  bridge,  and  putting  them  in  order, 
he  wasted  two  precious  hours — the 
most  precious  hours  of  the  day  ; for,  as 
we  now  know,  Longstreet  had  so  ex- 
hausted his  strength  by  sending  rein- 
forcements to  the  Confederate  left,  that 
he  had  only  some  two  thousand  men 
with  whom  to  oppose  Burnside’s  ad- 
vance. It  is  impossible  not  to  admire 
the  skill  with  which,  on  this  and  other 
occasions,  the  Confederate  generals  con- 
trived to  make  an  imposing  and  de- 
ceptive show  of  their  forces,  when  they 
were  really  weak  and  in  distress.  At 
three  o’clock,  Burnside  was  in  the  same 
position.  McClellan,  becoming  impa- 
tient, sent  Colonel  Key  to  him,  with 
the  most  urgent  entreaties  to  push  on 
without  a moment’s  delay.  The  move- 
ment, he  assured  him,  was  vital  to  suc- 
cess. It  w'as  no  time  to  halt  or  hesitate 


TEE  BATTLE  ENDED. 


327 


because  of  the  value  of  life.  With  a 
considerateness  which  seems  strange  to 
those  accustomed  to  the  stern  military 
orders  of  older  nations,  McClellan  again 
sends  Key  to  Burnside,  telling  him 
that  if,  on  experiment,  he  finds  that  he 
cannot  flank  or  storm  the  battery,  and 
carry  the  heights,  he  is  to  inform  him, 
so  that  he  may  be  able  to  recall  the 
troops.  The  advance  is  now  resumed ; 
the  attack  is  gallantly  made ; the  guns 
are  abandoned  by  the  fleeing  Confede- 
rates ; the  heights  are  carried ; and  the 
victorious  Nationals,  in  considerable 
force,  are  already  at  the  outskirts  of 
Sharpsburg.  At  this  supreme  moment, 
when  victory  seems  at  last  about  to 
crown  the  labors  and  sacrifices  of  the 
day,  the  Nationals  are  brought  to  a 
standstill.  A new  army  appears  to 
have  arisen  out  of  the  ground.  It  is 
A.  P.  Hill,  who,  with  his  division,  has 
just  come  up  from  Harper’s  Ferry. 
Gietting  his  men  into  order  on  the  brow 
of  a ridge  to  the  left,  he  falls  heavily 
on  Burnside’s  troops,  as  they  press 
eagerly  forward,  apparently  with  vic- 
tory in  their  grasp.  The  blow  is  all 
the  more  stunning  that  it  is  unexpected. 
Under  cover  of  a tremendous  fire  of 
artillery,  the  Confederates  charge  upon 
Burnside’s  left  flank.  The  National 
troops  offer  a stubborn  resistance.  But 
they  cannot  hold  their  ground.  Step 
by  step  they  are  forced  back  to  the 
bridge  over  the  Antietam,  where  they 
are  protected  by  the  batteries  on  the 
other  side  of  the  creek.  Here  Burnside 
had  instructions  to  make  a determined 
stand.  It  was  unnecessary,  as  the  Con- 
federates did  not  venture  to  pursue.  In 


this  last  struggle  there  was  a heavy 
loss  of  life.  The  Confederate  general, 
Branch,  was  killed ; and  General  Rod- 
man  was  mortally  wounded.  The  last 
shot  was  fired  as  night  spread  her 
mantle  of  gloom  over  that  field  of  blood 
and  agony.  The  battle  of  Antietam 
was  ended.  It  was  not  the  most  de- 
cisive, but  it  was  the  bloodiest  battle 
since  the  commencement  of  the  Civil 
War.  On  that  narrow  piece  of  ground 
lay  dead,  or  bleeding  to  death,  twenty 
thousand  men,  their  comrades  so  com- 
pletely outworn  by  continuous  march- 
ing and  fighting,  without  sleep  and 
without  food,  that  they  could  not  give 
burial  to  the  one  or  succor  to  the  other. 

The  National  loss  in  this  battle  was 
2010  killed,  9416  wounded,  and  1043 
missing;  a total  of  12,469.  Lee’s  losses 
were  correspondingly  heavy.  About 
2700  were  buried  by  McClellan.  His 
wounded  numbered  about  7000,  not  in- 
cluding those  which  had  fallen  into  the 
hands  of  the  Nationals.  In  that  single 
day  his  army  must  have  been  reduced 
by  at  least  10,000  men.  Lee  himself 
acknowledged  that,  in  the  different  en- 
gagements at  Crampton’s  Gap,  Tur- 
ner’s Gap,  Harper’s  Ferry  and  Antietam, 
he  sustained  a loss  of  1567  killed,  and 
8724  wounded.  Most  undoubtedly 
Lee,  from  some  cause  or  other,  under- 
estimated his  loss.  It  does  not  appear 
possible  to  get  at  the  exact  figures; 
but  it  is  not  an  overestimate  to  say  that 
Lee’s  loss,  during  his  brief  campaign  in 
Maryland,  was  from  25,000  to  30,000 
men.  Although  Antietam  could  not 
be  called  a National  victory,  it  was  un- 
questionably a gain  to  the  National 


328 


ANTIETAM. 


cause ; and  McClellan  was  hardly  to  be 
blamed  if  he  felt  some  self-satisfaction 
in  being  able  to  say  that  ^Hhirteen 
guns,  thirty-nine  colors,  upwards  of 
15,000  stand  of  small  arms,  and  more 
than  6000  prisoners  are  the  trophies 
which  attest  the  success  of  our  arms 
in  the  battles  of  South  Mountain, 
Crampton’s  Gap  and  Antietam,”  and 
that  “not  a single  gun  or  color  was  lost 
by  our  army  during  these  battles.” 
Lee  could,  no  doubt,  boast  that  he  had 
not  been  defeated,  although  he  had 
fought  with  inferior  numbers,  and  that 
McClellan  did  not  venture  to  resume 
the  battle  on  the  following  day;  but 
he  had  lost  ground  along  the  whole 
line,  and  his  army  was  so  broken  down 
that  a retreat  to  Virginia  was  now  an 
absolute  necessity.  His  whole  plan  of 
campaign  had  failed.  It  is  fair,  here, 
to  ask  the  reader  to  bear  in  mind  that 
Lee,  although  repeatedly  reinforced, 
was  not  able  to  bring  into  the  field  on 
that  day  more  than  40,000  or  45,000 
men ; whereas,  McClellan’s  elfective 
strength  was  over  87,000. 

It  would  not  be  difiicult  to  show  that 
greater  results  ought  to  have  been 
achieved  by  the  noble  army  of  the  Po- 
tomac. The  discipline  was  defective. 
The  generalship  ^ was  not  good.  The 
commanding  mind  which  gives  unity  of 
j)urpose  and  unity  of  movement  to  a 
great  army  was  wanting.  McClellan 
repeated  his  characteristic  blunder.  In 
place  of  combining  his  forces,  and  at- 
tacking with  an  overwhelming  mass, 
he  used  them  too  much  in  driblets,  and 
worked  too  much  in  detail.  In  his 
history  of  the  Civil  War,  tlie  Comte  de  | 


Paris  very  clearly  puts  the  merits  and 
demerits  of  the  fight.  "‘The  error,” 
he  says,  “which  Lee  expiated  by  this 
great  defeat  is  evident.  This  error 
was  in  dividing  his  army  for  the  pur- 
pose of  capturing  Harper’s  Ferry  in  the 
presence  of  McClellan,  and  in  counting 
too  much  upon  the  tardiness  of  his  ad- 
versary. If  he  had  not  made  such  a 
division  of  his  forces,  he  would  have 
had  the  choice  either  to  hght  a decisive 
battle  under  much  more  favorable  cir- 
cumstances, upon  the  steej,^  acclivities 
of  South  Mountain,  or  of  continuing 
the  campaign  on  the  upper  Potomac 
with  all  his  troops.  The  mistakes  of 
his  enemies  repaired  to  some  extent 
those  committed  by  himself.  Through 
the  disgraceful  capitulation  of  Miles, 
the  slow  movements  of  Franklin  on  the 
14th  and  15th,  and  the  delays  MLich 
prevented  McClellan  from  attacking 
him  on  the  16th,  he  was  enabled  on  the 
17th  to  mass  all  his  troops  on  the  field 
of  battle.  The  issue  of  the  contest, 
however,  would  probably  have  been 
different  if  A.  P.  Hill,  instead  of  arriv- 
ing at  three  o’clock  in  the  afternoon, 
had  been  able  to  take  part  in  the  strug- 
gle early  in  the  morning,  and  add  his 
efforts  to  those  which  kept  the  Federal 
right  so  long  in  check.  There  were, 
however,  many  other  causes  which  pre- 
vented McClellan  from  achieving  a 
more  complete  victory,  and  taking  ad- 
vantage of  the  opportunity  to  strike  an 
irreparable  blow  at  Lee.  The  first  is  to 
be  found  in  the  moral  condition  of  his 
troops.  The  army  which  had  been  en- 
trusted to  him  was  partly  composed  of 
the  van(|uished  soldiers  of  Manassa-, 


A WISE  DISCEETION. 


329 


and  the  remainder  consisted  of  soldiers 
who  had  been  only  one  or  two  weeks 
in  the  service,  who  had  never  marched, 
never  been  under  lire,  and  knew  neither 
their  commanders  nor  their  comrades. 
They  fought  with  great  bravery;  but 
they  could  not  be  expected  to  perform 
what  Lee  easily  obtained  from  his  men. 
Their  ranks  had  not  that  cohesion 
which  enables  a commander  to  follow 
up  a first  success  without  interruption. 
The  Union  generals  may  be  censured 
for  having  divided  their  efforts  on  the 
right  in  successive  attacks,  and  thereby 
impaired  their  effectiveness.  The  corps 
of  Hooker,  Mansfield  and  Sumner — in 
all  from  40,000  to  44,000  men — instead 
of  being  brought  into  action  one  after 
the  other  for  the  space  of  four  hours, 
might  have  been  united  so  as  together 
to  strike  the  Confederate  left,  which 
they  would,  no  doubt,  have  crushed. 
McClellan  and  several  of  his  lieuten- 
ants, as  we  have  said,  had  also  overrated 
the  number  of  their  adversaries — an 
error  which  had  the  effect  of  keeping 
back  Franklin  and  Porter,  whose  co- 
operation at  the  close  of  the  battle 
would  have  been  decisive.  Finally 
Burnside,  by  his  long  inaction,  upset 
all  McClellan’s  plans,  enabled  Lee  to 
mass  all  his  forces  on  his  left,  and  thus 
deprived  the  Federals  of  the  principal 
advantages  which  a more  energetic 
action  on  his  part  would  certainly  have 
f'Ccured.”  These  are  sensible  words; 
and  they  justify  the  tone  which  per- 
vades this  narrative. 

McClellan  himself  tells  us  that  the 
night  of  the  17th  brought  with  it  grave 
responsibilities.  The  question  was  seri- 


ously revolved  in  his  own  mind,  and 
discussed  with  his  generals,  ‘^whether 
to  renew  the  attack  on  the  18th  or  to  , 
defer  it,  even  with  the  risk  of  the  ene- 
my’s retirement.”  Some  of  the  gen- 
erals, Franklin  among  the  rest,  urged 
immediate  action.  Others  again,  Sum- 
ner included,  opposed  such  a course. 
McClellan  concluded  to  wait  a day,  to 
give  his  army  rest,  and  to  prepare  for 
the  renewal  of  the  battle  on  the  19th. 
For  this  McClellan  has  been  greatly 
blamed  by  many.  We  cannot  join  with 
them.  Discretion  is,  sometimes  at  least, 
the  better  part  of  valor.  McClellan, 
we  think,  showed  a wise  discretion.  It 
may  be  true  that,  if  he  had  resumed  the 
attack  on  the  morning  of  the  18th,  he 
could  easily  have  captured  or  ruined 
Lee’s  army.  It  ought  not  to  be  forgot- 
ten, however,  that  we  judge  the  situa- 
tion now  with  a fuller  knowledge  than 
McClellan  then  possessed.  There  were 
certainly  grave  reasons  why  he  should 
act  with  caution.  As  he  himself  has 
said : At  that  moment — V irginia  lost, 
Washington  menaced,  Maiyland  invad- 
ed— the  National  cause  could  afford  no 
risks  of  defeat.  One  battle  lost,  and 
all  would  have  been  lost.”  During  the 
course  of  the  18th,  he  was  joined  by 
14,000  fresh  troops,  under  Couch  and 
Humphrey.  Thus  strengthened,  he  felt 
that  he  could  strike  the  enemy  on  the 
following  morning  with  assured  hope 
of  victory.  Meanwhile,  the  18th  Avas 
spent  in  collecting  the  dispersed,  giving 
rest  to  the  fatigued,  removing  the 
wounded,  burying  the  dead,  and  the 
necessary  preparations  for  a renewal  of 
the  battle. 


;530 


ANTIETAM. 


The  18th  of  September,  1862,  will 
Sept.  soon  be  forgotten  by  any  who 
spent  that  day  on  the  battle  field 
of  Antietam.  Sad  duties  had  to  be 
performed;  and  sad  sights  had  to  be 
witnessed.  In  battle  histories,  it  is  too 
much  the  habit  to  confine  the  reader’s 
attention  to  the  stirring  scenes  of  actual 
conflict — too  little  the  habit  to  linger 
with  him  in  the  battle’s  rear,  and  wit- 
ness the  scenes  of  woe.  Yet  it  is  on 
the  blood-soaked  field,  when  the  din  of 
battle  has  ceased,  among  the  dead  and 
the  wounded,  that  the  true  lesson  is  to 
be  learned.  Happily,  a picture  of  the 
field  of  Antietam  after  the  battle  has 
been  preserved  to  us  by  a competent 
eye-witness.  “My  route,”  says  Captain 
Noyes,  “ carried  me  over  the  late  battle 
field,  and  I spent  much  of  the  afternoon, 
in  company  wdth  a friend,  in  visiting 
some  of  the  most  severely-contested 
points,  to  be  awe-struck,  sickened,  al- 
most benumbed  wdth  its  sights  of  horror. 
Within  this  space  of  little  more  than  a 
mile  square — this  spot  once  beautiful 
with  handsome  residences  and  well- 
cultivated  farms,  isolated,  hedged  in 
with  verdure,  sacred  to  quiet,  calm  con- 
tent— the  hottest  fury  of  man’s  hottest 
wrath  had  expended  itself,  burning 
residences  and  well-filled  barns,  plough- 
ing fields  of  ripened  grain  with  artillery, 
scattering  everywhere  through  corn- 
field, wood  and  valley  the  most  awdul 
illustrations  of  war.  Not  a building 
about  us  which  was  not  deserted  by  its 
occupants,  and  rent  and  torn  by  shot 
and  shell;  not  a field  which  had  not 
witnessed  the  fierce  and  bloody  en- 
counter of  armed  and  desperate  men. 


Passing  through  the  cornfield,  with  the 
dead  lying  all  through  its  aisles,  out 
into  an  uncultivated  field,  I saw  bodies, 
attired  mainly  in  gray,  lying  in  ranks  so 
regular  that  Death,  the  Reaper,  must 
have  njowed  them  down  in  swaths. 
Our  burying  parties  were  already  busi- 
ly engaged,  and  had  put  away  to  rest 
many  of  our  own  men;  still  here,  as 
eveiywhere,  I saw  them  scattered  over 
the  field.  The  ground  was  strewn  wdth 
muskets,  knapsacks,  cartridge-boxes  and 
articles  of  clothing;  the  carcasses  of 
horses,  and  thousands  of  shot  and  shell. 
And  so  it  was  on  the  other  side  of  the 
turnpike — nay,  in  the  turnpike  itself. 
Ride  where  we  may,  through  cornfield 
wood  or  ravine,  and  our  ride  will  be 
among  the  dead,  until  the  heart  grows 
sick  and  faint  with  horror.  Just  in 
front  of  these  hay-stacks,  where  our 
general  and  his  staff  paused  for  a while 
during  the  heat  of  the  battle,  was  the 
only  pleasing  picture  on  this  battle 
field — a fine  horse  struck  with  death. 
At  the  instant  when  cut  down  by  his 
wound,  he  was  attempting  to  rise  from 
the  ground.  His  head  was  half  lifted ; 
his  neck  proudly  arched ; every  muscle 
seemed  replete  with  animal  life.  The 
wound  which  killed  him  was  wholly 
concealed  from  view,  so  that  I had  to 
ride  close  up  before  I could  believe 
him  dead.  He  w^as  the  admired  of 
every  passer-by.  Two  weeks  after- 
ward, I found  myself  pausing  to  gaze 
upon  him,  and  always  with  the  wish 
that  some  sculptor  would  immortalize 
in  stone  this  magnifi?ent  animal,  in  the 
exact  pose  of  his  death-hour.  One 
would  like  to  see  something  from  a 


LEE’S  RETEEAT. 


331 


battle  field  not  wholly  terrible.  One 
more  scene  in  this  battle  picture,  and 
our  ride  may  end.  It  is  a narrow 
country  lane,  hollowed  out  somewhat 
between  the  fields,  partially  shaded, 
and  now  literally  crowded  with  the 
Confederate  dead.  Here  they  stood  in 
line  of  battle,  and  here,  in  the  length 
of  five  hundred  feet,  I counted  more 
than  two  hundred  of  their  dead  in 
every  attitude  conceivable — some  piled 
in  groups  of  four  or  six ; some  grasping 
their  muskets,  as  if  in  the  act  of  dis- 
charging them ; some,  evidently  offi- 
cers, killed  while  encouraging  their 
men ; some  lying  in  the  position  of 
calm  repose,  all  black  and  swollen,  and 
ghastly  with  wounds.  This  battalion 
of  the  dead  filled  the  lane  with  horror. 
As  we  rode  beside  it — we  could  not 
ride  in  it — I saw  the  field  all  about  me 
black  with  corpses ; and  I was  told 
that  the  cornfield  beyond  was  equally 
crowded.  It  was  a place  to  see  once, 
to  glance  at,  and  then  to  ride  hurriedly 
away;  for  strong-hearted  as  was  then 
my  mood,  I had  gazed  upon  as  much 
horror  as  I was  able  to  bear.”  Such  is 
war,  when  stripped  of  the  pomp  and  the 
splendor  and  the  show,  and  seen  in  its 
naked  reality. 

On  the  morning  of  the  19th,  accord- 
Sept.  instructions  given  the  day 

before,  preparations  were  made 
for  an  advance.  The  cavalry  were  sent 
forward  to  reconnoitre  the  ground. 
What  has  happened?  Mounted  mes- 
sengers return  at  full  speed  to  McClel- 
lan’s headquarters.  There  is  no  longer 
any  enemy  in  front.  Taking  advantage 
of  the  darkness  of  the  night,  Lee  had 


taken  his  entire  army  across  the  Po- 
tomac by  the  Shepherdstown  Ford,  and 
escaped,  unmolested,  into  Virginia.  He 
had  left  eight  batteries,  under  Pendle- 
ton, on  the  river  bluffs,  for  the  purpose 
of  checking  the  pursuit.  This,  then, 
was  the  end  of  all  that  blood  and  sac- 
rifice. Justified,  as  McClellan  was,  in 
resting  on  the  18th,  it  must  be  regard- 
ed, from  a National  point  of  view,  as 
a great  misfortune  that  Lee  should 
have  been  able,  without  let  or  hin- 
drance, to  cross  the  Potomac,  carrying 
with  him  his  entire  army,  with  all  the 
supplies,  material  and  impedimenta  of 
war  generally.  It  is  no  matter  of  won- 
der if  many  a soldier’s  heart  sank 
within  him,  when  he  learned  that  the 
enemy  had  escaped.  Good  generalship 
was  again  on  the  side  of  the  Confede- 
rates. An  attempt  at  pursuit  was  made 
by  a portion  of  Porter’s  corps;  but  it 
was  a feeble  attempt,  and  tended  to 
reveal  the  indecision  and  want  of  pur- 
pose on  the  part  of  the  National  com- 
mander. Porter’s  men,  under  General 
Griffin,  captured  four  of  the  enemy’s 
guns ; but  on  the  morning  of  the  Sept, 
20th,  when  making  a reconnois- 
sance  in  force,  and  when  about  a mile 
from  the  ford,  they  were . surprised  by 
A.  P.  Hill,  who  lay  in  ambush,  and 
driven  back  into  and  across  the  river 
in  great  disorder,  with  the  loss  of  200 
men  made  prisoners.  The  Confederates 
held  the  river  for  the  remainder  of  that 
day.  On  the  21st,  Lee  moved  sept. 
leisurely  toward  Martinsburg,  de- 
stroying,  as  he  moved  along,  the  Balti- 
more and  Ohio  Bailroad.  Stuart  lin- 
gered behind  to  make  a show  of  numbers 


332 


ANTIETAM. 


and  strength ; and  on  the  same  day  that 
Lee  marched  to  Martinsburg,  he  was 
daring  enough  to  recross  the  river  at 
Williamsport.  He  was  met  by  Couch, 
who  compelled  him  to  make  a precipi- 
tate retreat.  Two  days  later,  Mary- 
land Heights  were  retaken  by  the  Na- 
tionals ; Harper’s  Ferry  was  reoccupied, 
and  in  charge  of  General  Sumner ; and 
pontoon  bridges  were  thrown  across 
both  the  Potomac  and  the  Shenandoah 
Fivers.  The  Maryland  campaign  was 
ended.  The  great  battle  of  Antietam 
had  been  fought;  blood  and  treasure 
had  been  liberMly  spent  on  both  sides ; 
yet  both  armies  had  substantially  re- 
sumed the  positions  which  they  occupied 
some  three  weeks  before.^ 

McClellan’s  besetting  sin  again  be- 
came a source  of  disquietude  to  the  coun- 
tiy  and  the  government.  There  was 
an  earnest  and  general  desire  that  he 

* The  battle  of  Antietam,  it  is  but  just  to  notice,  had 
a most  important  effect  in  determining  the  promulga- 
tion of  the  war  policy  which  the  National  government 
had  at  this  time  under  consideration.  President  Lin- 
coln himself  tells  the  story.  “It  had  got  to  be,”  said 
he,  “midsummer,  18G2.  Things  had  gone  on  from 
bad  to  worse,  until  I felt  that  we  had  reached  the  end 
of  our  rope  on  the  plan  of  operations  we  were  pursu- 
ing : that  we  had  about  played  our  last  card,  and  must 
change  our  tactics,  or  lose  the  game.  I now  deter- 
mined upon  the  emancipation  policy;  and  without 
consulting  with,  or  the  knowledge  of,  the  cabinet,  I 
prepared  the  original  draft  of  the  proclamation,  and, 
after  much  anxious  thought,  called  a cabinet  meeting 
on  the  subject.  This  was  the  last  of  July  or  the  first 
part  of  the  month  of  August,  1862.  This  cabinet 
meeting  took  place,  I think,  upon  a Saturday.  ♦ ♦ 

Nothing  was  offered  that  I had  not  already  fully  antici- 
pated and  settled  in  my  mind,  until  Secretary  Seward 
spoke.  He  said  in  substance:  ‘Mr.  President,  I ap- 
prove of  the  proclamation,  but  I question  the  expedi- 
ency of  its  issue  at  this  juncture.  The  depression  of 
the  public  mind,  consequent  upon  our  repeated  reverses, 
is  so  great  that  I fear  the  effect  of  so  important  a step. 
It  may  be  viewed  as  the  last  measure  of  an  exhausted 
government — a cry  for  help ; the  government  stretching 


should  pursue  Lee,  and  force  matters 
to  a crisis  before  the  winter  should 
set  in.  Lincoln  visited  the  army  oct. 
on  the  1st  of  October,  and  re- 
mained  with  it  several  days.  His  en- 
treaties were  urgent  that  McClellan 
should  advance.  The  general  was  full 
of  promises;  but  his  wants  were  many. 
He  needed  reinforcements,  horses,  cloth- 
ing, shoes,  supplies  of  all  kinds.  Lee  had 
moved  to  Winchester.  His  army  was 
in  a wretched  condition.  McClellan’s 
army  had  increased  to  150,000  strong. 
Yet  day  follows  day,  and  nothing  is 
done.  On  the  6th  of  October,  Hal- 
leck  telegraphed  to  the  general:  ‘^The 
president  directs  that  you  cross  the 
Potomac,  and  give  battle  to  the  ene- 
my, or  drive  him  South.  Your  army 
must  move  now,  while  the  roads  are 
good.”  On  the  10th,  General  J.  E.  B. 
Stuart  made  a raid  into  Pennsylvania. 

forth  its  hands  to  Ethiopia,  instead  of  Ethiopia  stretch- 
ing forth  her  hands  to  the  government.’  His  idea,” 
said  the  president,  “was  that  it  would  be  considered 
our  last  shriek  on  the  retreat.  ‘Now,’  continued  Mr. 
Seward,  ‘ w’hile  I approve  the  measure,  I suggest,  sir, 
that  you  postpone  its  issue,  until  you  can  give  it  to  the 
country  supported  by  military  success,  instead  of  issu- 
ing it,  as  would  be  the  case  now,  upon  the  greatest  dis- 
asters of  the  war.’”  Mr.  Lincoln  continued:  “The 
wisdom  of  the  view  of  the  secretary  of  state  struck  me 
with  great  force.  The  result  was  that  I put  the  draft 
of  the  proclamation  aside,  waiting  for  a victory.  Well, 
the  next  news  we  had  was  of  Pope’s  disaster  at  Bull 
Run.  Things  looked  darker  than  ever.  Finally  came 
the  week  of  the  battle  of  Antietam.  I determined  to 
wait  no  longer.  The  news  came,  I think,  on  Wednes- 
day, that  the  advantage  was  on  our  side.  I was  then 
staying  at  the  Soldiers’  Home.  Here  I finished  writing 
the  second  draft  of  the  proclamation  ; came  up  on 
Saturday ; called  the  cabinet  together  to  hear  it, 
and  it  was  published  the  following  Monday.  I made 
A SOLEMN  vow  BEFORE  GoD  THAT,  IP  GENERAL  LeE 
WAS  DRIVEN  BACK  FROM  MARYLAND,  I WOULD  CROWN 
THE  RESULT  BY  THE  DECLARATION  OF  FREEDOM  TO 

THE  SLAVES.” — Carpenter'*  Six  Months  in  the  White 
House. 


STUART’S  RAID. 


333 


Capturing  Chambersburg  in  that  State, 
he  destroyed  a large  quantity  of  sup- 
plies, burning  machine  shops,  trains  of 
cars,  and  other  property;  and  then, 
having  made  a complete  circuit  around 
McClellan’s  army,  he  re-entered  Vir- 
ginia by  crossing  the  Potomac  below 
him.  This  raid  of  Stuart  roused  public 
indignation  to  its  highest  pitch.  It 
was  regarded  as  an  open  insult  to 
the  National  army;  and  it  was  felt 
that  the  Confederates  had  made  good 
their  boast,  by  carrying  war  into  the 
free  States.  Still  McClellan  remained 
inactive.  There  was  no  forward  move- 
ment. Again,  on  the  21st,  Halleck 
telegraphed : The  president  does  not 


expect  impossibilities,  but  he  is  very 
anxious  that  all  this  good  weather 
should  not  be  wasted  in  inactivity.*’ 
McClellan  could  not  move  before  the 
1st  of  November.  Then  he  did  move; 
but  it  was  too  late.  On  the  7th  of  that 
month  there  was  a heavy  snow-storm. 
It  was  a sure  sio:n  that  winter  was  at 
hand.  Lincoln’s  patience  was  at  last 
exhausted — his  forbearance  had  given 
way;  he  had  already  taken  action; 
and  on  the  night  of  that  day,  while  at 
Pectortown,  on  his  southward  march 
towards  Gordonsville,  McClellan  re- 
ceived instructions  to  tarn  over  the 
command  of  the  army  to  General  Burn- 
side. 


i 


334 


FREDERICKSBUKG. 


CHAPTER  XXI. 


McClellan  and  the  National  Government. — Bad  Blood. — Blame  on  Both  Sides. — McClellan’s  Love  for  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac. — The  Army  Again  on  the  March. — McClellan’s  Plan. — A Storm. — McClellan’s  Bemoval. — 
Burnside  in  Command, — Keconstruction  of  the  Army. — Burnside’s  Order. — His  Plau. — McClellan’s  Plan 
Abandoned. — On  to  Fredericksburg. — Halleck  and  Meigs. — The  Pontoon  Difficulty. — Who  Were  to  Blame? — 
Falmouth. — Fredericksburg. — Stafford  Heights. — Marye’s  Heights. — Description  of  the  Country. — Topogra- 
phy of  the  Position. — Acquia  Creek. — Sumner  at  Falmouth. — The  Kiver  Impassable. — No  Pontoons. — 
An  Unfortunate  Delay. — Lee’s  Activity. — Position  of  the  Confederate  Army. — Marye’s  Heights  Impreg- 
nable.— Arrival  of  the  Pontoons. — Precious  Time  Lost. — Five  Bridges. — The  Morning  of  the  11th. — The 
Confederate  Sharpshooters  and  the  Pontoniers. — Three  Unsuccessful  Attempts  to  Construct  the  Bridges. — 
A Cannonade. — The  Sharpshooters  Dislodged. — The  Bridges  Completed. — The  National  Army  Across  the 
Kappahannock. — Preparations  for  Battle. — Both  Armies  in  Line. — A Glance  at  Lee’s  Position. — The  Dis- 
position of  his  Troops. — Burnside’s  Position. — His  Plan  of  Attack. — The  Night  of  the  12th. — Burnside 
Changes  his  Mind. — His  Delay  in  Giving  Orders. — His  Order  to  Franklin. — Franklin  Perplexed,  but  Obe- 
dient,— The  Attack  on  the  Left. — The  Gallantry  of  Meade  and  his  Pennsylvanians. — Gibbon  and  Double- 
day.— An  Artillery  Duel. — Meade  Penetrates  the  First  Confederate  Line. — His  Difficulty. — A Terrific  Strug- 
gle.— Fearful  Slaughter. — Meade  Driven  Back. — Arrival  of  Birney. — The  Confederate  Line  Closed. — Miracles 
of  Valor. — Bad  Management. — The  Attack  on  the  Bight. — General  Sumner  Advances. — French  and  Han- 
cock.— Marye’s  Hill. — The  Plank  Koad. — The  Stone  Wall. — Bravery  of  the  National  Troops. — Terrific 
Slaughter. — The  Jaws  of  Death. — French’s  and  Hancock’s  Divisions  Cut  to  Pieces. — The  Confederate  Po- 
sition Impregnable. — Burnside  Orders  Hooker  to  Advance. — Hooker  Kemonstrates. — Burnside  Obstinate. — 
“That  Crest  Must  be  Taken  To-Night.” — Useless  Slaughter. — Hooker’s  Own  Account. — The  Darkness. — 
The  Battle  of  Fredericksburg  Ended. — A Confederate  Victory. — Burnside’s  Blunders. — He  Alone  Besponsi- 
ble. — Betreats  Across  the  Biver. — Preparations  for  Another  Attack. — Disaffection  and  Distrust. — The  Pro- 
posed Attack  Countermanded. — Burnside  Offers  to  Besign. — The  Besignation  Not  Accepted. — Change  of 
Plan. — Another  Attack  About  to  be  Made. — A Fearful  Storm. — The  Elements. — The  “Mud  March.” — The 
Enterprise  Abandoned. — The  Army  Back  in  the  Old  Camps. — Public  Indignation. — Burnside  Dissatisfied 
with  his  Subordinates. — Believed  of  Command. — Franklin  Bemoved. — Sumner  Believed. — Hooker  in  Com- 
mand. 


The  battle  of  Antietam  was  fought 

1862  September.  It 

was  not  until  the  beautiful  month 
of  October  was  all  but  passed  that  any 
active,  forward  movement  was  made  by 
the  army  of  the  Potomac.  It  is  not 
necessary  to  dwell  at  any  length  on 
the  causes  of  this  extraordinary  and, 
as  the  result  proved,  unfortunate  de- 
lay. It  is  probable  that  the  exact 
truth  concerning  this  matter  will  never 
be  known.  It  is  certain  that  much 
precious  time  was  wasted  in  useless  cor- 


respondence between  the  National  com- 
mander and  the  authorities  at  Washing- 
ton. Bad  blood  most  unquestionably 
existed ; and  the  ill-concealed  jealousies 
and  enmities  of  individuals  contributed 
not  a little  to  increase  that  burden  of 
sorrow  and  suffering  under  which  the 
people  were  already  groaning.  We 
are  not  disposed  to  entirely  acquit  Mc- 
Clellan. But  we  are  as  little  disposed 
to  acquit  the  National  government. 
The  former  was,  no  doubt,  too  exacting 
in  his  demands  for  supplies  and  rein- 


McClellands  love  for  his  army. 


335 


forcements.  Poorly  equipped  as  his 
army  was  at  this  period,  it  was  not  for 
a moment  to  be  put  in  comparison  in 
this  respect  with  the  army  of  Lee, 
whose  men  were  shoeless  and  half-naked. 
Nor  was  there  any  good  reason  for  in- 
sisting that  the  reinforcements  and  sup- 
plies should  be  forwarded  at  once,  and 
before  the  onward  movement  com- 
menced ; for  surely  they  could  be  sent 
after  him.  On  the  other  hand  there 
was,  on  the  part  of  the  Washington 
officials,  a too  manifest  disposition  to 
dictate,  to  disregard  the  demands  and 
to  ignore  the  wishes  of  the  commander 
in  the  held.  There  was,  in  fact,  a 
mutual  distrust,  which  had  grown  into 
dislike.  There  was  blame  on  both 
sides.  McClellan  was  self-willed  ; and 
the  authorities  were  officious.  It  might 
have  been  better  for  McClellan’s  fame 
to-day  if,  when  at  this  stage,  he  found 
that  he  could  not  get  on  amicably  with 
the  War  Department,  he  had  resigned 
his  position.  It  was  known  that  he 
was  deeply  attached  to  the  army  of  the 
Potomac,  and  that  he  was  proud  to  be 
its  chief.  It  had  grown  up  under  his 
own  eye ; it  had  reached  maturity  and 
attained  perfection  under  his  own  watch- 
ful care.  His  Gallic  legions  were  not 
more  dear  to  Caesar;  the  grand  army 
of  the  empii'e  was  not  more  dear  to 
Napoleon,  than  was  the  army  of  the 
Potomac  to  McClellan.  His  resigna- 
tion would  have  fallen  like  a thunder- 
clap on  the  army  and  on  the  people. 
It  would  have  disarmed  suspicion 
wherever  suspicion  existed ; and  it 
would  have  proclaimed  to  all  the  world 
that  his  motives  were  pure  and  noble. 


and  his  actions  disinterested.  As  it 
was,  patriotism  or  ambition  impelled  him 
in  a different  course. 

On  the  6th  of  October,  instructions 
were  recei  ved  from  W ashington  to  oct. 
the  effect  that  McClellan  should 
move  at  once.  He  was  to  cross  the 
Potomac  and  give  battle  to  the  enemy, 
or  drive  him  South.  “ Your  army  must 
now  move,  while  the  roads  are  good.” 
It  was  the  26th,  when  the  first  Octo 
movement  was  made  in  obedience  26. 
to  this  order;  and  it  was  not  until  the 
2d  of  November  that  McClellan  was 
able  to  announce  that  his  whole  army 
was  once  more  in  Virginia,  prepared  to 
move  southward  on  the  east  side  of  the 
Blue  Kidge,  instead  of  pursuing  Lee  up 
the  Shenandoah  Valley,  on  the  western 
side  of  those  mountains.  By  the  4th 
the  National  army,  reinforced  by  the 
divisions  of  Generals  Sigel  and  Sickles 
from  Washington,  were  in  possession 
of  the  entire  region  east  of  the  Blue 
Bidge,  with  several  of  the  passes 
through  the  mountains,  from  Harper’s 
Ferry  to  Paris.  On  the  6th,  Me-  pfov. 
Clellan’s  headquarters  were  at 
Bectortown,  near  Front  Boyal.  The 
Confederates,  meanwhile,  were  steadily 
falling  back.  The  spectacle,  at  this 
time  presented,  was  that  of  two  great 
annies  moving  in  parallel  lines,  the 
mountain  chain  of  the  Blue  Bidge  be- 
tween them,  the  objective  point  in  both 
cases  being  the  same.  It  was  a race 
for  Bichmond.  Everything  depended 
on  despatch.  The  race  was  eagerly 
watched.  Would  not  McClellan,  with 
his  superior  force  and  ample  supplies, 
outrun  his  opponent,  and,  by  gaining 


S36 


FREDERICKSBURG. 


his  front,  strike  him  there  and  also  on 
the  flank,  through  the  gaps  in  the  hills  ? 
Such  was  the  question  put  by  many. 
As  usual,  Lee  was  too  quick  for  his 
opponent.  Anticipating  some  such 
movement,  he  had  hurried  Longstreet 
forward ; and  on  the  very  day  that  Mc- 
Clellan’s army  crossed  the  Potomac, 
that  general,  having  pushed  his  way 
over  the  Blue  Ridge,  was  at  Culpepper 
Court  House,  and  ready  to  resist  the 
advance  of  the  Nationals  on  the  Con- 
federate capital.  There  was  still  an 
opportunity  for  McClellan.  By  a rapid 
and  vigorous  movement,  he  might  cut 
Lee’s  army  in  two,  and  destroy  it  in 
detail.  But  there  was  distrust  of  Mc- 
Clellan at  Washington;  and  at  this 
critical  moment  it  was  determined  to 
displace  him.  On  the  5th  of  Novem- 
ber, an  order  was  issued  from  the  War 
Department,  relieving  him  of  the  com- 
mand of  the  army  of  the  Potomac,  and 
appointing  General  Burnside  in  his 
place — McClellan  being  required  to  re- 
port himself  at  Trenton,  New  Jersey. 
This  order  was  placed  in  the  hands  of 
General  Buckingham.  On  the  night 
of  the  7th,  during  a heavy  snow-storm, 
when  General  Burnside  happened  to 
be  in  McClellan’s  tent  at  Rectortown, 
Buckingham  arrived,  and  placed  the 
despatch  in  McClellan’s  hands.  After 
reading  it,  and  without  betraying  any 
emotion,  he  handed  it  to  Burnside, 
simply  remarking,  “ Burnside,  you  com- 
mand the  army.”  The  news  was  as 
unwelcome  to  Burnside  as  it  was  to  Mc- 
Clellan. The  position  had  been  offered 
him  twice  before;  but  Burnside,  hav- 
ing, as  we  have  seen  in  a previous 


chapter,  a high  opinion  of  McClellan's 
ability,  being  a warm,  personal  friend, 
and  being,  besides,  distrustful  of  him- 
self, had,  in  both  instances,  modestly 
declined  the  proffered  honor.  He  had 
not  changed  his  mind.  It  was  not 
until  the  ‘10th,.  after  having  received 
peremptory  orders  from  Washington, 
and  being  warmly  encouraged  by  his 
friends,  that  he  consented  to  assume 
the  responsibilities  of  general-in-chief 
of  the  army  of  the  Potomac.  “I’ll 
try,”  he  said,  evidently  intimating  that 
he  had  a secret  distrust  of  his  own 
fltness  for  so  responsible  a position.  In 
view  of  the  actual  situation,  and  with- 
out having  any  regard  to  the  disasters 
which  so  speedily  followed,  the  removal 
of  General  McClellan,  at  this  particular 
juncture,  must  be  pronounced  unfortu- 
nate and  ill-timed.  He  ought  to  have 
been  removed  at  an  earlier  date,  or  not 
until  he  had  had  another  opportunity 
of  measuring  his  strength  with  his  an- 
tagonist. 

McClellan  made  immediate  prepara- 
tions for  departure.  He  took  leave  of 
his  troops  in  the  following  words : 

“ Headquarters  of  the  Army  op  the  Potomac,  ) 
Camp  near  Rectortown,  Va.,  Nov.  7,  1862.  j 

“ Officers  and  Soldiers  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  : 

“An  order  of  the  president  devolves 
upon  Major-General  Burnside  the  com- 
mand of  this  army.  In  parting  from 
you,  I cannot  express  the  love  and  grati- 
tude I bear  to  you.  As  an  army,  you 
have  grown  up  in  my  care.  In  you  I 
have  never  found  doubt  or  coldness. 
The  battles  you  have  fought  under  my 
command  will  probably  live  in  our  na- 
tion’s history.  The  glory  you  have 


BURNSIDE  IN  COMMAND. 


337 


achieved  over  mutual  perils  and  fa- 
tigues; the  graves  of  our  comrades 
fallen  in  battle  and  by  disease;  the 
broken  forms  of  those  whom  wounds 
and  sickness  have  disabled — the  strong- 
est associations  which  can  exist  among 
men  unite  us  by  an  indissoluble  tie. 
We  shall  ever  be  comrades  in  support- 
ing the  Constitution  of  our  country  and 
the  nationality  of  its  people. 

^‘Geo.  B.  McClellax, 

‘‘Major-General  U.  S.  A.” 

On  Monday,  the  9th,  General  McClel- 
]Voy,  Ian  visited  the  different  camps, 
reviewed  the  troops,  and  took  a 
final  leave  of  officers  and  men.  The 
leave-taking  showed  that,  whatever  his 
defects  of  character,  or  whatever  were 
the  blunders  he  committed,  he  had  not 
lost  the  respect  and  confidence  of  his 
’men.  As  the  general,  “ mounted  upon 
a fiiK;  horse,  attended  by  a retinue  of 
fine-looking  military  men,  riding  rapid- 
ly through  the  ranks,  gracefully  recog- 
nized and  bade  a farewell  to  the  army, 
the  cries  and  demonstrations  of  the 
men  were  beyond  bounds — wild,  impas- 
sioned, and  unrestrained.  Disregarding 
all  military  forms,  they  rushed  from 
their  ranks  and  thronged  around  him, 
with  the  bitterest  complaints  against 
those  who  had  removed  from  command 
their  beloved  leader.”  On  the  next 
day  he  withdrew,  taking  the  cars  to 
Warrenton.  On  reaching  the  junction, 
a salute  was  fired.  The  troops  assem- 
bled at  that  point  actually  broke  their 
ranks,  through  their  eagerness  to  see 
him  and  to  obtain  a few  parting  words. 
While  on  the  platform,  he  said,  “I 
wish  you  to  stand  by  General  Burnside, 


as  you  have  stood  by  me,  and  all  will 
be  well.  Good-bye.”  At  Bristow  Sta- 
tion and  at  Manassas  Junction,  the  same 
scenes  were  repeated  ; and  the  cheering 
was  loud  and  enthusiastic. 

On  assuming  the  duties  of  general- 
in-chief,  Burnside  issued  the  following 
order : 

“ Headquarters  Army  of  the  Potomac,  ) 
Nov.  10,  1862.  j 

“In  accordance  with  General  Orders 
No.  182,  issued  by  the  president  of  the 
United  States,  I hereby  assume  com- 
mand of  the  army  of  the  Potomac. 
Patriotism,  and  the  exercise  of  my  every 
energy  in  the  direction  of  this  army, 
aided  by  the  full  and  hearty  co-opera- 
tion of  its  officers  and  men,  will,  I hope, 
under  the  blessing  of  God,  insure  its 
success. 

“ Having  been  a sharer  of  the  priva> 
tions,  and  a witness  of  the  bravery  ot 
the  old  army  of  the  Potomac  in  the 
Maryland  campaign,  and  fully  identi 
fied  with  them  in  their  feelings  of  re 
spect  and  esteem  for  General  McCleh 
Ian,  entertained  through  a long  an<d 
most  friendly  association  with  him,  I 
feel  that  it  is  not  as  a stranger  I assiTjme 
command. 

“ To  the  ninth  army  corps,  so  lon^  and 
intimately  associated  with  me,  I need 
say  nothing.  Our  histories  are  identi- 
cal. With  diffidence  for  mys/^df,  but 
with  a proud  confidence  in  the  CTSwerv- 
ing  loyalty  and  determination  of  the 
gallant  army  now  entrusted  to  my  care, 
I accept  its  control,  with  the  steadfast  as- 
surance that  the  just  cause  must  prevail. 

“A.  E.  Burnside, 
“Major-General  Commanding.” 


338 


FREDERICKSBURG. 


Burnside  did  not  make  any  attempt 
to  carry  out  McClellan’s  plan  of  attack, 
which  was,  by  a rapid  march  upon  Gor- 
donsville,  to  interpose  between  Lee’s 
divided  forces  and  beat  them  in  detail. 
The  truth  is,  the  opportunity -for  doing 
this  was  already  lost.  With  consent  of 
Halleck,  who  made  a visit  to  the  army, 
he  adopted  a new  plan  of  operations. 
The  capture  of  Bichmond,  rather  than 
the  destruction  of  Lee’s  army,  was  now 
to  be  his  objective.  Some  precious 
time  was  wasted  in  reorganizing  the 
army.  It  was  now  120,000  strong. 
In  place  of  the  old  arrangement  of 
corps  with  subordinate  divisions,  Burn- 
side divided  his  entire  force  into  three 
grand  divisions,  each  consisting  of  two 
corps.  The  right  was  placed  under  the 
command  of  General  Sumner,  the  left 
under  General  Franklin,  and  the  centre 
under  General  Hooker,  while  a lai^ge 
body  of  reserve  was  commanded  by 
General  Sigel.  Burnside  had  his  head- 
quarters at  Warrenton.  The  National 
plan  of  attack,  as  stated  by  Burnside 
himself,  was  to  concentrate  the  army 
in  the  neighborhood  of  Warrenton,  to 
make  a movement  across  the  Rappahan- 
nock as  a feint,  with  a view  to  divert 
the  attention  of  the  enemy,  and  leading 
him  to  believe  that  an  attack  was 
about  to  be  made  in  the  direction  of 
Gordonsville,  and  then  to  move  the 
whole  army  rapidly  to  Fredericksburg, 
on  the  southern  side  of  the  Rappahan- 
nock. 

Such  being  the  general  plan,  the 
mouth  of  Acquia  Creek,  where  it  emp- 
ties into  the  Potomac,  was  established 
as  the  basis  of  supplies.  Piers  and 


roads  were  constructed;  and  immense 
quantities  of  stores  were  sent  thither 
to  meet  the  wants  of  so  large  a body 
of  men.  The  bridges  across  the  Rap- 
pahannock, in  the  neighborhood  of 
Fredericksburg,  had  all  been  destroyed ; 
and,  in  carrying  out  the  proposed  plan, 
it  would  be  necessary  to  throw  pontoon 
bridges  across  at  various  points.  In 
connection  with  this  matter,  there  was 
some  sad  bungling — bungling  which,  if 
it  did  not  lead  to  the  defeat  of  the  Na- 
tional army,  at  least  gave  the  Confede- 
rates time  to  discover  Burnside’s  plan, 
and  to  prepare  to  meet  him  on  his  own 
chosen  ground.  This  whole  affair  is  so 
mixed  up  that  it  is  difficult,  if  not  im- 
possible, to  get  at  the  exact  truth.  It 
does  appear  that  when  Commander-in- 
Chief  Halleck  and  Quartermaster-Gen- 
eral Meigs  were  at  Warrenton,  Burn- 
side expressed  to  them  the  necessity  for 
having  the  pontoon  material  sent  on 
from  Washington  without  delay.  It 
was  understood  that  Halleck  and  Meigs 
sent  the  necessary  instructions  to  Wash- 
ington regarding  the  pontoons.  It  is 
certain  that  General  Burnside  felt  satis- 
fied that  this  matter  had  been  attended 
to,  and  that  the  instructions  would  be 
faithfully  and  promptly  carried  out.  It 
is  stated  on  reliable  authority  that  Gen- 
eral Woodbury,  who  commanded  the 
engineer  brigade  which  had  charge  of 
the  pontoon  equipage,  received  no  in- 
structions as  to  the  time  it  was  required 
to  be  at  Acquia  Creek,  or  the  part 
it  was  to  play  in  the  campaign ; that  he 
called  upon  General  Halleck  on  the 
14th,  telling  him  that,  if  the  date  of 
the  arrival  of  the  pontoons  was  to  coin- 


FATAL  DELAY. 


339 


cide  with  the  arrival  of  the  army  at 
Fredericksburg,  the  departure  of  the 
latter  from  Warrenton  should  be  de- 
layed for  at  least  five  days;  and  that 
Halleck,  while  not  yet  giving  any  posi- 
tive instructions  regarding  the  trans- 
port of  the  pontoon  equipage,  not  only 
refused  to  grant  the  delay,  but  even 
neglected  to  communicate  Woodbury’s 
remarks  to  Burnside.  It  was  a badly 
managed  business,  and  led  to  lament- 
able results,  as  the  reader  will  soon 
perceive;  and,  while  Burnside  cannot 
be  held  wholly  guiltless,  the  evidence 
lays  the  burden  of  blame  on  Halleck 
and  Meigs. 

On  the  14th  of  November,  orders 
Xov.  were  given  for  the  march  from 
Warrenton  to  Falmouth.  Sum- 
ner, who  was  the  first  to  start,  set  out 
on  the  morning  of  the  15th,  and  arrived 
at  Falmouth  on  the  17th.  This  village 
is  situated' on  the  left  or  northern  bank 
of  the  Kappahannock.  At  this  point, 
the  river  meets  a line  of  steep  hills,  and 
describing  an  angle,  changes  its  course 
from  east  to  southeast.  The  hills  on 
the  right  bank,  known  by  the  name  of 
Marye’s  Heights,  recede  from  the  river 
a little  above  the  angle,  and  then  de- 
scend gradually  towards  a small  plain, 
on  which,  and  close  to  the  river’s  edge, 
stands  the  town  of  Fredericksburg,  a 
little  below  Falmouth.  The  hills  on  the 
Falmouth  side  command  the  south  bank 
and  much  of  the  distance — a mile  and  a 
half — toward  the  frowning  hills  beyond. 
But  these  heights  equally  command  the 
intermediate  plain,  and  are  beyond  the 
reach  of  guns  planted  on  the  north  side 
of  the  river.  When  Sumner  arrived  at 


Falmouth,  he  discovered  that  on  the  op- 
posite bank  of  the  river  there  were  only 
one  battery  and  a few  detachments  of 
infantry  and  cavalry.  He  had  but  little 
difficulty  in  silencing  the  battery.  Fred- 
ericksburg, in  fact,  was  at  his  mercy; 
and  he  might  with  ease  have  taken  pos- 
session of  Marye’s  Heights — the  key 
of  the  position.  The  pontoons  had  not 
yet  arrived ; but  the  water  in  the  Rap- 
pahannock was  low,  and  the  fords,  al- 
though not  free  from  difficulty  and  dan- 
ger, were  not  impassable.  Sumner  was 
willing  and  even  anxious  to  make  the 
attempt ; but  he  was  positively  forbid- 
den to  cross  the  river  until  the  arrival 
of  the  other  troops.  “I  think,”  said 
Sumner  in  his  testimony,  ‘Hhat  I could 
have  taken  that  city,  and  heights  on 
the  other  side  of  it,  at  any  time  within 
three  days  after  my  arrival  here  [Fal- 
mouth], if  the  pontoons  had  been  here; 
foi  1 do  not  think  there  was  much  force 
of  the  enemy  here  up  to  that  time.” 
Sumner  was  thus  compelled  to  remain 
inactive.  Burnside,  with  Franklin’s 
grand  division,  reached  Falmouth  JVov. 
on  the  19th.  Hooker,  on  the 
same  day,  arrived  at  the  village  of  Har- 
wood ; and,  yielding  to  the  same  im- 
pulses which  controlled  Sumner,  he 
expressed  a desire  to  his  chief  to  cross 
the  river  above  Fredericksburg,  and 
occupy  Marye’s  Heights.  But  the  same 
reasons  which  hindered  Sumner’s  action, 
hindered  that  of  Hooker.  There  were 
no  pontoons;  and  by  this  time  heavy 
rains  had  swollen  the  river,  making  the 
fords  impassable. 

While  the  National  army  was  thus 
compelled  to  remain  comparatively  in- 


340 


FREDERICKSBURG. 


active  on  the  northern  side,  what  was 
taking  place  at  Fredericksburg  and  the 
heights  beyond  ? The  movement  of 
Sumner  on  the  15th  had  been  quickly 
reported  to  Lee.  He  had  also  been  in- 
formed of  the  arrival  of  several  trans- 
ports at  Acquia  Creek.  He  was  not 
slow  to  divine  the  meaning  of  the  move- 
ments of  his  antagonist.  The  feeble 
demonstrations  made  at  Culpepper 
could  not  deceive  him.  Fredericks- 
burg, he  saw  at  a glance,  was  the  objec- 
tive point.  Towards  Fredericksburg, 
therefore,  he  directed  his  attention. 
Longstreet’s  corps  had  been  at  Culpep- 
per since  the  3d.  Lee  ordered  them  to 
strike  their  camp,  and  started  with 
them  for  Fredericksburg.  On  his  ar- 
rival, he  found  McLaws  in  quiet  posses- 
sion of  the  heights  commanding  the 
town  ; and  while  the  Nationals  were 
still  barred  by  the  impassable  river,  he 
proceeded  with  all  haste  to  take  full 
advantage  of  his  splendid  position.  On 
IVov.  ftie  22d,  Burnside  and  his  divi- 
22.  sion  commanders  had  the  mortifi- 
cation to  see  the  opposite  heights — the 
object  of  their  ambition,  the  vantage 
ground  on  which  they  had  set  their 
hearts — crowned  with  the  enemy’s  bat- 
teries, and  bristling  with  the  enemy’s 
steel.  It  was  a humiliating  sight.  J ack- 
son  was  summoned  from  Orange  Court 
House  on  the  26th.  It  was  not  until 
the  28th  or  29th  that  he  rejoined  Lee. 
Up  until  that  date  Burnside’s  opportu- 
nity lasted.  If  he  could  have  crossed 
the  river,  he  might  have  whipped  Lee, 
and  taken  possession  of  Marye’s  Heights 
before  the  arrival  of  Jackson.  But  the 
opportunity  could  not  be  taken  advan- 


tage of.  The  pontoon  equipages  were 
not  forward  until  the  25th  ; and  it  was 
the  10th  of  December  before  all  thinor^ 

O 

were  ready  for  throwing  the  bridges 
across  the  river.  The  hills  behind 
Fredericksburg  had  by  this  time  been 
rendered*  impregnable.  It  was  a fatal 
delay — the  most  fatal  since  the  com- 
mencement of  the  war. 

Burnside  had  not,  however,  been 
wholly  idle.  The  Confederates,  as  has 
been  stated,  had  destroyed  the  railroad 
between  Fredericksburg  and  Acquia 
Creek.  The  bridges  were  all  broken 
down  or  burned;  and  the  track  in 
many  places  was  torn  up.  The  Na- 
tional engineers  had  succeeded  in  re- 
storing the  bridges — one  of  these,  built 
under  the  superintendence  of  Colonel 
Haupt  over  the  Potomac  Creek,  being 
four  hundred  feet  in  length  and  one 
hundred  feet  above  the  water,  com- 
manding especial  attention ; and  the 
line  was  put  in  good  working  order. 
Arrangements  had  been  made  to  cross 
the  river  at  Skinker’s  Neck,  twelve 
miles  below  Falmouth,  with  the  view 
of  turning  the  Confederate  right;  but 
the  ever-vigilant  Lee  discovered  the 
movement  in  time  to  show  himself 
fully  prepared.  Burnside  was  check- 
mated, and  the  enterprise  was  aban- 
doned. As  early  as  the  21st  of  Novem- 
ber, Sumner  had  made  a call  on  the 
mayor  of  Fredericksburg  to  surrender 
that  town ; but  the  reply  was  promptly 
made  that,  while  it  would  not  be  used 
for  offensive  purposes  against  the  Na- 
tional anny,  any  attempt  to  occupy  it 
would  be  stubbornly  resisted.  The  re- 
sult of  this  correspondence  was  that  the 


MAP  OF  NORTHERN  VIRGINIA,  SHOWING  FREDERICKSBURG,  CHANCELLORS- 
VILLE,  SPOTTSYLVANIA,  THE  WILDERNESS,  Etc.,  Etc. 


i 


THE  PONTOONS. 


341 


inhabitants,  dreading  a bombardment, 
for  the  most  part  left  the  city,  Barks- 
dale’s sharpshooters  distributing  them- 
selves behind  the  deserted  buildings 
near  the  river.  Meanwhile,  Lee’s  army, 
some  80,000  strong,  had  been  well 
brought  forward;  and  at  the  end  of 
November,  it  lay  in  a semicircle  around 
Fredericksburg,  each  wing  resting  on 
the  river — its  right  at  Port  Boyal,  be- 
low the  city,  and  its  left  a short  dis- 
tance above  it.  His  engineers  had 
constructed  in  the  rear  of  the  city  two 
lines  of  fortifications,  one  mile  apart; 
and  the  range  of  hills  to  his  left  were 
also  well  fortified. 

In  the  meantime  the  pontoons  had 
Pec.  arrived ; and  Burnside,  on  the 
evening  of  the  10th,  made  the 
necessary  arrangements  to  have  the 
bridges  thrown  across  early  on  the  fol- 
lowing morning.  About  four  o’clock  on 
the  cold,  raw  morning  of  the  11th  of  De- 
cember, and  amid  a dense  fog,  the  work 
was  commenced.  Five  bridges  were  to 
be  constructed — three  immediately  in 
front  of  Fredericksburg,  and  the  other 
two  a couple  of  miles  below.  The  two 
lower  bridges  were  to  be  used  by 
Franklin;  those  in  front  of  the  town 
by  Sumner  and  Hooker.  The  topogra- 
phy of  the  river  shores,  as  we  have 
already  indicated,  offered  facilities  for 
carrying  out  the  enterprise.  Stafford 
Heights,  on  the  Falmouth  side,  and  on 
which  the  Nationals  were  encamped, 
were  close  to  the  margin  of  the  river, 
which  at  this  point  is  about  three 
hundred  yards  wide.  These  heights 
were  crowned  with  twenty-nine  power- 
ful batteries,  numbering  147  guns. 


Lee’s  batteries,  on  the  othei  hand, 
were  from  three  fourths  of  a milo  to  a 
mile  and  a half  from  the  banks.  But 
for  the  sharpshooters,  who  had  found 
secure  lodgment  behind  the  stone  walls 
of  the  river  street  of  the  town,  there 
would  have  been  but  little  difficulty  ex- 
perienced in  throwing  across  the  pon- 
toons. The  National  army  was  posted 
along  the  north  bank  of  the  Rappahan- 
nock— Hooker  and  Sumner  in  front  of 
Fredericksburg,  Sumner  more  to  the 
right ; Franklin  about  two  miles  below. 
Burnside  had  his  headquarters  at  the 
house  of  a Mr.  Phillips,  on  the  high 
ground,  about  a mile  from  the  river; 
and  from  that  commanding  position,  he 
had  a full  view  of  the  whole  field  of 
operations.  On  the  morning  of  pec. 
the  11th,  as  we  have  seen,  before  Ho 
day-break,  the  work  was  commenced. 
For  a time  it  went  quietly  on,  the 
workmen  being  covered  by  the  Fifty- 
Seventh  and  Sixty-Sixth  New  York, 
of  Zook’s  brigade,  of  Hancock’s  divi- 
sion. The  bridges  below  Fredericks- 
burg were  constructed  without  much 
hindrance;  but  those  in  front  of  the 
town  were  now  exposed  to  the  Con- 
federate sharpshooters.  One  of  these 
latter  bridges  was  well-nigh  completed, 
when  the  Confederates  discovered  what, 
was  going  on.  Two  signal  guns  were 
fired ; and  from  behind  the  walls  along 
the  banks  of  the  river,  and  from  the 
windows  of  the  houses,  a galling  fire 
of  musketry  was  opened  upon  the  pon- 
toniers,  who  were  compelled  to  desist 
and  fall  back  to  the  shelter  of  the  hills. 
The  work  was  resumed  about  six 
o’clock.  The  Confederate  fire  became- 


939 


342 


FREDERICKSBURG. 


more  severe,  the  bullets  falling  like 
hail  among  the  brave  pontoniers.  It 
was  impossible  to  continue  the  work. 
Again  it  was  necessary  to  fall  back 
to  the  shelter  of  the  hills  which  ran 
parallel  with  the  river.  Burnside  now 
became  impatient.  The  sharpshooters 
must  be  silenced  and  driven  from  their 
hiding-places.  Orders  w^ere  given  that 
the  batteries  on  Staiford  Heiorhts  should 
open  fire  on  the  town,  and  batter  it 
down,  if  necessary.  The  response  was 
prompt  and  terrific.  More  than  a hun- 
dred guns  opened  their  angry  mouths 
at  once.  Fifty  rounds  were  fired  be- 
fore the  cannonade  ceased.  The  shot 
told  on  the  buildings,  battering  many 
of  them  down,  and  setting  some  of 
them  on  fire.  Another  attempt  was 
now  made,  under  cover  of  this  fire, 
to  finish  the  bridges ; but  the  sharp- 
shooters, strange  to  say,  were  still 
on  the  river’s  bank,  and  concealed  be- 
hind the  stone  walls.  A third  time 
were  the  pontoniers  compelled  to  fall 
back.  The  sharpshooters  must  be  dis- 
lodged. Volunteers  were  called  for; 
when  the  Seventh  Michigan,  and  Nine- 
teenth and  Twentieth  Massachusetts, 
of  Howard’s  division,  offered  their  ser- 
vices. They  were  quickly  conveyed 
across  the  stream;  and  in  a brief  space 
of  time  the  Mississippian  sharpshooters 
were  driven  from  their  shelter,  and 
nearly  100  of  them  made  prisoners. 
The  bridges  were  soon  completed. 

As  soon  as  the  bridoes  were  in  a fit 
state  to  be  used,  Sumner’s  grand  divi- 
sion, and  a portion  of  Hooker’s,  were 
over  before  dark  at  the  upper  bridges ; 
Franklin’s  grand  division  crossed  at  the 


lower.  The  movement  was  re-  Dec, 
sumed  on  the  morning  of  the 
12th;  and  on  the  evening  of  that  day, 
the  greater  portion  of  the  National 
army  was  on  the  south  side  of  the  Rap- 
pahannock, and  in  full  possession  of 
Frederictsburg.  During  the  afternoon, 
fire  was  opened  on  the  town  by  the  Con- 
federate batteries  on  the  heights  near- 
est the  town.  The  Nationals  made  a 
brisk  response,  and  the  firing  was  dis- 
continued. It  was  Lee’s  purpose  to 
tempt  the  Nationals  to  attack  him  on 
the  heights,  where  he  knew  he  was  all 
but  impregnable.  Had  he  given  them 
more  annoyance  in  the  city,  as  he  could 
easily  have  done,  this  purpose  might 
have  failed.  A full  revelation  of  his 
strength  might  have  led  to  the  recross- 
ins:  of  the  river.  Lee  succeeded  in  his 
plan.  Burnside  made  immediate  ar- 
rangements for  an  assault  on  the  Con- 
federate position. 

We  have  already  endeavored  to  give 
the  reader  a general  idea  of  the  ground 
on  which  the  struggle  was  about  to 
take  place.  We  have  seen  that  the 
town  of  Fredericksburg  lay  on  a stretch 
of  level  ground  on  the  south  bank  of 
the  Rappahannock,  and  that,  at  the  dis- 
tance of  half  a mile  or  a little  more  in 
i-ear  of  the  town,  the  ground  begins  to 
rise  in  sharp  slopes,  until  it  forms  a 
sort  of  table  land,  with  two  ridges,  the 
more  remote  ridge  being  the  higher  of 
the  two.  These  heights  were  generally 
known  by  the  name  of  Marye’s  Heights, 
although  special  names  were  given  to 
particular  prominences.  The  heights, 
which  are  from  three  quarters  of  a mile 
to  a mile  and  a half  in  the  rear  of 


READY  FOR  THE  ATTACK. 


343 


Fredericksburg,  and  which  completely 
command  the  town,  had  been  rendered 
impregnable.  A little  to  the  south  of 
Marye’s  Heights  there  is  another,  but 
more  irregular,  range  of  hills,  running 
for  some  distance  due  south,  then 
trending  to  the  southeast,  in  the  direc- 
tion of  the  Massaponax,  when  they  fol- 
low the  line  of  that  stream  to  the  Rap- 
pahanock.  On  these  hills  there  were 
some  strong  natural  positions,  particu- 
larly what  was  afterwards  called  Lee’s 
Hill,  at  the  northern  extremity;  Pros- 
pect Hill,  at  the  extreme  south ; and 
Bernard’s  Cabin,  not  far  from  the  centre. 
The  ground  in  the  rear  of  this  irregu- 
lar range  was  well  wooded,  thus  afford- 
ing good  shelter  for  the  troops  which 
might  be  in  possession.  Along  the 
front  of  this  ridge  ran  the  Fredericks- 
burg and  Potomac  Railroad.  In  conse- 
quence of  the  recession  of  the  hills 
towards  the  middle  of  the  range,  the 
plain,  which  extends  from  Fredericks- 
burg to  the  Massaponax,  and  from  the 
base  of  the  hills  to  the  Rappahannock, 
acquires  considerable  dimensions.  In 
addition  to  the  railroad  just  mentioned, 
there  runs  through  the  entire  length 
of  this  plain  the  old  Richmond  Road. 
Every  available  spot  on  this  range  of 
hills,  as  on  Marye’s  Heights,  although 
the  batteries  were  not  so  crowded,  was 
covered  with  cannon.  Distributed  along 
this  line,  and  guarding  every  approach, 
was  Lee’s  army  of  80,000  men,  with 
300  pieces  of  artillery.  Jackson  w'as 
on  the  right;  Longsti^eet  on  the  left; 
Stuart,  with  cavalry  and  artillery,  on 
the  plain  on  the  extreme  right.  In  his 
rear  Lee  had  cut  a new  road,  by  means 


of  which  he  was  able,  without  making 
a long  detour  through  a bad  country, 
to  connect  both  wings  of  his  army.' 
The  National  army  was  lying  on  the 
southwest  side  of  the  Rappahannock, 
in  the  same  position  in  which  the  divi- 
sions had  crossed — Sumner  and  Hooker 
at  the  town  of  Fredericksburg,  and 
Franklin  about  two  miles  below.  Such 
were  the  relative  positions  of  the  two 
armies  on  the  night  of  the  12th  and  the 
morning  of  the  13th.  Burnside’s  army, 
which  was  over  120,000  strong,  out- 
numbered that  of  Lee ; but  Lee  had 
the  advantage  of  position.  His  army, 
which  was  stretched  out  in  a sort  of 
semicircle,  not  only  commanded  the 
open  space  in  front — it  flanked  it. 

Everything  was  now  ready  for  the 
attack.  The  Confederates,  however, 
were  not  less  prepared  than  the  Na- 
tionals. Jackson  had  arrived  on  the 
field ; and  Longstreet  had  been  enabled 
to  close  his  lines  on  the  left.  On  the 
afternoon  of  the  12th,  A.  P.  Hill  had 
relieved  Hood,  and  taken  position  along 
the  margin  of  the  woods,  on  the  Con- 
federate right,  from  Hamilton’s  Crossing 
to  Bernard’s  Cabin.  Hood  lay  on  the 
heights,  between  Deep  Run  and  Hazel 
Run.  Pickett  was  stationed  at  the  foot 
of  the  hills,  near  the  centre,  between 
Hazel  Run  and  the  Telegraph  Road. 
McLaws  was  on  the  heights,  to  the  left 
of  Pickett;  and  Anderson’s  division, 
which  was  further  to  the  left,  rested 
on  the  river.  The  important  point  was 
Marye’s  Hill,  the  southernmost  promi- 
nence of  Marye’s  Heights,  which  com- 
manded the  Plank  Road.  This  posi' 
tion,  which  was  strongly  fortified  and 


344 


FEEDERICKSBURG. 


well  mounted  with  guns,  was  placed 
under  the  immediate  care  of  General 
Ransom.  At  the  foot  of  the  hill,  on  a 
road  which  was  protected  on  the  town 
side  by  a gray  stone  wall,  were  sta- 
tioned Cobb’s  brigade  and  the  Twenty- 
Fourth  North  Carolina.  The  redoubts 
on  the  crest  of  Marye’s  Hill  were  held 
by  the  Washington  (New  Orleans)  ar- 
tillery, under  Colonel  Walton.  On  the 
evening  of  the  12th,  Burnside  convened 
his  officers,  and  submitted  to  them  his 
plan  of  attack  for  the  next  morning. 
His  purpose  was  to  push  forward  his 
entire  force  wffiich  had  crossed  the 
river,  and,  by  sudden  and  simultaneous 
attacks  made  along  the  whole  line,  to 
penetrate  the  Confederate  ranks,  and 
seize  the  fortified  heights.  The  work 
was  to  be  done  by  Franklin  on  the  left 
and  Sumner  on  the  right.  Hooker’s 
gi*and  division  was  to  be  held  in  re- 
serve, so  as  to  be  ready  for  any  emerg- 
ency. After  consultation,  it  was  agreed 
that  the  main  attack  should  be  made 
upon  the  enemy’s  right ; and  to  enable 
Franklin  to  do  his  part  of  the  work 
with  effect,  his  command  was  streno^th- 
ened  by  the  addition  of  two  of  Hooker’s 
best  divisions,  making  his  whole  force 
about  55,000  men.  It  was  understood 
that  Fi’anklin  would  make  the  attack 
at  dawn ; but  he  was  to  receive  positive 
instructions  from  the  commanding-gen- 
eral before  midnight.  Sumner’s  attack, 
which  Avas  to  be  made  more  to  the 
right  of  the  Confederate  position,  in  the 
neighborhood  of  Marye’s  Hill,  was  to 
be  conditioned  somewhat  on  the  success 
which  might  attend  Fi'anklin’s,  but  it 
was  to  be  made  almost  immediately 


after.  Such  was  the  general  understand- 
ing on  the  night  of  the  12th.  Franklin 
waited  anxiously  for  his  orders.  Mid- 
night came  and  went ; but  there  was 
no  message  from  Burnside. 

It  was  not  until  near  six  o’clock  next 
morning  that  Burnside  issued  his  Dec. 
orders  to  his  three  grand  divi- 
sion  commanders;  and  it  was  nearly 
eight  o’clock  before  Franklin  knew 
what  was  expected  of  him.  As  Frank- 
lin was  greatly,  but  very  unjustly, 
blamed  for  his  conduct  at  Fredericks- 
burg, it  is  well  that  the  reader  should 
be  put  in  a position  to  judge  for  him- 
self. Burnside’s  order  to  Franklin  read 
as  follows : ^‘General  Hardie  will  carry 
this  despatch  to  you,  and  remain  with 
you  during  the  day.  The  general  com- 
manding directs  that  you  keep  your  ivhole 
command  in  position  for  a rapid  move- 
ment  down  the  old  Richmond  Road,  and 
you  will  send  out  at  once  a division,  at 
least,  to  pass  below  Smithfield,  to  seize, 
if  possible,  the  heights  near  Captain 
Hamilton’s,  on  this  side  of  the  Massa- 
ponax,  taking  care  to  keep  it  well  sup- 
ported, and  its  line  of  retreat  open. 
He  has  ordered  another  column  of  a 
division,  or  more,  to  be  moved  fi*om 
General  Sumner’s  command  up  the 
Plank  Road  to  its  intersection  of  the 
Telegraph  Road,  where  they  will  di- 
vide with  a view  to  seizing  the  heights 
on  both  these  roads.  Holding  these 
heights,  with  the  heights  near  Captain 
Hamilton’s,  wdll,  I hope,  compel  the 
enemy  to  evacuate  the  whole  ridge  be 
tween  these  points.  He  makes  these 
moves  by  columns  distant  from  each 
other,  with  a view  of  avoiding  the  pos- 


THE  ATTACK  ON  THE  LEFT. 


345 


sibility  of  a collision  of  our  own  forces, 
which  might  occur  in  a general  move- 
ment during  the  fog.  Two  of  General 
Hooker’s  divisions  are  in  your  rear,  at 
the  bridges,  and  will  remain  as  sup- 
ports. Copies  of  instructions  to  Gen- 
erals Sumner  and  Hooker  will  be  sent 
to  you  by  an  orderly  very  soon.  You 
will  keep  your  whole  command  in  readi- 
ness to  move  at  once,  as  soon  as  the  fog 
lifts.  The  watchword  which,  if  pos- 
sible, should  be  given  to  every  com- 
pany, will  be  ^ Scott.’”  The  order  was 
signed  by  J.  G.  Parke,  Chief  of  Staff. 

Such  were  the  instructions  brought 
to  Franklin  on  the  morning  of  the  13th. 
They  were  not  the  instructions  expect- 
ed, and  for  which  preparations  had 
already  been  made.  The  new  plan 
differed  entirely  from  that  agreed  upon 
the  night  before.  Puzzled  and  per- 
plexed as  Franklin  was  by  this  change 
of  mind  on  the  part  of  his  chief,  he  had 
no  choice  but  obey.  It  deserves  to  be 
borne  in  mind  that  Hardie,  who  brought 
the  instructions,  remained  with  Frank- 
lin, and  was  in  constant  communication 
with  Burnside  during  the  day.  The 
general-commanding  was,  therefore,  kept 
well  informed  of  all  that  was  going  on, 
on  his  left.  For  the  orders  given  to 
Sumner  to  attack  at  a time  when  Frank- 
lin was  not  yet  seriously  engaged,  for 
all  the  subsequent  orders  of  that  day, 
and  for  the  general  plan  of  the  battle, 
Burnside  was  wholly  responsible.  It 
is  evident  from  this  order  that  Burnside 
had  concluded,  at  the  last  moment,  not 
to  make  a vigorous  assault  with  his 
entire  strength  both  on  the  left  and 
right  of  the  enemy’s  position,  but,  in 


the  first  instance  at  least,  to  make, 
simultaneously,  two  partial  and  tenta- 
tive efforts — one  on  the  right  and  one 
on  the  left.  Franklin  made  immediate 
preparations  to  carry  out  the  order. 
Believing  that  he  was  to  hold  his  com- 
mand in  readiness  for  a rapid  move- 
ment on  the  old  Richmond  Road,  and 
that  he  was  to  send  out  only  an  armed 
reconnoissance,  with  a single  di^usion, 
he  ordered  Reynolds  to  take  Meade’s 
division,  and  attack  the  point  indicat- 
ed. Meade’s  division  was  accordingly 
thrown  forward.  The  other  two  divi- 
sions of  the  same  corps — those  of  Gib- 
bon and  of  Doubleday — were  ordered  to 
support  Meade,  the  one  on  his  right,  the 
other  on  his  left,  but  somewhat  in  the 
rear.  Meade  had  under  him  about 
5000  men;  Doubleday  had  about  the 
same  number ; and  Gibbon  had  nearly 
6000.  Reynolds’  disposable  force  was, 
therefore,  about  16,000  men.  A heavy 
fog  lay  over  the  valley.  So  dense  was 
it  that  neither  army  could  be  seen  by 
the  other.  The  Confederates,  however, 
could  distinctly  hear  the  words  of  com- 
mand given  by  the  National  officers. 
As  the  ground  was  exceedingly  broken 
and  irregular,  the  advance  was  conduct- 
ed under  great  difficulty.  It  was  now 
nearly  ten  o’clock.  The  fog  began  to 
clear  off ; and  the  columns  of  Meade, 
which  w’ere  well  advanced  beyond  the 
road,  came  full  into  view  of  the  Con- 
federates. At  this  moment,  Meade  was 
assailed  by  a terrible  storm  of  bullets 
at  near  range.  He  had  come  close 
upon  Stuart’s  horse  artillery,  which 
were  posted  along  the  road,  on  the 
open  ground,  to  the  Confederate  right. 


346 


FREDERICKSBURG. 


Meade  was  now  compelled  to  halt.  For 
half  an  hour  the  battle  raged  fiercely. 
At  the  end  of  that  time  Doubleday 
came  up  to  his  relief.  Doubleday  de- 
ployed his  men  in  front  of  Stuart ; and 
Meade  continued  his  advance.  At  this 
moment  Doubleday  was  facing  towards 
the  left,  while  Meade  was  pressing  to> 
wards  the  railroad  which,  at  this  point, 
skirts  the  edge  of  the  wooded  heights. 
Meade’s  progress  was  uninterrupted. 
All  was  quiet  on  the  heights  and  in 
the  woods  beyond.  Not  a sign  of  the 
foe  was  visible.  The  National  artillery 
poured  shell  into  the  woods  occupied 
by  the  division  of  A.  P.  Hill ; but 
there  was  no  response.  Jackson  was 
evidently  reserving  his  fire  until  his 
antagonist  came  fully  under  his  guns. 
Everything  now  depended  upon  dash 
and  daring.  Meade  urged  forward  his 
men.  On  rushed  the  brave  Pennsyl- 
vanians— troops  which  had  covered 
themselves  with  glory  at  Beaver  Dam 
and  on  the  blood-stained  field  of  Glen- 
dale. They  rapidly  approached  the 
position  occupied  by  Walker’s  artillery 
at  Prospect  Hill.  Suddenly  these  guns 
open  fire ; the  twelve  guns  at  the  Con- 
federate left  centre  open  fire  at  the 
same  moment ; and  Meade  finds  himself 
alone,  in  the  open  space,  exposed  to  the 
fire  of  two  concentric  batteries,  the  pro- 
jectiles actually  crossing  each  other  in 
his  ranks.  The  situation  is  perilous. 
There  is  a halt ; and  an  attempt  is  made 
to  silence  the  enemy’s  guns.  Gibbon 
deploys  to  the  right  of  Meade.  Birney, 
with  his  division,  of  Stoneman’s  corps, 
is  hurried  forward  to  the  relief  of  both. 
After  a fearful  artillery  duel,  the  Con- 


federate fire  from  the  batteries  on 
Prospect  Hill,  and  those  more  to  their 
left  centre  in  front  of  the  railroad,  is 
considerably  slackened.  A decided  ad- 
vantage has  been  gained  by  the  Na- 
tionals. 

Beynolds  now  gives  Meade  the  signal 
for  attack.  Though  the  ground  is  cover- 
ed with  dead  and  wounded,  there  is  no 
time  to  halt  and  consider.  On  rush  the 
Pennsylvanians — on  in  the  face  of  the 
most  destructive  fire  of  shell  and  canis- 
ter. The  Confederate  general,  Brock- 
enborough,  is  compelled  to  fall  back. 
A powerful  battery  is  silenced,  and 
hurried  to  the  rear.  Bushing  bravely 
on,  Meade  soon  finds  himself  across  the 
railroad,  over  the  crest  of  the  hill,  with 
his  advance,  under  Sinclair,  as  far  as 
the  new  military  road,  which  Lee  had 
constructed  for  the  purpose  of  uniting 
the  Avings  of  his  army.  The  first  line 
of  the  Confederates  had  been  pierced. 
On  the  military  road,  the  victorious 
Nationals  come  into  contact  with  Gregg 
and  his  South  Carolina  veterans.  Un- 
prepared for  so  vigorous  an  attack,  and 
mistaking  Meade’s  men  for  Confederate 
soldiers,  Gregg  forbids  his  own  men 
to  fire.  In  a moment  he  is  undeceived. 
There  is  a terrific  discharge  of  mus- 
ketry. Orr’s  rifles,  the  most  exposed 
regiment  of  the  Confederate  line,  is  al- 
most annihilated ; and  Gregg  himself 
has  fallen,  mortally  wounded. 

It  is  a critical  moment.  If  Meade  is 
well  sustained,  he  may  succeed  in  pene- 
trating the  second  line  of  the  enemy — 
thus  cutting  the  Confederate  army  in 
two.  In  such  a case,  Burnside’s  first 
object  will  have  been  accomplished; 


MEADE  REPULSED. 


347 


and  victory,  it  is  not  improbable,  may 
crown  his  efforts.  But  Meade  has 
been  brave  almost  overmuch ; he  is  far 
in  advance  of  his  supports;  and  his 
brave  Pennsylvanians  are  utterly  ex- 
hausted. No  help  is  within  reach. 
Doubleday  is  on  the  Richmond  Road  ; 
Gribbon  has  allowed  himself  to  be 
stopped  at  the  left  of  Hill’s  line,  near 
the  railroad  ; and  Birney  still  lingers  in 
the  rear.  Franklin’s  headquarters  are 
far  distant  from  the  scene  of  action : 
and  being  desirous  to  carry  out  the  in- 
structions he  has  received,  he  is  fearful 
to  engage  the  greater  portion  of  his 
forces.  Left  thus  to  himself,  Meade  is 
unable  to  make  good  the  advantage  he 
has  gained.  The  Confederates,  having 
re-formed,  fall  upon  his  wearied  troops 
in  front  with  great  weight,  and  with 
tremendous  fury.  It  was  already  a 
most  unequal  combat.  While  thus  at- 
tacked in  front,  and  while  his  men  were 
reeling  and  staggering  under  the  vigor- 
ous onslaughts  of  the  rapidly  multiply- 
ing Confederates,  Early  came  dashing 
up,  with  Ewell’s  division,  and  struck 
Meade’s  flank  as  if  with  a thunderbolt. 
Resistance  was  no  longer  possible.  The 
Nationals  were  driven  back  over  the 
railroad  in  confusion,  and  with  great 
loss,  the  Confederates  pursuing,  with 
loud  yells,  and  flinging  themselves  on 
the  guns  which  covered  the  retreat. 
Birney  came  forward  in  time  to  save 
Meade  from  destruction.  The  Confede- 
rates were  forced  back  into  the  woods, 
with  the  loss  of  500  men  in  killed  and 
wounded.  Birney,  however,  could  not 
reopen  the  breach  in  the  Confederate 
line.  Meade  could  render  no  assist- 


ance ; Gibbon’s  men  had  suffered  terri- 
bly, and  he  himself  had  been  wounded ; 
while  Smith,  who  had  been  advanced 
more  to  the  right,  was  too  far  removed 
to  render  any  efficient  aid.  At  two 
o’clock  Reynolds  held  the  railroad ; but 
he  was  not  strong  enough  to  make  any 
attempt  upon  the  woods.  All  that 
Meade  had  won  was  lost — hopelessly 
lost;  and  yet  Franklin  had  under  him 
some  30,000  men  who  had  never  been 
engaged.  Never,  during  the  world’s 
history,  was  there  displayed  more  gal- 
lantry; but  never  was  gallantry  dis- 
played to  so  little  purpose.  Meade 
performed  miracles  of  valor;  and  the 
future  hero  of  Gettysburg  was  already 
revealed.  Franklin,  overfaithful,  and 
too  rigidly  obedient  to  rule,  lost  his  op- 
portunity— an  opportunity  which  rare- 
ly falls  to  the  lot  of  a division  com- 
mander, and  which  was  never  to  be 
his  again.  In  strictly  adhering  to  his 
orders,  he  did  that  which  was  right; 
but  a little  more  willingness  to  incur 
risk,  and  to  share  responsibility,  might 
have  made  him  the  hero  of  Fredericks- 
burg, and  the  future  captain  of  the 
Northern  hosts. 

Let  us  now  see  what  was  taking  place 
on  the  right.  While  the  thick  fog  was 
still  resting  heavily  on  the  valley,  Sum- 
ner’s forces  were  already  moving  to- 
wards the  artillery-crowned  heights  in 
the  rear  of  the  city.  Marye’s  Heights 
we  have  already  described.  There  were 
three  prominences,  all  of  which  were 
well  mounted  with  cannon — Marye’s 
Hill  to  the  south,  and  commanding  the 
Plank  Road;  Cemetery  Hill  towards 
the  centre;  and  Stansbury  Hill  further 


348 


FREDERICKSBURG. 


to  the  north.  Burnside’s  plan,  it  will 
be  remembered,  was  to  throw  upon  the 
Plank  Eoad  and  Telegraph  Road  a col- 
umn of  equal  strength  with  that  which 
was  to  make  the  attack  on  the  left,  his 
expectation  being  that  he  would  thus 
make  himself  master  of  the  entire  range 
of  hills,  those  on  his  right  as  well  as 
those  on  his  left.  Of  Sumner’s  grand 
division,  Couch’s  corps  (the  Second) 
occupied  the  town  of  Fredericksbui*g ; 
and  Wilcox’s  (the  Ninth)  occupied  the 
interval  between  Couch  and  Franklin. 
Couch  was  to  have  the  honor  of  making 
the  first  attack.  It  was  now  nearing 
the  noontide.  The  mist  had  just  cleared 
off  the  valley.  Burnside,  who  was  still 
at  the  Phillips  House,  on  the  northern 
side  of  the  river,  and  who  had  reserved 
to  himself  the  direction  of  the  battle 
on  his  right,  gave  the  signal  for  attack; 
and  French’s  division,  of  Couch’s  corps, 
composed  of  the  brigades  of  Kimball, 
Anderson  and  Palmer,  was  seen  to 
emerge  from  Fredericksburg  into  the 
open  plain.  The  Confederate  batteries 
on  Marye’s  Hill  had  already  opened 
fire  upon  the  town.  As  French’s  col- 
umns advanced,  the  Confederate  guns 
on  the  heights  were  lowered ; and  the 
shot  and  shell  fell  thick  and  fast  into 
his  serried  ranks.  French’s  division 
was  followed  at  some  little  distance  by 
that  of  Hancock;  and  Howard’s  divi- 
sion was  held  in  reserve.  An  attempt 
was  made  by  the  National  artillery  on 
Stafford  Heights  to  silence  the  batteries 
on  Marye’s  Hill ; but  the  distance  was 
so  great  that  the  shot  fell  short,  and 
threatened  to  do  more  damage  to  friend 
than  foe.  The  firing  on  the  part  of  the 


National  artillery  on  the  northern  side 
of  the  river  was,  therefore,  discontin- 
ued. So  terrific  was  the  fire  from 
Marye’s  Hill  that  Couch’s  field-pieces 
could  not  be  advanced.  On,  however, 
rushed  the  brave  Nationals — French  in 
front,  Hancock  following  close  behind. 
It  was  a rush  into  the  jaws  of  death. 
Longstreet  has  told  us  that  the  gaps 
made  by  the  artillery  could  be  seen 
half  a mile  away.  French’s  soldiers 
had  approached  within  fifty  paces  of 
the  stone  wall  at  the  base  of  Marye’s 
Hill.  As  they  rushed  forward,  they 
were  received  with  a murderous  volley. 
The  first  line  was  reduced  to  a handful 
of  men.  The  two  brigades  which  fol- 
lowed were  brought  to  a standstill; 
and,  after  a single  discharge,  they  re- 
tired, leaving  nearly  one  half  of  their 
comrades  on  the  ground.  Hancock  was 
now  in  the  front ; and,  being  joined  by 
such  portions  of  French’s  command  as 
had  not  been  broken  and  disorganized, 
he  rushed  towards  the  stone  wall.  It 
was  a teiTific  struggle  Bullet,  ball 
and  shell,  like  a tempest  of  iron,  mowed 
down  his  ranks,  while  the  triumphant 
Confederates,  safe  behind  their  strong 
bulwark,  shouted  and  yelled  in  fierce 
delight.  Again  and  again  did  Meagher 
dash  his  gallant  Irishmen  against  the 
stone  wall.  As  often,  torn  and  bleed- 
ing and  reduced  in  numbei's,  were 
they  driven  back.  Fifteen  minutes  had 
elapsed  since  Hancock  advanced  to  the 
front.  His  division,  like  that  of  French, 
had  been  cut  to  pieces.  Of  5600  vet- 
erans whom  he  led  into  action,  he  had 
lost  over  2000,  of  whom  156  were  offi- 
cers. The  slaughter  was  terrible. 


HOOKER’S  ATTACK. 


349 


Hancock  in  turn  was  compelled  to 
fall  back ; but  the  battle  was  not  dis- 
continued. Howard  hurried  forward 
to  lend  what  aid  he  could  on  Hancock’s 
right.  Sturgis  and  Getty  crossed  Hazel 
Run,  with  two  brigades,  and  endeav- 
ored to  divert  the  attention  of  the  ene- 
my by  an  attack  on  the  right  of  his 
position.  It  was  all  in  vain.  These 
attempts  only  increased  the  number  of 
victims.  They  did  not  in  any  material 
way  affect  the  enemy.  It  was  now 
about  half-past  one.  On  the  left, 
Meade  had  just  been  driven  out  of  the 
Hamilton  Wood,  and  back  over  the 
railroad.  Burnside’s  plan  had  failed. 
The  two  independent  attacks  had  been 
made;  they  had  been  sustained  with 
great  vigor,  and  with  indomitable  pluck; 
but  they  had  only  revealed  the  strength 
of  the  enemy’s  position.  It  was  time 
to  desist.  To  prolong  the  struggle  was 
useless.  It  was  worse  than  useless — it 
was  murder. 

Such,  however,  was  not-  the  opinion 
of  Burnside.  Orders  were  sent  to 
Franklin  to  renew  the  assault,  and  this 
time  with  all  his  forces,  the  avowed 
object  being  so  to  engage  the  enemy’s 
attention  as  to  facilitate  a new  attack 
on  the  right.  Hooker,  at  the  same 
time,  was  ordered  forward  to  repeat 
the  attack  where  French  and  Hancock 
had  vainly  sacrificed  their  splendid  di- 
visions. The  experience  of  that  morn- 
ing had  irritated,  not  enlightened,  the 
general  in  command.  Burnside,  in  fact, 
was  ignorant  of  the  situation. . He  was 
still  at  the  Phillips  House.  He  saw  the 
battle  only  from  afar ; and  he  had  but 
a dim  notion  of  the  strength  of  the 


enemy’s  position,  and  of  the  terrible 
sacrifices  which  he  himself  had  uselessly 
made.  His  eye  was  fixed  on  Marye's 
Hill — alternately  girt  with  flame,  and 
wreathed  with  smoke.  He  knew  the 
importance  of  the  position ; but  he 
forgot,  for  the  time,  the  deadly  havoc 
which  that  incessant  and  well-directed 
fire  was  producing  among  his  troops. 
Striding  up  and  down  the  terrace,  proof 
against  all  advice,  and  as  if  lost  to  all 
reason,  he  kept  repeating,  mechanically, 
“That  crest  must  be  carried  to-night.” 

No  one  has  ever  had  the  hardihood 
to  accuse  Hooker  of  cowardice.  Dur- 
ing the  peninsular  campaign  at  Will- 
iamsburg, and  in  all  the  subsequent  bat- 
tles before  Richmond,  in  almost  every 
one  of  which  he  performed  a brilliant 
part,  he  had  acquired  the  name  of 
“ Fighting  Joe.”  Hooker  did  not  hesi- 
tate to  obey  the  orders  he  had  received 
from  his  chief.  Taking  with  him  the 
divisions  of  Sykes  and  Humphreys,  of 
Butterfield’s  corps,  he  advanced  to  the 
attack.  As  soon,  however,  as  he  saw 
the  positions  he  was  ordered  to  take, 
and  heard  from  their  own  lips  the  ex- 
perience of  French  and  Hancock,  he 
became  convinced  that  the  attempt 
was  vain,  and  sent  an  aide-de-camp  to 
the  general-in-chief  for  a counter-or- 
der. Burnside,  however,  was  inflexible. 
“That  crest  must  be  carried  to-night.” 
Hooker,  unwilling  to  fling  away  the 
lives  of  his  brave  men,  hurried  across 
the  river,  and  saw  his  chief  in  person. 
It  was  all  in  vain.  Burnside  would  listen 
to  no  advice.  The  only  answer  w^ljich 
Hooker  could  get  from  him  was,  “That 
height  must  be  carried  this  evening.” 


350 


FREDERICKSBURG. 


An  hour  and  a half  had  thus  been 
lost.  On  the  National  left,  the  fighting 
had  not  been  resumed  with  any  degree 
of  vigor.  Franklin’s  forces  were  scat- 
tered over  an  extended  line.  It  would 
be  dangerous  to  leave  any  one  point 
undefended.  Even  if  it  were  safe  to 
concentrate,  it  would  be  night  before  it 
could  be  accomplished;  and  to  make 
any  fresh  attack  with  a portion  of  his 
forces  would  only  be  useless  slaughter. 
About  three  o’clock,  the  Confederates 
made  a vigorous  attack  on  the  left  of 
Howe’s  division,  which  was  posted 
along  the  railroad.  The  attack  was 
speedily  repulsed,  one  of  the  Con- 
federate regiments — the  Fifty-Seventh 
North  Carolina — being  almost  annihi- 
lated. With  this  exception,  the  fight- 
ing was  virtually  ended  on  the  National 
left,  when  Birney  came  to  the  relief 
of  Meade,  and  reclaimed  the  railroad. 
Musketry  firing  was  kept  up  along  the 
whole  line;  but  there  was  no  engage- 
ment. 

It  was  now  four  o’clock.  The  brief 
December  daylight  would  soon  be  suc- 
ceeded by  the  dense  December  dark- 
ness. Hooker  had  returned  to  the  field. 
Burnside’s  orders  were  positive.  The 
attack  must  be  made  at  once.  How  the 
attack  was  made,  and  with  what  suc- 
cess, Hooker  has  told  us  himself.  ‘‘I 
proceeded,”  he  says,  “against  the  bar- 
rier as  I would  against  a fortification, 
and  endeavored  to  breach  a hole  suffi- 
ciently large  for  a ‘forlorn  hope’  to 
enter.  Before  that,  the  attack  along 
the  line,  it  seemed  to  me,  had  been  too 
general — not  sufficiently  concentrated. 
I had  two  batteries  posted  on  the  left  of 


the  road,  within  four  hundred  yards  of 
the  position  upon  which  the  attack  was 
to  be  made,  and  I had  other  parts  of 
batteries  posted  on  the  right  of  the 
road,  at  the  distance  of  five  hundred  or 
six  hundred  yards.  I had  all  these 
batteries  playing  with  great  vigor  until 
sunset  upon  that  point,  but  with  no 
apparent  effect  upon  the  rebels  or  upon 
their  works.  During  the  last  part  of 
the  cannonading,  I had  given  directions 
to  General  Humphrey’s  division  to  form 
under  the  shelter,  which  a small  hill 
afforded,  in  column  for  assault.  When 
the  fire  of  the  artillery  ceased,  I gave 
directions  for  the  enemy’s  works  to  be 
assaulted.  General  Humphrey’s  men 
took  off  their  knapsacks,  overcoats  and 
haversacks.  They  were  ordered  to 
make  the  assault  with  empty  muskets, 
for  there  was  no  time  then  to  load  and 
fire.  When  the  word  was  given,  the 
men  moved  forward  with  great  impetu- 
osity. They  ran  and  hurrahed,  and  I 
was  encouraged  by  the  great  good  feel- 
ing that  pervaded  them.  The  head  of 
General  Humphrey’s  column  advanced 
to  perhaps  within  fifteen  or  twenty  yards 
of  the  stone  wall,  which  w^as  the  ad- 
vanced position  held  by  the  rebels,  and 
then  they  were  thrown  back  as  quickly 
as  they  had  advanced.  Probably  the 
whole  of  the  advance,  and  the  retiring, 
did  not  occupy  fifteen  minutes.  They 
left  behind,  as  was  reported  to  me, 
1760  of  their  number,  out  of  4000.”  It 
was  now  twilight.  Hooker,  to  use  his 
own  words,  having  lost  “about  as  many 
men  as  he  was  ordered  to  sacrifice,” 
gave  the  signal  for  retreat.  Darkness 
came  and  prevented  a further  useless 


DEFEAT. 


351 


sacrifice  of  life.  A few  hours  more  of 
daylight,  and  Jackson  might  have  fallen 
upon  Franklin  with  tremendous  energy. 
It  is  hardly  possible  that  he  could  have 
won  ; but  the  attack  must  have  resulted 
in  a heavy  loss  of  life.  The  battle  of 
Fredericksburg  was  ended.  To  the 
National  cause,  it  was  one  of  the  most 
disastrous  battles  of  the  war.  To  the 
Confederate  cause,  it  was  a great  tri- 
umph ; but  the  triumph  was  more  in 
seeming  than  in  reality,  for  Lee,  either 
from  inability  or-  from  fear,  failed  to 
turn  it  to  account. 

According  to  the  reports  of  the  divi- 
sion commanders,  the  National  loss  was 
over  13,000.  Franklin  had  lost  4679. 
Sumner  had  lost  5494,  and  Hooker’s 
loss  was  3548.  The  killed  numbered 
1152;  the  wounded  9101;  and  there 
were  3234  missing.  The  Confederate 
loss  did  not  exceed  one  half  of  these 
enormous  figures. 

The  battle  of  Fredericksburg  must 
ever  be  regarded  as  one  huge  blunder,  so 
far  as  Burnside  is  concerned.  For  the 
battle  ground  chosen  he,  and  he  alone, 
was  responsible.  The  plan  he  followed 
was  not  McClellan’s  plan ; it  was  not 
the  plan  approved  and  recommended 
by  the  authorities  at  W ashington ; it 
was  his  own.  He  might  have  done 
better  by  pursuing  Lee  towards  the 
Rapidan,  than  by  occupying  the  heights 
of  Falmouth.  * He  gave  the  enemy  his 
opportunity ; and  circumstances  enabled 
the  enemy  to  seize  it.  The  pontoon 
mismanagement  was  the  second  grand 
blunder.  It  was  the  opinion  of  Burn- 
side himself,  and  all  his  subordinates, 
that  if  the  pontoons  had  arrived  in  time 


to  allow  him'  to  transfer  his  army  to 
the  south  side  of  the  Rappahannock, 
before  Lee  had  time  to  concentrate  his 
forces  and  fortify  the  heights,  the  battle 
of  Fredericksburg  might  never  have 
been  fought,  or,  if  fought,  the  result 
would  have  been  entirely  different. 
For  the  pontoon  mismanagement  Burn- 
side was  not  wholly  responsible ; but  it 
was  his  business  more  than  that  of  any 
other.  On  the  prompt  arrival  of  the 
pontoons  everything  depended ; yet  he 
treated  this  as  a secondary  matter,  and 
left  it  entirely  for  some  days  in  the 
hands  of  Halleck  and  Meigs,  who 
regarded  themselves  as  irresponsible. 
The  non-arrival  of  the  pontoons  in  time 
gave  the  Confederates  the  full  advan- 
tage of  a splendid  position,  and  brought 
about  the  necessity  that  if  a battle  were 
to  be  fought  at  all  on  the  chosen 
ground,  it  must  be  fought  by  the  Na- 
tionals at  a terrible  disadvantage.  It 
would  have  been  better  far,  however 
humiliating  for  the  moment  it  might 
have  seemed,  if  Burnside,  after  he  knew 
that  the  heights  on  the  opposite  side 
of  the  river  were  all  but,  if  not  abso- 
lutely, impregnable,  had  entirely  aban- 
doned his  plan,  and  sought  to  meet  the 
foe  by  a different  course.  Having  de- 
cided to  make  the  attack,  he  ought  to 
have  done  it  differently.  His  plan  on 
the  evening  of  the  12th  was  better  than 
that  on  the  morning  of  the  13th.  He 
had  changed  his  mind  in  the  interval ; 
but  he  had  changed  it  for  the  worse.  A 
general  attack  was  hazardous.  A partial 
attack  was  folly.  The  temporary  suc- 
cess of  Meade  showed  what  might  have 
been  done  if  he  had  massed  his  troops 


S52 


FREDERICKSBURG. 


on  his  left,  and  encouraged  Franklin  to 
put  forth  his  entire  strength  in  one 
bold,  dashing  effort.  He  blundered 
ao:ain  when  he  ordered  Sumner  to  ad- 
vance  before  he  knew  what  success 
had  attended  Franklin  on  the  left.  He 
sinned  against  reason  and  common-sense 
when  he  forced  Hooker  to  make  the 
final  attack.  History  will  say  that  the 
army  of  the  Potomac — one  of  the  finest 
armies  the  world  has  ever  known — was 
literally  slaughtered  through  the  in- 
competency of  its  chief. 

The  14th  was  Sunday.  It  had  been 
Dec,  Burnside’s  intention  to  renew  the 
attack  in  the  morning.  He  found 
it  impossible,  however,  to  overcome  the 
opposition  of  his  chief  officers,  who  re- 
garded the  enemy’s  lines  as  impreg- 
nable; and  the  order  which  had  already 
been  given  was  countermanded.  Dur- 
ing that  day,  and  the  next,  the  Na- 
tional army  lay  on  the  Fredericksburg 
side  of  the  Rappahannock ; but  on 
neither  side  was  any  evidence  given  of 
a disposition  to  attack. 

During  the  night  of  the  15th,  Burnside 
Dec.  quietly  withdrew  his  entire  army, 
with  his  guns,  to  the  Falmouth  side 
of  the  river ; the  pontoon  bridges  were 
also  taken  up ; and  Lee  was  permitted 
to  enter  and  occupy  Fredericksburg. 
It  was  not  to  be  wondered  at  that  Lee 
took  advantage  of  the  circumstance,  to 
boast  of  a great  victory.  On  the  16th, 
Dec.  Burnside  wrote  to  Halleck,  the 
commander-in-chief,  that  the  army 
was  withdrawn  to  the  Falmouth  side  of 
the  river,  because  he  felt  that  the  posi- 
tion in  front  could  not  be  carried,  and 
because  it  was  a military  necessity 


either  to  attack  or  retire.  A repulse, 
he  said,  would  have  been  disastrous. 
The  army  was  withdrawn  at  night 
without  the  knowledge  of  the  enemy, 
and  without  loss  either  of  property  or 
men. 

Burnside  was  still  hopeful  that  he 
might  be  able  to  redeem  the  disaster 
which  had  befallen  the  National  army. 
He  had  another  plan  ready.  He  pro- 
posed to  make  an  immediate  advance 
on  Richmond.  His  plan  was  to  make 
a feint  above  Fredericksburg,  and  to 
cross  with  the  main  body  of  the  army 
about  six  miles  below.  Twenty-five 
thousand  cavalry,  with  four  guns,  were 
to  cross  at  Kelley’s  Ford,  push  towards 
the  Rapidan,  destroy  the  railroad  tracks 
and  bridges  in  the  rear  of  Lee’s  army, 
destroy,  also,  the  locks  on  the  James 
River  Canal,  traverse  Virginia,  raiding 
as  they  advanced,  and  finally  join  the 
National  garrison,  then  under  Peck  at 
Suffolk.  Such  was  Burnside’s  plan. 
Unhappily  for  him  and  his  plan,  how- 
ever, there  was  dissatisfaction  among 
his  subordinate  officers.  The  bad  man- 
agement at  Fredericksburg  had  pro- 
duced a feeling  of  general  distrust ; and 
this  distrust  found  free  and  full  expres- 
sion at  Washington.  Representations 
had  been  made  to  the  president  by 
Franklin  and  Smith,  showing  the  utter 
folly  and  uselessness  of  any  further 
attempts  to  cross  the  Rappahannock. 
They  could  only,  they  said,  result  in 
disaster.  At  the  same  time,  two  other 
generals — Newton  and  Cochrane — who 
happened  to  be  in  Washington,  fully 
convinced  the  president  of  the  bad  tem- 
per which  prevailed  in  the  army  of  the 


THE  «MUD  MARCH” 


353 


Potomac — a temper  wMch  did  not  jus- 
tify any  farther  movement  for  the  pres- 
ent. 

A fortnight  had  now  elapsed  since 
the  battle  of  Fredericksburg.  On  the 
Dec.  2C)th  of  December,  Burnside  had 
completed  his  preparations  for  the 
onward  movement ; his  cavalry  were  al- 
ready at  Kelley’s  Ford,  and  his  infantry 
were  ready  to  start.  The  whole  move- 
ment was  suddenly  stopped  by  an  order 
from  the  president.  Burnside  hastened 
to  Washington  to  demand  an  explana- 
tion. From  the  commander-in-chief  and 
the  secretary  of  war  he  could  learn 
nothing.  Ignorant  of  the  cause  them- 
selves, they  could  not  explain.  The 
president,  however,  did  not  conceal  his 
reasons  for  acting  as  he  had  done. 
Complaints  against  the  general  had 
been  made  by  several  prominent  officers 
in  the  army.  The  complaints  of  these 
men  were  such  that  the  president  could 
not  afford  to  ignore  them.  It  was  no- 
torious that  bad  feeling  existed  among 
the  officers  and  men ; and  while  such 
was  the  state  of  things,  he  did  not  feel 
justified  in  sanctioning  a forward  move- 
ment. Burnside  tendered  his  resigna- 
tion ; but  this  the  president,  having 
perfect  faith  in  his  loyalty  and  patriot- 
ism, refused  to  accept.  The  president 
desired  him  to  remain  in  command  of 
the  army,  but  he  was  not  to  renew  the 
campaign  without  his  knowledge  and 
consent.  All  these  things  led  to  delay. 
Much  precious  time  was  wasted;  and 
what  was  even  more  to  be  lamented, 
the  secret  of  Burnside’s  plans  had  leaked 
out,  and  Lee  was  no  longer  ignorant 
of  the  intentions  of  his  antagonist. 


Burnside  changed  his  plan.  He  now 
proposed  to  cross  the  Bappahan- 
nock  above  Fredericksburg,  at 
Banks’  and  United  States  Fords,  hop- 
ing to  flank  the  enemy,  and  to  force  a 
battle.  Permission  was  given  him  by 
the  president  to  renew  the  campaign. 
It  was  now  the  20th  of  January,  jan. 
1863.  Franklin  and  Hooker  were  20. 
at  Banks’  Ford.  At  that  point  the  river 
is  not  passable  in  winter  time.  The 
pontoons,  however,  had  been  brought 
up;  and  preparations  were  being  made 
for  throwing  bridges  across  the  swollen 
waters.  It  seemed,  for  the  moment,  as 
if  fortune  were  smiling  on  Burnside. 
Some  demonstrations  made  at  a point  a 
little  further  down  had  been  attended 
with  complete  success.  The  weather, 
too,  was  good;  and  the  roads  were 
in  excellent  condition.  On  the  night 
of  the  20th,  all  these  hopes  were  dis- 
sipated. A fearful  storm  of  wind, 
snow,  sleet  and  rain  came  on,  such  as  is 
seldom  seen  in  that  region;  it  contin- 
ued all  night ; and  when  morning 
dawned,  the  entire  conntry  was  con- 
verted into  a huge  quagmire.  The 
troops  were  for  some  hours  hopelessly 
mired.  They  could  neither  retreat  nor 
advance.  Lee  had  already  become 
aware  of  Burnside’s  intention  to  cross 
the  river,  and  was  at  the  point  of  dan- 
ger, ready  to  meet  hina.  Burnside  was 
not  unwilling  even  yet  to  cross  the 
river,  and  offer  the  enemy  battle.  It 
was  found  impossible,  however,  to  con- 
struct the  bridges.  The  greater  the 
effort  made  by  men  and  horses  to  push 
forward  the  vehicles  containing  the 
boats,  the  more  hopelessly  did  they 


354 


FREDERICKSBURG. 


eink  in  the  soft,  paste-like  mud,  with 
which  the  roads  were  covered.  The 
rain  continued  during  the  whole  of  the 
21st.  It  was  still  raining  on  the  morn- 
ing of  the  2 2d.  The  three  days’  ra- 
tions, with  which  the  men  had  been 
supplied,  were  all  but  exhausted.  The 
game  was  already  lost;  and  the  Con- 
federates could  again  make  the  boast 
that  the  elements  fought  in  their  favor. 
Jan#  23d,  the  army  of  the 

23#  Potomac  was  in  its  former  en- 
campments, and  in  winter  quarters. 
What  was  known  at  the  time  as  the 
“Mud  March”  was  ended. 

At  this  crisis,  the  public  mind  was 
filled  with  indignation  and  sorrow. 
Not  a little  blame  was  attached  to  the 
president  and  his  cabinet.  The  com- 
mander-in-chief was  not  held  guiltless. 
The  revelations  made  throus^h  the  court 
of  inquiry  in  the  case  of  General  Mc- 
Dowell, and  the  court  martial  on  Gen- 
eral Porter,  had  convinced  the  public 
that  the  government  had  intermeddled 
too  much  with  the  plans  of  the  military 
leaders.  Burnside  had  done  much  to 
save  the  president  and  his  cabinet  by 
publishing  a letter,  in  which  he  assumed 
the  entire  responsibility  of  the  plan, 
and  the  conduct  of  the  attack  on  Fred- 
ericksburg. Some  of  the  old  feeling, 
however,  still  remained.  At  this  time, 
Burnside  became  ill-satisfied  with  his 
generals ; and,  irritated  and  discouraged 
by  this  latest  failure,  and  by  the  ad- 
verse criticisms  which  were  freely  made 
both  by  men  and  officers,  he  resolved 
to  rid  the  army  of  the  fomenters  of  dis- 


cord. Among  the  officers  aimed  at 
were  Generals  Hooker,  Brooks,  New- 
ton and  Cochrane,  whom  he  wished  to 
be  dismissed  from  the  service  of  the 
United  States ; and  Generals  Franklin, 
Smith,  Sturgis  and  Ferrers,  with  Col- 
onel Taylor,  whom  he  wished  to  be 
deprived  of  their  respective  commands. 
Hurrying  to  Washington,  he  asked  the 
president  to  sign  the  order  which  he 
had  already  prepared.  Of  course  the 
president  refused.  To  have  signed  such 
an  order  would  have  ruined  the  army. 
It  would  have  deprived  it  of  some  of 
its  trusted  and  most  competent  leaders. 
Burnside  then  tendered  his  resignation 
of  the  command  of  the  army  of  the  Po- 
tomac, and  also  of  his  rank  of  major- 
general.  He  was  relieved  of  command 
at  his  own  request,  but  he  retained  his 
rank  in  the  army.  The  same  order 
which  relieved  Burnside,  also  relieved 
Franklin  and  Sumner.  Franklin,  some- 
what unjustly,  we  think,  had  come 
under  suspicion;  and  Sumner,  who  was 
broken  down  by  age  and  infirmity,  was 
relieved  at  his  own  request.  Hooker 
was  now  the  senior  general  of  the  army 
of  the  Potomac.  He  had  shared  its  for- 
tunes from  the  first.  By  his  courage, 
skill  and  promptitude,  he  had  won  not 
a little  renown.  To  him,  therefore,  was 
now  assigned  the  dangerous  honor  of 
being  its  chief.  The  appointment  was 
generally  approved;  and  Hooker  was 
well  received  by  both  officers  and  men. 
How  the  army  fared  under  his  com- 
mand will  form  the  subject  of  another 
chapter. 


BATESVILLE. 


353 


CHAPTER  XXII. 


Guerrilla  Movements  in  the  West. — General  Curtis  at  Batesville. — Moving  Eastward. — At  Jacksonport. — Na- 
tional Gunboats. — White  River. — St.  Charles. — Clarendon. — Encounter  with  General  Rust. — Condition  of 
the  National  Army. — Sad  Disappointment. — What  was  to  be  Done? — The  March  to  Helena. — At  Helena. — 
Arkansas  and  Missouri  Unprotected. — General  J.  M.  Schofield  in  Command  in  Missouri. — Attacks  of  the 
Guerrillas. — Political  Feuds  in  Missouri. — Lincoln  Complains. — Guerrilla  Leaders. — Porter.  Poindexter  and 
Cobb. — General  McNeil. — McNeil  Attacked  by  Porter  and  Cobb. — Colonel  Merrill. — Newark  Captured. — 
Battle  of  Kirksville. — Poindexter  Caught  in  a Trap. — Defeat  of  Cobb. — National  Supremacy  Restored  North 
of  the  Missouri. — Capture  of  the  Garrison  at  Independence. — Battle  of  Cross  Roads. — Defeat  of  Foster.— 
Coffee’s  Retreat. — The  Guerrillas  in  Arkansas. — Rains,  Parsons,  Cooper  and  McBride. — Hindman  in  Com- 
mand of  the  Guerrillas. — The  Ozark  Mountains. — Schofield  Takes  the  Field  in  Person. — The  “Army  of 
the  Frontier.” — Sarcoxie. — Blunt  and  Totten. — Fort  Wayne. — The  Confederates  Attacked. — Fayetteville. — 
Boston  Mountains. — Hindman  Preparing  to  Attack  the  Nationals. — Cane  Hill. — Illness  of  Schofield. — Blunt 
in  Command. — Blunt  About  to  be  Attacked. — Herron  Sent  For. — Prairie  Grove. — Battle  of  Prairie  Grove. — 
Terrible  Fighting. — Herron  in  Peril. — Arrival  of  Blunt. — The  Confederates  Defeated. — Hindman's  Mistakes. — 
Blunt’s  Ride  to  Van  Buren. — The  Guerrillas  in  Texas. — The  Loyalty  of  the  Texans. — The  Texan  Martyrs. — 
Among  the  Indians. — Ta-le-Quah. — Forts  Davis  and  Gibson. — The  Indian  Encampments  — Colonel  Phillipps. — 
Phillipps  Attacked  by  Taylor. — Bayou  Barnard. — Taylor  Killed.— Attack  by  the  Indians  on  New  Ulra  and 
the  Agencies. — Horrible  Butchery. — Swift  Punishment. — Peace  Established  on  the  Frontier  of  Minnesota. 


Towards  the  close  of  1862,  there 

1862  some  engagements,  in  the 

’western  country,  beyond  the  Mis- 
sissippi, and  east  of  the  Rocky  Moun- 
tains— engagements  ’which,  although  not 
of  first-class  importance,  or  directly  con- 
nected with  any  of  the  great,  leading 
military  movements,  cannot,  in  a work 
of  this  kind,  be  passed  over  in  silence. 
After  the  battle  of  Pea  Ridge,  described 
in  a previous  chapter,  the  Confederate 
general.  Van  Dorn,  who,  as  we  have 
seen,  made  a skilful  and  successful  re- 
treat, moved  with  the  greater  portion 
of  his  army  down  the  Arkansas  River 
as  far  as  Little  Rock,  marched  in  an 
eastward  direction,  crossed  the  Missis- 
sippi at  Helena,  and  joined  the  army  of 
Beauregard  almost  in  time  to  take  part 
in  the  battle  of  Shiloh.  General  Curtis 
made  no  haste  to  pursue.  On  the  field 


of  victory  he  rested  his  men ; and  then, 
finding  no  foe  in  that  part  of  Arkansas, 
he  descended  from  the  highlands  into 
the  vast  plains  below,  and,  moving  in  a 
southeasterly  direction,  reached,  on  the 
6th  of  May,  Batesville,  a large  village 
on  the  White  River.  Here  he  expected 
to  find  gunboats  and  supplies  in  charge 
of  Colonel  Fitch.  But  the  siege  of 
Corinth  had  not  yet  ended;  and,  in 
consequence,  the  White  River  and  its 
tributaries  were  not  yet  open  to  the 
Federal  flotilla.  Curtis,  not  a little 
disappointed,  remained  at  Batesville 
until  the  24th  of  June,  depending  for 
his  supplies  by  wagon  trains  from  Rolla, 
far  up  in  Missouri,  and  thus  very  much 
at  the  mercy  of  the  guerrilla  bands 
which  infested  the  country.  After  the 
evacuation  of  Corinth,  and  the  capture 
of  Memphis,  the  Arkansas  waters  were 


356 


THE  GUERRILLAS. 


open  to  navigation  ; and  several  Federal 
gunboats  proceeded  up  the  White  River. 
June  C)n  the  25th  of  June,  Curtis, 
learning  that  the  gunboats  were 
coining  up  the  river,  started  for  Jack- 
sonport.  Here  he  was  joined  by  Gen- 
eral C.  C.  Washburne,  with  the  Third 
Wisconsin  cavalry,  which  had  come 
down  from  Springfield,  Missouri,  with- 
out encountering  any  opposition.  The 
gunboats,  however,  had  not  yet  made 
their  appearance.  They  had  been  de- 
tained further  down  the  river,  by  an 
encounter  with  some  Confederate  bat- 
teries near  St.  Charles;  and,  although 
these  works  had  been  carried,  the  gun- 
boats had  been  so  damaged  that  they 
were  unable  to  proceed  further  upl  To 
add  to  their  difficulties,  the  water  in 
the  river  had  become  very  low.  Still 
hopeful  that,  if  he  could  reach  the  gun- 
boats, he  might  be  able  to  turn  them 
to  some  account  in  a joint  movement 
against  Little  Rock,  Curtis,  with  his 
whole  army,  pressed  on  towards  Claren- 
don. He  was  the  more  anxious  to 
reach  the  gunboats,  that  he  knew  they 
were  accompanied  by  a brigade  of  in- 
fantry from  Indiana.  It  was  a wretch- 
ed country  through  which  they  had  to 
pass — a low,  swampy  region,  intersected 
by  canals  or  bayous,  covered  with  cane- 
brakes,  and  inhabited  by  a white  popu- 
lation, who  were  entirely  in  sympathy 
Ju'y  with  the  Southern  cause.  On  the 
7th  of  July,  while  still  in  this 
inhospitable  region,  the  advance  (Thir- 
ty-Third Illinois)  under  Colonel  A.  P. 
Hovey,  was  attacked  by  some  1500 
Texan  cavalry,  under  General  Albert 
Rust.  Hovey  was  soon  joined  by  W ood, 


who  came  up  with  the  First  Indiana 
cavalry  and  two  howitzers,  when  a vig- 
orous charge  was  made,  and  Rust  was 
compelled  to  beat  a hasty  retreat,  leav- 
ing 110  of  his  men  dead  on  the  field. 
The  National  loss  was  8 killed  and  45 
wounded.’  The  march  was  continued 
to  Clarendon;  but,  on  reaching  that 
place,  it  was  found  that  the  gunboats 
had  departed  some  twenty-four  houi'S 
before. 

It  was  a sad  disappointment.  Curtis’ 
condition  was  a thousand  times  worse 
than  it  had  been  before.  It  would 
have  been  better  far  for  him  to  have 
remained  at  Pea  Ridge  or  at  Bates ville. 
He  had  not  only  made  a long  and  fa- 
tiguing march : he  had  lost  all  the  ad- 
vantages of  these  positions,  without  ob- 
taining any  compensation.  What  was 
now  to  be  done  ? Retrace  his  steps  ? 
That  was  not  to  be  thought  of.  Remain 
where  he  was?  That  would  be  suici- 
dal ; for  the  region  was  unhealthful, 
and  he  was  without  food,  without 
ammunition,  without  supplies  of  any 
kind,  and  without  the  means  of  com- 
municating with  any  base  of  operations. 
There  was  but  one  course  open  to 
him,  and  that  was  to  reach  the  waters 
of  the  Mississippi  as  quickly  as  possi- 
ble. It  was  an  ungrateful  task,  con- 
sidering the  exhausted  condition  of  his 
men.  But  there  was  no  choice.  No 
delay  was  permitted.  It  was  sixty-five 
miles  to  Helena,  the  nearest  point  of 
any  importance.  Washburne,  with  all 
the  cavalry,  numbering  some  2500 
horses,  and  with  five  ho.witzers,  set  out 
at  once.  Although  he  had  to  make  the 
roads  as  he  advanced,  bridging  the  bay- 


DIVISION  OF  SENTIMENT. 


35T 


ous,  and  cutting  his  way  through  the  I 
tangled  and  almost  impenetrable  copse, 
Helena  was  reached  in  twenty-four 
hours.  Curtis  followed,  with  the  in- 
fantry, taking  with  him  a few  Arkansas 
volunteers  and  a large  number  of  ne- 
groes, and,  proceeding  by  long  marches, 
July  arrived  at  the  same  place  on  the 
12th  and  13th  of  July.  At  He- 
lena, Curtis  found  his  much-needed  sup- 
plies; but  for  the  remainder  of  the 
summer  he  was  fastened  to  the  Missis- 
sippi, having  no  other  duty  to  perform 
than  that  of  guarding  its  western  banks, 
and  thus  covering  the  right  of  the  Na- 
tional army,  which  was  operating  on 
the  other  side. 

The  retirement  of  Curtis  to  the  Mis- 
sissippi left  Arkansas  very  much  un- 
cared for.  The  result  was  that  large 
guerrilla  bands  were  organized  in  that 
State  and  the  neighboring  State  of  Mis- 
souri. They  gradually  united  and  as- 
sumed the  proportions  of  a formidable 
ai-my.  In  April,  1862,  Missouri  was 
in  charge  of  General  J.  M.  Schofield, 
an  officer  of  decided  ability,  who  had 
served  on  the  staff  of  the  lamented 
Lyon.  All  the  militia  of  the  State, 
numbering  some  14,000  men,  and  large- 
ly composed  of  cavalry,  were  assigned 
to  his  command.  To  this  was  attached 
a volunteer  force  of  considerable 
strength,  and  drawn  from  almost  all 
sections  of  the  State.  In  June,  at  the 
request  of  Curtis,  Missouri  was  created 
into  a separate  military  district;  and 
Schofield  was  placed  in  command. 
About  this  time  the  guerrilla  bands 
began  to  be  a terrible  source  of  annoy- 
ance. Every  device  was  resorted  to 


I by  the  Confederates  to  organize  armed 
opposition  in  the  State.  Whole  Mis- 
souri regiments,,  including  officers  and 
men,  were  furloughed;  they  returned 
to  their  homes  in  citizens’  clothes,  carry- 
ing with  them  secret  instructions  to 
recruit  and  organize  bands  in  all  direc- 
tions, and  then,  at  a given  signal,  to 
meet  in  the  heart  of  the  State,  and  de- 
stroy the  militia  enrolled  under  the 
Federal  flag.  Schofield,  however,  was 
vigilant,  active  and  energetic,  and 
spared  no  efforts  to  overcome  these 
cunning  devices  of  the  foe.  Fresh  ap- 
peals were  made  to  the  militia  and  to 
the  volunteers ; and,  on  the  22d  of  June, 
he  issued  an  order  holding  all  rebels 
and  rebel  sympathizers  responsible  in 
their  property,  and,  if  need  be,  in  their 
persons,  for  damages  thereafter  com- 
mitted by  guerrillas  or  marauding  par- 
ties. His  appeals  to  the  militia  and 
the  volunteers  were  only  partially  suc- 
cessful ; and  his  order  did  not  produce 
the  effect  which  he  probably  expected. 
At  the  close  of  July  he  had  on  his  roll 
50,000  men,  of  whom  20,000  were 
ready  for  effective  service ; but  the 
failure  of  the  campaign  against  Kich- 
mond  greatly  encouraged  the  rebel 
spirit,  and  i*endered  his  position  one  of 
extreme  difficulty.  The  people  of  Mis- 
souri were  greatly  divided  in  sentiment 
as  to  the  political  issues  before  the 
country.  Emancipation  found  favor 
with  one  party : it  was  bitterly  op- 
posed by  another.  Such  were  the 
wranglings  and  contentions  that  Lin- 
coln, on  one  occasion,  wrote  to  them 
in  bitter  complaint.  “It  is  painful  to 
me,”  he  said,  “ that  you  in  Missouri 


•JSS 


358 


THE  GUERRILLAS. 


cannot  or  will  not  settle  your  factional 
quarrels  among  yourselves.  I have 
been  tormented  Muth  them  beyond  en- 
durance for  months,  by  both  sides. 
Neither  side  pays  the  least  respect  to 
my  appeals  to  your  reason.” 

Schofield’s  army  of  militia  and  volun- 
teers was  distributed  over  the  State  in 
six  divisions,  under  competent  officers. 
Towards  the  end  of  July,  the  guerrillas 
be^an  to  reveal  their  strencrth  and  their 
purpose.  The  northeastern  division  of 
the  State,  above  the  Missouri  River, 
and  bordering  on  the  Mississippi,  was 
under  the  command  of  Colonel  McNeil. 
This  was  the  principal  theatre  of  opei’- 
ations.  Here  the  guerrilla  bands  were 
strong,  and  under  the  leadership  of  such 
men  as  Porter,  Poindextei*  and  Cobb, 
jniy  On  the  28th  of  July,  Porter  and 
28.  Cobb  came  into  contact  with  a 
portion  of  McNeil’s  command,  under 
Colonel  Merrill.  In  this  encounter, 
Merrill  revealed  those  rare  qualities 
which  mark  a first-class  cavalry  officer. 
Porter  and  Cobb  were  compelled  to  re- 
treat. Three  days  afterwards.  Porter 
.captured  Newark  and  two  companies 
of  National  troops.  Merrill  renewed 
the  pursuit,  which  lasted  for  twelve 
days,  ultimately  coming  up  with  the 
Aug.  Confederates  on  the  6th  of  Au- 
gnst,  at  Kirksville,  in  Adair 
County.  Here  a desperate  fight  en- 
sued. McNeil’s  entire  force  at  this 
point  did  not  exceed  1000  men,  all 
mounted,  with  six  guns.  Porter  had 
under  him  at  least  2500  men  of  all 
arms.  Porter,  however,  was  defeated, 
with  a loss  of  180  killed,  about  500 
wounded,  and  several  wagon  loads  of 


arms.  McNeil’s  loss  was  28  killed  and 
60  wounded.  Porter’s  power  was  com- 
pletely broken.  Poindexter’s  gang, 
meanwhile,  had  increased  to  at  least 
1200  men.  Early  in  August,  Colonel 
Guitar,  with  600  men,  and  two  pieces 
of  artillery,  went  in  pursuit  of  the  guer- 
rilla captain,  and  fell  upon  him  while 
crossing  the  Chariton  River,  on  the  Aug. 
night  of  the  1 0th.  Poindexter  was 
caught  in  a trap.  A large  number  of  his 
men  fell  a prey  to  the  bullets  and  sabres 
of  the  Nationals ; not  a few  were  driven 
into  the  river  and  drowned.  A consid- 
erable quantity  of  his  supplies  was  cap- 
tured. With  what  remained  of  his 
band,  Poindexter  hastened  north  to 
effect  a junction  with  Porter ; but,  com- 
ing into  contact  with  Ben  Loan,  he  was 
forced  back  again  upon  Guitar.  He 
was  thus  caught  between  two  fires.  His 
men  fled  for  their  lives,  and  he  himself 
was  made  prisoner.  Cobb  soon  after- 
wards shared  the  fate  of  his  brother 
bandits ; and  to  the  north  of  the  Mis- 
souri River,  the  National  supremacy 
was  restored.  • In  his  report,  Schofield 
tells  us  that,  from  the  1st  of  April  to 
the  20th  of  September,  there  were  more 
than  one  hundred  engagements.  The 
National  loss  was  3000.  The  loss  on 
the  other  side  was  not  less  than  10,000 
men.  Some  terrible  stories  are  told, 
illustrative  of  the  vengeful  spirit  with 
which,  on  both  sides,  this  guerrilla  war- 
fare was  conducted.  It  is  quite  possi- 
ble that  the  stories  are  exaggerated 
reports  of  the  facts  in  the  case;  but 
there  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  cold- 
blooded murder  of  Colonel  McCullough, 
the  day  after  Kirksville,  and  what 


COFFEE  AND  HUGHES. 


359 


were  called  the  Palmyra  massacres, 
threw  a dark  cloud  over  the  name  of 
McNeil,  and  damaged  the  reputation  of 
a loyal  and  patriotic  soldier. 

The  guerrilla  bands  to  the  south  of 
the  Missouri  River  were  scarcely  less 
asrerressive  than  their  brethren  further 
north.  These  bands,  having  been  or- 
ganized under  a chief  of  the  name  of 
Hughes,  when  they  heard  of  the  out- 
break in  the  north,  resolved  to  take  the 
initiative,  and,  if  possible,  open  com- 
munication with  their  friends  across  the 
An?,  river.  On  the  11th  of  August 
H*  Hughes,  with  about  1000  com- 
batants, surprised  the  garrison  at  Inde- 
pendence. He  encountered  some  severe 
opposition  from  them  inside  the  garri- 
son ; but  he  had  no  great  difficulty  in 
making  himself  master  of  the  place. 
About  the  same  time  the  Confederate 
general.  Coffee,  who  had  moved  from 
the  interior  of  Arkansas  with  1500 
horse,  was  pushing  on  rapidly  for  the 
purpose  of  forming  a junction  with 
Hughes.  A combination  of  National 
troops  was  formed  to  prevent  this  junc- 
tion. Coffee,  as  he  moved  north,  was 
being  pressed  by  1200  cavalry  sent  by 
Brown.  General  Blunt,  commanding 
on  the  west  of  Kansas,  detached  some 
troops  for  the  same  purpose.  General 
Totten  was  ordered  by  Schofield  to 
attack  Hughes  at  once,  before  he  could 
be  joined  by  Coffee.  Unhappily,  Tot- 
ten’s forces  were  divided;  800  horse 
and  two  guns,  commanded  by  Major 
Foster,  being  at  Lexington,  on  the  Mis- 
souri, east  of  Independence,  and  1500 
men,  under  Colonel  Warren,  being  at 
Clinton,  more  to  the  southeast.  Both 


had  started  for  Independence.  Foster, 
who  had  the  shorter  journey  to  make, 
encountered  the  enemy  at  the  Cross 
Roads,  called  Lone  Jack,  on  the  Au?. 
15th  of  August.  Coffee  and  15. 
Hughes  had  formed  a junction;  and 
their  united  forces  amounted  to  4000 
or  5000  men.  Foster’s  band  was  de- 
feated, and  driven  back  to  Lexington. 
In  the  struggle,  Foster  himself  was 
wounded.  At  this  moment  Coffee, 
who  was  free  in  his  movements,  would 
not  have  shown  bad  generalship,  if  he 
had  crossed  the  river  and  joined  his 
friends,  who  were  waiting  for  him  on 
the  other  side ; but  he  was  so  pressed 
in  his  rear,  that  he  deemed  it  best  to 
make  a detour  and  find  his  way,  as 
quickly  as  possible,  back  into  Arkan- 
sas. Blunt  was  already  upon  his  heels ; 
but  Coffee,  who  knew  the  country 
thoroughly,  and  whose  men  were  well 
trained  in  that  kind  of  warfare,  con- 
trived to  make  his  escape. 

Robbed  of  their  strength,  if  not  com- 
pletely driven  out  of  Missouri,  the 
guerrillas  were  still  powerful  in  Ar- 
kansas; nor  was  it  any  part  of  their 
plan  that  their  adversaries  should  re- 
main masters  in  Missouri.  At  the  be- 
ginning of  September,  the  united  Con- 
federate forces  in  Arkansas  amounted 
to  nearly  50,000  men.  They  were 
under  the  command  of  General  T.  C. 
Hindman,  who  was  assisted  by  Gen- 
erals Rains,  Parsons,  Cooper,  McBride 
and  others.  Hindman  had  been  a mem- 
ber of  Congress;  but  he  had  warmly 
espoused  the  Confederate  cause,* and 
gone  into  the  war  with  all  the  bitterness 
of  a partisan.  Under  the  plea  of  mill- 


360 


THE  GUERRILLAS. 


tary  necessity,  he  had  arrogated  to  him- 
self excessive  powers  in  the  State,  exer- 
cising an  arbitrary  authority,  and  allow- 
ing his  soldiers  a license  in  the  last 
degree  offensive  to  all  peaceful  citizens. 
Living  on  the  country  wherever  he  hap- 
pened to  be,  and  rigidly  enforcing  the 
conscription  law,  he  was  enabled  to 
gather  together  and  to  maintain  a large 
body  of  men.  Hindman  was  complete- 
ly master  of  Arkansas.  Indeed,  there 
were  no  Federal  soldiers  in  that  State 
to  dispute  his  authority.  Nestling  in 
the  recesses  of  the  Ozark  Mountains, 
among  which  the  battle  of  Pea  Kidge 
had  been  fought,  he  could  sweep  the 
vast  and  fertile  plains  which  lay  around 
him  on  every  side,  and  carry  off  what- 
ever he  thought  his  army  needed.  In 
one  thing  only  was  that  army  found 
wanting.  It  was  well  provisioned,  but 
poorly  supplied  with  arms.  This  was 
the  less  an  inconvenience  that  there  was 
no  foe  against  which  the  arms  could  be 
used.  So  much  was  this  the  case  that 
General  J.  Johnston,  who  had  just  been 
placed  in  command  of  the  armies  of  the 
West,  added  his  solicitations  to  those 
of  General  Randolph,  that  the  forces 
under  Hindman  should  be  turned  to 
some  account,  by  being  sent  across  the 
Mississippi  to  strengthen  the  forces 
under  Pemberton.  Davis,  however, 
would  not  give  his  consent.  Randolph, 
in  consequence,  retired  from  the  Con- 
federate cabinet,  and  Hindman  de- 
termined to  make  a fresh  invasion  of 
the^  State  of  Missouri.  His  forces  were 
divided  as  follows:  Rains,  with  GOOO 
infantry,  occupied  the  heights  in  the 
neighborhood  of  Pea  Ridge;  Cooper, 


with  7000  horse  and  some  artillery,  had 
advanced  into  the  valley  of  Neosho,  as 
far  as  Newtonia,  thus  menacing  the 
National  troops,  who  were  stationed 
at  Springfield ; while  another  body 
of  4000  men,  massed  on  the  White 
River,  seemed  to  be  making  ready  for 
a march  on  Roll  a,  the  most  important 
of  the  National  depots  in  the  Western 
country. 

Schofield  now  resolved  to  take  the 
field  in  person,  and,  if  possible,  strike 
the  enemy  before  he  was  in  a fit  condi- 
tion to  take  the  offensive.  He  had 
shortly  before,  on  the  26th  of  Septem- 
ber, been  appointed  to  the  command  of 
what  was  called  the  army  of  the  fron- 
tier,” General  Curtis  having  superseded 
him  by  taking  command  of  the  depart- 
ment. Steele  was  put  in  command  of 
the  forces  which  remained  stationary  at 
Helena.  The  army  under  Schofield  has 
been  variously  estimated  at  from  12,000 
to  15,000  men,  of  whom  about  8000 
were  available  for  active  operations. 
There  were  about  5000  cavalry  and 
some  sixteen  pieces  of  artillery,  with  a 
complement  of  men  and  horses.  The 
largest  portion  of  this  army  was  at 
Springfield  ; two  brigades,  all  mounted, 
were  at  Sarcoxie ; and  General  Blunt 
was  known  to  be  coming  up  from  Kan- 
sas. Schofield  took  up  his  line  of 
march  for  Sarcoxie  with  6000  men,  leav- 
ing some  5000  to  guard  Springfield  and 
his  long  line  of  communication  with  St. 
Louis.  On  the  30th,  a reconnois- 
sance  was  made  in  the  direction  30. 
of  Newtonia  by  some  of  the  troops 
which  were  already  at  Sarcoxie.  Com- 
ing into  contact  with  Cooper’s  cavalry. 


COOPER  AND  RAINS  DEFEATED. 


361 


they  were,  after  a lively  engagement, 
driven  back  to  their  encampments.  On 
the  1st  or  2d  of  October,  the  troops, 
which  had  left  Springfield,  arrived  in 
the  neighborhood  of  Sarcoxie,  and,  form- 
ing a division  under  General  Totten, 
were  joined  by  those  commanded  by 
Blunt.  On  the  following  day,  the  en- 
tire National  army  set  out  for  Newtonia. 
Blunt  and  Totten  approached  at  differ- 
ent points.  The  Confederates  evident- 
ly were  taken  by  surprise ; and  Bains 
and  Cooper,  who  had  not  been  able  to 
form  a junction,  both  took  to  flight,  the 
one  towards  Huntsville,  the  other  to- 
wards Maysville.  Schofield  marched 
Oct.  steadily  onward ; and,  on  the 
17th  of  October,  he  was  on  the 
old  battle  ground  of  Pea  Bidge.  The 
Confederates,  as  we^  have  seen,  were 
divided.  Cooper  evidently  intended  to 
take  possession  of  Maysville,  and  cut 
off  communication  with  Fort  Scott. 
Bains,  with  the  main  body  of  the  troops, 
covered  by  about  3000  cavalry,  was 
still  moving  in  the  direction  of  Hunts- 
ville. Blunt,  with  two  brigades,  went 
off  in  pursuit  of  Cooper;  while  Scho- 
field, with  the  main  army,  pushed  over 
the  White  Biver  Mountains,  in  the 
track  of  Bains. 

Blunt,  who  did  not  allow  his  men  to 
halt  by  the  way,  reached  the  outskirts 
Oct.  of  Maysville  before  daylight  on 
22.  the  morning  of  the  2 2d  of  Octo- 
ber. He  felt  satisfied  that  the  enemy 
could  not  be  far  off.  Disguising  him- 
s df,  and  entering  into  conversation 
with  some  of  the  villagers,  he  soon  dis- 
covered that  Cooper  was  encamped  on 
prairie  ground  in  the  vicinity  of  an  old 


military  post,  called  Fort  Wayne.  As 
soon  as  day  broke,  Blunt,  although  his 
men  were  not  all  forward,  resolved  to 
make  the  attack.  It  was  important  to 
strike  a blow  before  his  presence  was 
discovered  by  the  enemy.  His  van- 
guard, therefore,  dismounted  and  com- 
menced firing.  The  Confederates  were 
quite  unprepared  for  the  attack;  and, 
before  they  thoroughly  understood 
their  position,  the  main  body  of  Blunt’s 
troops  came  up  at  a gallop  from  Mays- 
ville, and  deployed  on  the  prairie.  A 
few  shells  were  flung  into  the  encamp- 
ment, and  then  the  whole  line  advanced. 
The  Confederates,  making  but  little  re- 
sistance, fled  precipitately  towards  Fort 
Gibson  in  the  Indian  Territory,  leaving 
their  four  guns  behind  them.  There 
was  but  little  loss  of  life  on  the  part  of 
the  Confederates;  and  the  Nationals 
had  only  three  men  disabled. 

Schofield  had  been  not  less  successful 
in  his  pursuit  of  Bains.  The  enemy  had 
escaped  from  Huntsville,  and  sought 
shelter  once  more  in  the  neighborhood 
of  the  Ozark  Mountains.  It  was  evi- 
dently Hindman’s  intention  to  avoid 
battle  until  his  troops  were  collected 
in  greater  force.  Beturning  to  a posi- 
tion not  far  from  Pea  Bidge,  Schofield 
learned  that  some  3000  or  4000  cavalry 
were  encamped  on  White  Biver,  about 
eight  miles  from  Fayetteville.  Totten 
was  ordered  to  advance  and  attack 
them  in  front,  while  Francis  J.  Herron 
was  instructed  to  proceed  immediately 
with  about  1000  cavalry,  and  strike 
them  in  the  rear.  Herron  was  the  first 
to  reach  the  enemy.  On  the  morn-  ort. 
ing  of  the  28th  of  October,  afttr  28. 


362 


THE  GUERRILLAS. 


a rapid  night  march,  he  found  him- 
self close  upon  the  encampment.  With- 
out waiting  for  the  arrival  of  the  in- 
fantry, he  fell  upon  the  foe  with  the 
rapidity  of  lightning.  The  surprise 
was  complete ; and  such  was  the  vigor 
of  the  onslaught  that  the  Confederates 
fled  to  the  mountains,  leaving  every- 
thing behind  them. 

Comparative  quiet  reigned  in  those 
regions  for  nearly  a month.  On  the 
26th  of  November,  however,  it  became 
known  to  Schofield  that  Hindman  had 
made  up  his  mind  to  resume  the  oifen- 
sive.  The  Confederate  general,  Mar- 
maduke,  had  arrived  at  Cane  Hill  with 
7000  or  8000  men ; and  it  was  natural 
to  conclude  that  Hindman  was  about  to 
follow.  Schofield,  who  had  for  some 
time  previous  to  this  been  in  poor 
health,  deemed  it  necessary  to  resign 
his  command.  General  Blunt  imme- 
diately accepted  the  responsibilities  of 
the  situation.  He  set  out  at  once  in 
quest  of  the  enemy.  So  rapid  were 
his  movements  that,  on  the  morning  of 
PfoY,  the  28th,  he  found  himself  in 
28.  presence  of  his  antagonist.  Blunt 
had  advanced  with  5000  men  and 
thirty  pieces  of  artillery.  He  had 
taken  with  him  provisions  for  four 
days.  In  one  day  he  had  marched 
twenty-seven  miles.  Only  some  200 
men  were  forward  when  he  encoun- 
tered resistance.  The  main  body,  how- 
ever, soon  came  up,  when  Marinaduke 
fell  back  upon  his  reserves  on  the  Bos- 
ton Mountains,  and  took  a good  position 
on  the  heights.  Blunt  now  assailed 
him  with  his  entire  strength ; and  a 
vigorous  charge  having  been  made  by 


the  Second  Kansas  Cavalry,  the  Third 
Cherokee  Indians,  and  the  Eleventh 
Kansas  Infantry,  the  Confederates  were 
driven  back,  but  not  in  disorder,  in  the 
direction  of  Van  Buren.  Blunt  re- 
turned and  took  up  a position  at  Cane 
Hill,  in  this  engagement,  which  is 
known  as  the  battle  of  Boston  Moun- 
tains, the  Nationals  had  four  killed,  and 
36  wounded.  The  Confederate  loss 
was  75  killed.  The  number  of  wound- 
ed was  not  reported. 

Hindman  was  not  disposed  to  give 
the  Nationals  any  rest.  He  seemed  re- 
solved to  recover  his  State.  In  order 
to  do  this,  it  was  necessary  to  give  a 
crushing  blow  to  Blunt.  Hindman,  no 
doubt,  was  encouraged  in  this  determin- 
ation by  the  knowledge  that  Schofield, 
who  had  been  his  great  terror,  was  no 
longer  in  command.  He  might  also 
have  been  emboldened  in  his  purpose 
by  the  fact  that  the  National  army  was 
divided  into  two  parts,  at  that  time  far 
from  each  other.  Blunt,  with  the  first 
division,  composed  of  three  brigades, 
numbering  about  6000  or  7000  men, 
was  at  Cane  Hill  and  the  village 
called  Khea’s  Mills,  on  the  Fayetteville 
Koad.  Herron,  with  the  remainder  of 
the  army,  comprising  6000  infantry, 
8000  horse,  and  20  guns,  was  at  Wil- 
son’s Creek,  many  miles  away.  On  the 
1st  of  December,  Hindman,  who  pec. 
had  been  hastening  to  Marma- 
duke’s  relief,  crossed  the  Arkansas  Kiver 
at  Van  Buren  with  9000  infantry  and 
3000  cavalry;  and  the  two  forces  were 
united  at  a point  some  fifteen  miles 
further  up.  Made  aware  of  this  fact, 
Blunt  sent  to  Herron,  requesting  him 


PRAIRIE  GROVE. 


363 


to  hurry  to  his  assistance.  That  excel- 
lent officer  lost  no  time  in  coming  to  the 
relief  of  his  chief.  His  cavalry  he  hur- 
ried forward  under  Colonel  Wicker- 
sham,  while  he  himself  advanced  with 
the  main  army.  Fayetteville  was  reached 
Dec.  morning  of  the  7th.  He 

had  marched  all  night.  Resting 
his  men  for  an  hour,  he  pushed  on  in 
the  direction  of  Cane  Hill.  He  had 
advanced  to  within  ten  or  eleven  miles 
of  that  place,  when  he  met  a portion  of 
his  own  cavalry,  despatched  by  him  in 
advance,  fleeing  from  the  enemy.  They 
had  been  attacked  and  broken  by  Mar- 
maduke’s  horsemen.  Herron  was  in  a 
position  of  very  considerable  danger. 
The  Confederate  general  had  been  ap- 
prised of  the  approach  of  Herron ; and 
his  purpose  was,  if  possible,  to  inter- 
pose between  him  and  Blunt.  He  had 
left  a few  troops,  with  a field  battery, 
in  a strong  position  on  the  Cane  Hill 
Road,  at  the  culminating  point  of  the 
pass  of  the  Boston  Mountains,  his  ob- 
ject being  to  mask  his  movement  and 
detain  Blunt.  With  the  rest  of  his 
army,  he  had  moved  along  the  Fayette- 
ville Road.  This  was  the  condition  of 
things  when,  about  eight  o’clock,  Her- 
ron’s advance,  consisting  of  two  regi- 
ments of  cavalry,  was  met  and  driven 
back  by  Marmaduke.  The  retreating 
cavalry  were  brought  to  a halt  by  the 
second  division,  which  was  under  Gen- 
eral Totten,  the  Confederate  attack 
being  not  only  resisted  but  repelled. 
Herron,  at  this  moment,  had  a good  po- 
sition ; and  he  might  have  been  able,  if 
he  had  known  the  actual  state  of  things, 
to  make  a bold,  defensive  stand.  But  he 


was  ignorant  of  his  real  danger,  and  in- 
tent'only  on  the  relief  of  Blunt.  He, 
therefore,  pressed  forward,  driving  the 
Confederates  back  over  Illinois  Creek, 
on  the  heights  beyond  which  the  Con- 
federate army  was  posted. 

The  ground  on  which  Herron  now 
found  himself  was  known  by  the  name 
of  Prairie  Grove.  It  was  an  extensive, 
natural  clearing  in  the  midst  of  woods 
and  thickets,  with  which  the  surround- 
ing hills  were  covered.  The  ground 
was  irregular;  there  were  also  some 
clumps  of  trees;  and,  here  and  there, 
cultivated  patches  had  taken  the  place 
of  the  tall  grasses,  with  which  the 
prairie  generally  was  covered.  On  its 
eastern  extremity,  this  open  ground  was 
watered  by  the  creek  above  mentioned. 
It  was  traversed,  also,  by  two  roads — 
one  leading  from  Fayetteville  to  Cane 
Hill,  and  passing  at  Rhea’s  Mills;  an- 
other leading  from  Van  Buren,  and 
crossing  a ford  at  Illinois  Creek,  near 
the  church  of  Prairie  Grove.  Beyond 
this  stream,  and  about  three-quarters  of 
a mile  to  the  east,  the  Van  Buren  Road 
ascends  a hill  which  is  well  covered 
with  woods.  On  these  heights,  so  soon 
as  he  became  aware  of  the  approach  of 
Herron,  Hindman  had  taken  position 
with  all  his  army. 

Hindman’s  troops  were  well  concealed 
in  the  woods.  Herron  did  not  know, 
and  he  had  no  means  of  discovering, 
the  actual  strength  of  the  enemy  in  his 
front.  On  these  heights,  hidden  by  the 
trees,  but  admirably  posted  for  defense, 
was  an  army  of  some  20,000  men,  well 
supplied  with  cavalry  and  artillery. 
Herron  had  found  it  necessary  to  leave 


364 


THE  GUERRILLAS. 


certain  detachments  behind  him.  His 
entire  available  force,  therefore,*  did 
not  exceed  5000  men;  and  these  were 
not  yet  all  on  the  ground.  It  was,  so 
far  as  numbers  were  concerned,  destined 
to  be  a most  unequal  contest.  Had 
Herron  been  aware  of  the  facts,  he 
might  well  have  hesitated,  before  ven- 
turing upon  an  attack.  In  this  case, 
however,  as  not  unfrequently  happens, 
pluck  and  daring,  guided  by  a clear 
head  and  steady  nerve,  fully  compen- 
sated for  lack  of  numbers.  Herron  had 
not  heard  from  Blunt  since  the  2d, 
Avhen  he  received  instructions  to  come 
to  his  aid.  Blunt  was  aware  of  the 
difficulties  which  lay  in  Herron’s  way ; 
but  such  was  the  activity  of  Marma- 
duke’s  skirmishers,  that  he  found  it 
impossible  to  open  communications  with 
his  lieutenant,  or  send  to  him  any  words 
of  warning.  Blunt,  in  fact,  had  for 
some  days  been  misled  by  the  tactics  of 
his  antagonist.  He  was  under  the  im- 
pression that  he  had  been  skirmishing 
with  the  advance  of  Hindman’s  main 
army,  when,  in  truth,  Hindman,  having 
turned  his  left,  was  making  for  his 
trains,  and  actually  interposing  between 
him  and  Herron.  It  was  not  until  the 
arrival  of  Wickersham,  with  his  four 
cavalry  regiments,  that  Blunt  became 
fully  alive  to  the  true  character  of  the 
situation. 

As  soon  as  his  third  division  came 
up,  Herron  resolved  to  assume  the  of- 
fensive. It  was  yet  early  morning.  An 
attempt  was  made  to  force  the  passage 
of  the  ford  near  the  church,  a light  bat- 
tery having  been  sent  forward  to  feel 
the  foe.  The  attempt  was  unsuccess- 


ful, the  battery  being  driven  back. 
Another  attempt  was  made  about  a 
mile  and  a half  further  down  the  creek. 
Murphy’s  battery  was  successfully  trans- 
ported to  the  other  side  of  the  creek ; 
and,  as  soon  as  it  was  got  into  position, 
it  openeci  fire  upon  the  flank  of  the 
enemy.  The  attack  from  this  quarter 
had  all  the  effect  of  a surprise.  It  not 
only  engaged  the  attention  of  the  Con- 
federate officers — it  created  the  impres- 
sion that  the  National  troops  were  more 
numerous  than  they  actually  were. 
Herron  did  not  lose  his  opportunity. 
Three  batteries,  accompanied  by  three 
full  regiments,  were  pushed  across  the 
ford  in  his  front ; and  about  ten  o’clock 
the  whole  of  the  National  artillery 
were  pouring  grape-shot  and  canister  on 
the  Confederate  positions.  The  result 
was  soon  visible.  Within  sixty  min- 
utes most  of  the  Confederate  guns 
were  silenced.  The  Nationals  contin- 
ued to  advance,  the  artilleiy  belching 
forth  destruction  until  they  were  with- 
in a hundred  yards  of  the  ridge.  It 
was  now  evident  that  Hindman,  whose 
force  had  already  suffered  severely, 
was  massing  his  men  on  the  right  with 
a view  to  crush  the  National  left. 
This  movement  was  supported  by  a 
powerful  battery  in  front.  This  battery 
must  be  captured.  The  perilous  task 
was  assigned  to  the  Nineteenth  Iowa, 
and  the  Twentieth  Wisconsin.  The 
task  was  speedily  accomplished.  It 
was  the  work  of  only  a few  minutes. 
The  summit  of  the  hill  was  reached; 
the  enemy  was  driven  back ; and  the 
guns  were  seized.  It  was  impossible, 
however,  for  those  gallant  regiments  to 


PRAIRIE  GROVE. 


365 


hold  the  position  which  they  had  so 
nobly  won.  The  Confederates  rallied 
and  returned  to  the  charge.  Largely 
outnumbered,  the  two  National  regi-. 
merits  were  compelled  to  fall  back,  and 
the  battery  was  again  in  possession  of 
the  enemy.  The  Confederates  contrived 
to  press  forward ; and,  gatheriifg  cour- 
age as  they  advanced,  they  made  a bold 
dash  towards  the  National  guns.  It 
was  a vain  effort.  Their  ranks  were 
jiloiighed  by  gr’ape-shot ; they  were 
torn  in  pieces  by  canister.  It  was  a 
rush  to  destruction.  They  soon  fell 
back,  leaving  the  ground  covered  with 
the  dead  and  wounded.  At  this  criti- 
cal moment,  and  seeing  the  determina- 
tion with  which  Hindman  was  menacing 
his  left,  Herron  summoned  up  two 
fresh  regiments — the  Twenty-Sixth  In- 
diana and  the  Thirty-Seventh  Illinois — 
and  hurled  them  against  the  enemy’s 
right.  This  fresh  attack  was,  in  the 
first  instance,  completely  successful. 
Colonel  Houston,  who  was  in  charge, 
led  his  men  forward  right  gallantly. 
The  Confederate  battery  was  again  cap- 
tured ; but,  as  in  the  former  case,  so  in 
this,  the  National  regiments  were  out- 
numbered, and  compelled  to  fall  back. 
It  was  now  half-j)ast  two.  The  bat- 
tle had  raged  fiercely  since  eleven. 
Herron’s  men  had  all  been  put  under 
fire.  Further  aggressive  effort,  on  his 
part,  was  out  of  the  question.  It  was 
doubtful  whether  he  could  much  longer 
hold  the  ground  he  occupied ; for  the 
Confederates  had  evidently  begun  to 
feel  their  strength,  and  to  realize  the 
value  of  superior  numbers.  Fortu- 
nately, just  at  this  time,  the  noise  of 


heavy  guns  was  heard  on  the  extreme 
right;  and  some  stray  shot  fell  in  the 
midst  of  the  National  skirmishers.  It 
was  Blunt.  He  had  arrived  on  the 
field  just  in  time.  The  news  quickly 
spread  along  the  lines,  reviving  the 
sinking  spirits  of  the  Union  soldiers. 
Hindman  was  in  the  act  of  massing  his 
forces,  for  the  purpose  of  flanking  Her- 
ron’s right  wing.  While  thus  engaged, 
he  came  into  contact  with  the  heads  of 
Blunt’s  advancing  columns.  The  bat- 
tle was  thus  renewed  with  tremendous 
energy.  Blunt  pushed  forward  three 
batteries,  which  soon  drove  the  Con- 
federates back  into  the  woods.  While 
the  cavalry  was  crossing  his  right,  he 
pushed  forward  Colonel  Weir,  with  a 
heavy  force,  to  the  woods,  where  the 
Confederates  were  forming  for  the  at- 
tack. Weir  accomplished  his  task  with 
skill  and  energy.  The  Confederates 
were  driven  from  their  shelter,  and 
their  onward  movement  was  completely 
arrested.  During  the  struggle,  an  at- 
tempt was  made  by  the  Confederates 
to  capture  the  batteries  of  Bobb  and 
Hopkins.  The  assailants,  however,  were 
severely  punished  for  their  temerity. 
Another  attack,  in  which  the  Confed- 
erate general,  Stein,  of  Missouri,  fell, 
was  successfully  repelled  by  Lieutenant 
Tenney  and  his  six^ ten-pounder  Par- 
rotts. After  the  arrival  of  Blunt,  his 
own  lines  and  those  of  Herron  were 
speedily  joined ; and  a daring  attempt 
made  by  the  Confederates,  to  penetrate 
between  Herron’s  second  and  third  di- 
vision, was  completely  frustrated  by 
the  stubborn  resistance  of  Dye’s  bri- 
gade. Musketry-fire  and  cannonading 


366 


THE  GUERRILLAS. 


continued  until  dark ; but  the  Confed- 
erates did  not  renew  the  attack,  nor 
did  the  Nationals  retire  from  the  posi- 
tion they  had  won.  Night  ended  the 
conflict.  The  National  troops  slept  on 
their  arms,  in  the  expectation  that  the 
battle  would  be  resumed  in  the  morn- 
ing. When  morning  dawned,  the  Con- 
federates were  in  full  flight  along  the 
Van  Buren  Road.  The  Nationals,  how- 
ever, were  in  no  condition  to  pursue. 
Such  was  the  famous  and  bloody  battle 
of  Prairie  Grove.  The  estimated  Na- 
tional loss  in  this  day’s  fighting  was 
1148  men,  of  whom  167  were  killed, 
798  wounded,  and  183  made  prisoners 
— but  of  the  total,  953  belonged  to 
Herron’s  foi’ce. 

If  Hindman  had  been  more  daring, 
the  battle  at  Prairie  Grove  might  have 
resulted  very  differently.  He  had  two 
good  opportunities,  both  of  which  he 
recklessly  flung  away.  He  might  have 
crushed  Blunt  on  the  4th  or  5th,  on 
both  of  which  days  he  had  him  alone 
in  his  front ; and  a more  dashing  effort 
might  have  led  to  the  discomfiture  of 
Herron,  when  he  met  him  alone  on  the 
borders  of  Illinois  Creek. 

After  the  battle  of  Prairie  Grove, 
the  ‘‘army  of  the  frontier”  remained 
quiet  in  the  Ozark  Mountains.  As 
late  as  the  28thj^  of  December  Blunt, 
having  been  informed  that  Hindman 
was  collecting  troops  and  preparing 
for  another  attack,  made  a rapid  march 
with  some  light  cavalry  and  artillery, 
as  far  as  the  borders  of  the  Arkansas, 
taking  possession  of  Van  Buren  with- 
out any  opposition,  burning  several 
steamers,  destroying  the  Confederate 


depots,  and  then  returning  to  the  main 
army,  which  had  gone  into  winter 
quarters.  At  the  close  of  1862,  quiet 
. reigned  both  in  Missouri  and  Arkansas, 
Missouri  had  been  completely  relieved, 
and  at  least  one  half  of  Arkansas  had 
been  occupied. 

The^e  guerrilla  bands  were  not  con- 
fined to  Missouri  and  Arkansas  alone, 
nor  indeed  to  Kentucky  and  Tennessee, 
where  we  have  already  found  them. 
They  were  scattered  in  large  numbers 
over  Texas — the  extreme  southwestern 
State  of  the  Republic.  In  the  western 
part  of  that  State  there  were  but  few 
slaveholders.  There  was,  therefore, 
but  little  sympathy  with  the  Southern 
cause.  The  people,  who  were  truly 
loyal  and  devoted  to  the  Union,  w^ere 
at  once  feared  and  hated  by  the  guer- 
rilla bands  which  infested  the  country, 
and  whose  acts  were  characterized  by 
great  wastefulness  and  horrible  bru- 
tality. As  they  were  far  removed  from 
the  National  armies,  and  but  little  lia- 
ble to  be  called  to  account,  they  seemed 
to  deem  it  their  privilege  to  indulge  in 
all  kinds  of  excess,  and  to  riot  in  the 
destruction  of  life  and  property.  Early 
in  the  summer  of  1862,  after  the  Con- 
federates had  been  defeated  and  driven 
out  of  Tennessee,  Texas  was  placed 
by  the  Richmond  government  under 
martial  law,  and  a rigid  and  merciless 
conscription  was  enforced.  The  State 
was  overrun  by  guerrilla  bands,  whose 
lawlessness  knew  no  bounds.  They 
robbed  and  murdered  at  will ; and 
other  crimes  of  the  most  heinous  and 
shocking  character  have  been  laid  to 
their  charge.  Some  of  the  loyalists  at- 


THE  TEXAN  MARTYRS. 


307 


tempted  to  escape  into  Mexico.  Of 
these,  many  were  captured  and  mur- 
dered ; and  the  boast  was  proudly  made 
by  the  San  Antonio  Herald^  that  their 
bones  were  bleaching  on  the  soil  of 
every  county,  from  Red  River  to  the 
Rio  Grande ; and  in  the  counties  of 
Wise  and  Denton,  their  bodies  were 
suspended  by  scores  from  the  “black 
jacks.”  On  the  night  of  the  9th  of 
August,  1862,  a company  of  young 
Germans,  about  sixty  in  all,  and  be- 
longing to  the  best  families  in  Western 
Texas,  who  were  on  their  way  to  New 
Orleans,  by  way  of  Mexico,  in  order  to 
join  the  Union  army,  had  reached  the 
Nueces  River,  about  forty  miles  from 
the  Rio  Grande.  They  lay  encamped 
on  the  edge  of  a cedar  brake ; their 
movements  had  been  conducted  with 
great  secrecy;  and  they  were  hopeful 
that  they  might  escape  the  vigilance  of 
the  guerrillas.  By  treachery  or  other- 
wise, their  character  and  their  where- 
abouts became  known  to  the  freeboot- 
ers; and  Duff,  the  girerrilla  chief  in 
those  parts,  sent  one  hundred  men  to 
surprise  and  destroy  them.  Early  on 
the  morning  of  the  8th,  one  of  the 
party,  who  happened  to  be  up  and 
about,  was  captured.  As  he  refused 
to  lead  the  gang  to  the  exact  spot 
where  his  companions  were  still  sleep- 
ing, he  was  immediately  hanged.  The 
guerrillas  found  out  the  encampment, 
and  at  night  fell  upon  the  young  men 
in  their  sleep.  A terrible  hand-to-hand 
fight  ensued.  Not  less  than  two-thirds 
of  the  brave  young  Unionists  perished, 
some  of  them  having  been  cruelly  put 
to  death  after  they  were  wounded  and 

} 


helpless.  Only  a few  of  them  escaped 
to  tell  the  horrid  tale.  One  of  the 
butchers  afterwards  boasted  that  he 
killed  several  of  the  wounded  with  his 
own  hands.  In  the  performance  of  this 
brutal  work  he  emptied  two  revolvers. 
Such  was  his  own  confession.  His 
name  will  be  infamous  forever.  It  was 
Lieutenant  Lily.  Three  years  after- 
wards, a monument  was  erected  over 
all  that  could  be  collected  of  the  re- 
mains of  the  Texan  martyrs. 

The  Western  territory,  during  the 
year  1862,  experienced  not  a little  dis- 
turbance from  the  peculiar  combina- 
tions and  conflicts  of  the  Indian  tribes. 
The  withdrawal  of  the  volunteers 
raised  in  Northern  Missouri,  and  in  the 
young  States  of  Iowa  and  Minnesota, 
had  left  some  portions  of  the  country 
on  the  western  slope  of  the  Rocky 
Mountains  very  much  at  the  mercy  of 
the  indigenous  race.  The  Indians  had 
wrongs  to  right,  revenges  to  gratify, 
both  as  regarded  their  white  conquerors 
and  the  rival  native  tribes;  and,  in  the 
absence  of  the  troops  of  the  regular 
army,  they  believed  they  had  found 
their  opportunity.  In  the  circumstances, 
it  was  natural  that  they  should  make 
some  efforts  to  multiply  the  scalps  with 
which  they  delighted  to  adorn  their 
wigwams.  Some  of  those  tribes,  more- 
over, had  been  induced  to  take  sides  in 
the  great  struggle.  On  both  sides,  con- 
siderable armies  had  been  raised.  They 
were  generally  commanded  by  whites, 
and  were,  for  the  most  part,  employed 
in  guarding  the  frontier.  The  frontier 
was  designated  by  several  posts  which, 
before  the  war,  had  served  as  provision 


368 


THE  GUERRILLAS. 


depots.  All  those  to  the  south  of  Kan- 
sas had  been  abandoned  by  the  Na- 
tionals. These  posts,  separated  from 
each  other  by  vast  intervals,  and  placed 
en  echelon  through  the  vast  region  then 
known  as  Indian  Territory,  were  di- 
vided among  several  tribes,  the  most 
powerful  of  which  were  the  Creeks  and 
the  Cherokees.  The  latter  tribe  had 
experienced  somewhat  of  the  benefits 
of  civilization.  Scattered  over  the  rich 
prairie,  which  extends  from  Pea  Ridge 
to  the  borders  of  the  Neosho,  were  to 
be  seen  not  a few  Cherokee  villages, 
surrounded  and  adorned  by  patches  of 
cultivated  land.  The  principal  chief  of 
this  tribe  was  John  Ross,  who  resided 
in  a beautiful  villa  at  Park  Hill,  on  the 
Fayetteville  Road.  The  chief  town  or 
capital  of  this  tribe  was  called  Tah-le- 
Quah,  a place  which  though  not  yet  old, 
was  giving  some  evidence  of  premature 
decay.  The  Cherokees  were  no  great 
favorites  with  their  more  war-like  neigh- 
bors, who  were  located  a little  more  to 
the  south  and  west.  As  a rule,  the 
semi-civilized  Indian  is  despised  by  his 
rougher  and  ruder  brethern,  who  ad- 
here to  their  primitive  modes  of  life. 
Such  was  the  feeling  entertained  to- 
wards the  Cherokees  by  the  other 
Indian  tribes  all  along  the  borders  of 
the  Arkansas.  The  war-like  ardor  of 
these  latter  was  stimulated  by  Southern 
emissaries ; and  in  the  neighborhood  of 
Fort  Davis — a new  fort  built  by  the 
Confederates — and  also  at  Fort  Gibson 
— an  old  fort  near  the  village  of  the  same 
name — quite  a little  army  of  redskins 
had  assembled.  Officered  by  white  men, 
they  undertook  to  conquer  the  whole 


Indian  Territory,  and  even  threatened 
the  invasion  of  Arkansas  and  Missouri. 

In  the  absence  of  the  regular  army, 
this  whole  region  depended  for  protec- 
tion on  three  regiments  of  Indians,  all 
mounted,  and  officered  by  white  men  of 
the  Natibnal  army.  It  was  not  long 
before  these  National  officers  became 
aware  of  the  hostile  intentions  of  the 
rival  tribes  enlisted  in  the  interest  of 
the  Sv)uth.  It  was  resolved  to  make 
an  immediate  attack — to  surprise  and 
disperse  them,  before  they  could  have 
time  to  carry  out  their  meditated  pur- 
pose. With  this  end  in  view.  Colonel 
Phillipps,  with  1200  mounted  men  and 
two  field  pieces,  was  detached,  and  sent 
forward  in  the  direction  of  the  enemy. 
We  have  already  seen  that  the  hostile 
Indians  were  congregated  in  strength 
in  and  about  the  village  of  Gibson. 
They,  too,  consisted  of  three  mounted 
resriments,  and  were  under  the  com- 
mand  of  Colonel  Taylor.  Phillipps  di- 
vided his  forces  into  two  columns  of 
equal  strength.  The  one  column,  under 
Major  Forman,  was  to  cross  the  Neosho, 
and  descend  the  right  bank  of  the 
river:  the  other  column,  under  Phillipps 
himself,  was  to  march  towards  Gibson, 
through  Park  Hill  and  Tah-le-Quah. 
It  was  Phillipps’  intention  to  advance 
and  surprise  the  enemy  on  the  morning 
of  July,  the  24th.  Taylor,  however, 
was  not  to  be  so  easily  caught.  He 
had  been  apprised  of  the  intended 
movement,  and  had  made  preparations 
accordingly.  Sending  forward  some 
300  men  to  meet  and  delay  the  ad- 
vance of  Forman,  he  advanced  himself 
with  about  800  men  to  meet  Phillipps. 


THE  INDIANS. 


369 


July  On  the  28th,  about  two  o’clock 
28.  in  the  afternoon,  Taylor  came 
into  contact  with  the  National  advance, 
between  Gibson  and  Tah-le-Quah  ; and 
falling  upon  them  with  tremendous 
fury,  he  drove  them  back  in  confu- 
sion. Their  retreat,  however,  was  soon 
arrested  by  the  main  body,  which  had 
found  time  to  deploy,  dismount,  and 
occupy  a strong  position  along  the 
edge  of  a wood.  As  Taylor’s  Indians 
were  rushing  forward  in  the  full  tri- 
umph of  victory,-  they  were  received  by 
a murderous  hre,  the  Nationals,  with 
fierce  yells,  rushing  out  upon  them,  and 
driving  them  back  in  disorder.  On  a 
ridge  which  commanded  the  little  val- 
ley of  Bayou  Barnard,  they  rallied  and 
renewed  the  attack.  It  was,  however, 
only  for  an  instant.  After  the  first 
fire,  they  fell  back  again  and  dispersed. 
In  this  last  encounter.  Colonel  Taylor 
was  killed.  His  body  and  the  body  of 
twm  Choctaw  captains  were  found  on 
the  field.  Phillipps  crossed  the  Neosho 
and  joined  Forman.;  but  the  detach- 
ment of  Indians  which  Taylor  had  sent 
against  the  latter,  contrived  to  escape, 
and  succeeded  in  making  its  way  to 
the  south  of  the  Arkansas. 

On  the  19th  of  August,  a savage  at- 
Au».  tack  was  made  by  the  Sioux  on 
two  Indian  agencies  and  on  the 
village  of  New  Ulm,  not  far  from 
Fort  Bidgely,  on  the  Minnesota  River. 
At  the  agencies,  all  the  employes  were 
massacred ; and  at  the  village,  over  100 
women  and  children  were  ruthlessly 
put  to  death.  After  their  bloody  woi*k, 
the  Indians  retired  to  their  camp,  near 
Yellow  Medicine  Creek.  It  was  abso- 


lutely necessary,  for  the  safety  of  the  set- 
tlers, that  so  horrible  an  outrage  should 
be  promptly  and  adequately  avenged. 
Colonel  Sibley  was  entrusted  with 
this  duty.  On  the  19th  of  Sep-  sep. 
tember,  taking  with  him  about 
1000  men  in  all,  composed  of  detach- 
ments from  the  Third,  Sixth  and  Sev- 
enth regiments  of  Minnesota,  with  some 
militia,  Sibley  proceeded  from  Fort 
Ridgely  towards  the  Indian  encamp- 
ment. As  soon  as  it  became  known 
that  he  was  approaching.  Little  Crow, 
the  chief  of  the  tribe,  called  a council 
of  war,  and  advised  that  an  attack 
should  be  made  on  the  National  camps 
at  night.  His  counsel  was  not  ap- 
proved of  by  the  Sioux  warriors;  and 
it  was  agreed  that,  to  give  proof  of 
their  courage,  they  should  fight  the 
white  men  openly  in  the  broad  light  of 
day.  On  the  23d  of  September,  gep# 
they  approached  the  National  en-  23. 
campment  from  two  different  points; 
and  rushing  forward  in  their  usual  man- 
ner, uttering  savage  yells,  they  made  a 
vigorous  attack.  The  Nationals  prompt- 
ly put  themselves  in  line  to  receive  them. 
For  two  hours  the  battle  raged,  the  In- 
dians trying  to  break  their  ranks  in 
front,  to  turn  their  right,  and  to  strike 
them  in  the  rear.  It  w^as  all  in  vain. 
The  Nationals  were  more  numerous,  and 
their  artillery  enabled  them  to  keep  the 
Indians  at  a distance.  Peace  was  thus 
established  on  the  frontier  of  Minnesota. 
Before  the  close  of  1862,  all  those  guer- 
rilla bands,  both  whites  and  redskins, 
were  broken  and  dispersed ; and  between 
the  Mississippi  and  the  Rocky  Moun- 
tains, the  National  power  w'as  supreme. 


370 


CHICKASAW. 


« 


CHAPTEK  XXIII. 


Alter  Corinth — Grant’s  Army. — The  Great  Western  Plan. — The  Missipippi. — Grant’s  Inaction. — The  Keason.— 
Vicksburg. — Farragut  at  Vicksburg. — Williams  and  the  Canal. — Reinforcements  for  Grant. — Grant’s  Army  in 
Motion. — The  Confederate  Position. — John  C.  Pemberton. — The  Yallabusha  and  Tallahatchie. — The  Yazoo. — 
Grant  at  La  Grange. — Feeling  his  Way. — McPherson  at  Lamar.  — Washburne  and  Hovey. — Grant  at  Holly 
Springs  and  Oxford. — Sherman  at  College  Hill. — Grant’s  New  Plan. — The  Expedition  to  the  Yazoo. — Sher- 
man and  Porter. — Grant  to  Move  Against  Pemberton. — McClernand's  Intrigue. — Holly  Springs. — Van  Dorn’s 
Raid. — Holly  Springs  Captured. — Murphy’s  Cowardice. — Forrest’s  Raid. — Grant's  Supplies  Cut  Off. — His  Re- 
treat.— Failure  of  his  Plan. — Murphy  Dismissed  the  Army. — Grant  at  La  Grange  and  Grand  Junction. — Sherman 
* and  Porter  on  their  Way  Down  the  Mississippi. — Friar’s  Point. — Lincoln's  Weakness. — McClernand’s  Appoint- 
ment.— Sherman  and  Porter  at  the  Mouth  of  the  Yazoo. — Disposition  of  the  Troops. — The  Plan  of  Attack. — 
The  Disembarkation. — The  Ground. — Vicksburg. — Walnut  Hills. — Haines’  Bluff. — Chickasaw  Bayou. — The 
Slough. — Dangerous  Battle  Ground. — The  Preparations  of  the  Confederates. — The  Nationals  Prepared  for  the 
Attack. — Barfield’s  Plantation. — Movements  of  General  Steele. — General  Frank  P.  Blair. — The  Morning  of 
the  29th  of  November. — The  Attack.  — The  Reception. — Blair  and  Thayer. — Their  Bravery. — Morgan’s  Failure. — 
Inactivity  of  Stuart  and  A.  J.  Smith. — Morgan  L.  Smith  Wounded. — A Critical  Moment. — Blair,  Thayer 
and  De  Courcy  Compelled  to  Fall  Back. — The  Sixth  Missouri. — “Shoot  Higher.” — “Shoot  Lower.” — A 
Complete  Failure. — Morgan  to  Blame. — Sherman  Mortified. — A Flag  of  Truce. — Burying  the  Dead. — A Sad 
Sight. — Another  Attack  Resolved  Upon. — The  Fog. — The  New  Enterprise  Abandoned. — End  of  the  Second 
Campaign  Against  Vicksburg. — Disappointment  in  the  North. — Rejoicing  in  the  South. — Reflections. — 
Sherman’s  Mistake. — Blair  the  Hero  of  Chickasaw  Bayou. — Back  at  the  Mouth  of  the  Yazoo. — Arrival  of 
McClernand. — Sherman  Superseded. — His  Nobility  of  Conduct. — Army  Corps. — McClernand’s  General  Order 
No.  1. — Sherman’s  Order. — Arkansas  Post. — The  New  Expedition. — Up  the  Mississippi. — At  the  Mouth  ot 
the  White  River —The  “Cut-Off.” — The  Arkansas  River. — Notrib’s  Farm. — Fort  Hindman. — The  Ground. — 
Strength  of  the  Fortress. — The  Gandson. — Landing  of  the  Troops. — A Detour. — Porter  and  his  Gunboats. — 
The  Morning  of  the  11th  of  December  — The  Signal  for  Attack. — A Terrific  Cannonade. — Sherman  on  the 
Right. — Morgan  on  the  Left. — A Hard  Struggle. — The  Edge  of  the  Woods. — The  Guns  of  the  Fort 
Silenced. — Steele's  Men  Performing  Prodigies  of  Valor. — Morgan’s  Advance  Interrupted  by  the  Ravine. — 
Bravery  of  Burbridge. — The  Surrender. — The  Prize  of  Victory. — Sherman  Dissatisfied,  but  Patiently 
Submissive. — McClernand’s  Report. — Petty  Jealousy. — Sherman’s  Memoirs. — Porter’s  Report. — Grant’s  In- 
fluence.— The  Day  After  the  Battle. — Burial  of  the  Dead. — The  Transportation  of  Prisoners. — Little  Rock. — 
Another  Joint  Expedition. — Des  Arc  and  Duval’s  Bluff  Captured. — Fort  Hindman  Dismantled  and  Blown 
XJp — On  the  Way  Down  the  Arkansas. — The  Army  and  the  Flotilla  at  Napoleon. — Instructions  from  Grant. — 
Back  at  Milliken’s  Bend. — Estimate  of  the  Whole  Expedition. 


After  the  battle  of  Corinth,  which 
1862  fought  on  the  4th  of  Octo- 

ber, the  army,  under  General 
Grant,  fell  back  to  the  position  which 
it  formerly  occupied,  and  remained  in 
comparative  inactivity  until  the  begin- 
ning of  November.  It  was  stationed 
, from  Memphis  to  Bridgeport,  Tennes- 
see, along  the  Memphis  and  Charleston 
Railroad.  Its  strong  points  were  Mem- 
phis, Grand  Junction  and  Corinth.  The 


army  was  arranged  in  four  divisions. 
General  Sherman,  with  the  first  divi- 
sion, was  at  Memphis;  General  Hurl- 
but,  with  the  second,  was  at  Jackson; 
General  C.  S.  Hamilton,  with  the  third, 
was  at  Corinth ; and  General  T.  A. 
Davies,  with  the  fourth,  was  at  Colum- 
bus. Grant’s  headquarters  were  at 
Jackson,  Tennessee,  a point  in  the  West 
where  the  Central  Mississippi  Railroad 
unites  with  the  Mobile  and  Ohio.  That 


FARRAGUT  AND  WILLIAMS. 


371 


general  had  not  abandoned  the  plan 
which  was  inaugurated  at  Henry  and 
Donelson.  His  whole  soul  was  bent  on 
the  capture  of  Vicksburg,  A variety 
of  circumstances,  however,  had  necessi- 
tated delay.  The  removal  of  Halleck 
to  Washington  had  devolved  upon  him 
the  entire  care  of  the  Department  of 
the  Tennessee — a department  which 
included,  in  addition  to  Cairo,  Forts 
Henry  and  Donelson,  the  whole  of 
Northern  Mississippi,  and  those  por- 
tions of  Tennessee  and  Kentucky  west 
of  the  Tennessee  River.  This,  how- 
ever, was  not  the  only  or  even  the 
most  important  reason.  The  army 
which  had  fought  and  won  at  Shiloh, 
at  Corinth  and  at  luka,  had  been  great- 
ly weakened,  a large  pioportion  of  its 
strength  having  been  sent  to  Kentucky 
to  resist  the  invasion  of  Bragg.  It  was 
necessary,  therefore,  for  Grant,  while 
perfecting  his  plans  and  rearranging 
his  troops,  to  wait  for  reinforcements. 
As  soon  as  the  reinforcements  arrived, 
he  was  ready  to  move. 

The  reader  has  already  been  made 
familiar  with  the  general  plan  to  be 
pursued  in  the  opening  of  the  Missis- 
sippi ; and  he  has  learned  that  a con- 
sidei-able  portion  of  that  plan  had  been 
successfully  carried  out.  The  National 
gunboats  had  swept  the  Mississippi, 
from  Cairo  to  Memphis ; and,  between 
those  two  points,  every  Confederate 
stronghold  had  been  deserted  or  de- 
stroyed. Farragut,  with  a portion  of  his 
fleet,  had  pushed  his  way  up  to  Vicks- 
burg, after  the  capture  of  New  Orleans. 
He  was  accompanied  by  General  F. 
Williams,  with  an  infantry  force  of 


four  regiments.  While  Farragut  bom- 
barded the  city,  Williams  was  cutting 
a canal,  with  the  view  of  diverting  the 
waters  of  the  Mississippi  from  their 
proper  channel,  thus  leaving  Vicksburg 
high  and  dry  on  all  sides.  The  siege 
lasted  some  seventy  days.  It  was  all 
to  no  purpose.  Farragut,  who  failed 
to  make  any  serious  impression  on  the 
Confederate  works,  began  to  fear  for 
his  own  safety.  The  canal,  also,  proved 
a complete  failure.  The  fleet  and  the 
land  force  both  found  it  necessary  to 
retire ; and  Vicksburg  remained  to  ob- 
struct the  navigation  of  the  great  river. 

On  the  4th  of  November,  Grant 
began  to  move.  He  transferred  ]^ov, 
his  headquarters  from  Jackson  to 
La  Grange,  some  few  miles  to  the  west 
of  Grand  Junction.  He  soon  discovered 
that  the  Confederates,  under  General 
John  C.  Pemberton,  a Pennsylvanian, 
who  had  superseded  Van  Dorn,  were 
in  considerable  strength  immediately  in 
his  front.  Pemberton,  in  fact,  had  taken 
a strong  position  behind  two  lines  of 
defenses,  the  outer  being  the  Yalla- 
busha,  and  the  inner  bemg  the  Talla- 
hatchie— two  streams  which,  after  their 
junction,  form  the  Yazoo  River.  Both 
of  these  streams  cross  the  Mississippi 
Central  Railroad,  between  Grand  Junc- 
tion and  Grenada.  The  banks  of  the 
Tallahatchie  were  strongly  fortified. 
Grant’s  first  intention  was  to  offer 
Pemberton  battle,  defeat  him,  and  force 
his  way  to  Vicksburg. 

On  the  8th,  he  sent  out  McPherson 
with  10,000  infantry  and  1500 
cavalry,  with  instructions  to  drive 
from  Lamar  a body  of  Confederates 


572 


CHICKASAW. 


who  were  holding  the  railroad.  Mc- 
Pherson accomplished  his  task  in  the 
most  effectual  manner,  the  Confederates 
having  been  driven  back  as  far  as  Holly 
Springs. 

About  the  17th  of  November,  Grant 
summoned  Sherman  to  meet  him  at 
Columbus ; and  at  the  interview  which 
there  took  place,  the  views  of  the  two 
generals  were  freely  exchanged.  Grant 
explaining  to  Sherman  his  plan,  and 
giving  him  his  orders.  It  was  at  Sher- 
man’s suggestion  that  a portion  of 
Curtis’  army,  which,  as  we  have  seen 
in  a previous  chapter,  was  stationed  at 
Helena,  should  be  brought  over  to 
Delta,  with  a view  to  co-operate  with 
Grant  in  his  general  movement  towards 
Vicksburg.  Tliese  troops  which,  in 
the  absence  of  General  Curtis,  who  was 
at  St.  Paul,  being  under  the  temporary 
command  of  General  Frederick  Steele, 
were  promptly  at  the  place  appointed, 
on  the  eastern  banks  of  the  Mississippi. 
They  numbered  some  7000  men,  and 
were  under  the  joint  command  of  Gen- 
erals A.  P.  Hovey  and  C.  C.  Wash- 
burne.  Ordered  to  scour  the  country 
to  the  south  and  east,  in  the  rear  of  the 
Confederate  army,  to  destroy  the  rail- 
]*oads  and  bridges,  so  as  to  cut  off  sup- 
plies, and  generally  to  prepare  the  way 
for  Grant’s  advance,  they  accomplished 
their  task  in  the  most  effectual  manner, 
and  then  returned  to  the  Mississippi. 
Pemberton,  on  discovering  that  the  rail- 
roads were  badly  damaged,  and  that 
the  rolling-stock  was  destroyed,  Grant 
meanwhile  pressing  on  his  front,  deemed 
it  prudent  to  fall  back  on  Grenada. 

On  the  1st  of  December,  Grant  was 


at  Holly  Springs.  On  the  5th,  he  was 
at  Oxford,  where  he  established  his 
headquarters.  It  now  became  a seilous 
question  with  General  Grant,  how  far 
he  was  wise  in  allowing  himself  to  be 
tempted  to  advance  into  the  enemy’s 
country.  ‘ The  State  of  Mississippi  was 
but  sparsely  peopled;  and  he  had  no 
means  of  knowing  whether  its  resources 
were  equal  to  the  wants  of  a large 
army,  possibly  cut  off  from  its  base  of 
supplies.  Had  he  known  what  he 
knew  afterwards,  the  caution  would 
have  been  unnecessary ; and  he  would 
doubtless  have  continued  his  onward 
march. 

On  the  5th  of  December^  Sherman 
on  his  way  to  join  Grant,  and  Dec. 
bnnging  with  him  from  Memphis 
some  16,000  men,  arrived  at  College 
Hill,  about  ten  miles  from  Oxford, 
whence  he  reported  to  his  chief.  On 
the  8th,  he  received  from  Grant  a let- 
ter, requesting  his  immediate  presence 
at  Oxford,  and  enclosing  a message 
from  Halleck  to  Grant,  authorizing  the 
latter  to  prosecute  the  new  plan  he  had 
just  submitted  to  him,  to  move  his 
troops  as  he  thought  best,  to  retain  till 
further  orders  all  Curtis’  troops  now  in 
his  department,  to  telegraph  to  General 
Allen,  in  St.  Louis,  for  all  the  steam- 
boats he  might  need,  and  to  ask  Porter 
to  co-operate  with  his  gunboats.  On 
his  arrival  at.  Oxford,  Sherman  found 
Grant  surrounded  by  his  staff.  The 
new  plan  was  discussed  and  approved. 
It  will  be  seen  that  Grant  had  made  up 
his  mind  that,  for  the  safety  of  his  men 
as  well  as  for  the  final  success  of  the 
expedition,  it  was  necessary  to  take 


DISASTER  AT  HOLLY  SPRINGS. 


373 


full  advantage  of  the  river  communica- 
tion with  Vicksburg.  It  was  agreed 
that  a large  force  on  transports  should 
proceed  down  the  Mississippi,  under 
convoy  of  Porter’s  gunboats,  that  on 
reaching  the  mouth  of  the  Yazoo,  they 
should  open  up  that  water  line,  and,  by 
a joint  attack  of  the  land  and  naval 
forces,  attempt  to  capture  Vicksburg  in 
the  rear.  Grant,  meanwhile,  was  to 
press  forward  towards  Jackson,  which 
is  only  some  forty-six  miles  to  the 
west  of  Vicksburg,  offering  Pemberton 
battle,  and  following  him  up  close  in 
the  event  of  his  retreat,  in  the  hope  of 
finding  Sherman  on  the  Yazoo  with 
supplies,  or  in  possession  of  Vicksburg. 

Happily,  Grant  had  been  left  com- 
plete control  of  the  whole  movement, 
Halleck  having  offered  no  special  ad- 
vice, and  imposed  no  conditions.  He 
could  move  at  will,  and  he  could  place 
in  prominent  command  the  men  of  his 
own  choice.  Sherman,  who  commanded 
the  right  wing  of  Grant’s  army,  was 
appointed  to  the  command  of  the  river 
expedition,  and  received  his  instruc- 
tions. Grant  had  the  greater  pleasure 
in  appointing  Sherman  to  this  com- 
mand that  McClernand,  who  had  great 
influence  with  the  president,  was  known 
to  be  intriguing  for  an  independent 
command  on  the  Mississippi.  Sherman 
was,  therefore,  ordered  to  take  com- 
mand of  the  forces  at  Memphis,  and 
those  also  at  Helena  and  Delta,  under 
General  Steele,  to  descend  the  river 
by  transports,  with  the  gunboat  fleet 
as  a convoy,  commanded  by  Admiral 
Porter,  and  to  attack  Vicksburg  by  the 
29  th  of  November.  McClernand  was 


to  take  the  forces  at  Cairo,  and  to  pro- 
ceed to  Vicksburg,  so  as  to  be  in 
time  to  lend  Sherman  effective  aid  as 
soon  as  he  made  the  attack.  Grant 
himself,  as  we  have  said,  was  to  move 
rapidly  on  the  Confederates  to  the 
north  and  east  of  Vicksburg,  to  follow 
them  if  they  should  retreat  towards  the 
city,  and  to  take  part  with  Sherman,  if 
necessary,  in  the  reduction  of  the  place. 
It  was  a well-conceived  plan.  Its  suc- 
cess, however,  depended  on  the  prompt 
and  faithful  execution  of  all  its  parts. 
Grant  knew  that  it  was  unsafe  to  trust 
for  supplies  solely  to  the  enemy’s  coun- 
try. He  had,  therefore,  repaired  the 
Central  Mississippi  Railroad  as  far  as 
Oxford,  where,  for  the  present,  he  had 
established  his  headquarters ; and  Holly 
Springs,  which  was  entrusted  to  the 
care  of  Colonel  R.  C.  Murphy,  was  re- 
tained as  a grand  depot  and  hospital. 

Let  us  see  how  this  plan  was  carried 
out.  Grant  had  taken  great  care  that 
no  misfortune  should  befall  him  in  his 
rear.  He  had  left  small  but  adequate 
garrisons  at  Columbus,  at  Humboldt, 
Trenton,  Jackson,  Bolivar,  Corinth, 
Holly  Springs,  Coldwater,  Davis’  Mills 
and  Middlebury.  He  had  taken  par- 
ticular care  of  Holly  Springs ; for 
he  knew  that  the  treasures  at  that 
place  presented  a powerful  temptation 
to  Van  Dorn.  On  the  night  of  the 
19th,  he  warned  Murphy  of  his  danger, 
and  informed  him  that  he  had  sent  4000 
men  to  enable  him  to  repel  any  attack 
which  might  be  made  upon  him.  Mur- 
phy, it  would  seem,  paid  little  heed  to 
the  instructions  given  him.  He  made 
no  extra  preparations  to  resist  the  enemy. 


249 


374 


CHICKASAW. 


On  the  morning  of  the  20th,  at  day- 
Dec.  break,  Van  Dorn,  executing  a 
20.  brilliant  cavalry  operation,  rushed 
upon  the  place  with  tremendous  fury. 
Murphy  offered  no  resistance.  The 
Second  Illinois,  however,  refused  to 
surrender,  and  gallantly  fought  their 
way  out,  with  a loss  of  only  seven  men. 
Murphy,  with  the  rest  of  his  men,  ac- 
cepted a parole.  Van  Dorn  seized  all 
the  property,  valued  at  over  $1,500,000, 
taking  with  him  what  he  could  carry, 
and  destroying  the  remainder.  He  set 
fire  to  the  buildings,  not  even  sparing 
the  hospital,  which  was  filled  with  sick 
and  wounded  soldiers.  This  was  the 
second  time  that  Murphy  had  been 
guilty  of  such  conduct.  He  did  the 
same  thing  at  luka.  General  Grant 
was  wild  with  rage.  It  was  his  opinion 
that  with  all  the  cotton,  public  stores 
and  substantial  buildings  about  the 
depot,”  Murphy  ought  to  have  been 
able  to  keep  the  assailants  at  bay  until 
relief  arrived.  It  was  only  four  hours 
after  the  catastrophe,  when  the  4000 
men  sent  to  his  aid  arrived  on  the  spot. 
Grant  was  particularly  incensed  at  Mur- 
phy for  accepting  a parole  for  himself 
and  his  men.  A cartel  had  been  agreed 
to  by  the  rival  commanders  ; and  it  had 
been  stipulated  that  each  party  should 
take  care  of  his  own  prisoners.  . If 
Murphy  had  refused  parole  for  himself 
and  men,  V an  Dorn  would  have  been 
“compelled  to  release  them  uncon- 
ditionally, or  to  have  abandoned  all 
further  aggressive  movements  for  the 
time  being.”  In  a severe  order,  on  the 
9th  of  January,  General  Grant  dis- 
missed Murphy  from  the  army,  the 


order  to  take  effect  “from  December 
20th,  the  date  of  his  cowardly  and  dis* 
graceful  conduct.” 

The  disaster  at  Holly  Springs  was 
ruinous  to  Grant’s  plan.  It  robbed  him 
of  supplies,  which,  it  w'as  intended, 
should  sustain  the  army  for  several 
weeks.  To  replace  them,  it  would  be 
necessary  to  put  in  operation  all  the 
capacity  and  force  of  the  Columbus 
Railroad ; but  this  railroad  had  been 
destroyed,  and  weeks  would  be  ex- 
hausted before  it  could  be  put  in  work- 
ing order.  Ignorant  of  the  resources 
of  the  country,  and  not  knowing 
whether,  in  the  event  of  his  pressing 
forward,  he  should  find  Sherman  in  the 
vicinity  of  Vicksburg,  he  deemed  it  his 
duty  to  fall  back.  He  immediately  re- 
crossed  the  Tallahatchie.  Having  no 
other  means  of  subsisting  his  army,  he 
made  requisitions  on  the  inhabitants  as 
he  moved  along.  On  the  23d  of  De- 
cember, he  w^as  at  Holly  Springs,  now 
a scene  of  wreck  and  ruin  ; and  a few 
days  later,  he  re-entered  La  Grange 
and  Grand  Junction,  where  he  was  once 
more  in  communication  with  Corinth 
and  Memphis.  Pemberton  made  no  at- 
tempt to  pursue.  On  the  contrary, 
taking  advantage  of  the  retreat  of  his 
antagonist,  he  withdrew  the  greater 
portion  of  his  forces  from  Grenada,  and 
concentrated  towards  Vicksburg. 

On  the  same  day  that  Van  Dorn 
made  his  raid  on  Holly  Springs,  nn  at- 
tack was  made  by  a Confederate  force 
on  Davis’  Mills,  a little  further  to  the 
north.  In  the  neighborhood  of  Jack- 
son,  Tennessee,  a vital  point  in  Grant’s 
line  of  communications,  an  attack  was 


THE  JOINT  EXPEDITION. 


375 


made  by  a body  of  cavalry  under  For- 
rest, on  the  19th.  The  telegraph  wires 
were  cut,  and  the  railroad  was  destroyed. 
On  the  following  day  Forrest  presented 
himself  before  Humboldt  and  Trenton. 
These  and  other  stations  along  the  rail- 
road, such  as  Dyer’s,  Rutherford  and 
Kenton,  fell  an  easy  prey  to  the  enemy. 
It  seemed  to  be  the  purpose  of  the 
Confederates  to  destroy  every  railroad 
bridge  from  Columbus  to  Corinth,  and 
thus  to  cut  Grant  off  from  all  his  com- 
munications and  supplies.  So  far,  they 
had  carried  out  their  purpose  with 
determination,  and  with  not  a little 
success.  Never  was  campaign  opened 
under  apparently  happier  auspices. 
The  rich  bud  of  promise,  however,  was 
cruelly  blasted. 

Grant’s  plan  of  the  campaign  had 
failed.  Meanwhile,  what  of  Sherman  ? 
On  the  20th,  the  very  day  on  which 
Van  Dorn  and  Forrest  struck  the  blow 
which  compelled  Grant  to  fall  back 
and  abandon  his  part  of  the  joint  un- 
dertaking, Sherman  took  his  departure 
from  Memphis.  Taking  with  him  over 
20,000  troops  in  transports,  he  left,  as 
a guard  to  the  city,  a strong  force  of 
infantry  and  cavalry,  and  the  siege 
guns  in  position,  with  a complement  of 
gunners.  On  the  following  day,  at 
Friar’s  Point,  he  was  joined  by  Admi- 
ral Porter,  in  his  flag-ship  Black  Hawk, 
with  the  Marmora,  Captain  Getty,  and 
the  Conestoga,  Captain  Selfridge,  which 
were  to  act  as  a convoy.  The  remain- 
der of  Porter’s  fleet  were  at  the  mouth 
of  the  Yazoo.  On  the  same  even  in 
the  21st,  the  troops  at  Helena  embark- 
ed in  transports,  and  came  to  Friar’s 


Point.  Sherman’s  force  was  now  at 
least  30,000  strong.  All  the  arrange- 
ments were  completed ; and  the  joint 
• expedition  was  moving  down  the  river 
the  following  morning. 

Sherman  got  away  just  in  time  to  se- 
cure for  himself  the  glory  or  dishonor 
of  the  expedition.  Had  he  lingered  a 
day  longer,  he  would  have  been  super- 
seded in  his  command  by  General 
McClernand.  It  is  a strange  story, 
and  one  which,  for  the  sake  of  all  the 
parties  concerned,  it  would  be  well  if 
the  world  could  forget.  We  will  not 
enter  into  details.  It  has  already  been 
stated  that  General  McClernand  was  a 
warm  personal  friend  of  President  Lin- 
coln, and  that  he  was  ambitious  of  an 
independent  command  on  the  Missis- 
sippi. It  is  not  necessary  to  say  that 
Sherman  was  a man  according  to  Grant’s 
own  heart.  Since  that  great  day  at 
Shiloh,  their  fates  had  been  linked  to- 
gether, and  they  had  been  to  each  other 
like  David  and  Jonathan.  Sherman 
was  also  a great  favorite  with  Halleck, 
the  commander-in-chief  at  Washing- 
ton. But  for  the  personal  wishes  of 
Grant  and  Halleck,  both  of  whom 
knew  well  that  Sherman  was  the  man 
for  the  position,  McClernand  would 
have  been  appointed  by  Lincoln  in  the 
first  instance  to  the  command  of  the 
river  expedition. 

McClernand,  however,  was  not  to  be 
put  off ; and  Lincoln,  who  was  always 
unwilling  to  disoblige  a friend,  was 
weak  enough  to  yield  to  his  entreaties. 
On  the  18th  of  December,  an  order  from 
the  president  reached  Grant,  directing 
him  to  divide  all  his  forces  into  four 


376 


CHICKASAW. 


army  corps,  to  assign  one  corps  to 
McClernand,  and  to  place  him  at  the 
head  of  the  troops  destined  for  the 
attack  upon  Vicksburg.  Grant  could 
hardly  fail  to  see  in  this  order  a blow- 
aimed  at  himself.  It  was  a most  a-^vk- 
ward  circumstance,  and  reflected  little 
credit  on  the  wisdom  and  good  sense  of 
the  president.  Good  and  great  as  he 
was,  Lincoln  was  not  without  his  weak- 
nesses. He  was  vain  enough  to  imagine 
that  he  knew  quite  as  much  as  his  gen- 
erals in  the  field ; and  he  was  disposed 
to  deal  with  military  officers,  as  he  was 
in  the  habit  of  dealing  with  politicians. 
It  is  not  much  to  be  wondered  at  if 
Grant  was  staggered  by  this  order,  and 
if  he  was  slow  to  put  it  in  execution. 
It  was  not  difficult  for  him  to  find  an  ex- 
cuse. He  was  in  the  midst  of  his  pre- 
parations for  an  onward  march.  The 
reconstruction  of  his  army,  according 
to  the  instructions  received,  occupied 
him  the  whole  of  the  19th.  The  disaster 
at  Holly  Springs,  compelling  a back- 
ward movement,  occurred  on  the  20th ; 
and  the  raids  of  Forrest  on  the  same 
day  deprived  him  of  the  use  of  the 
telegraph.  As  it  was,  Sherman  had 
proceeded  down  the  river  before  any 
counter-instructions  reached  Memphis. 
If  Sherman  had  any  reason  to  fear  a 
counter-order,  his  haste  to  get  ready 
and  his  prompt  departure  but  revealed 
the  soldierly  spirit  and  true  character 
of  the  man.  As  the  result  proved,  it 
was  well  for  Sherman,  well  for  General 
Grant,  and  well  for  the  nation  at  large, 
that  Lincoln’s  order  did  not  take  effect 
before  the  20th  of  December. 

On  Christmas  Day,  the  expedition 


under  Sherman  and  Porter  had  i>ec, 
reached  Milliken’s  Bend,  when  25. 
Sherman  detached  Burbridge’s  brigade, 
of  A.  J.  Smith’s  division,  to  break  up 
the  railroad  leading  from  Vicksburg  to 
Shrevepo^’t,  Louisiana.  Leaving  A.  J. 
Smith’s  division  to  await  the  arrival, 
the  remaining  divisions  proceeded,  on 
the  26th,  to  the  mouth  of  the  Yazoo, 
and  up  that  river  to  Johnson’s  planta- 
tion, some  thirteen  miles,  and  there  dis- 
embarked. The  disembarkation  was 
conducted  without  any  opposition. 
Steele’s  division  landed  furthest  up  the 
river,  above  what  is  called  Chickasaw 
Bayou;  Morgan’s  division  a little  lower 
down,  at  the  house  of  Johnson,  which 
had  been  burned  by  the  gunboats  on  a 
former  occasion ; Morgan  L.  Smith’s 
division  below  that  of  Morgan  ; and 
A.  J.  Smith’s,  which  arrived  next  night, 
below  that  of  M.  L.  Smith.  The 
ground  on  which  Sherman  now  found 
himself  presented  obstacles  of  which 
formerly  he  had  but  a very  imperfect 
conception. 

Vicksburg  is  built  on  a range  of 
bluffs,  known  as  the  W alnut  Hills. 
These  hills,  which  take  their  rise  a lit- 
tle below  the  city,  extend  for  the  most 
part  in  a northeasterly  direction,  ter- 
minating in  Haines’  Bluff,  a distance 
of  some  thirteen  or  fourteen  miles.  The 
configuration  of  these  hills  has  been 
compared  to  the  ridge  at  Inkerman,  to 
which,  it  is  said,  they  bear,  in  some  par- 
ticulars, a striking  resemblance.  Their 
average  height  is  about  two  hundred 
feet.  Where  the  Mississippi  touches 
their  base  at  Vicksburg,  and  for  some 
miles  both  above  and  below,  they  are 


THE  YAZOO. 


377 


precipitous.  Along  their  entire  length, 
indeed,  from  Vicksburg  to  Haines’  Bluff, 
their  face  is  very  abrupt,  and  cut  up  by 
numerous  valleys  and  ravines.  The 
only  approach  to  the  city  by  land,  from 
up  the  river,  is  by  climbing  their  al- 
most perpendicular  front.  The  ground 
beyond  is  high,  broken,  and  somewhat 
rolling,  gradually  descending  to  the 
Big  Black  River.  The  Yazoo,  which 
skirts  the  ridge  at  Haines’  Bluff,  about 
nine  miles  above  Vicksburg  by  the 
road,  along  the  foot  of  the  bluffs,  flows 
in  a southwestern  direction,  and  before 
discharging  its  waters  into  the  Missis- 
sippi, crosses  an  old  arm  of  the  river, 
which  now  forms  a semicircular  lake. 

The  Yazoo  evidently,  in  times  gone 
by,  clung  to  the  foot  of  the  hills ; and 
traces  of  its  former  whereabouts  are  to 
be  seen  in  the  numerous  bayous  and 
channels  by  which  the  intervening 
ground  is  cut  up.  One  of  these  bayous 
puts  off  from  the  Yazoo,  about  one 
third  of  the  distance  below  Haines’ 
Bluff,  running  at  right  angles  with  the 
river  until  it  approaches  the  bluffs, 
when  it  turns  and  follows  their  base 
until  it  empties  itself  into  the  Missis- 
sippi. It  is  called  Chickasaw  Bayou. 
Between  the  bayou  and  the  hills  there 
was  an  irregular  strip  of  land,  on  which 
the  trees  had  been  filled  to  form  an 
abatis.  It  was  dotted  also  with  rifle- 
pits.  Rifle-trenches  abounded,  too, 
along  the  front  of  the  bluffs ; and  the 
heights  above  were  crowned  with  bat- 
teries. About  a mile  to  the  northeast 
of  the  bayou,  and  parallel  with  it,  there 
is  a deep  slough,  which  makes  a sharp 
turn  as  it  approaches  the  bluffs,  and 


enters  Chickasaw  Bayou  at  the  point 
where  the  latter  is  checked  in  its  course, 
and  turns  to  flow  along  the  base  of  the 
hills.  There  was  thus  a fortified  line 
some  twelve  or  thirteen  miles  in  length 
formed  of  abatis  and  rifle-pits,  with  an 
impassable  ditch  in  front,  and  terminat- 
ing in  the  powerful  fixed  batteries  at 
Haines’  Bluff,  on  the  one  hand,  and  in 
the  heavy  batteries  and  field  works 
above  Vicksburg,  on  the  other.  The 
land  lying  between  the  Yazoo  and  the 
Chickasaw  was  not  only  low  and 
swampy : it  was,  except  in  one  or  two 
places,  where  there  were  plantations, 
densely  wooded.  The  distance  from 
Johnson’s  Landing  to  the  Chickasaw 
was  about  six  miles.  Such  was  the 
ground  over  which  Sherman  proposed 
to  march  his  men.  Such  were  the  ob- 
stacles to  be  overcome  before  he  could 
enter  Vicksburg.  To  the  National  com- 
mander, how^ever,  and  to  his  officers, 
these  obstacles  were,  as  yet,  but  imper- 
fectly known. 

General  Sherman’s  army  was  organ- 
ized in  four  divisions.  The  first  divi- 
sion, comprising  three  brigades,  was 
under  Brigadier-General  George  W. 
Morgan ; second  division,  three  bri- 
gades, under  Brigadier-General  Morgan 
L.  Smith  ; third  division,  three  brigades, 
under  Brigadier-General  A.  J.  Smith; 
fourth  division,  four  brigades,  under 
Brigadier-General  Frederick  Steele. 
The  brigade  commanders  of  the  fourth 
division  were  Generals  Frank  P.  Blair, 
John  M.  Thayer,  C.  E.  Hovey,  and 
Colonel  Hassendurbel.  According  to 
Sherman’s  plan  of  attack,  Genei-al 
Steele  was  to  hold  the  extreme  left, 


378 


CHICKASAW. 


General  Morgan  the  left  centre,  Gen- 
eral M.  L.  Smith  the  right  centre,  and 
General  A.  J.  Smith  the  extreme  right. 
As  the  latter  general  had  not  yet  ar- 
rived from  Milliken’s  Bend,  where  we 
left  him  waiting  for  Burbridge,  Gen- 
eral Frank  P.  Blair,  with  his  brigade, 
was  detached  from  Steele’s  division,  and 
placed  on  Morgan’s  right.  The  object 
of  this  arrangement  was  to  distract  the 
enemy’s  attention,  leading  him  to  ex- 
pect an  attack  at  a number  of  different 
points.  Instructions,  however,  had  been 
given  to  each  of  the  commanders  to 
converge  toward  the  point  of  attack,  at 
or  near  Barfield’s  plantation.  There  it 
had  been  discovered  the  bayou  could 
be  crossed  at  two  points — at  a sand 
bar,  and  at  a narrow  levee. 

On  the  27th,  the  army  began  to 
Dec,  move.  General  Steele,  who  had 
27.  been  ordered  to  take  position  on 
the  further  side  of  the  slough  above 
this  bayou,  experienced  great  difficulty 
in  landing  his  troops.  So  soft  and 
slushy  was  the  ground,  and  so  dense 
was  the  brushwood,  that  he  found  it 
necessary  to  construct  roads  for  moving 
his  wagons  and  artillery.  When  night 
came  he  had  only  advanced  some  two 
miles  from  the  shore.  During  the 
greater  portion  of  next  day  he  pushed 
forward  his  command;  but  he  was  com- 
pelled to  report  to  Sherman  that  he 
found  it  physically  impossible  to  reach 
the  bluffs  from  his  position,  and  that 
to  persist  in  the  attempt,  would  inevit- 
ably lead  to  the  ruin  of  his  troops,  and 
the  loss  of  his  field  equipage.  He  was, 
therefore,  ordered  to  leave  some  of  his 
troops  behind  him  as  a show  of  force. 


to  hasten  to  the  west  side  of  the  Chick- 
asaw Bayou,  and  take  a position  on 
Morgan’s  left.  On  the  27th,  Blair 
moved  slowly  towards  the  bluffs,  his 
desire  being  to  give  Steele  time  to 
come  into  position  on  the  left.  He 
succeeded  in  silencing  one  of  the  ene- 
my’s batteries  at  the  point  where  he 
expected  Steele  would  be  able  to  join 
him,  and  held  his  ground. 

On  the  28th,  the  various  divisions 
pressed  forward;  and  the  Na-  Dec. 
tional  troops  were  in  full  posses-  28. 
sion  on  the  Yazoo  side  of  the  bayou, 
with  one  bridge  thrown  across,  and 
with  two  bridges  partially  constructed. 
During  the  course  of  the  day,  while  re- 
connoitering.  General  M.  L.  Smith  was 
severely  wounded  in  the  hip,  and  com- 
pelled to  retire  to  his  steamboat.  His 
command  devolved  on  General  Stuart ; 
but  Sherman,  feeling  convinced  that 
A.  J.  Smith  could  accomplish  nothing 
on  the  extreme  right,  because  of  the 
heavy  fire  of  the  forts  immediately  in 
his  front,  ordered  him  to  leave  Bur- 
bridge  in  position  at  that  point,  and  to 
come  up  with  a portion  of  his  forces 
to  the  point  selected  for  crossing  the 
bayou,  and  entrusted  him  with  the 
execution  of  the  task.  Such  was  the 
state  of  things  on  the  night  of  the 
28th.  General  Morgan  was  in  position 
on  the  west  or  rather  southwest  side  of 
the  Chickasaw;  General  Blair  was  a 
little  to  his  right,  near  the  angle  of  the 
bayou ; General  M.  L.  Smith’s  division, 
under  General  Stuart,  was  on  the  right 
centre;  General  A.  J.'  Smith’s,  which 
was  further  to  the  right,  had  taken  posi- 
tion near  the  place  where  the  bayou 


THE  ATTACK. 


379 


was  to  be  crossed ; and  General  Steele 
was  moving  up  on  the  left,  to  act  as  a 
reserve  to  Morgan. 

On  the  morning  of  the  29th,  all 
Dec,  things  were  in  readiness  for  the 
2^*  attack.  It  was  Sherman’s  object, 
as  he  himself  has  told  us,  to  make  a 
lodgment  on  the  foot-hills  and  blutfs 
abreast  of  his  position,  while  diver- 
sions M^ere  being  made  by  the  navy  at 
Haines’  Blulf,  and  by  the  first  division, 
directly  towards  Vicksburg.  We  have 
already  mentioned  that  there  were  two 
crossings — one  in  front  of  Morgan,  and 
another  a little  further  to  the  south- 
west, in  front  of  M.  L.  Smith.  An 
attempt  was  made  by  A.  J.  Smith  to 
throw  a light-flying  bridge  over  the 
bayou,  more  to  the  right.  On  the  ex- 
treme left,  a little  above  the  angle  of 
the  Chickasaw,  near  the  house  of  Mrs. 
Lake,  Blair’s  men  had  succeeded  in 
constructing  a bridge,  but  not  without 
great  difficulty,  and  with  very  consider- 
able loss.  Sherman  expected  great 
things  from  General  Morgan,  who,  as 
we  have  seen,  commanded  the  first  di- 
vision, and  was  to  lead  the  attack  in 
person.  Sherman  pointed  out  to  him 
the  place  where  he  could  pass  the 
bayou,  and  received  for  answer:  “Gen- 
eral, in  ten  minutes  after  you  give  the 
signal.  I’ll  be  on  those  hills.”  His  po- 
sition was  one  of  considerable  difficulty. 
The  crossing  was  narrow ; and  immedi- 
ately opposite,  at  the  base  of  the  hills, 
there  was  a Confederate  battery,  sup- 
ported by  infantry,  posted  on  the  spurs 
of  the  hills  in  the  rear.  This  was  the 
real  point  of  attack;  but  to  distract  the 
attention  of  the  enemy,  Sherman’s  in- 


structions were  that  the  initial  move- 
ments should  be  made  at  the  flanks. 

It  was  about  noon  before  the  siornal 

O 

w^as  given  for  a general  forward  move- 
ment across  the  bayou  and  towards  the 
enemy’s  position.  A heavy  artillery 
fire  was  opened  all  along  the  National 
line.  It  recalled  the  memory  of  luka 
and  Corinth.  T he  Conf ed  erate  batteries 
made  a prompt  reply,  and  were  soon 
followed  by  the  infantry,  which  opened 
a perfect  tempest  of  lead  on  the  ad- 
vance ranks  of  Morgan  and  A.  J.  Smith. 
In  the  midst  of  this  fierce  storm  of  cam 
non-shot  and  musketry,  De  Courcy’s 
brigade,  of  Morgan’s  division,  succeeded 
in  crossing  the  bayou;  but  so  terrific 
was  the  fire  that  they  took  to  cover  be- 
hind the  bank,  and  could  not  be  moved 
forward.  General  Blair,  meanwhile, 
had  crossed  the  bayou  by  the  bridge 
above  the  angle,  and  had  reached  the 
slough,  the  bottom  of  which  was  quick- 
sand, and  the  banks  of  which  were  cov- 
ered with  felled  trees.  With  great 
difficulty,  and  not  until  his  ranks  were 
thrown  into  some  disorder,  was  the 
crossing  of  the  slough  accomplished. 
This  done,  it  was  necessary,  before 
reaching  the  enemy’s  works,  to  traverse 
a sloping  plateau,  raked  by  a direct 
and  enfilading  fire  from  heavy  artillery, 
and  swept  by  a storm  of  bullets  from 
the  rifle-pits.  Nothing  daunted,  Blair 
and  his  brave  brigade — his  own  and 
his  officers’  horses  having  been  left  be- 
hind, some  of  them  floundering  in  the 
mire  and  vainly  seeking  a foothold  in 
the  c^uicksand — went  bounding  across 
th>e  plateau.  Rushing  upon  the  rifle- 
pits,  they  captured  the  first  line  and 


380 


CHICKASAW. 


then  the  second,  and  made  a despei*ate 
effort  to  gain  the  crest  of  the  hill  on 
which  the  batteries  were  planted. 

Colonel  Thayer,  of  Steele’s  division, 
had  followed  Blair,  with  his  brigade, 
over  the  same  bridge.  Entering  the 
abatis  at  the  same  point,  he  turned 
somewhat  to  the  right,  and  emerged 
upon  the  plateau  almost  simultaneously 
with  Blair,  and  about  two  hundred 
yards  to  his  right.  Unfortunately, 
however,  Thayer  found  that  he  was  fol- 
lowed by  only  one  regiment ; his  second 
regiment,  after  his  movement  had  com- 
menced, having  been  ordered  to  the 
support  of  Morgan,  and  the  other  two 
regiments  having  followed  this  one  by 
mistake.  It  was  a sad  blunder,  and 
one  w^hich  contributed  not  a little  to 
the  disaster  of  the  day.  Thayer  dis- 
covered the  mistake  before  he  had  fair- 
ly brought  his  troops  into  action ; but 
he  was  too  brave  a man  to  halt  or 
hesitate  in  the  circumstances.  On  he 
pushed  to  the  right  of  Blair,  and  ren- 
dered effective  aid  in  the  capture  of  the 
second  line  of  rihe-pits.  Leaving  his 
regiment  to  hold  the  position  it  had 
won,  he  hurried  back,  with  Blair’s  con- 
sent, to  obtain  reinforcements.  It  was 
a trying  interval.  The  moments  seemed 
hours.  ‘‘It  was  a struggle,”  as  has 
been  well  said,  “between  three  thou- 
sand in  the  open  ground  below  and  ten 
thousand  behind  entrenchments  above.” 
The  hill  sides  bristled  with  bayonets 
and  blazed  with  the  lire  of  musketry, 
while,  from  the  angry  mouths  of  huge 
cannon,  destruction  was  poured  forth 
upon  the  shattered  and  rapidly  thinning 
ranks  of  the  assailants.  Blair,  impa- 


tient for  the  return  of  Thayer,  rushed 
back  himself  to  persuade  the  advance 
of  more  troops.  It  W'as  all  in  vain. 
Both  Thayer  and  himself  failed  in 
obtaining  reinfoi-cements.  No  help 
reached  them;  no  diversion  was  made 
in  their  favor.  They  had  no  choice  but 
to  order  a retreat.  Blair  and  Thayer 
fell  back,  with  a loss  of  at  least  one 
third  of  their  men;  and  De  Courcy, 
who  had  been  attacked  on  the  flank  by 
the  Seventeenth  and  Twenty-Sixth  Lou- 
isiana, lost  four  flags,  332  men  made 
prisoners,  and  about  500  small  arms. 

The  attack  was  a complete  failure. 
Somehow,  the  signal  for  attack  was  im- 
perfectly understood.  Either  that,  or 
it  was  not  heard  at  all  on  the  right. 
Two  divisions  had  remained  immovable, 
w'hile  a handful  of  men  were  being 
crushed  in  a desperate  attempt  on  the 
left.  A.  J.  Smith  had  done  nothing. 
Stuart  had  managed  to  push  across  one 
regiment — the  Sixth  Missouri — which 
had  orders  to  undermine  the  bluff.  The 
position  of  those  men  was  one  which 
severely  tried  their  faith  and  patience. 
They  were  exposed  to  the  vertical  Are 
of  the  Confederate  sharpshooters  who 
occupied  the  ridge ; and  a battalion  of 
the  Thirteenth  Begulars,  who  were 
stationed  opposite,  and  wflio  attempted 
to  protect  them  from  the  Confederate 
Are,  proved  equally  dangerous  with  the 
enemy  above.  “ Shoot  higher !”  shouted 
the  Nationals  below  the  bluff.  “Shoot 
lower!”  cried  the  Confederates.  After 
dark,  this  regiment  was  brought  back 
over  the  bayou.  The  remainder  of 
Steele’s  division  did  not  get  up  in  time 
to  be  of  any  assistance  to  Blair.  Mor- 


SAD  SCENES. 


381 


gan  failed  to  make  good  his  promise. 
He  did  not  even  obey  his  orders.  Gen- 
eral Sherman  was  particularly  severe  on 
Morgan.  To  him,  and  to  his  conduct, 
he  attributed  the  failure  of  the  attack. 
‘‘  This  attack  failed,”  he  has  since  told 
us  in  his  memoirs,  and  I have  always 
felt  that  it  was  due  to  the  failure  of  Gen- 
eral G.  W.  Morgan  to  obey  his  orders, 
or  to  fulfil  his  promises  made  in  person. 
Had  he  used  with  skill  and  boldness 
one  of  his  brigades,  in  addition  to  that 
of  Blair,  he  could  have  made  a lodg- 
ment on  the  blutf,  which  would  have 
opened  the  door  for  our  whole  force  to 
follow.” 

Sherman  was  naturally  mortified  at 
the  “ lame  and  impotent  conclusion  ” 
of  a movement  which,  he  had  fondly 
and  confidently  believed,  would  result 
in  a great  and  decisive  victory.  Baffled, 
and.  even  humiliated,  he  was  not  dis- 
mayed. He  resolved  to  make  another 
attack;  and  arrangements  were  made 
to  push  forward  General  Hovey  to  the 
position  from  which  Blair  had  been 
driven ; Morgan’s  division,  with  the 
brigades  of  Blair  and  Thayer,  to  follow 
and  support.  For  some  reason  it  was 
not  done ; and  next  morning  it  was 
found  to  be  impossible,  because  of  the 
increased  strength  of  the  Confederates 
at  the  menaced  point.  Firing  was  con- 
tinued on  both  sides  during  Tuesday  ; 
Dec.  Wednesday,  the  31st,  a 

31*  flag  of  truce  was  sent  in;  and  the 
dead  were  buried,  and  the  wounded 
cared  for.  An  eye-witness  has  given 
us  a* sad  picture  of  the  battle  field  on 
that  day  of  burial.  “All  across  the 
plain,  scattered  among  the  abatis^  .and 


hid  away  in  little  entanglements  of 
bogs,  or  tufts  of  bushes,  they  lay.  Con- 
federates and  Federal  s side  by  side, 
showing  how  the  battle  had  rolled  and 
surged  with  the  alternate  charges  of 
either  party.  But  the  saddest  sight  of 
all  was  that  of  the  unfortunate  wound- 
ed who  had  lain  through  all  these  weary 
hours,  since  the  battle,  uncared  for, 
many  of  them,  because  the  nature  of 
their  wounds  prevented  them  from 
moving;  others  were  held  fast  by  a 
little  knot  of  corpses  which  chance  had 
thrown  upon  them;  and  still  others, 
perhaps  not  wounded  at  all  at  first, 
but  being  caught  beneath  the  horses 
they  rode,  as  they  fell,  were  pinned  to 
the  earth.  The  frantic  appeals  for 
water,  for  food,  or  other  succor,  of  such 
of  these  miserable  victims  of  war  as 
could  speak  at  all,  were  most  heart- 
rending.” 

Sherman  was  still  dissatisfied,  and 
resolved  to  make  another  attack.  After 
consulting  with  Admiral  Porter,  it  was 
agreed  that  a combined  naval  and  land 
assault  should  be  ' made  on  Haines’ 
Bluff,  the  key  of  the  Confederate  posi- 
tion. Porter  was  to  proceed  up  the 
Yazoo  with  his  gunboats,  and  open  fire 
on  the  bluffs,  while  General  Steele  was 
to  land  his  division  out  of  range  of  the 
enemy’s  guns,  then  to  push  forward 
and  take  the  position  by  storm.  The 
attack  was  to  be  made  during  the  dark 
hours.  By  two  o’clock  on  the  morn- 
ing of  Thursday,  the  1st  of  Jan- 
nary,  the  necessary  arrangements 
were  completed.  A heavy  fog,  how- 
ever, had  enveloped  the  entire  district; 
and  so  dense  was  it  that  Porter  found  it 


382 


CHICKASAW. 


impossible  to  steer  the  boats.  It  was 
utterly  out  of  the  question  to  make 
any  further  efforts.  On  the  night  of 
the  29th  December,  there  had  been  a 
tremendous  rain-storm ; all  the  low 
ground  was  flooded ; and  the  men  who 
had  been  bivouacking  for  five  successive 
days  in  those  wretched  swamps,  with- 
out fire,  were  suffering  cruelly  from 
Jan.  damp  and  cold.  On  the  2d  of 
January,  Sherman  placed  his 
troops  on  board  the  transports;  and 
the  fleet  sailed  down  to  the  mouth  of 
the  Yazoo.  Thus  ended,  somewhat  in- 
gloriously,  the  second  campaign  against 
Y icksburg.  Sherman  had  accomplished 
nothing.  He  had,  however,  made  great 
sacrifices ; his  loss  in  killed  and  wound- 
ed and  prisoners  amounting  to  nearly 
2000  men.  Such  was  the  battle  of 
Chickasaw  Bayou,  or,  as  it  is  sometimes 
but  less  correctly  named,  the  battle  of 
Haines’  Bluff. 

It  was  a sad  disappointment  to  the 
people  of  the  North ; and  Sherman, 
from  whom  great  things  were  expected, 
came  in  for  a large  share ' of  abuse. 
Several  of  the  correspondents  on  the 
spot,  ignorant  of  some  of  the  causes  of 
the  failure,  and  not  knowing  as  yet 
the  fate  which  had  befallen  Grant,  were 
unnecessarily  severe  in  their  condemna- 
tion of  Sherman.  That  he  meant  well, 
that  he  was  resolved  to  win,  and  that 
his  plan  was  well-conceived,  there  can 
be  no  doubt.  But  somehow  the  execu- 
tion was  not  equal  to  the  conception. 
There  was  some  mistake  in  giving 
the  signal ; and  the  real  assault  was 
made  by  only  3000  men.  If  Blair  had 
been  sustained  in  his  attack,  as  he 


ought  to  have  been  sustained,  the  Na- 
tional army  would  most  undoubtedly 
have  effected  a lodgment  on  the 
heights ; and,  although  hard  fighting 
must  have  followed  with  doubtful  suc- 
cess, it  is  not  at  all  impossible  that 
Shermail  might  have  reaped  all  the 
glory  due  to  the  capture  of  Vicksburg. 
Blair  will  be  remembered  as  the  hero 
of  Chickasaw  Bayou.  He  fought  like 
a warrior  of  old,  face  to  face  and  hand 
to  hand  with  the  foe.  After  Blair, 
praise  is  due  to  Thayer,  who  gallantly 
sustained  his  companion  in  arms.  The 
battle  ground,  no  doubt,  had  much  to 
do  with  the  defeat.  To  any  one  of 
less  daring  than  Sherman,  familiar 
with  the  district,  and  well-informed  as 
to  the  strength  of  the  enemy’s  position, 
the  undertaking  might  have  seemed 
impracticable  from  the  outset ; and  it  is 
questionable  whether  even  he,  had  he 
possessed  a fuller  knowledge  of  the 
difficulties  which  beset  him,  would 
have  imperilled  his  fame  and  risked 
the  lives  of  his  soldiers  in  a task  so 
apparently  hopeless.  It  was  doubtless 
a mistake  not  to  have  more  thoroughly 
and  officially  reconnoitered  the  ground 
before  choosing  it  as  the  field  of  action. 
After  all,  however,  it  was  an  experi- 
ment which  might  have  been  successful ; 
and  it  was  not  the  only  unsuccessful 
experiment  which  was  made  before 
Vicksburg  was  captured.  As  it  was, 
everything  might  have  been  well,  if 
Grant  had  been  able  to  carry  out  his 
part  of  the  plan.  The  retreat  of  the 
latter  from  Oxford,  leaving,  as  it  did, 
Pemberton  free  to  concentrate  his 
troops  for  the  defense  of  Vicksburg, 


McCLERNAND  IN  COMMAND. 


383 


largely  diminished  Sherman’s  chances 
of  success. 

The  Confederates  were  jubilant  after 
this  first  victory.  It  was  undoubtedly 
a great  triumph.  General  Pemberton, 
not  without  reason,  felt  proud  that  he 
had  baffled  Grant  in  person,  compelling 
him  to  retreat,  and  that  he  had  tem- 
porarily, at  least,  saved  Vicksburg  by 
the  defeat  of  the  greatest  of  Grant’s 
lieutenants.  These  rejoicings  in  the 
South  were  not  un mixed  with  sorrow. 
The  more  thoughtful  of  the  Confed- 
erates knew  that  defeat  only  intensi- 
fied the  purpose  of  the  North.  Vicks- 
burg had  not  yet  fallen ; but  Vicksburg, 
they  felt,  was  doomed. 

We  left  the  transports  and  the  fleet 
on  their  way  down  the  Yazoo.  At  the 
mouth  of  that  river.  General  McCler- 
nand  was  waiting  with  orders  from  the 
War  Department  to  take  command  of 
the  entire  expedition.  That  general, 
it  will  be  remembered,  was  appointed 
to  this  command  by  the  direct  influence 
of  President  Lincoln.  It  was  a severe 
blow  to  Sherman,  who  felt  it  keenly. 
It  was  some  consolation,  however,  to 
him  to  know  that  the  appointment — 
which  had  been  made  weeks  ahead, 
and  which  had  no  connection  with  the 
recent  disaster — was  not  intended  as  a 
disgrace.  With  a modesty  which  be- 
came a man  of  his  high  spirit,  he  ac- 
cepted the  situation,  and  explained  to 
McClernand  what  had  been  done,  ac- 
cepting the  entire  responsibility  of  the 
failure.  Keferring  to  the  trains  of  cars 
which  could  be  heard  coming  in  to 
Vicksburg  almost  every  hour,  and  the 
fresb  troops  seen  on  the  bluffs,  he  gave 


it  as  his  opinion  that  Pemberton’s  army 
must  have  been  pressed  back,  and  that 
Grant  must  be  at  hand.  He  then 
learned,  for  the  first  time,  what  bad 
befallen  Grant ; McClernand  stating 
that  Grant  was  not  coming  at  all,  that 
the  depot  at  Holly  Springs  had  been 
captured  by  Van  Dorn,  that  Grant  had 
fallen  back  from  Coffeeville  and  Ox- 
ford to  Holly  Springs  and  La  Grange, 
and  that  when  he  passed  down,  Quim- 
by’s  division,  of  Grant’s  army,  was  ac- 
tually at  Memphis  for  stores.  By 
common  consent,  all  further  attempts 
against  Vicksburg,  for  the  present, 
were  abandoned ; and  the  entire  force 
left  the  Yazoo,  and  retired  to  Milli- 
ken’s  Bend  on  the  Mississippi. 

On  the  4th  of  January,  McClernand 
issued  his  General  Order  No.  1,  assum- 
ing command  of  what  was  to  be  called 
the  army  of  the  Mississippi,  and,  fol- 
lowing the  plan  which  had  been  agreed 
upon  at  Washington,  and  which  had 
been  adopted  in  the  armies  of  the  East, 
dividing  his  forces  into  two  corps. 
The  first  'was  to  be  commanded  by 
General  Morgan,  and  was  to  be  com- 
posed of  his  own  and  A.  J.  Smith’s 
divisions;  and  the  second,  to  consist  of 
Steele’s  and  Stuart’s  divisions,  was  to 
be  commanded  by  General  Sherman. 
The  rest  of  the  army  of  the  Tennessee 
was  similarly  divided,  General  Hurl- 
but  being  placed  in  command  of  one 
corps,  and  General  McPherson  in  com- 
mand of  the  other.  The  supreme  com- 
mand of  these  four  corps  was  retained 
by  General  Grant.  On  the  same  day. 
General  Sherman  issued  the  following 
order : 


384 


CHICKASAW. 


“ Headquarters  Right  Wing  Army  of  Tennessee,  \ 
Steamer  Forest  Queen,  Milliken’s  Bend,  > 

January  4,  1863.  ) 

“ Pursuant  to  the  terms  of  General 
Order  No.  1,  made  this  day  by  General 
McClernand,  the  title  of  our  army  ceases 
to  exist,  and  constitutes  in  the  future 
the  army  of  the  Mississippi,  composed 
of  two  ‘ anny  corps  one  to  be  com- 
manded by  General  G.  W.  Morgan,  and 
the  other  by  myself.  In  relimpiishing 
the  command  of  the  army  of  the  Ten- 
nessee, and  restricting  my  authority  to 
my  own  corps,  I desire  to  express  to  all 
commanders,  to  soldiei’s  and  officers  re- 
cently operating  before  Vicksburg,  my 
liearty  thanks  for  the  zeal,  alacrity,  and 
courage  manifested  by  them  on  all  oc- 
casions. We  failed  in  accomplishing 
one  great  piu’pose  of  our  movement — 
the  capture  of  Vicksburg ; but  we  were 
])art  of  a whole.  Ours  was  but  pai’t  of 
a combined  movement  in  which  others 
w’ere  to  assist.  We  were  on  time;  un- 
foreseen contingencies  must  have  de- 
layed the  others.  We  have  destroyed 
the  Shreveport  Hoad,  wm  have  attacked 
the  defenses  of  Vicksburg,  and  pushed 
the  attack  as  far  as  prudence  would  jus- 
tify; and,  having  found  it  too  strong  for 
our  single  column,  we  have  drawn  otf  in 
good  order  and  good  spirits,  ready  for 
any  new  move.  A new  commander  is 
now  here  to  lead  you.  He  is  chosen  by 
the  president  of  the  United  States,  who 
is  charged  by  the  Constitution  to  main- 
tain and  defend  it,  and  he  has  the  un- 
doubted ri^ht  to  select  his  own  agents. 
I know  that  all  good  officers  and  sol- 
diers will  give  him  the  same  hearty 
support  and  cheerful  obedience  they 


have  hitherto  given  me.  There  are 
honors  enough  in  reserve  for  all,  and 
work  enough,  too.  Let  each  do  his  ap- 
propriate part,  and  our  nation  must,  in 
the  end,  emerge  from  the  dire  conflict 
purified  and  ennobled  by  the  fires  which 
now  test  its  strength  and  purity.  All 
officers  of  the  general  staff  not  attached 
to  my  person  will  hereafter  report  in 
person  and  by  letter  to  Major-General 
McClernand,  commanding  the  army  of 
the  Mississippi,  on  board  the  steamer 
Tigress  at  our  rendezvous  at  Haines’ 
Landing  and  at  Montgomery  Point. 

“By  order  of 

“Major-General  W.  T.  Sherman. 

“J.  H.  Hammond, 
“Assistant-Adjutant  General.” 

Befoie  the  arrival  of  McClernand, 
Sherman  and  Porter  had  agreed  upon  a 
plan  for  the  reduction  of  Fort  Hind- 
man, or-,  as  it  was  called,  Arkansas  Post. 
About  forty  or  forty-five  miles  from  the 
mouth  of  the  Arkansas,  there  is  a piece 
of  elevated  gi’ound,  the  first  high  land 
on  the  banks  of  the  river,  after  leaving 
the  Mississippi.  At  ’ this  point,  the 
river  makes  a sharp  bend.  Here  the 
French  had  a trading  post  and  a settle- 
ment as  far  back  as  1685.  The  Con- 
federates had  taken  advantage  of  the 
place  to  erect  some  fortifications,  the 
principal  work  being  named  Fort  Hind- 
man, after  the  famous  guerrilla  chief. 
Behind  these  works,  they  kept  several 
steamboats,  which  were  wont  to  sweep 
down  the  river  and  intercept  supplies. 
Sherman  had  experienced  some  incon- 
venience from  the  existence  of  this 
stronghold.  He  had  left  Memphis  in 
such  hade  that  he  had  not  been  able  to 


WHITE  RIYER. 


385 


take  with  him  a sufficient  supply  of 
ammunition  for  his  guns.  The  Blue 
Wing,  a small  steamer  carrying  a mail, 
towing  some  coal  barges,  and  having 
with  her  the  necessary  supplies,  had 
been  sent  after  him.  This  boat  had 
been  pounced  upon  at  the  mouth  of  the 
Arkansas,  captured,  and,  with  all  her 
supplies,  taken  up  to  Fort  Hindman.  It 
was  Sherman’s  conviction,  from  the 
moment  he  learned  of  the  fate  of  the 
Blue  Wing,  that  before  any  operation 
could  be  successfully  conducted  against 
Vicksburg  by  way  of  the  Mississippi, 
it  would  be  necessary  to  reduce  Fort 
Hindman,  and  make  an  end  of  the  Ar- 
kansas pirates.  Sherman  communicated 
his  purpose  to  McClernand,  and  asked 
permission  to  go  up  the  Arkansas,  and 
clear  out  the  post.  McClernand,  who 
had  not  as  yet,  so  far  as  appearances 
indicated,  formed  any  plan  of  his  own, 
went  with  Sherman  on  board  the  Black 
Hawk  to  consult  with  Porter.  Porter, 
who  had  the  hig^hest  esteem  for  Sher- 
man,  not  only  approved  of  the  enter- 
prise, but  expressed  a desire  to  go  up 
the  river  himself,  in  place  of  trusting 
the  expedition  to  any  of  his  subordi- 
nates. It  was  Sherman’s  expectation 
that  he  would  be  sent,  with  his  own 
corps,  alone  on  this  business ; but  Mc- 
Clernand concluded  to  go  himself,  and 
to  take  with  him  his  whole  force. 

The  troops,  which  had  not  yet  dis- 
embarked from  the  transpoils,  were 
ordered  to  remain  on  board.  Sher- 
man’s corps  was  in  two  divisions.  The 
first,  which  consisted  of  three  brigades, 
commanded  respectively  by  Blair, 
Hovey  and  Thayer,  was  under  Briga- 


dier-General Frederick  ^teele.  The 
second,  which  consisted  of  two  bri- 
gades, commanded  by  Colonels  G.  A, 
Smith  and  T.  Kilby  Smith,  was  under 
Brigadier-General  Stuart.  The  trans- 
ports with  the  troops  on  board,  con- 
voyed by  the  gun  boats,  of  which 
three  were  iron-clads,  proceeded  up  the 
Mississippi.  The  force  under  McCler- 
nand amounted  to  some  26,000  or 
27,000  men,  comprising  40  regiments 
of  infantry,  10  batteries  with  several 
guns  of  heavy  calibre,  and  about 
1500  horse.  On  the  8th  of  January, 
the  expedition  was  at  the  mouth  of  the 
White  River.  This  river,  which  is  one 
of  the  principal  streams  in  Arkansas, 
rises  a few  miles  east  of  Fayetteville, 
flows  northeast  into  Missouri,  then  re- 
turns into  Arkansas,  and,  pursuing  a 
southeasterly  course,  enters  the  Missis- 
sippi about  fifteen  miles  above  the 
mouth  of  the  Arkansas  River,  It  is 
navigable  by  steamboats  for  about 
three  hundred  and  fifty  miles.  About 
fifteen  miles  from  its  mouth,  there  is  a 
channel  or  ‘^cut-off,”  through  which  it 
discharges  a portion  of  its  waters  into 
the  Arkansas.  If,  as  sometimes  hap- 
pens, the  Arkansas  should  be  higher 
than  the  White  River,  the  state  of 
things  is  reversed,  and  the  waters  of 
the  Arkansas  seek  the  Mississippi 
throug:h  the  channel  of  the  White 
River.  The  ‘‘cut-off”  at  this  season 
of  the  year  is  always  well  filled  and 
easily  navigable.  On  the  morning  of 
the  9th,  the  expedition  having  jan, 
ascended  the  White  River,  had 
reached  the  mouth  of  the  “cut-off.” 
There  was  no  delay  in  making  the 


386 


CHICKASAW. 


passage  through  to  the  Arkansas,  a dis- 
tance of  about  eight  miles.  Steaming 
up  the  Arkansas,  the  boats  reached 
Notrib’s  Farm,  about  four  miles  below 
Fort  Hindman,  shortly  after  four  o’clock 
in  the  afternoon.  Here  they  halted ; 
and  during  the  night  the  artillery  and 
wagons  were  got  on  shore,  the  troops 
disembarking  in  the  morning.  Arkan- 
sas Post  is  on  the  north  side  or  left 
bank  of  the  Arkansas,  at  a point  where 
the  river  makes  a sharp  elbow,  by 
flowing  north,  then  east,  then  again  ab- 
ruptly to  the  south.  The  principal 
work,  as  we  have  said,  was  Fort  Hind- 
man. Its  guns  commanded  the  river, 
as  it  stretched  to  the  east,  and,  after  it 
bent  toward  the  south.  This  fort  was 
a regular  square  bastioned  work,  one 
hundred  yards  each  exterior  side,  with 
a deep  ditch  about  fifteen  feet  wide, 
and  a parapet  eighteen  feet  high.  It  was 
armed  vdth  twelve  guns,  two  of  which 
were  eight-inch,  and  one  nine-inch. 
The  garrison,  which  numbered  only 
5000  men,  was  under  the  command  of 
General  T.  J.  Churchill,  who  was  under 
the  direction  of  General  T.  H.  Holmes, 
then  commandiniy  at  Little  Pock. 

O 

Churchill  had  received  instructions  to 
^^hold  on  until  help  should  arrive  or 
all  were  dead.” 

The  disparity  of  forces  was  great. 
It  'was  26,000  or  27,000  against  5000. 
The  strong  position  held  by  the  Con- 
federates, however,  did  much  to  com- 
pensate for  inferiority  of  numbers. 
The  fort  itself  was  strong ; and  its  ap- 
proaches were  of  the  most  difficult  de- 
scription. Fronting  on  the  river,  it 
was  protected  on  the  west  by  a bayou, 


on  the  east  by  a swamp  which  did  not 
quite  reach  the  edge  of  the  water. 
Between  the  fort  and  the  swamp,  there 
was  a ravine  which  stretched  down  to 
the  river;  and  the  front  of  this  ravine 
was  well  fortified.  The  position  had 
thus  to  be  approached  through  the  ele- 
vated ground  which  lay  between  the 
bayou  and  the  swamp.  The  encamp- 
ments of  the  Confederates  were  estab- 
lished in  front  of  the  fort,  in  the  centre 
of  the  plateau  dotted  with  clumps  of 
trees.  There  was  an  outer  line  of  en- 
trenchments which  stretched  across  the 
entire  ground. 

On  the  10th,  the  army  was  kept 
busy  endeavoring  to  get  a posi-  jan, 
tion  in  rear  of  the  fort,  Sher- 
man  on  the  right  and  Morgan  on  the 
left.  Some  mistakes  were  made,  in  con- 
sequence of  a want  of  knowledge  of 
the  ground.  In  the  afternoon,  and 
while  the  land  forces  were  still  seeking 
position.  Porter  was  making  good  use 
of  his  flotilla.  As  he  moved  up  the 
river,  he  shelled  the  rifle-pits  along  the 
levee,  and  drove  the  Confederates  in- 
side the  fort.  When  about  four  hun- 
dred yards  from  Fort  Hindman,  he 
brought  into  action  his  three  iron-clads — 
the  Baron  de  Kalb,  the  Louisville  and 
the  Cincinnati;  and  for  half  an  hour 
the  firing  was  kept  up,  the  guns  of  the 
fort  replying  vigorously. 

On  the  morning  of  the  11th  McCler- 
nand,  who  had  his  quarters  still  jan. 
on  board  the  Tigress,  had  come  H. 
up  and  taken  a position  in  the  woods 
to  the  rear.  Early  in  the  forenoon,  he 
sent  a message  to  Sherman,  asking  him 
why  the  attack  was  not  begun.  It  had 


FORT  HINDMAN  CAPTURED. 


387 


been  understood  beforehand  that  the 
opening  of  fire  by  the  gunboats  on  the 
fort  should  be  the  signal  for  a general 
attack.  Sherman,  therefore,  replied 
that  all  was  ready ; that  he  was  within 
five  or  six  hundred  yards  of  the  enemy’s 
works;  that  the  next  movement  must 
be  a direct  assault  along  the  whole  line; 
and  that  he  was  waiting  to  hear  from- 
the  gunboats.  Half  an  hour  or  there- 
about afterwards  was  heard  the  clear, 
ringing  sound  of  the  navy  guns,  the 
firing  becoming  louder  and  more  rapid 
as  they  neared  the  fort.  The  National 
field  pieces  opened  fire  along  the  whole 
line.  The  thunder  was  terrific.  The 
Confederates,  most  of  whom  were  Texan 
volunteers,  made  a gallant  resistance. 
A regiment  of  cavalry,  abandoning  their 
horses,  fought  on  foot,  and  rendered, 
for  a time,  effective  service  in  resisting 
the  advance  of  the  Nationals.  It  was 
impossible  for  them  to  resist  the  fierce 
onset  made  by  overwhelming  numbers. 
Sherman  pressed  forward  on  the  right, 
Morgan  on  the  left,  each  driving  the 
Confederates  back,  and  gradually  ob- 
taining possession  of  the  wooded  ground 
in  front  of  the  newly-erected  parapet, 
but  not  without  considerable  loss.  The 
Confederate  firing  was  heavy ; but  the 
National  soldiers  took  advantage  of  the 
clumps  of  trees,  and  felled  logs  to  shield 
themselves  from  the  storm  of  bullets. 
Gradually  the  edge  of  the  woods  was 
reached;  the  ground  was  clear;  and 
there  was  nothing  to  protect  them  from 
the  decimating  fire  of  the  enemy. 

Meanwhile,  the  gunboats  were  pour- 
ing a murderous  fire  upon  the  fort,  and 
sweeping  the  adjoining  ground  above 


and  below  with  grape  and  shrapnell. 
Porter  had  brought  into  action  not  only 
the  iron-clads,  but  the  ram  Monarch, 
Commander  Ellet,  and  even  the  frailer 
vessels,  as  he  tells  us,  that  amid  the 
clouds  of  smoke  they  might  “do  the 
best  they  could.”  It  was  not  long  until 
the  effects  of  this  terrific  firing  began 
to  be  visible.  All  the  adjoining  ground 
was  cleared  of  the  foe;  nearly  all  the 
artilleiy  horses  in  the  fort  were  killed ; 
and  one  by  one  the  guns  were  being 
silenced.  Shortly  after  three  o’clock, 
the  firing  from  the  fort  altogether 
ceased.  The  cannonading,  however, 
was  kept  up  by  the  gunboats.  Porter, 
who  had  taken  a regiment  on  board, 
was  proceeding  with  the  Black  Hawk 
to  attempt  a landing,  and  to  take  pos- 
session, when  a white  flag  was  raised  in 
token  of  surrender.  He  immediately 
ordered  the  firing  to  cease. 

We  left  the  troops  in  the  clearing  at 
the  edge  of  the  woods,  fully  exposed  to 
the  enemy’s  fire  from  the  parapet  out- 
side the  fort.  This  line  had  three  sec- 
tions of  ^ field  guns;  and  they  were 
handled,  according  to  the  testimony  of 
Sherman  himself,  with  great  skill  and 
energy.  Hovey  was  wounded ; Thayer 
had  his  horse  shot  under  him ; and  so 
thick  and  fast  was  the  round-shot  fall- 
ing about  Sherman  and  his  staff,  that 
they  felt  it  necessary  to  scatter,  Sher- 
man himself  dismounting.  Morgan,  at 
this  crisis,  unfortunately  found  himself 
in  front  of  the  ravine,  beyond  which  it 
was  impossible  to  pass.  Sherman  was 
now  well  engaged  on  the  right;  and 
Morgan,  finding  himself  thus  hindered, 
sent  a few  regiments  to  his  aid.  The 


383 


CHICKASAW. 


burden  of  the  fight,  as  at  Chickasaw, 
had  fallen  on  the  brigades  which  now 
composed  the  division  of  General  Steele. 
Blair  and  Thayer  and  Hovey  performed 
prodigies  of  valor. 

On  the  right,  the  Confederate  bat- 
teries had  been  all  but  silenced.  Mor- 
gan’s men,  on  the  left,  had  done  splen- 
did work  before  they  were  brought  to 
a standstill  at  the  ravine.  A.  J.  Smith’s 
brigades  had  pressed  the  Confederates 
back,  step  by  step,  until  they  were 
within  two  hundred  yards  of  the  fort. 
Burbridge  expressly  distinguished  him- 
self. But  for  the  ravine,  an  attempt 
would  have  been  made  by  the  One 
Hundred  and  Twentieth  Ohio  to  scale, 
and  carry  by  assault,  the  eastern  side  of 
the  fort.  Almost  at  this  moment,  how- 
ever, Sherman,  as  his  attention  was 
arrested  by  the  flags  of  the  gunboats 
visible  above  the  parapet  of  Fort  Hind- 
man, saw  a man  jump  on  the  nearer 
parapet  at  the  point  where  entered  the 
road  which  divided  the  peninsula. 

Cease  tiring  !”  he  ordered  ; and  the 
words  were  passed  along  the  line  with 
amazing  rapidity.  The  firing  soon 
ceased.  In  a few  seconds  the  fort  was 
invaded  on  every  side  by  the  National 
troops.  Colonel  Dayton  was  ordered 
forward  to  the  place  where  was  hung 
out  the  large  white  flag;  and  as  soon 
as  his  horse  was  seen  on  the  parapet, 
Sherman  advanced  with  his  staff.  It 
appeared  afterwards  that  the  white  flag 
was  hung  out  without  even  the  knowl- 
edge of  Churchill.  It  made  little  dif- 
ference. The  battle  had  really  been 
won  on  the  land  as  well  as  on  the  river 
side  of  the  fort.  Tha  surrender  was 


subsequently  made  in  due  form — Col- 
onel Diinnington,  the  commander  of  the 
fort,  surrendering  to  Admiral  Porter, 
and  Colonel  Churchill  surrendering  to 
the  military  authorities.  The  National 
loss  in  killed,  wounded  and  missing 
amounted  to  977  men.  On  the  Con- 
federate side  there  were  only  60  killed 
and  80  wounded.  Five  thousand  sol- 
diers, with  their  officers,  made  prison- 
ers, and  all  the  property  of  the  place, 
including  some  seventeen  guns,  consti- 
tuted the  prize  of  victor}^  General 
Burbridge  was  singled  out  for  the 
honor  of  planting  the  National  stand- 
ard on  Fort  Hindman.  Such  was  the 
battle  of  Arkansas  Post. 

General  Sherman  was  dissatisfied 
with  the  arrangements  made  by  Gen- 
eral McClernand  immediately  after  the 
surrender.  The  post  of  honor — the  oc- 
cupation of  Fort  Hindman — was  given 
to  A.  J.  Smith,  of  Morgan’s  division, 
Sherman  being  ordered  to  hold  the 
lines  outside,  and  go  on  securing  the 
prisoners  and  stores.  McClernand’s 
reason  for  so  doing  was  that  he  did  not 
wish  to  interfere  with  the  actual  state 
of  facts — the  status  quo  at  the  time  of 
surrender.  It  is  undeniable  that  it  was 
Sherman’s  plan  throughout;  that  his 
corps  bore  the  burden  of  the  fight ; that, 
after  the  surrender,  his  troops  were  in 
possession  of  two  of  the  three  brigades 
which  constituted  the  opposing  force; 
and  that  he  was  in  possession  of  all  the 
ground  outside  the  ‘Hort  proper.”  Mc- 
Clernand was  proud  of  his  success,  and 
manifested  not  a little  vanity.  His 
star,  he  said,  was  ever  in  the  ascendant. 
In  his  memoirs,  Sherman  tells  us  that 


JEALOUSY. 


389 


McClernand  was  extremely  jealous  of 
the  navy,  and  that,  in  his  report,  he  ig- 
nored altogether  the  action  of  Porter’s 
fleet.  This  was  the  less  to  be  regretted 
that  Porter  told  his  own  story  in  a very 
handsome  and  effective  way.  It  is  only 
simple  truth  to  say  that  the  battle  was 
fought  and  won  by  the  fleet  before  the 
land  troops  had  any  certainty  of  success. 
There  was,  in  fact,  a feeling  of  jealousy 
among  the  commanders — a feeling  which 
was  not  wholly  to  disappear  until  the 
arrival  of  Grant,  in  whose  presence,  and 
under  the*  influence  of  whose  more  com- 
manding genius,  jealousy  and  selfish- 
ness gave  place  to  a spirit  of  honorable 
rivalry  and  dutiful  obedience. 

The  day  after  the  battle  was  devoted 
to  burying  the  dead.  The  prisoners 
were  all  collected  and  sent  to  St.  Louis. 
The  victory  at  Arkansas  Post  opened 
the  way  for  a successful  expedition  to 
Little  Pock,  the  capital  of  the  State  of 
Arkansas.  Sherman  expressed  a desire 
to  be  sent  on  this  expedition.  McCler- 
nand, however,  did  not  deem  it  advis- 
able. A combined  expedition,  was, 
therefore,  sent  up  the  White  River,  as 


far  as  St.  Charles,  Des  Arc  and  Duval’s 
Bluff,  under  General  Gorman  and 
Lieutenant-Commanding  J.  G.  Walker. 
The  expedition  was  completely  success- 
ful. Meanwhile,  the  works  at  Fort 
Hindman  were  dismantled  and  blown 
up;  and,  on  the  loth,  the  troops  were 
re-embarked,  and  ^n*oceeded  down  the 
Arkansas  to  Napoleon.  There,  instruc- 
tions were  received  from  General  Grant, 
who  ordered  McClernand  to  take  the 
entire  expedition  down  the  river  to 
Milliken’s  Bend,  and  await  his  arrivah 
This  place  was  reached  on  the  21st  of 
January. 

In  itself,  the  movement  against  Ar- 
kansas Post  was  a small  affair ; it  was 
so  regarded  by  General  Grant ; it  ought 
to  have  been  successfully  accomplished 
by  one  corps,  and  by  a portion  of  the; 
fleet — instead  of  the  combined  strength 
of  both — and  that  was  Sherman’s  idea ; 
but  resulting,  as  it  did,  in  victoiy, 
it  served  the  double  purpose  of  era- 
ploying  troops  which  would  otherwise 
have  been  idle,  and  of  cheering  thj 
hearts  of  a people  who  were  some^ 
what  despondent. 


390 


VICKSBURG. 


CHAPTER  .XXI‘V. 

The  Proclamation  of  Emancipation. — Divided  Sentiments. — A Turning  Point  in  History. — The  Cry  of  the 
Slave. — Prayers  Heard  and  Answered. — Colored  Troops. — “Vicksburg  Must  Be  Taken.” — Grant  at  Young’s 
Point. — The  Walnut  Hills. — The  Yazoo. — Haines’  Bluff. — An  Apparently  Impregnable  City. — How  to  Get  to 
the  East  of  the  Mississippi. — Five  Different  Schemes. — The  Williams  Canal  Experiment. — Almost  a Suc- 
cess.— A Failure. — A Bold  and  Daring  Experiment. — The  Flood. — Koundabout  Bayou. — Another  Failure. — 
— Lake  Providence.— Moon  Lake. — The  Yallabusha.— The  Tallahatchie. — Greenwood. — Fort  Pemberton. — 
Another  Failure.— Steele’s  Bayou. — Admiral  Porter. — Failure  Again. — A Five-Fold  Failure. — Grant  Disap- 
pointed, but  Not  Discouraged —Sherman’s  Opinion. — Grant's  Besolve. — The  New  Movement  Commenced. — 
New  Carthage. — A Tedious  and  Difficult  March. — The  Fleet. — Passing  the  Batteries. — A Midnight  Scene. — 
Grierson’s  Raid.— The  Importance  of  Cavalry. — A Brilliant  Exploit. — Grand  Gulf. — The  Gunboats  Open  Fire. — 
The  Place  too  Strong. — Rodney.— Bruinsburg. — A Landing  Effected. — A Useful  Diversion. — Sherman  at 
Haines’  Bluff.— Safe  on  the  East  Side. — Grant’s  Self-Reliance. — Port  Gibson. — The  Battle. — The  Confederates 
Fall  Back. — Hankinson’s  Ferry. — “ The  City  of  an  Hundred  Hills.” — Bayou  Pierre. — Big  Black. — The  Natural 
Barriers. — Reconnoitering  Parties. — Raymond.— A Tremendous  Rush  for  the  Guns. — A National  Victory. — 
Johnston  at  Jackson. — His  Instructions  to  Pemberton. — Jackson  Evacuated. — An  Easy  Victory. — Torrents  of 
Rain. — The  Three  Generals,  Grant,  McPherson  and  Sherman. — Grant  Now  Marches  Against  Pemberton. — 
Edward’s  Station  the  Point  of  Rendezvous. — Champion  Hills. — A Strong  Position. — Pemberton  Prepares  for 
Battle. — Arrival  of  the  National  Advance. — The  Battle  of  Champion  Hills  Begun. — Hovey  Sorely  Pressed. — 
Reinforced. — Logan's  Success.— The  Battle  Won  After  a Terrible  Struggle. — McClernand  too  Late. — McCler- 
nand  and  Osterhaus  Ordered  in  Pursuit. — The  Big  Black  River. — The  Railway  Bridge. — A Successful  Re- 
treat.—Preparations  for  Assault.— Lawler’s  Discovery. —The  Assault  Made. — A Terrible  Struggle. — Heavy 
Loss  of  Life. — The  Burning  of  the  Bridges. — The  Bridges  Reconstructed. — On  to  Vicksburg. — Porter  on 
the  Yazoo.— Sherman  at  Haines’  Bluff. — The  Fall  of  Vick.sburg  Secured. — Preparing  to  Make  the  Assault. — 
Pemberton’s  Situation.— The  Assault  of  the  lOth  of  May. — A Failure. — The  Assault  of  the  22d. — Grant’s 
Reasons  for  Avoiding  Further  Delay. — Terrible  Fighting. — The  “Works  too  Strong,  Naturally  and  Arti 
ficially,  to  be  Taken  by  Assault.” — McClernand’s  Mistake. — Sergeant  Griffiths. — A Usele.ss  Slaughter. — The 
Troops  Recalled. — The  Troops  Complimented. — The- Bravery  of  the  Defenders. — A Confederate  Picture. — 
McCleruand’s  Congratulatory  Order. — His  Removal  from  the  Command  of  the  Thirteenth  Corps. — The 
Appointment  of  Ord. — Grant  R;  solves  to  Take  the  Place  by  a‘ Regular  Siege. — Reinforcements. — The  In- 
vestment Completed. — Siege  Operations  Commenced. — Pemberton’s  Situation  Becoming  Desperate. — His 
Complaints. — The  Want  of  Cavalry.— What  Johnston  Proposed. — Johnston  Preparing  to  Attack  the  Na- 
tional Rear. — Pemberton’s  Vacillation.— Distress  of  the  Garrison. — The  Mining  Operations  Well  Advanced. — 
The  2r)th  of  June. — The  First  Mine  Fired. — The  Storming  Columns. — The  As.sault  on  Fort  Hill. — A Terrific 
Cannonade. — A Repulse. — The  1st  of  July. — The  Destruction  of  the  Redan. — An  Intercepted  Letter. — 
Promised  Aid  to  Pemberton. — Grant’s  Instructions  to  Sherman. — The  3d  of  July. — The  White  Flag. — General 
Bowen  and  Colonel  Montgomery. — A Letter  from  Pemberton. — He  Asks  for  an  Armistice  and  the  Appoint- 
ment of  Commissioners. — Grant  Refuses.  — “Unconditional  Surrender.” — The  Interview  Between  Grant  and 
Pemberton. — An  Imposing  Scene.  — Under  the  Old  Oak,  in  View  of  Both  Armies.— A Striking  Contrast. — Can’t 
Agree. — Consideration  on  the  Part  of  Grant. — Terms  in  Writing.— The  Agreement. — The  Surrender. — The 
Fourth  of  July.— Light  at  Last. — A Great  Day  for  the  National  Cause. — A National  Triumph.— A Great  Triumph 
for  Grant. — The  First  Soldier  of  the  Republic. — The  Results  of  the  Campaign. — Pursuit  of  Johnston. — 
Evacuation  of  Jackson. — Johnston,  the  “Hero  of  Retreats.” — The  End  of  a Great  and  Glorious  Campaign. 


The  opening  of  the  year  18G3  was 
1863  memorable  by  the  Procla-' 

mation  of  Emancipation.  It  was 


by  slow  degrees  that  Abraham  Lincoln 
rose  to  the  full  dignity  of  his  mission, 
and  arrived  at  the  conclusion  that  the 


CIVIL  WAR.] 


THE  CRY  OP  THE  OPPRESSED. 


391 


will  of  God,  as  well  as  the  rights  of 
man  and  the  preservation  of  the  Union, 
called  for  the  immediate  and  unquali- 
fied abolition  of  slavery.  What  to  do 
with  the  slaves  of  the  South  had,  in- 
deed, been  a vexed  question  since  the 
commencement  of  the  war.  It  was  a 
fruitful  source  of  controversy  in  the 
cabinet;  and  it  puzzled  alike  the  legis- 
lators in  Congress  and  the  generals  in 
the  held.  Among  the  last  named,  par- 
ticularly from  whom  direct  action  was 
frequently  demanded,  the  greatest  ,di- 
versity  of  sentiment  prevailed.  Butler 
looked  upon  the  slaves  as  contraband. 
In  his  own  department,  Fremont  gave 
them  liberty.  McClellan  would  put 
them  down  with  an  iron  hand.”  Pat- 
terson would  repress  all  servile  insur- 
rections. Mansfield  would  allow  them 
no  harbor  in  his  camps.  Halleck  would 
drive  them  out  of  his  lines.  Burnside 
would  not  interfere  with  slavery.  Cam- 
eron would  not  surrender  any  that 
might  chance  to  come  within  the  army 
lines.  Dix  was  unwilling  to  interfere 
between  the  slave  and  his  master. 
Wool  was  willing  to  give  them  employ- 
ment, and  to  regulate  their  pay  and  al- 
lowances. Hooker  and  Buell  actually 
went  so  far  as  to  authorize  slave-owners 
to  search  the  National  camps  for  fugi- 
tives, and  to  carry  them  off.  Lincoln 
c unplained  of  the  conduct  of  Fremont; 
and  he  issued  a counter-order  when 
Hunter,  at  Hilton  Head,  proclaimed 
the  slaves  in  his  department  free. 

It  is  not  necessary  to  trace  the  suc- 
cessive steps  by  which,  ultimately,  eman- 
cipation was  reached.  Reference  has 
already  been  made,  in  these  pages,  to 


the  history  of  the  proclamation  itself. 
It  was  the  work  of  Lincoln’s  own  hand ; 
and,  in  its  every  sentence,  it  bears  the 
impress  of  his  genius.  Evidently  it 
took  shape  during  the  unfortunate  cam- 
paign of  General  Pope  in  Virginia — a 
campaign,  the  disastrous  results  of 
which  were  all  the  more  severely  felt 
that  it  followed  so  close  upon  McClel- 
lan’s retreat  from  the  peninsula.  But 
for  the  advice  of  Secretary  Seward,  the 
proclamation  would  have  been  pub- 
lished while  the  nation  was  yet  smart- 
ing under  defeat,  while  Pope  and  his 
shattered  legions  were  sheltered  behind 
the  fortifications  at  Washington,  and 
while  Lee  had  marched  in  triumph  into 
Maryland.  It  was  wisely  concluded  to 
wait  until  the  first  returning  sunshine 
of  victory  should  rest  on  the  National 
cause.  The  opportunity  arrived  after 
the  battle  of  Antietam,  and  when  Lee, 
on  the  night  of  the  19th  of  September, 
1862,  retired  into  Virginia.  Three 
.days  after  that  date,  on  the  2 2d  of  Sep- 
tember, Lincoln — remembering  the  vow 
he  had  made  before  God,  that,  if  Gen- 
eral Lee  were  driven  back  fi*om  Mary- 
land, he  would  crown  the  result  by  a 
declaration  of  freedom  to  the  slaves — is- 
sued that  famous  proclamation  which 
marked  a turning-point,  not  only  in  the 
history  of  the  United  States,  but  in 
the  history  of  the  world. 

In  one  of  the  finest  passages  of  his 
excellent  history  of  the  Civil  War,  Dr. 
Draper,  when  describing  the  condition 
of  the  negroes,  and  the  hopes  which  the 
proclamation  inspired  in  their  breasts, 
says : “ From  the  rivers  of  Virginia  to 
the  Mexican  confines  of  the  Republic 


392 


VICKSBURG. 


ai-ose  a mournful  wail : ‘ How  long,  O 
Lord,  how  long !’  It  came  from  the 
weary  laborer,  leaning  on  his  hoe  in  the 
cotton  field  under  the  noontide  sun ; it 
came  through  the  moaning  midnight 
forests,  solemn  and  clear  above  their 
multitudinous  inarticulate  sounds;  it 
came  from  children  torn  from  their 
parents,  from  wives  and  husbands  part- 
ed at  the  auction  block,  from  mothers 
in  despair,  from  strong  men  fainting 
under  the  lash,  from  the  aged,  whose 
heads  were  frosted  by  time.  In  their 
quaint  prayers,  the  Africans  talk  to 
(.Tod  as  a man  talks  face  to  face  with 
his  friend.  Slavery  had  made  Him 
their  friend.  By  the  flickering  fires  of 
their  cabins,  they  stealthily  spelt  out 
the  Bible,  to  see  what  He  had  promised 
to  them.  It  was  their  dreadful  lot  that 
had  caused  Jefferson,  himself  a slave- 
owner, to  expostulate  solemnly  with  his 
countrymen,  and  to  deprecate  the  wrath 
of  God.  For  who  shall  escape  when, 
from  the  hand  of  Eternal  Justice,  her. 
scales  have  dropped  as  useless;  when 
from  her  brow  the  bandage  has  been 
raised,  that  her  uncovered  and  angry 
eyes  may  gaze  upon  unutterable  wrong; 
when  her  uplifted  arm,  quivering  with 
indignation,  is  ready  to  strike  a blow 
that  shall  make  a whole  continent 
tremble !” 

On  the  evening  of  the  last  day  of  the 
year  1862,  these  poor,  down-trodden 
ones,  wherever  they  could  gather  to- 
gether— in  their  humble  meeting-houses, 
in  their  lowlier  cabins,  or  in  the  lone 
woods — met  in  solemn  assembly,  and 
lifted  their  eyes  and  their  hearts  to 
heaven,  calling  upon  Almighty  God  to 


strengthen  the  hands  of  Abraham  Lin- 
coln on  the  coming  day.  When  that 
day  arrived,  the  purpose  which  had 
been  declared  in  September,  was  made 
good ; and  the  stain  of  slavery  was 
wiped  out  from  the  escutcheon  of  the 
Republic. 

The  emancipation  proclamation  did 
not  give  satisfaction  to  all.  It  greatly 
enraged,  as  a matter  of  course,  the 
Southern  leaders ; and  there  were  many 
in  the  North  who,  although  they  had 
no  sympathy  with  the  Southern  Con- 
federacy, regarded  the  abolition  of 
slavery  as  an  interference  with  the 
rights  of  property,  and  a violation  of 
one  of  the  fundamental  principles  of 
the  constitution.  Immediate  and  un- 
qualified abolition  may  not  have  been 
an  unmixed  good;  but  it  was  a neces- 
sity— a necessity  growing  out  of  the 
war.  It  was  a weapon  which  the  North 
had  a perfect  right  to  use  in  putting 
down  the  rebellion;  and  not  to  have 
used  it  would  have  implied  both  weak- 
ness and  folly.  Slavery,  besides,  lay 
at  the  very  root  of  the  evil  out  of 
which,  cancer-like,  the  war  arose ; and, 
if  it  was  “the  paramount  object”  of  the 
North  “ to  save  the  Union,  and  not  to 
save  or  to  destroy  slavery,”  it  was  to 
preserve  the  institution  of  slavery  that 
the  war  was  undertaken  and  continued 
by  the  South.  It  was  not  a rash  act, 
done  in  hot  haste,  the  offspring  of  re- 
venge or  despair.  It  was  the  result  of 
much  anxious  and  prayerful  thought, 
the  ripe  fruit  of  calm,  patient  and  pro- 
tracted study.  It  was  the  noblest  act 
of  Lincoln’s  brief  and  chequered  but 
withal  noble  life. 


EMANCIPATION. 


393 


One  of  the  immediate  results  of  this 
proclamation  of  emancipation  was  the 
organization  of  colored  troops.  Towards 
the  close  of  1863,  there  were  some  fifty 
thousand  colored  men  in  actual  ser- 
vice ; and  this  number  was  tripled  be- 
fore the  close  of  1864.  It  was  not, 
however,  for  some  time  to  come  that 
their  influence  on  the  field  began  to  be 
felt.  During  the  year  1863,  although 
colored  troops,  as  we  shall  see,  took 
part  at  the  siege  of  Port  Hudson,  and 
in  other  engagements,  their  effect  was 
comparatively  unimportant.  The  intro- 
duction of  colored  men  into  the  army 
was  regarded  by  many  in  the  light  of 
a fresh  revolution.  It  gave  birth  in 
some  quarters  to  a perfect  howl  of  dis- 
satisfaction ; several  of  the  newspapers 
went  beyond  all  bounds  in  their  fierce 
denunciation  of  the  government;  and 
the  swords  of  some  prominent  generals 
relaxed  in  their  grasp.  General  Grant, 
not  troubling  himself  with  politics,  but 
regarding  himself  simply  as  the  servant 
of  the  Republic,  heartily  approved  of 
the  emancipation  policy,  and  enforced 
the  measures  of  the  government.  It 
is  expected,”  he  said,  “that  all  com- 
manders will  especially  exert  them- 
selves in  carrying  out  the  policy  of  the 
administration,  not  only  in  organizing 
colored  troops,  and  rendering  them  effi- 
cient, but  also  in  removing  prejudices 
against  them.” 

The  situation  was  now  ripe  for  the 
vigorous  prosecution  of  the  siege  of 
Vicksburg.  Sherman’s  non-success  at 
Chickasaw  had  not  dismayed  Grant, 
while  the  comparatively  unimportant 
victory  at  Arkansas  Post  had  greatly 


cheered  the  people.  The  popular  cry 
was  “On  to  Vicksburg!”  and  Grant’s 
emphatic  dictum  was  “ Vicksburg  must 
be  taken.”  The  army  under  General 
Grant  had  been  greatly  reinforced ; and 
the  general  feeling  was  that  if  the 
“ Queen  City  of  the  Bluff  ” was  to  be 
reduced,  it  was  to  be  done  by  the  hero 
of  Donelson  and  Shiloh,  of.  luka  and 
Corinth. 

As  we  stated  at  the  close  of  the  last 
chapter.  Grant  was  to  meet  McClernand 
and  Porter,  with  the  fleet  and  trans- 
ports, at  Milliken’s  Bend.  On  the  18th 
of  January,  that  meeting  took  jan, 
place.  There  was  a general  con-  18. 
sulfation ; and  the  views  of  the  general- 
in-chief,  and  of  all  the  leading  officers, 
were  freely  exchanged.  After  con- 
sultation, Grant  made  arrangements  for 
future  movements,  and  gave  some  spe- 
cial instructions.  McClernand  and  Sher- 
man made  immediate  preparations  to 
go  down  the  Mississippi  to  Young’s 
Point ; and  Grant,  without  delay,  re- 
turned to  Memphis,  in  order  to  hasten 
the  transportation  of  his  troops  to  the 
neighborhood  of  Vicksburg.  McCler- 
nand, it  will  be  remembered,  assumed 
command  of  what  was  named  the 
army  of  the  Mississippi,  after  the  bat- 
tle of  the  Chickasaw,  by  virtue  of  a 
confidential  .order  from  the  War  De- 
partment. In  this  capacity,  however, 
he  was  subject  to  orders  from  General 
Grant,  who  was  at  the  head  of  the  de- 
partment of  the  Tennessee.  At  the 
time  of  which  we  write,  all  things  were 
changed.  By  an  order  (No.  210)  of  De- 
cember 18th,  1862,  from  the  War  De- 
partment, the  Western  armies  had  been 


394 


VICKSBURG. 


1 


grouped  into  five  corps,  viz. : the  Thir- 
teenth, Major-General  McClernand ; the 
Fourteenth,  Major-General  George  H. 
Thomas,  in  Middle  Tennessee ; the  Fif- 
teenth, Major-General  W.  T.  Sherman ; 
the  Sixteenth,  Major-General  Hurlbut, 
at  Memphis;  and  the  Seventeenth, 
Major-General  McPherson,  back  of 
Memphis.  This  entire  force  was  placed 
under  the  control  of  General.  Grant. 
Pel),  On  the  2d  of  February,  the 
2*  greater  number  of  the  troops  in- 
tended to  be  used  in  the  operations 
against  Vicksburg  having  already 
reached  their  destination.  Grant  arrived 
at  Young’s  Point,  and  took  command. 

Now  that  General  Grant  was  on  the 
spot,  the  question  which  he  had  to  set- 
tle was — How  could  Vicksburg  be 
most  easily  and  effectually  approached  ? 
The  National  army  was  lying  on  the 
west  side  of  the  Mississippi.  Vicks- 
burg stood  on  the  Walnut  Hills,  high 
and  impregnable  ground  on  the  oppo- 
site shore.  The  city  must  be  ap- 
proached by  way  of  the  river.  To 
give  any  effect  to  the  siege,  troops 
must  be  landed  either  above  or  below 
the  city.  To  land  troops  above  the 
city,  implied  steaming  up  the  Yazoo  and 
passing  the  formidable  batteries  at 
Haines’  Bluff,  which  completely  com- 
manded that  river.  This,  as  the  latest 
attempt  had  proved,  was  in  the  last  de- 
gree dangerous,  if  not  absolutely  im- 
possible. It  could  only  succeed  by  a 
sacrifice  of  life  which  would  be  but  im- 
perfectly rewarded  by  the  result.  To 
land  troops  below  the  city,  implied 
steaming  down  the  Mississippi  and  pass- 
ing the  Vicksburg  defenses  throughout 


their  entire  length.  This  seemed  even 
a more  perilous  undertaking  than  the 
other.  How  were  these  obstacles  to  be 
overcome  ? That  was  the  question 
which  General  Grant  had  now  to  an- 
swer. !pive  different  solutions  were 
suggested.  There  were,  first,  the  Will- 
iams’ Canal;  second,  the  route  from 
Milliken’s  Bend ; third,  the  Lake  Provi- 
dence route;  fourth,  the  Yazoo  Pass; 
and  fifth,  the  route  by  Steele’s  Bayou. 
Let  us  consider  these  in  the  order  in 
which  we  have  named  them. 

A glance  at  the  map  will  show  the 
reader  what  was  meant  by  the  canal, 
and  how  practicable  at  first  it  seemed. 
In  front  of  Vicksburg  the  Mississippi 
makes  a sharp  bend,  forming  the  penin- 
sula on  which  stands  the  town  of  De 
Soto.  A canal  cut  across  this  tongue 
of  land,  giving  a more  direct  passage 
to  the  current  of  the  river,  would  leave 
Vicksburg  without  any  water  de- 
fenses— the  place  would,  for  all  mili- 
tary purposes,  be  neutralized.  It  will 
be  remembered  that,  in  the  summer  of 
1862,  General  Williams,  who  came  up 
the  river  with  Farragut,  undertook  to 
cut  such  a canal,  and,  for  that  purpose, 
gathered  some  twelve  hundred  negroes 
from  the  plantations  in  the  immediate 
neighborhood.  It  has  already  been 
narrated  how,  from  an  error  committed 
in  the  location  of  its  mouth,  the  canal 
proved  a failure.  The  waters  stub- 
bornly refused  to  leave  their  ancient 
channel.  This  canal  or  “ cut-off,”  which 
was  one  mile  in  length,  was  located 
across  the  peninsula,  at  right  angles, 
about  six  miles  below  Vicksburg. 
Grant  perceived  that  if  it  could  effect- 


EXPERIMENTS. 


395 


ively  be  turned  to  account,  it  would 
not  only  isolate  Vicksburg,  but  make  a 
channel  for  the  transportation  of  troops 
and  supplies  to  the  south  of  the  city. 
To  the  completion  of  this  work,  he 
gave  much  of  his  personal  attention,  as 
soon  as  he  returned  from  Memphis. 

Meantime,  the  work  had  been  prose- 
cuted with  great  vigor  by  McClernand 
and  Sherman.  The  men  continued  to 
work  day  and  night;  and,  to  secure 
their  protection,  good  use  was  made  of 
Porter’s  fleet,  strengthened  now  by  the 
addition  of  several  armed  vessels,  such 
as  the  Chillicothe,  Indianola,  Lafayette, 
Eastport  and  others.  It  was  a bold 
and  daring  experiment  to  attempt  to 
divert  the  course  of  a great  river  like 
the  Mississippi — all  the  more  so  that 
the  former  attempt,  undertaken  in  more 
favorable  circumstances,  had  pi*oved  a 
complete  failure.  But  it  was  not  an 
impossible  task;  and,  in  the  circum- 
stances, nothing  but  the  absolutely  im- 
possible was  to  be  left  untried.  The 
work  progressed  favorably.  The  camps 
were  on  the  west  side  of  the  canal ; and 
the  earth  was  thrown  up  on  that  side 
as  a sort  of  levee.  During  February, 
the  river  continued  to  rise.  By  the 
end  of  the  month,  it  had  risen  to  a 
great  height ; and  the  work  was  carried 
on  with  very  great  difficulty,  McCler- 
nand’s  corps  being  removed  to  higher 
ground  at  Milliken’s  Bend.  Sherman 
remained  at  Young’s  Point,  and  con- 
tinued to  direct  operations  at  the  canal. 
For  days  the  waters,  rolling  past  in 
their  fury,  and  ever  rising  higher  and 
higher,  had  been  threatening  instant 
and  sweeping  destruction  to  the  entire 


scheme.  It  was  now  the  8th  of  March. 
The  harrier  at  the  mouth  of  the  “ cut  ” 
could  no  longer  resist  the  pressure  of 
the  great  river.  Suddenly,  this  barrier 
gave  way ; and  the  waters  rushing 
through,  swept  all  before  them,  filling 
the  cut,  submerging  thousands  of  im- 
plements, and  driving  the  soldiers  to 
the  levee.  The  canal  experiment  was 
a second  time  a failure.  It  was  not  to 
be  tried  again.  General  Grant  was  no 
doubt  disappointed;  but  he  was  not 
discouraged. 

There  were  a series  of  bayous  con- 
necting Milliken’s  Bend  with  the  Ten- 
sas River,  which  again  connects  with 
the  Mississippi,  at  New  Carthage,  some 
distance  below  Vicksburg.  The  prin- 
cipal of  these  bayous  was  that  of 
Roundabout  or  Roundaway,  which  at 
one  of  its  extremities  unites  with  the 
Tensas.  In  this  case,  canal-cutting 
was  less  necessary  than  dredging.  It 
so  happened  that  some  dredge  boats 
were  on  hand ; and  with  these  boats. 
Captain  F.  E.  Prime  and  Colonel  G.  G. 
Piide,  went  earnestly  to  work.  In  a 
short  time,  a clear  passage  was  effected ; 
and  some  vessels  of  li^ht  tonnasre  were 
able  to  pass  through.  The  Mississippi, 
however,  began  to  fall  in  April;  and 
as  the  roads  between  Milliken’s  Bend 
and  New  Carthage  became  more  ser- 
viceable, this  water-way  was  of  com- 
paratively little  value.  It  was,  in  fact, 
another  useless  experiment. 

General  Grant’s  attention  was  not 
devoted  exclusively  to  any  one  of  those 
possible  avenues  by  which  Vicksburg 
might  be  approached.  His  object  was 
to  discover  a route  which  should  be  at 


396 


VICKSBURG. 


once  practicable  and  efficient.  With 
this  end  in  view,  he  was  feeling  his 
way  all  around  and  in  every  direction. 
To  the  north  of  Vicksburg  about  sev- 
enty-five miles,  and  about  one  mile 
from  the  Mississippi,  on  the  Louisiana 
shore,  there  is  a large  body  of  water 
about  six  miles  in  length,  formed  evi- 
dently in  an  old  bed  of  the  river,  and 
known  as  Lake  Providence.  This  lake, 
by  a couple  of  bayous,  unites  its  waters 
with  the  Tensas  and  Washita  Rivers, 
Avhich  form  the  Black  River.  Through 
the  Black  River,  it  connects  Avith  the 
Red  River,  and  then  with  the  Missis- 
sippi, some  little  distance  north  of  Port 
Hudson.  At  the  point  where  the  Mis- 
sissippi is  reached,  that  river  receives 
jilso  the  waters  of  the  Atchafalaya. 
By  following  this  latter  river,  which  is 
also  naAngable,  it  would  be  possible  to 
form  a connection  with  General  Banks, 
who  was  in  command  at  New  Orleans, 
and  come  up  on  the  east  side  of  the 
river.  General  Grant,  having  more 
troops  on  hand  than  could  be  advan- 
tageously employed  at  Young’s  Point, 
ordered  a portion  of  them  to  cut  a 
canal  between  Lake  Providence  and 
the  Mississippi.  The  canal  was  suc- 
<tessfully  cut,  and  some  light  vessels 
passed  into  Lake  Providence ; but  this 
I oute  was  finally  abandoned,  partly  be- 
(*ause  of  some  uncertainty  Avhich  existed 
regarding  the  channel  of  the  Tensas, 
b'lt  mainly  because  greater  success 
K:  emed  to  be  promised  in  other  direc- 
tions. 

Grant’s  resources  were  not  yet  ex- 
hausted. Some  eight  miles  below  He- 
lena, but  on  the  east  side  of  the  Missis- 


sippi, there  is  a sheet  of  water,  known 
as  Moon  Lake.  A narrow  channel,  of 
no  great  length,  at  that  time  connected 
Moon  Lake  with  the  Mississippi.  Run- 
ning in  an  eastern  direction  from  the 
lake,  there  is  what  is  called  Y azoo  Pass, 
about  twelve  miles  long,  which  opens 
into  the  Coldwater — a narrow  stream, 
which  flows  to  the  south  and  empties 
into  the  Tallahatchie;  and  this  latter, 
after  it  receives  the  waters  of  the  Yal- 
labusha,  becomes  the  Yazoo  River — an 
easily  navigable  stream  which,  after  a 
tedious  course  of  some  two  hundred 
and  fifty  miles,  falls  into  the  Missis- 
sippi a little  above  Vicksburg.  If  the 
Yazoo  River  could  be  reached  from 
above,  it  was  Grant’s  expectation  that 
he  would  then  be  able  to  obtain  a firm 
foothold  on  the  high  ground  to  the 
north  of  Haines’  Bluff,  which,  it  will  be 
remembered,  blocked  the  Yazoo  from 
below,  and  completely  protected  Vicks- 
burg from  attack  in  that  direction. 

It  was  known  that  Yazoo  Pass  had 
formerly  been  used  by  boats  as  a means 
of  access  into  the  interior  of  the  coun- 
try; it  was  believed  that  the  interior 
streams  were  still  navigable;  and  it 
was  felt  that,  in  order  to  make  this 
route  a complete  success,  it  was  only 
necessary  to  open  a wider  channel  from 
the  Mississippi  to  Moon  Lake,  and  to 
cut  through  a levee  which  obstructed 
the  mouth  of  the  pass.  The  channel 
having  been  widened,  and  the  obstruc- 
tions having  been  removed,  the  Avater 
of  the  Mississippi,  which  was  nine  feet 
higher  than  the  adjacent  country, 
rushed  in  with  tremendous  force,  sweep- 
ing everything  before  it,  and  tearing  a 


FORT  PEMBERTO^r. 


397 


passage  through  the  woods  deep  enough 
for  steamboats  to  make  their  way.  The 
expedition  consisted  of  two  heavy  gun- 
boats, one  ram,  six  light-draught  gun- 
boats, and  some  eighteen  transports. 
One  division  of  McClernand’s  coips, 
which  had  been  stationed  at  Helena, 
with  the  Twelfth  and  Seventeenth 
regiments,  Missouri  infantry,  as  sharp- 
shooters on  the  gunboats,  formed  the 
advance,  under  the  command  of  Briga- 
dier-General L.  F.  Ross.  McPherson, 
with  the  Seventeenth  corps,  and  two 
divisions,  one  from  the  Thirteenth  and 
one  from  the  Fifteenth,  was,  in  obe- 
dience to  instructions,  in  readiness  to 
embark,  when  it  was  found  that  the 
transports  were  inadequate,  and  that 
not  more  than  one  division  could  be 
taken.  It  was  not  without  great  diffi- 
culty that  the  expedition  found  its  way 
to  the  Coldwater.  The  country  on  each 
side  of  the  pass  was  a dense  forest. 
The  woods  abounded  with  diicks^  cor- 
morants, black  squirrels,  and  game  of 
various  kinds;  while,  in  the  half-stag- 
nant waters  and  the  cane-covered 
marshes  might  be  seen  the  turtle,  the 
alligator  and  the  copperhead  snake. 
White  smoke,  floating  here  and  there 
through  the  trees,  revealed  the  presence 
of  the  negro,  who,  in  detached  clear- 
ances, cultivated  not  cotton  but  corn. 
Gigantic  trees  cast  their  huge  branches 
across  the  passage,  much  to  the  detri- 
ment of  the  smoke-stacks  and  upper 
works  of  the  steamboats.  Three  days 
were  consumed  in  accomplishing  a dis- 
tance of  twelve  miles.  All  this  time 
the  occupants  of  the  gunl:)oats  and  the 
.transports  were  exposed  to  the  flee 


of  the  Confederate  sharpshooters,  who 
found  convenient  shelter  behind  the 
huge  trees  and  in  the  dense  brushwood. 

After  reaching  the  Coldwater,  the 
channel  of  which  was  a little  wider, 
less  difficulty  was  experienced ; and 
two  mortar-boats  having  joined  the  ex- 
pedition, the  whole  flotilla  was  soon 
steaming  cautiously  down  the  Talla- 
hatchie. On  the  11th,  the  advance  had 
reached  a point  within  ten  miles  of 
Greenwood,  a village  situated  a little 
below  the  confluence  of  the  Tallahatchie 
and  the Y allabusha.  At  the  point  above- 
mentioned,  and  just  before  the  two 
streams  unite  to  form  the  Yazoo,  the 
Tallahatchie  makes  a bend  almost  in 
the  form  of  a horse-shoe.  Here  the 
Confederates,  fully  apprised  of  the  ap- 
proach of  the  expedition,  had  construct- 
ed extensive  and  powerful  works,  which 
stretched  from  stream  to  stream,  com- 
pletely commanding  both,  as  well  as 
the  enclosed  space  between.  This  place 
was  named  Fort  Pemberton.  Thus  it 
was  that  while  the  National  foi’ces  were 
opening  one  end  of  the  pass,  “the  ene- 
my,” to  quote  the  words  of  General 
Gi*ant,  “ was  diligently  closing  the 
other.”  The  ground  in  front  of  and 
all  around  the  fort  was  low ; and  the 
water  in  the  rivers  being  high,  it  was 
deeply  flooded.  * It  was  impo.ssible  to 
land  troops ; and  all  attempts  made  by 
the  gunboats  to  silence  the  enemy’s 
guns  proved  unavailing.  Several  days 
had  been  spent  in  vain  endeavors,  made 
by  the  gunboats,  Chillicothe  and  De- 
Kalb,  to  silence  the  fort  or  to  force  a 
passage  down  the  river,  when  Ross, 
feeling  convinced  that  the  undertaking 


398 


VICKSBURG. 


was  hopeless  with  the  force  at  liis  coir- 
,mand,  retired  by  the  way  he  came.  Oh 
his  way,  he  was  met  by  General  Quim- 
by,  of  McPherson’s  corps,  with  some 
troops,  when  another  attack  was  medi- 
3Iar.  tated;  but  on  the  23d  of  March, 
23.  the  whole  expedition  was  ordered 
to  return  to  the  Mississippi,  General 
Grant  having  made  up  his  mind  to  con- 
centrate his  army  at  Milliken’s  Bend. 

This  does  not  exhaust  the  experi- 
ments which  were  made  in  order  to 
obtain  a suitable  route  by  which  the 
National  army  could  be  moved  so  as  to 
attack  Vicksburg  on  the  land  side. 
While  those  other  experiments  were 
being  made  Admiral  Porter  had  been 
unwearied ly  active.  Before  it  was 
known  what  success  might  attend  the 
expedition  by  way  of  Yazoo  Pass  and 
the  Tallahatchie,  Porter  had  I'econnoi- 
tered  another  route,  by  which  he  hoped 
the  Yazoo  might  be  reached,  and  a de- 
scent made  above  the  batteries  on 
Haines’  Bluff.  Seven  miles  above  the 
mouth  of  the  Yazoo,  what  has  been 
called  Steele’s  Bayou  empties  into  that 
river.  Having  discovered  that  about 
thirty  miles  up  Steele’s  Bayou  there 
was  a passage  through  Black  Bayou  to 
Deer  Creek,  about  six  miles  distant, 
and  learning  from  some  negroes  that 
Deer  Creek  could  be  navigated  to  Roll- 
ing Fork,  and  thence  down  the  Big 
Sunflower  into  the  Yazoo,  Poiter  noti- 
fied Grant  of  the  possibilities  of  this 
water-way.  Grant  saw  at  once  that  if 
such  a route  could  be  turned  to  practi- 
cal account,  it  would  place  Greenwood 
between  two  bodies  of  his  forces,  and 
compel  the  abandonment  of  Fort  Pem- 


berton. This  was  not  all.  Some  thirty 
of  the  enemy’s  steamboats,  w^hich  had 
sought  refuge  in  those  inland  waters, 
would  fall  into  his  hands. 

The  expedition  was  promptly  ap- 
proved of;  and  five  gunboats,  sevmral 
transports,  and  one  of  Sherman’s  divi- 
sions, were  ordered  to  attempt  the  new 
passage.  This  was  the  most  intricate 
and  diflucult  of  all  the  routes  yet  at- 
tempted. Grant  had  accompanied  Por- 
ter part  of  the  way,  and  experienced 
some  of  the  diflhculties,  before  Sherman 
was  ordered  to  take  with  him  his  pioneer 
corps  or  a regiment  of  first-class  men, 
and,  with  the  steamers  Diligence  and 
Silver  Wave,  proceed  up  the  bayou  to 
the  assistance  of  Porter.  In  Black 
Bayou,  and  in  Deer  Creek,  the  most 
formidable  obstacles  were  encountered. 
The  passages  were  blocked  by  ovei*- 
hanging  trees,  which  had  to  be  cut  down 
before  the  boats  could  pass.  The  dark- 
ness of  the  moonless  night  was  rendered 
all  the  more  intense  by  the  deep  gloom 
of  the  surrounding  forests.  Rain  fell 
incessantly.  In  some  cases  heavy  trees, 
which  had  been  felled,  lay  across  the 
streams.  At  last,  before  Porter  had  ac- 
complished the  passage  of  Deer  Creek, 
the  Confederates,  who  had  evidently 
anticipated  the  movement,  were  encoun- 
tered in  great  force ; and  it  became  peril- 
ous for  the  men  to  show  themselves  on 
the  gunboats  or  on  the  transports.  It  . 
was  found  impossible  to  advance. 

This  expedition,  like  all  the  others, 
had  to  be  abandoned ; and  it  was  dis- 
covered to  be  no  easy  matter  to  effect  a 
retreat.  The  expedition,”  says  Gen- 
eral Grant,  “ failed,  probably,  more  from 


DISAPPOINTMENTS. 


399 


want  of  knowledge  as  to  what  would 
be  required  to  open  this  route,  than 
from  any  impracticability  in  the  naviga- 
tion of  the  streams  and  bayous  through 
which  it  was  proposed  to  pass.  The 
want  of  this  knowledge  led  the  expedi- 
tion on,  and  difficulties  were  encoun- 
tered, and  then  it  would  become  neces- 
sary to  send  back  to  Young’s  Point  for 
the  means  of  removing  them.  This 
gave  the  enemy  time  to  move  forces  to 
effectually  checkmate  further  progress  ; 
and  the  expedition  was  withdrawn 
when  within  a few  hundred  yards  of 
free  and  open  navigation  to  the  Yazoo.” 

It  seemed  as  if  Vicksburg  were  des- 
tined to  sit  secure  on  her  throne  of 
hills,  in  proud  defiance  of  all  the  skill, 
ingenuity  and  force  of  the  National 
government.  Farragut  and  Williams 
had  done  their  best,  but  had  failed. 
Sherman  and  Porter  had  put  forth  their 
noblest  efforts,  but  to  no  purpose.  And 
now  a five-fold  failure  had  been  experi- 
enced by  Grant  himself.  Disappointed 
he  must  have  been ; but  he  was  not 
discouraged.  Disappointment  but  gave 
force  to  his  determination ; his  repeated 
failures  but  gave  him  a firmer  grasp  of 
the  difficulties  which  he  had  to  over- 
come; and  out  of  the  darkness,  in  which 
he  saw  but  dimly,  he  was  gradually 
working  his  way  to  a clearer  light,  and 
to  a fuller  comprehension  of  the  situa- 
tion. “At  that  very  stage,”  as  S win  ton 
well  puts  it,  “ when  an  intellect  of  less 
determined  fibre  would  have  been  re- 
signing itself  to  a seemingly  implacable 
fortune.  Grant,  overleaping  fate  and 
failure,  rose  to  the  height  of  that  au-. 
dacious  conception,  on  which,  at  length, 


he  vaulted  into  Vicksburg.”  A Na- 
poleon might  not  have  wasted  time  in 
so  many  fruitless  experiments  ; but  Na- 
poleon himself  could  not  more  resolute- 
ly have  resisted  fate — could  not  moi’e 
imperiously  have  resumed  operations 
which  were  destined  to  chain  victory  to 
his  standard. 

It  was  now  evident  that  all  hope  of 
diverting  the  Mississippi  from  its  chan- 
nel must  be  abandoned,  and  that  prac- 
tical access  to  the  east  bank  of  the 
Yazoo,  in  the  rear  of  Vicksburg,  was 
not  to  be  obtained  by  any  of  the  passes. 
What  was  now  to  be  done?  General 
Grant  alone  could  answer  that  question. 
It  was  the  opinion  of  some.  General 
Sherman  included,  that  the  movement 
so  auspiciously  begun,  but  so  premature- 
ly brought  to  grief,  at  the  close  of  the 
previous  year,  should  be  resumed.  Ac- 
cording to  this  plan,  it  would  have  been 
necessary  for  the  main  army  to  return 
up  the  Mississippi,  and,  after  landing, 
to  make  an  inland  march  towards  V icks- 
burg,  on  the  eastern  side  of  that  river ; 
while  the  gunboats  and  a minor  land 
force  would  have  remained  behind  to 
threaten  Vicksburg  on  its  river  front. 

The  position  of  Grant  at  this  stage, 
so  far  as  appearances  went,  was  not 
better  than  it  was  when  he  commenced 
his  retreat  from  Oxford,  after  the  dis- 
aster at  Holly  Springs ; and  there  can 
be  no  doubt  that  he  already  regretted 
that  retreat.  We  know  that  he  has 
since  confessed  that  if  the  army  had 
had,  in  December,  18()2,  the  experience 
which  it  afterwards  acquired,  he  would 
have  marched  on  from  Oxford,  as  at 
first  contemplated,  and  trusted  to  the 


400 


VICKSBURG. 


country  along  his  line  of  march  and 
around  Vicksburg  for  support.  A back- 
ward march,  however,  at  this  time,  if 
any  other  movement  promising  equal 
success  were  possible,  would  have  been 
in  the  last  degree  injudicious.  It  would 
have  given  temporary  encouragement, 
at  least,  to  the  Confederates  It  would 
have  lent  emphasis  to  the  howl  of  dis- 
content, already  loud  all  over  the  North. 
It  would — it  could  not  but — have  been 
humiliating  to  General  Grant.  Happi- 
1}^,  another  movement  was  possible,  al- 
though it  was  beset  at  the  outset  with 
grave  and  serious  difficulties. 

Grant,  whose  headquarters  were  at 
Milliken’s  Bend,  and  whose  army  was 
well  gathered  around  him,  resolved  to 
attack  Vicksburg  from  the  south ; and, 
in  order  to  give  effect  to  this  resolution, 
he  proceeded  to  make  all  the  necessary 
arrangements.  It  was  a bold  experi- 
ment— bolder  than  any  yet  attempted. 
It  implied  great  risks.  It  implied  the 
moving  of  the  whole  army  across  the 
Mississippi.  But  this  could  not  be 
done  at  any  point  within  range  of  the 
guns  of  the  enemy’s  works,  or  without 
the  aid  of  the  gunboats  and  transports 
which  were  lying  above  the  city.  The 
troops  would,  therefore,  have  to  march 
at  least  thirty  or  forty  miles,  probably 
a greater  distance,  over  the  worst  pos- 
sible country,  at  the  worst  possible  sea- 
son of  the  year;  and  the  gunboats  and 
transports  would  have  to  run  the  gaunt- 
let of  the  long  line  of  batteries  which 
completely  commanded  the  river  at 
Vicksburg.  These  difficulties  overcome, 
it  implied  the  transportation  of  the 
troops  across  the  river,  in  the  face  of 


all  the  opposition  of  a powerful  and 
vigilant  enemy.  Nor  was  this  all.  It 
implied  the  complete  abandonment  of 
his  former  base  of  communications,  with- 
out having  secured  another  in  advance. 
Such  was,  the  movement  which  General 
Grant  determined  to  make.  Let  us 
now  see  how  it  was  put  in  execution. 

On  the  29th  of  March  the  movement 
was  commenced.  On  that  day,  ^yjar. 
General  McClernand,  with  the  29. 
Thirteenth  army  corps,  moved  from  Mil- 
liken’s Bend  across  the  peninsula  which 
the  river  here  makes  towards  New  Car- 
thage. McPherson  was  to  follow  with 
the  Seventeenth  army  corps  as  soon  as 
supplies  of  food,  ammunition  and  other 
stores  could  be  forwarded.  Sherman, 
with  the  Fifteenth  army  corps,  was  to 
bring  up  the  rear.  The  roads  were  exe- 
crable. The  march  was,  in  consequence, 
made  with  the  utmost  difficulty,  and 
much  time  was  consumed.  Loads  had  to 
be  made  and  repaired ; boats  and  bridges 
had  to  be  extemporized ; and,  as  there 
was  danger  that  the  rising  flood  might 
burst  its  barriers  and  sweep  all  before 
it,  some  twenty  miles  of  levee  had  to 
be  carefully  guarded  both  day  and 
night.  At  last,  McClernand ’s  advance 
reached  Smith’s  Plantation,  about  two 
miles  from  New  Carthage,  when  it  was 
found  that  the  levee  of  the  Bayou  Vidal 
had  given  way  in  several  places,  and 
that  the  town  and  immediate  neighbor- 
hood were  surrounded  by  water.  New 
Carthage,  in  fact,  had  become  an  island. 
Attempts  were  made  to  reach  the  town 
by  boats.  This,  however,  prov^ed  to  be 
too  tedious  a process;  and,  a clrcirt>us 
road  being  discovered,  the  murcli  was 


PASSING  THE  BATTERIES. 


401 


resumed  around  Bayou  Vidal  to  a point 
some  twelve  miles  further  to  the  south. 
The  distance  travelled  from  Milliken’s 
Bend  was  about  thirty-five  miles.  It 
was  a most  laborious  and  tedious 
march. 

In  the  meantime,  preparations  were 
being  pushed  forward  for  running  the 
transports  and  gunboats  past  the  heavy 
batteries  at  Vicksburg.  These  batteries 
extended  eio^ht  miles  along  the  river. 
April  On  the  night  of  the  16th  of  April, 
the  attempt  was  made  by  seven 
iron-clads,  one  unarmed  gunboat,  and 
three  transports,  the  vulnerable  pai’ts 
of  which,  above  the  water,  were  all 
well  protected  with  hay  and  cotton. 
It  was  arranged  that  the  gunboats 
should  pass  down  in  single  hie,  with 
intervals  between  of  a few  hundred 
yards,  and  that  when  they  opened  their 
broadsides  upon  the  batteries,  the 
transports,  under  cover  of  the  smoke, 
should  endeavor  to  pass  unseen.  It 
was  a starlit  night;  but  there  was  a 
haze  on  the  river  which  dimmed  the 
lights  on  the  Vicksburg  heights.  The 
Benton  led  the  way.  It  seemed  as  if 
the  city  was  wrapped  in  sleep,  and  as 
if  the  fleet  would  pass  undetected. 
But  no.  ‘‘At  just  a quarter  before 
eleven  o’clock,”  an  eye-witness  tells  us, 
“ two  bright,  sharp  lines  of  flame  flashed 
through  the  darkness,  at  the  extreme 
right  of  the  Vicksburg  batteries;  and 
in  an  instant  the  whole  length  of  the 
line  of  the  bluffs  was  ablaze  with  fire.” 
The  gunboats,  wdiich  had  just  rounded 
the  point  and  lay  squarely  before  the 
city,  opened  their  broadsides  at  once. 
The  firing  was  terrific.  In  an  hour  and 


a half  the  Vicksburg  batteries  were 
passed. 

The  batteries  of  Warrenton,  a little 
further  down  the  river,  had  still  to  be 
encountered.  As  these  w’ere  approached, 
the  fleet  took  the  initiative,  and  so 
continuous  and  effective  was  the  fire, 
that  the  enemy  made  but  a feeble  re- 
sponse. The  work  was  now  done,  and 
done  effectively.  The  gunboats  were 
comparatively  uninjured.  Of  the  three 
transports,  the  Forest  Queen,  which 
was  in  the  advance,  received  one  shot 
in  her  hull  and  another  in  her  steam- 
drum, and  was  instantly  disabled. 
Taken  in  tow  by  a gunboat,  she  was 
carried  down  the  river  without  further 
damage.  The  Henry  Clay,  which  was 
next,  having  been  hit  by  a shell,  was 
soon  a blazing  mass,  and  beyond  all 
hope  of  being  saved.  The  Silver  W ave 
had  passed  through  the  fiery  ordeal  un- 
scathed. On  board  the  gunboats,  one 
man  was  killed  and  two  men  wounded. 
Not  a man  was  injured  on  board  the 
transports.  The  affair  had  been  suc- 
ceesful  beyond  all  expectation.  Em- 
boldened by  what  had  happened.  Grant 
had  other  six  transports  prepared  and 
sent  down  the  river  on  the  night  of  the 
2 2d  of  April.  One  of  them,  the  Louis- 
iana, which  was  struck  below  water- 
mark, was  sunk.  The  other  five  were 
all  more  or  less  injured,  but  they  were 
soon  repaired,  and  ready  for  use  again. 

Simultaneously  with  these  move- 
ments, a magnificent  cavalry  exploit 
was  being  performed  by  Colonel  Ben- 
jamin H.  Grierson.  Grant  was  anxious 
to  ascertain  the  strength  of  the  Con- 
federacy, and  to  find  out  by  a practical 


402 


VICKSBURG. 


test  what  resistance  it  could  make  to 
an  invading  force  well  organized  and 
well  equipped.  He  wished  to  do 
more : he  wished  to  cut  off  the  Con- 
federate forces  who  were  protecting 
Vicksburg  from  their  base  of  supplies 
and  their  lines  of  communication.  Col- 
onel Grierson  was  a dashing  but  able 
and  skilful  cavalry  officer ; and  to  him 
was  entrusted  this  somewhat  hazardous 
April  task.  On  the  morning  of  the 
17th  of  April,  while  the  National 
troops  were  still  busy  seeking  a route  by 
which  to  attack  Vicksburg  from  above, 
Grierson,  taking  with  him  his  own  regi- 
ment, the  Sixth  Illinois,  the  Seventh  Ill- 
inois, and  the  Second  Iowa,  some  1700 
horsemen  in  all,  and  a battery  of  artille- 
ry, started  from  La  Grange,  Tennessee, 
and  proceeded  on  his  southward  march, 
ill  the  rear  of  the  Confederate  forces. 
These  mounted  men,  now  breaking  up 
into  detached  parties,  and  diverging  in 
different  directions,  and  now  reuniting, 
swept  the  country  like  a tornado,  break- 
ing up  railroad  tracks,  cutting  the  tele- 
graph wires,  and  burning  bridges, 
depots,  cars,  manufactories,  magazines 
and  stores  of  every  kind.  The  work 
was  not  performed  without  some  hard 
experience.  On  the  fith  day  after  their 
departure  from  La  Grange,  Grierson’s 
men  rode  eight  miles  through  a swamp 
in  which  the  water  was  from  three  to 
four  feet  deep,  losing  twenty  of  their 
horses.  Much  of  the  country  through 
which  they  passed  was  utterly  desti- 
tute of  forage  and  jirovisions;  and  it 
was  rarely  that  they  could  obtain  more 
than  one  meal  a day.  In  less  than  six- 
teen days  they  had  travelled  over  six  I 


hundred  miles.  During  the  last  thirty 
hours  they  had  accomplished  at  least 
eighty  miles,  fought  the  enemy  four 
times,  swum  the  Comite  River  and  de- 
stroyed a Confederate  camp. 

At  nqon,  on  the  2d  day  of  May, 
they  entered  Baton  Rouge,  amid  May 
the  plaudits  of  Banks’  men,  horses  2. 
and  men  half-famished,  and  some  three 
fourths  of  the  latter  more  than  half- 
asleep  in  their  saddles.  During  the 
expedition,  they  had  killed  and  wound- 
ed one  hundred  of  the  enemy,  captured 
and  paroled  five  hundred  prisoners, 
many  of  them  officers,  destroyed  be- 
tween fifty  and  sixty  miles  of  railroad 
and  telegraph,  captured  and  destroyed 
over  thi-ee  thousand  stand  of  arms,  and 
seized  and  carried  with  them  over  a 
thousand  horses  and  mules.  It  was 
not  without  reason  that  General  Grant 
pronounced  this  one  of  the  most  brill- 
iant exploits  of  the  war,  and  one 
which  would  be  handed  down  in  his- 
tory as  an  example  to  be  imitated. 
Grierson  had  demonstrated  the  rotten- 
ness of  the  Confederacy.  It  w^as  a 
‘‘shell,”  and  nothing  more. 

We  left  General  Grant,  with  the  two 
army  corps — McClernand’s  in  advance, 
McPherson’s  following  close  behind — at 
a point  some  few  miles  below  New 
Carthage.  Under  Grant’s  own  superin- 
tendence, the  necessary  preparations 
were  being  hurried  forward  for  the 
transportation  of  his  troops  from  the 
west  to  the  east  side  of  the  Mississippi. 
It  was  his  intention  to  cross  the  river 
from  this  point,  and  to  attempt  a land- 
ing at  Grand  Gulf.  It  was  found, 
however,  that  his  means  of  transporta- 


BRUINSBURG. 


403 


lion  were  insufficient;  and  he  deemed 
it  necessary  to  extend  his  line  of  move- 
ment as  far  south  as  Hard  Times,  mak- 
ing the  entire  distance  from  Milliken’s 
Bend  some  seventy  or  seventy-hve 
miles.  On  the  29th  March,  all  things 
were  in  readiness.  McClernand’s  troops 
were  all  forward;  and  McPherson’s 
were  well  on  their  way.  Sherman,  as 
we  have  seen,  was  left  behind  to  bring 
up  the  rear.  As  many  of  the  Thirteenth 
corps  (McClernand’s)  as  could  be  put 
on  board  the  transports  and  barges, 
were  embarked,  and  moved  to  the  front 
of  Grand  Gulf.  This  was  a strong  for- 
tified position  on  the  east  bank  of  the 
Mississippi,  below  the  mouth  of  the 
Big  Black  River — the  last  of  the  forti- 
fications which  guarded  the  approach  to 
Vicksburg  from  the  south.  Grant’s 
plan  was  to  silence  the  batteries  by  the 
gunboats,  and,  under  cover  of  the  fire, 
to  land  the  troops,  and  carry  the  place 
by  storm.  At  eight  o’clock  in  the 
morning.  Porter  moved  his  fleet  towards 
the  enemy’s  works,  and  opened  a tre- 
mendous fire.  The  response  was  quick 
and  hearty.  For  five  hours  and  a half 
the  firing  on  both  sides  continued.  At 
the  end  of  that  time  the  lower  batteries 
were  silenced ; but  the  upper  ones  could 
not  be  reached. 

From  a tugboat  on  the  river.  General 
Grant  contemplated  the  scene.  Many 
times,”  he  tells  us,  “it  seemed  to  me 
that  the  gunboats  were  within  pistol 
shot  of  the  enemy’s  batteries.  It  soon 
became  evident  that  the  guns  of  the 
enemy  were  too  elevated  and  their  for- 
tifications too  strong  to  be  taken  from 
tile  water  side.  The  whole  ran^re  of 


hills  on  that  side  were  known  to  be 
lined  with  rifle-pits.  Besides,  the  field 
artillery  could  be  moved  to  any  position 
where  it  might  be  useful,  in  case  of 
an  attempt  at  landing.”  He  wisely 
concluded,  therefore,  to  discontinue  the 
firing,  and  to  abandon  the  attempt  to 
effect  a landing  at  Grand  Gulf.  Porter 
was  ordered  to  run  past  the  batteries, 
with  the  gunboats  and  transports,  as  he 
had  done  at  Vicksburg  and  Warrenton, 
and  move  down  to  a point  opposite 
Rodney,  where  the  river  might  be 
crossed  with  less  difficulty.  At  six 
o’clock  that  evening,  accordingly,  Poiter 
renewed  the  attack ; and,  under  cover 
of  the  fire,  the  transports  passed  with- 
out injury.  In  the  double  effort  thus 
made,  three  of  the  gunboats  sustained 
some  damage ; but  they  were  soon  re- 
paired. Porter  had  2d  men  killed  and 
56  wounded. 

During  the  coui'se  of  the  night,  infor- 
mation was  obtained  from  a negro  who 
had  been  selling  home-made  beer  at 
Grand  Gulf,  that  there  was  a good  road 
from  Bruinsburg  to  Port  Gibson,  on  the 
Bayou  Pierre,  in  the  rear  of  Grand 
Gulf.  Bruinsburg  lies  between  Grand 
Gulf  and  Rodney.  At  Bruinsburg,  ac- 
cordingly, General  Grant  resolved  to 
effect  a landing.  At  daylight,  on  jyjjir, 
the  morning  of  the  30th,  the  gun- 
boats  and  transports  were  again  in  mo- 
tion. The  landing  was  effected  with- 
out any  great  inconvenience.  McCler- 
iiand’s  corps  (the  Thirteenth)  was  fer- 
ried across  first.  McPherson’s  (the 
Fourteenth),  which  had  arrived  from 
Lake  Providence,  followed.  Without 
delay,  both  corps,  having  been  supplied 


VICKSBUKG. 


4(M 

with  rations  for  three  days,  were  on 
their  way  to  Port  Gibson. 

The  east  side  of  the  Mississippi,  be- 
low V icksburg,  had  at  last  been  reached 
with  compai‘ative  ease.  The  crossing 
might  have  been  attended  with  greater 
difficulty,  but  for  the  use  which  was 
made  of  Sherman  and  his  corps.  While 
waitinof  for  orders  to  follow  the  other 
two  corps,  Sherman  received  from 
Grant  a letter,  couched  in  very  friendly 
terms,  requesting  him,  while  McCler- 
nand  and  McPherson  were  attempting 
to  cross  the  river  below,  ^‘to  make  a 
demonstration  on  Haines’  Bluff,  and  to 
make  all  the  show  possible.”  He  did 
not  like,  he  said,  to  order  him  to  do  it, 
because  it  might  be  reported  at  the 
North  as  another  failure.  Sherman  an- 
swered that  he  would  do  as  required, 
without  any  regard  to  public  clamor  at 
a distance ; and  he  did  it  most  effec- 
tually. On  the  29th,  at  an  early  hour 
ill  the  morning,  he  embarked  ten  regi- 
ments, of  Blair’s  division,  on  ten  steam- 
ers, and,  preceded  by  several  iron-clads 
and  gunboats,  he  ascended  the  Yazoo, 
and  lay  for  the  night  at  the  mouth  of 
Chickasaw  Bayou.  Towards  evening, 
he  caused  the  troops  to  disembark  in 
full  view  of  the  enemy,  although,  as  he 
has  himself  told  us,  he  ‘‘knew  full  well 
that  there  was  no  road  across  the  sub- 
merged field  that  lay  between  the  river 
and  the  blufP.” 

This  movement  had  the  desired  ef- 
fect. Pemberton  had  just  sent  off  a 
large  force  to  assist  General  Bowen  to 
resist  the  threatened  attack  on  the 
river  below.  Seeing  this  movement  in 
his  front,  and  dreading  an  immediate 


assault  in  great  force,  he  recalled  his 
men,  and  ordered  them  to  take  position 
at  Haines’  Bluff.  The  feint  resulted 
advantageously  in  a double  sense.  It 
withdrew  opposition  from  the  point  at 
which  the  troops  were  to  be  pushed 
across  the  river ; and  the  marching  and 
counter-marching  so  fatigued  Pember- 
ton’s troops,  that  they  were  unfit  for 
serious  work  when  the  real  encounter 
took  place.  For  two  days,  Sherman 
preserved  this  threatening  attitude.  As 
the  other  two  corps  had  crossed  the 
river  seventy-five  miles  below,  and 
gained  a firm  footing  on  the  “ high  pla- 
teau in  rear  of  Vicksburg,”  further  de- 
monstration in  the  direction  of  Haines’ 
Bluff  was  unnecessary.  Sherman  was 
accordingly  ordered  to  hasten  forward 
and  join  the  main  army. 

It  had  been  General  Grant’s  inten- 
tion, up  to  the  time  of  his  crossing  the 
Mississippi,  to  collect  all  his  forces  at 
Grand  Gulf,  to  get  on  hand  a good 
supply  of  provisions  and  ordnance 
stores,  and,  in  the  meantime,  to  detach 
an  army  corps  to  co-operate  with  Gen- 
eral Banks  against  Port  Hudson,  in  the 
hope  that  thereby  he  might  be  able  to 
effect  a junction  of  the  two  armies.  A 
letter  from  General  Banks  informed 
him  that  it  would  be  impossible  for 
him  to  return  to  Baton  Bouge  before 
the  10th  of  May,  but  that  by  the  re- 
duction of  Port  Hudson,  he  would  be 
able  to  join  him  with  12,000  men. 
About  the  same  time,  information 
reached  him  that  troops  were  expected 
at  Jackson  from  the  Southern  cities, 
with  General  Beauregard  in  command. 
Grant  wisely  concluded  that  delay  in 


PORT  GIBSON. 


405 


in  the  circumstances  was  dangerous — all 
the  more  so  that  on  the  10th  of  May, 
with  the  addition  of  12,000  men,  his 
strength  relatively  would  not  be  so 
great  as  it  now  was.  He  resolved, 
therefore,  to  act  at  once.  This  decisive 
step  was  taken  on  his  own  responsi- 
bility. He  did  not  consult  the  authori- 
ties at  Washington;  for  he  knew  that 
he  would  encounter  opposition  alike 
from  Lincoln  and  from  Halleck,  both 
of  whom  were  in  favor  of  his  effecting 
a union  with  Banks. 

As  soon  as  the  troops  had  been 
landed  on  the  other  side  of  the  river, 
the  onward  movement  was  commenced, 
^lay  On  the  morning  of  the  1st  of 
L May,  about  two  o’clock,  when 
some  eight  miles  from  Bruinsburg,  the 
advance,  under  McClernand,  came  into 
contact  with  the  enemy.  The  Confede- 
rates retired ; and  no  attempt  at  pursuit 
was  made  until  daylight.  Early  in  the 
morning,  General  Grant  rode  forward, 
with  his  staff,  and  found  McClernand 
engaged  with  a strong  force  of  the 
enemy,  about  four  miles  from  Port 
Gibson.  At  this  point  the  road  forked 
off  in  two  opposite  directions,  both 
branches,  however,  leading  to  Port 
Gibson.  These  roads  which,  for  the 
most  part,  ran  along  narrow  ridges, 
were  Hanked  on  either  side  by  deep 
and  impenetrable  ravines.  The  Con- 
federates had  taken  position  on  both 
roads.  It  was  a position  which  offered 
}>eculiar  advantages  to  the  resisting 
party,  as  in  falling  back,  they  necessa- 
rily divided  the  pursuing  forces.  It  was 
held  by  General  Bowen,  with  not  more 
than  6000  men.  McClernand’s  troops 


were  divided  so  as  to  suit  the  require- 
ments of  the  ground.  The  divisions  of 
Hovey,  Carr  and  Smith  were  on  the 
right;  the  division  of  Osterhaus  was 
on  the  left.  McClernand  advanced 
with  the  three  divisions.  The  Confed- 
erates offered  a stubborn  resistance, 
contesting  point  after  point  with  great 
bravery.  The  National  forces  on  the 
right  made  steady  advances  on  the 
enemy,  driving  him  from  position  to 
position ; but  Osterhaus  on  the  left  was 
making  no  impression  on  his  stubborn 
antagonist.  On  the  arrival  of  Logan’s 
division,  of  McPherson’s  corps,  Grant 
sent  one  brigade  to  the  assistance  of 
McClernand  and  another  to  the  assist- 
ance of  Osterhaus.  Effective  resistance 
was  no  longer  possible.  At  both  points 
the  Confederates  gave  way,  but  fell  back 
in  good  order  towards  Port  Gibson. 
Night  closing  in,  the  Nationals  halted, 
and  rested  on  their  arms  in  the  expecta- 
tion of  renewing  the  conflict  in  the  morn- 
ing. When  morning  came,  it  was  found 
that  the  Confederates  had  abandoned 
Port  Gibson,  had  crossed  both  forks  of 
the  Bayou  Pierre,  and  burned  the  bridges 
in  their  rear.  In  this  engagement,  the 
Confederates  sustained  a heavy  loss. 
The  Nationals  captured  three  guns, 
four  flags  and  580  prisoners.  Their 
loss  was  130  killed  and  780  wounded. 
This  encounter  is  generally  spoken  of 
as  the  battle  of  Port  Gibson. 

No  time  was  lost  in  the  reconstruc- 
tion of  the  bridges;  and  on  the  jifay 
3d  of  May,  the  Confederates  were  3. 
pursued  as  far  as  Hankinson’s  Ferry. 
On  the  same  day.  Grant  having  discov- 
ered that  Grand  Gulf  had  been  evac- 


•J44 


406 


VICKSBURG. 


uated,  resolved  to  transfer  his  base  of 
supplies  from  Bruinsbiirg  to  that  place. 
At  Hankinson’s  Ferry,  he  halted  his 
forces,  and  waited  for  wagons  and  sup- 
plies, as  well  as  for  the  arrival  of  Sher- 
3[ay  man.  On  the  7th  of  May,  that 
general  succeeded  in  carrying 
across  the  river  his  entii-e  command, 
with  the  exception  of  Blair’s  division, 
which  was  left  at  Milliken’s  Bend  to 
protect  the  depots  there,  until  i*elieved 
by  troops  from  Memphis.  On  the  same 
day,  General  Grant  gave  orders  for  a 
general  forward  movement  of  the  whole 
army. 

In  a previous  chapter,  we  endeavored 
to  present  a clear  and  intelligible  view 
of  Vicksburg,  as  looked  at  from  the 
river  side.  Built  on  one  side  of  a sharp 
bend  in  the  river,  on  a high  line  of 
bluffs,  which  extend  some  fifteen  miles 
from  Haines’  Bluff,  touching  the  Yazoo 
on  the  north  to  a point  below  Warren- 
ton  on  the  south,  the  heights  being  for- 
tified thi'oughout  their  entire  length, 
and  the  ground  on  the  triangle  in  front 
of  the  Northern  defenses  being  all  but 
impassable,  it  is  no  abuse  of  language 
to  say  that  on  the  river  front  Vicks- 
burg was  impregnable.  We  have  al- 
ready seen  how  all  the  attempts  on  that 
side  had  failed.  We  have  now  to  look 
at  Vicksburg  from  a different  stand- 
point. Another  and  formidable  effort 
was  about  to  be  made  to  reduce  the  “city 
of  an  hundred  hills  but  this  time  the 
attack  was  to  be  made  on  the  land  side — 
not  from  the  river.  It  is  but  truth  to 
say  that,  at  the  time  of  Grant’s  ap- 
proach, the  obstacles  to  be  encountered 
and  overcome  on  the  land  side  were,  in 


many  respects,  as  great  as  those  on  the 
side  of  the  river.  There  was  first  the 
Bayou  Pierre,  with  its  steep  banks, 
forming  an  outer  line.  Then  came  the 
Big  Black,  with  its  tributaries.  Big 
Sandy,  Five  Mile,  Fourteen  Mile  and 
Baker’s  Creeks.  This,  however,  was 
not  all.  The  roads  were  narrow,  and 
not  unfrequently,  as  we  have  just  seen, 
flanked  on  both  sides  by  deep  ravines. 
The  whole  country  was  broken  and  ir- 
regular, presenting  serious  obstacles  to 
an  invading  army.  Nearer  the  city, 
the  surrounding  heights  were  crowned 
with  fortifications — bastioned  forts,  re- 
doubts, redans,  detached  batteries  with- 
out number,  and  countless  lines  of  con- 
necting rifle-pits.  It  was  not  without 
reason  that  the  South  was  proud  of 
Vicksburg.  After  Richmond,  it  was 
the  strongest  place  within  the  limits  of 
the  Confederate  States.  Such  was  the 
place  which  Grant  had  resolved  to  cap- 
ture. Such  were  the  obstacles  which 
lay  in  the  way  of  the  accomplishment 
of  his  purpose. 

It  was  General  Grant’s  design  to  se- 
cure his  rear  by  a rapid  march  on  Jack- 
son,  the  capital  of  the  State  of  Missis- 
sippi, to  destroy  the  public  property 
there,  to  break  up  the  railroad  which 
connects  that  capital  with  Vicksburg, 
and  then  to  concentrate  his  forces 
around  the  doomed  city.  In  order  the 
more  effectually  to  accomplish  his  pur- 
pose, he  deemed  it  prudent  to  distract 
the  attention  of  the  enemy,  and  to  con- 
ceal, as  far  as  possible,  his  real  inten- 
tion. Reconnoitering  parties  to  the 
west  side  of  the  Big  Black  felt  their 
way,  unmolested,  to  within  six  miles  of 


RAYMOND. 


407 


Warrenton.  The  main  body  of  the  army 
advanced  by  two  parallel  roads  on  the 
southeast  bank  of  the  same  river — Mc- 
Pherson on  the  road  to  the  left;  Mc- 
Clernand  on  the  ridge  road,  a little 
more  to  the  right;  Sherman,  whose 
corps  was  divided,  following  on  both 
roads.  On  the  11th,  and  while  these 
movements  were  being  carried  out, 
Grant  telegraphed  to  General  Halleck 
that  he  would  communicate  no  more 
with  Grand  Gulf,  and  that  several 
weeks  might  elapse  before  he  would 
again  hear  from  him.  That  night  Mc- 
Clernand’s  corps  was  on  and  near  the 
Baldwin’s  Ferry  Road ; Sherman’s  corps 
was  at  and  beyond  Auburn ; and  Mc- 
Pherson, with  his  corps,  was  eight 
miles  to  the  right,  a little  in  advance  of 
Utica,  in  the  direction  of  Raymond. 

On  the  morning  of  the  12th,  Sherman 
]>Iay  and  McClernand  crossed  Fourteen 
12.  Mile  Creek,  the  former  at  Dillon’s 
Plantation,  the  latter  a little  further  to 
the  west.  At  both  crossings  the  enemy 
was  encountered,  and  there  was  severe 
skirmishing.  Grant  had  been  with 
Sherman  from  the  time  the  latter  ar- 
rived at  Auburn.  McPherson,  wdio,  as 
w^e  have  seen,  w^as  moving  northward 
some  seven  or  eight  miles  to  the  west, 
when  within  tw^o  or  three  miles  of  Ray- 
mond, encountered  the  Confederates  in 
much  greater  force.  Two  brigades  of 
the  enemy,  some  six  thousand  strong, 
under  Generals  Gregg  and  Walker,  the 
former  being  in  command,  were  well 
posted  near  Farnden’s  Creek.  The 
troops  were  for  the  most  part  concealed 
in  the  thickly- wooded  and  irregular 
ground  which  bordered  the  stream. 


Two  powerful  batteries,  planted  on  an 
eminence,  commanded  the  two  roads  by 
which  the  Nationals  were  approaching. 
Logan,  who  was  in  the  advance,  was 
the  first  to  feel  the  weight  of  the  ene- 
my’s arm.  His  second  brigade,  which 
advanced  to  the  edge  of  the  woods, 
called  forth  a vigorous  and  well-direct- 
ed volley.  De  Golyer’s  artillery  was 
ordered  forward,  when  for  the  first 
time  the  Confederates  opened  their  bat- 
teries. The  firing  was  kept  up  with 
great  vigor  on  both  sides.  Finding  it 
impossible  to  silence  the  National  ar- 
tillery, the  Confederates  made  a tre- 
mendous rush  for  the  guns.  The  Na- 
tional gunners  stuck  to  their  posts. 
They  were  not  to  be  intimidated. 
Waiting  till  the  Confederates  were 
fairly  within  range,  they  opened  upon 
them  a well-directed  fire  of  shot  and 
shell.  The  Confederates,  their  ranks 
torn  in  pieces  by  exploding  shells,  halt- 
ed, broke,  and  retired  in  confusion  be- 
yond the  creek.  There,  however,  they 
rallied,  and  re-formed.  McPherson  fol- 
lowed them  up,  and  ordered  a fresh  at- 
tack on  their  new  position.  This  time 
the  movement  was  led  by  the  brigade 
of  General  Dennis.  The  struggle  at 
this  point  was  protracted  and  severe, 
the  Twentieth  Ohio,  the  Twentieth 
Illinois  and  the  Twenty-Third  Indiana 
being  badly  cut  up.  Offering  a most 
stubborn  resistance,  the  Confederates, 
although  compelled  to  yield  some  of 
their  ground,  still  maintained  an  un- 
broken front.  Roused  to  the  highest 
pitch  of  excitement,  the  Eighth  Illinois, 
Colonel  Sturgis,  at  the  supreme  moment 
of  the  fight,  rushed  with  tremendous 


408 


VICKSBURG. 


fury,  and  with  fixed  bayonets,  on  this 
unbroken  and  apparently  invincible 
phalanx.  The  attack  was  irresistible. 
The  Confederate  line  broke  in  frag- 
ments, and,  in  disordered  masses,  fled 
from  the  creek.  Such  was  the  battle  of 
Raymond.  It  lasted  three  hours.  The 
Confederate  loss  in  this  engagement 
w’as  103  killed  and  720  wounded. 
The  National  loss  was  69  killed,  341 
wounded  and  32  missing.  The  battle 
of  Raymond  added  to  the  already 
great  reputation  of  McPherson,  and  to 
Logan’s  growing  fame. 

McClernand  and  Sherman  had  been 
ordered  to  move  towards  the  Vicks- 
burg and  Jackson  Railroad  by  parallel 
roads,  the  former  in  the  direction  of 
Edward’s  Station,  the  latter  to  a point 
between  Edward’s  Station  and  Bolton. 
This  order  was  countermanded,  and 
both  were  ordered  to  march  towards 
Raymond.  This  change  had  been  ren- 
dered necessary  by  the  battle  which 
had  just  been  fought,  the  defeated 
Confederates  having  retreated  in  the 
direction  of  Jackson,  where  it  was 
known  General  Joe  Johnston  was 
hourly  expected,  with  large  reinforce- 
ments. General  Grant  resolved  to 
make  sure  of  Raymond,  so  as  to  have 
no  enemy  in  his  rear.  Determined  to 
anticipate  Johnston,  and  to  prevent  by 
all  possible  means  a junction  between 
him  and  Pemberton,  Grant  hurried  for- 
]^ay  ward  his  troops.  On  the  13th, 
McPherson  pushed  on  towards 
Clinton,  entering  the  town  unopposed 
about  two  o’clock  in  the  afternoon,  and 
immediately  destroyed  a section  of  the 
railroad,  thus  cutting  off  supplies  from 


Vicksburg.  This  was  a victory  in  it- 
self. Losing  no  time,  McPherson  has- 
tened towards  Jackson.  Sherman  was 
marching  to  the  same  point  by  the  di- 
rect road  from  Raymond.  McCler- 
nand, meanwhile,  was  taking  a position 
near  Raymond. 

Johnston  had  anived  at  Jackson  on 
the  13th.  There  he  found  the  brigades 
of  Gregg  and  Walker  which,  on  the 
preceding  day  had  fallen  back  before 
McPherson  from  Raymond.  He  knew 
that  Grant  was  approaching ; and  re- 
cognizing the  military  genius  mani- 
fested in  the  conception  of  the  cam- 
paign, as  well  as  impressed  by  the 
terrible  energy  with  which  it  was  being 
executed,  he  felt  convinced  that  he  had 
to  deal  Math  a formidable  antagonist. 
He,  therefore,  ordered  Pemberton  to 
move  up  to  Clinton,  in  rear  of  the  Na- 
tional force,  which  he  imagined  to  be 
only  a detachment.  He  was  to  move 
that  night.  To  beat  such  a detach- 
ment,” he  said,  “ would  be  of  immense 
value.  The  troops  could  here  co-ope- 
rate. All  the  strength  you  can  quickly 
assemble  should  be  brought.  Time  is 
all-important.”  It  was  sound  advice. 
It  indicated  a course  which  Pemberton 
ought  to  have  followed  at  an  earlier 
date.  Thei-e  was  a bare  probability, 
however,  that  if  Johnston’s  advice  had 
been  taken,  the  movements  of  General 
Grant  might  have  been  seriously  em- 
barrassed. Pemberton,  who  held  posi- 
tion at  Edward’s  Station,  might  at 
least  have  been  able  to  effect  a junction 
Math  Johnston.  What  did  he  do?  He 
called  a council  of  war.  It  was  the 
opinion  of  the  majority  of  the  officers 


JACKSON. 


409 


that  J ohnston’s  order  should  be  obeyed. 
It  was  the  opinion  of  not  a few  of  them 
that,  in  place  of  following  out  Johnston’s 
instructions,  a movement  should  be  made 
to  cut  off  Grant’s  supplies  from  the 
Mississippi — a very  unnecessary  move- 
ment, as  Grant  had,  five  days  before 
this  time,  notified  the  government  that 
he  ‘‘would  communicate  no  more  with 
Grand  Gulf.”  “My  own  views,”  says 
Pemberton,  “ were  expressed  as  un- 
favorable to  any  movement  which 
would  remove  me  from  my  base,  which 
was  and  is  Vicksburg.  I did  not,  how- 
ever, see  fit  to  place  my  own  judgment 
and  opinions  so  far  in  opposition  as  to 
prevent  the  movement  altogether ; but 
believing  the  only  possibility  of  success 
to  be  in  the  plan  proposed,  of  cutting 
off  the  enemy’s  supplies,  I directed  all 
my  disposable  force — say  seventeen 
thousand  five  hundred — toward  Ray- 
mond.” On  the  morning  of  the  14th, 
therefore,  when  Johnston  was  momen- 
tarily expecting  the  arrival  of  the  Na- 
tionals, his  expected  reinforcements  not 
having  come  up,  he  was  depending  en- 
tirely on  the  two  brigades  of  Walker 
and  Gregg.  McPherson  moved  on  Jack- 
son  by  the  Clinton  Road.  Sherman 
advanced  by  the  road  which  leads  from 
Raymond.  Both  encountered  some 
slight  opposition ; and  both  entered  the 
place  at  the  same  time.  It  was  an  easy 
victory.  The  Confederates  made  good 
their  retreat,  moving  northward,  in  the 
direction  of  Canton.  It  was  found  that 
the  State  and  city  officials  had  fled, 
carrying  with  them  the  State  papers 
and  funds.  Seventeen  guns  had  been 
captured;  but  the  commissary  and 


quartermaster’s  stores  were  in  flames. 
Grant  entered  the  city  with  Sherman’s 
head  of  column.  His  soldiers  patrolled 
the  streets,  and  brought  the  prisoners 
to  the  State  House.  In  the  hotel,  in 
front  of  the  State  House,  the  three 
generals  met,  when  arrangements  were 
made  for  the  immediate  future  of  the 
campaign.  During  the  night  of  the 
13th  and  the  morning  of  the  14th,  up 
until  noon,  the  rain  fell  in  torrents; 
but  the  rank  and  file  of  the  army  of 
the  West  were  inured  to  the  hardships 
of  a soldier’s  life;  and,  while  excellent 
work  was  done  and  the  most  perfect 
order  preserved,  there  was  neither  mur- 
mur nor  complaint. 

On  the  morning  of  the  14th,  General 
Grant  learned  that  Johnston  had  ]vray 
ordered  Pemberton  to  move  im-  H. 
mediately  out  of  Vicksburg,  cross  the 
Big  Black,  and  fall  upon  the  National 
rear.  Grant  saw  at  once  what  was 
meant,  and  he  gave  his  corps  command- 
ers to  understand  that  “ time  was  all- 
important.”  All  his  and  their  energies 
must  now  be  bent  to  prevent  the  junc- 
tion of  the  Confederate  forces.  Action 
was  taken  at  once.  Pemberton  must 
receive  the  lesson  which  had  just  been 
given  to  Johnston.  Orders  were  given 
for  a concentration  of  the  entire  Na- 
tional army  in  the  direction  of  Edward’s 
Station.  McClernand  was  ordered  to 
gather  together  his  scattered  divisions, 
and  move  towards  Bolton.  Blair,  with 
his  division,  was  detached  from  Sher- 
man’s corps,  and  ordered  to  move  in 
the  same  direction.  Similar  instruc- 
tions were  given  to  McPherson.  Sher- 
man, with  the  bulk  of  his  troops,  was 


410 


VICKSBURG. 


ordered  to  remain  for  the  present  at 
Jackson,  the  special  duty  assigned  him 
being  the  destruction  of  the  railroads, 
bridges,  factories,  workshops,  arsenals, 
and  everything  which  might  be  of  any 
value  or  service  to  the  enemy.  This 
duty  was  faithfully  performed,  and 
with  a rapidity  and  completeness 
which  characterized  all  the  doings  of 
that  great  soldier.  Bolton  was  favor- 
ably situated  for  the  conveyance  of  the 
troops.  It  was  a convenient  point  from 
which  to  move  on  Edward’s  Station. 
May  On  the  morning  of  the  15th  the 
movement  began.  Grant  had 
been  particularly  careful  that  there 
should  be  no  mistake ; and,  as  McCler- 
nand  was  at  some  distance  from  his 
headquarters,  he  sent  Lieutenant-Colo- 
nel Wilson,  of  his  stalf,  to  explain  to 
him  the  situation,  and  to  urge  imme- 
diate action.  Grant  himself  hastened 
to  the  front. 

Meanwhile,  what  was  Pemberton  do- 
ing ? He  had  received  a despatch  from 
Johnston  on  the  14th,  “suggesting,  not 
ordering,”  as  he  afterwards  said,  a com- 
bined attack  on  McPherson  at  Clinton. 
It  was  not  until  the  next  morning  that 
he  began  to  move  towards  Raymond. 
He  did  not  know  that  his  chief  had  fled 
from  Jackson,  and  that  Grant,  with  the 
bulk  of  his  army,  was  making  forced 
marches  westward.  He  had  been  de- 
layed for  some  hours  in  passing  a 
branch  of  Baker’s  Creek,  which  was 
greatly  swollen  by  the  heavy  rains. 
He  had,  thei’efoi*e,  only  reached  Cham- 
pion Hills,  a strong  place,  some  four  or 
five  miles  fi*om  Baker’s  Creek,  when  he 
received  a note  from  Johnston,  directing? 


him  to  move  northward,  so  that  they 
might  be  able  to  unite  their  forces. 
Pemberton  halted,  sent  back  his  wagon 
trains  to  the  Big  Black,  and  was  pre- 
paring to  follow,  when  he  learned  that 
Grant  was  close  at  hand.  It  was  too 
late  to  return.  It  was  perilous  to  ad- 
vance. He,  therefore,  took  position, 
and  remained  to  fight.  The  ground 
was  well  adapted  for  offering  resistance. 
To  the  left  of  the  road,  as  it  approaches 
Vicksburg,  there  was  a high,  undulat- 
ing hill,  covered  by  a dense  forest  and 
undergrowth.  To  the  right,  the  timber 
extended  a little  way  down  the  hill, 
and  then  opened  into  cultivated  fields, 
and  a valley  which  stretched  out  for  a 
considerable  distance.  On  the  right, 
the  slope  was  gentle.  Pemberton  had 
posted  his  army  right  across  the  road, 
his  left  wing  resting  on  a height  where 
the  road  made  a sharp  turn  to  the  left. 
General  W.  W.  Loring  commanded  his 
right ; General  John  Bowen  his  centre ; 
and  General  Carter  L.  Stevenson  his 
left. 

It  was  the  morning  of  the  16th  of 
May.  Grant  was  already  at  the  yjay 
front.  There  he  found  Hovey,  of 
McClernand’s  corps,  getting  into  line, 
and  nearly  ready  for  battle.  Hovey, 
who  had  moved  up  the  road,  occupied 
the  centre ; McPherson,  with  two  of  his 
divisions,  was  stationed  on  the  right ; 
and  Smith  and  Blair  were  to  take  posi- 
tion on  the  left.  The  enemy  was  not 
only  well  posted : he  was  strong  in 
numbers.  Grant,  unwilling  to  run  any 
unnecessary  risks,  forbade  an  attack  un- 
til the  arriv^al  of  McClernand,  who  was 
coming  up  with  four  divisions.  Mcst 


CHAMPION  HILLS. 


411 


sages  were  sent  to  McClernand,  urging 
him  forward  with  all  possible  haste. 
In  vain  did  Grant  listen  for  the  sound 
of  McClernand’s  guns.  Every  minute 
made  it  more  difficult  to  postpone  the 
conflict.  The  troops  were  already  in 
close  contact.  Hovey’s  advance  was 
developing  the  enemy’s  skirmishing 
line.  The  firing  became  more  and  more 
rapid ; and  by  eleven  o’clock  the  battle 
had  fairly  begun.  Hovey’s  division 
was  soon  fully  engaged.  This  division, 
indeed,  which  was  composed  of  Ohio, 
Indiana  and  Wisconsin  troops,  bore 
the  brunt  of  the  battle.  General  Mc- 
Ginnis gallantly  led  the  attack.  A 
vigorous  charge  was  made  upon  two 
Confederate  batteries,  which  were  post- 
ed upon  a ridge;  and  one  of  them,  was 
captured.  The  battle  raged  with  great 
fury  for  an  hour  and  a half.  Pember- 
ton, however,  continued  to  mass  his  men 
in  the  centre  and  towards  the  National 
right;  and  Hovey’s  troops,  pressed  by 
superior  numbers,  unable  to  hold  their 
position  or  to  retain  possession  of  the 
captured  guns,  reluctantly  fell  back 
nearly  half  a mile.  Hovey  called  for 
help.  Help  could  not  be  given  without 
weakening  McPherson  on  the  right ; but 
help  could  not  be  refused,  except  at  the 
risk  of  losing  the  fight. 

Knowing  that  McClernand  would  soon 
be  up,  and  having  no  fear  of  the  result. 
Grant  sent  first  one  and  then  another 
brigade,  of  Croker’s  division,  of  McPher- 
son’s corps,  to  the  aid  of  Hovey,  who 
gallantly  renewed  the  conflict.  Mean- 
while, Logan’s  division  was  operating 
with  great  effect  on  the  enemy’s  left 
and  rear.  When  Hovey  called  for 


more  troops,  Logan  rode  up  to  General 
Grant,  and  told  him  that  if  Hovey 
could  make  another  dash  at  the  ene- 
my, he  could  come  up  where  he  then 
was,  and  capture  the  greater  part  of 
the  opposing  army.  Grant  rode  for- 
ward, and  cheered  the  troops  who  had 
been  so  gallantly  engaged,  urging  them 
again  to  the  attack,  and  explaining  the 
position  of  Logan’s  division.  Logan 
continued  to  press  heavily  on  Pember- 
ton’s left.  General  C.  L.  Stevenson, 
Hovey  holding  his  ground  in  the  cen- 
tre. About  five  o’clock  in  the  after- 
noon, Stevenson’s  line,  which  for  some 
time  had  been  yielding  under  Logan's 
pressure,  broke,  and  fell  back  in  dis- 
order. The  battle  was  lost.  Loring, 
who  commanded  on  the  Confederate 
right,  had  already  left  the  field,  leaving 
his  cannon  behind  him.  When  his  left 
gave  out,  Pemberton’s  heart  sank  within 
him;  and  he  ordered  a retreat  of  his 
whole  army.  McClernand,  with  Carr’s 
division,  followed  by  that  of  Osterhaus, 
arrived  on  the  field  only  in  time  to 
pursue  the  retreating  foe.  The  battle 
of  Champion  Hills  was  fought  and  won 
by  Hovey’s  division,  of  McClernand’s 
corps,  and  by  Logan’s  and  Quimby’s, 
commanded  by  Croker,  of  McPher- 
son’s corps.  It  was  a bloody  and 
most  unequal  strife,  the  Nationals  from 
the  outset  being  greatly  outnumbered. 
The  National  loss  amounted  to  nearly 
2500,  of  whom  some  430  were  killed. 
The  loss  sustained  by  the  Confederates 
must  have  been  even  more  severe ; for 
in  addition  to  killed  and  wounded, 
2000  were  made  prisoners. 

After  the  battle  was  ended,  it  was 


412 


VICKSBURG. 


discovered  that  the  Vicksburg  Road, 
after  following  the  ridge  in  a southerly 
direction  for  about  a mile,  turns  almost 
to  the  west,  across  the  valley  in  which 
Logan  was  operating.  One  of  Logan’s 
brigades  had  nearly  reached  this  road. 
Consciously  or  unconsciously  to  himself, 
Logan’s  manoeuvre  was  thus  threatening 
the  Confederate  rear  and  the  capture  of 
the  greater  portion  of  Pemberton’s  army. 
There  is  no  evidence  that  the  existence 
of  this  road  was  known  to  Grant,  or  any 
of  his  commanders,  at  the  commence- 
ment of  or  during  the  contest.  Its  ex- 
istence was,  of  course,  known  to  the 
Confederates.  This  circumstance  goes 
far  to  explain  the  panic  which  seized 
Loring  on  the  right,  and  Stevenson  on 
the  left,  and  which  at  last  demoralized 
the  centre,  making  flight  a necessity. 
The  non-arrival  of  McClernand  in  time 
was  unfortunate,  and  threatened  to  be 
dangerous;  and,  most  undoubtedly,  if 
the  result  had  been  different,  he  would 
have  been  called  to  account.  General 
Grant  evidently  felt  the  delicacy  of  Mc- 
Clernand’s  position,  and  the  necessity 
for  some  explanation  of  his  conduct; 
and  it  redounds  to  his  credit  that,  in  his 
report,  he  takes  some  pains  and  goes 
som.ewhat  out  of  his  way  to  throw  over 
his  lieutenant  the  mantle  of  his  protec- 
tion. ‘‘The  delay,”  he  says,  “in  the 
advance  of  the  troops  immediately  with 
McClernand  was  caused,  no  doubt,  by 
the  enemy  presenting  a front  of  artillery 
and  infantry  where  it  was  impossible, 
from  the  nature  of  the  ground  and  the 
density  of  the  forest,  to  discover  his 
numbers.” 

If  any  blame  was  attachable  to  Mc- 


Clernand for  his  delay  in  coming  up  on 
the  IGth,  he  nobly  atoned  for  it  by  his 
conduct  of  the  pursuit  on  the  day  fol- 
lowing. The  pursuit,  as  we  have  seen, 
was  commenced  on  the  afternoon  of  the 
16th.  It  was  continued  until  after 
dark,  with  great  loss  to  the  Confede- 
rates. A train  of  cars,  loaded  with  a 
large  quantity  of  commissary  and  ord- 
nance stores,  fell  into  the  hands  of  the 
pursuers;  and  the  Confederates  them- 
selves destroyed  much  valuaVde  proper- 
ty, which  they  found  it  impossible  to 
carry  with  them.  McClernand  biv- 
ouacked for  the  night  on  the  hill  which 
overlooks  Edward’s  Station.  It  was 
Saturday  night.  On  Sunday  morning 
the  pursuit  was  resumed ; but  it  was  not 
long  continued.  The  Nationals  were 
soon  brought  to  a standstill  by  the  strong 
works  which  the  Confederates  had  con- 
structed on  both  sides  of  the  Big  Black, 
in  the  neighborhood  of  the  Railroad 
Bridge.  On  the  west  side,  the  bluffs 
extend  to  the  water’s  edge.  On  the 
eastern  side,  there  is  an  open,  cultivated 
plain,  nearly  a mile  in  width,  surround- 
ed by  a bayou  of  stagnant  water,  from 
two  to  three  feet  in  depth,  and  from 
ten  to  twenty  in  width,  reaching  from 
the  river  above  the  railroad  to  the  river 
below.  Following  the  line  of  this 
bayou,  which  served  as  a ditch  in  front, 
was  a well-constructed  line  of  rifle-pits. 
Behind  the  defenses  on  the  eastern  side 
of  the  river  were  the  brigades  of  Gi’een, 
Villepigue  and  Cockrell.  A little  above 
the  Railroad  Bridge,  was  a passage-way 
for  troops,  constructed  of  steamboat 
hulks.  On  the  western  side  which,  as  we 
have  said,  was  steep,  the  bluffs  running 


THE  BIG  BLACK. 


413 


down  to  the  water’s  edge,  there  were 
strong  fortifications,  mounted  with 
heavy  guns.  Such  was  the  new  posi- 
tion which  obstructed  the  triumphant 
Nationals  in  their  onward  march  to 
Vicksburg.  Of  the  pursuing  party, 
Carr’s  division  occupied  the  extreme 
advance.  Of  this  division,  Lawler  com- 
manded the  right  brigade.  After  seve- 
ral hours  ineffectual  skirmishing,  Lawler 
discovered  that,  by  moving  under  cover 
of  the  river  bank,  he  could  gain  a point 
from  which  a successful  assault  might 
be  made.  It  was  a hazardous  opera- 
tion, because  of  the  level  ground  over 
which  a portion  of  the  troops  would 
have  to  pass  without  cover,  and  because 
of  the  ditch  in  front  of  the  works. 
Lawler  gave  the  order  ; the  charge  was 
gallantly  made ; and  in  spite  of  the 
obstacles  which  lay  in  their  way,  and 
the  tempest  of  bullets  which  decimated 
their  ranks,  the  brave  fellows,  whose 
comrades  were  falling  at  every  step  by 
their  side,  nobly  and  successfully  ac- 
complished their  task.  Not  a shot  did 
they  fire  until  they  had  crossed  the 
ditch ; then  they  poured  forth  one 
simultaneous  and  terrific  volley,  and, 
rushing  forward  without  reloading,  they 
carried  the  works  at  the  point  of  the 
bayonet.  Almost  the  entire  garrison, 
and  seventeen  pieces  of  artillery,  several 
thousand  stand  of  arms,  and  a large 
quantity  of  commissary  stores,  were  the 
trophies  of  this  daring  and  brilliant 
exploit.  Only  a few  of  the  garrison, 
some  1500  strong,  had  found  their  way 
across  the  river,  when  the  Confederates 
on  the  western  bank  set  fire  to  both 
bridges — th?  railroad  bridge  and  the 


bridge  of  boats — thus  shutting  olf  their 
comrades  from  all  means  of  escape,  and 
checking  the  progress  of  the  National 
troops.  It  was  a cruel  measure,  and 
as  the  result  proved,  a useless  piece  of 
incendiarism;  but  such  things  are  not 
unlawful  in  war.  Such  was  the  battle 
of  the  Big  Black.  It  briglitened  the 
fame  of  McClernand ; but  Lawler,  and 
his  brave  brigade,  carried  off  the  honors 
of  the  day.  In  the  engagement,  Oster- 
haus  was  wounded. 

With  as  little  delay  as  possible,  float- 
ing bridges  were  thrown  across  the  river. 
On  the  afternoon  of  the  17th,  McCler- 
nand came  up ; and  all  the  neces-  ]>iay 
sary  preparations  were  completed  *7. 
for  continuing  the  pursuit.  On  the 
following  morning  his  corps,  and  that 
of  McPherson,  which  had  also  arrived, 
crossed  to  the  western  side  of  the  Big 
Black.  After  the  battle  of  Champion 
Hills,  Sherman  had  been  ordered  to 
advance  to  Bridgeport,  some  miles  to 
the  north  of  the  railroad  bridge.  By 
crossing  the  river  at  that  point,  it  was 
expected  he  would  be  able  effectually 
to  fall  on  the  enemy’s  flank,  in  the 
event  of  his  making  a stand  at  the 
bridge  on  the  western  shore.  On  the 
17th,  Sherman  had  reached  his  destina- 
tion, and  been  joined  by  Grant.  Sher- 
man had  with  him  a pontoon  tiaiii,  the 
only  one  with  the  army.  On  the  even- 
ing of  that  day,  the  bridge  having 
been  thrown  across,  the  troops  began 
the  passage.  After  dark,  the  scene 
was  lit  up  with  fires  of  pitch-pine. 
Grant  and  Sherman  having  crossed, 
seated  themselves  on  a log,  and,  by  the 
light  of  the  blazing  pine  fires,  wit- 


414 


VICKSBURG. 


nessed  the  passage  of  the  Fifteenth  j 
corps,  Sherman’s  own.  Having  made  j 
known  his  purpose,  and  explained  his 
plans  for  the  morrow,  Grant  returned 
through  the  forest  to  his  headquarters 
in  the  cane-brake.  Next  day  Sher- 
man, in  his  onward  march  to  Vicks- 
burg, and  when  about  three  and  a half 
miles  from  the  city,  turned  to  the 
right,  in  the  direction  of  the  Yazoo  and 
the  northern  extremity  of  the  Walnut 
Hills.  That  night,  Haines’  Bluff  was 
in  his  possession  ; and  he  had  opened 
communication  with  Admiral  Porter 
on  the  Yazoo.  Porter,  who  left  his 
ii*on-clads  below  Vicksburg,  had  entered 
the  Yazoo  on  the  16th,  to  be  ready 
to  co-operate  wdth  the  army.  On  the 
18th  he  heard,  in  the  rear  of  Vicks- 
burg,  the  sound  of  cannon ; and  soon 
afterwards,  by  the  use  of  his  glass,  he 
discovered  Sherman’s  division  on  the 
left  of  Snyder’s  Bluff,  and  knew  that 
the  Confederates  at  that  place  had 
been  cut  off  from  joining  the  forces  in 
the  city.  With  the  view  of  opening 
communication  with  the  army,  he  des- 
patched, up  the  Yazoo,  the  De  Kalb, 
the  Choctaw,  the  Borneo  and  the  For- 
est Bose,  under  Lieutenant-Commander 
Breeze.  Tlie  task  was  easily  accom- 
plished. Menaced  by  the  land  forces 
on  the  adjoining  heights,  the  Confed- 
erates made  a precipitate  retreat,  leav- 
ing everything  behind  them — stores  of 
all  kinds,  guns,  gun-cainiages,  ammu- 
nition, tents,  and  an  admirably  con- 
structed camp.  The  Yazoo  was  now 
open.  A base  of  supplies  had  thus 
been  secured  for  the  National  army; 
and  if  Vicksburg  could  not  be  taken 


by  assault.  Grant  could  afford  to  wait, 
and  force  submission  by  the  slower 
process  of  a siege. 

It  was  a proud  satisfaction  to  both 
Porter  and  Sherman,  to  find  themselves 
masters  of  this  important  position  at 
last.  The  works  at  Haines’  Bluff  had 
been  abandoned  on  the  17th.  They 

%j 

were  found  to  have  been  very  strong. 

Such  a network  of  forts,”  says  Porter, 
“I  never  saw.”  Writing  to  M.  L. 
Smith,  some  time  afterwards,  Sherman 
says,  ‘‘As  soon  as  we  had  fixed  things 
in  Jackson,  I made  good  time  in  reach- 
ing the  very  point  above  Vicksburg 
that  we  had  worked  so  hard  and  thank- 
lessly for  last  January.  It  has  fulfilled 
all  my  expectations,  and  we  now  have 
high  and  commanding  ground,  and  haul 
all  our  stores  from  our  old  landing,  at 
Chickasaw  Bayou.  The  very  roads 
made  by  the  enemy,  which  enabled  him 
to  mass  his  troops  so  promptly  before 
us,  are  now  ours,  and  answer  an  ad- 
mirable purpose.  I ride  often  to  the 
very  hill  from  which  all  our  movements 
were  telegraphed,  and  enjoy  an  inter- 
nal satisfaction  that,  after  five  months’ 
patient  labor  and  fighting,  I can  now 
reciprocate  the  compliment.  We  are 
close  upon  the  enemy ; our  artillery 
reaches  every  part  of  the  city,  which,  I 
am  told,  has  become  like  a prairie-dog 
village,  all  burrowed  in  the  earth.” 
At  this  stage.  Grant  must  have  felt 
well-satisfied.  He  had  now  marched 
two  hundred  miles  since  he  ci’ossed 
the  river  at  Bruinsburg,  had  fought 
four  battles,  had  taken  ninety  guns, 
had  captured  six  thousand  prisoner^, 
had  cut  off  Pemberton’s  retreat;  and 


THE  FIRST  ASSAULT. 


415 


he  knew  that  Vicksburg  was  already 
May  his  grasp.  On  the  19th,  the  in- 
19*  vestment  of  Vicksburg  was  com- 
pleted. Porter  commanded  the  city 
from  tlie  river,  cutting  off  all  communi- 
cations on  that  side.  McPherson  took 
position  at  the  front,  when  Sherman 
turned  oft'  to  the  right.  McClernand 
came  up  the  Jackson  Road  to  Mount 
Alban’s,  and  then  turned  to  the  left  to 
get  to  the  'Baldwin  Road.  Sherman 
was  thus  on  the  right;  McPherson  in 
the  centre;  and  McClernand  on  the  left. 

The  situation  now  looked  gloomy 
enough  for  Pemberton.  He  had  locked 
himself  in  a cage  with  his  own  hands. 
He  had  done  it  deliberately,  and  against 
the  advice  of  his  chief.  Vicksburg  had 
ceased  to  be  of  any  value  as  a strategic 
point  from  the  moment  that  the  National 
troops  crossed  the  river  Vjelow  the  city. 
After  the  battle  at  Port  Gibson,  it  was 
patent  to  all  reflecting  minds  that  the 
capture  of  Vicksburg  was  merely  a 
question  of  time.  The  city  was  doomed. 
Pemberton  refused  to  open  his  eyes  to 
facts ; and,  in  place  of  saving  his  army 
and  making  it  his  chief  business  to 
effect  a junction  with  Johnston,  he 
clung  to  Vicksburg  with  what  seemed 
the  tenacity  of  despair,  rather  than  the 
tenacity  cf  hope.  He  had  received  a 
letter  from  Johnston,  written  on  the 
17th.  “If  Haines’  Bluff,”  said  John- 
ston in  that  despatch,  “ be  untenable, 
Vicksburg  is  of  no  value ; it  cannot  be 
held.  If  you  are  invested  in  it,  you 
must  ultimately  surrender.  Instead  of 
losing  both  troops  and  place,  you  must, 
if  possible,  save  the  troops.  If  not  too 
late,  evacuate  Vicksburg  and  its  de- 


pendencies forthwith,  and  march  north- 
east.” It  was  too  late.  Pemberton 
had  been  blind  to  his  duty  in  a higher 
sense  than  he  understood  it ; he  had 
lost  his  opportunity,  whether  he  knew 
it  or  not;  and  he  must  now  reap  the 
fruit  of  his  folly.  As  escape  was  now 
impossible,  and  as  he  was  not  yet  in  a 
mood  to  surrender,  he  must  needs  do 
as  he  best  can  with  his  shattered  and 
dispirited  forces.  His  position,  as  we 
have  shown  already,  was  one  of  great 
strength.  His  line  of  works  was  ex- 
tensive, but  it  was  protected  by  one 
hundred  and  two  guns;  and,  as  there 
were  within  the  lines  from  twenty-flve 
to  thirty  thousand  men,  the  forts  were 
well  manned.  In  the  arrangement  of 
his  troops,  he  placed  Brigadier-General 
Stevenson  in  command  on  the  right, 
Major-General  Forney  in  the  centre, 
and  Major-General  Martin  L.  Smith  on 
the  extreme  left. 

On  the  19th,  Grant,  believing  that 
the  Confederate  troops  were  demoral- 
ized by  the  repeated  defeats  sustained 
outside  of  Vicksburg,  ordered  a gen- 
eral assault  to  be  made  at  two  o’clock 
in  the  afternoon.  This  attack  was 
made  mainly  by  Sherman’s  corps  ou 
the  right,  Blair’s  division  taking  the 
lead,  followed  by  Tuttle’s  as  a support. 
There  were  two  forts  which  guarded 
the  entrance  to  the  city  by  the  old 
Jackson  Road — Fort  Hill  to  the  right 
and  Fort  Beauregard  to  the  left.  The 
attack  was  directed  as^ainst  the  former 
of  those  works.  It  was  gallantly  made, 
the  Thirteenth  regulars,  the  Eighty- 
Third  Indiana,  and  the  One  Hundred 
and  Twenty-Seventh  Illinois,  winning 


416 


VICKSBURa. 


special  distinction.  It  was  a perilous 
operation,  rendered  all  the  more  so  by 
the  rugged  character  of  the  ground, 
intersected  by  deep  chasms  and  covered 
by  felled  trees,  which,  with  the  remain- 
ing stum]:)s,  made  a powerful  abatis. 
The  ground  was  really  almost  impassa- 
ble. Sherman’s  men  reached  the  para- 
pet, but  they  could  not  cross  over.  At 
dark  they  were  recalled.  But  little 
fighting  was  done  by  the  other  two 
army  corps.  The  result  of  the  attempt 
on  the  19th  was  that  the  Nationals  along 
the  whole  line  drew  nearer  the  Con- 
federate works,  and  secured  more  ad- 
vantageous positions.  A Confederate 
writer  gives  the  following  account  of 
that  day’s  fighting : 

‘‘  On  Tuesday,  the  enemy  made  their 
first  assault  on  the  line  of  works  held 
by  Brigadier-General  Shoup’s  brigade 
of  Louisianians.  They  marched  up  in 
one  solid  column,  our  men  withholding 
their  fire  urftil  the  enemy  had  ap- 
proached within  thirty  yards  of  the 
lines,  when  they  opened  a terrific  vol- 
ley of  musketry.  The  enemy  wavered 
a moment,  and  then  marched  forward. 
They  were  again  met  by  another  vol- ' 
ley,  when  they  broke  and  fled  under 
cover  of  the  hills.  This  was  the  only 
attempt  made  on  that  day  to  force  our 
lines,  and  the  attempt  was  evidently 
made  more  with  the  intention  of  ^ feel- 
ing’ our  lines  than  with  any  serious 
idea  of  storming  them.” 

Two  days  were  allowed  to  pass  with- 
out any  further  attempt  being  made 
against  the  enemy’s  works.  Grant, 
however,  was  not  idle ; nor  was  any 
idleness  permitted  in  the  National  lines. 


Supplies  were  hurried  forward  from 
the  Yazoo ; rations  were  served  to  the 
men ; roads  were  constructed ; and  can- 
non were  planted  on  every  available 
spot  which  offered  any  advantage.  On 
the  21st,  Grant  was  ready  to  make 
another  assault.  He  has  himself  given  us 
the  I’easons  which  induced  him  to  make 
tins  second  attempt  without  further 
delay.  It  was  his  belief  that  an  assault 
made  from  the  position  which  he  had 
now  gained  would  be  attended  with 
success.  He  knew  that  Johnston  was 
at  Canton,  with  the  forces  taken  from 
Jackson,  that  he  was  continually  re- 
ceiving reinforcements,  and  that  it  was 
his  intention  to  make  an  attack  on  his 
rear,  with  the  view  of  relieving  Pem- 
berton. His  own  forces,  not  exceeding^ 
at  the  time  30,000  men,  did  not  justify 
him  in  courting  any  such  attack  from  a 
general  of  Johnston’s  skill  and  expe- 
lience.  Possessed  of  Vicksburg,  he 
would  be  able  to  tui*n  upon  Johnston, 
drive  him  from  the  State,  and  make 
himself  master  of  the  entire  territory 
west  of  the  Tombigbee,  before  the 
season  for  campaigning  was  over.  Nor 
was  this  all.  A successful  assault,  by 
enabling  him  to  secure  all  this  country, 
would  render  it  unnecessary  for  the  gov- 
ernment to  send  him  reinforcements 
which  were  needed  elsewhere.  In  ad- 
dition to  all  this,  the  troops  were  impa- 
tient to  be  led  to  the  attack,  and 
detested  trench-work,  because  they  be- 
lieved it  to  be  unnecessary.  Such  were 
his  reasons;  and  even  in  view  of  the 
failure  of  the  attack  and  the  terrible 
loss  of  life  which  it  entailed,  they  must 
be  admitted  to  be  satisfactory. 


417 


THE  SECOND  ASSAULT. 


On  the  21st,  Grant’s  arrangements 
were  completed ; and  orders  were  given 
for  an  assault  along  his  whole  line,  at 
ten  o’clock  on  the  following  moi’ning. 
That  there  might  be  no  blundering  or 
irregularity  in  the  movement,  he  or- 
dered all  his  corps  commanders  to  set 
their  watches  by  his.  On  the  morning 
May  of  the  2 2d,  promptly  at  the  hour 
22.  designated,  the  three  army  corps 
simultaneously  advanced  to  the  assault. 
Grant  had  taken  a commanding  posi- 
tion near  the  centre,  from  which  he 
could  see  all  McPherson’s  corps,  a 
part  of  Sherman’s  and  a portion  also  of 
McClernand’s.  Meanwhile,  Admiral 
Porter,  according  to  instructions  re- 
ceived from  General  Grant,  had  opened 
a heavy  tire  from  his  mortars  and  gun- 
boats, on  the  water  and  hill  batteries. 
On  both  the  one  side  and  the  other, 
the  enemy’s  woiks  were  found  to  be 
invulnerable.  “The  works,”  said  Por- 
ter, “ are  stronger  than  any  of  us 
dreamed  oP”  Sherman,  whose  advance, 
as  on  the  19th,  was  led  by  Blair’s  divi- 
sion, encountered  a vigorous  resistance 
from  the  brigades  of  Baldwin  and 
Shoup,  of  the  division  of  General 
Smith ; Hurlbiit’s  brigade,  of  Forney’s 
division,  met  the  attack  in  the  centre; 
while  on  the  National  left,  McClernand, 
putting  forth  his  whole  strength,  made 
but  little  impression  on  the  stubborn 
brigades  of  Moore  and  Lee,  of  the  di- 
vision of  General  Stevenson,  who,  as 
we  have  mentioned,  commanded  on  the 
Confederate  right.  The  assault  was 
gallantly  made  by  each  of  the  three 
cor})s.  It  was  not  all  at  once  that  the 
Confederates  revealed  themselves.  Con- 


cealed behind  the  parapets,  they  waited 
until  their  assailants  were  close  to  the 
works ; and  then  springing,  as  if  from 
the  bosom  of  the  earth,  they  poured 
their  destructive  fire  on  the  advancing 
columns,  literally  mowing  down  the 
first  line.  In  spite  of  this  withering 
fire,  a portion  of  the  commands  of  each 
succeeded  in  planting  the  National  flag- 
on the  outer  slopes  of  the  enemy’s  bas- 
tions. For  two  hours  the  battle  raged 
with  great  fierceness.  No  real  advan- 
tage, however,  was  being  gained  by 
the  assailants  at  any  point.  Under 
cover  of  their  guns,  the  Nationals  made 
repeated  attempts  to  carry  the  works  in 
their  front.  It  was  all  in  vain.  No 
permanent  lodgment  could  be  secured. 
The  experience  of  the  three  different 
corps,  and  along  the  entire  line,  was 
very  much  the  same.  In  one  instance, 
only,  was  an  entrance  effected  into  any 
of  the  Confederate  works ; but  it  was 
only  a brief  triumph,  and'proved  to  be 
barren  of  good  results.  In  the  first 
fierce  onset  made  by  the  brigades  of 
Lawler  and  Landrum,  of  McClernand’s 
corps,  upon  the  fortifications  to  the 
southeast  of  the  city,  Sergeant  Griffiths, 
a youth  of  eighteen  years,  with  eleven 
privates  of  the  Twenty-First  Iowa  Vol- 
unteers, rushed  across  the  ditch,  up  the 
slope,  over  the  bastion,  and  leaped 
into  one  of  the  redoubts.  The  privates 
were  all  prostrated  inside  the  work. 
Griffiths,  however,  contrived  to  escape, 
carrying  Avith  him  several  prisoners.  Mc- 
Clernand’s men  succeeded  in  planting 
the  National  colors  on  the  bastion  of 
this  redoubt,  and  on  the  bastion  of 
another  strong  earth-work  in  their 


418 


VICKSBURG. 


front ; but  Griffiths’  was  the  only  case 
of  actual  occupation. 

It  was  now  about  twelve  o’clock. 
Grant,  but  little  satisfied  with  the  suc- 
cess of  the  undertaking,  and,  having 
left  his  horse  in  a place  of  safety  in  the 
rear,  came  up  on  foot  to  Sherman’s 
headquarters.  Sherman  pointed  out  to 
him  the  Confederate  works,  and  admit- 
ted that  his  assault  had  failed.  Grant, 
whose  position  had  given  him  a full 
view  of  the  National  centre  and  also  of 
the  right  of  the  National  left,  admitted 
that  it  was  about  the  same  with  both 
McPherson  and  McClernand.  At  this 
moment,  a messenger  arrived  from  Mc- 
Clernand, bearing  a despatch  to  Grant, 
‘‘  stating  positively  and  unequivocally 
that  he  was  in  possession  of,  and  still 
held,  two  of  the  enemy’s  forts,  and  that 
the  American  hag  was  waving  over 
them,”  requesting,  at  the  same  time, 
that  Sherman  and  McPherson  should 
be  ordered  to  make  a diversion  in  his 
favor.  This  was  the  second  despatch 
which  General  Grant  had  received  from 
McClernand  to  the  same  effect.  He 
doubted  its  accuracy.  He  did  not  be- 
lieve it  to  be  a faithful  presentation  of 
the  facts  of  the  case.  He  had  just  left 
a commanding  position  where  he  had  a 
full  view  of  the  woiks  referred  to,  and 
he  had  witnessed  no  signs  of  successful 
attack  or  occupation.  His  first  impulse 
was  to  disregard  the  message  altogether. 
But  he  was  reminded  by  Sherman  that 
the  note  was  official.  With  great  re- 
luctance, Grant  consented  to  give  orders 
for  a renewal  of  the  attack.  He  or- 
dered Quimby’s  division,  of  McPher- 
son’s corps,  to  the  aid  of  McClernand, 


and  authorized  that  general  to  call  to 
his  assistance  also  the  division  of  Mc- 
Arthur, of  the  same  corps.  At  three 
o’clock,  the  general-in-chief  having  re- 
sumed his  position,  with  McPherson  in 
the  centre,  the  attack  was  renewed  with 
great  vigor.  This  other  assault  was 
but  a repetition  of  the  former — deter- 
mined, bloody,  but  unsuccessful.  It 
resulted  in  the  useless  slaughter  of 
3000  men,  including  many  veteran  sol- 
diers, who  could  ill  be  spared,  and  not 
a few  first-class  officers.  General  Grant 
bitterly  regretted  yielding  to  McCler- 
nand’s  importunate  calls  for  assistance. 
It  was,  in  fact,  a great  blunder.  Mc- 
Clernand was  either  greatly  deceived 
as  to  the  value  of  the  position  occupied 
by  his  troops,  or  his  better  reason  was 
overpowered  by  an  extreme  desire  to 
connect  his  name  in  some  prominent 
way  with  the  capture  of  Vicksburg. 
It  was  no  doubt  unfortunate  that  Mc- 
Arthur was  so  far  distant  when  he  re- 
ceived Grant’s  orders,  and  that  Quimby, 
who  had  been  hurried  to  McClernand’s 
relief,  did  not  arrive  until  twilight.  It 
is  doubtful,  however,  whether  any  as- 
sistance which  might  have  been  sent  Mc- 
Clernand could  have  altered  the  situa- 
tion. It  does  not  appear  that  he  had 
gained  any  real  advantage.  Subsequent 
revelations  justified  the  doubts  which 
General  Grant  expressed  as  to  the  cor- 
rectness of  McClernand’s  statement;  and 
General  Sherman  has  told  us  that  “ in- 
stead of  having  taken  any  single  point  of 
the  rebel  main  parapet,  McClernand  had 
only  taken  one  or  two  small  outlying 
lunettes,  open  to  the  rear,  where  his 
men  were  at  the  mercy  of  the  enemy. 


ANOTHER  FAILURE. 


419 


behind  the  main  parapet,”  most  of  his 
men,  in  fact,  being  thus  actually  cap- 
tured. As  it  was,  the  fighting  con- 
tinued until  dark.  During  the  whole 
day,  Porter’s  mortars  kept  up  an  in- 
cessant fire  on  the  city,  greatly  adding 
to  the  horrors  of  the  imprisoned  inhab- 
itants. It  was,  however,  a useless 
struggle.  The  diversion  requested  by 
McClernand  had  been  promptly  and 
vigorously  made ; but  while  it  had  in- 
creased the  mortality  list  of  the  Na- 
tional troops  full  hfty  per  cent.,  it  had 
brought  about  no  compensating  advan- 
tao^es.  About  eisrht  o’clock  in  the  even- 
ing,  therefore,  the  troops  were  recalled 
from  the  more  advanced  positions, 
pickets  being  left  to  hold  the  ground 
which  had  been  won. 

In  his  report.  General  Grant  paid  a 
well-merited  compliment  to  his  men. 
‘^The  assault  of  this  day,”  he  said, 
‘^proved  the  quality  of  the  soldiers  of 
this  army.  Without  entire  success,  and 
with  a heavy  loss,  there  was  no  mur- 
muring or  complaining,  no  falling  back, 
or  other  evidence  of  demoralization.” 
It  is  but  just  to  say  that  the  gallantry 
exhibited  by  the  assailants  was  equalled 
by  the  bravery  of  the  troops  defending 
the  works,  and  by  the  heroic  self-en- 
durance  of  the  unfortunate  people  who 
were  shut  up  inside  the  city.  Every 
part  of  Vicksburg  was  within  range 
of  the  Federal  guns — of  Poi*ter’s  mor- 
tars as  of  the  attacking  batteries.  The 
scene  presented  is  described  by  those 
who  were  inside  the  fortifications  as 
having  been  sublime  and  terrific  in  the 
extreme,  and  requiring  the  ‘‘  pen  of  the 
poet”  to  do  it  justice.  The  following 


report  is  from  a Confederate  source. 
While  doing  substantial  justice  to  the 
National  troops,  it  gives  us  an  inside 
vievi  of  the  day’s  fighting : 

^^On  the  mornino:  of  the  22d,  the 
enemy  opened  a terrific  fire  with  their 
Parrott  guns,  and  continued  it  till 
about  eleven  o’clock,  when  the  bom- 
bardment ceased,  and  heavy  columns  of 
the  enemy  could  be  seen  forming  in  line 
of  battle.  Our  forces  were  all  ready 
for  them,  and  eager  for  their  advance. 
At  about  a quarter  to  twelve,  the  col- 
umn of  the  Federal  army  advanced  all 
along  the  lines  in  splendid  order,  and, 
with  a loud  cheer,  dashed  up  to  the 
works.  They  w^ere  gallantly  responded 
to  by  our  brave  boys,  and  the  first 
charge  repulsed.  On  the  extreme  ]*ight 
of  our  lines,  the  nature  of  the  ground 
prevented  the  enemy  from  making  any 
heavy  attack ; but  on  the  right  of  the 
centre,  the  centre  and  the  left  of  the 
centre,  the  assault  was  desperately  made 
and  gallantly  met.  But  once  did  our 
lines  break,  and  that  was  in  Lee’s  bri- 
gade. The  enemy  gained  a temporary 
footing  on  the  rifle-pits,  but  Lee  quickly 
rallied  his  men,  and,  after  a desperate 
hand-to-hand  fight,  drove  them  out  and 
reoccupied  the  lines.  The  engagement 
at  this  point,  and  at  the  right  of  the 
line,  held  by  Brigadier-General  L.  Her- 
bert, was  of  a terrible  nature,  the  Fed- 
erals  having  thrown  their  best  troops 
on  these  works.  Five  times  did  they 
charge,  and  each  time  were  repulsed. 
The  last  charge  on  the  right  of  Brig- 
adier-General Herbert’s  lines  was  made 
by  an  Irish  regiment  (the  Seventeenth 
Wisconsin),  carrying  the  green  flag  of 


420 


VICKSBUEG. 


Erin.  They  came  at  a double  quick  up 
the  hill,  each  man  in  the  front  rank  fur- 
nished with  ladders  to  reach  the  works. 
Three  times  they  essayed  to  plant  their 
ladders,  but  were  prevented  by  the 
obstinate  resistance  offered  by  the  con- 
solidated Twenty-First  and  Twenty- 
Third  Louisiana  regiments.  At  the 
third  charge,  they  came  within  ten  yards 
of  the  line  ; but  two  volleys  of  buckshot 
from  the  shot-guns  of  our  foi*ces  com- 
pelled them  to  make  a precipitate  re- 
treat from  the  front  of  our  works.  At 
about  two  o’clock  they  made  their 
last  charge,  and  were  again  repulsed, 
when  they  retired,  and  did  not  at- 
tempt any  further  demonstration  that 
day.” 

The  Confederates  not  unnaturally  ex- 
aggerated the  National  loss,  by  putting 
it  down  at  from  8000  to  10,000  men. 
They  admitted  a loss  of  1000  in  killed 
and  wounded. 

The  difficulty  between  McClernand 
and  the  general-in-chief  was  not  to  be 
easily  removed.  Grant  naturally  felt 
sore  because  of  the  useless  waste  of  life 
which  McClernand  had  brought  about. 
This,  however,  might  have  been  got 
over,  had  not  McClernand,  in  a congrat- 
ulatory order  addressed  to  his  troops, 
and  first  published  in  St.  Louis,  re- 
flected on  General  Grant  and  the  dis- 
position which  he  made  of  his  troops, 
and  attributed  his  own  failure  to  a 
want  of  support  which,  he  asserted, 
could  have  been  given  him.  On  the 
15th  of  June,  Grant  deemed  it  pru- 
dent, for  the  sake  of  preserving  disci- 
pline in  his  army,  to  remove  Mc- 
Clernand from  the  command  of  the 


Thirteenth  corps.  The  command  was 
given  to  Major-General  Ord. 

After  the  failure  of  the  22d  of  May, 
Grant,  already  convinced  that  the  po- 
sition of  the  enemy  was  too  strong, 
“ both  naturally  and  artificially  ” to  be 
taken  by  direct  assault,  determined 
upon  a regular  siege.  The  troops  now 
j at  his  command  were  not  sufficient,  ab- 
I solutely  to  complete  the  investment — • 
such  was  the  extent  of  the  enemy’s 
works.  He  sent,  therefore,  to  West 
Tennessee  for  all  the  troops  which 
could  be  spared.  Keinforcements  were 
ordered  also  from  West  Virginia,  Ken- 
tucky and  Missouri.  Lanman’s  division, 
and  four  regiments  from  Memphis,  with 
the  divisions  of  Generals  Smith  and 
Kimball,  of  the  Sixteenth  corps,  soon 
arrived,  and  were  placed  under  the 
command  of  General  C.  C.  Washburn. 
On  the  11th  of  June,  General  Herron 
arrived,  with  his  division,  from  the  de- 
partment of  the  Missouri;  and  on  the 
14th  came  General  Parke,  with  two 
divisions  of  the  Ninth  army  corps.  The 
National  force  was  thus  increased  to 
some  70,000  men,  in  sixteen  divisions. 
The  investment  was  now  made  abso- 
lute. Parke’s  corps  and  the  divisions 
of  Smith  and  Kimball  were  sent  to 
Haines’  Bluff.  In  front  of  the  works 
which  protected  the  city,  Sherman  was 
posted  to  the  right;  McPherson’s  corps 
came  next,  and  extended  so  as  to  guard 
the  railroad  ; Ord’s  corps  lay  to  the  left 
of  McPherson’s ; the  investment  in  that 
dii-ection  being  completed  by  the  divi- 
sions of  Herron  and  Lanman  which, 
stretching  across  Stout’s  Bayou,  touched 
the  bluffs  on  the  river.  The  ground 


THE  BOMBARDMENT. 


421 


was,  in  a Ligli  degree,  favorable  to  a 
besieging  army.  Springs  of  excellent 
water  abounded  in  the  ravines ; and  the 
sheltering  woods  protected  the  troops 
from  the  rays  of  the  hot  summer  sun. 
On  the  river  side,  Porter  had  made 
ample  preparations;  and  throughout 
the  siege,  as  he  had  already  done  in 
the  different  assaults,  he  continued  to 
render  very  effective  assistance.  In 
addition  to  gunboats,  which  were  sta- 
tioned both  above  and  below  the  city, 
he  had  six  13-inch  mortars,  and  two 
200-pound  Parrott  guns  mounted  on 
rafts. 

Siege  operations  were  commenced  at 
once,  and  were  conducted  with  great 
vigor.  Along  the  entire  front,  forts, 
batteries  and  rifle-pits  were  rapidly  con- 
structed ; and  the  irregularities  of  the 
gi'ound  admitted  of  the  construction  of 
covered  roads,  by  which  the  men  could 
move  from  point  to  point  without 
being  exposed  to  the  fire  of  the  sharp- 
shooters behind  the  Confederate  works. 
Up  until  the  25th  of  May,  the  firing  on 
the  city  was  made  only  during  the  day. 
After  that  date,  it  was  continued  both 
day  and  night.  Porter  opened  fire  on 
May  the  26th,  and  on  his  part  there 
26.  was  no  interruption  until  the 
surrender.  It  was  estimated  that 
as  many  as  6000  mortar-shells  were 
flung  into  the  city  every  twenty-four 
hours,  and  that,  in  the  same  space 
of  time,  not  fewer  than  4000  shells 
were  flung  from  the  land  batteries  in 
the  rear. 

It  was  not  long  until  Pemberton 
was  in  a sufficiently  sorrowful  plight. 
His  relations  with  Johnston  were  tlie 


reverse  of  agreeable ; and  he  had  been 
worried  by  delusive  hopes  held  out  by 
the  authorities  at  Pichmond.  To  the 
one  and  the  other,  however,  he  was 
bound  to  look  for  succor.  There  was 
no  other  source  of  relief.  He  com- 
plained bitterly  of  the  want  of  cavalry. 
With  a sufficient  force  of  mounted  men, 
he  might  have  been  able  to  protect  his 
communications — he  would  certainly 
have  been  able  to  watch,  if  not  to 
thwart,  the  movements  of  Grierson, 
who  gave  him  so  much  annoyance.  He 
might  even  have  prevented  Grant  from 
reaching  Jackson.  As  it  was,  he  had 
to  submit  to  great  inconvenience,  and 
not  a little  mortification.  One  of  his 
greatest  sorrows  was  that  he  had  found 
it  impossible — such  was  the  rapidity 
of  Grant’s  advance — to  withdraw  his 
heavy  guns  from  Grand  Gulf.  This, 
however,’  was  not  all.  He  had,  for 
some  reasons,  lost  the  confidence  of  his 
troops ; and  he  was  no  longer  a favor- 
ite with  the  people  of  Vicksburg. 
There  were,  in  addition,  troubles  of  a 
more  pressing  and  immediate  character. 
His  ammunition  which,  since  the  com- 
mencement of  the  siege,  he  had  been 
using  with  the  utmost  economy,  was 
well-nigh  exhausted.  Provisions,  also,, 
were  scarce.  For  the  first  five  days  of 
the  siege,  full  rations  were  allowed  to- 
the  troops ; but,  afterwards,  the  daily 
allowance  was  gradually  reduced  to 
four  ounces  of  flour,  four  ounces  of 
bacon,  one  and  a half  ounce  of  rice, 
two  ounces  of  peas,  and  three  ounces- 
of  sugar — fourteen  and  a half  ounces, 
of  food  in  all.  Add  to  all  this  the- 
small  number  of  men,  and  the  conse- 


ii-te 


422 


VICKSBURG. 


qiient  heavy  duties  which,  day  and 
night,  devolved  upon  them,  and  an 
idea  may  be  formed  of  Pemberton’s 
position. 

Pemberton’s  hope  of  relief  was  now 
centred  in  Johnston.  The  latter  was 
not  without  reason  for  being  angry 
wdth  his  lieutenant;  but  it  was  his 
duty  to  do  all  that  lay  within  the 
reach  of  his  ability  to  extricate  the  be- 
leaguered garrison.  It  was  no  longer 
possible  to  save  the  city ; but  something 
might  be  attempted  to  save  Pember- 
ton’s soldiers.  Pemberton  had  written 
to  Johnston  in  despair.  On  the  14th, 
Johnston  sent  word  to  Pemberton  that 
he  would  make  an  attempt  to  come  to 
his  relief,  suggested  that  while  he  made 
an  attack  on  Grant’s  line  at  a given 
j)oint,  an  attack  should  be  made  simul- 
taneously on  the  same  point  from  within 
the  lines,  and  requested  that  Pember- 
ton should  designate  the  point  of  attack 
somewhere  north  of  the  railroad.  The 
desires  of  Pemberton  and  the  purposes 
^of  Johnston  were  no  secret  to  the  Na- 
tional commander.  Haines’  Bluff  was 
carefully  guarded ; so,  also,  was  the 
entire  peninsula  on  the  river  side  of  the 
city ; Porter’s  boats  w'ere  keeping  watch 
above  and  below ; and  vigilant  recon- 
noissances  were  being  made  in  the 
neighborhood  of  Milliken’s  Bend.  It 
was  from  the  land  side,  however,  that 
an  attack  was  most  to  be  dreaded.  It 
was  well  known  that  Johnston  was  col- 
lecting troops  on  the  line  of  the  Big 
Slack,  that  his  army  was  rapidly  in- 
creasing in  numbers,  that  his  deficien- 
cies in  artillery,  in  ammunition  for  all 
arms,  and  in  means  of  transport,  were 


gradually  being  supplied,  and  that  his 
object  was  to  attack  the  National  army 
in  the  rear,  with  a view  to  the  relief  of 
Pemberton.  Happily  Grant,  had  now 
a sufficient  number  of  troops  to  enable 
him  to  hold  Pemberton  with  the  one 
hand,  and  to  strike,  if  necessary,  John- 
ston with  the  other.  Parke’s  corps, 
which  was  stationed  at  Haines’  Bluff 
with  one  division  of  each  of  three  corps 
d'armee  investing  Vicksburg,  was  placed 
under  the  command  of  General  Sher- 
man, who  was  ordered  to  watch  John- 
ston, and  counteract  any  movement  he 
might  make  in  the  direction  of  Vicks- 
burg. It  was  General  Grant’s  inten- 
tion, as  he  wrote  to  General  Parke  on 
the  27th  of  June,  “to  whip  Johnston 
fifteen  miles  off.”  Sherman  faced 
about,  his  line  extending  from  Haines’ 
Bluff  eastward  to  the  railroad  crossing 
of  the  Big  Black,  where  Osterhaus 
held  a strong  position.  It  was  Sher- 
man’s conviction  that  if  Johnston 
should  cross  the  Big  Black,  it  would 
not  be  difficult,  from  the  nature 
of  the  country,  to  hold  him  in  check, 
until  a concentration  could  be  effect- 
ed. Johnston  did  not  venture  to 
make  any  attempt  to  penetrate  Sher- 
man’s line,  nor  did  he  cross  the  Big 
Black. 

It  was  now  towards  the  end  of  June. 
Pemberton’s  situation  was  ^vell-nigh 
desperate.  In  his  agony,  his  mind  va- 
cillated from  one  resolution  to  another. 
The  one  day  he  writes  to  Johnston, 
suggesting  that  if  he  could  divert  the 
attention  of  the  assailants  by  attacking 
them  to  the  north  of  the  city,  he  might 
succeed  in  making  his  escape  by  break- 


THE  FIRST  MINE  EXPLODED. 


423 


ing  the  investing  lines  to  the  south, 
and  by  forcing  his  way  across  the  Big 
Black,  at  Hankinson’s  Ferry.  The  next 
day,  as  if  despairing  of  the  success  of 
his  plan,  he  thinks  it  might  be  better 
to  abandon  Vicksburg,  and  to  propose 
to  Grant  that  he  allow  all  the  troops 
to  pass  out  “ with  their  arms  and  equi- 
page.” Success  would  have  been  as 
little  likely  to  result  from  the  one 
course  as  from  the  other.  Meanwhile, 
famine  was  doing  its  terrible  work. 
After  the  thirty-fifth  day  of  the  siege, 
mule  meat  had  become  the  common 
fare  of  all  alike ; and  even  dog’s  meat 
was  in  request  for  the  table.  Bean- 
meal  was  made  into  bread,  and  corn- 
meal  into  colfee.  ‘‘In  these  straits,” 
says  a Confederate  oflGicer,  “the  garri- 
son dragged  on  the  weary  length  of 
one  day  after  another,  under  a scorch- 
ing sun,  the  stench  from  the  unburied 
corpses  all  around  alone  causing  the 
strongest -minded,  firmest -nerved  to 
grow  impatient  for  the  day  of  deliver- 
ance.” 

In  the  last  week  of  June,  the  mining 
operations  which  were  being  carried  on 
in  front  of  McPherson’s  line,  and  under 
his  immediate  direction,  were  well  ad- 
Jiine  vanced.  On  the  25th,  between 
25.  four  and  five  o’clock  in  the  after- 
noon, the  first  mine  was  fired.  The 
explosion  was  fearful.  The  air  was 
filled  to  the  height  of  one  hundred  feet 
with  earth,  broken  timber,  and  the 
shattered  fragments  of  gabions,  stock- 
ades and  gun-carriages.  A great  breach 
was  made,  a part  of  the  face  of  Fort 
Hill  having  been  thrown  down.  Two 
columns  of  storming  parties,  consisting 


each  of  100  picked  men,  taken  respec- 
tively from  the  Forty-Fifth  Illinois  and 
from  the  Twenty-Third  Indiana,  were 
held  in  readiness  to  make  the  assault. 
As  soon  as  the  breach  was  made,  in 
rushed  the  brave  fellows,  in  their  shirt- 
sleeves, and  carrying  nothing  with  them 
save  their  muskets  and  their  cartridge- 
boxes.  A fearful  struggle  ensued,  the 
Confederates  offering  a most  stubborn 
resistance.  Supports  were  pressed  for- 
ward ; and  ultimately,  amid  wild  cheers, 
heard  amid  the  roaring  din  of  battle, 
the  flag  of  the  Forty-Fifth  was  planted 
on  the  summit  of  Fort  Hill.  As  soon 
as  the  storming  columns  entered  the 
breach,  the  batteries  opened  fire  along 
the  whole  line.  Porter  following  the 
example  with  his  gunboats  and  mortars 
on  the  river  front.  It  was  one  of  the 
most  terrific  cannonades  heard  during 
the  whole  war.  While  shot  and  shell 
were  falling  thick  and  fast  upon  the 
Confederate  works  and  upon  the  doomed 
city,  “ the  classic  thunders  of  the  Roman 
poet  were  being  realized  across  the 
whole  heavens,  and  from  pole  to  pole.” 
Nobly  as  was  this  assault  on  Fort  Hill, 
and  proud  as  was  the  temporary  tri- 
umph, it  ended  in  a repulse.  On  the 
28th,  there  was  another  mine  explo- 
sion, which  did  further  damage  to  Fort 
Hill.  On  the  1st  of  July,  a mine 
was  sprung  to  the  right  of  the  Jack- 
son  Road.  The  result  was  the  com- 
plete demolition  of  the  redan  situated 
at  that  point,  the  living  burial  of 
nine  men  who  were  counter-mining, 
and  the  killing  and  wounding  of  a 
large  number  who  were  manning  the 
works 


424 


VICKSBURG. 


On  the  1st  of  July,  Johnston  had 
July  taken  position  between  Browns- 
b ville  and  the  Big  Black,  having 
with  him  from  30,000  to  40,000  men, 
with  all  the  necessary  munition  of  war. 
With  as  little  delay  as  possible,  he  sent 
a note  to  Pemberton,  informing  him  that 
a diversion  W'ould  be  made  on  or  about 
the  7th,  to  enable  him  to  cut  his  way 
out.  This  message,  which  was  inter- 
cepted by  General  Ewing,  fell  into  the 
hands  of  General  Grant.  The  latter 
had  already  made  up  his  mind  as  to 
what  he  should  do.  He  had  deter- 
mined to  make  an  assault  on  Vicksburg 
on  the  morning  of  the  6th,  and,  if  the 
assault  should  prove  successful,  to  move 
Sherman  with  all  possible  haste,  and 
with  all  the  forces  that  could  be  spared, 
against  Johnston.  All  needful  prepa- 
rations for  the  final  assault  were  com- 
pleted. Further  delay  might  prove  as 
dangerous  as  it  was  unnecessary.  Sher- 
man was  notified  of  his  intention,  and 
ordered  to  hold  himself  in  readiness. 
Grant  was  confirmed  in  his  purpose  by 
intercepted  documents,  which  informed 
him  of  the  wretched  condition  to  which 
the  city  and  garrison  had  been  reduced. 
The  assault,  however,  was  not  to  be 
necessary.  In  addition  to  all  the  other 
misfortunes  of  the  situation,  6000  sick 
and  wounded  crowded  the  hospitals  of 
Vicksburg;  and  the  number  was  daily 
increasing.  Convinced  that  Grant  was 
about  to  make  a final  and  fatal  assault, 
despairing  of  any  aid  from  Johnston, 
and  knowing  how  helpless  he  was  to 
offer  either  a vigorous  or  protracted  re- 
sistance, Pemberton’s  heart  sunk  within 
him,  and  he  determined  to  surrender. 


On  the  3d  of  July,  about  eight 
o’clock  in  the  morning,  a white  jn’y 
flag  was  seen  displayed  on  the 
parapet  in  front  of  the  division  of  Gen- 
eral A.  J.  Smith,  of  Ord’s  (late  Mc- 
ClernancJ’s)  corps.  An  officer  having 
been  sent  forward  to  learn  its  meaning, 
it  was  found  that  General  Bowen,  com- 
mander of  one  of  the  Confederate  di- 
visions, and  Colonel  Montgomery,  of 
Pemberton’s  staff,  were  the  bearers  of 
a messat^e  to  General  Grant.  Havino: 
been  blind-folded,  these  officers  were 
led  to  the  headquarters  of  General 
Smith,  to  await  the  reply  of  the  Na- 
tional commander.  It  must  have  been 
a proud  moment  in  the  life  of  General 
Grant,  when  the  sealed  message  was 
put  into  his  hands.  After  more  than 
seven  months  of  planning,  hard  fight- 
ing and  weary  waiting,  his  great  task 
was  on  the  point  of  accomplishment. 
But  the  bystander  looked  on  those  firm 
features  in  vain  for  any  sign  of  unusual 
emotion.  At  that  moment,  when  weaker 
men  would  have  given  way,  the  con- 
queror gave  proof  that,  if  he  knew  how 
to  subdue  great  armies,  he  knew  also 
how  to  restrain  himself.  The  message 
proved  to  be  a proposal  from  the  Con- 
federate commander  for  an  armistice, 
during  a time  not  specified,  and  for  the 
appointment,  on  each  side,  of  three  com- 
missioners, whose  duty  it  should  be  to 
arrange  terms  for  the  capitulation  of 
Vicksburg.  “ I make  this  proposition,” 
said  Pemberton,  “to  save  the  further 
effusion  of  blood,  which  must  otherwise 
be  shed  to  a frightful  extent,  feeling  my- 
self fully  able  to  maintain  my  position 
a yet  indefinite  period.”  Grant's  reply 


THE  SURRENDER. 


425 


was  characteristic.  “The  effusion  of 
blood,  which  you  propose  stopping  by 
this  course,  can  be  ended  at  any  time 
you  may  choose,  by  an  unconditional 
surrender  of  the  city  and  garrison. 
Men  who  have  shown  so  much  endu- 
rance and  courage,  as  those  now  in 
Vicksburg,  will  always  challenge  the 
respect  of  an  adversary,  and,  I can 
assure  you,  will  be  treated  with  all 
the  respect  due  to  them  as  prisoners  of 
war.  I do  not  favor  the  proposition 
of  appointing  commissioners  to  arrange 
terms  of  capitulation,  because  I have 
no  other  terms  than  those  indicated 
above.”  Declining  to  see  General 
Bowen,  General  Grant  expressed  a 
willingness,  if  it  were  so  desired,  to 
meet  General  Pemberton,  any  time  that 
afternoon,  between  the  lines,  in  Mc- 
Pherson’s front.  Three  o’clock  was 
appointed.  At  that  hour  the  meeting 
was  held.  Grant  was  accompanied  by 
Generals  McPherson,  Ord,  Logan  and 
A.  J.  Smith.  Pemberton  was  attended 
by  General  Bowen  and  Colonel  Mont- 
gomery. After  shaking  hands,  and  in- 
troducing the  officers,  the  two  chiefs 
retired,  and  sat  down  on  the  grass  be- 
neath the  shade  of  an  old  oak  tree. 
The  position  was  on  the  southern  slope 
of  Fort  Hill,  and  in  full  view  of  thou- 
sands of  the  opposing  armies.  The  oak 
tree  has  disappeared ; biit  a handsome 
monument  now  commemorates  the  event. 
Pemberton  renewed  his  proposition  for 
the  appointment  of  commissioners.  This 
was  the  course  followed  at  Vera  Cruz, 
at  the  surrender  of  which,  he  said,  he 
was  present.  Grant  was  not  to  be 
moved  from  his  purpose.  He  had  no 


terms  to  offer  but  “unconditional  surren- 
der,” and  he  would  consent  to  no  other. 
Pemberton  thought  the  terms  unrea- 
sonable. He  would  never  submit  to 
them — never,  w'hile  he  had  a man  left — 
he  would  fight,  rather.  Unable  to  re- 
strain himself,  he  was  showing  signs 
of  great  irritation.  “Then,  sir,”  said 
Grant,  coolly  puffing  his  cigar,  “you 
can  continue  the  defense.  My  army 
has  never  been  in  a better  condition 
for  the  prosecution  of  the  siege.”  Pem- 
berton had  much  to  say  in  regard  to 
details.  Finding  it  impossible  to  come 
to  an  agreement,  Grant,  with  an  evident 
desire  not  to  wound  unnecessarily  the 
feelings  of  his  baffled  and  defeated  oppo- 
nent, brought  the  interview  to  a close 
by  promising  to  send  his  ultimatum  in 
writing.  It  was  finally  agreed  that  the  en- 
tire garrison — officers  and  men — should 
be  paroled  not  to  take  up  arms  against 
the  United  States  until  exchanged  by 
proper  authority;  that  the  officers  should 
be  allowed  their  side-arms  and  private 
baggage,  and  the  field,  staff  and  cavalry 
officers  one  horse  each;  that  the  rank 
and  file  be  allowed  all  their  clothing, 
but  no  other  property ; that  they  should 
take  rations  from  their  own  stores  suffi- 
cient to  last  them  until  beyond  the  Na- 
tional lines ; that  they  should  be  allowed 
to  take  with  them  the  necessary  cooking 
utensils  for  preparing  their  food;  and 
that  they  should  have  thirty  wagons 
for  the  transport  of  such  articles  as 
could  not  well  be  carried.  The  same 
conditions  were  to  be  granted  to  all 
sick  and  wounded  officers  and  privates 
as  soon  as  they  should  be  able  to 
travel. 


426 


VICKSBUEG. 


The  next  day  was  tlie  Fourth  of 
July  July — a day  sacred  to  American 
liberty.  On  the  morning  of  that 
day,  white  flags  were  displayed  along 
the  whole  length  of  the  Confederate 
woi’ks,  in  token  of  surrender.  In  the 
afternoon,  General  Grant,  accompanied 
by  General  McPherson,  with  their 
staffs,  entered  the  city  in  triumph. 
Pemberton  was  greatly  blamed  for  sur- 
rendering the  city  on  the  4 th.  It  was 
a lame  excuse  to  say  that,  knowing  the 
vanity  of  his  enemies,  he  hoped  to 
obtain  better  terms  by  giving  them  an 
opportunity  to  triumph  on  that  day. 
The  Fourth  of  July,  1863,  was  indeed 
a proud  ’day  for  the  friends  of  the 
Union.  On  that  same  day,  victory, 
which  smiled  so  propitiously  at  Vicks- 
biug,  crowned  the  National  arms  at 
Gettysburg.  The  star  of  the  Union 
was  again  in  the  ascendant;  and  the 
hearts  of  a dispirited  people  w’ere  once 
more  filled  with  joy.  The  fall  of  Vicks- 
burg was  a great  triumph  to  the  nation. 
It  settled  the  question  of  the  free  navi- 
gation of  the  Mississippi,  and  it  deter- 
mined the  fate  of  the  rebellion.  It  was 
a great  triumph  for  General  Grant,  be- 
cause it  stamped  him  as  the  first  soldier 
of  the  Kepublic.  His  praises  were  in 
every  mouth ; and  the  country  rang  with 
applause.  Congratulatory  letters  came 
to  him  from  all  quarters;  but  those 
most  })rized  were  from  Commander-in- 
Cliief  Halleck  and  from  President  Lin- 
coln, both  of  whom,  it  was  known,  had 
had  at  one  time  doubts  as  to  the  wis- 
dom shown  in  his  movements.  Halleck 
was  lavish  of  praise ; and  Lincoln  con- 
cluded his  noble  letter  by  saying,  “I 


now  wish  to  make  the  personal  acknow- 
ledgment that  you  were  right  and  I was 
wrong.”  * 

The  result  of  the  campaign,  as  summed 
up  by  Grant  himself,  was  “ the  de- 
feat of  the  enemy  in  five  battles  out- 
side of  Vicksburg;  the  occupation  of 
Jackson,  Mississippi,  and  the  capture 
of  Vicksburg,  its  garrison  and  muni- 
tions of  war;  a loss  to  the  enemy  of 
37,000  prisoners,  among  whom  were 
fifteen  general  officers ; at  least  10,000 
killed  and  wounded,  and  among  the 
killed  Generals  Tracy,  Tilghman,  and 
Green ; and  hundreds,  perhaps  thou- 
sands, of  stragglers  who  can  never  be 
collected  and  recognized.  Arms  and 
munitions  of  war  for  an  army  of  60,000 
men  have  fallen  into  our  hands,  be- 
sides a large  amount  of  other  public 
property,  consisting  of  railroads,  loco- 

* General  Grant,  like  all  other  men  who  have  risen  to 
fame  and  fortune,  has  had  his  detractors.  His  own 
grand  career  which,  from  first  to  last,  needs  no  com- 
mentary, is  his  best  advocate.  In  this  connection, 
however,  we  cannot  refrain  from  reproducing  one 
paragraph  from  the  elegantly  written  and  thoughtful 
Memoirs  of  General  Sherman.  In  his  chapter  on 
Vicksburg,  General  Sherman  says : “The  campaign  of 
Vicksburg,  in  its  conception  and  execution,  belonged 
exclusively  to  General  Grant,  not  only  in  the  great 
whole,  but  in  the  thousands  of  its  details.  I still  retain 
many  of  his  letters  and  notes,  all  in  his  own  hand- 
writing, prescribing  the  routes  of  march  for  divisions 
and  detachments,  specifying  even  the  amount  of  food 
and  tools  to  be  carried  along.  Many  persons  gave  his 
adjutant-general,  Eawlins,  the  credit  for  these  things, 
but  they  were  in  error ; for  no  commanding  general  of 
an  army  ever  gave  more  of  his  personal  attention  to 
details,  or  wrote  so  many  of  his  own  orders,  reports  and 
letters,  as  General  Grant.  His  success  at  Vicksburg 
justly  gave  him  great  fame  at  home  and  abroad.  The 
president  conferred  on  him  the  rank  of  major-general 
in  the  regular  army,  the  highest  grade  then  existing  by 
law ; and  General  McPherson  and  I shared  in  his  suc- 
cess by  receiving  similar  commissions  as  brigadier- 
generals  in  the  regular  army.” — Shermafi's  Memoir 
vol.  1,  page  334. 


KETREAT  OF  JOHNSTON. 


427 


motives,  cars,  steamboats,  cotton,  <fec. ; 
and  much  was  destroyed  to  prevent  our 
capturing  it.”  His  own  losses  he  ad- 
mitted to  be  8573,  of  whom  943  were 
killed.”  He  owed  much  to  Generals 
Sherman,  McPherson,  Logan  and  Ad- 
miral Poi'ter,  all  of  whose  services  were 
handsomely  acknowledged. 

One  of  the  immediate  results  of  the 
occupation  of  Vicksburg  was  the  fall  of 
Port  Hudson ; but  of  this  we  shall  have 
to  speak  more  in  detail  in  the  next 
chapter.  Grant’s  immediate  attention, 
after  placing  McPherson  in  charge  of 
Vicksburg,  was  given  to  Johnston.  As 
soon  as  that  general  heard  of  the  sur- 
render, he  fell  back  to  Jackson.  Sher- 
man was  already  in  pursuit,  with  an 
army  of  50,000  men ; and  Grant  was 
resolved  that  Johnston  should  not 
escape.  On  the  8th,  the  National 
army,  under  Sherman,  had  reached  the 
neighborhood  of  Clinton.  The  weather 
was  extremely  hot,  and  the  water 
scarce.  All  the  ponds  were  filled  with 
dead  animals,  which  Johnston  on  his 
march  had  driven  in  and  shot.  On  the 
10th,  Sherman  was  before  Jackson; 
and  the  Confederates  had  been  driven 
in  behind  the  intrenchments.  On  the 
11th,  pressing  close  in,  the  Nationals 
shelled  the  town  from  every  direction. 
It  unfortunately  happened  that  Lan- 
man’s  brigade,  on  this  occasion,  got  too 
close,  and  was  roughly  handled,  some 
250  men  being  killed  and  wounded, 
and  as  many  captured.  Lanman,  who 
had  the  reputation  of  being  a brave 
and  capable  officer,  was  greatly  blamed 
for  his  rashness  or  his  folly,  and  at  the 


request  of  Ord,  his  corps  commander, 
was  relieved  of  his  command.  In  spite 
of  the  excessive  heat,  Sherman  was 
pressing  the  siege  day  and  night,  and 
preparing  for  a vigorous  and  final  as- 
sault, when,  on  the  morning  of  the 
17th,  the  place  was  found  to  be  ju]y 
evacuated — Johnston  thus  once  H. 
more  vindicating  his  reputation  as  a 
“ hero  of  retreats.”  Steele’s  division 
pursued  as  far  as  Brandon,  a distance 
of  fourteen  miles;  but  as  Johnston  was 
found  to  be  safely  off,  with  his  whole 
army,  the  pursuit  was  not  continued. 
On  the  27th  of  July,  Sherman  was 
back  in  his  old  position  between  Haines’ 
Bluff  and  the  Big  Black,  indulging  the 
hope  that  both  himself  and  his  troops 
would  enjoy  rest  for  the  remainder 
of  the  summer.  Thus  ended  one  of 
the  greatest,  and,  in  many  respects, 
most  important  campaigns  of  the  Civil 
War. 

* The  town  of  Jackson  suffered  terribly  from  these 
repeated  occupations  and  evacuations.  Situated  on  the 
right  bank  of  th  3 Pearl  Kiver,  and  adorned  with  many 
magnificent  public  buildings,  such  as  the  capitol,  the 
penitentiary,  the  governor’s  house,  the  asylum  for  the 
deaf,  dumb  and  insane,  as  well  as  with  many  handsome 
residences— the  entire  place  being  tastefully  laid  out 
and  beautified  by  trim  gardens— Jackson  was  one  of 
the  most  elegant  towns  of  the  South.  It  had  suffered 
much  from  the  first  occupation  by  the  National  troops. 
The  Confederate  soldiers,  under  Johnston,  showed  little 
respect  either  to  the  beauty  of  the  situation  or  to  the 
value  of  the  property.  The  Nationals,  in  this  last  occu- 
pation, showed  even  less.  The  soldiers,  for  a time, 
were  allowed  to  give  themselves  up  to  license.  Some 
of  the  finest  buildings  and  most  useful  public  works 
were  burned  to  the  ground.  Houses  were  ransacked ; 
pianos  and  other  articles  of  furniture  were  demolished ; 
libraries  were  torn  to  pieces  and  trampled  in  the  dust ; 
pictures  were  pierced  with  bayonets;  and  during  all 
hours  of  the  night  the  place  was  illumined  by  burning 
buildings.  Such  conduct,  too  common  in  war,  was  hap- 
pily exceptional  in  the  great  American  conllict. 


428 


PORT  HUDSON. 


CHAPTER  XXV. 

1 

Effect  of  the  Surrender  of  Vicksburg. — The  Mississippi. — “Unvexed  to  the  Sea.” — The  Department  of  the 
Gulf. — General  Butler. — Minor  Engagements. — The  Confederate  Earn,  Arkansas. — Farragut  and  Williams. — 
The  Yazoo. — Bombardment  of  Donaldson ville. — Baton  Rouge. — Van  Dorn  and  Breckenridge. — Battle  of 
Baton  Rouge. — Williams  Killed. — The  Confederates  Fall  Back  and  Retreat. — The  Arkansas  Again. — 
Porter  in  Search  of  Her. — The  Arkansas  Exploded. — La  Fourche. — Expedition  under  Weitzel. — The 
Confederates  under  McPheeters  Defeated. — La  Fourche  Reclaimed. — General  Banks  at  New  Orleans, — 
His  Expedition. — How  he  was  Received  by  Butler. — The  Nineteenth  Army  Corps. — The  General  Instruc- 
tions Given  to  Banks. — The  Departure  of  Butler. — Galveston. — Commodore  Renshaw. — The  Forty- 
Second  Massachusetts. — Colonel  Burrill. — General  Magruder. — Virginia  Point. — Magruder’s  Fleet. — De- 
scription of  Galveston.— The  Confederate  Attack. — Sibley’s  Brigade. — Fighting  on  Land  and  Water. — The 
Massachusetts  Men  Make  a Bold  Resistance. — The  Bayou  City  and  Neptune  Fall  Upon  the  Harriet  Lane. — 
A Rush  Together. — The  Neptune  Sunk. — The  Bayou  City  in  Danger. — She  Rushes  for  the  Harriet  Lane. — 
The  Two  Vessels  Become  Entangled. — Commander  Wainright  Refuses  to  Surrender. — Wainright  Killed 
while  Defending  Himself. — The  Harriet  Lane  Captured. — The  Westfield  Aground. — Demand  for  Surrender. — 
Refusal. — She  is  Prematurel}'  Blown  Up. — Terrible  Destruction  of  Life. — Renshaw  Involved  in  the  Common 
Ruin. — Several  Other  Vessels  Captured. — The  Troops  Surrender. — The  Sabine  River. — The  Morning  Light 
and  Velocity. — Capture  of  Sabine  Pass. — The  National  Vessels  Driven  to  Sea  and  Captured.  — The  Sugar 
Districts  of  Louisiana. — The  Red  River  Country. — The  Bayou  Teche. — The  J.  A.  Cotton. — Brashear  City. — 
Weitzel  and  McKean  Buchanan  on  the  Teche. — Carney's  Bridge. — Torpedoes  and  Batteries. — Buchanan 
Killed. — A National  Victory. — The  Return  to  Brashear  City. — A Joint  Expedition  to  Port  Hudson. — An  At- 
tempt to  Run  the  Batteries. — An  Awful  Scene. — Another  Louisiana  Expedition. — Fort  Bisland. — The  Con- 
federates Again  Retreat. — General  Dick  Taylor. — A Successful  Expedition. — Success  of  General  Augur. — 
Farragut. — The  Hartford  and  the  Albatross. — At  Grand  Gulf. — At  Warrenton. — At  the  Williams  Canal. — 
In  Communication  with  Grant  and  Porter. — Reinforcements  and  Supplies. — Destruction  of  the  Lancas- 
ter.— Going  Down  the  River  Again. — Farragut  on  the  Red  River. — At  Gordon's  Landing. — A Severe  En- 
gagement.— The  Mary  T.  and  the  Grand  Duke. — Heavy  Firing. — The  Albatross  Injured. — The  Confede- 
rate Vessels  Badly  Punished. — Banks  Again  on  the  Mississippi. — At  Bayou  Sara. — Concentration  of  his 
Forces. — Preparations  for  Investing  Port  Hudson. — Joined  by  Sherman  and  Augur. — Port  Hudson  Plains. — 
Description  of  Port  Hudson. — The  Strength  of  the  Place. — The  First  Assault. — A Tremendous  Fire. — The 
Great  Bravery  of  the  Troops. — Temporary  and  Partial  Success. — The  Troops  Withdrawn. — Negro  Soldiers. — 
Complimented  and  Praised  by  General  Banks. — Disappointed,  but  not  Disheartened. — Preparing  for  a 
Regular  Siege. — Digging  Trenches. — The  Hot  June  Sun. — General  Gardner  in  a Sad  Plight. — The  1 1th  of 
June. — The  Second  Assault. — Another  Failure. — The  14th  of  June. — Gardner  Called  Upon  to  Surrender. — 
He  Refuses. — Another  Assault. — Tremendous  Fighting,  both  on  the  Right  and  Left. — Another  Failure. — A 
Regular  Siege  the  Only  Hope. — Mining  and  Counter-mining. — The  Heroic  Garrison. — The  Confederates 
Again  in  Louisiana. — Capture  of  Brashear  City. — Banks’  Misfortune. — The  7th  of  July. — News  of  the  Fall 
of  Vicksburg. — Rejoicing  in  the  National  Ranks. — Gardner  in  Despair. — A Council  of  War. — Pro- 
posals for  Surrender. — Honorable  Terms. — The  Surrender. — The  Spoils  of  Victory. — The  Hero  of  Port 
Hudson. 


Three  days  after  the  surrender  and 

1863  Vicksburg,  a cor- 

respondence was  opened  between 
Major-General  Gardner  and  Major-Gen- 
eral Banks,  with  a view  to  the  surren- 
render  of  Port  Hudson.  On  learning 


that  Vicksburg  had  fallen,  Gardner 
feeling  convinced  that  further  resist- 
ance was  useless,  and  that  he  had  de- 
fended the  city  as  long  as  duty  required 
him,  expressed  a willingness  to  surren- 
der the  stronghold  in  his  charge.  Com- 


THE  ARKANSAS. 


429 


mission ers  having  been  appointed  on 
both  sides,  and  the  terms  of  capitula- 
tion having  been  drawn  up,  the  surren- 
July  ^ier  was  formally  made  on  the  8th 
of  July,  General  Banks  and  the 
National  troops  entering  and  occupying 
the  place  on  the  following  day.  Port 
Hudson  fell  because  Vicksburg  fell ; and 
the  fall  of  the  one,  as  of  the  other,  was 
due  to  the  persistent,  patient,  persever- 
ing genius  of  General  Grant.  On  one 
occasion  General  Sherman  said,  “The 
possession  of  the  Mississippi  Biver  is 
the  possession  of  America.”  It  was  his 
opinion  that  if  the  Confederates  had 
been  able  to  hold,  with  a grip  sufficient- 
ly strong,  the  lower  portion  of  that  great 
river,  the  Union  could  not  have  been 
restored.  This  opinion  was  shared  by 
General  Grant  and  by  the  best  minds 
in  the  North.  It  was  this  opinion — 
this  deep-rooted  conviction — that  gave 
importance  to  the  capture  of  Vicks- 
burg; for  so  long  as  the  Confederates 
held  that  stronghold,  they  were,  to  all 
intents  and  purposes,  masteis  of  the 
waters  of  the  lower  Mississippi,  and 
that  river  was  comparatively  useless. 
With  Vicksburg  fell  Port  Hudson ; the 
great  object  aimed  at  by  the  Western 
armies  was  accomplished ; the  back- 
bone of  the  Confederacy  was  broken ; 
and  the  Mississippi,  as  President  Lin- 
coln expressed  it,  rolled  “unvexed  to 
the  sea.” 

The  fall  of  Port  Hudson,  however, 
formed  the  climax  of  a lengthened  se- 
ries of  detailed  operations,  not  necessa- 
rily connected  with  Vicksburg.  Some 
of  these  ^operations  were  of  greater, 
some  of  them  of  lesser,  importance ; but 


they  had  all  of  them  a common  bearing, 
and  were  conducted,  for  the  most  part, 
under  the  direction  of  one  controllino^ 
mind.  In  the  present  chapter,  there- 
fore, we  shall  endeavor  to  group  these 
operations  together,  describe  them  in 
detail,  and,  as  far  as  possible,  present 
them  as  a connected  whole. 

In  a previous  chapter  we  have  de- 
scribed at  length  the  operations 
which  resulted  in  the  capture  of 
New  Orleans.  In  that  chapter,  it  was 
incidentally  stated  that  Baton  Bouge 
and  Natchez  speedily  shai*ed  the  fate 
of  the  Queen  City  of  the  South.  Pre- 
vious to  the  recall  of  General  Buder 
from  the  command  of  the  Department 
of  the  Gulf,  there  occurred  a few 
engagements  of  a minor  character, 
each  of  which  is  entitled  to  a passing 
notice — all  the  more  so  that  the  reader 
will  thus  be  enabled  the  more  easily 
and  the  more  clearly  to  understand 
what  follows.  No  account  of  the  bat- 
tles of  the  Civil  War  could  l)e  regarded 
as  complete,  if  it  omitted  all  reference 
to  the  Confederate  “ ram  ” Arkansas. 
After  the  first  unsuccessful  attempt, 
made  upon  Vicksburg  by  Farragiit  and 
Williams,  and  when  the  National  ves- 
sels, with  comparatively  little  harm, 
had  been  run  up  past  the  city,  Farragut 
was  made  aware  that  a Confederate 
steam-ram,  of  immense  dimensions  and 
of  enormous  power,  was  lying  in  the 
Yazoo.  This  vessel,  it  appeared,  had 
been  commenced  at  Memphis ; but  two 
days  before  the  evacuation  of  Fort  Pil- 
low, she  had  been  towed  down  the 
river  to  a place  of  safety,  in  order  to  be 
finished.  She  was  now  completed,  and 


430 


PORT  HUDSON. 


ready  for  action,  her  engines,  which 
were  low  pressure,  possessing  an  aggre- 
gate strength  of  900  horse-power.  This 
was  the  Arkansas.  Farragut  lost  no 
time  in  offeiing  the  monster  battle. 
July  Oil  f guii" 

boats  Carondelet  and  Tyler,  and 
Ellet’s  ram.  Queen  of  the  West,  were 
sent  to  reconnoitre  her  position.  They 
had  sailed  about  six  miles  up  the  Yazoo, 
when  they  found  themselves  in  the 
presence  of  their  powerful  antagonist. 
The  fire  was  opened  at  once,  on  both 
sides.  After  a sharp  encounter,  the 
National  boats  were  compelled  to  re- 
tire, the  Arkansas  making  her  way 
down  the  Yazoo  into  the  Mississippi, 
and  taking  shelter  under  the  batteries 
at  Vicksburg.  In  this  encounter  the 
Carondelet  was  badly  injured,  having 
lost  14  men  in  killed  and  wounded.  On 
board  the  Arkansas  there  were  20  killed 
and  wounded.  The  idea  of  further  de- 
monstration being  made  against  Vicks- 
burg for  the  present  having  been 
abandoned,  Farragut  ran  past  the  bat- 
teries again.  Another  attack  was  made 
July  on  the  Arkansas  on  the  22d,  this 
22.  time  by  the  Essex,  Captain  W. 
D.  Porter,  and  Ellet’s  Queen  of  the 
West.  It  was  unsuccessful;  and,  as 
the  river  was  now  falling  rapidly,  the 
fieet  was  ordered  to  return  to  New 
Orleans. 

The  progress  down  the  river  was  diver- 
sified by  some  lively  incidents.  When 
passing  Donaldsonville,  fire  was  opened 
upon  the  fleet  by  a band  of  guerrillas. 
Having  warned  the  inhabitants  of  his 
intention,  Farragut  bombarded  the  vil- 
lage, setting  it  on  fire.  The  place  was 


afterwards  occupied  by  National  troops, 
and  named  Fort  Butler.  Arrived  at 
Baton  Bouge,  General  Williams  and 
the  land  force  disembarked,  with  the 
view  of  permanently  occupying  the 
place,  ^^leinforcements  were  sent  to 
Williams;  and  Farragut  held  himself 
in  readiness  to  give  what  assistance 
might  be  necessary.  Van  Dorn,  not 
ignorant  of  the  intentions  of  the  Na- 
tional commanders,  and  aware  that 
the  troops  were  suffering  much  from 
sickness,  was  prepared  to  offer  them 
battle.  General  J.  C.  Breckenridg^e  was 
sent  towards  the  city  with  500  men; 
and  the  Arkansas  was  ordered  down 
the  river  to  take  part  in  the  fight.  A 
severe  battle  ensued  on  the  5th  of  j^ug. 
August,  and  lasted  for  the  better 
part  of  two  hours.  Williams’  troops, 
although  attacked  by  greatly  superior 
forces,  offered  a stubborn  resistance. 
During  the  struggle,  the  Twenty-First 
Indiana  won  great  distinction.  Discov- 
ering that  it  had  lost  all  its  field-officers, 
General  Williams  placed  himself  at  its 
head,  exclaiming,  “Boys!  your  field- 
officers  are  all  gone.  I will  lead  you.” 
Loud  cheers  greeted  his  words.  Scarce- 
ly, however,  had  he  spoken,  when  he  fell 
to  the  ground  dead,  pierced  by  a bullet- 
wound  in  the  breast.  He  had  just 
ordered  the  line  to  fall  back.  Colonel 
T.  W.  Cahill,  of  the  Ninth  Connecticut, 
taking  the  command,  the  movement  was 
conducted  in  good  order.  The  battle, 
however,  was  now  ended ; for  the  Con- 
federates also  fell  back,  and  then  re- 
treated. The  National  loss  was  90 
killed  and  250  wounded.  The  Confed- 
erate  loss  w^as  considerably  greater,  the 


ARRIVAL  OF  BANKS. 


431 


Nationals  claiming  that  they  them- 
selves buried  300  of  the  enemy’s 
dead.  The  Arkansas  did  not  arrive 
in  time  to  take  part  in  the  conflict.  In 
coming  down  the  river,  her  machineiy 
got  disabled,  and  she  became  unman- 
ageable. 

O 

On  the  following  morning,  the  6th 
of  August,  Porter,  who  had  done  some 
good  service  at  Baton  Rouge,  in  repell- 
ing the  enemy,  was  waiting  in  readi- 
ness for  the  appearance  of  the  “rebel 
ram.”  Impatient  of  her  delay,  he  set 
out  in  search  of  her  with  his  gunboat, 
the  Essex,  accompanied  by  the  Cayuga 
and  Sumter.  The  huge  monster  was 
discovered  on  the  river,  about  four 
miles  above.  She  was  really  helpless. 
When  within  half  a mile  of  hei*,  and 
about  10  A.  M.,  Porter  opened  fire. 
After  an  action  of  about  twenty  min- 
utes, she  was  discovered  to  be  ablaze. 
She  was  then  headed  to  the  river  bank; 
and,  about  noon,  she  exploded  with  a 
tremendous  noise,  being  literally  shat- 
tered into  fragments.  Such  was  the 
end  of  the  famous  iron-clad  which  was 
to  “ drive  the  Yankees  from  New  Or- 
leans,” and  which  was  as  much  a terror 
to  the  inhabitants  on  the  banks  of  the 
lower  Mississippi,  as  it  was  the  hope  of 
the  Confederate  government.'^ 

In  the  early  part  of  October,  detach- 
ments of  the  fleet  were  employed  to 
advantage  against  the  defenses  of  the 
harbor  and  city  of  Galveston  and  on 

* Difference  of  opinion  exists  as  to  the  origin  of  the  fire 
which  destroyed  the  Arkansas.  It  was  claimed  by  Porter 
that  he  set  her  on  fire  by  an  incendiary  shell  of  his  own 
invention.  It  was  claimed  by  the  officers  and  crew,  all 
of  whom  escaped,  that  they  set  her  on  fire  when  she 
became  unmanageable. 


the  Sabine  River;  and  both  Galveston 
and  Sabine  Pass  were  occupied. 

Later  in  the  month  of  October,  an 
effort  was  made  to  “ re-possess  ” the 
rich  distri(;t  of  La  Fourche,  on  the  west 
side  of  the  Mississippi.  On  the  27th,  at 
Labadieville,  a sharp  encounter  ort. 
took  place  between  the  Nationals,  27i 
under  General  Weitzel,  and  the  Confed- 
erates, under  McPheeteis.  The  Confed- 
erates were  driven  back,  and  pursued 
about  four  miles.  Weitzel  captured  268 
prisoners  and  one  piece  of  artillery.  His 
loss  was  18  killed  and  74  wounded. 
The  result  of  this  engagement  was  the 
recovery  of  two  congressional  districts, 
each  of  which,  in  December,  sent  repre- 
sentatives to  Washington. 

General  Banks  had  been  appointed 
to  the  command  of  the  Department  of 
the  Gulf  late  in  the  autumn.  He  did 
not  arrive  in  New  Orleans  until  the 
14th  of  December.  Banks  sailed  from 
the  North  at  the  head  of  an  expedition 
consisting  of  26  steam  vessels  and  25 
sailing  vessels,  and  carrying  with  him  a 
military  force  of  about  10,000  men. 
The  destination  of  the  expedition  was, 
for  obvious  reasons,  kept  a secret.  The 
secret  was  well  kept,  although,  by  the 
time  the  fleet  set  sail,  it  began  to 
be  whispered  about  that  its  destination 
was  the  coast  of  Texas.  On  his  arrival 
at  New  Orleans,  Banks  was  received 
by  Butler  in  the  most  courteous  man- 
ner. Banks  immediately  took  command 
of  the  department ; and  what,  with  the 
17,000  well-trained  troops — some  of 
them  colored — handed  over  to  him  by 
Butler,  and  the  10,000  which  he  had 
brought  with  him  from  the  North,  hu 


432 


PORT  HUDSON. 


found  hinoiself  at  the  head  of  an  armed 
force  of  30,000  men.  This  force  was 
designated  the  Nineteenth  army  corps. 
It  was  expected  that,  with  these  troops, 
Banks  would  co-operate  with  Grant 
generally  in  the  opening  of  the  Missis- 
sippi— that  he  would  attempt  the  de- 
struction or  capture  of  Port  Hudson, 
take  possession  of  the  Red  River  region, 
expel  the  Confederates  from  Louisiana, 
and  restore  the  National  authority  in 
Texas. 

On  his  arrival  in  New  Orleans,  Banks 
discovered  that  matters  were  not  in  so 
hopeful  a condition  as  they  seemed  at 
a distance.  Grant  had  met  with  re- 
verses on  his  way  to  Vicksburg,  and 
had  deemed  it  prudent  to  fall  back. 
Sherman  was  meeting  with  but  little 
success  at  Chickasaw  Bayou.  He  re- 
occupied Baton  Rouge  with  a force  of 
10,000  men,  under  General  Cuvier; 
but  such  was  the  strength  of  the  enemy 
in  and  around  Port  Hudson,  that  the 
advance  on  that  place  was  for  the  pres- 
ent delayed.  We  have  seen  already 
that  the  Nationals  had  resumed  posses- 
sion of  Galveston,  and  also  of  the  Sa- 
bine Pass — both  of  them  positions  of 
first-class  importance.  In  the  posses- 
sion of  these,  however,  they  were  not 
to  be  allowed  long  to  remain.  At  the 
C'ose  of  December,  and  at  the  request 
of  Commodore  Renshaw,  who  was  in 
charge  of  Galveston,  Banks  sent  to  that 
place,  from  New  Orleans,  three  com- 
])anies  of  the  Forty-Second  Massachu- 
setts Volunteers,  under  Colonel  Burrill. 
Dec.  When  they  landed  and  encamped 
on  the  28th,  the  gunboats  West- 
field,  Clifton,  Harriet  Lane,  Owasco, 


Corypheus  and  Sachem,  were  lying  in 
front  of  the  town.  At  this  time  Gen- 
eral Magruder,  who  had  distinguished 
himself  in  the  Peninsula  by  his  skilful 
resistance  of  McClellan,  was  in  com- 
mand in  that  department.  Magruder 
seems  to  llave  had  a high  opinion  of  the 
courtesy  and  good-nature  of  Renshaw. 
At  Virginia  Point,  opposite  Galveston, 
he  spent  a whole  night,  with  some  80 
men,  inspecting  the  defenses.  Renshaw 
was  made  aware  of  the  fact — was 
warned  even — that  an  attack  was  con- 
templated ; but  he  made  no  prepara- 
tions. Meantime,  Magruder,  who  had 
collected  from  the  adjoining  rivers  all 
the  available  troops  in  the  neighbor- 
hood, with  four  steamboats,  on  which 
he  had  put  guns,  and  which  he  had  for- 
tified with  cotton  bales,  proceeded  to- 
wards Galveston,  with  the  view  of  mak- 
ing an  attack  on  Renshaw  at  dawn  on 
the  morning  of  the  1st  of  January,  1863. 

The  island  on  which  Galveston  is 
built  is  a sand  bank,  some  thirty 
miles  long  and  two  wide.  It  is 
connected  with  the  main-land  by  a 
wooden  bridge,  two  miles  long,  over 
which  runs  the  Galveston  and  Houston 
Railroad.  It  was  bright  moon-  jan, 
light,  shortly  after  midnight,  L 
when  Magruder  crossed  the  bridge  on 
a train  of  cars,  carrying  with  him  his 
troops  and  field-pieces.  He  had  actual- 
ly reached  a point  within  two  squares 
of  the  camp  of  the  Massachusetts  sol- 
diers, and  had  planted  his  cannon  so  as 
to  bear  upon  Renshaw’s  gunboats. 
His  steamboats  were  now  seen  in  the 
bay.  The  moon  had  gone  down;  it 
was  now  about  four  o’clock ; and,  under 


THE  WESTFIELD  BLOWN"  UP. 


433 


cover  of  the  darkness,  a storming  party, 
500  strong,  and  a battalion  of  sharp- 
shooters, fell  with  great  fury  on  the 
Massachusetts  troops,  the  Confederate 
cannon,  at  the  same  time,  opening  tire 
on  the  gunboats.  The  Massachusetts 
men  were  found  not  wholly  unprepared. 
Posted  behind  a breast-work,  which 
they  had  constructed  with  the  torn-up 
planking  of  the  wharf,  they  offered  a 
gallant  resistance,  and  ultimately,  not- 
withstanding their  inferiority  of  num- 
bers, succeeded  in  repulsing  the  storm- 
ing party,  and  silencing  the  guns.  But 
the  enemy  was  not  to  be  so  easily  de- 
feated. The  Confederate  steamers  now 
arrived  on  the  scene.  They  were  well 
manned  by  a portion  of  Sibley’s  bri- 
gade. Two  of  these  steamers — the 
Bayou  City  and  Neptune — rushed  at 
once  upon  the  Harriet  Lane,  the  troops 
on  board  the  two  former  sweeping 
the  deck  of  the  latter  with  a perfect 
storm  of  bullets.  The  Harriet  Lane 
ran  into  the  Bayou  City,  carrying  off 
her  wheel-guard,  but  doing  little  other 
damage.  The  Neptune  then  ran  in 
upon  the  Harriet  Lane,  and  so  damaged 
herself  that  she  was  compelled  to  fall 
back  to  the  flats,  where  she  sank 
almost  immediately.  A sixty-eight 
pounder,  the  only  gun  on  board  the 
Bayou  City^  had  burst,  and  it  seemed  as 
if  she,  too,  must  go  down.  But  no. 
Making  another  rush  for  the  Harriet 
Lane — and  this  time  her  bow  penetrating 
the  wheel  of  her  rival — the  two  ves- 
sels became  entangled.  Sibley’s  sol- 
diers, discharging  volleys  of  musketry 
on  the  gunners,  began  to  swarm  on 
board  the  Harriet  Lane.  In  the  brief 


struggle  which  ensued,  Commander 
Wainright,  who  refused  to  surrender, 
was  killed,  while  bravely  defending 
himself  with  his  revolver.  Lieutenant- 
Commander  Lee  was  also  mortally 
wounded.  The  Westfield  had  even  a 
sadder  fate  than  the  Harriet  Lane. 
She  had  gone  out  to  meet  the  Confede- 
rate steamers  in  Bolivar  Channel,  and 
had  run  aground  at  high  tide.  The 
Clinton,  Lieutenant-Commander  Law, 
hastened  to  her  relief.  Scarcely  had 
the  Clinton  arrived  when  Renshaw, 
hearing  the  sound  of  arms,  and  know- 
ing that  the  attack  had  begun,  ordered 
Law  to  return.  Having  returned,  he 
opened  fire  upon  the  batteries  at  Fort 
Point ; but  as  the  Owasco  had  ground- 
ed in  the  attempt  to  reach  the  Harriet 
Lane,  he  did  not  venture  further. 
About  sunrise  messengers,  bearing  a 
flag  of  truce,  arrived,  demanding  a sur- 
render. Law,  refusing  to  take  upon 
himself  the  responsibility,  was  allowed 
time  to  communicate  with  Renshaw,  on 
board  the  Westfield.  Renshaw  would 
not  surrender.  He  gave  orders  that 
the  National  vessels  and  troops  should 
make  their  escape,  if  possible.  As  the 
Westfield  was  hopelessly  grounded,  he 
proposed  to  blow  her  up,  and,  with  his 
officers  and  crew,  make  his  escape  to 
two  of  the  transports.  The  match,  un- 
fortunately, was  applied  too  ,soon ; and, 
before  they  had  time  to  escape,  Ren- 
shaw himself.  Lieutenant  Zimmerman, 
Engineer  Green  and  about  a dozen  of 
the  crew  were  involved  in  the  common 
destruction.  They  all  perished;  and 
nearly  as  many  men,  who  were  in  the 
Commodore’s  gig,  close  to  the  Westfield, 


434 


PORT  HUDSOlSr. 


shared  the  same  fate.  Law,  making 
the  Owasco  his  flagship,  escaped  with 

hat  remained  of  the  fleet  to  New  Or- 
]( ans.  The  Harriet  Lane  and  two  coal 
harks,  the  Cavallo  and  Elias  Pike,  were 
left  in  the  hands  of  the  enemy.  The 
troops  had  no  choice  but  surrender. 
This  affair  at  Galveston  was  hailed  as 
a great  victory  by  the  South.  It  was 
claimed  by  Magruder  that  the  blockade 
of  that  port  was  raised,  and  that  “ the 
Harbor  of  Galveston  was  open  for  trade 
to  all  friendly  nations.”  It  proved, 
however,  but  a barren  victory ; for  be- 
fore the  Harriet  Lane  could  get  to  sea 
in  her  new  capacity  as  a Confederate 
pirate,  Farragut  had  re-established  the 
blockade. 

Emboldened  by  their  success  at  Gal- 
veston, the  Confederates  resolved  to 
make  a similar  attempt  on  Sabine  Pass. 
The  occupation  of  this  place  by  the 
Nationals  was  a great  inconvenience  to 
the  Southern  authorities.  The  Sabine 
River,  which  the  pass  commands,  is 
the  boundary  line  between  Louisi- 
ana and  Texas,  and  is  conveniently 
situated  for  the  foreign  trade  through 
Mexico  and  the  West  Indies.  It  was, 
therefore,  of  great  utility  to  them  in 
exporting  cotton  and  importing  muni- 
tions of  war  and  other  supplies.  The 
pass,  since  its  occupation  by  the  Na- 
tionals in  October,  had  been  blockaded 
by  two  gunboats,  the  Morning  Light 
and  Velocity.  The  Morning  Light  was 
well  armed,  carrying  a formidable  bat- 
tery of  nine  guns — one  of  them  a thii’ty- 
pound  pivot-rifled  gun  ; the  other  eight, 
thirty-two  pounders.  The  Velocity  car- 
ried one  small  howitzer.  The  Confed- 


erates fitted  out  four  vessels,  protected 
by  cotton  bales,  after  the  manner  of 
the  vessels  which  were  employed  in 
the  capture  of  the  Harriet  Lane.  The 
largest  of  the  fleet — a steamer — carried 
two  eighteen-pounders ; another,  a long 
thirty-two  pounder ; and  the  others, 
one  gun  each.  On  the  moim-  j^fj, 
ing  of  the  21st  of  January,  the 
weather  being  favorable,  they  pushed 
down  the  Sabine,  drove  the  National 
vessels  out  to  sea;  where,  being  pur- 
sued by  the  John  Bell  and  the  Uncle 
Ben,  they  were  captured,  with  their 
guns,  prisoners  and  a large  amount 
of  stores.  The  soil  of  Texas  was  once 
more  completely  in  the  hands  of  the 
Confederates. 

General  Banks  had,  meanwhile,  been 
giving  his  attention  to  the  rich  sugar 
districts  of  Louisiana,  to  the  west  of 
the  Mississippi.  This  was  the  more 
necessary  that,  if  the  Confederates  ^vere. 
allowed  to  concentrate  in  any  strength 
in  that  region,  they  would  be  able  to 
give  him  trouble  on  his  flank  and  rear, 
and  seriously  to  menace  New  Oiheans. 
Already,  as  we  have  seen,  a portion  of 
that  territory  had  been  overrun  by  the 
National  troops ; but  there  were  por- 
tions more  particularly  in  the  direction 
of  the  Red  River,  into  which  they  had 
not  yet  penetrated,  and  the  inhabitants 
were,  for  the  most  part  disloyal.  It  is 
a peculiar  country,  badly  adapted  for 
the  movement  of  large  bodies  of  men 
and  artillery — much  better  adapted,  in 
fact,  for  defense  than  for  attack.  There 
are  large  and  productive  plantations; 
there  are  also  extensive  forests;  and 
the  entire  country  is  intersected  with 


CAEKEY’S  BRIDGE. 


435 


lagoons,  bayous  and  impassable  swamps. 
The  waters  abound  with  alligators ; and 
the  intervening  ground,  which  is  for 
the  most  part  soft  and  slushy,  is  dark- 
ened by  huge  cypress  trees,  which 
spread  their  umbrageous  foliage  all 
around.  At  that  particular  season,  in 
consequence  of  the  overflow  of  the 
Mississippi  and  its  tributaries,  the  dis- 
trict was  half  submerged  in  water.  In 
addition  to  those  natural  diflSculties, 
obstructions  had  been  placed  in  the 
streams ; and,  at  points  favorable  for 
defense,  fortifications  had  been  con- 
structed. 

About  eighty  miles  west  of  New 
Orleans,  at  a point  where  the  waters  of 
the  great  Bayou  Teche  meet  those  of 
the  Atchafalaya,  stands  Brashear  City. 
This  city  is  connected  with  New  Or- 
leans by  a single  railroad.  On  the 
Teche,  it  was  known,  there  was  an 
armed  steamer,  called  the  J.  A.  Cotton. 
At  different  parts  on  the  Teche,  and 
also  on  the  Atchafalaya,  there  were 
strong  earth-works.  Banks  resolved 
to  draw  the  Confederates  from  their 
strongholds  in  the  neighborhood  of 
Brashear  City.  An  expedition  for  that 
purpose  was  organized,  and  placed  under 
the  direction  of  General  Weitzel  and 
Commodore  McKean  Buchanan.  About 
the  nth  of  January,  Weitzel  was  at 
Brashear  City.  There  he  placed  his 
infantry  on  the  gunboats,  his  cavalry 
and  artillery  being  sent  forward  by 
land.  At  Carney’s  Bridge,  just  above 
Pattersonville,  they  were  brought  to 
a halt  by  the  demolished  structure, 
against  which  lay  a sunken  steamboat, 
laden  with  brick.  Immediately  above 


was  the  formidable  steamer,  Cotton ; 
and  on  each  side  of  the  bayou  there 
were  powerful  batteries,  defended,  as  it 
turned  out,  by  about  1100  men. 

On  the  morning  of  the  15th,  Buchanan 
opened  fire  on  the  enemy’s  posi-  j^u, 
tion.  The  Confederates  responded 
sharply,  both  from  the  Cotton  and  from 
the  batteries.  The  engagement  had  not 
lasted  long  when  a torpedo  exploded 
below  the  gunboat,  Kinsman,  lifting  her 
stern,  but  not  doing  serious  damage. 
Heedless  of  the  warning,  Buchanan 
passed  on  in  the  Calhoun,  in  the  face  of 
a fierce  cannonade.  He  was  standing 
on  the  bow  of  the  boat,  with  his  spy- 
glass in  his  hand.  A spent  ball  from  a 
rifle-pit  hit  his  chief  engineer  on  the 
thigh.  ‘‘Ah,  you’ve  got  it,”  he  said. 
The  next  moment  he  fell  dead,  a bullet 
having  penetrated  his  head.  By  this 
time  the  Eighth  Vermont,  having 
reached  the  Confederate  rear,  was  clear- 
ing the  rifle-pits,  while  the  batteries  of 
the  Fourth  Maine  and  Sixth  Massa- 
chusetts, supported  by  Fitch’s  sharp- 
shooters and  the  One  Hundred  and 
Sixteenth  New  York,  had  flanked  the 
defenses  on  the  south  side  of  the  bayou. 
The  Cotton,  which  was  now  exposed  to 
an  enfilading  fire,  was  soon  compelled 
to  retreat.  So,  also,  were  the  land 
forces,  the  latter  leaving  forty  of  their 
number  prisoners.  The  Cotton  more 
than  once  returned  to  the  fight,  every 
time  to  be  terribly  punished ; and,  on 
the  morning  of  the  16th,  she  was  seen 
floating  on  the  bayou,  deserted  and  in 
flames.  It  was  a swift,  sharp,  bitter 
fight.  The  monster  vessel  having  been 
destroyed,  it  was  deemed  unnecessary  to 


456 


PORT  HUDSON. 


proceed  further.  Including  Buchanan, 
whose  death  was  a great  calamity,  for 
he  was  a brave  and  deserving  officer, 
and  had  sacrificed  much  by  clinging  to 
the  National  cause,  there  were  7 killed 
and  27  wounded.  On  the  night  of  the 
15th — the  dead  and  wounded  having 
been  placed  on  a raft — the  expedition 
sailed  back  to  Brashear  City  under  the 
pale  light  of  a January  moon. 

The  forces  were  now  concentrated  at 
Baton  Rouge.  It  was  resolved  to  make 
a joint  land  and  naval  mov^ement  in  the 
direction  of  Port  Hudson.  Farragut  de- 
termined, if  he  could  not  do  more,  that 
he  would  at  least  attempt  to  recover  230S- 
session  of  the  river  from  that  point  to 
Vicksburg.  He,  therefore,  assembled 
his  fieet  at  Prophet’s  Island,  a few  miles 
below  Port  Hudson ; and,  on  the  same 
day.  Banks  sent  forward  12,000  men 
to  engage  the  attention  of  the  enemy, 
while  the  perilous  attempt  at  running 
the  batteries  should  again  be  made.  It 
Mar.  was  now  the  13th  of  March. 

Some  little  progress  was  made. 
The  pickets  were  driven  in;  and  fire 
was  opened  on  the  Confederate  works 
by  the  gunboats  and  the  mortars.  It 
was  Farragut’s  intention  to  run  the 
gauntlet  of  the  batteries  next  morning. 
The  night,  however,  seemed  favorable 
for  an  attack.  It  was  exceedingly 
dark ; and  he  was  now  perfectly  fa- 
miliar with  the  channel.  The  fleet  con- 
sisted of  the  frigates  Hartford,  Missis- 
sippi, Richmond  and  Monongahela,  the 
gunboats  Albatross,  Genessee,  Kineo, 
Essex  and  Sachem,  with  six  mortar 
schooners.  The  vessels  moved  in  the 
following  order : the  Hartford,  Cap- 


tain Palmer,  Farragut  on  board,  with 
the  gunboat  Albatross  lashed  to  her 
side ; the  Richmond ; the  Genessee ; 
the  Monongahela ; the  Kineo;  the  Mis- 
sissippi. As  they  moved  along  through 
the  deep  darkness,  the  mortars  kept  up 
their  fird.  The  darkness,  however,  was 
not  dense  enough  to  put  the  Confede- 
rates off  their  guard,  or  to  make  them 
fo]getful  of  their  duty. 

As  the  vessels  approached  the  fort, 
the  batteries  suddenly  opened  fire,  and 
immense  bonfires  were  kindled  on  the 
hill-sides,  lighting  up  the  whole  scene. 
The  bonfires  gave  a brilliant  but  local 
light,  which  was  hemmed  in,  so  to 
speak,  by  the  surrounding  darkness, 
while  what  seemed  meteors  bursting 
now  from  the  batteries  on  the  bluffs, 
and  now  from  the  vessels  on  the  river, 
created  a pandemonium- like  picture 
more  horrible  than  the  onlooker,  in  his 
most  imaginative  moods,  ever  before 
conceived.  The  batteries  being  high, 
the  Confederates  had  all  the  advantage. 
It  was  a most  unequal  struggle.  The 
fleet,  however,  kept  moving  on,  vainly 
replying  to  the  deadly  fire,  which 
poured  like  hail  from  the  heights  on 
their  right.  Grape,  canister,  shrapnel, 
shot,  and  the  scarcely  less  destructive 
bullets  of  sharpshooters,  swept  murder- 
ously over  the  decks  of  the  vessels  as 
they  drew  nearer  and  nearer  the  bluffs. 
For  an  hour  and  a half  the  terrific  can- 
nonade continued.  What  had  happened 
in  that  space  of  time  was  known  only 
on  board  the  separate  vessels. 

About  one  o’clock  the  firing  ceased. 
Only  the  Hartford  and  the  Albatross 
had  passed  the  batteries.  Most  of  the 


CAPTUKE  OF  OPELOUSAS. 


437 


other  vessels  had  suffered  severely. 
The  Kichmond  received  a shot  in  her 
steam-drum,  and  was  compelled  to  fall 
back  and  anchor.  The  captain  of  the 
Monongahela  was  seriously  injured; 
that  vessel,  also,  fell  back  and  anchored. 
.The  Kineo  had  her  rudder-post  shot 
through ; her  propeller  was  made  foul 
by  a hawser ; she,  too,  floated  down  and 
anchored.  The  Mississippi  had  the 
worst  fate  of  all.  Grounding  at  a point 
where  she  was  exposed  to  the  fire  of 
three  batteries,  she  was  terribly  pun- 
ished. ’For  a time,  however,  she  kept 
up  a most  vigorous  fire,  replying  shot 
for  shot  to  every  one  that  struck  her. 
As  it  was  found  impossible  to  relieve 
her,  it  was  resolved  to  abandon  her  to 
her  fate.  Her  guns,  in  consequence,  were 
spiked ; she  was  set  on  fire ; and  what 
remained  of  the  officers  and  crew  found 
safety  on  the  shore  opposite  the  bat- 
teries. It  was  believed  that  many 
jumped  overboard  and  were  made  pris- 
oners. Of  1 33  officers  and  men,  29  were 
found  to  be  missing.  A little  later,  and 
after  she  had  drifted  off  and  floated  a 
short  distance  down  the  river,  she  ex- 
ploded, and  went  to  the  bottom,  with 
her  fine  armament  of  twenty-one  heavy 
guns  and  two  howitzers.  The  fleet, 
with  the  exception  of  the  two  vessels 
which  had  passed  the  batteries,  fell 
back  to  Baton  Bouge,  and  there  found 
shelter.  It  was  another  failure;  but 
neither  Farragut  above  nor  Banks  be- 
low had  given  up  their  purpose  regard- 
ing Port  Hudson. 

The  Louisiana  region  west  of  the 
Mississippi  again  commands  our  atten- 
tion. Again  there  was  a concentration 


of  forces  at  Brashear  City,  General 
Banks  commanding  in  person.  It  was 
the  Teche  expedition  over  again,  but 
on  a grander  scale.  When  General 
Weitzel  returned  to  Brashear  City, 
after  the  expedition  in  January,  the 
Confederates  resumed  their  old  position 
in  the  neighborhood  of  the  Teche.  It 
was  resolved  to  drive  them  effectually 
out  of  this  rich  and  productive  district. 
On  the  10th  of  April,  General  April 
Weitzel,  who  had  been  lying  at 
Brashear  City,  crossed  over  to  Ber- 
wick, on  the  opposite  side  of  the  bayou. 
The  landing  was  not  disputed ; but  it 
was  discovered  that  the  enemy,  in  con- 
siderable strength,  was  not  far  distant. 
General  Bichard  Taylor,  it  was  known, 
was  in  command.  On  the  next  day — 
Saturday — the  infantry  advanced  a short 
distance. 

On  Sunday,  the  12th,  General  Emory 
crossed,  with  his  division.  A further 
advance  was  made,  the  enemy  resisting, 
but  not  obstinately.  General  Emory 
slowly  moved  back  to  the  shelter  of 
the  works  above  Patterson ville.  On 
the  same  day  on  which  Emory  crossed 
the  Teche,  General  Grover,  with  his 
division  on  transports,  accompanied  by 
four  gunboats — the  Clifton,  Calhoun, 
Arizona  and  Estrella — moved  up  the 
Atchafalaya  into  Lake  Chatimacha  to- 
wards Irish  Bend,  his  object  being  to 
fall  upon  the  rear  of  the  Confederates 
and  cut  off  their  retreat,  in  the  event 
of  their  being  driven  from  their  posi- 
tion at  Fort  Bisland.  It  was  difficult 
to  effect  a landing ; and  some  time,  in 
consequence,  was  lost.  ‘ Grover  was; 
vigorously  attacked ; but  he  succeeded. 


248 


438 


PORT  HUDSON. 


in  repelling  the  assailants,  who  fell  back 
into  the  woods.  This  success  of  Grover 
weakened  the  confidence  of  the  enemy 
in  front  of  General  Banks,  who  was 
some  eleven  miles  distant.  The  entire 
Confederate  force,  therefore,  retreated 
towards  Opelousas,  making  a stand  at 
Vermilion  Bayou.  In  their  retreat, 
they  burned  several  steamboats  at 
Franklin,  and  destroyed  the  bridges  in 
their  rear.  So  rapid  was  the  pursuit 
made  by  Weitzel’s  brigade,  supported 
by  a portion  of  Emory’s  division,  under 
Colonel  Ingraham,  that  Taylor,  finding 
it  impossible  to  carry  them  with  him, 
destroyed,  at  New  Iberia,  five  trans- 
ports laden  with  commissary  stores  and 
ammunition,  and  an  iron-clad  which 
was  in  course  of  construction.  On  the 
1 7th,  Emoiy  came  up  with  Taylor  at 
Vermilion  Bayou.  The  contest  was 
brief,  but  sharp,  Taylor  again  retiring, 
and  burning  the  bridges  behind  him. 
The  night  of  the  17th  and  the  follow- 
ing day  were  spent  in  rebuilding  the 
bridges. 

On  the  19th  the  march  was  resumed, 
and  continued  to  the  vicinity  of  Grand 
Coteau ; and,  on  the  20th,  General 
Banks  entered  Opelousas  in  triumph. 
On  the  same  day  on  which  Banks  en- 
tered Opelousas,  Lieutenant-Command- 
ing A.  P.  Cooke  captured  Butte  k la 
Rose,  with  its  garrison  of  60  men,  2 
heavy  guns,  and  a large  quantity  of 
ammunition.  The  way  was  thus  opened 
through  the  Atchafalaya  to  the  Bed 
River;  and  the  Arizona,  having  passed 
through,  reached  Admiral  Farragut, 
above  Port  Hudson,  on  the  2d  of  May. 

Banks  continued  to  push  forward  to 


Alexandria,  Taylor  still  retreating  be- 
fore him.  On  the  6th  of  May,  his  ad- 
vance, under  General  William  Dwight, 
entered  Alexandria ; but  Admiral  Por- 
ter, who  had  ascended  the  Red  River 
with  a fleet  of  gunboats,  had  arrived 
some  hours  before  him  and  taken  posses- 
sion of  the  place.  Weitzel  pursued  Tay- 
lor as  far  as  Grand  Ecore,  when  the  chase 
was  discontinued.  The  expedition  had 
been  completely  successful ; and  Banks, 
on  the  7th  of  May,  wrote  to  Washington, 
saying:  ^‘W(thave  destroyed  the  ene- 
my’s army  and  navy,  and  made  their  re- 
organization impossible  by  destroying  or 
removing  the  material.  We  hold  the 
key  of  the  position.  Among  the  evi- 
dences of  victory  are  2000  prisoners,  2 
transports  and  20  guns  taken,  and  3 
gunboats  and  8 transports  destroyed.” 

While  Banks  had  been  thus  engaged, 
the  division  of  General  T.  W.  Sherman, 
which  had  been  quartered  at  New  Or- 
leans, had  not  been  idle  or  inactive. 
At  Tickfaw  Station,  near  Lake  Pont- 
chartrain,  a large  quantity  of  cotton, 
lumber,  corn  and  bacon  had  been  cap- 
tured ; a large  tannery,  a car-shop,  the 
Tangipaho  Bridge  and  other  valuable 
property  had  been  destroyed  ; and  four 
schooners,  with  cargoes  of  contraband 
goods,  had  been  burned  on  the  lake. 
A detachment  from  the  force,  under 
General  Augur,  who  had  returned  to 
Baton  Rouge,  had  encountered  and 
routed  a body  of  the  enemy  on  the  rail- 
road, between  Port  Hudson  and  Clin- 
ton. About  this  same  time,  Grierson, 
to  whose  successful  raid  reference  has 
already  been  made,  captured,  near  Port 
Hudson,  some  300  head  of  cattle.  TJie 


GORDON’S  LANDING. 


439 


ground  was  thus  cleared  of  the  enemy 
on  both  sides  of  the  great  river;  and 
Banks  was  left  at  liberty  to  concentrate 
his  troops,  with  a view  to  the  fresh  at- 
tack on  Port  Hudson. 

We  left  Admiral  Farragut  as  he 
passed  the  batteries  at  Port  Hudson 
with  his  now  veteran  flag-ship,  the 
Hartford,  and  the  gunboat  Albatross.. 
Before  halting  finally  with  Banks  at 
Port  Hudson,  let  us  follow  Farragut, 
and  take  note  of  his  experiences  until 
the  commencement  of  the  siege.  The 
Hartford  and  the  Albatross,  having 
passed  the  batteries,  proceeded  up  the 
river.  They  encountered  little  or  no 
opposition  until  they  reached  Grand 
Gulf.  Here,  however,  they  were  rough- 
ly treated,  both  vessels  being  more  or 
less  injured.  The  Hartford  was  struck 
fourteen  times;  and  three  of  her  men 
were  killed.  In  passing  Warrenton, 
they  experienced  a similar  fate,  the 
Confederate  batteries  at  that  point 
opening  upon  them  a heavy  cannonade. 
It  was  not  possible,  how^ever,  to  hinder 
Farragut  from  moving  upward.  On 
Mar.  the  26th  of  March,  he  anchored 
26*  below  Vicksburg,  at  the  mouth 
of  the  Williams  Canal,  to  which  refer- 
ence has  frequently  been  made  in  the 
preceding  chapter.  Here  he  opened 
communications  with  General  Grant 
and  Admiral  Porter.  The  latter,  yield- 
ing to  his  call  for  reinforcements  and 
supplies,  sent  him  two  rams — the  Lan- 
caster and  the  Switzerland — together 
with  several  flat-boats,  laden  with  coal. 
The  Lancaster  was  destroyed  while  at- 
tempting to  pass  the  batteries  at  Vicks- 
burg. The  Switzerland  was  disabled; 


but,  being  rescued  by  the  Albatross,  she 
was  towed  down  to  a safe  position. 
The  gunboats  floated  past  without  dam- 
age. The  Switzerland  was  speedily 
repaired;  and  the  three  vessels  pro- 
ceeded on  their  downward  course.  On 
the  30th  of  March,  the  fleet  witnessed 
the  destruction  of  the  Confederate 
steamer  Vicksburg,  as  already  described. 
Warrenton  was  again  passed  on  the 
morning  of  the  31st  of  March  ; and,  on 
the  night  of  the  same  day,  the  three 
vessels,  after  some  fifteen  minutes’  bit- 
ter experience  from  the  batteries  at 
Grand  Gulf,  had  anchored  below  that 
place. 

On  the  following  day  they  weighed 
anchor,  and  proceeded  to  the  April 
mouth  of  the  Bed  Biver.  Over  L 
the  mouth  of  the  river  and  the  adjoin- 
ing country,  Farragut  kept  a vigilant 
guard.  It  was  not  deemed  safe  to 
make  any  further  attempt  to  pass  the 
batteries  at  Port  Hudson.  It  was  as 
little  desirable  to  repeat  the  fruitless 
efforts  which  had  been  made  in  the  di- 
rection of  Vicksburg,  especially  with 
the  heavier  vessels.  Farragut  was 
thus  in  some  danger  of  falling  a victim 
to  the  enemy.  The  Switzerland  had 
returned  and  joined  the  fleet  of  Ad- 
miral Porter,  who  was  now  co-operating 
with  General  Grant  against  Vicksburg. 
Towards  the  end  of  April,  Farragut, 
who  had  sailed  on  an  expedition  up  the 
Bed  Biver,  had  a severe  engagement 
with  the  enemy.  He  had  taken  with 
him;  in  addition  to  the  Albatross,  the 
Estrella  and  the  Arizona.  At  Gordon’s 
Landing,  he  encountered  two  Confede- 
rate vessels — the  Mary  T.  and  the 


440 


PORT  HUDSON. 


Grand  Duke.  The  Estrella  and  the 
Arizona  were  soroewhat  in  the  rear,  as 
they  had  been  ordered  not  to  advance. 
The  Albatross  moved  up  to  within  four 
hundred  yards  of  the  Mary  T.  At  this 
point,  she  was  stopped  by  obstructions 
in  the  river.  A vigorous  light,  how- 
ever, now  began,  the  Grand  Duke  com- 
ing to  the  aid  of  her  consort.  The  firing 
of  the  Confederate  vessels  told  with 
terrible  effect  from  the  very  commence- 
ment of  the  contest.  The  pilot-house 
of  the  Albatross  was  demolished.  One 
of  the  pilots  was  killed  outright ; and 
the  other  lost  his  hand.  The  rigging 
was  badly  damaged ; and  the  main-mast 
was  cut  in  two.  A ball  passed  through 
her  hull;  and  her  machinery  was  par- 
tially disabled.  The  Confederate  ves- 
sels were  more  severely  punished.  The 
first  broadside  from  the  Albatross  car- 
ried away  the  steam-connection  pipe  of 
the  Mary  T.,  at  the  same  time  killing 
and  wounding  some  30  persons.  The 
Grand  Duke  was  so  severely  punished 
that  she  steamed  off  up  the  stream, 
under  cover  of  the  woods.  While  Far- 
ragut,  who  had  fallen  back,  was  con- 
sulting with  Captain  Cook  as  to  the 
practicability  of  capturing  the  now  dis- 
abled Mary  T.,  the  Grand  Duke  came 
back  and  towed  away  her  crippled  com- 
panion. The  fight  lasted  about  forty 
minutes.  The  Albatross  had  lost  some 
seven  men  in  killed  and  wounded.  The 
Confederate  loss  on  each  vessel  was 
understood  to  be  much  greater.  After 
this,  Farragut  was  comparatively  inac- 
tive until  the  first  assault  was  made  on 
Port  Hudson. 

Banks,  as  we  have  seen,  had  swept  the 


entire  country,  on  both  sides  of  the  great 
river,  from  New  Orleans  to  a point  be- 
yond the  mouth  of  the  Red  River.  Hav- 
ing returned  to  the  Mississippi,  he  lost  no 
time  in  pushing  his  army  across  to  Bayou 
Sara.  The  landing  was  effected  on  ]Uay 
the  21st  of  May.  On  the  follow- 
ing  day,  he  was  joined  by  Brigadier-Gen- 
eral Sherman  and  Major-General  Augur, 
the  latter  of  whom,  on  the  2 2d  of  May, 
and  while  taking  position,  had  a severe 
encounter,  on  Port  Hudson  Plains,  with 
a portion  of  the  enemy’s  force.  On  the 
25th,  the  Confederates  were  compelled 
to  abandon  their  first  line  of  works. 
On  the  27th,  all  the  necessary  prepara- 
tions having  been  made,  a general  as- 
sault was  ordered. 

Port  Hudson,  originally  a place  of 
comparatively  little  importance  and  of 
no  great  strength,  had  been  strongly  for- 
tified, and  converted  into  an  almost  im- 
pregnable fortress.  It  stood  on  the 
east  side  of  the  Mississippi,  on  a bend 
of  the  river,  about  twenty-two  miles 
above  Baton  Rouge  and  one  hundred 
and  forty-seven  above  New  Orleans. 
Approaching  the  place  by  water  from 
the  south,  the  front  batteries  were  on  a 
bold  blufP,  about  forty  feet  above  high 
water  mark.  From  this  point,  three 
series  of  batteries  extended  along  the 
heights  above  the  town  to  a point  on 
Thompson’s  Creek,  making  a continuous 
line  about  three  and  a half  miles  long. 
Beyond  Thompson’s  Creek  there  is  an 
impassable  marsh,  which  forms  a natural 
defense.  From  the  lower  battery  there 
stretched  out,  in  semicircular  form,  a 
line  of  land  fortifications,  which  termi- 
nated at  Thompson's  Creek.  The  place 


THE  ASSAULT. 


441 


was  strong  by  nature ; and  everything 
which  art  and  science  could  accomplish 
had  been  done  to  make  it  impregnable. 
But  for  the  fall  of  Vicksburg,  the  pre- 
sumption is  that  it  could  not  have  been 
reduced,  except  by  a formal  siege.  The 
guns  on  the  works  were  of  heavy  cali- 
bre ; and  there  were  numerous  light  bat- 
teries, which  could  be  removed  to  any 
part  of  the  line.  The  place  was  under 
the  command  of  General  Frank  Gardner. 

When  the  order  for  the  assault  was 
May  given,  fire  had  already,  for  some 
27*  days,  been  opened  on  the  place 
from  the  river.  Farragut,  with  the 
blartford  and  Albatross,  and  one  or  two 
gunboats,  were  above  Port  Hudson. 
Commander  C.  H.  B.  Caldwell,  with 
the  Monongahela,  Kichmond,  Essex 
and  Genessee,  was  below.  The  firing 
from  the  land  batteries  commenced 
about  six  o’clock  on  the  morning  of 
the  27th,  and  continued  all  day.  At 
about  ten  o’clock,  and  while  the  bat- 
teries were  vigorously  at  work  pour- 
ing shot  and  shell  into  the  place,  an 
attack  was  made  on  the  right  of  Banks 
by  Weitzel,  Grover  and  Paine.  It  was 
long  past  noon  when  Augur,  in  the 
centre,  and  Sherman  got  fairly  to  work. 
For  hours  the  battle  raged  with  great 
fury.  The  batteries  on  the  land,  and 
the  batteries  on  the  river,  kept  up  a most 
destructive  fire,  while  the  brave  soldiers 
rushed  forward  over  the  broken  ground, 
over  abatis^  the  Confederate  shot  and 
shell  sweeping  the  entire  space  like  a 
very  besom  of  destruction.  Never  was 
more  bravery  exhibited  by  any  troops. 
The  fight  was  most  severe  on  the  right. 
Three  desperate  charges  were  made. 


They  pushed  their  way  across  Big 
Sandy  Creek;  and,  by  four  o’clock, 
they  had  driven  the  enemy  through  the 
woods,  and  forced  their  way  up  to  the 
very  edge  of  the  works.  The  attack 
was  made  with  equal  bravery  in  the 
centre  and  on  the  left ; and,  by  sunset, 
the  Confederates,  who  made  a gallant 
resistance,  were  at  every  point  com- 
pelled to  seek  shelter  behind  their  for- 
tifications. The  right  continued  to  hold 
the  position  which  it  had  won  in  front 
of  the  parapet ; but  the  left,  being  ex- 
posed to  a flank  fire,  withdrew  to  the 
cover  of  a belt  of  woods  close  at  hand. 
In  the  evening  the  troops  were  with- 
drawn. It  was  a bold  effort,  daringly 
and  bravely  made ; but  it  proved  a dis- 
astrous failure.  The  National  loss  was 
293  killed  and  1549  wounded.  On  the 
Confederate  side,  the  killed  and  wound- 
ed did  not  exceed  300. 

The  employment  of  negro  soldiers 
was  a feature  of  this  engagement.  It 
was  the  first  time  that  they  had  been 
employed  in  any  great  numbers.  The 
bravery  which  they  exhibited,  their 
patience  and  endurance  under  fire,  com- 
manded alike  the  admiration  of  their 
white  companions -in -arms  and  the 
praises  of  their  commanders.  In  His 
report,  General  Banks  makes  special 
mention  of  the  manner  in  which  they 
conducted  themselves.  “The  position 
occupied  by  these  troops”  (the  First 
and  Second  Louisiana),  says  that  com- 
mander, “was  one  of  importance,  and 
called  for  the  utmost  steadiness  and 
bravery  in  those  to  whom  it  was  con- 
fided. It  gives  me  pleasure  to  report 
that  they  answered  every  expectation. 


PORT  HUDSON^. 


442 


In  many  respects  their  conduct  was 
heroic.  No  troops  could  be  more  de- 
termined or  more  daring.  They  made, 
during  the  day,  three  charges  upon  the 
batteries  of  the  enemy,  suffering  very 
heavy  losses,  and  holding  their  position 
at  nightfall  with  the  other  troops  on 
the  right  of  our  line.  The  highest  com- 
mendation is  bestowed  upon  them  by 
all  the  officers  in  command  on  the  right. 
Whatever  doubt  may  have  existed 
heretofore  as  to  the  efficiency  of  organi- 
zations of  this  character,  the  history  of 
this  day  proves  conclusively  to  those 
who  were  in  condition  to  observe  the 
conduct  of  these  regiments,  that  the 
government  will  find  in  this  class  of 
troops  effective  supporters  and  de- 
fenders. The  severe  test  to  which  they 
were  subjected,  and  the  determined 
manner  in  which  they  encountered  the 
enemy,  leaves  upon  my  mind  no  doubt 
of  their  ultimate  success.  They  require 
only  good  officers,  commands  of  limited 
numbers,  and  careful  discipline,  to 
make  them  excellent  soldiers.” 

Banks  must  have  been  disappointed ; 
but  he  was  not  disheartened.  He  had 
no  need  to  be.  The  stone  walls  and 
earth- works,  and  the  powerful  and  well- 
manned  batteries  of  the  enemy  were,  a 
few  miles  further  up  the  river,  baffling 
the  skill  and  trying  the  patience  of  a 
greater  soldier  than  he.  The  day  after 
the  assault  was  occupied  in  burying  the 
dead.  It  became  more  and  more  ap- 
parent that  the  place  might  prove  too 
strong  for  the  forces  at  his  command, 
and  that  he  might  have  to  depend  on  a 
regular  siege  for  its  final  reduction. 
With  this  probability  before  him,  he 


set  his  men  to  work.  Under  the  hot 
June  sun,  the  men  worked  with  a will, 
digging  trenches,  throwing  up  earth- 
works, and  undermining  the  enemy’s 
fortifications.  They  were  daily  and 
hourly  exposed  to  the  heavy  guns,  and 
to  the  sharpshooters  behind  the  works. 
On  both  sides,  the  firing  was  kept  up 
with  but  little  iutermission.  The  shot 
and  shell  from  the  gunboats  on  the 
river,  as  well  as  from  the  batteries  on 
land,  allowed  the  garrison  no  repose. 
It  was  the  same  thing  day  and  night. 
Gardner’s  position  was  daily  becoming 
more  critical.  His  provisions  were 
growing  scarce  ; his  medical  stores  were 
all  but  exhausted  ; and,  what  was 
worse,  he  had  but  small  hope  of  de- 
liverance. In  his  case,  as  in  the  case 
of  Pemberton,  everything  depended 
upon  Johnston.  Even  if  unable  to  re- 
lieve Vicksburg,  he  might  succeed  in 
sweeping  around  Grant’s  rear,  and  give 
Banks  a surprise  at  any  moment.  This 
was  his  strongest  consolation.  Banks 
was  scarcely  in  a better  plight.  His 
army  was  small.  Around  Port  Hudson, 
he  had  not  more  than  12,000  effective 
men.  The  Confederate  cavalry  were 
concentrating  in  his  rear.  General  Tay- 
lor was  collecting  troops,  with  a view 
to  fresh  efforts  of  as^o'ression  in  the  ad- 
joining  regions  of  Louisiana.  He,  too, 
had  his  thoughts  about  Johnston;  but 
what  was  Gardner’s  hope  was  Banks’ 
fear. 

It  was  in  the  last  degree  desirable, 
so  far  as  the  National  commander  was 
concerned,  that  Port  Hudson  be  re- 
duced with  as  little  delay  as  possible. 
Another  assault,  therefore,  was  planned. 


THE  SECON’D  ASSAULT. 


443 


The  men  had  done  good  work  in 
trenching  and  throwing  up  works  since 
the  last  attack.  On  the  11th  of  June, 
June  attempt  was  made  to  establish 
a new  line  within  easy  attacking 
distance  of  the  Confederate  works.  If 
this  line  could  be  established,  all  the 
dangers  of  a movement  over  a broad 
intervening  space  would  be  avoided. 
At  three  o’clock  in  the  morning,  under 
cover  of  a heavy  fire  of  artillery,  the 
National  troops  advanced.  They  had 
made  their  way  through  the  abatis, 
when  the  garrison  came  out  in  force. 
A fierce  struggle  ensued.  The  Na- 
tionals not  only  held  their  ground  for 
a time,  but  forced  some  of  the  Confed- 
erates back  behind  the  fortifications. 
The  attempt  was  gallantly  made,  but  it 
was  fiercely  repelled.  Lieutenant  Stan- 
ton Allyn,  a brave  young  officer  from 
Connecticut,  alone  reached  the  parapet; 
but  both  he  and  his  men  wei-e  driven 
back  over  the  abatis,  with  a heavy  loss 
in  killed,  wounded  and  prisoners. 

This  partial  attempt,  although  a fail- 
ure, did  not  prevent  Banks  from  making 
a general  assault  along  the  whole  line 
three  days  afterwards.  He  had  made 
up  his  mind  to  take  the  place  by  storm, 
if  it  were  at  all  possible,  and  had  taken 
some  pains  to  rearrange  his  troops, 
which  at  this  time  lay  for  the  most  part 
in  two  lines — a right  and  a left,  but  no 
centre.  Joined  together,  they  made  a 
right  angle.  Grover’s  division,  on  the 
upper  side  of  Port  Hudson,  extended 
over  three  miles  from  the  mouth  of 
Thompson’s  Creek  into  the  interior  of 
the  country.  Augur’s  division,  from  a 
pQint  within  supporting  distance  of 


Grover,  extended  some  three  miles  to- 
wards the  river  below  Port  Hudson. 
At  its  extreme  point  near  the  river, 
this  line  was  within  hailing  distance  of 
the  fleet.  The  enemy  was  well  posted, 
and  not  unprepared  for  the  advance  of 
those  bright  lines  of  glittering  steel 
which,  stretching  out  on  either  side  of 
them,  met  in  their  front.  The  defenses 
of  the  enemy  formed  a right  angle, 
both  lines  of  which  extended  to  the 
river,  and  enclosed  a sharp  bend.  In 
front  of  the  earth-works,  which  seemed 
covered  with  gleaming  bayonets,  there 
was  a deep  ditch  nearly  twelve  feet  in 
width ; and  within  short  range,  enfi- 
lading breast-works  commanded  every 
approach.  The  point  of  attack  was  the 
extreme  northeasterly  angle  of  the  Con- 
federate position.  The  attack  was  to 
be  made  by  Grover  and  Weitzel.  Gen- 
erals Augur  and  Dwight  were  instruct- 
ed to  make  a feint  or  a real  attack  on 
the  enemy’s  right,  as  circumstances 
might  determine.  When  the  final  dis- 
position was  made.  General  Gardner 
was  entreated  to  surrender,  and  thus 
prevent  the  effusion  of  blood  which 
must  necessarily  follow  the  attack. 
The  shot  and  shell  were  already  spread- 
ing death  and  destruction  all  around 
him ; but  Gardner,  like  Pemberton, 
hoping  against  hope,  and  still  more 
than  half  believing  that  Johnston  might 
come,  refused  to  yield. 

It  was  now  early  dawn,  on  the  morn- 
ing of  the  14th  of  June.  The  June 
onward  movement  had  already  H. 
commenced.  There  was  the  same  deaf- 
ening roar  of  artillery  as  on  the  occasion 
of  the  first  attack.  The  Confederate 


444 


PORT  HUDSON. 


works  literally  blazed,  while  the  boom- 
ing of  the  National  land  batteries  was 
echoed  back  by  the  thunders  from  the 
river.  Two  regiments  of  sharpshooters 
—the  Seventy-Fifth  New  York  and  the 
Twelfth  Connecticut — were  pushed  for- 
ward in  advance.  These  were  to  creep 
up  and  lie  on  the  exterior  slope  of  the 
breast-works.  Another  regiment  fol- 
lowed, each  man,  in  addition  to  his  mus- 
ket, carrying  a iive-pound  hand  grenade, 
which  he  was  to  throw  over  the  para- 
pet. Still  another  regiment  followed, 
carrying  sand-bags  full  of  cotton,  which 
were  to  be  used  in  tillino^  the  ditch  in 
front  of  the  breast-works.  These,  again, 
were  followed  by  Weitzel’s  brigade, 
with  the  brigades  of  Kimball  and  Mor- 
gan, in  support.  In  conjunction  with 
these,  and  to  the  left,  moved  the  old 
division  of  General  Emory,  under  Gen- 
eral Paine,  forming  a separate  column. 
Both  parties  were  under  the  command 
of  General  Grover,  who  planned  the 
attack.  It  was  expected  that  W eitzel 
would  succeed  in  effecting  a lodgment 
in  the  Confederate  works,  and  thus  pre- 
pare the  way  for  the  action  of  Paine’s 
column.  The  advance,  as  we  have  said, 
w’as  made  about  dawn.  The  troops 
moved  along  a covered  way,  until  they 
were  within  three  hundred  yards  of 
the  enemy’s  position.  At  this  point, 
the  ground  was  extremely  irregular, 
broken  into  deep,  hollows,  and  covered 
with  tangled  brushwood  and  creeping 
vines.  On  this  almost  impassable 
ground,  and  in  full  front  of  the  ene- 
my’s guns,  the  advance  was  met  by 
the  Confederates,  who,  advised  of  the 
intended  attack,  were  massed  in  great 


force,  and  offered  a most  determined 
resistance. 

On,  however,  the  Nationals  moved, 
some  of  the  skirmishers  actually  reach- 
ing the  ditch,  where  they  were  terribly 
punished,^  being  exposed  to  an  enfilad- 
ing fire.  The  hand  grenades  were 
found  to  be  a curse  to  their  bearers ; 
for  they  were  at  once  caught  up  by  the 
besieged,  and  hurled  back  to  explode 
in  the  ranks  of  the  assailants.  The 
assaulting  column  was  not  deterred  by 
what  was  happening  to  the  skirmishers 
in  front.  The  men  pushed  boldly  for- 
ward, in  the  face  of  a tremendous  fire, 
making  a series  of  vigorous  assaults ; 
but  all  in  vain.  The  point  of  attack 
was  too  stronof.  It  could  not  be  taken. 

O 

Meanwhile,  Generals  Augur  and  Dwight 
had  not  been  idle  on  the  right.  But 
their  efforts  were  attended  with  no  bet- 
ter success.  The  Confederates  fought 
at  all  the  points  attacked  with  skill 
and  determination.  At  eleven  o’clock, 
the  Nationals  had  been  repulsed  along 
the  whole  line.  The  firing  ceased; 
and  the  Confederates  remained  mas- 
ters of  the  situation.  In  this  assault, 
Banks  lost  700  men.  General  Paine, 
whose  division  had  done  most  of  the 
hard  fighting,  had  been  wounded. 
The  Nationals  had  gained  one  advan- 
tage. They  had  established  themselves 
in  strong  positions,  and  on  ground  con- 
siderably nearer  the  Confederate  works. 
Dwight  had  carried  a hill  which  com- 
manded the  “citadel”;  and,  from  the 
advantage  thus  gained,  he  was  enabled 
within  a few  days  to  advance  and  se- 
cure a strong  position  within  ten  yards 
of  the  Confederate  line. 


CONFEDERATE  RAIDS. 


445 


After  these  repeated  failures,  the 
conviction  was  forced  upon  Banks  that 
the  place  could  be  reduced  only  by  a 
regular  siege.  Mining  operations  were 
carried  on  with  great  energy;  and  the 
firing  was  not  intermitted  either  by  the 
land  batteries  or  by  the  vessels  in  the 
river.  Steadily,  day  after  day,  the  in- 
vesting lines  were  pushed  closer  upon 
the  doomed  city ; and  the  sufferings  of 
the  garrison,  already  reduced  to  the 
necessity  of  living  upon  mule-meat,  and 
even  upon  rats,  were  greatly  aggravated 
by  the  continuous  explosion  of  shells. 
Thus  day  followed  day,  nothing  occur- 
ring to  relieve  the  wearisome  monotony. 
A huge  mine  has  been  all  but  com- 
pleted ; and,  in  a few  days  more,  un- 
less the  place  is  surrendered,  thirty 
barrels  of  gunpowder  will  be  exploded 
under  the  citadel.  Gardner’s  spirit 
now  begins  to  sink  within  him.  It  was 
useless  any  longer  to  look  to  Johnston 
for  relief.  Such  was  the  condition  of 
things  towards  the  end  of  June.  The 
heroic  little  garrison  had  manifested 
the  utmost  bravery,  and  had  endured 
privation  without  murmur  or  complaint. 

While  General  Banks,  his  troops  be- 
ing all  concentrated  at  Port  Hudson, 
was  giving  his  undivided  attention  to 
the  conduct  of  the  siege,  the  Confede- 
rates, mainly  under  the  direction  of 
General  Dick  Taylor,  reappeared  in 
force  on  the  western  bank  of  the  Mis- 
sissippi. They  oven*an  the  Teche  and 
Attakapas  regions,  from  which  they  had 
been  so  recently  driven  by  the  National 
troops.  They  seemed  specially  bent  on 
gaining  possession  of  the  New  Orleans 
and  Opelousas  Bailroad.  Opelousas 


was  soon  reoccupied ; a successful  raid 
was  made  upon  Plaquemine ; and,  press- 
ing southward,  the  Confederates,  before 
the  end  of  June,  had  made  themselves 
masters  of  Brashear  City.  At  the  last- 
mentioned  place,  the  raiders  were  re- 
warded with  immense  booty,  including 
commissary,  medical  and  other  stores,  to 
the  value  of  several  millions  of  dollars, 
with  an  indefinite  number  of  horses, 
mules,  flags,  tents,  small  arms  and  siege 
guns.  The  capture  of  Brashear  City 
was  esteemed  in  the  South  as  almost 
an  equivalent  for  the  loss  of  Vicksburg. 
Having  made  good  their  position  on  the 
western  bank  of  the  river,  their  sharp- 
shooters proved  a fruitful  source  of  an- 
noyance to  the  Nationals.  Massing 
themselves  now  at  one  point  and  now 
at  another,  so  as  to  evade  the  fire  of  the 
gunboats,  they  rendered  transportation 
next  to  impossible. 

On  the  28  th  of  June,  an  attempt  was 
made  upon  Donaldsonville.  This  June 
place  had  been  garrisoned  by  Gen-  28* 
eral  Banks ; and  what  with  the  resist- 
ance the  garrison  was  able  to  make, 
and  the  spirited  aid  rendered  by  the  gun- 
boats, the  attack  proved  a failure.  The 
Confederates  had  not  yet  abandoned  all 
hope  of  regaining  possession  of  New 
Orleans.  If  they  could  obtain  control 
of  its  land  approaches,  it  was  impossible 
to  predict  what  might  be  accomplished 
by  the  many  friends  of  secession  still  in 
the  city.  Their  main  object,  however, 
in  all  these  movements,  was  to  distract 
the  attention  of  General  Banks,  to  divide 
his  forces,  and  so  aid  the  beleaguered 
garrison  at  Port  Hudson.  It  was  Banks’ 
misfortune,  that  the  force  at  his  com- 


446 


PORT  HUDSON. 


mand  was  too  small  for  the  demands 
which  were  made  upon  it.  He  could  not, 
at  one  and  the  same  time,  successfully 
protect  the  vast  territory  committed  to 
his  care  from  the  incursions  of  the 
enemy,  and  effectively  carry  on  the  siege 
of  Port  Hudson.  After  the  surrender 
of  Vicksburg,  Grant  sent  some  troops 
to  his  assistance ; but  they  were  the  less 
necessary,  that  the  fall  of  Vicksburg 
sealed  the  fate  of  Port  Hudson,  and  en- 
abled Banks  to  operate  his  troops  in 
other  directions. 

It  was  near  the  7th  of  July.  Loud 
July  cheering,  and  other  joyous  demon- 
7*  strations  made  along  the  National 
line,  reached  the  ears  of  the  besieged. 
These  were  accompanied  by  thunders  of 
artillery,  which  sounded  like  salutes, 
from  the  gunboats  and  the  batteries. 
The  meaning  could  hardly  be  mistaken ; 
but  doubt  was  not  permitted ; for  the 
Confederates  on  the  outer  works  could 
distinctly  hear  the  words,  as  they  were 
joyously  repeated  by  the  advanced  pick- 
ets of  the  besiegers — Vicksburg  has 
surrendered ! ” The  intelligence  was  im- 
mediately communicated  to  General 
Gardner.  He  was  not  yet  reduced  to 
absolute  despair.  The  garrison  was  not 
murmuring.  The  mule-meat  and  the 
fricasseed  rats  were  still  quieting,  if  not 
satisfying,  the  cravings  of  nature.  He 
could,  if  he  chose,  hold  out  a few  days 
longer.  But  would  it  be  wise  ? In  this 
state  of  mind,  Gardner  summoned  a 
council  of  war  on  the  night  of  the  7th. 
There  were  present  General  Beale,  Col- 
onels Steadman,  Miles,  Lyle  and  Shelby, 
and  Lieutenant  Marshal  S.  Smith.  It 
W\^s  the  unanimous  opinion  of  the  officers 


that  further  resistance  would  be  vain. 
A correspondence  was,  in  consequetice, 
immediately  opened  with  General  Banks. 
Gardner,  in  his  first  letter,  referred  to 
the  rumor  regarding  the  surrender  of 
Vicksburg,  asked  whether  the  rumor 
were  true,  and  expressed  a desire  that  if 
it  were  true,  Banks  would  consent  to  a 
suspension  of  hostilities,  with  a view  to 
arranging  terms  of  surrender.  On  being 
assured  of  the  fact  that  Vicksburg  had 
fallen,  but  that  there  would  be  no  cessa- 
tion of  hostilities  for  the  purposes  indi- 
cated, Gardner  again  wrote,  requesting 
the  appointment  of  a commission  of  three 
officers,  to  meet  a similar  commission  ap- 
pointed by  himself,  that  they  might  agree 
upon  and  draw  up  the  terms  of  surren- 
der. For  this  purpose  he  asked  a cessa- 
tion of  hostilities.  These  terms  were 
complied  with.  A committee  of  three 
were  appointed  on  either  side ; and  in- 
structions were  given  by  both  command- 
ers, to  the  effect  that  hostilities  should 
cease  until  further  orders. 

Honorable  terms  were  granted  to 
the  vanquished;  and,  on  the  9th  July 
of  July,  General  Andrews,  Chief 
of  Staff  of  General  Banks,  with  Colonel 
Berge  leading  his  column,  followed  by 
two  picked  regiments  from  each  divi- 
sion, with  the  batteries  of  Holcomb  and 
Bowie  and  the  gunners  of  the  naval 
battery,  entered  the  works.  The  Na- 
tional troops  were  then  drawn  up  in  two 
lines,  with  their  officers  in  front.  The 
Confederates,  their  backs  to  the  river, 
were  drawn  up  in  line,  with  their  offi- 
cers in  front,  on  the  opposite  side  of  the 
road.  General  Gardner  then  advanced 
and  offered  to  surrender  his  sword,  with 


THE  SURRENDER. 


447 


Port  Hudson.  He  was  politely  re- 
quested to  retain  liis  sword,  in  consider- 
ation of  the  respect  which  his  bravery 
commanded  in  the  breasts  of  his  rivals. 
He  then  said : “ General,  I will  now 
formally  surrender  my  command  to 
you,  and  for  that  purpose  will  give  the 
order  to  ground  arms.”  With  the  post 
thus  surrendered,  there  fell  into  the 
hands  of  the  Nationals,  6233  prisoners, 
51  guns,  2 steamers,  4400  pounds  of 
cannon  powder,  5000  small  arms,  and 
150,000  rounds  of  ammunition.  The 
little  hamlet  of  Port  Hudson,  originally 
consisting  of  a small  church  and  a few 
houses  was  completely  in  ruins.  After 
the  surrender,  Farragut  moved  down 
the  river,  arriving  in  time  to  receive 
the  cordial  greetings  of  the  victorious 
and  exultant  troops,  and  to  take  part  in 
the  general  rejoicing.  So  ended  the 
protracted  struggle  for  the  possession 
of  Port  Hudson. 

This  chapter  on  Port  Hudson,  and 
connected  engagements,  is  so  intimately 
related  to  the  chapter  on  Vicksburg, 
that  to  enlarge  on  the  importance  of  the 
fall  of  Port  Hudson,  would  only  be  a 
•useless  repetition  of  what  has  already 
been  said.  It  was  impossible  for  the 
Confederates  to  hold  out  in  Port  Hud- 
son, after  Vicksburg  had  surrendered. 


If  Vicksburg  had  not  surrendered  at 
the  time  it  did,  Gardner  might  have 
held  out  for  a few  days,  but  he  could 
not  have  held  out  long.  Nothing  but 
the  appearance  of  a powerful  force  in 
the  rear  of  Banks  could  have  tempted 
Gardne]*  to  make  a sortie.  Of  the  ap- 
pearance of  such  a force  there  was  but 
little  hope;  and,  even  if  such  a diver- 
sion had  been  made,  it  is  questionable 
whether,  in  the  exhausted  condition  of 
the  garrison,  a sortie  would  have  been 
attempted,  or,  if  attempted,  would  not 
have  resulted  in  complete  and  disastrous 
failure.  Looked  at  in  the  light  we 
now  enjoy,  the  glory  attending  the  cap- 
ture of  Port  Hudson,  was  eclipsed  by 
the  greater  glory  of  Vicksburg.  This 
much,  in  addition  to  what  has  been  said 
in  this  chapter  already,  it  is  only  fair  to 
say  in  vindication  of  General  Banks 
and  the  brave  officers  and  men  who 
fought  under  him.  He  would  have 
done  better  if  he  had  had  a stronger 
force  at  his  command,  and  less  territory 
to  protect.  As  it  was,  Banks  reduced 
a fortress  second  only  in  impoidance  to 
that  of  Vicksburg ; and,  by  the  con- 
spicuous service  which  he  rendered  his 
country,  the  hero  of  Port  Hudson  shared 
the  favors  which  were  then  being  poured 
out  so  lavishly  on  Meade  and  Grant. 


448 


CHANCELLORSVILLE. 


CHAPTEH  XXVI. 


The  West  and  the  East. — After  Fredericksburg. — Changes  in  the  Arm^  of  the  East.— General  Hooker. — His 
Past  Career. — His  Personal  Appearance. — Hooker’s  Address  to  the  Army. — The  Emancipation  Proclama- 
tion.— Its  Effect  on  the  Army. — Rearrangement  of  the  Army. — The  Position  of  General  Lee. — Condition 
of  his  Army. — Description  of  the  Ground. — Hooker  Preparing  to  Attack. — His  Plan  of  Battle. — The  Na- 
tional Army  in  Motion. — The  Crossing  of  the  Rappahannock. — The  Crossing  of  the  Rapidan. — At 
Chancellorsville. — The  Position  Described. — Sedgwick's  Operations  Below  Fredericksburg. — A Successful 
Feint. — Hooker’s  Plan  Working  Admirably. — Hooker  Advances  Towards  Frederick.sburg. — The  Three 
Roads. — Sykes  Compelled  to  Fight  his  Way. — The  Advance  Successful. — A Splendid  Position  Won. — 
Fortune  Smiling  on  Hooker  and  the  National  Army. — Hooker’s  First  but  Fatal  Blunder. — The  Plan  of 
Battle  Changed. — On  the  Defensive. — The  Line  of  Battle. — The  Confederate  Lines. — Jackson  Pushed  To- 
wards Chancellorsville. — Disposition  of  the  Confederate  Troops. — Lee’s  Description  of  the  National  Posi- 
tion.— Jackson’s  Plan. — A Bold  Experiment. — Jackson’s  Movement  to  the  National  Right. — Hooker  in 
Ignorance  of  Jackson’s  Plan. — The  Confederate  Column  Seen  at  the  Furnace. — Advance  of  Sickles. — Cap- 
ture of  the  Twenty-Third  Georgia  Regiment. — An  Attempt  to  Intercept  the  Confederate  Train. — Jackson 
on  the  Plank  Road  and  the  Turnpike. — Ready  to  Strike. — The  Unsuspecting  Nationals. — Startled 
Game. — A Mighty  Cheer. — A Panic. — The  National  Right  Demolished. — The  Battle  of  Bull  Run  Re- 
peated.— Advance  of  Birney  and  Best. — Jackson  Checked. — Sickles  Recalled  from  the  Furnace. — Hazel 
Grove. — Crutchfield  Wounded. — A Midnight  Battle. — “Stonewall”  Jackson  Mortally  Wounded. — His 
Death. — A.  P.  Hill  Takes  Command,  and  is  Wounded. — The  Command  Devolves  upon  Stuart. — Hooker’s 
Mistake. — Sedgwick  ordered  to  Advance. — Hooker  Takes  a New  Position. — The  Battle  Resumed. — Sickles 
Ordered  to  Abandon  the  Key-Position  of  the  Field. — “Charge,  and  Remember  Jackson.” — Tempest  of 
Lead. — The  Nationals  Driven  Back. — Lee  Pressing  on  Slocum  and  Handcock. — The  Confederate  Line 
United. — The  National  Line  Melts  Away. — Chancellorsville  House  Abandoned. — Hooker  Stunned  and 
Stupefied  by  a Cannon  Ball. — A Lull  in  the  Fight. — The  New  Position. — Lee  About  to  Strike  a Decisive 
Blow. — His  Arm  Arrested. — New^s  of  the  Advance  of  Sedgwick. — The  Occupation  of  Fredericksburg. — The 
Storming  of  the  Heights. — Marye’s  Hill. — The  Plank  Road. — The  Famous  Stone  Wall. — Magnificent  At- 
tack on  Marye’s  Hill. — The  Shout  of  Victory. — The  National  Flag  on  Marye’s  Hill. — Howe  at  Hazel  Run. — 
He  Captures  Lee’s  Hill. — Sedgwick  in  Full  Possession  of  the  Heights. — Sedgwick’s  Advance. — The  Con- 
federate Forces  Divided. — Lee’s  Dilemma. — Estimate  of  Lee. — He  Resolves  to  Intercept  the  Advance  of 
Sedgwick. — Wilcox  on  the  Plank  Road. — Salem  Church. — McLaws  Arrives  with  Three  Brigades,  and 
Takes  Command. — The  Battle  of  Salem  Church. — Newton’s  Advance. — Bravery  of  Bartlett. — The  Nationals 
Carry  the  Crest. — A Temporary  Triumph. — The  Nationals  Driven  Back. — A Bloody  Repulse. — Lee  Re- 
solved to  Crush  Sedgwick,  and  then  Fall  Back  on  Hooker. — McLaws  Reinforced. — Lee  at  Salem. — The 
Confederate  Attack  Renewed. — The  Fighting  Severe. — Sedgwick  Crosses  the  River.— Lee  Hurries  Back  to 
Attack  Hooker.—  A Fearful  Rainstorm. — Hooker  Resolves  to  Retreat. — Crosses  the  River  at  Midnight. — 
Disappointment  of  Lee. — Stoneman  and  his  Cavalry. — A Profitless  Raid. — The  National  Army  in  its  Old 
Encampment  at  Falmouth. — A Boastful  Address. — General  Lee  to  his  Army. — Stanton’s  Despatch. — The 
Draft  Proclamation. 


While  we  have  been  giving  oiir  at- 
tention to  the  military  and  naval 
movements  of  theW est  and  South- 
west— to  that  series  of  events  which  cul- 
minated in  the  fall  of  Vicksburg,  and 
to  that  other  series  of  events  which 
culminated  in  the  fall  of  Port  Hudson — 
movements  of  equal  importance,  taking 


place  in  the  East,  have  been  pressing 
themselves  upon  our  notice.  In  two 
great  battles — that  of  Chancellorsville, 
and  that  of  Gettysburg — the  National 
army  of  the  Potomac  and  the  Confede- 
rate army  of  Virginia  had  met  and 
tested  each  other’s  skill  and  strength. 
The  former  resulted  in  a great  National 


GENERAL  JOSEPH  HOOKER. 


449 


disaster : the  latter  was  a National 
triumph.  The  former  inspired  the  Con- 
federates with  hope  and  confidence, 
and  led  them  to  the  adoption  of  daring- 
ly aggressive  measures:  the  latter,  oc- 
curring as  it  did  simultaneously  with 
the  final  struggle  and  triumph  at  Vicks- 
burg, and  being  followed  so  closely  by 
the  fall  of  Port  Hudson,  swelled  the 
National  heart  with  joy  and  gratitude, 
and,  by  contributing  with  the  other  vic- 
tories just  named  to  the  establishment 
of  fresh  confidence  and  to  the  creation 
of  fresh  resolves,  gave  a new  phase  to 
the  general  contest. 

In  the  present  chapter,  we  propose  to 
give  an  account  of  the  great  but  ill- 
managed  and  disastrous  battle  of  Chan- 
cellorsville.  In  a previous  chapter,  we 
have  related  the  causes  which  brought 
about  the  removals  of  Generals  Burn- 
side, Franklin  and  Sumner  from  the 
army  of  the  Potomac,  and  the  placing 
of  General  Joseph  Hooker  in  the  su- 
preme command.^  The  elevation  of 
Hooker  may  have  given  offense  to  some 
of  his  brother-officers;  but  it  was  on 
the  whole,  so  far  as  the  army  was  con- 
concerned,  a popular  and  acceptable  ap- 
pointment. Outside  the  army,  opinion 
was  divided.  There  were  many  who 

♦ Buknsidi:  was  appointed  to  the  command  of  the 
Department  of  the  Oaio.  Franklin  was  ordered  south, 
to  take  command  of  a corps  under  Banks  in  Louisiana. 
Sumner  was  assigned  to  the  command  of  the  Depart- 
ment of  Missouri,  then  threatened  with  fresh  trouble 
by  the  guerrillas.  While  preparing  to  set  out  for  his 
more  distant  command,  he  was  taken  ill  at  the  house  of 
his  son-in-law,  in  Syracuse,  N.  Y.  He  died,  after  a 
few  days’  illness,  on  the  21st  of  March,  18(»3.  General 
Sumner  had  just  completed  his  sixty-seventh  year.  He 
died  universally  regretted.  In  him  the  country  lost 
one  of  its  best  citizens,  and  the  army  one  of  its  bravest 
soldiers. 


regarded  the  elevation  of  Hooker  to  the 
chief  command  of  the  army  of  the 
Potomac  with  extreme  satisfaction. 
Since  the  commencement  of  the  Penin- 
sular campaign,  he  had  been  promi- 
nently identified  with  that  army.  He 
greatly  distinguished  himself  at  the 
battle  of  Williamsburg ; and,  from  that 
day  to  the  end  of  the  campaign,  he  was 
ever  ready  with  his  well-trained  and 
devoted  division,  to  perform  any  duty, 
to  run  any  risk,  to  make  any  sacrifice. 
At  the  battle  of  Antietam,  where  he 
literally  covered  himself  with  glory,  he 
proved  himself  to  be  the  bravest  of  the 
brave.  He  was  one  of  the  few  of  Mc- 
Clellan’s generals,  who  gave  to  Pope  a 
willing  and  honest  obedience  during 
his  campaign  against  Lee  in  Virginia. 
When  the  army  of  the  Potomac  again 
changed  its  leader,  he  did  not  withold 
his  allegiance  from  Burnside,  although 
he  was  not  without  reasons  for  being 
dissatisfied  with  this  appointment ; and 
at  the  battle  of  Fredericksburg,  where 
he  commanded  the  centre,  he  yielded  to 
duty  against  his  better  judgment,  and, 
in  obedience  to  orders,  attempted  the 
performance  of  a perilous  and  an  impos- 
sible task.  In  his  case,  from  first  to 
last,  personal  feeling  was  not  allowed 
to  interfere  with  the  discharge  of  public 
duty.  His  fine  appearance  and  his 
agreeable  manners,  which  made  him  a 
great  favorite  with  his  own  men,  recom- 
mended him  to  all  with  whom  he  was 
brought  into  contact.  Tall,  erect,  mus- 
cular, but  not  heavily-built;  light  of 
complexion,  with  a fresh,  ruddy  coun- 
tenance ; fine,  clean-cut,  intellectual  fea- 
tures, lit  up  by  large,  clear,  mild  yet 


450 


CHAN-CELLORSVILLE. 


expressive  eyes;  a lofty  forehead,  his 
hair  brown,  but  tinged  with  gray;  quick 
and  decided  in  all  his  movements — such 
at  that  time  was  General  Joseph 
Hooker.  In  figure  and  in  bearing  he 
had  few  if  any  equals  among  the  officers 
of  the  army.  It  was  hoped  that 
under  such  a leader  the  army  of  the 
Potomac  would  3^et  prove  itself  worthy 
of  the  care  which  had  been  bestowed 
upon  it,  and  justify  the  expectations 
which  it  had  raised  in  the  hearts  of 
the  Northern  people.  There  were  not 
a few,  however,  who  regarded  the  ap- 
pointment of  Hooker  with  doubt  and 
misgiving.  His  bravery,  which  had 
been  put  to  the  test  on  many  a battle- 
field, was  not  to  be  called  in  question  ; 
his  ability  as  a corps  or  division  com- 
mander had  been  abundantly  estab- 
lished; but  the  qualities  which  had 
served  him  in  good  stead  and  carried 
bim  to  victor}^,  in  a secondary  capacity, 
might  not  be  sufficient  for  him  as  com- 
mander-in-chief.  The  skilful  lieutenant 
has  oftentimes  been  found  helpless  when 
left  alone.  He  was  my  right  arm,” 
said  Napoleon  of  Murat,  “ but  without 
me  he  was  nothing.  In  battle,  he  was, 
23erhaps,  the  bravest  man  in  the  world ; 
left  to  himself,  he  was  an  imhecile 
without  judgment.”  Of  Ney,  he  said  : 
“ He  was  the  bravest  of  men ; there 
terminate  all  his  faculties.”  The  army 
of  the  Potomac  had  already  furnished 
two  examples  of  conspicuous  failure. 
Might  not  Hooker,  like  Pope  and  Burn- 
side, be  found  wanting?  It  had  cer- 
tainly 3’et  to  be  proved  whether  he 
were  possessed  of  the  higher  qualities 
requisite  in  a general-in-chiel  The 


broad  conception,  with  the  power  to 
combine  and  utilize  the  forces  at  his 
command ; the  comprehensive  grasp,  vrith 
minute  attention  to  detail;  the  quick 
eye  and  the  clear  head  to  perceive  and 
know  where  relief  is  needed  or  where 
a deadly  blow  may  be  struck ; the  light- 
ning-like promptitude  of  action  which 
always  implies  self-reliance  and  the  full 
courage  of  conviction — these  were  the 
qualities  needed  in  the  man  who  would 
lead  to  victory  the  army  of  the  Potomac ; 
and  if  there  were  some  who  doubted 
whether  these  were  all  united  in  General 
Hooker,  it  was  not  because  they  under- 
estimated his  abilities  or  disesteemed 
his  past  career,  but  because  he  had  not 
been  tested  in  this  lofty  and  exacting 
sphere  of  duty. 

General  Hooker’s  elevation  command 
ed  the  greater  attention,  that  he  had 
been  open-mouthed  regarding  the  errors, 
real  or  supposed,  of  his  predecessors. 
His  estimate  of  his  own  abilities  was 
undoubtedly  high.  When  questioned 
by  the  Congressional  Committee  as  to 
the  cause  of  the  failure  of  the  Peninsu- 
lar campaign,  he  answered:  “I  do  not 
hesitate  to  say  that  it  is  to  be  attributed 
to  the  want  of  generalship  on  the  part 
of  our  commander.”  It  was  his  opinion 
— and  he  did  not  disguise  it — that 
there  were  several  occasions  during 
that  campaign,  on  which,  if  he  had 
been  at  liberty  to  act,  he  could  have 
taken  Richmond.  His  views  were 
expressed  with  equal  freedom,  and 
v^^ere  of  similar  import,  after  the  battle 
of  Fi'edericksburg.  If,  therefore,  he 
was  about  to  be  judged  by  a high 
standard,  it  w'as  a standard  which  he 


ADDRESS  TO  THE  ARMY. 


451 


himself,  had  been  mainly  instrumental 
in  setting  up. 

Hooker  assumed  command  on  the 
Jan,  26th  of  January.  On  the  same 
day  he  issued  an  address  to  the 
army.  “ The  undersigned,”  he  said, 
“ assumes  command  of  the  army  of  the 
Potomac.  He  enters  upon  the  dis- 
charge of  the  duties,  imposed  by  the 
trust,  with  a just  appreciation  of  their 
responsibility.  Since  the  formation  of 
this  army  he  has  been  identified  with 
its  history;  he  has  shared  with  you  its 
glories  and  reverses,  with  no  other  de- 
sire than  that  these  relations  might  re- 
main unchanged  until  its  destiny  should 
be  accomplished.  In  the  record  of 
your  achievements  there  is  much  to 
be  proud  of,  and,  with  the  blessing  of 
God,  we  will  contribute  something  to 
the  renown  of  our  arms  and  the  success 
of  our  cause.  To  secure  these  ends, 
your  commander  will  require  the  cheer- 
ful and  zealous  co-operation  of  every 
officer  and  soldier  in  the  army.  In 
equipment,  intelligence  and  valor  the 
enemy  is  our  inferior.  Let  us  never 
hesitate  to  give  him  battle  whenever 
we  can  find  him.  The  undersigned  only 
gives  expression  to  the  feelings  of  this 
army  when  he  conveys  to  our  late  com- 
mander, Major  General  Burnside,  the 
most  cordial  good  wishes  for  his  future. 

‘‘Joseph  Hooker.” 

When  Hooker  took  command,  the 
ai*my  of  the  Potomac  was  in  a dread- 
fully demoralized  condition.  It  still 
lay  at  Falmouth,  and  occupied  Stafford 
Heights.  The  emancipation  proclama- 
tion had  produced  a bad  effect  among 
the  officers,  many  of  them  openly  de- 


claring that  had  they  known  what  was 
to  be  done  in  the  matter  of  slavery, 
they  would  never  have  joined  the  army. 
There  was,  besides,  a lingering  affection 
for  McClellan,  both  on  the  part  of  offi- 
cers and  men ; and  neither  the  one  nor 
the  other  could  forgive  Hooker  for  his 
statement  that  the  Peninsulai*  campaign 
had  failed  on  account  of  bad  general- 
ship. The  demoralization,  which  set  in 
immediately  after  the  battle  of  Fred- 
ericksburg, was  increased  greatly  by 
what  was  called  Burnside’s  “ Mud  ” cam- 
paign. Desertions  to  the  number  of 
200  men  were  occurring  daily.  As 
many  as  2922  commissioned  officers, 
and  81,964  men  were  reported  absent. 
This  was  not  all.  In  the  spring,  40,000 
men,  who  would  have  completed  their 
term,  would  be  at  liberty  to  go  home. 
Hooker  set  himself  busily  to  the  work 
of  reconstruction.  The  division  system 
was  abolished ; and  the  army  was  di- 
vided into  seven  corps.  The  First 
corps  was  commanded  by  Reynolds; 
the  Second  by  Couch  ; the  Third  by 
Sickles ; the  Fifth  by  Meade ; the  Sixth 
by  Sedgwick;  the  Eleventh  by  How- 
ard; the  Twelfth  by  Slocum.  The 
cavalry,  which  consisted  of  four  di- 
visions, commanded  respectively  by 
Pleasonton,  Buford,  Averill  and  Gregg, 
was  consolidated  into  one  corps,  under 
Stoneman.  The  army  of  the  Potomac 
needed  rest ; and,  for  three  months,  it 
lay  inactive  in  winter-quarters  at  Fal- 
mouth. Hooker,  however,  was  not 
idle.  Desertions  were  checked ; the 
ranks  were  gradually  filled  up  by  the 
return  of  absentees ; the  discipline  was 
improved;  and,  by  the  end  of  April, 


453 


CHANCELLORSVILLE. 


the  army  was  in  a state  of  high  effi- 
ciency. The  infantry  and  artillery 
amounted  to  123,000  men;  there  were 

13.000  cavalry  and  400  guns.  ‘‘All 
were  actuated,”  said  Hooker,  “ by  feel- 
inofs  of  confidence  and  devotion  to  the 
cause,  and  I felt  that  it  was  a living 
army,  and  one  well  worthy  of  the  Re- 
public.” 

In  front  of  Hooker,  on  the  south 
side  of  the  Rappahannock,  and  occupy- 
ing the  now  famous  heights  in  the  rear 
of  Fredericksburg,  lay  the  army  of 
General  Lee,  62,000  strong.  This  army 
which,  after  the  battle  of  the  13th  of 
December,  needed  rest  quite  as  much 
as  the  army  of  the  Potomac,  had  also, 
during  the  winter  months,  been  brought 
up  to  a high  state  of  efficiency.  Such 
was  the  effect  of  the  Conscription  Act, 
now  fairly  in  operation,  that,  in  three 
months,  Jackson’s  corps  increased  from 

25.000  to  33,000  muskets.  Fredericks- 
burg, and  the  country  in  the  immediate 
neighborhood,  has  been  fully  described 
in  a previous  chapter.  It  will  be  re- 
membered that  the  hills  to  the  rear  of 
that  city  rise  at  some  little  distance 
from  the  river,  leaving  not  exactly  a 
plain  but  open  and  comparatively  level 
ground  between.  Above  Fredericks- 
burg, and  opposite  Falmouth,  the  ridge 
approaches  close  to  the  river ; but  from 
that  point,  the  distance  between  the 
river  and  the  heights  gradually  widens, 
until,  about  four  or  five  miles  below  the 
town,  the  open  ground  is  about  a mile 
and  a half  wide.  The  Confederates,  as 
we  have  said,  occupied  the  heights, 
their  line  extending  from  Banks’  Ford  on 
the  left,  to  Port  Royal  on  the  right — a 


distance  of  twenty-five  miles.  Their 
cavalry  extended  to  the  left  as  far  back 
as  Buckley’s  Ford,  on  the  Upper  Rap- 
pahannock, and  scoured  the  country  as 
far  south  as  the  Pamunkey  River. 
During  the  winter,  General  Lee  had 
exerted  Himself  to  the  utmost  to  make 
his  position  secure.  He  extended  and 
strengthened  the  fortifications  in  the 
rear  of  Fredericksburg,  and  constructed 
a system  of  elaborate  works  along  his 
whole  front.  Inside  of  these  lines,  he 
might  have  bidden  defiance  to  an  army 
twice  or  three  times  the  strength  of  his 
own.  Such  was  the  nature  of  the 
works,  and  such  was  the  arrano^ement 
of  his  troops,  that  he  could  concentrate 
with  the  utmost  rapidity,  and,  with  a 
powerful  force,  resist  an  attack  at  any 
point.  From  this  position,  however,  he 
had  only  two  main  lines  of  retreat — 
one  towards  Richmond  by  railroad,  and 
the  other  towards"  Gordonsville. 

It  was  now  near  the  end  of  April. 
As  it  was  vain  to  attempt  any  direct 
attack  in  his  position  at  Fredericksburg, 
Hooker  resolved  upon  a bold  experi- 
ment, the  object  of  which  was  to  com- 
pel Lee  to  come  out  of  his  intrench- 
ments  and  accept  the  gage  of  battle  in 
the  open  ground.  He  was  the  more 
encouraged  to  adopt  this  course,  without 
further  delay,  that  Longstreet  had  been 
detached,  with  several  of  his  divisions, 
to  the  south  of  the  James  River.  Some 
feigned  movements  were  made  as  early 
as  the  21st  of  April;  but  it  was  not 
until  the  27th,  that  the  feal  onward 
movement  began.  Hooker’s  purpose 
was  to  effect  the  complete  destruction 
of  the  Confederate  army.  With  this 


CROSSING  THE  RIVER. 


453 


end  in  ^dew,  he  ordered  Sedgwick  to 
make  a pretense  of  reversing  Burnside’s 
plan  of  attack,  by  crossing  the  river  be- 
low Fredericksburg  and  making  there 
a vigorous  demonstration.  He  him- 
self proposed  to  move,  with  the  larger 
portion  of  the  army,  to  his  own  right, 
and  to  push  his  forces  by  a circuitous 
route  across  the  Bappahannock  and  the 
Bapidan,  to  drive  otf  or  capture  the 
guards  at  the  forts,  and  then  wheeling 
round  on  his  left,  as  on  a pivot,  so  as  to 
face  eastward,  to  march  towards  the 
river.  It  was  his  hope  that  he  would 
thus  be  able  to  emerge  from  the  wil- 
derness before  the  Confederates  were 
aware  of  his  approach,  and,  by  dealing 
them  a deadly  blow  on  their  left  flank, 
compel  them  to  face  about  and  offer 
battle.  Fully  confident  that  his  plan 
would  be  successfully  carried  out,  and 
in  order  to  make  Lee’s  retreat  to  Bich- 
mond  impossible,  he  had  already  de- 
tached all  the  cavalry  under  Stoneman, 
with  the  exception  only  of  1000  men 
left  in  charge  of  Pleasonton,  with  in- 
structions to  destroy  all  the  bridges 
and  tear  up  all  the  railroads  in  the 
Confederate  rear.  The  plan  was  excel- 
lent; and,  as  we  shall  see,  it  was  in 
the  first  instance  at  least  admirably 
executed. 

It  will  be  observed  by  referring  to 
the  map,  that  about  three  miles  above 
Fredericksburg  in  a straight  line,  or 
about  five  following  the  river,  is  a 
crossing  called  Banks’  Ford.  Some 
seven  or  eight  miles  further  up,  and  at 
no  great  distance  • from  the  confluence 
af  the  Bappahannock  and  the  Bapidan, 
or,  as  they  were  wont  to  be  named, 


north  and  south  forks,  is  another  cross- 
ing, known  as  United  States  Ford. 
Following  up  the  Bappahannock,  or 
north  fork,  we  come  to  Kelley’s  Ford, 
about  twenty-seven  miles  from  Fred- 
ericksburg. Following  up  the  Bapidan, 
or  south  fork,  we  come  first  to  Ely’s 
Ford,  and  then,  at  some  little  distance, 
Germania  Ford.  As  Kelley’s  Ford  is 
several  miles  above  the  confluence  of 
the  two  streams,  it  was  necessary  for 
the  troops  who  crossed  the  Bappahan- 
nock at  that  point  to  cross  also  the 
Bapidan,  either  at  Ely’s  or  Germania 
Ford,  before  they  could  reach  their  point 
of  destination.  All  these  fords,  but 
particularly  those  on  the  line  of  the 
Bappahannock,  were  strongly  guarded 
by  Confederate  troops ; and  the  water 
in  the  river,  as  it  generally  is  at  this 
season,  was  high. 

On  the  27th,  Monday,  the  weather 
was  favorable,  and  the  movement  April 
commenced.  The  turning  column  27. 
consisted  of  the  Fifth  corps.  General 
Meade ; the  Eleventh  corps.  General 
Howard;  and  the  Twelfth  corps.  Gen- 
eral Slocum.  On  Tuesday,  the  28th, 
they  reached  Kelley’s  Ford.  During 
the  night  and  following  morning  all 
the  troops  were  safely  pushed  across. 
The  infantry  was  moved  in  two  col- 
umns— the  Eleventh  and  Twelfth  to- 
wards Germania,  and  the  Fifth  towards. 
Ely’s  Ford,  on  the  Bapidan.  At  both 
fords  the  Confederate  pickets  were 
driven  off  without  difficulty.  At  Ger- 
mania, 150  pioneers  were  attempting; 
to  build  the  bridge  which  Stoneman 
had  destroyed  some  days  before.  All 
of  these  were  captured.  The  troops. 


454 


CnAXCSLLORSVILLE. 


were  in  the  best  of  spirits.  Impatient 
to  reach  the  opposite  shore,  large  num- 
bers of  them  plunged  into  the  flood, 
wading  to  the  arm-pits,  their  clothes 
and  their  cartridge-boxes  carried  high 
on  the  points  of  their  bayonets.  Bon- 
fires blazed  during  the  darkness ; and,  at 
both  fords,  all  were  safely  got  across. 
Once  on  the  south  side  of  the  Rapidan, 
the  united  columns  moved  eastwardly 
towards  United  States  Ford,  driving 
off  the  Confederate  guards.  This  ford 
being  thus  uncovered.  General  Couch, 
who,  with  a portion  of  the  Second 
corps,  had,  since  Tuesday,  been  lying 
on  the  other  side,  waiting  for  his  oppor- 
tunity, crossed  the  Rappahannock  on  a 
pontoon  bridge.  The  combined  forces 
April  moved  southward,  and  on 

Thursday  night  took  position  at 
Chancellorsville.  On  the  evening  of 
the  same  day.  General  Hooker,  who  had 
•superintended  the  crossing  of  Couch’s 
troops,  arrived  at  Chancellorsville ; and, 
at  a large  and  substantial  brick  house, 
with  out-buildings — the  only  house  in 
the  near  neighborhood,  and  formerly 
.an  inn — he  established  his  headquarters. 

The  position  thus  secured  offered 
many  advantages.  Around  the  house 
was  an  open,  cultivated  space;  and  im- 
mediately in  front  M^as  a little  stream 
which  flowed  into  the  Rappahannock. 
Jt  was  about  eleven  miles  from  Fred- 
ericksburg, and  was  connected  there- 
with by  three  main  roads — the  plank- 
rcxad  on  the  right,  the  river  road  on  the. 
left,  and  the  turnpike  betw^een  them. 
It  communicated  also  with  Orange 
Coiiit  House,  and  with  Gordonsville,  by 
a road  through  the  wilderness. 


While  Hooker  had  been  carrying  out 
his  plan,  and  apparently  with  complete 
success  on  his  right,  Sedgwick  had  not 
been  inactive  on  his  left.  This  general, 
it  will  be  remembered,  was  left  behind 
at  Falmouth,  with  the  First,  Third  and 
Sixth  corps,  comprising  some  30,000 
eflcective  men.  His  special  instructions 
were  that  he  should,  at  the  time  ap- 
pointed, throw  a portion  of  his  troops 
across  the  river  below  Fredericksburg, 
and,  by  making  a vigorous  demonstra- 
tion, create  the  impression  that  the  plan 
of  Burnside  was  about  to  be  repeated. 
On  Monday,  the  27th,  the  First  corps. 
General  Reynolds,  the  Third,  General 
Sickles,  and  the  Sixth,  in  immediate 
charge  of  Sedgwick  himself,  moved  from 
their  camps,  and  took  a position  down 
the  river,  about  ten  miles  below  Fred- 
ericksburg. Pontoons  were  thrown 
across  at  three  points ; and,  on  the  morn- 
ing of  the  29th,  troops  were  pushed 
over,  and  such  demonstrations  were 
made  as  seemed  to  imply  that  the  real 
attack  was  to  be  made  in  that  direction. 
So  far  as  Generals  Hooker,  Sedgwick, 
or  any  of  the  National  commanders 
could  judge,  the  feint  made  by  the  left 
had  been  completely  successful.  The 
plan  of  the  commanding  general  had, 
up  to  a certain  point  at  least,  worked 
admirably.  All  the  upper  fords  of  the 
Rappahannock  were  in  his  hands ; and 
he  had  massed  a powerful  army  at 
Chancellorsville.  Further  demonstra- 
tions being  considered  unnecessary,  for 
the  present,  on  the  part  of  the  left, 
Sedgwick  was  instructed  to  remain  at 
Falmouth  and  assist  developments  on 
the  right.  Sickles,  meanwhile,  was  de- 


A FATAL  BLUNDER. 


455 

i 


tached,  and  ordered  to  cross  with  the 
Third  corps,  at  United  States  Ford,  and 
join  Hooker  at  Chancellorsville.  Key- 
nolds,  in  due  time,  was  to  follow. 
Sickles  arrived  at  Chancellorsville  on 
the  morning  of  the  1st  of  May.  It 
was  not  wonderful  that,  at  this  stage. 
Hooker  should  have  felt  elated,  or  that 
his  men  should  have  been  confident  of 
victory.  It  might  have  been  wiser, 
however,  if  such  feelings  had  been  less 
boisterously  expressed.  On  the  30th 
of  April,  Hooker  issued  a general  order. 
“It  is  with  heartfelt  satisfaction,”  he 
said,  “ that  the  commanding  general 
announces  to  the  army,  that  the  opera- 
tions of  the  last  three  days  have  de- 
termined that  our  enemy  must  either 
ingloriously  fly,  or  come  out  from  behind 
his  defenses  and  give  us  battle  on  our 
own  ground,  where  certain  destruction 
awaits  him.  The  operations  of  the 
Fifth,  Eleventh  and  Twelfth  corps  have 
been  a succession  of  splendid  achieve- 
ments.” Hooker  seemed  to  feel  that 
the  prize  was  in  his  grasp.  . In  the 
hearing  of  some  of  his  ofiScers  and  cer- 
tain gentlemen  connected  with  the 
])ress,  who  were  present  at  his  head- 
quarters, he  exclaimed:  “The  rebel 
army  is  now  the  legitimate  property  of 
the  army  of  the  Potomac.  They  may 
as  well  pack  up  their  haversacks  and 
make  for  Richmond,  and  I shall  be  after 
them.”  * Hooker  really  had  reason  to 
be  proud.  His  plan,  as  we  have  said, 
had  worked  well.  Up  to  this  point,  it 
could  hardly  have  worked  better ; and 

* The  words  were  spoken  in  the  hearing  of  Mr.  William 
Swinton,  who  was  present  on  the  occasion. — Campaijns 
of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac^  p.  275. 


it  is  not  at  all  improbable  that  if  the 
head  which  conceived  it,  and  which  had 
so  far  given  it  development,  had  re- 
mained cool  and  steady  throughout, 
his  magniloquent  language  would  have 
been  abundantly  justified.  Lee’s  po- 
sition was  the  reverse  of  enviable.  In 
his  front  there  was  a well- trained,  well- 
equipped  army  of  70,000  men ; in  his 
rear  there  was  a broad  river,  guarded 
by  another  army  of  30,000  men ; Avhile 
his  retreat  was  cut  off  by  12,000  cav- 
alry. Everything,  however,  now  de- 
pended upon  steadiness  of  purpose  and 
rapidity  of  movement. 

Gratified  as  Hooker  was  with  the 
success  which  had  attended  his  move- 
ments hitherto,  he  knew  that  he  had 
only  entered  on  the  threshold  of  his 
great  undertaking.  He  resolved,  there- 
fore, to  turn  his  success  to  account,  and 
to  press  his  advantage.  On  Friday, 
May  1st,  having  arranged  his  i^jay 
troops  in  three  columns,  he  L 
pushed  them  eastward  towards  Fred- 
ericksburg, by  the  three  principal  roads 
already  mentioned.  His  object  was  to 
get  out  of  the  wilderness  into  the  clear, 
open  country  beyond,  where  there  was 
free  fighting  room,  and  where  artillery 
and  cavalry  could  be  easily  and  effect- 
ively handled.  The  left,  composed  of 
two  divisions  of  Meade’s  corps — those 
of  Griffin  and  Humphreys — advanced  by 
the  river  road;  the  centre,  Sykes’  di- 
vision, also  of  Meade,  supported  by  Han- 
cock, advanced  by  the  turnpike ; while 
Slocum’s  corps  on  the  right  marched 
along  the  plank  road.  The  left  marched 
along  the  river  road  for  five  miles,  and 
came  in  sight  of  Banks’  Ford  without 


456 


CHANCELLORSVILLE. 


encountering  any  opposition.  The  cen- 
tre had  moved  along  the  turnpike  for 
about  a mile  to  the  east  of  Chancellors- 
ville,  when  it  encountered  the  enemy 
in  some  force.  Vigorous  firing  was 
kept  up  on  both  sides  for  some  hours ; 
but  Sykes  pressed  forward  his  gallant 
little  band,  and,  the  foe  falling  back, 
he  reached  the  place  assigned  him  early 
in  the  afternoon.  The  right  moved  to 
its  destined  point  without  difficulty,  and 
without  meeting  any  resistance.  It 
would  be  difficult  to  overestimate  the  im- 
portance of  the  advanced  position  thus 
gained  by  these  different  bodies  of  men. 
It  was  an  elevated  ridge,  beyond  the 
bounds  of  the  wilderness,  completely 
protecting  Chancellorsville,  and  com- 
manding the  clear,  open  country  in  rear 
of  the  Fredericksbui’g  Heights.  On 
the  left  it  uncovered  Banks’  Ford. 
Artillery  could  be  planted  advanta- 
geously on  the  face  of  the  ridge  ; while 
the  clear  open  ground  in  front  was  ad- 
mirably adapted  for  the  use  of  artillery. 
This,  however,  was  not  all.  It  short- 
ened by  twelve  miles  the  communica- 
tion between  the  main  force  at  Chan- 
cellorsville and  that  under  Sedgwick 
at  Falmouth,  and  below  Fredericksburg. 
It  was  surely  natural  to  expect  that  such 
a position  would  be  seized,  and  held 
at  any  cost,  and  that  to  this  vantage- 
ground  Hooker  would  push  forward  his 
whole  army.  It  was  not  to  be  so. 
Fortune  was  smiling  on  the  National 
commander;  but,  strange  to  relate,  with 
a perversity  which  is  almost  unexam- 
pled, he  turned  his  back  upon  the  favor- 
ing goddess,  when  she  was  about  to  con- 
fer upon  him  her  richest  rewards. 


Victory  seemed  to  be  within  his  grasp; 
but  he  flung  away  all  that  he  had  won, 
and  his  splendid  opportunity  besides. 
In  spite  of  the  earnest  remonstrances  of 
his  officers,  he  ordered  the  columns  to 
fall  back  to  Chancellorsville,  where  he 
resolved  to  take  position,  and  await 
the  attack  of  the  enemy.  His  original 
plan  was  abandoned  at  once.  It  was 
Hooker’s  first  blunder  in  this  campaign ; 
but  it  was  fatal. 

Hooker  now  gathered  his  forces 
around  him  at  Chancellorsville,  threw 
up  intrenchments,  and  prepared  to  re- 
ceive, not  to  make  an  attack.  The  tide 
of  battle  was  thus,  by  a fatal  infelicity, 
turned  before  the  battle  was  com- 
menced. It  was  only  two  days  since 
the  proud  words  were  uttered ; yet  the 
boastful  National  commander  was  al- 
ready on  the  defensive.  The  ground 
selected  was  by  no  means  so  well 
adapted,  either  for  attack  or  defense,  as 
the  ground  which  he  had  abandoned. 
It  was  commanded  by  high  grounds,  and 
surrounded  on  all  sides  by  the  forest. 
In  this  new  position,  however,  the  dis- 
position of  the  troops  was  not  unskil- 
fully made.  Not  knowing  from  what 
direction  the  blow  might  come,  and  re- 
solved to  preserve  his  communications 
with  the  river.  Hooker  arranged  his 
forces  in  a form  which,  for  the  benefit 
of  the  reader  has  been  compared  not 
inaptly  to  the  letter  U.  The  limbs  of 
the  U pointed  towards  the  Bappahan- 
nock,  the  one  side  facing  to  the  east, 
and  the  other  to  the  west.  The  eastern 
side  was  held  by  Meade  and  one  di- 
vision of  Couch ; the  centre  was  held 
by  Slocum  and  one  division  of  Sickles ; 


THE  RIVAL  ARMIES  IH  POSITION. 


457 


and  the  right  by  Howard.  Every  effort 
was  made  to  strengthen  the  front  by 
rifle-pits  and  ctbatis.  Howard,  who 
little  dreamed  of  an  attack  on  his  side, 
took  too  little  pains  to  prevent  a sur- 
prise. Two  divisions  of  the  Second 
and  two  divisions  of  the  Third  corps 
were  held  in  reserve.  Pleasonton,  with 
his  cavalry,  was  also  on  the  right.  Such 
was  the  position  of  the  National  army 
on  the  night  of  Friday,  the  1st  of 
May. 

Let  us  now  see  what  the  Confede- 
rates were  doins:  in  the  interval  since 
the  National  troops  began  to  move  on 
the  27th  April.  It  has  been  claimed 
by  Southern  writers  that  Lee  was  awaie 
of  Hooker’s  movements  and  plans,  if 
not  from  the  commencement,  at  least 
from  a much  earlier  date  than  is  com- 
monly believed.  There  can  be  no 
doubt,  we  think,  that  up  until  the 
29th,  he  was  disposed  to  believe  that 
the  real  attack  was  to  be  made  from 
Falmouth  and  by  the  lower  Rappahan- 
nock. The  feeble  efforts  made  by 
Sedgwick  on  the  morning  of  that  day, 
and  his  subsequent  inactivity,  must 
have  filled  Lee’s  mind  with  doubt,  if  it 
did  not  convince  him  that  the  threat- 
ened movement  from  that  quarter  was 
intended  only  as  a feint.  We  know 
that,  on  the  afternoon  of  the  29th,  he 
received  from  Stuart  definite  informa- 
tion of  the  fact  that  heavy  columns  of 
Nationals  had  crossed  the  upper  Ilaj)pa- 
hannock,  and  that  they  were  marching 
towards  Germania  and  Ely’s  fords. 
Anderson,  who  was  hurried  forward  to 
Chancellorsville,  occupied  that  place  on 
the  night  of  the  29th.  Learning  that 


the  National  troops  had  crossed  the 
Rapidan  in  great  force,  he  withdrew 
on  the  following  morning.  On  the 
morning  of  the  30th,  Jackson’s  corps 
was  still  in  line  of  battle  at  Hamilton’s 
Crossing,  his  left  extending  for  upwards 
of  a mile  towards  the  northwest,  his 
right  resting  on  the  Rappahannock,  at 
the  mouth  of  Massaponax  Creek.  Mc- 
Laws’  division,  of  Longstreet,  was  still 
in  its  camp,  his  line  extending  from 
Fredericksburg  some  two  or  three  miles 
up  the  river.  Barksdale’s  brigade  oc- 
cupied the  town.  Pendleton’s  reserve 
artillery  was  under  orders  to  take  posi- 
tion at  Massaponax  Church.  Stuart, 
with  Fitz  Lee’s  brigade  of  cavalry, 
having  crossed  the  Racoon  Ford  during 
the  night,  was  moving  to  harrass  the 
National  advance.  There  was  another 
strong  Confederate  brigade  at  Culpep- 
per, in  Stoneman’s  front.  Anderson  had 
taken  up  a line  perpendicular  to  the 
plank  and  turnpike  roads,  near  their 
junction  with  the  old  Mine  Road.  At 
midnight,  McLaws  was  ordered  to  move 
his  division,  with  the  exception  of 
Barksdale’s  brigade,  in  the  direction  of 
Anderson,  and  take  position  on  his 
right.  Jackson  was  ordered  to  move 
at  daylight,  on  the  1st  of  May,  with 
three  of  his  divisions,  in  the  same  di- 
rection, and  to  take  command  of  the 
field.  Early  was  left  to  defend  the 
works  from  Hamilton’s  Crossins:  to 
Fredericksburg.  The  force  under  his 
command  for  this  purpose,  as  stated  by 
a Confederate  authority,  consisted  of 
his  own  command,  Barksdale’s  brigade, 
of  McLaws’,  Andrew’s  battalion  of  ar- 
tillery, and  a part  of  the  reserve  artillery 


458 


OHAXCELLORSVILLB. 


under  General  Pendleton,  and  amounted 
to  8500  muskets  and  30  guns.  From  the 
resistance  which  Franklin  experienced, 
as  \^^e  shall  see  by  and  by,  the  pre- 
sumption is  that  this  force  was  much 
stronger.  McLaws  reached  Anderson 
by  the  early  dawn.  Jackson  came  up 
at  eight  o’clock,  and  ordered  a general 
advance.  It  thus  happened  that  both 
armies  were  in  motion  at  the  same  time, 
but  in  opposite  directions.  Jackson 
was  moving  towards  Chancellorsville ; 
Hooker  was  moving  his  army  towards 
Fredericksburg;  and  eacb  was  prepared 
to  offer  the  other  battle.  This  advance 
mov^ement  of  Jackson  explains  the  re- 
sistance wdiich  the  National  centre  ex- 
perienced on  the  old  turnpike  road,  on 
Friday,  the  1st  of  May. 

On  the  night  of  the  1st,  General^ Lee 
had  come  to  the  conclusion  that  the 
National  position  was  too  strong  to  be 
taken  in  front.  “ The  enemy,”  he  said 
in  his  report,  “ had  assumed  a position 
of  great  natural  strength,  surrounded 
on  all  sides  by  a dense  forest,  filled  with 
a tangled  undergrowth,  in  the  midst  of 
which  breast-works  of  logs  had  been 
constructed,  with  trees  felled  in  front, 
so  as  to  form  an  almost  impenetrable 
abatis.  His  artillery  swept  the  few 
narrow  roads  by  which  the  position 
could  be  approached  from  the  front, 
and  commanded  the  adjacent  woods.” 
What  was  to  be  done?  Was  an  at- 
tack more  practicable  on  the  National 
right?  The  ground  was  reconnoitered. 
Hooker’s  line  was  reported  to  be  vul- 
nerable in  that  direction.  The  next 
question  was  whether  there  existed  a 
practicable  route  by  which,  with  speed 


and  secrecy,  the  movement  could  be 
accomplished.  This  question  also  was 
satisfactorily  answered.  If  a route  did 
not  exist,  a route  could  be  made. 
Seated  on  cracker-boxes,  the  Confede- 
rate leaders  consulted  as  to  what  should 
be  done.  Jackson  was  familiar  with 
the  locality.  With  a map  before  him, 
he  described  the  ground,  suggested  that 
a circuitous  march  of  fifteen  miles  be 
made  towards  the  extreme  right  of  the 
National  army,  and  proposed  to  strike  a 
deadly  blow,  before  the  opposing  hosts 
should  be  aware  of  his  presence.  It 
was  a bold  experiment;  but  it  was  just 
the  kind  of  experiment  which  Jackson 
delighted  to  make.  If  it  succeeded,  he 
would  certainly  produce  a panic  in 
Hooker’s  army — he  might  even  seize 
bis  communications  with  United  States 
Ford,  on  which  the  National  commander 
relied  in  case  of  retreat.  “ With  what 
force  will  you  attempt  this  ?”  asked 
General  Lee.  ‘‘  With  my  whole  corps 
present,”  replied  Jackson.  “ What,  in 
that  case,  would  be  left  to  resist  an  ad- 
vance of  the  enemy  towards  Fredericks- 
burg?” Lee  again  asked.  ‘^The  divi- 
sions of  Anderson  and  McLaws,”  was 
the  prompt  and  confident  answer.  It 
was  a most  audacious  plan,  and  in  open 
violation  of  the  first  principles  of  the 
military  art.  As  things  were,  the  Con- 
federate commander  was  confronted  by 
superior  numbers.  With  42,000  mus- 
kets, he  was  in  the  presence  of  60,000 
or  70,000.  Lee  reflected  for  a moment. 
His  army  was  already  divided  in  two. 
If  he  consented,  his  army  would  be  cut 
up  into  three  parts.  And  then,  what 
if  Jackson  failed  ? It  would  be  ruin — 


LEE  AND  JACKSON  IN  COUNCIL. 


459 


hopeless,  irretrievable  ruin.  But  Lee 
had  faith  in  his  brave  and  adventurous 
lieutenant.  He  gave  his  consent;  and 
orders  for  the  march  were  immediately 
given. 

On  Saturday  morning,  Jackson,  with 
May  some  22,000  men,  set  out  on  his 
perilous  expedition.  He  moved 
with  great  secrecy  and  with  a speed 
almost  incredible,  considering  the  nature 
of  the  ground  he  had  to  traverse.  Stu- 
art’s cavalry  was  employed  to  conceal 
his  column  from  view,  and  to  distract 
the  attention  of  the  National  troops. 
Lee,  too,  made  frequent  demonstrations, 
so  as  to  engage  attention  in  front. 
Hooker,  however,  was  not  without  warn- 
ing, nor  was  he  wholly  without  sus- 
picion. On  Friday  night,  the  Confede- 
rates were  observed  cutting  a road  past 
the  National  picket  lines  on  the  right. 
Oil  Saturday  morning,  trains  and  ambu- 
lances were  seen  passing  over  a hill  in 
Sickles’  front.  When  informed  of  the 
movement  of  Jackson,  Hooker  sent 
orders  to  the  officers  commanding  on  the 
right,  to  be  on  their  guard  against  an 
advance  of  the  enemy  on  their  flank,  and 
directed  them  to  strengthen  that  por- 
tion of  their  line  to  meet  such'  an  emerg- 
ency. Birney  reported  to  Sickles  that 
he  saw,  in  the  direction  of  what  was 
called  the  Furnace,  a Confederate  col- 
umn, as  it  marched  down  the  hill  and 
crossed  Lewis’  Creek.  Sickles  went 
forward  in  person,  and  satisfied  himself 
of  the  truth  of  the  report.  He  saw 
the  trains  of  artillery  wagons  and  am- 
bulances which  followed  in  Jackson’s 
rear;  but  he  concluded  that  the  Con- 
federates were  in  full  retreat.  A bat- 


tery was  pushed  forward,  and  the  mov- 
ing column  was  shelled  at  a distance. 
As  it  soon  disappeared,  it  was  believed 
that  the  movement,  whether  of  attack 
or  retreat,  had  been  abandoned.  It 
soon  again  reappeared  ; and  Sickles  was 
ordered  to  push  forward  two  divisions 
to  develop  the  strength  or  the  intentions 
of  the  enemy.  This  force,  which  con- 
sisted of  the  divisions  of  Birney  and 
Whipple,  with  Barlow’s  brigade,  of 
Howard’s  corps,  soon  came  up  with  the 
enemy.  A sharp  skirmish  ensued ; and, 
by  the  aid  of  Randolph’s  battery,  some 
400  men,  including  several  officers  of 
the  Twenty-third  Georgia  regiment, 
were  captured.  Information  received 
from  the  prisoners  removed  all  doubt 
as  to  the  character  or  purpose  of  the 
mysterious  column.  It  was  Stonewall 
Jackson’s  corps;  its  redoubtable  chief 
was  at  its  head ; and  it  was  moving, 
with  hostile  intent,  to  the  flank  and  rear 
of  the  National  right.  It  was  no  time 
now  for  trifling.  Jackson,  it  was  evi- 
dent, meant  business.  Sickles,  there- 
fore, pressed  forward  with  fresh  energy, 
and  with  the  view  of  intercepting  the 
train  in  Jackson’s  rear.  Williams,  who 
was  ordered  to  co-operate,  advanced  at 
the  same  time  with  his  division,  of  Slo- 
cum’s corps,  and  commenced  a vigorous 
flank  movement  on  Jackson’s  right.  It 
was  believed,  for  a moment,  that  the 
Confederate  general  would  be  caught 
in  his  own  trap — that,  if  not  captured, 
he  would  be  compelled  to  retreat.  It 
was  a mistaken  belief.  A Confederate 
battalion  of  artillery,  under  Colonel 
Thompson  Brown,  happened  to  be  close 
at  hand.  Brown  got  his  guns  into  po- 


4G0 


CHANCELLORSVILLE. 


sition,  and  supported  them  by  such 
companies  of  infantry  as  could  be  got 
together.  Meantime,  Archer,  with  his 
own  and  Thomas’  brigade,  of  A.  P. 
Hill’s  division,  hearing  of  the  capture 
of  the  Georgia  regiment,  fell  back  to 
the  menaced  point.  By  these  means. 
Sickles  was  held  in  check,  and  Jackson’s 
train  was  enabled  to  pass  on.  What  was 
more  important  still  to  the  Confederates, 
time  was  gained.  Jackson  was  now 
beyond  reach.  While  this  skirmishing 
was  going  on,  on  his  flank  and  rear,  he 
was  pushing  forward  through  the  tan- 
gled wilderness  with  incredible  speed. 
Obstacles  seemed  to  disappear  as  he 
advanced.  Where  there  was  no  open- 
ing in  the  woods,  a passage  was  soon 
created,  the  sturdy  forest  trees  yielding 
to  the  vigorous  blows  of  his  hardy 
pioneers.  When  Sickles,  who,  after 
the  Confederates  retired,  held  possession 
of  the  road  in  the  neighborhood  of  the 
Furnace,  was  preparing  to  follow  up 
Jackson  and  strike  him  in  the  rear,  the 
Confederate  chieftain,  having  reached 
his  chosen  ground,  was  about  to  burst 
like  a whiidwind  on  his  unsuspecting 
foe. 

After  passing  the  Furnace,  and 
plunging  into  the  forest,  Jackson,  being 
under  complete  cover  of  the  woods, 
pursued  his  way  unmolested.  As  he 
moved  around,  he  was  continually  feel- 
ing the  National  lines.  On  reaching 
the  plank  road,  he  halted  for  a time, 
and,  from  a commanding  eminence,  sur- 
veyed the  position  and  works  of  his 
antagonist.  Fitz  Lee’s  cavalry,  sup- 
ported by  Paxton’s  brigade  of  infantry, 
was  ordered  forward  on  the  plank  road. 


Jackson  himself,  with  the  mass  of  his 
command,  pushed  on  through  the  jungle 
to  the  old  turnpike.  He  was  now  near 
the  outskirts  of  the  National  encamp- 
ment. Secrecy  had  become  more  im- 
portant than  ever.  The  knowledge  of  his 
whereabouts,  on  the  part  of  the  National 
commanders,  before  he  was  fully  pre- 
pared to  strike  the  decisive  blow,  might, 
at  the  last  moment,  mar  all  his  plans. 
Orders  were,  therefore,  given  in  a low 
tone;  the  firing  of  guns  was  forbid- 
den ; no  cheering  was  allowed  as  the 
general  passed  by ; and  the  w^ell-trained 
battalions,  disciplined  almost  to  perfec- 
tion, moved  along  slowly,  silently,  and 
with  cat-like  caution.  Arrived  at  the 
turnpike,  he  turned  to  the  right,  and 
moved  along  that  road  to  some  distance 
in  the  direction  of  Chancellorsville. 
Here  be  arranged  his  troops  in  three 
lines  of  battle,  perpendicular  to  the 
turnpike,  and  extending  about  one  mile 
on  either  side.  Bodes,  with  his  own 
brigade  and  that  of  Iverson  on  the  left, 
and  those  of  Doles  and  Colquitt  on  the 
right,  occupied  the  first  line.  Colston, 
who  commanded  Trimble’s  division, 
with  his  own  brigade  and  those  of 
Nicholls  and  Jones,  took  position  two 
hundred  yards  in  the  rear  of  Bodes. 
A.  P.  Hill’s  division,  as  it  came  up, 
was  formed  into  the  third  line.  Two 
pieces  of  Stuart’s  artillery  moved  along 
the  turnpike  with  the  first  line.  The 
second  and  third  line  was  to  support 
the  first  when  necessary,  without  wait- 
ing for  specific  instructions. 

It  was  now  after  five  o’clock.  Let 
us  look  within  the  National  lines. 
Hooker  was  still  at  his  headquarters  at 


DOWDALL’S  TAVERN. 


461 


Chancellorsville ; and,  althougli  watch- 
ful of  his  whole  line,  he  had  a special 
care  of  his  front  and  the  side  looking 
towards  Fredericksburg.  In  this  latter 
direction,  as  we  have  seen,  Meade  and 
Couch  kept  guard — Sickles  and  a por- 
tion of  Slocum’s  troops  were  at  the 
Furnace,  preparing  to  follow  Jackson. 
The  right  of  the  National  army  was 
protected  by  the  Eleventh  corps,  Gen- 
eral Howard,  one  of  the  bravest  officers 
in  the  National  army.  The  outworks 
at  this  point  ran  parallel  to  the  plank 
and  turnpike  roads,  and  faced  to  the 
south.  Stein wehr  was  on  the  left, 
Schurz  in  the  centre,  and  Devens  on  the 
right.  Devens’  position  was  near  Tal- 
ley’s House.  It  was  now  near  six 
o’clock.  All  fear  of  danger,  for  the 
day,  had  been  abandoned.  Their  arms 
were  stacked,  and  the  men  were  cook- 
ing or  eating  their  evening  meal.  All 
of  a sudden  there  is  a commotion  in  the 
woods.  Startled  game,  as  if  disturbed 
in  their  quiet  retreats,  appear  in  large 
numbers,  and  rush  to  and  fro  in  wild 
bewilderment.  Deer  leap  over  the 
works,  and  dash  through  the  National 
lines  into  the  woods  beyond.  Jackson 
has  given  the  signal  to  advance;  and 
these  scared  creatures  of  the  wood, 
frightened  by  the  presence  of  man,  and 
running  they  know  not  whither,  are  but 
an  emblem  of  what  is  soon  to  be  wit- 
nessed, on  a far  grander  scale,  on  the 
right  wing  of  the  great  and  invincible 
ai*my  of  the  Potomac.  A second  more, 
and  the  bugles  are  heard.  Then  a 
mighty  cheer,  followed  by  a terrific  vol- 
ley, the  deadly  missiles  coming  crashing 
through  the  trees,  and  falling  like  hail 


among  the  unarmed  and  unsuspecting 
Unionists,  and  it  is  known  that  “ Stone- 
wall ” Jackson  is  upon  them.  It  is  an 
instant  panic.  The  high  and  com- 
manding ground  at  Talley’s  is  at  once 
abandoned,  Devens’  men  fleeing  pre- 
cipitately and  in  the  wildest  confusion, 
many  of  them  without  having  picked 
up  their  muskets.  Schurz's  men  behave 
even  worse — ^joining  in  the  rout  with- 
out even  waiting  for  the  attack.  In 
vain  does  the  brave  Devens,  a second 
time  wounded,  in  vain  does  the  heroic 
Howard,  galloping  among  the  broken 
columns,  urging  them  by  voice  and  ges- 
ture, and  waving,  banner-like,  his  empty 
sleeve,  attempt  to  rally  the  fugitives, 
and  turn  them  against  their  pursuers. 
Once  and  again  a regiment  is  halted, 
but  it  is  only  to  be  torn  to  pieces  by 
the  merciless  fire  of  the  on-rushing  and 
now  triumphant  Confederates.  Sud- 
denly, however,  a halt  is  made  on  the 
part  of  both  pursuers  and  pursued. 
The  works  at  Melzi  Chancellor’s  or  Dow- 
dall’s  Tavern,  on  Howard’s  extreme 
left,  have  been  reached.  Into  these 
works  Steinwehr  has  thrown  Bush- 
beck’s  brigade,  his  other  brigades  being 
absent  with  Sickles.  Bushbeck  has 
been  joined  by  some  of  Schurz’s  regi- 
ments, which  have  been  rallied  and 
brought  to  order.  At  this  point  a gal- 
lant resistance  is  made.  The  Confed- 
erates are  held  in  check,  but  it  is  only 
for  a brief  period.  Jackson,  impatient 
of  resistance,  pushes  forward  his  le- 
gions. Bodes,  who  has  been  held  at 
bay,  is  speedily  joined  by  Colston ; and 
their  united  divisions,  already  flushed 
with  success,  and  uttering  their  ac- 


462  CHANCELLORSVILLE. 


customed  yell,  rush  bounding  into  the 
works,  shivering  to  pieces  the  last  solid 
remnant  of  Howard’s  splendid  corps. 
The  rout  of  the  right  wing  was  now 
complete.  All  semblance  of  organiza- 
tion was  gone.  Heedless  of  the  dead 
and  dying  who  lay  crowded  on  the 
turnpike  and  in  the  adjoining  woods, 
and  flinging  from  them  their  muskets, 
their  knapsacks,  and  every  other  en- 
cumbrance, the  routed  troops  rushed 
pell-mell  towards  Chancellorsville.  Ar- 
tillery, wagons,  ambulances,  pack-mules 
and  cattle,  all  inextricably  commingled, 
were  being  hurried  along  in  the  same 
direction.  It  was  a scene  of  the  wildest 
confusion.  No  such  scene  had  been 
witnessed  since  the  first  battle  of  Bull 
Eun. 

It  was  now  seven  o’clock,  one  brief 
hour  since  the  attack  commenced,  and 
darkness  was  coming  on.  The  situation 
was  critical  in  the  extreme.  Jackson 
was  in  full  possession  of  the  breast- 
works, and  within  half  a mile  of  Hook- 
er’s headquarters.  It' was  necessary  for 
the  National  commander  to  foi*m  a new 
line  of  battle.  This,  however,  was  a 
task  of  peculiar  difliculty.  Lee  was 
pressing  Hooker  hard,  both  on  his  left 
and  centre;  and  the  tornado-like  rush 
of  the  retreating  hosts  had  all  the  effect 
of  an  invading  army.  Hooker,  on  hear- 
ing of  the  disaster  to  Howard,  sent  for- 
ward the  choicest  division  of  the  army 
— a division  which  he  himself  had 
created,  and  which  he  had  often  led  to 
victory,  and  now  under  the  command 
of  General  Berry.  The  batteries  of 
this  division,  under  Captain  Best,  posted 
on  a ridge  across  the  ‘turnpike,  having 


opened  a most  murderous  fire,  checked 
the  Confederate  advance.  At  this  point 
the  battle  raged  fiercely.  Sickles  was 
recalled  from  the  Furnace,  where  he  had 
been  joined  by  Pleasonton,  with  1000 
cavalry,  ,his  instructions  being  that  he 
should  attack  Jackson  in  flank.  He  at 
once  hurried  forward  Pleasonton  and 
Birney.  Pleasonton,  with  two  of  his 
regiments  and  his  battery,  arrived  at 
Hazel  Grove — where  Sickles  had  Vjeeii 
compelled  to  leave  a portion  of  his 
artillery — just  as  Howard’s  corps  was 
hurrying  past  in  full  retreat.  Compre- 
hending the  situation  at  a glance,  he 
hurled  the  Eighth  Pennsylvania  on  the 
pursuing  columns.  The  regiment  was 
overwhelmed,  and  its  commander  in- 
stantly killed.  Disastrous  as  the  charg  j 
was  to  the  regiment,  it  nevertheless 
accomplished  its  object.  The  Confede- 
rate onrush  was  temporarily  checked. 
In  a few  minutes,  what  with  his  own 
battery  of  horse  artillery,  some  guns 
belonging  to  the  routed  corps,  and  those 
which  Sickles  had  left  behind  him,  he 
had  thirty  pieces  in  position.  A heavy 
cannonade  was  opened  by  Colonel 
Crutchfield,  from  the  Confederate  bat- 
teries on  the  plank  road,  his  object  be- 
ing to  prevent  the  National  troops  from 
reforming.  Pleasonton  replied  with 
tremendous  energy ; and  as  often  as  the 
Confederates  came  up  to  the  charge, 
their  ranks  were  decimated  by  his 
double-shotted  guns.  During  this  en- 
counter, General  Crutchfield  was  wound- 
ed, and  some  of  his  guns  were  silenced. 

It  was  now  night.  The  daylight  had 
sped,  but  it  was  not  dark  ; for  the  moon 
was  brio^ht  and  full.  There  was  no 


MIDNIGHT  FIGHTING. 


463 


disposition  on  either  side  to  discontinue 
the  content.  It  was  absolutely  neces- 
sary that  Hooker  should,  before  morn- 
ing, re-connect  his  broken  lines,  and  re- 
establish his  communications.  It  was 
necessary,  in  fact,  that  he  should  take 
a new  position.  Jackson,  on  the  other 
hand,  felt  the  importance,  if  not  neces- 
sity, of  pushing  the  advantage  he  had 
won.  The  relative  positions  of  both 
armies  was  much  the  same  as  at  night- 
fall. Lee  continued  to  claim  a large 
amount  of  Hooker’s  attention  on  the 
left.  Jackson  held  the  advanced  posi- 
tions he  had  won  on  the  old  turnpike 
and  plank  roads.  Berry  kept  the 
ground  he  had  taken  towards  the  close 
of  the  evening’s  contest.  His  artillery, 
under  Best,  crowned  the  crest  at  the 
western  end  of  the  clearing  around 
Chancellorsville.  Birney  had  come  up 
and  taken  position  on  the  left.  Ward’s 
brigade,  of  his  division,  was  ordered  to 
be  ready  to  make  an  attack  on  the 
enemy’s  lines  at  1 1 o’clock.  Meanwhile 
Jackson  was  impatiently  awaiting  the 
arrival  of  A.  P.  Hill,  to  replace  the 
divisions  of  Bodes  and  Colton,  which, 
after  the  severe  work  of  the  afternoon, 
and  because  of  the  thick  and  tangled 
woods  in  which  much  of  the  fighting 
was  done,  had  fallen  into  confusion. 
At  the  appointed  time,  Best  opened  a 
tremendous  fire  on  the  Confederate 
lines,  and  Ward’s  men  rushed  to  the 
charge  with  terrific  fury.  It  was  again 
and  again  repeated.  In  one  of  these 
charges,  a portion  of  the  artillery  lost 
by  General  Howard,  was  gallantly  re- 
taken. This  almost  midnight  attack  has 
been  described  as  presenting  one  of  the 


grandest  and  most  soul-rousing  scenes 
of  the  war.  ‘‘The  moon,”  says  an  eye- 
witness, “ shone  bright,  and  the  foe 
could  be  seen  at  good  musket  range. 
The  air  was  very  still,  and  the  roar  and 
reverberation  of  the  musketry  and  ar- 
tillery exceeded  all  conception.  Mal- 
vern Hills  was  a skirmish  compared  to 
this,  except  in  the  degree  of  slaughter.” 
The  attack  was  completely  successful, 
the  Confederates  having  been  driven 
back  half  a mile.  The  battle  ceased  ; 
but  there  was  little  repose  in  either 
camp  during  that  anxious  night. 

At  the  very  commencement  of  the 
night  attack,  a terrible  calamity  befell 
the  Confederate  army.  General  “ Stone- 
wall” Jackson,  the  author  of  that  day’s 
splendid  achievement,  in  many  respects 
the  greatest  soldier  of  the  Confederacy, 
fell  mortally  wounded.  While  waiting 
for  Hill,  and  just  before  the  batteries  of 
Best  opened  fire  and  Ward  made  his 
attack,  he  rode  forward  to  reconnoitre 
the  ground.  He  was  accompanied  by 
a portion  of  his  staff,  couriers  and  other 
officers.  On  setting  out,  he  gave  posi- 
tive orders  to  his  troops  not  to  fire  un- 
less cavalry  approached  from  the  direc- 
tion of  the  enemy.  He  advanced  to  a 
considerable  distance  beyond  his  own 
pickets.  When  near  what  was  called 
the  Van  Wert  House,  some  one  re- 
marked to  him,  “ General,  you  should 
not  expose  yourself  so  much.”  “There 
is  no  dano-er,”  he  said.  “Go  back  and 
tell  General  Hill  to  press  on.”  When 
returning,  and,  as  he  approached  his  own 
lines,  he  and  his  escort,  mistaken  for  Fed- 
eral cavalry,  were  received  with  a volley 
of  musketiy.  Several  of  the  party  fell, 


464 


CHANCELLORSVILLE. 


some  of  them  killed,  others  of  them 
severely  wounded.  Turning  aside,  the 
party  entered  a thicket,  still  moving 
towards  the  Confederate  lines.  A mo- 
ment more,  and  being  still  mistaken 
for  Federal  cavalry,  they  were  again 
tired  upon,  and  at  a distance  of  not 
more  than  thirty  or  forty  yards.  Jack- 
son  received  three  balls,  one  in  the 
right  hand,  and  two  in  the  left  arm, 
one  of  which  shattered  the  bone  two 
inches  below  the  shoulder,  and  severed 
the  artery.  Half  of  his  escort,  includ- 
ing Captain  Boswell,  of  his  staff,  were 
killed  or  wounded.  His  frightened 
horse  rushed  towards  the  National  lines. 
Quickly  recovering  himself,  he  managed, 
with  his  bleeding  hand,  to  rein  it  uj> 
and  turn  it  into  the  plank  road.  Cap- 
tain Wilbourn,  of  his  staff,  now  rushed 
to  his  aid.  Bleeding  and  fainting,  the 
general  was  taken  from  his  horse,  car- 
] ied  to  the  road  side  and  laid  under  a 
tree.  It  was  at  this  moment  the  guns 
of  Best  opened  tire ; and  the  National 
troops,  coming  up  in  great  force, 
charged  over  Jackson’s  body.  The  Na- 
tionals again  falling  back,  he  was 
placed  upon  a litter ; but  Berry’s  guns 
were  now  sweeping  the  road  ; and,  one 
of  the  litter-bearers  being  shot  down, 
the  wounded  general  fell  to  the  ground, 
receiving  a severe  contusion  on  his  right 
side.  As  the  tiring  continued,  the 
whole  party  lay  flat  on  the  ground,  till 
the  storm  of  grape  and  canister  was 
turned  in  another  direction.  He  was 
soon  afterwards  conveyed  safely  to  the 
hospital  in  the  rear.  It  was  found 
necessary  to  amputate  the  arm.  Jack- 
son  died  on  Sunday,  the  10th  of  May. 


He  lived  to  see  the  fruit  of  this  day’s 
work.  His  death  was  a great  blow  to 
the  Confederate  cause.  It  was  equal 
to  a National  victory.  General  Stone- 
wall Jackson  will  live  in  history  as  the 
hero  of  C/iancellorsville."^ 

Hill  came  to  the  front  just  as  Jackson 
was  wounded,  and  prepared  to  assume 
the  command.  Scarcely,  however,  had 
he  issued  his  first  instructions,  when  he 
too  was  disabled,  having  received  a 
severe  contusion  from  a piece  of  shell. 
General  J.  E.  B.  Stuart  was  the  ofilcer 
next  in  rank ; but  he  had  moved  off  in 
the  direction  of  Ely’s  Ford,  his  inten- 

* In  an  ably-written  paragraph,  which  is  evidently 
intended  to  be  eulogistic  of  General  Stonewall  Jackson, 
Swinton,  yielding  to  a spirit  of  detraction,  which 
is  too  common  a characteristic  of  Northern  writers, 
makes  some  remarks  which  are  scarcely  just  to  the 
Confederate  soldier.  He  speaks  of  Jackson  as  “devoid 
of  high  mental  parts,  and  destitute  of  that  power  of 
planning  and  combination,  and  of  that  calm,  broad, 
military  intellect  which  distinguished  General  Lee.” 
He  has  just  described  him  as  “ essentially  an  executive 
officer.”  Without  referring  to  General  Jackson’s  entire 
military  career,  we  have  no  hesitation  in  saying  that 
such  remarks  were  singularly  inapplicable  to  the  man, 
after  the  first  day’s  fighting  at  Chancellorsville.  The 
Chancellorsville  plan  of  battle  was  Jackson’s  through- 
out. It  was  his  conception ; and  it  was  he  who  gave 
it  development,  and  determined  its  success.  It  is 
not  too  much  to  say  that  but  for  the  death  of 
Jackson,  the  National  army  might  have  been  cap- 
tured or  cut  to  pieces.  It  would  certainly  have  been 
placed  in  great  peril.  Such  was  Jackson’s  own  opinion. 
‘‘  If  I had  not  been  wounded,”  he  said,  “ I would  have 
cut  the  enemy  off  from  the  road  to  United  States  Ford  ; 
we  would  have  had  them  entirely  surrounded;  and 
they  would  have  been  obliged  to  surrender  or  cut  their 
way  out — they  had  no  other  alternative.”  Nor  do  we 
think  it  fair  to  characterize  Jackson  as  a “fanatic  in 
religion.”  The  word  “fanatic”  has  come  to  have  an 
offensive  meaning.  In  the  sense  in  which  it  is  now 
generally  used,  it  certainly  cannot  be  applied  to  Jack- 
son.  In  the  sense  in  which  Jackson  was  a fanatic,  so 
was  Oliver  Cromwell ; so,  too,  in  a milder  sense,  was 
George  Washington.  Thus  applied,  the  epithet  is  not 
opprobrious ; but,  in  this  latter  sense,  it  is  now  rarely 
used.  He  was  certainly  a religious  enthusiast;  but  a 
fanatic,  in  the  offensive  sense,  he  was  not. 


JACKSON  MORTALLY  WOUNDED. 


465 


tion  being  to  seize  that  place  and  occupy 
it.  Such  was  part  of  General  Jackson’s 
plan.  In  the  circumstances,  and  until 
the  arrival  of  Stuart,  who  was  at  once 
recalled,  the  command  of  the  Confede- 
rate left  devolved  upon  Brigadier-Gen- 
eral Bodes.  It  was  a trying  moment. 
Jackson  had  fallen,  mortally  wounded ; 
Hill  had  been  disabled;  and  Stuart 
was  some  miles  distant.  This,  how- 
ever, was  not  all.  Berry  was  repeating 
his  tremendous  assaults ; and  his  artil- 
leiy,  under  the  direction  of  Best,  was 
maintaining  a fierce  cannonad  e.  It  is  not 
wonderful  that  Bodes  should  have  hes- 
itated to  make  any  attack  or  run  any 
serious  risk  until  the  morning.  In  this 
view  of  the  case  Stuart,  on  his  arrival, 
concurred.  It  had  the  approval,  also,  of 
Hill  who,  although  disabled  and  placed 
on  a litter,  had  not  been  removed  from 
the  held.  Stuart  sent  a messenger  to 
Jackson,  asking  for  instructions.  Jack- 
son  was  so  feeble  and  suffering  so  much, 
that  he  could  only  give  for  answer: 

Tell  General  Stuart  that  he  must  use 
his  own  judgment.”  The  night  was 
spent  by  the  new  commander  and  his 
staff  in  visiting  the  different  parts  of  his 
line,  in  locating  his  troops,  and  in  making 
the  other  necessary  arrangements  for 
the  coming  day. 

It  had  already  become  apparent  to 
the  different  officers  of  the  National 
army — it  must  have  been  apparent  to 
General  Hooker  himself — that  a great 
blunder  had  been  committed  on  the 
Thursday,  when  no  effort  was  made  to 
bring  up  the  three  corps  under  Sedg- 
wick at  Fredericksburg,  so  as  to  make 
the  army  a unit,  and  that,  if  possible,  a 


still  greater  blunder  was  committed  on 
the  Friday,  when  the  entire  right  wing, 
having  advanced  towards  Fredericks- 
burg by  three  different  roads,  and  hav- 
ing gained  advantageous  positions  in 
the  clear,  open  country  beyond  the 
woods,  was  compelled  by  the  mere  will 
of  its  chief  to  fall  back,  and  wait  for 
the  onset  of  the  enemy  in  the  tangled 
jungles  of  the  wilderness.  These  blun- 
ders—one  or  other  or  both— had  brought 
about  all  the  sorrows  of  Saturday ; 
and  superior  as  were  the  Nationals  in 
numbers,  and  excellent  as  was  the  spirit 
of  the  troops,  it  was  a doubtful  ques- 
tion with  many  whether  greater  sorrows 
were  not  in  store  for  them.  The  dis-  ^ 
cipline  of  the  army,  however,  was  well 
preserved.  Hooker,  showing  no  indeci- 
sion, adopted  his  course  with  firmness, 
and  after  the  disasters  of  the  afternoon 
and  evening:  made  his  arranD:ements  for 
the  morrow.  On  the  evening  of  that 
day,  Beynolds,  with  his  corps  of  some 
1 7,000  men,  having  come  up  from  before 
Fredericksburg  and  crossed  the  United 
States  Ford,  joined  the  forces  immediate- 
ly under  Hooker,  and  by  their  presence 
more  than  compensated  for  the  losses 
sustained  by  the  Eleventh  corps.  Sedg- 
wick was  still  below  Fredericksburg 
with  his  own  entire  corps,  which  num- 
bered some  24,000  men.  Late  on  Sat- 
urday night.  Hooker  sent  instructions 
to  Sedgwick  to  put  himself  in  motion 
immediately,  to  occupy  Fredericksburg, 
to  seize  the  heights  in  the  rear,  to  gain 
the  plank  road  leading  thence  to  Chan- 
cellorsville,  and  to  move  out,  fighting 
his  way,  as  best  he  might,  with  the  view 
of  joining  the  main  body  by  daylight 


466 


CHANCELLORSVILLE. 


on  Sunday  morning.  It  was,  beyond 
all  question,  of  the  utmost  importance, 
that  Sedgwick  should  be  able  to  accom- 
plish the  task  thus  assigned  him.  The 
best  results  might  naturally  enough  be 
expected  to  flow  from  it.  But  it  was  an 
almost  impossible  task.  Hooker  made 
little  account  of  the  more  than  possible 
difficulties  to  be  encountered  in  seizing 
the  heights  in  the  rear  of  Fredericks- 
burg— difficulties  of  which  he  himself 
had  had  so  bitter  an  experience  in 
the  Burnside  campaign.  It  would  have 
been  more  wise,  if  the  order  had  been 
given  at  an  earlier  hour,  or  on  an  earlier 
day.  It  was  not  unwise  to  give  it  now ; 
but  most  certainly  it  was  the  duty  of 
the  general-in-chief  to  think  of  the 
obstacles  which  might  hinder  the  pro- 
gress of  his  lieutenant,  and  by  every 
conceivable  means  to  facilitate  his  ad- 
vance. 

During  the  night,  the  National  com- 
mander succeeded  in  rearranging  his 
lines,  and  taking  a new  position.  His 
new  line  resembled  somewhat  the  letter 
V,  or  rather  a triangle  slightly  prolonged 
at  the  apex,  the  left  leg  being  consider- 
aVjly  larger  than  the  right,  and  both  ex- 
tremities reaching  close  to  the  river,  thus 
covering  United  States  Ford.  His  lines 
were  contracted,  as  compared  with  those 
c f the  previous  day,  and  he  had  drawn 
nearer  the  river.  He  held  possession 
of  the  heights  between  Melzi  Chancel- 
lor’s and  Fairview,  including  Hazel 
Grove — an  eminence  which  commanded 
the  apex,  and  the  holding  of  which  was 
essential  to  the  safety  of  the  new  posi- 
tion. Beynolds  was  on  the  extreme 
right,  at  the  upper  end  of  the  left  limb 


of  the  triangle.  Meade’a  forces  came 
next;  then  those  of  Sickles,  command- 
ing the  line  on  the  left  of  the  apex; 
then  those  of  Slocum  on  the  right  of  the 
apex ; and  then,,connecting  wdth  Slocum, 
but  more  to  the  north  on  the  right  limb 
of  the  tri'angle,  came  Howard’s  corps, 
which,  with  marvellous  rapidity,  had 
been  brought  together,  and  restored  to 
something  like  order.  On  the  left  limb 
of  the  triangle,  the  National  forces  were 
heavily  massed.  In  the  centre  of  the 
triangle  or  V , and  almost  behind  Meade, 
was  stationed  Couch,  that  he  might  be 
able  to  act  in  either  direction,  as  occasion 
might  require.  Reynolds  and  Meade 
were  some  distance  on  the  north  of  the 
turnpike.  Sickles  covered  the  road ; 
Berry,  with  Whipple  in  his  rear,  being 
on  the  north  side;  and  Birney,  with 
Williams,  of  Slocum’s  corps,  in  his  rear. 
Slocum,  with  his  other  division,  that  of 
Geary,  guarded  the  apex.  Hancock’s 
division  of  Couch  was  on  Slocum’s  left, 
and  stretched  out  towards  Howard. 
Sickles’ artillery,  under  Best,  was  massed 
on  the  ridge  in  the  centre  of  the  open 
ground,  all  the  guns  pointing  west,  so 
as  to  command  the  approaches  to  the 
turnpike.  Hooker  had  60,000  infantry 
immediately  available  at  Chancellors- 
ville.  The  combined  forces  of  Lee  and 
Jackson  were  far  short  of  that  num- 
ber, not  much  exceeding  40,000  men. 
Hooker  had,  besides,  the  prospect  of 
being  joined  by  Sedgwick,  whose  corps, 
some  24,000  strong,  was  e(pial  to  a 
large  army.  Sedgwick  was  only  ten 
miles  distant.  He  had,  it  is  true, 
some  difficulties  in  his  way;  but  these 
might  be  overcome.  If  Sedgwick 


THE  COKFEDERATE  BATTLE-CRY. 


46.7 


should  come  up  in  time,  might  not 
Hooker  yet  be  able  to  destroy  first  the 
Confederate  right,  and  then  fall  back 
with  all  his  force  and  deal  a deadly 
blow  to  the  Confederate  left  ? If  such 
is  to  be  the  result,  the  National  com- 
mander must  exhibit  at  once  more  skill 
and  nerve  than  he  has  revealed  since  the 
lighting  commenced. 

The  Confederate  commander  had 
been  equally  active  during  the  night. 
He  had  drawn  up  his  men  in  three  lines 
of  battle.  Hill’s  division  was  in  ad- 
vance. Its  different  brigades  were  ar- 
ranged across  the  road  in  the  following 
order : Archer’s,  McGowan’s,  and  Lane’s 
were  on  the  right  of  the  road ; Pender’s 
and  Thomas’s  were  on  the  left.  Hill’s 
brigade  was  in  reserve,  supporting  Lane 
and  Pender ; Archer  and  McGowan 
were  thrown  back,  somewhat  obliquely, 
so  as  to  confront  Sickles.  The  rest  of 
the  line  was  perpendicular  to  the  road. 
Colston’s  division  formed  the  second 
line,  and  that  of  Kodes  the  third.  The 

ridge,  occupied  by  the  right  of  the  corps, 
was  covered  by  artillery.  Such  was 
the  disposition  of  the  left  wing  of  the 
Confederate  army,  on  the  morning  of 
May  Sunday,  the  3d  of  May.  Lee, 
meanwhile,  had  concluded  to  ef- 
fect a junction,  if  at  all  possible,  of  his 
right  and  left  wings;  and  instructions 
were  given  to  Stuart,  McLaws  and  An- 
derson, that  they  should  direct  their 
movements  accordingly.  It  will  be  re- 
membered that  Sickles  held  a command- 
ing position  at  Hazel  Grove  It  was 
the  key-point  of  the  battle  ground,  and 
advantageous,  not  only  because  it  com- 
manded the  enemy’s  flank,  but  because 


if  occupied  by  the  enemy,  it  would 
imperil  the  safety  of  Slocum’s  entire 
line.  Sickles,  who  was  naturally  proud 
of  the  position,  had  been  at  great 
pains  to  strengthen  and  turn  it  to  the 
best  account.  It  was  not,  therefore, 
without  mingled  surprise  and  pain  that 
he  received  orders  from  Hooker,  before 
daylight  on  Sunday  morning,  to  the 
effect  that  the  ground,  the  holding  of 
which  he  deemed  of  so  much  importance, 
should  be  immediately  abandoned.  It 
was  another  of  those  inexplicable  blun- 
ders which  Hooker  had  been  making 
since  the  moment  he  first  felt  the  pres- 
sure of  his  antagonist.  Quick  as  light- 
ning, and  with  the  earliest  dawn,  Stuart 
saw  the  advantage  which  the  blundering 
mismanagement  of  his  opponent  had 
given  him,  and  immediately  occupied 
the  abandoned  position.  In  so  doing,  he 
became  engaged  with  Sickles’  rear.  The 
crest,  however,  was  seized ; thirty  pieces 
of  artillery  were  got  into  position ; and 
a heavy  fire  was  opened  at  once  on  the 
open  ground  around  Chancellorsville 
House.  The  battle  of  the  3d  of  May 
was  begun.  In  a few  seconds,  it  was 
raging  along  the  whole  line.  “ Charge, 
and  remember  Jackson  ! ” was  the  Con- 
federate battle-cry ; and  never  was 
battle-cry  more  effective  in  evoking  mili- 
tary enthusiasm.  With  a fury  which 
seemed  to  be  blind,  with  an  energy 
which  was  irresistible,  and  with  a pur- 
pose and  determination  which  death 
only  could  restrain,  on  came  the  brave 
Confederates.  Jackson  was  not  with 
them;  but,  it  was  evident,  his  spirit 
was  there.  Brave  as  they  were,  how- 
ever, they  were  about  to  encounter  foe- 


468 


CHANCELLORSVILLK 


men  worthy  of  their  steel — men  who 
feared  no  foe,  who  knew  how  to  resist 
and  how  to  attack.  Sickles  was  on 
hand  with  his  well- trained  and  war- 
hardened  veterans — Berry  on  the  right, 
Birney  on  the  left,  Whipple  and  Will- 
iams supporting — ready  to  receive  the 
onslaught.  Best’s  forty  pieces  of  artil- 
lery were  all  pointed  to  the  road  along 
which  the  attacking  column  w^as  ap- 
proaching. As  the  Confederates  came 
forward,  they  were  received  with  a 
perfect  tempest  of  lead,  which  burst 
upon  them,  tornado-like,  from  the  firm 
lines  of  Berry  and  Birney,  and  also, 
from  Whipple  and  Williams,  who  had 
already  been  pushed  to  the  front. 
Reckless  of  this  tempest  of  lead,  and 
reckless,  also,  of  the  more  destruct- 
ive tempest,  of  grape  and  canister,  which 
bursts  upon  them  from  the  batteries  on 
the  hill,  the  column  still  advances.  It 
is  cut  up  and  gashed,  as  if  ‘^pierced, 
scarred,  ploughed  by  invisible  light- 
ning.” Companies,  whole  regiments 
even,  seem  to  melt  away;  but  still  they 
com:'.  No  such  bravery,  in  assault,  has 
been  exhibited  by  the  Confederates 
since  the  famous  battle  of  Corinth,  when 
they  advanced  against  the  storm  of 
bullets  with  faces  averted,  like  men 
striving  to  protect  themselves  from  a 
driving  storm  of  hail.”  Will  nothing 
check  their  forward  rush  ? Beriy  and 
Birney,  now  massing  their  troops,  rush 
upon  them  with  the  weight  and  impetus 
of  an  avalanche.  The  shock  is  terrific. 
Like  waves  driven  by  contrary  winds, 
the  opposing  hosts,  dash  and  roil  against 
each  other,  but  dash  and  roll  apparently 
in  vain.  Neither  prevails : neither 


yields.  It  seems  an  endless,  wasteful 
struggle.  Now  the  Nationals  fall  back ; 
and  it  seems  as  if  the  Confederates  are 
about  to  win  the  victory.  It  is  only, 
however,  for  a moment.  The  Nationals 
charge  agajn ; the  batteries  pour  forth 
their  destructive  fire ; and  Jackson’s  men, 
their  ranks  literally  torn  to  pieces,  their 
dead  and  wounded  lying  in  groups  on 
the  field,  are  driven  back  to  their  original 
position.  Again  there  is  a Confederate 
charge;  again  a teirific  shock  and  stub- 
born resistance ; again  victory  oscillates, 
yielding  now  to  the  one  side,  and  now 
to  the  other ; and  so  the  battle  rages 
until  about  eight  o’clock,  when  Stuart, 
putting  forth  all  his  disposable  strength 
on  that  point,  drives  the  Nationals 
back  and  back,  and  captures  the  works 
in  Sickles’  front. 

The  struggle,  however,  is  not  yet 
abandoned.  The  Confederates  have 
undoubtedly  gained  an  important  ad- 
vantage. They  have  pressed  the  Na- 
tionals back  from  their  first  line  of 
works.  It  is,  in  a qualified  sense,  a Con- 
federate victory.  But  Sickles,  if  dis- 
couraged, is  not  yet  dismayed.  He  has 
already  sent  for  reinforcements.  If 
these  should  arrive  in  time,  he  may  yet 
turn  the  tide  of  battle.  He,  therefore, 
boldly  holds  his  ground.  The  battle 
rages  again  with  tremendous  fury.  The 
works  are  repeatedly  taken  and  retaken. 
The  Confederates,  becoming  more  con- 
fident, press  upon  the  National  columns 
with  increasing  energy.  As  it  has  be- 
come dangerous  or  impossible  to  make 
any  very  effective  use  of  the  National 
artillery  in  his  front.  Sickles  is  com- 
pelled to  depend  on  the  resisting  power 


LEE’S  TWO  WINGS  UNITED. 


469 


of  the  bayonet.  As  yet,  no  response  is 
inadeL  to  his  repeated  calls  for  assistance. 
In  obedience  to  orders  fj-om  headquar- 
ters, French  has  sent  out  some  regi- 
ments, under  Carroll ; but  these,  instead 
of  moving  to  the  aid  of  Sickles,  have 
moved  to  the  south  of  Meade,  and 
struck  the  enemy’s  flank.  These  regi- 
ments are  quickly  repulsed ; and  Stuart, 
again  massing  his  troops,  falls  upon 
Sickles  with  his  entire  weight  and 
with  undivided  strength.  Sickles  had 
done  his  utmost.  He  had  used  his 
men  wisely ; and  they  had  nobly  re- 
sponded to  his  every  call.  Berry’s 
division,  formerly  Hooker’s  own,  had 
sustained  its  high  character.  The  men 
fought  like  heroes  of  the  olden  time. 
The  same  was  true,  also,  of  Birney’s 
division.  But  they  were  confronted 
by  a body  of  men  who,  for  discipline, 
dash  and  endurance,  were  perhaps 
never  surpassed  in  the  whole  history 
of  war;  and  they  were  overpowered 
by  superior  numbers.  And  so  it  came 
to  pass  that  while  the  corps  of  Eey- 
nolds  and  Meade  and  Howard,  number- 
ing together  some  40,000  men,  were 
doing  nothing,  Sickles,  after  having  re- 
sisted for  hours  the  persistent  attacks  of 
Jackson’s  battalions,  and  after  having 
held  at  bay,  successively,  his  first,  his 
second  and  his  third  lines,  was  com- 
pelled, at  last,  to  fall  back  in  the  di- 
rection of  Chancellorsville,  only,  how- 
ever, to  offer  a fresh  resistance  under 
cover  of  the  guns  at  Fairview. 

While  these  things  were  taking 
place  on  Hooker’s  right,  the  Confed- 
erates were  not  idle  on  his  front,  or 
at  the  apex  of  the  triangle.  Slocum, 


as  we  have  seen,  was  holding  the  apex 
on  the  eastern  side,  with  Geary’s  di- 
vision, Hancock,  of  Couch’s,  being  on 
his  left.  On  this  point,  Lee,  from  an 
early  hour,  had  been  directing  all  his 
disposable  strength.  We  have  already 
mentioned  that  instructions  had  been 
sent  to  Anderson  and  McLaws  to  direct 
their  movements  so  as  to  form  a junc- 
tion with  Stuart’s  right,  and  thus  unite 
the  Confederate  line.  The  Confederate 
guns  at  Hazel  Grove  had  made  Slocum’s 
position  almost  untenable  from  the  com- 
mencement of  the  fight  in  the  early 
morning.  Anderson,  having  been 
pushed  along  the  plank  road,  which 
connects  Chancellorsville  with  Freder- 
icksburg, fell  with  tremendous  weight 
on  Slocum.  McLaws,  moving  in  a 
direction  a little  further  north,  pressed 
heavily  upon  Hancock.  After  repeated 
attacks  and  repeated  failures,  McLaws 
not  only  found  it  impossible  to  make 
any  impression  on  Hancock,  but  was. 
handsomely  repulsed.  Anderson’s  ef- 
fort was  attended  with  better  success.. 
Pressing  with  great  stubbornness  on. 
Slocum  at  the  point  of  the  triangle,  he; 
contrived  to  throw  around  his  left,  and 
thus,  by  a thin  line,  to  form  a junction 
with  Stuart.  The  object,  so  ardently 
desired  by  Lee,  was  at  last  effected.. 
His  army,  which  had  been  divided^ 
since  the  morning  of  the  2l1,  was  again 
united.  His  two  wings  thus  brought 
together,  Lee  bore  in  upon  the  Nationals, 
with  his  whole  line.  Sickles  and  Slo- 
cum were  forced  back ; and  the  National, 
line  seemed  to  melt  away,  Hancock, 
alone  holding  his  position,  and  resisting,, 
with  great  firmness  and  determination,, 


259 


470 


CHANCELLORSVILLE. 


the  fierce  and  persistent  onslaughts  of 
the  already  triumphant  Confederates. 
Hooker  ordered  the  troops  to  fall  back 
upon  Chancellorsville ; and  here  again, 
at  the  angle  of  the  woods,  the  battle  for 
a time  raged  with  great  fury,  the  artil- 
lery on  both  sides  doing  terrible  execu- 
tion. The  Chancellorsville  House,  which 
was  still  General  Hooker’s  headquarters 
Avas  now  discovered  to  be  on  fire,  and 
laid  to  be  abandoned.  The  National 
line,  in  this  new  position,  began  to 
waver ; and  the  Confederates,  already 
flushed  with  success,  seeing  their  oppor- 
tunity, made  a tremendous  dash,  and, 
springing  forward  with  wild  yells, 
captured  Chancellorsville,  with  a con- 
sidei-able  number  of  prisoners.  It  was 
now  a few  minutes  past  ten  o’clock. 
The  battle  had  lasted,  almost  without 
intermission,  for  more  than  five  hours. 
Tlie  Nationals,  although  pressed  vigor- 
ously by  the  triumphant  Confederates, 
whose  guns  were  sweeping  the  open 
ground  around  Chancellorsville,  fell 
back  in  good  order,  and  took  a new 
and  well-fortified  position  about  a mile 
nearer  the  river.  The  new  line  was 
still  in  the  form  of  a triangle,  or  V,  but 
shorter  and  somewhat  flatter  than  be- 
fore. The  apex  was  at  Bullock's  House. 
The  left  limb  extended  along  the  Ely’s 
Ford  road,  towards  the  mouth  of  Hunt- 
ing Run.  The  right  extended  along 
Mineral  Spring  road,  towards  what  is 
known  as  Scott’s  Dam.  Thus  ended  the 
second  great  battle  at  Chancellorsville, 
fought  on  the  3d  of  May,  1863. 
x\mong  the  many  brave  men  who  per- 
ished that  day  was  General  Berry. 

At  an  early  stage  of  the  contest,  a 


severe  misfortune  befell  the  National 
army.  While  the  conflict  was  at  its 
height.  General  Hooker  was  standing 
on  the  balcony  of  the  Chancellorsville 
House,  leaning  against  one  of  the  pillars. 
The  pillar  was  struck  by  a cannon-ball ; 
and  the  general  was  thrown  down  by 
the  violence  of  the  concussion.  He  was 
stunned  and  stupefied,  and  rendered 
incapable  of  command.  This  misfortune 
goes  far  to  explain  some  of  the  mys- 
teries of  that  mysterious  day,  when 
Sickles  and  Fi-ench  and  Slocum  were 
struggling  against  the  superior  numbers 
of  the  enemy,  and  vainly  calling  for 
reinforcements,  while  40,000  men,  com- 
posing the  corps  of  Reynolds  and  Meade 
and  Howard,  were  doing  nothing. 
Hooker  was  still  insensible,  and  unlit 
for  duty.  The  responsibilities  of  gen- 
eral-in-chief, at  this  supreme  crisis,  and 
in  these  peculiar  circumstances,  devolved 
upon  General  Couch,  who,  from  some 
as  yet  unexplained  cause,  did  not  prove 
himself  equal  to  the  requirements  of 
the  situation.  Had  these  40,000  men, 
who  were  unused,  and,  therefore,  useless 
in  the  fight,  been  hurled  against  the  foe 
at  the  different  points  of  attack,  there 
can  be  no  reasonable  doubt  that  the 
tide  of  victoiy  would  have  rolled  in  an 
opposite  direction.  The  Nationals,  in 
such  a case,  would  certainly  have  fully 
engaged  Lee’s  attention,  and  occupied 
his  army.  The  plank  road  would  have 
been  preserved  ; and  Sedgwick,  if  his 
arrival  at  the  point  of  destination  must 
still  have  been  a little  late,  would  at 
least  have  been  able  to  march  compara- 
tively unmolested  from  Fredericksburg 
to  Chancellorsville.  The  mystery  of 


HOOKER  STUNNED. 


471 


Chancellorsville  will,  perhaps,  never  be 
explained.  It  is  certainly  but  little 
likely  to  be  explained  during  the  lives 
of  the  principal  actors  in  the  great  and 
tragic  drama.  The  accident  which  be- 
fell Hooker  was  undoubtedly  a misfor- 
tune to  the  National  army.  It  explains 
much ; but  it  does  not  explain  all. 

Sunday,  the  3d  of  May,  was  yet  young. 
Sacred  as  was  this  day,  and  severe  as 
had  been  the  work  already  accomplished, 
there  was  no  disposition  to  rest  on 
either  side.  Hooker,  now  partially  re- 
covered, busied  himself  in  strengthen- 
ing his  line,  and  preparing  for  another 
attack,  as  well  as  securing  his  lines  of 
communication  with  the  United  States 
and  Ely’s  Fords,  in  the  event  of  further 
retreat  being  j udged  necessary.  Howard 
and  Slocum  were  stationed  on  his  left ; 
Meade  and  Reynolds  were  on  the  right ; 
and,  at  Bullock’s  House — a commanding 
plateau,  the  vertex  and  key  of  the  pos- 
sition — Sickles  and  Couch  were  massed 
with  a large  number  of  pieces  of  artil- 
lery. 

Lee  had  not  been  less  active.  He  had 
already  displayed  his  army  on  the  pla- 
teau at  Chancellorsville.  The  scattered 
regiments,  brigades  and  divisions  which 
had  been  broken  in  the  confusion  of 
battle,  were  again  brought  together. 
A line  of  battle  was  formed  along:  the 
plank  road  to  the  west  of  Chancellors- 
ville, and  extending  down  the  old  turn- 
pike, to  the  east  of  that  place.  Rodes, 
with  his  right  on  Chancellorsville,  ex- 
tended up  the  plank  road.  On  his  left 
was  Pender,  with  half  of  the  division 
of  A.  P.  Hill.  To  the  ea>t  of  Chan- 
cellorsville was  Colston,  with  Ander- 


son and  McLaws  in  order,  on  his 
right. 

There  was  quiet  on  the  battle  field, 
but  everything  indicated  preparation 
and  readiness  for  a resumption  of  the 
fight.  While  the  armies  were  in  this  ex- 
pectant condition,  a fire  broke  out  in  the 
forest,  on  the  north  side  of  the  plank 
road,  where  the  battle  had  raged  in  the 
morning.  In  consequence  of  the  dry- 
ness of  the  leaves  and  the  brushwood, 
it  spread  with  great  rapidity.  The 
wood  was  filled  with  the  dead  and 
wounded  of  both  armies ; the  wounded 
were  most  the  objects  of  anxiety  and 
care;  but  it  was  found  impossible  to 
remove  them  in  time  to  save  them  from 
the  flames.  The  smoke  arising  from 
the  burning  material  had  a strange, 
offensive  odor.  It  was  a sad  sio:ht.  It 
revealed  the  demon  of  war  in  one  of 
his  most  horrid  aspects.  In  spite  of 
all  this,  however,  Lee,  resolved  to  push 
his  advantage,  was  hurrying  forward 
his  preparations  for  a fresh  attack  on 
the  National  army  behind  its  rear  line 
of  works.  His  troops  and  artillery 
were  ordered  into  position,  ar^d  recon- 
noissances  were  made  of  the  National 
line.  It  was  evidently  Lee’s  intention 
to  strike  at  Hooker  a deadly  blow  be- 
fore Sedgwick  could  have  time  to  come 
up  from  Fredericksburg,  If  he  could 
drive  Hooker  from  behind  his  new  line 
of  fortifications,  force ' him  towards  the 
river,  he  might,  in  the  confusion  which 
must  result  from  any  attempt  at  crossing, 
succeed  in  capturing  or  destroying  the 
g I eater  portion  of  the  National  army. 
Success  was  not  to  attend  him  from  such 
calculations.  His  arrangements  were 


472 


CHANCELLORSVILLE. 


all  but  completed  ; his  arm  was,  so  to 
speak,  uplifted  and  ready  to  strike, 
when  the  blow  was  arrested,  and  his 
purpose  changed  by  a despatch,  which 
informed  him  of  the  capture  of  Marye’s 
Hill,  and  of  the  advance  of  Sedgwick. 

Leaving  the  army  of  Hooker  and  the 
amiy  of  Lee  in  the  positions  which  we 
•have  described,  let  us  now  turn  our  at- 
tention to  certain  important  movements 
which  have  been  made,  or  which  are  just 
about  to  be  made,  in  the  immediate  neigh- 
borhood of  Fredericksburg.  In  an  ear- 
lier part  of  this  chapter,  we  have  shown 
how,  and  for  what  purpose,  Sedgwick 
was  left  behind  at  Falmouth,  with  his 
own  corps — the  Sixth — and  also  with  the 
First  and  Third.  We  have  seen  how, 
after  the  demonsti*ation  successfully 
made  on  the  29th  of  April,  the  Third 
corps,  under  Sickles,  advanced  by  the 
north  bank  of  the  river,  crossed  at 
L^nited  States  Ford,  and  joined  Hooker 
at  Chancellorsville.  We  have  seen  how 
the  First  corps,  under  Reynolds,  follow- 
ing the  same  path,  joined  the  main  army 
on  the  night  of  the  2d  of  May.  We 
have  also  seen  how,  on  the  same  nio’ht 
after  the  fatal  surprise  by  Jackson, 
Sedgwick,  who  had  already  crossed  the 
Rappabannock  below  Fredericksburg, 
was  ordered  to  put  his  troops  in  motion 
immediately,  to  occupy  Fredericksburg, 
by  Gibbon’s  division,  of  Couch,  which 
had  been  left  behind  at  Falmouth,  to 
seize  the  heights  in  the  rear  of  the  city, 
to  gain  the  plank  road  leading  to  Chan- 
cellorsville, to  move  along  that  road 
towards  the  main  body  of  Hooker’s 
army,  and  to  be  at  the  place  assigned 
by  daylight  the  following  morning.  It 


remains  to  be  seen  how  this  order  was 
executed. 

It  was  past  eleven  o’clock,  on  the 
night  of  Saturday,  the  2d,  when  the 
order  was  received.  The  officers  and 
men  had  already  gone  to  sleep ; and  it 
was  midnio^ht  before  the  instructions 
to  advance  were  fully  communicated. 
Sedgwick  was  lying  on  the  south  bank 
of  the  river,  about  three  miles  below 
Fredericksburg.  Without  delay,  he 
put  his  corps  in  motion  by  the  flank, 
proceeding  towards  the  town.  It  was 
a critical  march.  On  the  right  was  the 
river,  about  a mile  distant ; on  the  left 
was  the  range  of  heights  on  which  the 
watch-fires  of  the  enemy  could  be  dis- 
tinctly seen.  The  column  was  long, 
and  exposed  along  its  whole  flank 
to  the  enemy  on  the  heights.  It 
was  moonlight;  but  a heavy  fog  had 
settled  over  the  low  ground  and  the 
river.  Newton  led  the  advance;  and 
his  instructions  were  that,  in  the  event 
of  any  attack  being  made,  the  regiments 
attacked  should  face  the  hills  and 
charge  without  further  instructions. 
The  head  of  the  column  had  advanced 
but  a short  distance,  when  it  encoun- 
tered the  Confederate  pickets.  There 
was  some  slow  marching,  and  some  little 
delay  was  experienced ; but  the  Confede- 
rates fell  back.  On  the  outskirts  of  the 
town,  on  the  banks  of  a small  creek,  the 
Confederate  skirmishers  were  again 
encountered ; but  they  were  driven 
back  without  much  difficulty.  The 
column  was  now  within  a short  distance 
of  Marye’s  Heights.  At  two  o’clock. 
General  Warren  arrived  from  Hooker’s 
headquarters,  his  object  being  to  hasten 


ATTACK  ON  MARYE’S  HILL. 


473 


forward  the  movement.  It  was  near 
dawn  when  the  head  of  the  column 
entered  Fredericksburg.  Here  Sedg- 
wick was  joined  by  Gibbon,  with  his 
division  of  the  Second  corps. 

We  have  already  mentioned  w'hat 
provision  Jackson  made  for  the  protec- 
tion of  Fredericksburg  and  the  heights, 
when  he  set  out  to  meet  Hooker  at 
Chancellorsville.  He  left  behind  him 
Early’s  division  of  four  brigades,  with 
Barksdale’s  brigade,  of  McLaws’  divi- 
sion. Barksdale  was  charged  with  the 
protection  of  the  heights  immediately  in 
the  rear  of  the  town,  including  Marye’s 
Hill  and  the  stone  wall,  made  famous 
by  the  Burnside  campaign.  His  bri- 
gade consisted  of  some  1400  men.  It 
was  disposed  as  follows : seven  compa- 
nies of  the  Twenty-First  Mississippi 
were  posted  between  the  Marye  House 
and  the  plank  road ; the  three  remaining 
companies  of  the  Twenty-First  were 
posted  on  the  telegraph  road,  at  the 
foot  of  Marye’s  Hill;  his  other  two 
regiments  were  on  the  hills  further  to 
the  right.  Batteries  were  set  up  at  Lee’s 
Hill,  and  at  the  Harrison  House;  while 
four  pieces  of  General  Pendleton’s 
artillery  were  stationed  at  the  Marye 
House,  two  on  the  right  and  two  on  the 
left.  As  soon  as  Early  was  made  aware 
of  Sedgwick’s  movement,  he  sent  Hays’ 
brigade  to  reinforce  Barksdale.  The 
Confederates,  it  is  manifest  from  the 
small  number  of  troops  left  at  this  point, 
had  perfect  confidence  in  their  ability 
to  hold  the  heights. 

As  soon  as  the  opening  dawn  per- 
mitted it,  Sedgwick  moved  forward 
four  regiments  from  the  town  in  the 


direction  of  the  heights.  As  they  ad- 
vanced stealthily  over  the  ground,  so 
sadly  memorable,  not  a sound  disturbed 
the  death-like  stillness  of  that  dull,  dark 
Sabbath  morning.  The  stillness,  how- 
ever, is  not  to  be  of  long  duration.  A 
few  paces  more,  and  the  regiments  will 
have  reached  the  fatal  stone  wall.  Sud- 
denly, and  simultaneously,  light  flashes  . 
from  the  summit  of  the  hill  and  from 
the  rifle-pits  at  the  base.  The  Con- 
federates have  opened  upon  them  with 
both  artillery  and  musketry.  The  regi- 
ments fall  back  under  cover  of  the  fog, 
but  not  without  considerable  loss.  This 
attempt  having  failed,  Sedgwick  now 
resolved  to  turn  the  Confederate  posi- 
tion. Howe  was  ordered  to  advance 
on  the  left  of  Hazel  Bun,  and  to  attack 
the  Confederate  right,  while  Gibbon 
was  ordered  to  move  up  the  river  and 
make  a vigorous  attack  on  the  Confede- 
rate left.  Howe  found  his  progress 
barred  by  the  strength  of  the  works  in 
his  front;  and  the  stream  deterred  him 
from  moving  to  the  right  and  attacking 
in  flank  the  works  at  Marye’s  Hill. 
Gibbon,  who  attempted  to  carry  out 
Sedgwick’s  instructions  on  the  extreme 
right,  had  no  better  success.  Having 
advanced  by  the  river  road,  he  found 
the  canal  impassable ; and  the  vigorous 
fire  which  was  opened  upon  him  from 
Taylor’s  Hill,  where  Wilcox,  who  had 
hurried  up  from  Banks’  Ford,  had 
planted  two  pieces  of  artillery,  com- 
pelled his  men  to  seek  shelter  in  the 
cuts  of  the  road.  These  experiments 
were  so  far  unsuccessful ; and  yet  it 
would  be  unjust  to  pronounce  them 
failures;  for  it  is  oftentimes  only  by 


474 


CHANCELLORSVILLE. 


such  experiments  that  a knowledge  of 
what  it  is  right  to  do  can  be  arrived  at. 
It  was  by  such  experiments  that  Gen- 
eral Grant  was,  at  last,  to  make  himself 
master  of  V icksburg.  Benefiting  by  th  e 
experience  thus  acquired,  and  knowing 
at  least  what  could  not  be  done,  Sedg- 
wick felt  that  he  was  left  no  alternative 
but  to  make  a powerful,  concentrated 
effort,  and  take  the  works  by  storm. 

It  was  now  near  ten  o’clock.  Precious 
time  had  unavoidably  been  lost.  If 
this  work  was  to  be  done,  it  must  be 
done  without  further  delay.  Newton 
was  ordered  to  send  foi’ward  two  storm- 
ing columns  against  Ma rye’s  Hill  and 
the  adjoining  works.  Howe,  who  was 
moi'e  to  the  left,  was  ordered  to  repeat 
his  attack  up  Hazel  Bun,  on  the  second 
line  of  heights.  Newton’s  right-hand 
column  was  composed  of  the  Sixty-First 
Pennsylvania,  and  Forty-Third  New 
York,  supported  by  the  Sixty-Seventh 
New  York  and  the  Eighty-Second  Penn- 
sylvania, and  was  commanded  by  Colonel 
Spear,  of  the  Sixty-First  Pennsylvania. 
His  left  was  composed  of  the  Seventh 
Massachusetts,  and  Thirty-Ninth  New 
York,  and  was  commanded  by  Colonel 
Johns,  of  the  Seventh  Massachusetts. 
These  columns  moved  up  the  plank 
road,  and  to  the  right.  Colonel  Burn- 
ham, with  four  regiments,  at  the  same 
time  moved  to  the  left  of  the  plank 
road,  and  directly  against  the  rifle-pits 
at  the  base  of  Marye’s  Hill.  The  Na- 
tional columns  meet  with  but  little  re- 
sistance, until  they  are  within  three 
hundred  yards  of  the  Confederate  works. 
At  this  point,  the  guns  on  the  hill  pour 
from  their  murderous  throats  a tre- 


mendous shower  of  canister.  Nothing 
dismayed,  the  columns  push  on,  until 
within  close  musket  range.  Here  the 
Confederate  infantry,  nsing  from  behind 
the  stone  wall,  open  upon  them  a ter- 
rific fire,  j The  Nationals  reel  and  stag- 
ger, and  threaten  to  break.  Quickly 
rallied,  they  rush  again  to  the  attack. 
The  storm  of  lead  abates  not.  The 
volleys  are  swifter  and  more  sure. 
Nothing,  however,  can  damp  the  cour- 
age, check  the  enthusiasm,  or  arrest  the 
progress  of  these  heroic  men.  Bight, 
left  and  centre,  each  emulous  of  the 
other,  nerved  by  the  same  purpose,  and 
inspired  by  the  same  hope,  press  eagerly 
forward.  Spear  falls;  but  Shaler  is  at 
hand.  The  right  is  rallied ; and  the 
attack  is  resumed.  Johns  is  wounded  ; 
but  Colonel  Walsh,  of  the  Thirty-Ninth 
New  York,  takes  the  brave  fellows  in 
charge;  and  the  left,  in  the  rivalry  and 
onward  rush,  resumes  and  maintains  its 
proud  position.  The  supporting  column 
vies  with  the  other  two;  and  Burnham, 
of  the  Sixth  Maine,  performs  deeds  of 
daring,  which  command  at  once  admir- 
ation and  envy.  It  is  a race  for  a prize ; 
and  the  prize  is  on  the  summit  of  the 
hill.  The  stone  wall  has  been  cleared  ; 
the  rifle-pits  have  been  seized  and 
silenced;  but  the  artillery  on  the  hill 
still  thunders  and  belches  forth  its  mur- 
derous shell  and  canister.  Ploughed 
through  and  through,  and  torn  to  pieces, 
their  comrades  falling  in  dozens  by  their 
side,  these  gallant  fellows  rush  fearlessly 
on.  There  is  a lull  in  the  thunderstorm 
of  artillery.  There  is  a loud-resound- 
ing cheer.  It  is  the  shout  of  victory. 
The  race  is  run ; the  task  is  accom- 


MAEYE’S  HILL  CAPTURED. 


475 


plisRed;  and  the  Union  flag  waves 
proudly  on  the  crest  of  Marye’s  Hill. 

While  Newton  has  been  carrying 
the  National  standard  to  victory  in  the 
centre,  success  not  dissimilar  has  been 
attending  Howe  on  the  left.  When 
pressing  forward  on  the  left  of  Hazel 
Run,  he  was  vigorously  confronted  by 
the  Confederate  skirmishers,  who  were 
intrenched  in  rifle-pits  behind  the  em- 
bankment of  the  Richmond,  Fredericks- 
burg and  Potomac  Railroad.  Lee’s 
Hill  and  the  adjacent  heights, ' which 
constituted  Howe’s  objective  point, 
were  occupied  by  the  Confederate  ar- 
tillery, and  by  their  main  line  of  infan- 
try. Howe  advanced  with  two  col- 
umns— six  regiments  composing  that 
on  the  right,  three  that  on  the  left. 
There  was  a third  column,  which  moved 
still  further  to  the  left,  and  which  was 
instructed  to  strike  the  Confederate 
position  in  the  rear,  and  then  co-operate 
with  the  others  when  they  should  have 
carried  the  works  in  front.  Three  res:- 
iments  of  the  principal  column  to  the 
right,  getting  separated  from  the  others, 
crossed  the  Run,  and  took  part  in  the 
attack  on  Marye’s  Hill.  The  remain- 
der pushed  forward,  and  soon  obtained 
a Arm  footing  on  Lee’s  Hill.  Here,  for 
a time,  the  struggle  was  vigorously 
maintained.  After  the  capture  of 
Marye’s  Hill,  Lee’s  Hill  and  the  ad- 
joining heights  were  no  longer  tenable. 
The  Confederates,  therefore,  abandoned 
the  works,  and  fell  back  by  the  tele- 
graph road.  In  addition  to  the  actual 
gain  of  the  position,  five  guns  and  a 
considerable  number  of  prisoners  re- 
warded this  brilliant  feat  of  arms. 


Early  hurried  up  from  Hamilton’s 
Crossing,  and  the  pursuit  of  the  retreat- 
ing Confederates  was  discontinued  ; but 
the  entire  range  of  hills  in  the  rear, 
and  to  the  south  of  Fredericksburg, 
was  in  Sedgwick’s  possession. 

It  was  as  yet  only  eleven  o’clock. 
In  this  brief  struggle,  there  had  been  a 
fearful  loss  of  life.  In  the  space  of 
ten  minutes,  when  the  conflict  raged 
most  fiercely  at  the  base  of  Marye’s 
Hill,  nearly  1000  men  were  killed  or 
wounded.  The  Confederates  suffered  as 
severely,  as  they  bravely  fought.  The 
rifle-pits  were  full  of  dead  and  dying 
men,  who  fell,  many  of  them,  in  a hand- 
to-hand  struggle.  In  addition  to  the 
loss  of  the  rank  and  file,  the  Nationals 
lost  some  of  their  ablest  officers, 
among  whom  was  the  gallant  Colonel 
Spear,  and  Majors  Bassett,  Faxon  and 
Haycock.  But  the  sacrifice  had  not 
been  made  in  vain.  The  heights  had 
been  carried ; the  Confederate  forces 
were  divided ; and  the  plank  road 
which  led  direct  to  Chancellorsville 
was  open.  Sedgwick  was  now  free  to 
advance  to  the  assistance  of  Hooker. 
He  did  not  know  that  the  latter  had 
already  been  driven  behind  his  last  line 
of  intrenchments. 

It  was  this  alarming  state  of  things 
which  was  reported  to  Lee  when,  elated 
with  success,  he  was  about  to  strike  a 
final  blow  at  Chancellorsville.  Lee 
found  himself  in  a most  critical  situa- 
tion. There  were  several  courses  open 
to  him ; but  every  one  of  them  was  be- 
set with  difficulty.  He  might  carry  out 
his  original  purpose,  and  fall  on  Hooker 
with  all  his  might,  cripple  or  destroy 


476 


CHANCELLORSVILLE. 


•him,  and  then  give  his  attention  to 
Sedgwick ; but  in  that  case,  he  would 
expose  himself  to  the  risk  of  being  at- 
tacked by  Sedgwick  in  flank  and  rear. 
He  might  fall  back  towards  Fredericks- 
burg, meet  and  demolish  Sedgwick,  and 
being  relieved  from  all  danger  in  this 
direction,  face  about  and  press  matters 
to  a flnal  issue  with  Hooker;  but  in 
that  case,  he  would  be  exposing  him- 
self to  a similar  and  even  greater  risk ; 
for  Hooker  might  sally  forth  from  his 
intrenchments  and  fall  with  crushing 
effect  on  his  rear.  He  might  remain  in 
his  present  position,  defer  his  meditated 
attack  on  Hooker,  detach  a sufiicient 
number  to  check  or  destroy  Sedgwflck, 
leaving  events  themselves  to  determine 
in  which  direction  the  first  crushing 
blow  should  be  dealt ; but  in  that  case, 
he  would  run  the  risk  of  being  com- 
pelled to  fight  two  battles  at  once,  if  in- 
deed, he  was  not  caught  as  in  a vice, 
between  two  powerful  armies.  The 
last  course,  perilous  as  it  was,  was  the 
one  he  adopted.  It  was  a course  justi- 
fied by  the  highest  principles  of  the 
military  art,  and  sanctioned  by  some  of 
the  greatest  examples  of  the  past. 
Never  over-bold,  Lee  had  an  advantage 
over  most  of  the  generals,  either  in  the 
Confederate  or  National  armies,  in  cool- 
ness of  head  and  clearness  of  vision. 
He  had,  also,  great  steadiness  of  pur- 
pose. In  some  of  these  qualities  he  was 
approached  by  McClellan ; but  the  un- 
questionably great  talents  of  that  gen- 
eral were  ruined  by  his  excess  of  caution. 
In  all  that  made  Lee  a great  general, 
he  was  equalled  only  by  Grant ; but 
Grant  surpassed  him  in  self-reliance,  in 


strength  of  will,  in  deep  intensity  of 
purpose,  and  in  a certain  bull-dog  tena- 
city of  grip.  In  the  present  instance,  as 
the  result  proved,  Lee’s  judgment  stood 
him  in  good  stead.  He  had  wisely 
measured  Hooker.  He  believed  that 
with  a reasonable  show  of  force,  he 
could  keep  him  behind  his  intrench- 
ments. Without  delay,  therefore,  he 
detached  McLaws,  with  his  own  three 
brigades — those  of  Wofford,  Semmes 
and  Kershaw — together  with  Mahone’s 
brigade,  of  Anderson’s  division,  with 
instructions  to  advance  towards  Fred- 
ericksburg, to  co-operate  with  Wilcox 
and  Barksdale,  and  the  other  troops 
under  Early,  with  a view  to  the  inter- 
ception or  destruction  of  Sedgwick. 

After  the  capture  of  the  heights, 
Sedgwick  pursued  the  retreating  Con- 
federates about  two  miles  along  the  tele- 
graph road ; but  at  that  point.  Early, 
who  had  come  up  from  Hamilton’s 
Crossing,  halted  the  commands  of  Barks- 


dale and  Hays,  and  reinforced  them 
with  three  regiments  of  Gordon’s  bri- 
gade. Sedgwick  had  no  motive  in 
pushing  along  the  telegraph  road.  His 
destination  was  Chancellorsville.  He, 
therefore,  discontinued  the  pursuit,  and 
turned  towards  the  plank  road.  He 
had  advanced  but  a little  way  when  he 
found  the  Confederates  in  some  strength 
on  the  ridge,  which  stretches  along 
the  road  from  Guest’s  to  Stansbury. 
It  was  Wilcox’s  brigade.  Wilcox,  it 
will  be  remembered,  was  at  Taylor’s 
Hill,  when  the  attempt  was  made  by 
Gibbon  to  cross  the  canal  and  turn  the 
Confederate  left.  Hays  was  at  Stans- 
burv’s  Hill.  When  the  combined  attack 


THE  TOLLGATE. 


477 


was  made  on  Marye’s  Hill  and  to  the 
left,  they  had  been  ordered  to  come  up, 
but  they  had  not  had  time ; and  so 
rapid  was  the  advance  of  Sedgwick, 
that  they  found  themselves — Wilcox 
with  his  whole  brigade,  and  Hays 
with  a portion  of  his — cut  off  from 
the  main  body  of  the  Confederates,  and 
left  on  the  north  side  of  the  plank  road. 
Hays,  by  retreating  parallel  to  the 
road,  succeeded  in  getting  round  the 
head  of  the  National  advance,  and  re- 
joining Early.  Wilcox  remained  be- 
hind; and,  yielding  to  the  instincts  of 
a true  soldier,  as  well  as  resolved  to 
make  the  best  use  possible  of  the  means 
at  his  disposal,  drew  up  his  brigade  in 
line  on  the  ridge  above  referred  to,  and 
placed  in  position  four  pieces  of  artil- 
lery. Sedgwick  was  now  advancing 
slowly,  and  with  great  caution.  Wil- 
cox, for  a time,  offered  a spirited  resist- 
ance, and  greatly  annoyed  the  National 
advance.  The  Nationals  coming  up  in 
greater  force,  Wilcox,  fearing  lest  he 
should  be  surrounded,  fell  back  to  the 
river  road,  about  half  a mile  in  rear  of 
Taylor’s  House.  Sedgwick  was  still  ad- 
vancing with  slow  and  cautious  steps. 
Taking  courage  from  the  leisurely  move- 
ment of  the  National  troops,  and  deter- 
mined to  retard  their  progress  as  much 
as  possible,  Wilcox  again  pushed  for- 
ward his  brigade,  with  the  artillery, 
this  time  taking  position  in  the  neigh- 
borhood of  Salem  Church,  some  five 
miles  distant  from  Fredericksburo:.  The 
heights  in  the  vicinity  of  the  church, 
extending  on  both  sides  of  the  road, 
and  about  two  hundred  and  fifty  yards 
to  the  east,  were  thickly  wooded.  Be- 


yond the  wood,  and  on  slightly  lower 
ground,  there  were  cleared  fields  spread- 
ing out  on  both  sides  of  the  road,  and 
reaching  as  far  as  and  beyond  the  toll- 
gate,  which  was  distant  from  the  church 
about  one  thousand  yards.  Advancing 
his  troops  to  the  toll-gate,  and  placing 
two  rifled  pieces  on  the  road,  Wilcox 
awaited  the  approach  of  Sedgwick.  He 
had  not  long  to  wait ; for  Collins  and 
the  cavalry  skirmishers  came  up  almost 
immediately.  The  artillery  on  both 
sides  opened  fire  at  once.  Meanwhile, 
McLaw^s,  who  had  come  up  with  his 
three  brigades,  was  taking  position  on 
the  high  ground  in  the  rear  of  Wilcox, 
and  to  the  right  and  left.  As  soon  as 
McLaws  came  up,  he  ordered  Wilcox 
to  fall  back  on  Salem  Church. 

It  was  now  four  o’clock.  The  Con- 
federates were  well  posted.  The  ground 
was  high,  and,  as  we  have  seen,  well 
wooded.  McLaws  had  drawn  up  his 
line  of  battle  perpendicular  to  the  road. 
Mahone  was  on  his  extreme  left,  then 
Semmes,  tben  Wilcox — who,  having 
fallen  back,  crossed  the  road,  having 
three  regiments  on  the  right  or  south 
of  it,  and  two  on  the  left — and  then 
Kershaw.  Wofford  came  up  later,  and 
took  position  on  Kershaw's  right.  The 
artillery  was  so  disposed  as  to  command 
the  road,  and  to  cover  both  flanks.  On 
the  road,  in  the  front  of  his  centre, 
Wilcox  had  four  guns.  Troops  were 
posted  in  the  church,  and  also  in  the 
school-house,  some  sixty  yards  in  ad- 
vance. Scarcely  had  these  ari-ange- 
ments  been  completed,  when  the  Na- 
tionals came  up  in  force.  Sedgwick 
threw  forward  Brooks’  division,  which 


478 


CHANCELLORSVILLE. 


had  moved  up  the  road  and  on  both 
sides  of  it.  Brooks  was  followed  by 
Newton,  in  support.  Bartlett’s  brigade 
was  on  the  National  left,  and  the  First 
New  Jersey  on  the  right.  Getting  his 
guns  into  position  at  the  toll-gate, 
Sedgwick  opened  a terrific  fire,  shell- 
ing the  woods  to  the  right  and  to  the 
left.  The  Confederate  artillery  for 
some  minutes  replied  with  great  spirit. 
Gradually,  however,  the  fire  slackens; 
and  the  skirmishers  fall  back,  first  to  the 
wood  and  then  to  their  line  of  battle. 
The  Nationals,  having  passed  on  to  the 
edge  of  the  road,  uttered  a loud  and 
triumphant  cheer,  and  then  rushed  for- 
ward to  the  charge.  When  within 
about  eighty  yards  of  the  opposing 
line,  the  Confederates,  who  had  re- 
served their  fire,  opened  upon  them  a 
tremendous  volley.  The  effect  was 
dreadful.  The  National  line  wavered, 
but  it  was  only  for  a moment.  Bartlett 
dashed  forward ; and,  in  a second,  the 
school-house  was  surrounded,  and  the 
garrison  captured.  A few  minutes  more, 
and  he  has  fallen  with  crushing  weight 
on  the  line  in  the  rear,  and  nearly  de- 
molished a whole  regiment.  The  Con- 
federates waver  and  break,  yielding  the 
ground  to  the  advancing  and  triumph- 
ant Nationals.  The  crest  has  been  won. 
At  this  point,  however,  the  tide  of  vic- 
tory turned.  Wilcox  had  still  in  re- 
serve the  Ninth  Alabama  regiment. 
At  this  supreme  moment,  when  all 
seemed  lost,  he  hurled  this  regiment 
upon  the  advancing  Nationals.  Firing 
at  close  quarters,  the  Alabamians 
charged  with  great  fury.  The  shock 
was  irresistible.  The  Nationals  yield- 


ed, and  fell  back  in  terror.  In  vain  did 
Bartlett  strive  to  hold  the  advantage 
he  had  won.  At  this  point  the  strug- 
gle was  most  fierce.  Sedgwick  hurried 
forward  his  second  line ; but  it  was  to 
little  puwpose.  The  fury  of  the  Con- 
federate onset,  the  weight  of  the  pres- 
sure, was  irresistible.  Step  by  step  the 
Nationals  were  driven  back — back  be- 
hind the  school-house,  which  was  recap- 
tured and  reoccupied  by  the  Confed- 
erates— back  through  the  open  fields,  in 
which  it  was  found  impossible  to  make 
a fresh  stand — back  to  the  toll-gate, 
where  the  retreating  columns  were 
sheltered,  and  the  enemy’s  advance  was 
checked  by  the  well-directed  fire  of 
Tompkins’  batteries.  It  was  now  night ; 
and  neither  the  one  side  nor  the  other 
seemed  anxious  to  prolong  the  contest. 
Sedgwick  had  not  been  defeated ; but 
he  had  met  with  a bloody  repulse. 

Sunday,  the  3d  of  May,  in  spite  of 
the  ray  of  promise  revealed  on  the 
heights  of  Fredericksburg,  was  a day 
of  disaster  to  the  National  cause.  All 
the  plans  of  the  morning  had  been 
frustrated.  Lee,  in  place  of  being 
crushed  between  the  two  wings  of  the 
National  army,  had  whipped  first  the 
one  and  then  the  other ; and  while 
Hooker,  with  his  splendid  army,  was 
shut  up,  prisoner-like,  behind  his  own 
intrench  men  ts,  Sedgwick  was  being 
effectually  hindered  from  coming  to  his 
relief. 

On  Monday,  the  4th,  the  opposing  ar- 
mies found  themselves  in  a pecu-  j>iay 
liar  plight.  The  final  upshot  of 
the  campaign  was  revealing  itself  more 
and  more  clearly.  But  it  could  not  be 


/ SALEM 

said  that  on  either  side  the  danger  was 
past;  nor  could  it  be  predicted  with 
confidence  which  should  win  the  vic- 
tory. Lee,  so  far,  had  been  successful 
in  wooing  or  forcing  the  favors  of  for- 
tune. But  his  hands  w'ere  full.  Hooker 
was  evincing  no  signs  of  a disposition 
to  resume  the  offensive,  and  was,  to  all 
appearance,  contented  to  remain  inac- 
tive behind  his  lines  at  Chancellors- 
ville ; but  he  had  under  him  a mighty 
army,  whole  divisions  of  which  had 
taken  no  part  in  the  contest.  Sedg- 
wick had  been  checked ; but  his  num- 
bers were  considerably  greater  than 
those  by  which  he  was  opposed ; and 
any  attempt  made  by  Lee  to  strengthen 
his  right  wing  would  necessarily  weaken 
his  left,  already  too  w^eak  to  resist  a 
vigorous  sortie,  if  Hooker  should  make 
up  his  mind  to  rush  from  behind  his 
iutrenchments.  Lee,  however,  was  not 
slow  to  decide.  His  final  success  seemed 
to  him  to  depend  on  his  first  crushing 
Sedgwick,  or  driving  him  across  the 
Rappahannock,  and  then  falling  back 
with  his  whole  weight  and  dealing  a 
decisive  blow  on  Hooker.  Early  was, 
therefore,  ordered  up  from  below  Fred- 
ericksburg, with  instructions  to  retake 
the  heights  in  the  rear  of  the  town, 
and  to  press  on  against  Sedgwick’s 
right.  At  the  same  time,  leaving  three 
of  Jackson’s  divisions  to  hold  Hooker 
in  check,  Lee  pushed  forward  the 
three  remaining  brigades  of  Anderson 
in  the  direction  of  Salem  Church.  Thus 
strengthened,  the  Confederate  force 
in  front  of  Sedgwick  amounted  to 
23,000  men.  The  rival  forces  in 
this  direction  were  now  about  equal. 


CHURCH.  m 

Anderson  was  to  take  position  on 
McLaws’  right,  with  the  view  of  forming 
a connection  with  Early.  Lee  went  for- 
ward in  person  to  direct  operations. 

On  Monday  morning,  Sedgwick  found 
himself  confronted  by  McLaws,  and 
threatened  in  the  rear  by  Early.  The 
latter  had  experienced  little  difficulty 
in  recapturing  the  heights.  Sedgwick, 
although  not  yet  aware  of  the  approach 
of  Anderson  and  Lee  in  person,  tele- 
graphed to  General  Hooker  that  large 
masses  of  the  enemy  were  moving  from 
his  right  to  his  left,  and  asking  whether 
the  main  army  could  support  him.  The 
answer  was  that  no  support  must  be 
expected.  Sedgwick,  cut  off  from  Fred- 
ericksburg by  the  advance  of  Early, 
formed  his  line  so  as  to  cover  Banks’ 
Ford  and  the  pontoon  bridge  near 
that  point.  Howe  was  upon  his  left ; 
Brooks  was  upon  the  right  of  Howe, 
and  at  right  angles  to  him  on  the  plank 
road;  and  Newton  was  on  the  right  of 
the  line,  perpendicular  to  the  road, 
much  as  he  had  been  the  previous 
evening.  It  was  noon  before  Anderson 
arrived  at  Salem  Church.  Preparations 
for  the  attack  were  not  completed  until 
about  six  o’clock,  although  there  had 
been  skirmishing,  both  on  the  National 
right  and  left,  from  an  early  hour. 
Sedgwick,  perceiving  that  he  was  about 
to  be  attacked  both  in  front  and  rear, 
had  notified  Hooker  that  his  position 
was  untenable,  and  that  the  bridges 
might  be  sacrificed,  and  had  received 
for  answer  that  he  must  not  cross  the 
river  ‘‘unless  compelled  to  do  so.”  At 
the  appointed  time — it  was  close  upon 
six  o’clock — the  signal  was  given^ 


480 


CHANCELLORSVILLE. 


and  tlie  Confederates  moved  to  the  at 
tack  along  the  whole  line.  It  was 
made  with  great  impetuosity.  The  Na- 
tionals resisted  with  great  stubborn- 
ness ; but  they  were  compelled  to  fall 
back  towards  the  river,  Sedgwick  still 
holding  possession  of  Banks’  Ford. 
The  fighting  was  severe,  both  armies 
suffering  terribly.  Darkness  ensued ; 
and  the  nature  of  the  country  was  such 
that  the  Confederates  were  prevented 
from  following  up  their  advantage. 
Under  cover  of  the  night,  having  re- 
ceived permission  to  withdraw,  Sedg- 
wick recrossed  the  river  at  Banks’  Ford 
with  his  whole  force.'^f  The  last  bri- 
gade had  crossed  before  day-break.  In 
the  three  engagements — the  storming 
of  the  heights,  the  battle  of  Sunday, 
and  the  battle  of  Monday — Sedgwick 
had  lost  5000  men. 

It  was,  no  doubt,  a great  misfortune 

* At  one  o’clock,  A.  M.,  on  the  5th,  in  reply  to  a des- 
patch sent  to  Hooker  at  11.45  on  the  night  of  the  4th, 
General  Butterfield  wrote  to  Sedgwick  to  “withdraw 
under  cover.”  The  movement  to  recross  was  at  once 
commenced,  and  by  five  o’clock  on  the  following  morn- 
ing, the  troops  were  all  on  the  other  side,  and  the 
bridges  taken  up.  When  the  last  brigade  was  crossing, 
an  order  was  received  from  Hooker  countermanding 
the  withdrawal.  This  latter  order  was  based  on  a 
despatch  of  Sedgwick,  sent  in  the  afternoon,  stating 
that  he  could  hold  a position  south  of  the  Kappahan- 
nock — a despatch  which  reached  Hooker  subsequent  to 
the  one  which  called  forth  the  permission  to  withdraw. 
We  subjoin  the  last  order  and  the  reply. 

5,  18G3— 1.20  A.  M. 

“ Genekal  Sedgwick  : 

“Yours  received  one  A.  M.,  saying  that  you  should 
hold  position.  Order  to  withdraw  countermanded. 
Acknowledge  both. 

“Joseph  Hooker, 
“Major-General  Commanding.” 

To  this  Sedgwick  replied,  at  5 A.  M.  : 

“ The  bridges  at  Banks’  Ford  are  swung,  and  in  pro- 
cess of  being  taken  up.  The  troops  are  much  exhaust- 
ed. The  despatch  contermanding  my  movement  over 
the  river  was  received  after  the  troops  had  crossed.” 


that  Sedgwick  did  not  succeed  in  form- 
ing a junction  with  Hooker.  That  he 
did  his  best  to  accomplish  this  object, 
no  impartial  mind,  in  view  of  all  the 
facts,  can  refuse  to  admit.  It  is  greatly 
to  be  regr,etted  that  General  Hooker,  in 
his  testimony  before  the  Committee  of 
Congress  on  the  conduct  of  the  war, 
should  have  so  far  forgotten  himself  as 
attribute  his  defeat  at  Chancellorsville 
to  the  failure  of  Sedgwick  to  join  him 
on  Sunday  morning.  The  reader  of 
these  pages,  unless  we  greatly  mistake, 
must  have  come  to  another  and  very 
different  conclusion;  and  we  do  not 
see  how  the  cruel  and  most  unjust  charge 
of  Hooker  can  ever  be  endorsed  by  the 
impartial  historian.  ‘Hn  my  judgment,” 
says  Hooker,  “ General  Sedgwick  did 
not  obey  the  spirit  of  my  order,  and 
made  no  sufi&cient  effort  to  obey  it. 
His  movement  was  delayed  so  long  that 
the  enemy  discovered  his  intentions; 
and  when  that  was  done,  he  was  neces- 
sarily delayed  in  the  further  execution 
of  the  order.”  It  is  unnecessary  to  re- 
peat what  we  have  already  said,  believ- 
ing, as  we  do,  that  our  narrative  is  suf- 
ficient disproof  of  these  assertions.  We 
ajxree  with  Swinton — whose  observa- 
tions,  at  the  close  of  his  account  of  the 
battle  of  Chancellorsville,  reveal  the 
keen  sense  of  the  military  critic,  and 
whose  arguments  are  unanswerable — in 
pronouncing  this  statement  of  Hooker 
to  be  ‘‘  a cruel  charge  to  bring  against 
a commander,  now  beyond  the  reach 
of  detraction ; whose  brilliant  exploit 
in  carrying  the  Fredericksburg  Heights, 
and  his  subsecpient  fortitude  in  a try- 
incr  situation,  shine  out  as  the  one  re- 


RETREAT  ACROSS  THE  RAPPAHANNOCK. 


481 


lieving  brightness,  amid  the  gloom  of 
that  hapless  battle.” 

It  was  felt  by  both  parties  that  the 
struggle  and  defeat  of  Sedgwick  on 
Monday  had  decided  the  contest.  Some 
of  the  National  generals  were  willing, 
and  even  anxious,  to  make  another  ef- 
fort. All  fight,  however,  seemed  to 
have  passed  out  of  Hooker ; and  he  re- 
solved to  retire  his  troops  to  the  north 
bank  of  the  river.  Preparations  for 
}Iay  fiiis  movement  wei’e  begun  on  the 
morning  of  Tuesday,  May  5th. 
The  engineers  were  ordered  to  prepare 
a new  line  near  the  river,  so  as  to  cover 
the  crossing.  The  roads  and  bridges 
were,  in  consequence,  repaired ; and  an 
interior  line  of  works  was  constructed 
from  Scott’s  Dam  to  the  mouth  of 
Hunting  Run,  on  the  Rapidan,  a dis- 
tance of  three  miles.  Lee,  eager  to  | 
push  the  advantage  he  had  gained,  and 
impatient  to  deal  a deadly  blow  before 
his  antagonist  should  have  time  to  es- 
cape, left  Early’s  division  and  Barks- 
dale’s brigade  to  guard  the  river  from 
Banks’  Ford  to  Fredericksburg  and  the 
crossings  below,  and  ordered  Anderson 
and  McLaws  to  hurry  back  to  Chancel- 
lorsville.  Early  in  the  afternoon,  a vio- 
lent rain-storm  broke  out.  It  continued 
during  the  remainder  of  the  day, 
deluging  the  spongy  soil,  swelling  the 
streams  to  overflow,  and  covering  the 
low  flats  with  water.  It  was  late, 
in  consequence,  when  the  Confederate 
troops  had  reached  their  destination  at 
Chancellorsville.  As  the  storm  con- 
tinued to  rage,  nothing  could  be  done 
till  the  following  morning.  The  ele- 
ments on  this  occasion,  while  they  de- 


layed the  Confederates,  and  made  an 
attack  impossible  on  the  National  posh 
tion,  were  scarcely  less  unkind  to  the 
Nationals.  The  river  was  rising  rapid- 
ly, and  the  bridges  were  in  peril.  The 
National  generals  were  divided  as  to 
the  course  which  should  be  pursued. 
Some  of  them  were  in  favor  of  an  ad- 
vance. Others  deemed  it  more  prudent 
to  withdraw.  The  attempt  was  made. 
Straw  and  branches  were  laid  on  the 
bridges,  to  deaden  the  noise  of  the 
trains,  which  were  sent  over  first.  The 
trains  having  been  safely  transported, 
the  troops  followed  in  order;  and  so, 
during  a night  in  which  nature  seemed 
strangely  in  sympathy  with  the  situa- 
tion, fretting  and  fuming,  and  as  if 
scowling  upon  defeat,  the  great  army 
of  the  Potomac,  which  was  to  put  the 
I enemy  to  inglorious  flight,  found  itself, 
after  a feeble  campaign  of  six  days,  in- 
gloriously  transported  to  the  northern 
banks  of  the  Rappahannock.  In  the 
morning,  when  Lee  advanced  to  attack, 
he  found  that  his  enemy  was  gone. 

The  losses  in  the  battle  of  Chancel- 
lorsville were  heavy.  The  Confederate 
loss,  according  to  General  Lee,  amount- 
ed to  13,000,  of  whom  1581  were  killed, 
8700  wounded,  and  nearly  3000  prison- 
ers. Hooker’s  loss  was  1 7, 1 9 7,  of  whom 
5000  were  unwounded  prisoners.  He 
had  lost,  also,  14  pieces  of  artillery  and 
20,000  stand  of  arms. 

It  will  be  remembered  that  it  was 
Hooker’s  intention  that  the  cavalry 
force  of  his  army  should  play  an  im- 
portant part  in  this  campaign.  We 
mentioned  in  the  earlier  portion  of  this 
chapter  that  the  entire  cavalry  force  of 


CHANCELLORSVILLE. 


m 


the  army  of  the  Potomac  had  been  or- 
ganized in  four  divisions,  making  one 
distinct  and  separate  corps,  under  the 
command  of  General  Stoneman.  His 
four  division  officers  were  Pleasonton, 
Buford,  Averill  and  Gregg.  The  corps 
numbered  from  10,000  to  13,000  sabres. 
Neither  at  Chancellorsville  nor  at  Fred- 
ericksburg nor  at  Salem  have  we  seen 
much  of  this  branch  of  Hooker’s  army. 
Some  account  of  the  operations  of 
this  corps  is  necessary,  to  complete 
the  story  of  the  Chancellorsville  cam- 
paign. 

As  early  as  the  12th  of  April,  Stone- 
man  went  forth  on  his  expedition,  the 
principal  object  of  which  was  to  de- 
stroy the  railroads,  bridges  and  other 
means  of  communication  in  Lee’s  rear, 
and  so  cut  him  off  from  Richmond. 
He  rode  up  the  Rappahannock,  and 
attempted  to  effect  a crossing.  On  the 
14th,  he  had  succeeded  in  throwing 
over  one  division ; but  a violent  storm 
coming  on,  and  the  low  grounds  becom- 
ing flooded,  the  division  was  recalled, 
the  horses  taking  to  the  water,  and 
bravely  swimming  to  the  opposite  bank. 
As  the  weather  did  not  improve,  and 
the  upper  Rappahannock  was  still 
flooded,  Stoneman  remained  inactive 
until  the  general  advance  movement  of 
the  whole  army  was  commenced  on 
the  27th.  On  the  28th,  he  crossed  the 
Rappahannock  at  Kelley’s  Ford,  at  the 
same  time  with  the  main  body.  On 
the  following  day,  he  crossed  at  Mor- 
ton’s Ford  and  at  Racoon  Ford.  In 
the  meantime,  by  order  of  General 
Hooker,  Stoneman  had  divided  his 
troops  into  two  columns.  ^ One  column. 


which  consisted  of  about  4000  men, 
under  .General  Averill,  was  ordered  to 
move  on  the  Orange  and  Alexandria 
Railroad,  the  main  body,  under  Stone- 
man in  person,  being  charged  with  the 
destructiop  of  the  Richmond  and  Fred- 
ericksburg Railroad.  Averill  encoun- 
tered a cavalry  force,  under  W.  H.  F. 
Lee,  on  the  Ist  of  May,  near  Rapidan 
Station.  Lee,  after  burning  the  bridge 
over  the  river,  retired  to  Gordonsville. 
Averill  moved  to  the  north  along  the 
railroad  as  far  as  Culpepper,  dispersing 
some  Confederate  troops  who  were 
there  assembled,  and  destroying  a large 
quantity  of  the  enemy’s  stores.  On  the 
2d,  he  was  recalled,  and  ordered  to 
join  Hooker  at  Chancellorsville.  At 
10.30  that  night  he  reached  Ely’s  Ford. 
Later  the  same  night,  he  was  sur- 
prised by  the  Confederate  cavalry ; and 
it  is  more  than  probable  that  he  would 
have  suffered  severely,  had  it  not  been 
that  the  fall  of  Jackson  and  the  acci- 
dent which  befell  Hill  almost  imme- 
diately afterwards,  compelled  Stuart  to 
return  with  all  haste,  and  take  com- 
mand of  the  Confederate  troops  near 
Chancellorsville.  Finding  it  difficult, 
or,  as  he  thought,  impossible,  from  the 
character  of  the  country,  to  operate 
cavalry  on  the  Confederate  left,  he  re- 
mained inactive  in  camp,  taking  no 
part  in  the  engagements  of  Sunday, 
the  3d  of  May.  Hooker,  on  account 
of  this,  displaced  him,  and  turned  over 
his  command  to  General  Pleasonton. 

It  was  the  3d  of  May  before  Stone- 
man reached  Louisa  Court  House,  and 
before  the  important  line  of  communi- 
cation by  the  Richmond  and  Fred- 


CAVALRY  MOVEMENTS. 


483 


ericksburg  Railroad  was  struck.  The 
troops  were  divided  into  six  bodies, 
and,  having  received  special  instruc- 
tions, were  sent  out  in  all  directions. 
Colonel  Wyndham,  with  his  party, 
proceeded  to  Columbia,  on  the  James 
River.  Here  the  river  is  crossed  by 
the  Lynchburg  and  Richmond  Canal. 
An  attempt  was  made  to  destroy  the 
aqueduct.  It  was  not  successful;  but 
the  canal  was  greatly  damaged,  and 
much  public  property  destroyed.  Fitz- 
Lee,  hearing  of  what  was  being  done  in 
that  direction,  made  a rush  towards 
Columbia.  Wyndham  retired  down  the 
river,  and  then,  changing  his  course,  re- 
joined Stoneman  at  Thompson’s  Cross- 
Roads  at  ten  o’clock  the  same  night. 
Colonel  Kilpatrick,  who  was  ordered 
to  move  in  the  direction  of  the  Chicka- 
hominy,  having  travelled  all  day  and 
all  night  Sunday,  reached  Hungary 
Station,  on  the  Fredericksburg  Rail- 
road, at  daylight  on  Monday.  At  this 
point,  he  destroyed  the  depots  and  tore 
up  the  railroads.  Crossing  to  Brook 
Turnpike,  he  advanced  to  within  two 
miles  of  Richmond.  He  then  moved 
to  Meadow  Bridge,  where  the  Central 
Railroad  crosses  the  Chickahominy. 
Having  destroyed  this  bridge,  and  an 
engine  which  he  intercepted,  he  crossed 
the  Pamunkey  at  Harristown,  to  avoid 
pursuit.  On  the  7th,  after  having 
crossed  the  Mattapony,  and  having 
raided  through  Essex  and  the  neighbor- 
ing counties,  he  reached  Gloucester 
Point,  having  encc^untered  by  the  way 
but  little  opposition.  Colonel  Davis, 
who  was  sent  down  the  South  Anna, 
struck  the  Fredericksburg  Railroad  at 


Ashland  on  Sunday  evening.  He  first 
captured  an  ambulance,  filled  with  the 
wounded  from  Chancellors ville.  Hav- 
ing destroyed  the  engines  and  torn  up 
a portion  of  the  railroad,  he  pushed  on 
towards  Hanover  Court  House,  on  the 
Central  Railroad.  Here  he  burned  the 
depot  and  tore  up  the  rails.  At  Tun- 
stall’s,  near  the  White  House,  he  en- 
countered a small  body  of  infantry, 
with  some  artillery,  and  fell  back  upon 
Gloucester  Point,  reaching  it  without 
much  further  difficulty.  Colonel  Gregg 
destroyed  the  bridge  across  the  South 
A.nna,  on  the  road  from  Columbia  to 
Spottsylvania ; thence  he  moved  east, 
and  destroyed  the  road  to  Beaver  Dam 
Station.  On  Tuesday,  the  5th,  the 
whole  command,  except  Davis  and  Kil- 
patrick, was  concentrated  at  Yancey- 
ville,  on  the  South  Anna ; and,  on  the 
evening  of  that  day,  the  retrogade 
movement  commenced.  On  the  Sth, 
the  whole  force  recrossed  Kelley’s  Ford, 
on  the  Rappahannock. 

This  raid  must  be  pronounced  a fail- 
ure. No  doubt  it  did  much  damage  to 
Confederate  property;  audit  must  have 
struck  terror  into  the  hearts  of  the 
peaceful  inhabitants.  But  it  failed  of 
its  object.  It  did  not  seriously  inter- 
fere with  General  Lee’s  operations.  It 
did  not  affect  his  commissariat  to  any 
appreciable  extent.  It  did  not  cut  him 
off  for  any  length  of  time  from  his 
communications  with  Richmond ; for  in 
three  or  four  days  the  railroad  was  re- 
paired and  in  excellent  running  order, 
and  navigation  on  the  canal  was  resumed. 
This  was  all  that  was  accomplished  by 
that  splendid  army  of  mounted  troops — ' 


484 


CHANCELLORSYILLE. 


in  appearance  one  of  the  most  magnifi- 
cent bodies  of  cavalry  that  ever  went 
forth  to  battle.  Employed  as  they 
were,  they  contributed  nothing  towards 
the  possible  success  of  the  campaign; 
they  won  no  glory,  for  they  found  no 
foe;  and,  when  General  Hooker  most 
needed  them,  they  were  not  available. 

On  Wednesday,  the  6th  of  May,  the 
army  of  the  Potomac — with  the  excep- 
]^ay  tion  of  the  cavalry,  which,  as  we 
have  seen,  did  not  cross  the  river 
till  two  days  later — resumed  its  old 
quarters  at  Falmouth.  On  that  day — 
and  with  a bad  taste  which  was  only 
in  keeping  with  his  blundering  con- 
duct since  the  moment  he  first  felt  the 
enemy,  in  the  advance  towards  the  open 
ground  in  the  rear  of  the  heights  at 
Fredericksburg — Hooker  issued  the  fol- 
lowing address  to  his  army : 

“ Headquarters  Army  of  the  Potomac,  ) 
May  6,  1863.  j 

The  major-general  commanding  ten- 
ders to  this  army  his  congratulations 
on  its  achievements  of  the  last  seven 
days.  If  it  has  not  accomplished  all 
that  was  expected,  the  reasons  are  well 
known  to  the  army.  It  is  sufficient  to 
say,  they  were  of  a character  not  to  be 
foreseen  or  prevented  by  human  sagacity 
or  resource. 

“In  withdrawing  from  the  south 
bank  of  the  Rappahannock,  before  de- 
livering a general  battle  to  our  adver- 
saries, the  army  has  given  renewed 
evidence  of  its  confidence  in  itself,  and 
its  fidelity  to  the  principles  it  repre- 
sents. On  fighting  at  a disadvantage, 
we  would  have  been  recreant  to  our 
trust,  to  ourselves,  our  cause,  and  our 


country.  Profoundly  loyal,  and  con- 
scious of  its  strength,  the  army  of  the 
Potomac  will  give  or  decline  battle 
whenever  its  interest  or  honor  may  de- 
mand. It  will  also  be  the  guai-dian  of 
its  own  history  and  its  own  arm.  By 
your  celerity  and  secrecy  of  movement, 
our  advance  and  passage  of  the  rivers 
was  undisputed ; and,  on  our  with- 
drawal, not  a rebel  ventured  to  follow. 

“The  events  of  last  week  may  swell 
with  pride  the  heart  of  every  officer 
and  soldier  of  this  army.  We  have 
added  new  lustre  to  its  former  renown. 
We  have  made  long  marches,  crossed 
rivers,  surprised  the  enemy  in  his  en- 
trenchments, and,  wherever  we  have 
fought,  have  infiicted  heavier  blows 
than  we  have  received.  We  have  taken 
from  the  enemy  5000  prisoners;  15 
colors;  captured  and  brought  off  7 
pieces  of  artillery ; placed  hors  de  com- 
bat 18,000  of  his  chosen  troops;  de- 
stroyed his  depots,  filled  with  vast 
amounts  of  stores  ;*  deranged  his  com- 
munications ; captured  prisoners  within 
the  fortifications  of  his  capital,  and 
filled  his  country  with  fear  and  con- 
sternation. We  have  no  other  regret 
than  that  caused  by  the  loss  of  our 
brave  companions,  and  in  this  we  are 
consoled  by  the  conviction  that  they 
have  fallen  in  the  holiest  cause  ever 
submitted  to  the  arbitrament  of  battle. 

“ By  command  of 

“Major-Gexeral  Hooker. 

“S.  Williams, 

“Assistant  Adj utant-General. ” 

General  Lee,  who  had  certainly  more 
reason  to  use  boastful  language,  is- 
sued an  address  to  his  soldiers  on  the 


LEE’S  ADDRESS  TO  HIS  ARMY. 


4«0 


7th ; but  he  writes  with  a dignity  and 
modesty  becoming  the  occasion. 

“Headquarters  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  ) 
May  7,  1863.  f 

With  heartfelt  gratification,  the 
general  commanding  expresses  to  the 
army  his  sense  of  the  heroic  conduct 
displayed  by  officers  and  men,  during 
the  arduous  operations  in  which  they 
have  just  been  engaged. 

Under  trying  vicissitudes  of  heat 
and  storm,  you  attacked  the  enemy, 
strongly  entrenched  in  the  depths  of  a 
tangled  wilderness,  and  again  on  the 
hills  of  Fredericksburg,  fifteen  miles 
distant,  and,  by  the  valor  that  has 
triumphed  on  so  many  fields,  forced 
him  once  more  to  seek  safety  beyond 
the  Happahannock.  While  this  glori- 
ous victory  entitles  you  to  the  praise 
and  gratitude  of  the  nation,  we  are  es- 
pecially called  upon  to  return  our  grate- 
ful thanks  to  the  only  Giver  of  vic- 
tory, for  the  signal  deliverance  He  has 
wrought.  It  is,  therefore,  earnestly 
recommended  that  the  troops  unite, 
on  Sunday  next,  in  ascribing  to  the 
Lord  of  Hosts  the  glory  due  His  name. 
Let  us  not  forget,  in  our  rejoicings, 
the  brave  soldiers  who  have  fallen  in 
defense  of  their  country;  and,  while 
we  moutn  their  loss,  lat  us  resolve  to 
emulate  their  noble  example.  The 
army  and  the  country  alike  lament  the 
absence,  for  a time,  of  one  to  whose 
bravery,  energy  and  skill  they  are  so 
much  indebted  for  success. 

“ The  following  letter  from  the  pres- 
ident of  the  Confederate  States,  is 
communicated  to  the  aiany  as  an  ex- 


pression of  his  appreciation  of  its 
success : 

‘ I have  received  your  despatch,  and  rever- 
ently unite  with  you  in  giving  praise  to  God 
for  the  success  with  which  He  has  crowned 
our  arms. 

‘ In  the  name  of  the  people,  I offer  my  cor- 
dial thanks  to  yourself,  and  the  troops  under 
your  command,  for  this  addition  to  the  unpre- 
cedented series  of  great  victories  which  your 
army  has  achieved. 

‘The  universal  rejoicing  produced  by  this 
happy  result  will  be  mingled  with  a general 
regret  for  the  good  and  the  brave  who  are 
numbered  among  the  killed  and  wounded.’ 

“H.  E.  Lee,  General.” 

On  the  8th,  the  following  des- 
patch was  sent  by  the  secretary  of 
war  to  the  governors  of  the  Northern 
States : 

“Washington,  May  8,  1863. 

‘‘The  president  and  general-in-chief 
have  just  returned  from  the  army  of 
the  Potomac.  The  principal  opera- 
tions of  General  Hooker  failed,  but 
there  has  been  no  serious  disaster  to 
the  organization  and  efficiency  of  the 
army.  It  is  now  occupying  its  former 
position  on  the  Happahannock,  having 
recrossed  the  river  without  any  loss  in 
the  movement.  Not  more  than  one 
third  of  General  Hooker’s  force  was  en- 
gaged. General  Stoneman’s  operations 
have  been  a Vjrilliant  success.  Part  of 
his  force  advanced  to  within  two  miles 
of  Hlchmond,  and  the  enemy’s  communi- 
cations have  been  cut  in  every  direction. 
The  army  of  the  Potomac  will  speedily 
resume  offensive  operations. 

“E.  M.  Stanton, 

“Secretary  of  War.” 


486 


CHANOELLORSVILLE. 


On  the  same  day,  President  Lincoln 
issued  the  famous  proclamation,  an- 
nouncing his  intention  to  enforce  the 
law  of  enrolment  and  draft,  which  had 
been  passed  by  Congress  at  its  previous 
session.  All  able-bodied  male  citizens, 
and  persons  of  foreign  birth,  who,  al- 
though not  yet  citizens,  had  declared 
their  intention  to  become  such,  were 
proclaimed  to  constitute  the  National 
forces,  and  to  be  liable  to  perform  mili- 
tary duty  in  the  service  of  the  United 
States,  when  called  out  by  the  presi- 
dent for  that  purpose.  It  was  evident 
that,  if  the  Confederates  had  acquired 
fresh  courage  and  fresh  hope  from 
this  latest  triumph,  the  government  at 
Washington  had  become  more  resolved 

Generat4  George  Hiram  Berry. — This  brave  and 
talented  officer  was  killed,  as  has  been  mentioned  in  the 
test,  during  the  second  day’s  fighting  at  Chancellorsville. 
It  was  his  division,  formerly  Hooker’s  own,  which,  on 
the  first  day,  saved  the  National  army  from  destruction. 
The  situation  was  already  desperate  when  Hooker  or- 
dered forward  this  choice  division.  “Go  in,  general,” 
said  IIo(iker;  “throw  your  men  into  the  breach  ; don’t 
fire  a shot — they  can’t  see  you — but  charge  home  wuth  the 
bayonet.  ” Never  was  a charge  more  nobly  made  or  more 
gallantly  sustained.  For  three  hours,  almost  alone,  this 
division  resisted,  and  even  repelled,  the  fierce  onslaughts 
of  the  already  triumphant  enemy.  On  the  ground 
which  he  had  won.  Berry  resumed  the  battle  early  the 
following  morning.  Determined  to  drive  the  Confed- 
erates back,  he  thrust  his  brigades  forward,  making 
several  successful  charges.  In  one  of  these,  while  at 
the  head  of  his  men,  and  cheering  them  on,  he  was  in- 
stantly killed.  Berry  w'as  a native  of  Kockland,  Maine, 
where  he  was  born  on  the  27th  of  August,  1824.  Bred 
a carpenter,  he  subsequently  devoted  himself  to  navi- 


than  ever  to  put  down  the  rebellion 
and  to  restore  the  Union.  The  spirit 
which  prevailed  at  Washington  was 
the  same  spirit  which,  except  among 
certain  classes  who  had  never  been  in 
favor  of  the  war, . pervaded  and  ani- 
mated the  whole  people. 

Such,  then,  is  the  story  of  the  great 
but,  to  the  National  forces,  disastrous 
battle  of  Chancellorsville — a battle  in 
which,  as  has  been  well  said,  the 
rank  and  hie  had  been  foiled  without 
being  fought,  and  caused  to  retreat 
without  the  consciousness  of  having 
been  beaten.”  After  the  battle.  Gen- 
eral Hooker’s  reputation  suffered  an 
eclipse  from  which  it  has  not  yet 
fully  recovered. 

gation.  Later,  he  cultivated  a taste  for  military  affairs, 
and  was  the  originator  of  the  Bockland  Guard — a vol- 
unteer company  which,  before  the  war,  had  attained  a 
high  state  of  efficiency.  He  was  several  times  elected 
to  the  State  legislature  by  his  fellow-townsmen,  and 
Mas  once  mayor  of  Bockland.  When  the  war  broke 
out,  he  entered  the  volunteer  service  as  colonel  of  the 
Fourth  Maine  regiment.  He  fought  at  Bull  Bun.  He 
M as  raised  to  the  rank  of  brigadier-general  in  April, 
18(i2.  He  M'as  in  the  peninsula  Muth  McClellan,  and, 
as  commander  of  the  Third  brigade  of  the  Third  divi- 
sion, of  Heintzelman’s  corps,  took  part  in  most  of  the 
engagements.  He  followed  the  fortunes  of  Pope  in 
Virginia,  and  those  of  Burnside  at  Fredericksburg. 
At  the  latter  battle,  he  greatly  distinguished  himself. 
In  March,  18G3,  his  nomination  as  major-general  of 
volunteers  M'as  confirmed  by  the  Senate;  and  he  w^as 
placed  in  command  of  the  Second  division  of  the  Third 
army  corps,  then  under  Sickles.  In  this  capacity  he 
fought  at  Chancellorsville.  Berry  M-as  greatly  lamented 
by  the  army  and  by  the  nation  at  large. 


THE  HOPES  OP  THE  SOUTH. 


487 


CHAPTER  XXVII. 


Dark  Days. — After  Chancellorsville. — The  Army  of  Lee  and  the  Southern  People. — High  Hopes. — The  Inva- 
sion Mania. — Hooker  Watchful. — Lee’s  Array  in  Motion. — Longstreet  at  Culpepper. — A.  P.  Hill  at  Fred- 
ericksburg.— Hooker  and  Sedgwick  Deceived. — Pleasonton  Reconnoitres. — The  Discovery. — Both  Armies 
Moving  North. — Hooker  Protects  Washington. — At  Fairfax  and  Manassas. — The  Confederates  at  Winches- 
ter.— Milroy  Abandons  the  Place. — A Blunder. — Berryville  and  Martinsburg. — Harper’s  Ferry. — The  Valley 
Cleared  of  National  Troops. — Hooker’s  Mistake. — Too  Much  Advice. — Excitement  in  the  North. — Maryland 
and  Pennsylvania  Aroused. — Confederate  Raids.— Chambersburg  Open  to  the  Invader. — Hooker  No  Longer 
Doubtful. — Crosses  the  Potomac  at  Harper’s  Ferry. — At  Frederick. — Hooker  Removed. — Meade  in  Com- 
mand.— Sketch  of  Meade. — Modest,  but  Firm. — His  Request. — Lee  Moving  on  Harrisburg. — Stuart’s  De- 
tour.— Lee's  Ignorance  of  the  Whereabouts  of  the  National  Army. — The  Cumberland  Valley. — Lee’s  Dis- 
cpvery. — His  Change  of  Purpose. — Moving  Towards  Gettysburg. —Meade’s  Purpose. — Gettysburg. — Its 
Position  and  Surroundings. — Buford  at  Gettysburg. — The  B.ittle  Begun. — Arrival  of  Reynolds. — The  Iron 
Brigade. — Reynolds  Killed. — Doubleday  in  Command. — Arrival  of  Howard. — Cemetery  Ridge  Occupied. — 
The  Tide  Turns. — Ewell  on  the  Field. — The  Stonewall  Brigade. — Howard's  Mistake. — The  Nationals  Driven 
Back. — Terrific  Fighting. — Arrival  of  Hancock. — Buford,  the  Good  Angel  of  Gettysburg. — The  Nationals 
Again  in  Position. — The  Confederate  Skirmishers  Recalled. — End  of  the  Fir.st  Day’s  Fighting. —Meade 
Coming  up  from  Taney  town. — The  Whole  Army  Moving  towards  Gettj’-sburg. — Arrivals  of  the  Different 
Corps. — Disposition  of  the  Troops. — The  Confederate  Prospect. — The  Relative  Strength  of  the  Two 
Armies. — Lee’s  Original  Intention. — Necessity. — One  Opportunity  Lost. — The  Morning  of  the  2d  of  July. — 
A Peaceful  Scene. — Lee's  Order  of  Battle. — Waiting  for  the  Attack. — Sickles’  Mistaken  Position. — The 
Round  Tops. — Longstreet’s  Fierce  Attack  on  the  National  Left. — Severe  Fighting. — Hood’s  Texans  — Gen- 
eral Warren  on  Hand. — Terrible  Slaughter. — Little  Round  Top  Secured. — Birney’s  Left. — The  Salient. — 
Peach  Orchard. — Terrible  Pressure. — The  Orchard  Captured. — Birney’s  New  Position. — Birney’s  Brigades. — 
Caldwell’s  Division. — The  Battle  Boils  and  Bubbles. — The  Nationals  Again  Driven  Back. — The  Confederate 
Advance  Checked. — Crawford’s  Splendid  Charge. — Humphrey’s  Peculiar  Position. — His  Successful  Retreat. — 
Hancock  to  the  Rescue. — The  National  Position  in  Danger. — Slaughtered  Heaps. — The  Ridge  Secured. — 
The  National  Right  Weakened. — The  Confederate  Attack  on  the  Left  a Failure. — Ewell's  Attack  on  the 
National  Right. — The  Bravery  of  Greene. — Cemetery  Hill. — The  Ravine. — Benner’s  Hill. — A Tremendous 
Onset. — A Terrible  Reception.— Culp’s  Hill. — Johnston’s  Attack. — Seizure  of  the  Vacant  Breast-Works. — 
The  Darkness. — The  Breast- Works  Held. — End  of  the  Second  Day’s  Fight. — Heavy  Losses  on  Both  Sides. — 
Lee  Not  Dissatisfied. — Meade  Still  Confident. — The  Troops  Restored  to  the  National  Right. — Ewell’s  At- 
tack Resumed. — General  Geary  on  Hand. — A Terrible  Morning’s  Fighting. — The  Confederates  Driven 
Back. — The  Position  on  the  National  Right  Secured. — A Lull  in  the  Fight. — Arrival  of  the  Cavalry. — Lee 
Preparing  for  Another  and  Final  Attack. — A Terrific  Cannonade. — The  Advancing  Columns. — Mowed  Down 
by  the  National  Artillery. — Pickett’s  Brave  Virginians. — Stannard’s  Brave  Vermonters. — Caught  on  Flank. — 
In  Front  of  Hancock. — A Terrific  Musketry  Fire. — Pettigrew’s  Lines  Broken  and  Routed. — Pickett’s  Men 
Stand  Firm.-— 'A  Tremendous  Charge. — The  National  Line  Penetrated. — Doubleday’s  Men  to  the  Rescue. — 
The  Lines  Re-formed. — The  Confederates  Repulsed. — Havoc  and  Victory. — Wilcox’s  Vain  Attempt.— Cav- 
alry Charges  on  the  Left  and  Right. — Driven  Back  at  all  Points. — The  Battle  Ended.— Lincoln’s  An- 
nouncement of  the  Victory. — Lee’s  Disappointment. — Imboden  and  Lee. — “We  Must  Return  to  Virginia.” — 
Burying  the  Dead. — The  Retreat. — The  Pursuit. — Williamsport.— Crossing  the  Potomac. — On  to  the  Rapi- 
dan. — End  of  the  Campaign. — Reflections. 


The  months  of  May  and  June,  1863, 

1SS3  remembered  as  a period 

of  great  darkness  in  the  history 
of  the  Civil  War.  The  year,  so  far. 


had  been  marked  by  no  great  National 
triumph.  On  the  contrary,  reverse  had 
followed  reverse  in  rapid  and  alarming 
succession,  until  it  seemed  as  if  the  last 


488 


GETTYSBURG. 


ray  of  hope  were  about  to  be  extin- 
guished, and  until  the  hearts  of  many 
brave  men  were  failing  them  for  fear. 
Galveston,  which  had  been  restored  to 
the  Union  at  the  close  of  1862,  was 
again  in  the  hands  of  the  Confederates ; 
Beauregard,  at  Charleston  Harbor,  was 
successfully  resisting  all  the  skill  and 
energy  of  Dupont ; Rosecranz,  who  had 
accomplished  nothing  since  the  famous 
encounter  at  Murfreesboro,  was  effec- 
tually held  in  check  by  Bragg  at  Chat- 
tanooga; Banks  was  vainly  courting 
victory  on  the  lower  Mississippi ; Vicks- 
burg had  not  yet  yielded  to  the  stub- 
born pertinacity  of  General  Grant ; and 
in  two  great  battles — at  Fredericksburg 
and  at  Chancellorsville — the  army  of 
the  Potomac  had  sustained  inglorious 
defeat.  It  was  of  all  things  most 
natural  that,  in  such  circumstances, 
there  should  be  sorrow  in  the  North, 
and  contrasted  joy  and  hope  in  the 
South. 

The  state  of  things  which  existed 
after  the  battle  of  Chancellorsville  was 
not  unlike  that  which  supervened  upon 
the  defeat  of  Pope,  in  August  of  the 
previous  year.  Now,  as  then,  it  seemed 
as  if  fortune  were  smiling  on  the  South, 
and  as  if  a favorable  opportunity  had 
arisen  for  abandoning  the  defensive, 
and  striking  a final  and  decisive  blow. 
The  Confederate  troops  were  in  excel- 
lent spirits ; and  General  Lee  was  not 
to  be  blamed  if  he  shared  their  feelings. 
In  two  great  battles,  although  con- 
fronted by  superior  numbers,  they  had 
come  off  victorious,  and  inflicted  terri- 
ble punishment  on  the  National  forces. 
If  victory  was  so  easily  won  on  their 


own  territory,  might  not  similar  success 
attend  them  on  the  territory  of  their 
enemy  ? They  had  twice  over  repelled 
an  invading  army,  which  was  supposed 
to  be  invincible:  were  they  not  justi- 
fied in  playing  the  part  of  invaders  in 
turn  ? The  morale  of  Lee’s  army  could 
never  again  be  higher.  If,  therefore, 
a bold  and  vigorous  effort  were  not 
made  now,  the  opportunity  might  be 
lost  forever.  It  was  well  known  to 
General  Lee,  and  to  the  authorities  at 
Richmond,  that  Hooker’s  army  had 
been  largely  reduced,  because  of  the 
extensive  out-mustering  of  short-term 
troops.  Lee’s  army,  on  the  other  hand, 
had  gained  in  strength.  Longstreet 
had  come  up  from  the  south  of  the 
James,  where  he  had  been  operating  at 
the  time  of  the  battle  of  Chancellors- 
ville ; and  a rigidly  enforced  conscrip- 
tion had  brought  up  the  total  of  the  army 
to  over  70,000  men.  The  resources  of 
arbitrary  power  had  been  exhausted  to 
clothe,  equip  and  otherwise  put  the 
array  in  a condition  to  undertake  what 
some  were  sanguine  enough  to  hope 
might  prove  a successful  and  final  cam- 
paign. The  army  of  Northern  Virginia 
had  never  before  been  so  well  provided 
with  all  the  essentials  of  war.  It  was,  in 
the  words  of  Longstreet,  “ in  condition  to 
undertake  anything.”  If  there  was  de- 
ficiency anywhere,  it  was  in  the  commis- 
sariat; but  this  was  the  less  an  inconven- 
ience that,  in  the  rich  granaries  of  Penn- 
sylvania, which  awaited  their  approach, 
there  was  enough  and  to  spare.  In  ad- 
dition to  these  various  reasons,  which 
prompted  the  Southern  leaders  to  im- 
mediate and  vigorous  action,  there  was 


THE  ARMIES  IN  MOTION. 


489 


unquestionably  this  other  : there  was 
the  inspiring  hope  that  a successful 
campaign  in  the  free  Suites  of  the 
North  would  take  fj*om  foreign  govern- 
ments their  last  excuse  for  refusing 
to  recognize  the  independence  of  the 
Confederation.  By  the  end  of  May, 
Lee’s  army,  reorganized  into  three  sepa- 
rate army  corps,  commanded  respective- 
ly by  Longstreet,  Hill  and  Ewell,  was 
ready  to  launch  forth  on  what  seemed  a 
promising  but  in  reality,  as  the  result 
proved,  an  ill-starred  expedition. 

The  two  armies,  since  the  battle  of 
Chancellorsville — the  one  paralyzed,  and 
unable  to  strike,  the  other  in  seeming 
idleness,  and  apparently  without  plan 
or  purpose — lay  encamped  on  the  op- 
posite sides  of  the  Bappahannock. 
Hooker  was  at  Falmouth,  his  left  ex- 
tending several  miles  down  the  river. 
Lee,  on  the  south  and  west  of  the  river, 
occupied  that  line  of  impregnable  earth- 
works which,  from  one  extreme  to  the 
other,  dotted  the  country  for  thirty 
miles.  On  neither  side  had  any  de- 
monstration been  made.  Behind  this 
mask  of  idleness,  there  was  real  ac- 
tivity in  the  Confederate  ranks.  Lee 
was  busy  perfecting  his  arrangements 
for  his  projected  movement  toward  the 
North.  Hooker  was  io^norant  of  the 
plans  of  his  antagonist;  but  he  was 
watchful  and  not  unprepared  to  act,  as 
soon  as  the  movements  of  the  enemy 
should  reveal  his  purpose. 

It  was  now  the  3d  of  June.  On  that 
June  began  to  move  his  troops, 

McLaws’  and  Hood’s  divisions, 
of  Longstreet’s  corps,  being  pushed  for- 
ward in  the  direction  of  Culpepper 


Court  House.  On  the  4th  and  5th, 
Ewell’s  corps  was  marched  in  the  same 
direction.  In  order  to  disguise  his 
movement,  and  to  keep  the  National 
commander  otf  his  guard,  Lee  left  the 
corps  of  A.  P.  Hill  to  occupy  the  lines 
of  Fredericksburg.  It  was  not  possible, 
however,  that  so  gigantic  a movement, 
as  that  which  Lee  contemplated,  could 
be  conducted  for  any  length  of  time  in 
secrecy.  Discovering  signs  of  more 
than  ordinary  activity  in  the  camp  of 
the  enemy,  and  suspecting  its  cause. 
Hooker  sent  instructions  to  Sedg-  June 
wick,  on  the  6th,  to  throw  a por- 
tion  of  his  troops  across  the  Bappahan- 
nock at  Franklin’s  Crossing,  and  make 
a close  reconnoissance  of  the  enemy’s 
position.  The  reconnoissance  was  made 
accordingly.  Hill  held  his  position 
with  such  tenacity,  and  made  such  a 
display  of  strength,  that  Sedgwick  and 
Hooker  were,  for  the  time,  deceived. 
It  was  the  conviction  of  both  that, 
whatever  might  be  Lee’s  immediate 
purpose,  the  Confederate  forces  had 
not,  as  yet,  in  any  very  large  numbers, 
been  removed  from  their  old  encamp- 
ments. It  soon  became  manifest,  how- 
ever, that  Lee  was  bent  on  a movement 
to  the  North.  On  Tuesday,  the  June 
9th,  General  Pleasonton,  taking 
with  him  two  divisions  of  cavalry, 
under  Buford  and  Gregg,  with  two 
picked  brigades  of  infantry,  under  Bus- 
sel  and  Ames,  crossed  the  Bappahan- 
nock at  Kelley’s  and  Beverley’s  Fords, 
his  intention  being  to  move  by  converg- 
ing roads  on  Culpepper.  It  was  known 
that  Stuart  was  already  at  Culpepper; 
and  it  was  Hooker’s  expectation  that. 


490 


GETTYSBURG. 


by  sending  his  whole  cavalry  corps  for- 
ward, he  might  succeed  in  breaking  up 
Stuart’s  camp.  Stuart,  meanwhile,  had 
moved  on  from  Culpepper  to  Brandy 
Station,  his  object  being  to  form  the 
advance,  and  to  cover  the  flank  of  the 
main  movement.  Having  crossed  at 
Beverley’s  Ford,  Buford  came  imme- 
diately into  contact  with  a Confederate 
brigade,  under  General  Jones.  This 
brigade  he  drove  back  for  a couple  of 
miles,  when  he  found  himself  checked 
by  the  brigades  of  W.  H.  F.  Lee  and 
Wade  Hampton,  who  had  come  to  the 
suppoi't  of  their  companion  in  arms. 
At  this  point,  some  severe  fighting  en- 
sued. Meanwhile,  Gregg  had  crossed 
at  Kelley’s  Ford ; and,  having  pushed 
on  toward  Brandy  Station,  he  was 
about  to  fall  with  effect  on  Stuart’s 
rear.  Stuart  was  compelled  to  draw 
off  from  Buford’s  fi*ont,  so  as  to  face 
this  new  foe.  Getting  into  position, 
Stuart  fell  wuth  tremendous  force  upon 
Gregg.  A spirited  contest  at  once  took 
place  for  the  possession  of  the  heiglits. 
For  a time,  the  battle  raged  with  great 
fierceness.  It  was  one  of  the  very  few 
genuine  cavalry  engagements  during 
the  whole  war,  and  possessed  additional 
interest  from  the  fact  that  it  was  be- 
tween the  entire  mounted  force  of  both 
armies.  Gregg  carried  the  heights; 
but  finding:  that  the  other  column  was 
not  able  to  come  up  and  form  a junction 
with  him,  he  fell  back  toward  his  right 
and  rear,  and  united  with  Buford. 
Pleasonton  then  retired  his  whole  com- 
mand across  the  Kappahannoek,  but 
not  until  he  had  discovered,  through 
captured  correspondence,  that  Lee  was 


present  in  force  at  Culpepper,  and  that 
the  object  of  the  Confederate  leaders 
was  the  invasion  of  the  North.  In  this 
engagement,  the  loss  on  each  side  was 
about  600.  Among  the  wounded  on 
the  Confederate  side  was  W.  H.  F.  Lee. 

There  was  now  no  longer  any  doubt 
as  to  the  intention  of  the  enemy.  His 
object  was  invasion.  It  was  still  un- 
certain, however,  whether  Lee  meant 
to  move  on  Washington  or  to  push  his 
way  into  Maryland  and  Pennsylvania. 
It  was  known  that  the  Confederates 
felt  sore  because  of  the  raids  of  Grier- 
son in  Mississippi,  and  of  Davis  and 
Kilpatrick  in  Virginia ; and  threats  had 
been  made  against  both  the  States 
above  named.  At  the  same  time, 
Washington  w^ould  be  a rich  prize  to 
the  Confederates;  and  it  was  not  im- 
probable that  an  attempt  would  be  made 
to  capture  the  National  capital.  Hook- 
er’s first  move  was  to  throw  his  army 
along  the  line  of  the  Kappahannoek, 
his  right  being  advanced  so  as  to  cover 
the  fords  of  that  river.  While  Hooker 
was  thus  occupied,  Lee  had  actually 
turned  his  right,  and  thrown  the  head 
of  a column  into  the  Shenandoah  Val- 
ley. Hill  was  left  in  his  old  position 
at  Fredericksburg ; Longs treet  remained 
at  Culpepper;  while  Ewell,  on  the 
1 Oth,  was  pushed  forward  to  the  west 
and  north.  Striking  the  Blue  Kidge, 
he  moved  along  the  eastern  side  of  that 
range  until  he  reached  Chester’s  Gap. 
Passing  through  the  gap,  he  crossed 
the  Shenandoah  at  Front  Koyal.  Burst- 
ing into  the  valley,  he  advanced  by 
forced  marches  toward  Winchester,  at 
which  place  he  arrived  on  the  evening 


MILROY’S  DISASTROUS  RETREAT 


491 


June  the  13th,  having  accomplished 
the  distance  from  Culpepper, 
some  seventy  miles,  in  three  days. 

While  Ewell  was  making  this  rush 
towards  Winchester,  Hooker  was  still 
guarding  the  fords  of  the  Eappahan- 
nock.  It  was  not  until  the  13th  that 
he  was  made  aware  of  the  march  which 
his  antagonist  had  stolen  upon  him. 
The  intelligence  fell  upon  him  like  a 
thunderbolt.  Abandoning  his  camp 
on  the  Rappahannock,  he  fell  back  to- 
wards Washington,  taking  positions 
which  would  enable  him,  if  necessary, 
to  defend  the  capital,  while  at  the 
same  time  he  could  watch  the  develop- 
ment of  Lee’s  plan  of  operations.  On 
the  15th  and  16th,  he  had  fallen  back 
as  far  as  Fairfax  and  Manassas.  Here, 
for  some  days,  he  remained.  As  soon 
as  Hill,  who  had  been  left  behind  at 
Fredericksburg,  observed  the  disappear- 
ance of  the  Union  army,  he  marched 
towards  Culpepper,  where  Longstreet 
still  held  position.  Jenkins,  with  his 
cavalry  brigade,  was  ordered  forward 
to  Winchester  to  co-operate  with  Ewell. 
Irnboden,  with  his  troops,  was  sent  out 
in  the  direction  of  Romney,  his  instruc- 
tions being  to  cover  Winchester,  and 
to  prevent  reinforcements  arriving  by 
the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  Railroad. 
Ewell  had  detached  Rodes’  division  to 
Berryville,  with  the  view  of  cutting 
off  communications  between  Winches- 
ter and  the  Potomac.  General  Milroy, 
then  in  command  at  Winchester,  had 
under  him  a force  of  7000  men,  with 
three  pieces  of  field-artillery,  and  six 
siege  pieces  in  a fort.  Milroy  held  out 
against  the  vigorous  and  persistent  at- 


tacks of  the  rapidly  increasing  forces  of 
the  enemy  during  the  13th  and  June 
14th,  repelling  some  of  the  as-*^>H, 
saults  with  great  spirit;  but,  on  the 
night  of  the  14th,  discovering  that  the 
whole  corps  of  Ewell  and  of  Long- 
street  were  at  hand,  he  attempted  to 
retreat.  It  was  too  late.  He  was  al- 
most surrounded.  Only  a small  por- 
tion of  his  troops  managed  to  effect 
their  escape,  some  finding  their  way  to 
Harper’s  Ferry,  and  some  to  Pennsyl- 
vania. His  losses  were  4000  taken 
prisoners,  29  guns,  277  wagons  and  400 
horses.  General  Milroy  was  severely 
taken  to  task  by  some  for  his  conduct 
at  Winchester:  he  was  vindicated  by 
others.  President  Lincoln,  pronouncing 
on  the  evidence  laid  before  him  by  the 
judge -advocate -general,  declared  that 
neither  Milroy  nor  Schenck,  his  imme- 
diate superior,  and  between  whom  the 
blame  must  be  divided,  were  seriously 
to  blame,  and  that  a court-martial  was 
not  necessary  in  the  case.  The  mistake 
was  in  not  abandoning  the  place  at  an 
earlier  day.  It  is  doubtful  whether 
Milroy  could  have  held  out  until  succor 
reached  him;  but  certainly  defeat  and 
surrender  could  not  have  been  more 
disastrous  than  was  the  retreat. 

Berryville  and  Martinsburg,  at  the 
same  time,  yielded  to  the  attacks  of 
General  Rodes;  and  the  garrison  at 
Harper’s  Ferry  withdrew  to  Maryland 
'Heights.  The  valley  was  thus  cleared 
of  National  troops. 

Judged  from  a high  military  stand- 
point, General  Hooker’s  line  of  action, 
after  he  was  made  aware  of  the  surprise 
at  Winchester,  is  open  to  severe  criti- 


m 


GETTYSBURG. 


cism.  It  was  clearly  the  duty  required 
by  the  situation  to  interpose  between 
Hill  at  Fredericksburg  and  Longstreet 
at  Culpepper.  A blow  vigorously  dealt 
ought  to  have  resulted  in  the  capture 
or  destruction  of  Hill.  Even  if  neither 
of  these  results  followed,  the  presump- 
tion is  that  such  a movement  would 
have  brou2:ht  Lee  back  to  the  assistance 
of  his  lieutenant,  and  so  made  an  end 
of  the  invasion.  It  is  only  just  to 
Hooker  to  say  that,  if  we  are  to  judge 
from  the  correspondence  which  took 
place  between  him  and  Halleck  and 
President  Lincoln,  a short  time  before 
Lee  began  his  Northern  movement,  the 
course  which  Hooker  did  adopt  was 
opposed  to  his  own  better  judgment. 
The  course  which  we  have  indicated  as 
the  right  course  to  follow  in  the  circum- 
stances was  the  course  which  he  actual- 
ly suggested,  in  the  event  of  Lee  moving 
as  he  did.  It  was  condemned  by  Hal- 
leck, and,  in  the  most  emphatic  and 
characteristic  manner,  discouraged  by 
Lincoln.  If  Lee,”  said  the  president, 
“ should  leave  a rear  force  at  Freder- 
icksburg, tempting  you  to  fall  upon  it, 
he  would  fight  you  in  entrenchments, 
and  have  you  at  disadvantage ; and  so, 
man  for  man,  worst  you  at  that  point, 
while  his  main  force  would,  in  some 
way,  be  getting  an  advantage  of  you 
northward.  In  a word,  I would  not 
take  any  risk  of  being  entangled  upon 
the  river,  like  an  ox  jumped  half  over  a 
fence^  and  liable  to  he  torn  by  dogs  front 
and  rear^  without  a fair  chance  to  gore 
one  way  or  to  kick  the  other y ^ 

* Despatch  from  President  Lincoln  to  General 
Hooker,  Jime  5th. 


The  disaster  at  Winchester,  and  the 
appearance  of  Confederate  troops  on 
their  borders,  created  the  wildest  excite- 
ment in  Maryland  and  Pennsylvania. 
The  excitement  was  shared,  in  fact,  by 
the  who],e  of  the  Northern  States.  Ap- 
peals to  the  people  were  published  by 
the  governors  of  Maryland  and  Pennsyl- 
vania; and,  on  the  15th  of  June,  jun® 
a proclamation  was  issued  by  the 
president,  calling  for  120,000  militia. 
Pennsylvania  was  to  furnish  50,000 ; 
Ohio,  30,000 ; Maryland,  10,000 ; West 
Virginia,  10,000  ; New  York,  20,000. 
These  calls  were  promptly  and  heartily 
responded  to.  Meanwhile,  lively  scenes 
were  being  witnessed  in  the  larger 
towns,  threatened  by  the  invading 
troops.  Of  some  of  those  scenes  stir- 
ring descriptions  have  been  preserved. 
The  16th,  in  Harrisburg,  is  thus  June 
described  by  an  eye-witness  : 

The  morning  broke,”  he  tells  us,  “ up- 
on a populace  all  astir,  who  had  been 
called  out  of  bed  by  the  ‘ beat  of  the 
alarming  drum,’  the  blast  of  the  bugle, 
and  the  clanging  of  bells.  The  streets 
were  lively  with  men,  who  were  either 
returning  from  a night’s  work  on  the 
fortifications,  or  going  over  to  relieve 
those  who  were  toiling  there.  As  the 
sun  rose  higher,  the  excitement  gath- 
ered head.  All  along  the  streets  were 
omnibuses,  wagons  and  wheelbarrows 
taking  in  trunks  and  valuables,  and 
rushing  them  down  to  the  depot,  to  be 
shipped  out  of  rebel  range.  The  stores, 
the  female  seminaries  and  almost  every 
private  residence  were  busy  all  of  the 
forenoon  in  swelling  the  mountain  of 
freight  that  lay  at  the  depot.  Every 


THREATENED  INVASION. 


493 


horse  was  impressed  into  service,  and 
every  porter  groaned  beneath  his 
weight  of  responsibilities.  The  scene 
at  noon  at  the  depots  was  indescrib- 
able, if  not  disgraceful.  A sweltering 
mass  of  humanity  thronged  the  plat- 
form, all  furious  to  escape  from  the 
doomed  city.  At  the  bridge,  and  across 
the  river,  the  scene  was  equally  excit- 
ing. All  through  the  day  a steady 
stream  of  people,  on  foot  and  in  wagons, 
young  and  old,  black  and  white,  was 
pouring  across  it  fi*om  the  Cumberland 
Valley,  bearing  along  with  it  house- 
hold gods  and  all  manner  of  goods  and 
stock.  Endless  trains,  laden  with  flour, 
grain  and  merchandise,  hourly  emerged 
from  the  valley,  and  thundered  across 
the  bridge  and  through  the  city.  Miles 
of  retreating  baggage  wagons,  filled 
with  calves  and  sheep  tied  together, 
and  great,  old-fashioned  furnace  wagons, 
loaded  with  tons  of  trunks  and  boxes, 
deflled  in  continuous  procession  down 
the  pike  and  across  the  river,  raising  a 
dust  that  marked  the  outline  of  the 
road  as  far  as  the  eye  could  see.” 

Pittsburg,  on  the  19  th,  presented  a 
Jiijic  scene  of  great  activity.  “Work 
19*  on  the  city  defenses  is  still  pro- 
gressing vigorously,  and  some  of  the 
more  important  works  are  now  ready 
to  receive  the  guns.  The  number  of 
men  employed  on  the  fortifications  yes- 
terday was  4605.  The  works  are  on 
Herron’s  Hill,  on  Harrison’s  Hill,  on 
Mount  Washington,  on  Squirrel  Hill, 
and  on  Negley’s  Hill.  There  are  up- 
ward of  5000  men  in  the  trenches  to- 
day; and,  with  such  a large  working 
force,  it  cannot  take  many  days  to  finish 


the  works  now  in  hand.  General  Ber- 
nard,with  a competent  staff  of  engineers, 
was  engaged  in  laying  out  new  works 
yesterday  on  the  outer  side  of  the  Alle- 
ghany, so  as  to  render  the  city  secure 
against  an  advance  from  that  direction. 
Works  have  also  been  laid  out  near  Tur- 
tle Creek  and  other  important  points.” 

In  Baltimore,  similar  preparations 
were  made  for  the  approach  of  tbe  inva- 
ders. “The  work  of  erecting  barricades 
progressed  rapidly  on  Friday  and  Satur- 
day, and,  on  Sunday  morning,  the  entire 
circle  of  the  city  was  completed,  and 
ready  for  military  occupation  at  any 
moment  that  the  scouts  should  an- 
nounce the  approach  of  the  enemy. 
The  erection  of  lines  of  entrenchments 
and  fortifications  on  all  the  approaches 
to  the  city  have  also  progressed  rapidly. 
On  Saturday,  about  1000  colored  men 
were  gathered  by  the  police  from  dif- 
ferent sections  of  the  city,  causing  muck 
excitement  among  that  portion  of  our 
population,  as  they  were  marched  out 
to  the  different  locations  for  the  defen- 
sive works.  At  night  another  force  was 
secured,  to  relieve  those  who  had  been 
at  work  throughout  the  day,  and  an- 
other relief  gang  was  provided  on  Sun- 
day morning  and  evening,  so  that  rapid 
progress  has  been  made,  and  the  works 
are  now  ready  for  immediate  use.” 

While  Hooker  remained  at  Fairfax 
and  Manassas,  there  were  occasional 
cavalry  skirmishes  in  the  neighbor- 
hood of  Ashby  Gap.  In  some  of  these 
the  fighting  was  severe ; in  all  of  them 
the  National  troops  distinguished  them- 
selves for  dash  and  daring,  not  only 
holding  their  own,  but  driving  the 


494 


GETTYSBURG. 


enemy  before  them.  These  encounters, 
however,  exercised  no  jDerceptible  influ- 
ence on  the  campaign.  Lee  was  not  hin- 
dered from  posting  himself  in  strength 
in  the  Shenandoah  Valley,  where  he 
was  ready  to  meet  Hooker,  if  he  should 
deem  it  prudent  to  attack  him,  and 
where  also  he  could  send  foraging  par- 
ties into  Maryland  and  Pennsylvania. 
Jenkins’  troopers  had  already  pene- 
trated as  far  as  Chambersburg,  and 
ravaged  the  country  for  miles  around, 
frightening  the  peaceful  inhabitants, 
and  carrying  off  much  booty,  particu- 
larly in  cattle  and  horses.  On  the 
June  22d,  Hill  and  Longstreet  having 
22*  come  up  and  relieved  him  in  the 
valley,  Ewell,  at  the  head  of  the  in- 
vading columns,  passed  into  Maryland, 
Imboden  moving  to  the  west,  and 
breaking  up  the  lines  of  communication 
by  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  Bail  road 
and  the  Chesapeake  and  Ohio  Canal. 
The  whole  region  of  Western  Pennsyl- 
vania, up  to  the  Susquehanna,  was 
now  open  to  the  invaders.  On  the 
24tli  and  the  25th,  Longstreet  and 
Hill  followed  Ewell.  The  objective 
point  of  the  Confederates  was  Cham- 
June  bersburg.  On  the  26th,  the  entire 
26.  Confederate  army  had  crossed  at 
Williamsport  and  Shepherdstown.  On 
the  same  day.  Hooker,  no  longer  in 
doubt  as  to  Lee’s  plan,  led  his  army 
across  the  Potomac  at  Edward’s  Ferry, 
and  moved  towards  Frederick.  This, 
as  we  shall  see,  was  a wise  and  politic 
movement  on  the  part  of  the  National 
commander.  It  led  to  the  happiest 
results,  although  Hooker  himself  was 
not  to  reap  the  glory. 


At  this  conjuncture  there  occurred  an 
unlooked-for  circumstance,  which  June 
might  have  had  a most  disastrous  27. 
effect  on  the  campaign  and  on  the 
prospects  of  the  North.  On  the  27th, 
when  Hooker  had  marched  upon  Fred- 
erick, and  when  it  became  manifest 
that  a great  battle  was  imminent,  the 
public  were  astounded  by  the  intelli- 
gence that  General  Hooker  had  resigned 
the  command  of  the  army  of  the  Poto- 
mac, and  that  the  important  and  some- 
what perilous  trust  had  been  committed 
to  General  Meade.  What  was  it  that 
brought  about  this  sudden,  unexpected, 
and,  to  all  appearance,  untimely  change? 
The  story  can  be  briefly  told.  At  the 
time  Lee  began  his  movement  north- 
ward, the  National  forces  in  the  east 
were  divided  into  several  separate  and 
independent  commands.  General  Heint- 
zelman  commanded  the  department  of 
Washington,  with  a force  of  36,000 
men;  General  Schenck  had  charge  of 
the  middle  department,  including  the 
garrisons  at  Harper’s  Ferry,  Winches- 
ter, and  other  contiguous  places;  and 
General  Dix,  with  a considei’able  force, 
lay  idle  on  the  peninsula.  Hookei*, 
who  had  expressed  a strong  desire  that 
the  troops  of  Heintzelman  and  Schenck 
should  be  placed  under  his  control,  had 
at  length  so  far  overcome  the  scruples 
of  Commander-in-Chief  Halleck,  that  he 
obtained  a reluctant  consent.  Hooker 
had  sent  General  Slocum  to  Harper’s 
Ferry,  with  the  understanding  that  he 
should  be  joined  by  the  10,000  or 
11,000  troops  stationed  there  under 
French,  and  that  the  united  force 
should  make  a demonstration  on  Lee’s 


RESIGNATION  OF  HOOKER. 


495 


rear  by  a movement  up  the  Cumberland 
Valley.  .Such  an  arrangement  implied 
the  evacuation  of  Harper’s  Ferry,  but 
to  this  Halleck  would  not  consent.  It 
was  in  vain  that  Hooker  reasoned, 
showing  that  the  place  was  compara- 
tively of  no  importance,  that  it  com- 
manded no  ford  of  the  Potomac,  that 
the  removal  of  the  troops  would  not 
affect  the  fortifications,  that  it  was 
without  public  stores,  and  that  there 
was  only  a very  small  likelihood  that 
the  enemy  would  think  of  taking  pos- 
session. He  was  met  by  the  reply, 
Maryland  Heights  have  always  been 
regarded  as  an  important  point  to  be 
held  by  us,  and  much  expense  and 
labor  incurred  in  fortifying  them.  I 
cannot  approve  their  abandonment,  ex- 
cept in  case  of  absolute  necessity.” 
Hooker  requested  to  be  relieved  from 
the  command  of  the  army.  His  request 
was  at  once  complied  with.  Hooker 
has  been  severely  blamed  for  deserting 
his  post  at  this  critical  juncture.  It 
was  a perilous  experiment  to  change 
the  commander-in-the-field,  on  the  eve 
of  what,  it  was  evident,  must  prove 
a great  and  decisive  battle.  It  does 
seem,  on  the  surface,  as  if  Hooker  al- 
lowed personal  considerations  to  tri- 
umph over  what  he  ought  to  have 
regarded  as  the  welfare  of  the  nation. 
But,  undoubtedly.  Hooker  had  other 
reasons  for  the  course  he  took  than 
that  which  he  openly  assigned.  His 
relations  with  the  government  had  not 
been  cordial  from  the  first.  His  claims, 
after  the  removal  of  McClellan,  had 
been  passed  over  in  favor  of  Burnside; 
and  when,  after  the  battle  of  Fred- 


ericksburg, it  was  found  impossible 
longer  to  ignore  him,  the  command  of 
the  army  of  the  Potomac  was  grudg- 
ingly  given  him.  He  had  scarcely  en- 
tered upon  his  duties,  when  the  presi- 
dent wrote  him,  informing  him  of 
strange  charges  which  were  rumored 
against  him,  such  as  ambition  to  play 
the  role  of  dictator,  reminding  him 
that  the  most  effective  method  of  se- 
curing the  gratification  of  desires  so 
ambitious  was  to  overthrow  the  insur- 
gents, and  make  an  end  of  the  rebel- 
lion, and  assuring  him  that,  if  he  allowed 
disaster  to  befall  the  army  of  the  Po- 
tomac, he  would  never  be  at  the  head 
of  the  American  or  any  other  govern- 
ment. Hooker’s  relations  with  the 
government  were  not  improved  by  his 
failure  at  Chancellorsville.  On  the 
14th  of  May,  Lincoln  wrote  him:  ‘‘I 
must  tell  you  that  I have  some  fearful 
intimations  that  some  of  your  corps 
and  division  commanders  are  not  giving 
you  their  entire  confidence.  This  would 
be  ruinous,  if  true.”  These  things  being 
known,  it  is  not  much  to  be  wondered  at 
either  that,  in  the  circumstances.  Hooker 
should  have  resigned,  or  that  his  resig- 
nation should  have  been  so  promptly 
accepted.  On  the  morning  of  the  June 
28th  of  J une,  an  order  arrived  from  28. 
Washington,  transferring  the  command 
of  the  army  to  Major-General  Meade,  of 
the  Fifth  army  corps.  On  the  same  day 
appeared  the  two  following  orders : 

“ Headquarters  Army  of  the  Potomac,  ) 
Frederick,  Md..  June  28,  1863.  ) 

“In  conformity  with  the  orders  of 
the  War  Department,  dated  June  27th, 
1863,  I relinquish  the  command  of  the 


496 


GETTYSBURG. 


army  of  the  Potomac.  It  is  transferred 
to  Major-General  George  G.  Meade,  a 
brave  and  accomplished  officer,  who 
has  nobly  earned  the  confidence  and 
esteem  of  the  army  on  many  a well- 
fonght  held.  Impressed  with  the  be- 
lief that  my  usefulness  as  the  com- 
mander of  the  army  of  the  Potomac  is 
in]|)aired,  I part  from  it,  ^^et  not  with- 
out the  deepest  emotion.  The  sorrow 
of  parting  with  the  comrades  of  so 
many  battles  is  relieved  by  the  convic- 
tion that  the  courage  and  devotion  of 
this  army  will  never  cease  nor  fail ; 
that  it  will  yield  to  my  successor,  as 
it  has  to  me,  a willing  and  hearty 
support.  With  the  earnest  prayer 
that  the  triumph  of  its  arms  may 
bring  successes  worthy  of  it  and  the 
nation,  I bid  it  farewell. 

‘‘Joseph  Hooker, 

“ Major-General.” 

Headquarters  Army  of  the  Potomac,  ) 
June  28,  1863.  f 

“ By  direction  of  the  president  of 
the  United  States,  I hereby  assume 
command  of  the  army  of  the  Potomac. 
As  a soldier,  in  obeying  this  order — an 
order  totally  unexpected  and  unsolicit- 
ed— I have  no  promises  or  pledges  to 
make.  The  country  looks  to  this  army 
to  relieve  it  from  the  devastation  and 
disgrace  of  a hostile  invasion.  What- 
ever fatigues  and  sacrifices  we  may  be 
called  upon  to  undergo,  let  us  have  in 
view  constantly  the  magnitude  of  the 
interests  involved,  and  let  each  man  de- 
termine to  do  his  duty,  leaving  to  an 
all-controlling  Providence  the  decision 
of  the  contest.  It  is  with  just  diffidence 
that  I relieve,  in  the  command  of  this 


army,  an  eminent  and  accomplished 
soldier,  whose  name  must  ever  aj)pear 
conspicuous  in  the  history  of  its  achieve- 
ments; but  I rely  upon  the  hearty  sup- 
port of  my  companions  in  arms  to  assist 
me  in  the  discharge  of  the  duties  of  the 
important  trust  wffiich  has  been  confided 
to  me.  George  G.  Meade, 

“ Major-General  Commanding.” 

The  change  produced  some  surprise 
in  the  army ; but  the  appointment  of 
General  Meade  was  generally  well 
received.  The  report  of  the  change 
soon  extended  to  the  several  corps, 
and  their  coinmandei’S  hastened  to  bid 
farewell  to  General  Hooker.  By  three 
o’clock,  a large  number  of  officers  had 
assembled,  and,  soon  after,  the  gen- 
eral appeared  in  the  avenue  before  his 
tent.  Some  time  was  spent  in  social 
intercourse,  and,  to  the  last,  all  formali- 
ties were  dispensed  with.  The  parting 
was  painful  to  every  one,  particularly  to 
those  who  had  become  endeared  to  the 
general  by  old  associations.  General 
Hooker  was  deeply  grieved.  He  had 
been  identified  with  the  army  of  the 
Potomac,  he  said,  since  its  organization, 
and  had  hoped  to  continue  with  it  to 
the  end.  It  was  the  best  army  of  the 
country,  w^orthy  of  the  confidence  of 
the  nation,  and  could  not  fail  of  success 
in  the  approaching  struggle.  He  spoke 
of  his  successor  as  a glorious  soldier, 
and  urged  all  to  give  him  their  earnest 
support. 

Major-General  George  G.  Meade,  to 
whom  the  destinies  of  the  army  of  the 
Potomac  were  now  entrusted,  Avas  born 
in  Spain,  in  1815,  his  parents  residing, 
at  the  time  of  his  birth,  in  Barcelona, 


©EfJL.  ®E®.  ©.  MEAEIE 


GENERAL  MEADE  IN  COMMAND. 


497 


He  graduated  at  West  Point,  June  30th, 
1835,  and  entered  the  regular  army  of 
the  United  States  as  second  lieutenant 
of  artillery.  In  1836  he  resigned  his 
commission,  and  lived  in  retirement  for 
six  years.  On  the  19th  of  May,  1842, 
he  resumed  his  connection  with  the 
army,  and  took  part  in  the  Mexican 
War,  winning  special  distinction  in  the 
battles  of  Palo  Alto  and  Monterey. 
When  the  call  was  made  by  the  pre- 
sident for  300,000  volunteers,  and 
McCall’s  division  Mms  organized  at 
Tenallytown,  Meade  was  appointed  to 
the  command  of  the  second  brigade. 
At  Mechanicsville,  at  Gaines’  Mill,  at 
Charles  City  Cross  Roads,  at  the  second 
battle  of  Bull  Run,  at  South  Mountain, 
at  Antietam,  at  Fredericksburg,  and  at 
Chancellors ville,  General  Meade  had 
given  evidence  of  soldierly  abilities  of 
the  very  highest  order ; and  the  manner 
in  which  he  conducted  the  retreat  from 
.Chancellorsville  marked  him  out  as  the 
probable  future  commander  of  the  army 
of  the  Potomac. 

The  appointment  of  General  Meade  to 
the  chief  command  of  the  army  of  the 
Potomac,  a surprise  to  many,  was  per- 
haps the  greatest  surprise  to  General 
Meade  himself.  He  had  been  disgusted 
with  the  conduct  of  Hooker  at  Chancel- 
lorsville ; and  his  conviction  of  Hooker’s 
incapacity,  as  revealed  in  that  campaign, 
he  had  had  the  courage  frankly  to  ex- 
press. It  was  known  to  some  that 
Meade’s  conduct  at  Chancellorsville  had 
attracted  the  attention  of  the  president, 
and  commanded  his  admiration.  “I  tell 
you,”  said  Lincoln  a few  days  after 
the  Chancellorsville  retreat,  “I  think  a 


great  deal  of  that  fine  fellow,  Meade.” 
It  is  doubtful,  however,  whether  Meade 
was  aware  that  he  stood  so  high  in  the 
good  graces  of  the  president.  One 
thing  is  certain.  He  knew  that  he  had 
given  offense  to  Hooker;  and  when, 
on  the  night  of  the  27th,  he  was  awak- 
ened from  sleep  in  his  tent,  by  the  mes- 
senger from  Washington,  his  first  ques- 
tion was  whether  he  had  come  with  an 
order  for  his  arrest.  General  Hardie 
evaded  the  question,  told  him  to  strike 
a light,  and  then  put  in  his  hand  a 
paper,  which  he  found  appointed  him 
to  the  command  of  the  army  of  the  Po- 
tomac, with  almost  absolute  power  to 
conduct  the  war  according  to  his  own 
judgment.  Meade  was  not  what  might 
be  called  a popular  officer,  but  yet  he 
was  held  in  high  esteem  by  all  his  com- 
rades in  arms.  Some  forty-eight  years  of 
age,  tall  and  slim  in  person,  long  vis- 
aged  and  thoughtful,  he  had  the  aspect 
of  a scholar  rather  than  that  of  a sol- 
dier. He  was  an  excellent  tactician, 
and  imbued  with  sound  military  ideas. 
The  well-known  character  of  the  man, 
and  his  long  and  intimate  connection 
with  the  army  of  the  Potomac,  secured 
for  him  the  confidence  of  both  officers 
and  men.  They  knew  that  in  his  case, 
at  least,  performance  would  be  equal 
to  promise. 

To  Meade  was  granted  a large  amount 
of  authority — much  larger  than  had 
been  enjoyed  by  Hooker.  The  presi- 
dent waived  in  his  favor  all  the  powers 
of  the  Executive  and  the  Constitution. 
Meade,  in  fact,  was  untrammelled.  But 
he  made  a wise  and  cautious  use  of  the 
power  entrusted  to  him.  lie  made  as 


498 


GETTYSBURG. 


few  changes  as  possible,  and  only  those 
which  were  absolutely  necessary.  He 
retained  the  officers  who  had  formed 
General  Hooker’s  military  family — 
General  Butterfield,  chief  of  staff;  Gen- 
eral W arren,  chief  of  engineers ; Gen- 
eral Hunt,  chief  of  artillery ; and  Gen- 
eral Williams,  adjutant-general.  His 
desire  was  to  understand  and  give 
effect  to  the  plans  and  purposes  of  his 
late  chief.  In  his  telegram,  accepting 
the  chief  command  of  the  army  of  the 
Potomac,  he  said:  ‘‘Totally  unexpect- 
ed as  it  has  been,  and  in  ignorance  of 
the  exact  condition  of  the  troops,  and 
position  of  the  enemy,  I can  only  now 
say  that,  it  appears  to  me  I must 
move  towards  the  Susquehanna,  keep- 
ing Washington  and  Baltimore  well 
covered,  and,  if  the  enemy  is  checked 
in  his  attempt  to  cross  the  Susquehanna, 
or,  if  he  turns  towards  Baltimore, 
to  give  him  battle.  I would  say  that 
I trust  every  available  man  that  can  be 
spared  will  be  sent  to  me,  as,  from  all 
accounts,  the  enemy  is  in  strong  force.” 
In  response  to  this  request,  the  garri- 
son at  Harper’s  Ferry  was  placed  at 
his  disposal;  so,  also,  was  the  entire 
force  of  militia,  under  Couch,  at  Har- 
risburg; and,  in  addition,  such  forces 
as  could  be  spared  from  W est  Virginia, 
Baltimore,  Washington  and  Fortress 
Monroe,  with  the  returning  troops  from 
North  Carolina,  were  hurried  to  his 
support.  Sykes  was  placed  in  com- 
mand of  the  Fifth  corps,  which  had 
been  Meade’s ; Hancock  had  charge  of 
the  Second,  since  the  assignment  of 
Couch  to  the  department  of  the  Sus- 
quehanna; Reynolds  commanded  the 


First ; Sickles  the  Third ; Sedgwick  the 
Sixth ; Howard  the  Eleventh  ; Slocum 
the  Twelfth.  The  entire  effective  force 
was  about  100,000  men. 

The  opposing  armies,  at  this  time, 
were  nearly  equal  in  point  of  numbers. 
Lee’s  force,  as  it  passed  through  Hagers- 
town, Avas  estimated  at  97,000,  with 
280  guns.  This,  hoAvever,  did  not  in- 
clude the  strong  cavalry  force  Avhich, 
as  we  shall  see,  was  moving  by  a route 
different  from  that  followed  by  the 
main  army.  When  General  Meade 
took  the  place  of  General  Hooker,  the 
army  of  the  Potomac  was  lying  at 
Frederick.  General  Lee  had  his  head- 
quarters at  Chambersburg,  with  the 
corps  of  Longstreet  and  Hill.  Ewell 
had  advanced  as  far  as  York  and  Car- 
lisle. On  the  27th,  Lee  issued  the  fol- 
lowing order  to  his  army : 

“Headquarters  Army  of  Northern  Yirgini a..  ) 
Chambersburg,  Pa.,  tTMTid  27,  1863.  j 

“The  commanding  general  has  ob- 
served, with  marked  satisfaction,  the 
conduct  of  the  troops  on  the  march, 
and  confidently  anticipates  results  com- 
mensurate with  the  high  spirit  they 
have  manifested.  No  troops  could 
have  displayed  greater  fortitude,  or 
better  performed  the  arduous  marches 
of  the  past  ten  days.  Their  conduct, 
in  other  respects,  has,  with  few  excep- 
tions, been  in  keeping  with  their  charac- 
ter as  soldiers,  and  entitles  them  to 
approbation  and  praise. 

“There  have,  however,  been  instances 
of  forgetfulness,  on  the  part  of  some, 
that  they  have  in  keeping  the  yet 
unsullied  reputation  of  the  army,  and 
that  the  duties  exacted  of  us  by  civili- 


MEADE  ADVANCES  NORTHWARD. 


499 


zation  and  Christianity  are  not  less  ob- 
ligatory in  the  country  of  the  enemy 
than  in  our  own. 

The  commanding  general  considers 
that  no  greater  disgrace  could  befall 
the  army,  and  through  it  our  whole 
people,  than  the  perpetration  of  the 
barbarous  outrages  upon  the  innocent 
and  defenseless,  and  the  wanton  de- 
struction of  private  property  that  have 
marked  the  course  of  the  enemy  in  our 
own  country.  Such  proceedings  not 
only  disgrace  the  perpetrators,  and  all 
connected  with  them,  but  are  subver- 
sive of  the  discipline  and  efficiency  of 
the  army,  and  destructive  of  the  ends 
of  our  present  movement.  It  must  be 
remembered  that  we  make  war  only 
upon  armed  men,  and  that  we  cannot 
take  vengeance  for  the  wrongs  our  peo- 
ple have  suffered,  without  lowering 
ourselves  in  the  eyes  of  all  whose  ab- 
horrence has  been  excited  by  the  atroci- 
ties of  our  enemy,  and  offending  against 
Him  to  whom  vengeance  belongeth, 
without  whose  favor  and  support  our 
efforts  must  all  prove  in  vain. 

“The  commanding  general,  therefore, 
earnestly  exhorts  the  troops  to  abstain, 
with  most  scrupulous  care,  from  un- 
necessary or  wanton  injury  to  private 
property ; and  he  enjoins  upon  all  offi- 
cers to  arrest  and  bring  to  summary 
punishment  all  who  shall  in  any  way 
offend  against  the  orders  on  this  subject. 

“R.  E.  Lee,  General.” 

The  actual  conduct  of  the  Confed- 
erates was  in  striking  contrast  with  the 
spirit  of  these  instructions.  They  were 
living  on  the  country,  making  requisi- 
tions on  the  farmers  and  tradesmen, 


and  exacting  ransoms  from  the  towns. 
The  severity  of  these  exactions  may  be 
illustrated  by  one  example.  On  the  28th 
of  June,  the  little  town  of  York  alone 
was  ordered  to  furnish  165  barrels  of 
flour,  or  28,000  pounds  of  baked  bread; 
3500  pounds  of  sugar;  1650  pounds 
of  coffee ; 300  gallons  of  molasses ; 1200 
pounds  of  salt ; 32,000  pounds  of  fresh 
beef,  or  21,000  pounds  of  bacon  or 
pork ; 2000  pairs  of  shoes  or  boots ; 
1000  pairs  of  socks;  1000  felt  hats, 
and  $100,000  in  money.  Such  was  the 
comfort  which  the  invasion  brought  to 
Maryland  and  Pennsylvania. 

On  the  morning  of  the  29th,  Meade 
put  his  army  in  motion.  Giving  June 
up  the  idea  of  moving  to  the  29. 
west  of  the  South  Mountain,  he  took  a 
course  due  north,  ascending  the  course 
of  the  Monocacy  towards  the  Susque- 
hanna. The  army  moved  in  three  col- 
umns, covering,  as  it  advanced,  the 
lines  of  approach  to  Baltimore  and 
Washington.  The  First  and  Eleventh 
corps  were  directed  on  Emmettsburg ; 
the  Third  and  Twelfth  on  Taneytown; 
the  Second  on  Frizzleburg;  the  Fifth 
to  Union;  and  the  Sixth  to  Windsor. 
On  the  evening  of  the  29th,  the  Na- 
tional army  was  in  position — its  left  at 
Emmettsburg  and  its  right  at  Windsor. 

The  same  day  on  which  Meade  put 
his  army  in  motion.  General  Lee  had 
completed  all  the  necessary  preparations 
for  an  advance  on  Harrisburg.  On  that 
day,  however,  he  learned  for  the  flrst 
time,  by  means  of  a scout,  that  the  Na- 
tional army,  having  crossed  the  Poto- 
mac, was  advancing  northward,  and 
that  the  head  of  the  column  had  reached 


500 


GETTYSBURG. 


the  South  Mountain.  Lee’s  ignorance 
of  the  whereabouts  of  the  National 
army  is  explained  by  the  fact  that 
Stuart,  on  whom  he  depended  for  in- 
formation, had  been  left  behind  to 
guard  the  passes  of  the  mountains,  and 
to  obstruct,  as  much  as  possible,  the 
progress  of  the  enemy.  In  the  event 
of  the  Nationals  succeeding  in  crossing 
the  Potomac,  his  instructions  were  to 
follow,  crossing  the  river  to  the  east  or 
west  of  the  Blue  Kidge,  as  he  deemed 
the  more  convenient,  and  take  position 
on  the  Confederate  right.  Unable  to 
hinder  the  Nationals  from  crossing  the 
river,  and  anxious  to  execute  the  re- 
maining portion  of  his  instructions, 
Stuart  was  compelled  to  make  a wide 
detour  to  the  east  by  way  of  Fairfax 
Court  House.  When,  on  the  evening 
of  the  27th,  he  reached  the  Potomac  at 
the  mouth  of  Seneca  Creek,  he  found 
the  river  greatly  swollen  by  recent 
rains ; and  it  was  only  by  tremendous 
exertions  he  gained  the  Maryland  shore. 
He  then  learned  that  the  Nationals, 
having  crossed  the  day  before,  were  on 
their  way  to  Frederick.  The  National 
army  thus  lay  between  him  and  Lee ; 
and  he  was  compelled  to  march  north- 
ward, through  Westminster,  to  Han- 
over, in  Pennsylvania,  where  he  arrived 
on  the  30th  of  June.  It  was  Hookers 
misfortune  to  fight  without  his  cavalry, 
at  Chancellors ville.  A similar  misfor- 
tune had  now  befallen  Lee.  Without 
those  eyes  of  the  army,  he  had  been 
moving  about  in  ignoi*ance  of  the  where- 
abouts of  his  antagonist. 

The  intelligence  of  the  near  approach 
of  the  National  army  fell  upon  Lee 


like  a thunderbolt.  Dreading  an  irrup- 
tion of  the  National  forces  into  the 
Cumberland  Valley,  and  foreseeing  the 
peril  which  thus  threatened  his  com- 
munications, Lee  resolved  to  concen- 
trate on  the  east  side  of  South  Moun- 
tain, and ‘prevent,  if  possible,  the  fur- 
ther progress  of  the  opposing  army. 
The  movement  on  Harrisburg  was, 
in  consequence,  countermanded.  Long- 
street  and  Hill  were  directed  to  proceed 
from  Chambersburg,  defiling  through 
the  South  Mountain  range  towards 
Gettysburg ; and  Ewell  was  ordered  to 
countermarch  from  York  and  Carlisle, 
on  the  same  point. 

On  the  30th,  Meade  was  still  ignor- 
ant of  the  change  of  purpose  on  June 
the  part  of  Lee.  It  was  his  be- 
lief  that  the  Confederates  were  pressing 
northward  to  the  Susquehanna.  He 
had  little  doubt,  however,  that  a col- 
lision was  imminent.  On  that  day,  he 
pushed  his  right  forward  to  Manches- 
ter, his  left  still  remaining  at  Emmetts- 
burg,  where  three  corps — the  First, 
Eleventh  and  Third — were  under  or- 
ders of  Major-General  Peynolds.  Ke- 
alizing  the  gravity  of  the  situation,  he 
issued  to  the  army  the  following  order : 

Headquarters  Army  of  the  Potomac,  ) 
June  30,  1863.  ) 

“The  commanding  general  requests 
that,  previous  to  the  engagement  soon 
expected  with  the  enemy,  corps  and  all 
other  commanding  officers  address  their 
troops,  explaining  to  them  the  immense 
issue  involved  in  the  struggle.  The 
enemy  is  on  our  soil.  The  whole  coun- 
try looks  anxiously  to  this  army  to  de- 
liver it  from  the  pi-esence  of  the  foe. 


THE  BATTLE  GROUND. 


501 


Our  failure  to  do  so  will  leave  us  no 
such  welcome  as  the  swelling  of  mill- 
ions of  hearts  with  pride  and  joy  at 
our  success  would  give  to  every  soldier 
of  the  army.  Homes,  firesides  and  do- 
mestic altars  are  involved.  The  army 
has  fought  well  heretofore.  It  is  be- 
lieved that  it  will  fight  more  desperate- 
ly and  bravely  than  ever,  if  it  is  ad- 
dressed in  fitting  terms.  Corps  and 
other  commanders  are  authorized  to 
order  the  instant  death  of  any  soldier 
who  fails  to  do  his  duty  at  this  hour. 

By  command  of 

“ Major-General  Meade. 

Williams, 

“Assistant  Adjutant-General.” 

It  was  not  until  the  night  of  the 
30th  that  Meade  became  satisfied  that 
Lee  was  concentrating  his  forces  on  the 
east  side  of  South  Mountain.  He  at 
once  proceeded  to  select  a position  on 
which  he  might  make  a rapid  concen- 
tration of  his  troops,  and  so  receive 
battle  on  advantageous  terms.  The 
general  line  of  Pipe  Creek  seemed  to 
offer  the  advantage  sought ; but  its 
final  adoption  was  left  to  be  determined 
by  the  necessities  which  might  arise. 
Orders  were  issued  for  an  immediate 
advance  of  the  different  corps.  The 
Sixth  corps,  Sedgwick’s,  forming  the 
right  wing  of  the  army,  was  ordered 
to  Manchester,  in  rear  of  Pipe  Creek  ; 
headquarters  and  Second  corps,  Han- 
cock’s, were  directed  to  Taneytown  ; the 
Twelfth  corps,  Slocum’s,  and  the  Fifth 
corps,  Sykes’,  forming  the  centre,  were 
to  move  on  Two  Taverns  and  Hanover ; 
and  the  left  wing,  consisting  of  the 
First,  Reynolds’,  Third,  Sickles’,  and 


Eleventh,  Howard’s,  all  under  General 
Reynolds,  was  ordered  to  Gettysburg. 
The  movement  of  the  left  wing  was  in- 
tended only  as  a mask,  behind  which 
the  army  could  take  position  at  Pipe 
Creek.  It  was  not  the  intention  of 
either  Lee  or  Meade  to  make  Gettys- 
burg the  battle  field ; but,  unconscious- 
ly to  both,  a collision  was  becoming 
more  and  more  inevitable  in  the  im- 
mediate neighborhood. 

The  little  town  of  Gettysburg,  which 
was  soon  to  be  rendered  immortal  as 
the  theatre  not  only  of  the  greatest 
battle  of  the  Civil  War,  but  of  one  of 
the  greatest  battles  of  modern  times,  is 
about  ten  miles  east  of  the  South 
Mountain  range.  The  topographical 
features  of  the  neighborhood  are  pe- 
culiar, presenting  a series  of  ridges 
which,  for  the  most  pai't,  run  parallel 
with  South  Mountain,  and  give  to  the 
landscape  a rolling  and  diversified 
character.  Some  of  the  streams  flow 
to  the  northeast,  and  empty  themselves 
into  the  Susquehanna  ; others  flow 
southward,  and  find  an  outlet  into  the 
Potomac.  The  town  is  built  at  the' 
base  of  one  of  the  ridsres,  and  is  the 
centre  from  which  radiate  a large 
number  of  roads.  There  is  the  Cham- 
bersburg  road,  leading  to  the  north- 
west ; the  Carlisle  road  to  the  north 
the  Harrisburg  road  to  the  northeast 
the  Baltimore  road  to  the  southeast;, 
and  others,  which  lead  in  the  direction 
of  the  Potomac  to  the  southwest.  To' 
the  immediate  south  of  Gettysburg,, 
and  extending  some  four  or  five  miles,, 
is  a ridge  which  bears  a close  resem- 
blance to  a fish-hook.  The  point  of  the* 


502 


GETTYSBURG. 


hook  is  known  as  Wolf’s  Hill;  the 
barb  is  known  as  Culp’s  Hill ; while 
the  stem — a succession  of  ridges — end- 
ing in  Little  Round  Top  and  Round 
Top,  bears  the  general  name  of  Ceme- 
tery Ridge.  Little  Round  Top  is  about 
two  hundred  and  eighty  feet  high. 
Round  Top,  which  shoots  up  from  the 
former,  reaches  a height  of  some  four 
hundred  feet.  These  two  elevations 
constitute  the  military  keys  of  Ceme- 
tery Ridge.  At  their  base  runs  a 
marshy  stream,  called  Plum  Run.  Be- 
tween Wolf’s  and  Culp’s  Hills  flows 
what  is  called  Rock  Creek.  The  nearer 
part  of  the  bend,  which  fronts  the  town, 
had  been  used  as  a Cemetery — hence 
the  generic  name  of  the  ridge.  The 
broken  character  of  the  ground,  abound- 
ing with  rocky  ledges  and  covered  with 
huge  boulders,  make  it  a sort  of  natural 
fortification.  It  is  an  admirable  posi- 
tion for  defensive  operations.  On  the 
west  side,  the  ground  falls  off  into  a 
cultivated  valley,  which  it  commands, 
and  then  gradually  rises  until,  nearly  a 
mile  distant,  it  forms  another  and  a 
parallel  crest,  called  Seminary  Ridge — 
from  a theological  school  which  crowns 
one  of  its  heights  and  forms  a conspic- 
uous feature  of  the  landscape.  This 
ridge  is  covered  with  oaks,  and  is  local- 
ly known  as  Oak  Ridge.  In  the  valley 
between  Seminary  and  Cemetery  Ridges 
is  the  Emmettsburg  road.  Such  was 
the  ground  on  which,  for  three  consec- 
utive days,  the  contending  hosts  of 
North  and  South  were  about  to  strive, 
in  bloody  and  merciless  contest,  for  the 
imstery  of  the  Republic. 

On  the  morning  of  Wednesday,  the 


1st  of  July,  General  Buford,  who  jn|y 
had  been  occupying  Gettysburg  !• 
for  the  two  days  previous,  passed  through 
the  town  with  his  cavalry,  and,  advanc- 
ing beyond  Seminary  Ridge  to  the  next 
ridge,  more  to  the  west,  about  two 
miles  distant,  took  position  on  the  near 
side  of  Willoughby  Run.  His  line  was 
drawn  up  across  the  Chambersburg 
road,  along  which  Longstreet  and  Hill 
were  advancing.  It  was  about  nine 
o’clock.  All  of  a sudden,  he  found 
himself  in  collision  with  the  Jeadinoj 
division  of  Hill,  under  Heth.  It  was 
the  commencement  of  the  battle  of 
Gettysburg.  Knowing  that  Reynolds, 
who  had  bivouacked  the  night  before 
at  Marsh  Creek,  only  four  miles  off, 
was  within  striking  distance,  Buford 
resolved  to  hold  the  Confederates  in 
check  until  the  arrival  of  his  chief.  It 
was  a perilous  undertaking;  but  by 
skilful  deployments,  he  accomplished 
his  task.  He  had  fallen  back  some- 
what; but  his  ranks  were  unbroken, 
and  his  men  were  offering  a spirited 
resistance  when,  at  about  ten  o’clock, 
Reynolds  arrived  with  Wadsworth’s 
division.  Reynolds  had  no  instructions 
to  bring  on  a battle ; but  the  necessi- 
ties of  the  situation  supplied  the  place 
of  instructions.  Buford  was  sorely 
pressed,  and  he  must  support  him. 
Swinton  suggests  that,  probably,  his 
fine  military  eye  took  in  at  a glance 
the  features  of  the  rocky  ridge  of  Get- 
tysburg as  an  eminent  vantage  ground 
for  a defensive  battle,  and  that  his  ob- 
ject in  bringing  on  the  battle  was  to 
hold  the  enemy  in  check  beyond  the 
town,  and  thus  give  the  army  time  to 


DEATH  OF  REYNOLDS. 


503 


concentrate  on  the  fastness  of  hills. 
This,  of  course,  is  mere  conjecture ; and 
whether  he  had  such  thoughts,  and 
was  influenced  by  such  motives,  we 
shall  never  know.  But  for  his  own 
untimely  loss,  there  would  be  little 
cause  for  regret  that  he  acted  as  he  did. 
Wadsworth’s  troops  were  immediately 
deployed;  and  Reynolds  sent  instruc- 
tions to  Howard  to  advance  as  prompt- 
ly as  possible.  W adsworth  was  ordered 
to  place  his  only  battery — that  of  Hall 
— in  position  by  the  side  of  the  road 
leading  to  Cashtown.  Cutler’s  brigade 
was  thrown  into  position  on  the  right, 
while  Doubleday,  who  had  just  come 
up  with  the  van  of  the  infantry,  was 
ordered  to  move  Meredith’s  Iron  Bri- 
gade, as  it  was  called,  to  the  left  of  the 
road,  into  a piece  of  wooded  ground 
v hich  skirted  Willoughby  Run.  De- 
termined to  bring  matters  to  an  imme- 
diate issue,  Reynolds,  with  animating 
words,  gave  the  regiments  in  the  skirt 
of  the  woods  the  command  to  charge. 
The  order  was  being  gallantly  obeyed, 
Avhen,  shot  through  the  neck,  he  fell 
mortally  wounded,  dying  before  he 
could  be  removed  from  the  field.  The 
command  now  devolved  on  Doubleday. 
There  was  no  pause  in  the  battle.  The 
Iron  Brigade  fell  with  tremendous  force 
on  the  flank  of  Archer’s  brigade,  which 
was  pushing  its  way  across  Willough- 
by Run,  capturing  Archer  himself  and 
several  hundreds  of  his  men.  While 
tliese  events  were  taking  place,  there 
was  desperate  fighting  on  the  right. 
Hall’s  battery,  left  for  a time  unsup- 
ported, was  in  imminent  danger  of  being 
'aptured,  when  the  Fourteenth  Brook- 


lyn and  the  Ninety-Fifth  New  York, 
joined  by  the  Sixth  Wisconsin,  having 
made  a change  of  front,  charged  td  the 
relief  of  the  guns.  Such  was  the  im- 
petuosity of  the  onset  that  Davis’  two 
Mississippi  regiments  were  driven  for 
shelter  into  the  cut  of  an  unfinished 
railroad,  surrounded,  and  captured  with 
their  battle-flags.  So  far,  success  had 
been  with  the  Nationals. 

The  tide  of  battle  was  destined  soon 
to  turn.  Reinforcements,  in  increasinor 
numbers,  were  coming  up  and  joining 
both  of  the  contending  parties.  The 
Nationals  were  strengthened  by  the 
arrival  of  the  two  remaining  divisions 
of  the  First  corps,  under  Rowley  and 
Robinson,  the  former  having  taken 
command  of  Doubleday’s  men.  Robin- 
son’s division  remained  for  a time  in 
reserve  on  Seminary  Ridge;  but  the 
other  division  was  pushed  forw-ard  at 
once  to  the  assistance  of  the  sorely 
pressed  left.  These  fresh  troops  were 
in  excellent  spirits.  One  of  the  brigades 
of  Rowley’s  division,  commanded  by 
Colonel  Roy  Stone,  having  been  as- 
signed to  a position  dangerously  ex- 
posed to  the  fire  of  the  enemy’s  artil- 
lery, Stone  remarked  to  his  men,  ‘‘We 
have  come  here  to  stay.”  The  saying 
was  promptly  taken  up.  “We  have 
come  here  to  stay !”  resounded  through- 
out the  ranks.  The  words  were  too  truly 
prophetic ; for  a very  large  number  of 
the  brave  fellows  never  left  the  ground. 
The  battle  continued  to  rage  with  great 
fierceness,  the  Nationals  still  firmly 
maintaining  their  position.  Meanwhile, 
Hill  w^as  reinforced  by  another  division, 
under  General  Pender.  It  w^as  now 


504 


GETTYSBURG. 


past  noon.  The  sun  bad  been  blazing 
since  early  morning.  The  heat  was  in- 
tense. About  one  o’clock,  General 
Howard  arrived  on  the  battle  ground, 
and  took  command  of  the  held.  He 
had  brought  with  him  the  divisions  of 
Schui*z  and  Barlow,  the  former  now 
commanded  by  Schimmelpfenig,  Schui-z 
being  in  charge  of  the  corps.  These 
divisions  Howard  posted  to  the  right 
of  the  First  corps,  and  in  such  a manner 
as  to  prolong  the  general  lines  and 
cover  the  approaches  to  Gettysburg  from 
the  north  and  northwest.  The  other 
division,  under  Von  Stein  wehr — an 
experienced  and  skilful  officer,  who 
had  been  bred  in  the  service  of  Prussia, 
and  who  had  done  good  work  on  that 
fatal  first  day  at  Chancellorsville,  when 
Jackson  fell  on  Howard’s  corps  with 
the  force  of  an  avalanche — he  had  left 
as  a reserve  on  Cemetery  Eidge.  It 
was  a wise  and  prudent  step,  as  the 
result  proved,  and  was  taken,  it  is  un- 
derstood, in  obedience  to  the  instruc- 
tions of  Eeynolds. 

It  was  now  about  two  o’clock. 
Howard  had  had  little  more  than  time 
to  get  his  men  in  position,  when  the 
spectator  on  Cemetery  Hill  might  have 
seen  a long,  gray  line,  serpent-like, 
creeping  down  the  pike,  and  near  the 
railroad  on  the  northeast  side  of  the 
town.  They  were  “ Stonewall  ” Jack- 
son’s men — led  now  by  General  Ewell, 
Jackson’s  most  trusted  and  loved  lieu- 
tenant— who  were  hurrying  from  Y^ork 
and  Carlisle  to  decide  the  issues  of 
that  day.  Their  march  seems  to 
quicken  as  they  approach  the  battle- 
ground. Before  three  o’clock,  they 


have  come  up  from  the  Y^ork  road,  de- 
bouched into  the  woods,  and,  with 
their  old,  wild  battle-yell,  fallen  with 
crushing  effect  on  Howard’s  right. 
Early’s  division,  of  Ewell,  was  thrown 
upon  the  right  face  of  the  Eleventh, 
commanded  by  Barlow.  Bodes’  divi- 
sion, of  the  same  corps,  moved  further 
round  and  formed  a connection  with  the 
left  of  the  corps  of  General  Hill.  There 
was  a commanding  height,  called  Oak 
Hill,  opposite  the  National  line,  where 
the  left  of  the  Eleventh  and  the  rio-ht 

O 

of  the  First  corps  approached  each 
other,  but  did  not  meet.  With  the  eye 
of  a skilful  general,  Eodes  perceived 
that  this  was  the  key-point  of  the  field, 
and  seized  it  immediately.  The  Elev- 
enth, confronted  by  their  old  antagon- 
ists, seemed  resolved  to  redeem  the 
honor  lost  at  Chancellorsville.  They 
fought  with  the  utmost  bravery.  But 
the  battle  had  now  become  unequal — it 
was  50,000  men  against  21,000;  and 
Howard  had  fallen  into  an  eiror  not 
uncommon  during  the  war.  He  had 
attempted  to  cover  too  much.  It  was 
impossible  for  his  extended  line,  atten- 
uated almost  to  feebleness,  to  resist  the 
persistent  attacks  and  now  overwhelm- 
ing numbers  of  the  enemy.  From  his 
high  vantage  ground,  where  he  had 
planted  artillery,  Eodes  poured  an  ob- 
lique and  destructive  fire  on  the  left  of 
the  Eleventh.  A general  advance  was 
ordered  about  three  o’clock.  Eodes, 
having  massed  his  infantry,  came  sweep 
ing  down  through  the  opening  of  the 
National  line  in  his  front,  breaking 
and  cramping  the  left  of  the  Eleventh, 
and  turning  and  forcing  back  the  right 


THE  FIKST  HAY— SEMINARY  RIDGE. 


505 


of  the  First.  Early,  at  the  same  mo- 
ment, fell  with  equal  energy  on  the  right 
of  the  Eleventh.  The  gallant  Barlow 
made  a stubborn  resistance  near  the 
almshouse;  but,  in  the  midst  of  the 
struggle  at  this  point,  he  was  wound- 
ed, and  fell  helpless  into  the  hands  of 
the  enemy.  Schimmelpfenig  was  also 
taken  prisoner,  but  he  subsequently 
contrived  to  escape  and  rejoin  his  regi- 
ment. The  National  right  was  thus 
driven  back  in  confusion  into  Gettys- 
burg. The  troops  on  the  right  of  the 
First,  or  National  left,  were  in  a simi- 
lar plight.  They,  too,  were  driven  into 
the  town,  where  they  became  entangled 
with  Howard’s  corps.  Ewell  pursued 
the  disordered  mass  into  and  through 
the  streets  of  Gettysburg,  capturing 
some  five  thousand  prisoners  and  occu- 
pying the  place. 

Such  was  the  state  of  things  on  the 
National  right,  and  on  the  right  of  the 
National  left,  at  a comparatively  early 
hour  in  the  afternoon  of  July  1st. 
How  was  it  on  the  extreme  left  of  the 
National  line  ? These  troops  had  been 
under  fire  from  the  commencement  of 
the  fight — some  of  them  for  five,  some 
for  six  hours.  At  the  same  moment 
that  Ewell,  with  the  two  divisions  of 
Rodes  and  Early,  came  thundering 
down  upon  the  Eleventh,  A.  P.  Hill, 
strengthened  by  Ewell,  renewed  the 
attack  upon  the  heroic  and  not  yet 
completely  exhausted  First.  Robinson 
and  Doubleday  and  Wadsworth  did 
their  best  to  keep  their  men  in  position, 
and  to  hold  the  enemy  at  bay ; but 
they,  too,  began  to  feel  themselves 
weak  under  the  fierce  and  persistent 


pressure  of  superior  numbers.  “We 
have  come  to  stay,”  was  still  the  watch- 
word and  battle-cry  of  many  of  the 
men.  They  were  willing  to  wait  and 
fight  to  the  bitter  end.  But  when  it 
became  known  that  the  right  of  their 
corps  had  been  turned,  and  that  the 
Eleventh  had  been  routed,  the  convic- 
tion of  danger  in  their  present  position 
was  forced  upon  them.  It  was  with 
a stubborn  reluctance  they  began  to 
retire,  and  not  until  they  had  suffered 
most  severely.  They  had  saved  and 
moved  to  the  rear  all  their  artillery, 
with  the  exception  of  one  piece,  and 
all  their  ambulances,  before  they  let  go 
their  hold  on  Seminary  Ridge.  When 
they  fell  back  behind  the  town,  they 
did  so  in  something  like  order.  Double- 
day handled  his  men  during  this  crisis 
with  marvellous  ability.  In  managing 
affairs  on  the  National  left,  he  had  re- 
ceived little  or  no  assistance  from 
Howard,  wliose  attention  was  engrossed 
from  the  first  with  his  own  corps  and 
the  general  state  of  things  on  his  right. 
The  fighting,  as  we  have  seen,  was 
severe  on  the  left  during  the  whole  day. 
There  were  special  moments,  however, 
when  the  firing  was  terrific.  Some  of 
the  men  had  been  through  all  the  great 
battles  of  the  East.  They  had  been  in 
the  Peninsula,  and  under  fire  at  Mal- 
vern Hills;  with  Pope,  and  under  fire 
at  Cedar  Mountain,  at  Manassas,  and 
at  Centreville;  with  Burnside,  and 
under  fire  at  Fredericksburg;  with 
Hooker,  and  under  fire  at  Chancellors- 
ville ; and  they  gave  it  as  their  opinion 
that  the  firing  of  that  day  was  the  most 
terrific  they  had  ever  experienced.  In 


506 


GETTYSBURG. 


one  brigade  alone — that  of  Cutler — in 
the  brief  space  of  twenty  minutes, 
every  staff-officer  had  his  horse  shot 
under  him.  Some  of  them  lost  two, 
some  three  horses.  In  thirty  minutes, 
not  a horse  was  left  to  the  general  or 
his  staff,  but  one,  and  that  one  was 
wounded. 

The  remnants  of  the  two  shattered 
corps,  reduced  to  one  half  of  their 
original  strength,  found  a refuge  and  a 
resting-place  on  Cemetery  Hill.  The 
wisdom  of  leaving  Steinwehr  behind  to 
strengthen  and  fortify  the  position  was 
now  apparent  to  all.  Steinwehr  ha(J 
made  excellent  use  of  his  time.  His 
guns  were  admirably  posted,  so  as  to 
guard  the  approaches  to  the  heights ; 
and  behind  every  ledge  of  rock,  every 
stone  wall,  every  building,  there  was  a 
living  barrier — an  abatis  of  bayonets. 
When  the  disordered  masses  were 
pouring  through  Gettysburg  and  to- 
wards the  ridge,  Hancock  had  arrived 
on  the  ground.  Meade  was  still  at 
Taneytown,  some  thirteen  miles  distant. 
So  soon  as  he  was  made  aware  of  the 
battle,  and  of  the  death  of  Keynolds, 
he  sent  Hancock  forward  to  take  com- 
mand. He  was  to  use  his  own  judg- 
ment as  to  whether  the  forces  should 
be  retained  at  Gettysburg,  or  retire  to 
the  line  of  Pipe  Creek.  If  he  found 
the  ground  advantageous,  he  was  so  to 
advise  the  commander,  and  the  troops 
would  be  ordered  up  at  once.  Hurry- 
ing forward  in  an  ambulance,  and 
studying  the  map  by  the  way,  Hancock 
arrived  on  the  field  at  about  half-past 
three  o’clock.  “ I found,”  he  says, 
'Hhat  practically  the  fight  was  over. 


The  rear  of  our  column,  with  the  ene- 
my, was  then  coming  through  the  town 
of  Gettysburg.  General  Howard  was 
on  Cemetery  Hill,  and  there  had  evi- 
dently been  an  attempt  on  his  part  to 
stop  an(i  form  some  troops  there.” 
Hancock  was  a great  favorite  with  the 
rank  and  file  of  the  army  of  the  Po- 
tomac. His  fine  personal  presence, 
and  the  magnetism  of  his  manner,  did 
much  towards  restoring  the  confidence 
of  the  men  and  reestablishing  order. 
There  was  a nucleus  of  order  in  Stein- 
wehr’s  division,  and  in  the  cavalry  of 
Buford,  which  having  been  deployed 
in  the  plain  to  the  left  of  the  town, 
and  in  front  of  the  ridge,  presented  a 
bold  and  firm  front.  Buford  has  been 
described  as  the  good  angel  of  Gettys- 
burg. He  certainly  performed  heroic 
services  on  the  morning  of  that  first 
day,  and  also  at  this  supreme  moment, 
when  weakness  or  hesitation  would 
have  been  ruin.  Never  were  cavalry 
more  superbly  handled.  Never  did 
mounted  men  more  heartily  or  more 
effectively  obey  the  behests  of  their 
chief.  As  the  routed  Nationals  came 
up,  Hancock  quickly  formed  them  into 
line.  He  was  soon  able  to  present 
what  seemed  a formidable  front  to  the 
enemy.  The  National  army,  however, 
w^as  really  in  great  peril.  The  day 
was  yet  young ; several  hours  had  to 
elapse  before  sunset.  If  Lee  had  made 
a vigorous  attack  with  all  the  forces  at 
his  command,  it  is  scarcely  possible 
that  Hancock  could  have  offered  an 
effective  resistance.  To  his  surprise, 
and,  no  doubt,  to  his  delight,  the  Con- 
federate skirmishers,  who  were  already 


4 


J-R.R ICE 


SC.  P H I L ^ 


THE  SECOND  DAY— READY  FOR  BATTLE. 


507 


breasting  the  hill,  were  recalled ; and 
thus  ended  the  first  day’s  fighting  at 
Gettysburg.  General  Lee  made  a mis- 
take in  not  j)ressing  the  advantage  he 
had  won.  But  he  acted  up  to  the  best 
of  his  knowledge.  “ The  attack  was 
not  made  that  afternoon,”  he  tells  us, 
‘‘because  the  enemy’s  force  was  un- 
known, and  because  it  was  considered 
advisable  to  await  the  arrival  of  the 
rest  of  our  troops.”  It  was  a fatal 
pause — fatal  to  the  hopes  of  Lee  him- 
self, and  to  the  plans  and  purposes  of 
the  Confederate  rulers. 

Hancock  lost  no  time  in  reporting  to 
Meade.  Soon  after  arriving,  he  sent  a 
message  informing  him  that  he  could 
hold  the  ground  till  dark.  Shortly 
after  five  o’clock,  he  sent  the  following 
despatch:  “When  I arrived  here,  an 
hour  since,  I found  that  our  troops  had 
given  up  the  front  of  Gettysburg  and 
the  town.  We  have  now  taken  up  a 
position  in  the  cemetery,  which  cannot 
well  be  taken;  it  is  a position,  how- 
ever, easily  turned.  Slocum  is  now 
coming  on  the  ground,  and  is  taking 
position  on  the  right.  But  we  have, 
as  yet,  no  troops  on  the  left,  the  Thiixl 
corps  not  having  yet  reported ; but  I 
suppose  that  it  is  marching  up.  If  so, 
his  flank  march  will,  in  a degree,  pro- 
tect our  left  flank.  In  the  meantime. 
Gibbon  [who  had  been  left  in  com- 
mand of  the  Second]  had  better  marcli 
so  as  to  take . position  on  our  right  or 
left  to  our  rear,  as  may  be  necessary, 
in  some  commanding  position.  ^ 

The  battle  is  quiet  now.  I think  we 
shall  be  all  right  until  night.  I have 
sent  all  the  trains  back.  When  night 


comes  on,  it  can  be  told  better  what 
had  best  be  done.  I think  we  can  re- 
tire ; if  not,  we  can  fight  here,  as  the 
ground  appears  not  unfavorable,  with 
good  troops.”  Having  completed  his 
dispositions,  and  having  turned  over 
the  command  to  Slocum,  who  out- 
ranked him,  and  who  had  just  arrived, 
he  went  back  to  Taney  town  to  see 
Meade  personally.  Meade  had  already 
made  up  his  mind  ; and  he  set  his  army 
in  motion  at  once. 

The  Twelfth  corps,  Slocum’s,  which 
had  been  urgently  summoned  by  Gen- 
eral Howard  during  the  afternoon,  and 
which  had  been  pushed  forward  with 
as  little  delay  as  possible,  arrived  be- 
fore six  o’clock.  It  was  immediately 
put  into  position.  The  Third  corps. 
Sickles’,  which  had  also  been  sum- 
moned up  by  Howard,  arrived  some  of 
them  that  night  at  sunset,  and  the  re- 
mainder duriim  the  nio:ht  and  follow- 
ing  morning.  The  Second  corps,  Han- 
cock’s, which  had  only  to  travel  from 
Taneytown,  a distance  of  thirteen  miles, 
came  up  shortly  after  midnight.  The 
Fifth  corps,  Sykes’,  was  at  Union 
Mills,  twenty-three  miles  distant,  when 
the  order  was  given  , but  it  was  on  the 
ground  at  an  early  hour  in  the  morn- 
ing. The  Sixth,  Sedgwick’s,  was  at 
Manchester,  thirty-two  miles  distant. 
It  was  known  that  its  commander 
would  hurry  forward  with  all  possible 
despatch ; and  it  was  confidently  ex- 
pected that  he  would  reach  the  field 
in  time  to  take  part  in  the  fight  of  the 
following  day.  Meade,  himself,  as 
soon  as  he  had  received  Hancock’s  rep- 
resentations, broke  up  his  headquarters 


508 


GETTYSBURG. 


at  Taneytown,  sent  his  trains  to  West- 
minster, and  hastened  to  Gettysburg, 
which  he  reached  at  one  o’clock  on 
the  morning  of  the  2d.  Soon  after 
he  arrived  on  the  ground,  he  fixed 
his  headquarters  at  a little  frame 
house  on  the  Taneytown  road,  in 
rear  of  and  to  the  south  of  Zeigler’s 
Gi’ove.  It  was  sheltered  from  infantry 
fire  by  a swell  in  the  ground;  but 
there  was  nothing  to  prevent  it  from 
becoming  a target  for  the  enemy’s 
artillery. 

With  the^earliest  light  Meade  was 
July  inspecting  the  ground,  and 

making  arrangements  for  the  dis- 
position of  his  troops.  Some  of  the  corps 
were  already  in  position.  The  others 
were  placed  as  they  came  up.  The  Elev- 
enth retained  its  position  on  Cemetery 
Hill,  and  was  supported  by  Robinson’s 
and  Doubleday’s  divisions,  of  the  First, 
now  commanded  by  General  Newton. 
On  the  extreme  right  was  the  Twelfth, 
which,  with  the  division  of  Wadsworth, 
also  of  the  First,  held  Culp’s  Hill. 
The  Second  and  Third  were  ordered  to 
occupy  the  continuation  of  Cemetery 
Ridge,  to  the  left  of  the  Eleventh. 
The  Fifth  was  held  in  reserve.  When 
Sedgwick  came  up,  he  was  to  be  placed 
on  the  extreme  left,  behind  the  Round 
Tops.  The  order,  from  right  to  left, 
was,  therefore,  as  follows : Slocum, 
Newton,  Howard,  Hancock,  Sickles. 
The  entire  army  was  concentrated  on 
an  area  of  about  three  square  miles. 
The  reserve  forces  were  within  thirty 
minutes’  march  of  any  part  of  the  line. 
Batteries  were  posted  along  the  crest ; 
and  rock-ledges,  improvised  earth-works 


and  stone  walls  in  the  rear  gave  shelter 
to  the  soldiers. 

On  the  morning  of  Thursday,  the 
Confederate  prospect  was  not  quite  so 
bright  as  it  had  been  the  night  before. 
True,  Longstreet  had  arrived;  but  it 
was  manifest  at  a glance  that  the  Na- 
tional army  had  been  largely  reinforced, 
that  it  occupied  a position  of  formid- 
able strength,  and  that  to  attempt  to 
dislodge  it  meant  a tremendous  expen- 
diture of  force,  as  well  as  a fearful  sac- 
rifice of  life.  At  early  dawn,  Lee, 
Longstreet  and  Hill  were  in  eager  con- 
sultation on  Seminary  Ridge.  The 
summits  of  the  ridge  were  covered  with 
oak  and  pine  trees ; so,  also,  was  its 
western  slope,  thus  affording  excellent 
concealment  for  the  troops.  Along  this 
ridge,  and  round  to  the  east  of  Gettys- 
burg, in  the  form  of  a vast  crescent, 
over  five  miles  in  length,  its  concavity 
facing  the  National  line,  the  Confede- 
rate army  was  arranged.  The  eastern 
slope  was  dotted  thickly  with  artillery, 
which  looked  frowningly  over  the  in- 
tervening valley.  Longstreet  was  on 
the  right.  Hill  in  the  centre,  and  Ewell 
on  the  left.  Between  Ewell  and  Hill 
there  was  a gap  of  nearly  a mile.  The 
army  was  about  80,000  strong,  numer- 
ically equal  to  that  on  the  opposite 
heights,  even  if  Sedgwick  should  get 
up  in  time.  Lee’s  one  inconvenience 
was  the  extent  of  his  line,  and  the  con- 
sequent difificulty  of  communication. 
Meade  had  the  advantage  of  compact- 
ness ; and  communication  was  easy. 

It  was  evident  already  that  the  at- 
tack, if  there  was  to  be  an  attack, 
would  come  from  the  Confederates. 


THE  ABOVE  DIAGRAM  SHOWS  THE  POSITIONS  DURING  THE  FIRST  DAV’s  FIGHT. 


THIS  DIAGRAM  SHOWS  POSITIONS  OF  THE  ARMIES  I)URIN(}  THE  SECOND  AND  THIRD  DAYS. 


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LEE’S  MISTAKE. 


509 


Meade’s  position  was  merely  defensive. 
It  was  for  this  purpose,  and  this  pur- 
pose alone,  that  Cemetery  Eidge  had 
been  occupied  and  strengthened.  It 
was  no  part  of  his  intention  at  this  par- 
ticular juncture  to  initiate  aggressive 
measures.  It  had  not  been  the  original 
intention  of  Lee  to  fight  so  far  from  his 
base,  unless  attacked  by  the  enemy ; but 
it  had  become  difficult,  next  to  impos- 
sible, to  withdraw  his  troops  now  that 
they  had  come  into  actual  contact  with 
the  National  army,  and  tasted  somewhat 
of  the  sweets  of  victory.  It  may  well  be 
doubted  whether,  if  an  order  had  been 
given  for  retreat,  his  men,  elated  as 
they  were  with  past  successes,  and 
fi-ushed  as  they  were  with  the  fresh 
triumphs  of  yesterday,  would  have 
calmly  submitted.  General  Lee  was 
not  ignorant  of  the  difficulty  and  dan- 
ger of  assaulting  a powerful  foe  behind 
entrenched  lines,  and  in  so  command- 
ing a position  as  that  now  occupied  by 
the  National  army.  Still,  as  he  him- 
self tells  us,  a battle  had  become,  in  a 
measure,  unavoidable;  and,  ^‘encouraged 
by  the  successful  issue  of  the  engage- 
ment of  the  previous  day,  and  in  view 
of  the  valuable  results  which  would 
ensue  from  the  defeat  of  the  army  of 
General  Meade,  it  was  thobght  advis- 
able to  renew  the  attack.”  The  Con- 
federate commander,  however,  made 
one  mistake  when  he  paused,  on  the 
eve  of  victory,  on  the  afternoon  of  the 
1st.  He  made  another  mistake  when 
he  delayed  his  attack  on  the  morning 
and  forenoon  of  the  2d.  A vigorous 
assault  made  on  the  afternoon  of  Wed- 
nesday, or  even  on  the  early  hours  of 


Thursday,  could  scarcely  have  failed 
of  success.  Bent  on  invasion  as  he 
was,  he  flung  away  his  opportunities. 
By  delaying  as  he  did,  he  gave  the 
National  forces  not  only  time  to  come 
up  and  concentrate  in  strong  positions 
in  his  front,  but  time  to  enjoy,  after 
the  fatigues  of  their  march,  some  hours 
of  refreshing  rest. 

It  was  still,  however,  early  morning. 
The  Confederate  generals  had  not  yet 
completed  their  plans.  Meade  was  un- 
certain on  what  part  of  his  line  the 
first  blow  would  be  dealt,  but  he  was 
guarding  every  point  with  scrupulous 
care.  All  was  calm  and  still.  There 
was  a balmy  sweetness  in  the  summer 
air;  music  in  the  woods;  beauty  in 
the  landscape.  As  the  eye  of  the  spec- 
tator on  the  heights  fell  upon  the  val- 
ley below,  it  was  attracted  by  bloom- 
ing orchards,  by  smiling  fields,  already 
growing  yellow  with  rich  crops  of 
ripening  grain,  by  contented  cattle 
grazing  at  will  on  the  meadow,  or  lazily 
resting  in  the  shade.  Nature  seemed 
all-unconscious  of  the  terrible  tempest 
of  human  wrath  which  was  about  to 
burst  forth,  and  which  was  so  soon  to 
convert  those  scenes  of  peace  and  hap- 
piness into  scenes  of  tumult  and  horror, 
to  fill  the  air  with  the  sounds  of  de- 
struction and  the  shrieks  of  agon}^,  to 
cover  the  valley  and  the  hillsides  with 
the  ghastly  bodies  of  the  slain,  and  to 
delug^e  those  fields  and  redden  those 
streams  with  blood. 

It  was  four  o’clock  in  the  afternoon 
before  Lee  had  completed  his  arrange- 
ments for  attack.  There  had  been 
some  lively  skirmishing  earlier  in  the 


510 


GETTYSBURG. 


day.  In  the  morning,  Ewell’s  move- 
ments created  the  impression  that  an 
attack  was  about  to  be  made  on  Culp’s 
Hill ; and  General  Meade  was  disposed 
for  a time  to  assume  the  initiative  at 
that  point;  but  the  ground  being  found 
unfavorable,  and  the  enemy  not  making 
further  demonstrations,  the  purpose  was 
abandoned.  General  Sedgwick  arrived 
on  the  field,  with  the  Sixth  corps,  about 
two  o’clock,  having  accomplished  his 
long  march  with  marvellous  rapidity; 
and  General  Meade  immediately  there- 
after directed  Sykes,  who,  with  the 
Fifth  corps,  had  been  in  reserve  on  the 
right,  to  move  over  and  take  position 
as  a reserve  on  the  left.  Meantime, 
General  Lee  had  decided  on  his  plan 
of  assault.  It  was  determined,”  he 
tells  us,  “ to  make  the  principal  attack 
on  the  enemy’s  left,  and  endeavor  to 
get  a position  from  which  it  was 
thought  that  our  artillery  could  be 
brought  to  bear  with  effect.  Long- 
street  was  directed  to  place  the  di- 
visions of  Hood  and  McLaws  on  the 
right  of  Hill,  partially  enveloping  the 
enemy’s  left,  which  he  was  to  drive  in. 
General  Hill  was  ordered  to  threaten 
the  enemy’s  centre,  so  as  to  prevent  re- 
inforcements from  being  drawn  to  either 
wing,  and  to  co-operate  with  his  right 
division  in  Longstreet’s  attack ; General 
Ewell  was  instructed  to  make  a simul- 
taneous demonstration  on  the  enemy’s 
right,  to  be  converted  into  a real  attack, 
should  opportunity  offer.” 

Let  us  now  see  how  this  plan  was 
carried  out.  It  was  Meade’s  intention, 
in  posting  his  troops,  to  occupy  the 
ridge  continuously  from  Cemetery  Hill 


to  the  Round  Tops.  Sickles  had  been 
instructed  in  the  morning  to  form  Lis 
corps  in  line  of  battle  on  the  left  of 
Hancock’s  corps ; his  right  flank  to  rest 
on  Hancock’s  left;  and  his  left  to  ex- 
tend to  the  Round  Top,  occu])yiiig  it, 
if  practicable.  At  the  point  indicated, 
there  is  a depression  on  the  ridge;  and 
General  Sickles,  believing  that  he  would 
be  more  advantageously  posted  on  the 
intermediate  crest,  about  three  quarters 
of  a mile  in  front,  and  along  which 
runs  the  Emmettsburg  road,  assumed 
the  responsibility  of  occupying  that 
position.  It  was  not  till  within  a few 
minutes  of  four  o’clock,  when  General 
Meade  arrived  at  this  part  of  the  ground 
in  person,  that  he  discovered  the  peril- 
ous position  in  which  Sickles  had  placed 
himself,  his  men,  and,  indeed,  the  en- 
tire National  army.  Instead  of  connect- 
ing with  the  left  of  Hancock,  Sickles 
had  thrown  his  right  flank  forward 
some  four  hundred  yards  in  front,  thus 
leaving  a gap  between  his  right  and 
Hancock’s  left ; his  left,  instead  of  being 
near  the  Round  Top  Mountain,  was  in 
advance  of  it;  and  his  line,  instead  of 
being  a prolongation  of  Hancock’s  line, 
made  an  angle  of  about  forty-five  de- 
grees with  that  line.  Meade  expressed 
his  disappointment.  Sickles  his  regret; 
but  it  was  too  late  to  make  any  radical 
change.  Sickles,  undoubtedly,  meant 
well;  but  it  was  a weak,  exposed,  and 
otherwise  faulty  position.  Round  To]) 
was  really  the  key  of  the  battle  ground ; 
and  it  was  at  once  uncovered  and  unoc- 
cupied. Lee  discovered  at  once  the 
blunder  which  had  been  committed. 
In  his  report  he  says : “ In  front  oi 


LONGSTREET’S  ADVANCE. 


511 


General  Longstreet,  the  enemy  held  a 
position  from  which,  if  he  could  be 
diiven,  it  was  thought  that  our  army 
could  be  used  to  advantage  in  assailing 
the  more  elevated  ground  beyond,  and 
thus  enable  us  to  reach  the  crest  of  the 
ridge.”  Sickles,  who  was  thus  singled 
out  as  the  special  object  of  attack,  was 
to  pay  dearly  for  his  temerity.  His 
interview  with  Meade  had  not  ended ; 
the  latter,  in  fact,  was  just  expressing 
his  fear  that  the  enemy  would  not  per- 
mit him  to  withdraw,  and  that  there 
was  no  time  for  any  further  change  or 
movement,  when  the  Confederate  bat- 
teries opened  upon  the  position,  and 
the  action  was  commenced. 

It  was,  as  we  have  said,  about  four 
o’clock  in  the  afternoon  when  the  signal 
for  battle  was  given.  The  signal  came 
in  the  character  of  a terrific  cannonade 
from  the  Confederate  artillery.  The 
National  guns  soon  hurled  back  defi- 
ance. The  din  was  deafening,  and  the 
air  was  alive  with  missiles  of  every  de- 
scription, This,  however,  was  but  the 
prelude  to  more  desperate  work.  Meade 
did  not  lose  his  self-possession.  As- 
suring Sickles  of  every  assistance  pos- 
sible, he  hurried  off  to  give  more  general 
direction.  Sickles’  right,  commanded 
by  Humphrey,  was  disposed  along  the 
Emmettsburg  Road.  On  Humphrey’s 
left  the  line  was  continued  by  Graham’s 
brigade,  of  Birney’s  division,  as  far  as 
the  Peach  Orchard.  At  this  point  the 
remaining  brigades  of  Birney’s  divi- 
sion— those  of  De  Trobriand  and  W ard 
— were  refused,  and  thrown  back  ob- 
liquely towards  Round  Top.  The  sa- 
lient or  apex  of  the  angle  was  Sickles’ 


weakest  point.  It  was  the  point  which 
most  invited  attack,  and  the  driving  in 
of  which  offered  the  greatest  advan- 
tages. Under  cover  of  a heavy  artil- 
lery fire,  and  partially  concealed  by  the 
smoke,  Longstreet  was  seen  to  be  press- 
ing forward  with  his  whole  corps — 
nearly  one  third  of  the  Confederate 
army.  Batteries  were  quickly  got  into 
position ; and  Sickles  was  already  under 
a most  murderous  fire,  both  of  artillery 
and  musketry.  The  Confederate  flank, 
it  was  observed,  extended  far  beyond 
the  National  left.  As  Longstreet  came 
up,  with  his  warrior  columns,  defiance 
in  their  eyes  and  destruction  in  their 
firm  and  steady  tramp,  his  extreme 
right,  under  Hood,  was  seen  to  bend  in 
towards  the  National  left  and  in  the 
direction  of  Little  Round  Top.  As  the 
Confederate  line  draws  near,  it  bends  in 
more  and  more.  It  is  evidently  Long- 
street’s  intention  to  overlap  Sickles’ 
left,' and  to  fall  with  accumulated  force 
on  the  extremity  of  his  line.  His  pur- 
pose is  quickly  revealed.  Rushing  for- 
ward at  the  double-quick,  the  men  in 
grey  fell  with  tremendous  energy  up- 
on Ward’s  brigade,  who  held  the  ex- 
tremity of  the  National  line.  Ward  was 
not  unprepared.  This  was  the  point 
which  was  struck  first;  but  Hood’s 
men  kept  closing  in  along  the  whole 
of  Birney’s  front,  until  the  battle  raged 
from  the  orchard  to  the  base  of  Little 
Round  Top.  At  the  orchard,  and 
alon^  the  refused  line  towards  Little 
Round  Top,  the  waves  of  battle  surged 
and  rolled  for  weary  hours,  victory 
now  inclining  to  the  one  side  and  now 
to  the  other.  Ward  and  De  Trobriand 


512 


GETTYSBURG. 


and  Graham  pei’formed  prodigies  of 
valor;  Birney,  too,  and  even  Sickles, 
were  ever  at  the  point  of  danger,  cheer- 
ing the  men  by  their  words,  and  in- 
citing them  by  their  example ; but  no 
amount  of  valor  or  self-sacrifice  could 
atone  for  the  inherent  weakness  of  the 
position. 

Little  Round  Top  Avas  the  objective 
point  of  this  well-directed  Confederate 
attack.  It  was  the  prize  which  the 
Confederates  Avished  to  win,  and  which 
the  Nationals  wished  to  keep.  We 
have  already  described  this  hill,  and 
pointed  out  its  connection  Avith  the 
general  range,  on  the  crest  of  which 
the  National  forces,  for  the  most  part, 
were  posted.  It  is  a steep  and  rocky 
spur  of  the  loftier  Round  Top.  It  is 
bald  and  naked,  its  summit  and  its 
sides  being  cut  up  into  ledges,  and  cov- 
ered with  mighty  boulders.  This  hill 
was  destined  to  be  the  scene  of  one  of 
the  most  heroic,  and,  at  the  same  time, 
most  savage  encounters,  during  that 
aAvful,  yet  glorious,  2d  of  July,  at  Get- 
tysburg. While  the  battle  W’as  raging 
along  Birney’s  front,  the  fiery  and  im- 
petuous Hood  had  discovered  that  Lit- 
tle Round  Top  was  not  occupied,  and 
that  only  a thin  curtain  of  soldiers — the 
Ninety-Ninth  Pennsylvania — hung  in 
its  front.  If  that  position  were  in  his 
hands,  the  whole  army  of  Meade  could 
not  again  dislodge  him.  Nay,  more : 
the  battle  of  Gettysburg  would  be  the 
crowning  triumph  of  the  Confederate 
cause.  Selecting  his  chosen  band  of 
Texans,  his  most  trusted  soldiers,  he 
pointed  out  the  black  and  rugged  mass, 
and  sent  them  on  their  mission.  With 


the  speed  of  lightning,  they  rushed  for- 
ward to  give  effect  to  the  behests  of 
their  chief.  But  they  were  too  late. 
The  path  was  blocked  w^hen  they 
reached  Plum  Run,  a stream  which 
skirts  the  base  of  the  hill  on  its  west- 
ern side. 

Let  us  see  how  this  came  about. 
When  the  battle  commenced,  General 
Warren,  Meade’s  chief-engineer,  after 
liaving  inspected  Sickles’  position  in 
company  with  the  general  commanding, 
proceeded  to  Little  Round  Top,  whence 
he  had  a magnificent  view  of  the  whole 
field  of  battle.  He  saw  the  first  fierce 
onset  of  the  enemy,  and  how  nobly  it 
Avas  resisted  by  the  division  of  Birney. 
But  it  Avas  not  that  Avhich  fixed  his  at- 
tention and  engaged  his  thoughts.  It 
was  the  unprotected  condition  of  Little 
Round  Top,  the  key  of  the  National 
position,  and  the  terrible  consequences 
which  must  inevitably  folloAv,  if  it 
should  fall  into  the  hands  of  the  Con- 
federates. There  Avas  no  time  for  delay. 
The  hill  had  been  used  as  a signal  sta- 
tion ; and  the  signal-men,  Avhen  they 
beheld  the  oiiAvard  rush  of  the  Confed- 
e]*ate  masses,  commenced  to  fold  their 
flags  and  otherAvise  to  prepare  for  re- 
tiring. At  this  moment,  the  head  of 
Barnes’  division,  of  Sykes’  corps,  was 
approaching  at  the  double-quick  to  re- 
inforce Sickles.  Warren  assumed  the 
responsibility  of  detaching  Vincent’s 
brigade  from  that  division,  and  order- 
ing it  upon  Little  Round  Top.  Haz- 
litt’s  battery,  also,  Avas  immediately  or- 
dered up ; and  by  almost  superhuman 
efforts,  it  Avas  raised  to  the  crest  of  the 
hill,  and  placed  in  position.  Vincent 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP. 


513 


80  disposed  his  men  around  the  base 
of  the  hill,  that  the  approaches  were 
guarded  at  every  point. 

The  arrangements  were  completed  not 
a moment  too  soon.  Scarcely  had  Vin- 
cent’s regiments — the  Sixteenth  Michi- 
gan, Lieutenant-Colonel  Welch;  the 
Forty-Fourth  New  York,  Colonel  Rice; 
and  the  Twentieth  Maine,  Colonel 
Chamberlain — taken  position  behind 
the  huge  boulders,  when,  in  the  words 
of  one  of  the  officers  present,  there  was 
heard  a loud,  fierce,  distant  yell,  as  if 
all  pandemonium  had  broken  loose 
and  joined  in  the  chorus  of  one  grand, 
universal  war-whoop.”  Three  lines 
deep,  at  double-quick,  on  they  came. 
Hazlitt’s  battery  opens  upon  them  its 
murderous  fire;  musketry  blaze  forth 
from  behind  every  boulder;  but  in 
vain.  Those  impetuous  Texans  will 
not  be  checked.  On,  on  they  come 
in  ever-increasing  numbers.  Assault 
follows  assault;  but  each  time  they 
are  driven  back,  broken,  bleeding  and 
thinned,  their  dead  and  dying  com- 
rades left  lying  in  heaps  among  the 
rocks.  For  over  half  an  hour  the  sav- 
age contest  lasted ; but  Vincent’s  men 
stood  firm ; and  being  joined  by  Weed’s 
brigade,  of  Ayres’  division,  also  of  the 
Fifth  corps,  the  Confederates  were 
driven  from  the  slope  and  over  the 
rocky  ledges,  and  the  position  was  se- 
cured. Not  yet,  however,  was  the 
struggle  ended.  Clinging  to  the  rocky 
hollow  which  divides  the  Round  Tops, 
they  pressed  forward,  and,  although 
received  by  a withering  musketry  fire, 
succeeded  in  turning  the  left  flank  of. 
the  brigade.  At  this  stage,  the  fight- 


ing was  furious.  Chamberlain’s  Twen- 
tieth Maine  fell  upon  their  assailants 
with  the  energy  of  despair,  and,  with 
the  butts  of  tlieir  muskets,  clubbed 
them  to  death.  The  enemy  was  re- 
pulsed, but  not  destroyed.  They  still 
clung  to  the  rocky  hollow.  Chamber- 
lain’s left  flank  was  dangerously  ex- 
posed. He  called  for  help,  but  in  vain. 
Suddenly,  the  enemy  began  to  show 
some  signs  of  weakness ; and  Chamber- 
lain,  finding  his  opportunity,  rising  to 
the  dignity  of  the  occasion,  and  yield- 
ing to  the  severe  requirements  of  the 
emergency,  ordered  his  men  to  fix  bay- 
onets, and,  sweeping  like  a whirlwind 
upon  the  now  dispirited  Texans,  he 
drove  them  before  him  in  utter  rout.  At 
this  opportune  moment,  a brigade  of  the 
Pennsylvania  reserves  charged  up  the 
hill,  under  the  personal  leadership  of 
General  Crawford ; and  the  enemy,  be- 
lieving that  heavy  reinforcements  had  ar- 
rived, gave  up  the  contest.  The  hollow 
ground  between  the  Round  Tops  was 
cleared  of  the  foe.  Little  Round  Top,  the 
key  of  the  position,  was  secured.  The 
victory  was  complete ; but  it  had  been 
won  at  a great  sacrifice.  The  slaughter 
had  been  terrible.  It  recalled  the  mem- 
ory of  Ball’s  Bluff,  and  the  valley  of 
the  shadow  of  death,  at  Pittsburg 
Landing.  The  dead  were  found  piled 
in  heaps  behind  the  rocks;  and  the 
narrow  valley  was  literally  covered 
with  the  mangled  bodies  of  the  dead 
and  wounded.  The  gallant  Vincent 
had  yielded  up  his  life.  Weed,  too, 
had  been  killed;  and  Hazlitt,  when 
bending  over  the  prostrate  form  of  his 
chief,  had  received  his  death-wound. 


514 


GETTYSBURG. 


While  this  struggle  was  going  on 
for  the  possession  of  Little  Round  Top, 
there  was  even  more  severe  fighting  on 
Birney’s  right,  and  at  the  salient  in  the 
Peach  Orchard.  We  have  already  seen 
that  at  the  same  time  that  Hood  pushed 
Lis  men  on  Birney’s  left,  and  worked 
his  way  through  the  gap  between  the 
left  and  the  Round  Top,  he  drew  his 
line  steadily  in,  and  pressed  more 
closely  upon  Birney’s  right,  until  the 
battle  raged  between  the  Round  Top 
and  the  Peach  Orchard.  In  this  at- 
tack on  Birney’s  right,  and  particularly 
on  the  salient  at  the  orchard.  Hood 
was  assisted  by  McLaws,  and  eight 
regiments  of  Anderson’s  division,  of 
IlilLs  corps.  Longstreet’s  great  object 
was  to  break  Sickles’  line  at  the  salient, 
or  as  it  may  be  called,  the  centre,  and 
obtain  possession  of  the  orchard.  The 
onset  of  Hood  and  McLaws  on  Birney’s 
front  was  made  with  great  vigor ; and 
such  was  the  pressure  that  Sickles  was 
compelled  immediately  to  send  for  re- 
inforcements. It  was  in  response  to 
this  call  that  Barnes’  division,  of  Sykes’, 
was  sent  forward.  Vincent’s  brigade 
of  this  division  was,  as  we  have  seen, 
detached  by  General  AVarren,  and  sent 
to  hold  Little  Round  Top.  The  other 
two  brigades — those  of  Tilton  and 
Sweitzer — hastened  to  the  support  of 
Birney.  The  struggle,  at  this  point, 
was  fierce  and  terrible.  The  Nationals 
made  a gallant  and  determined  fight. 
The  Confederates,  however,  getting 
their  guns  into  advanced  positions, 
were  able  to  enfilade  the  National  line. 
The  pressure  was  now  irresistible. 
Sickles’  men  fell  back.  The  National 


line  was  broken ; and  the  much  cov- 
eted orchard  was  in  possession  of  the 
enemy. 

Birney,  still  resisting  fiercely,  made 
a gallant  stand  on  a new  position  on 
wooded  ground  adjoining  the  wheat 
field,  and  intermediate  between  his  last 
front  and  the  Round  Top.  De  Trobri- 
and’s  brigade,  which  had  fought  most 
bravely  since  the  first  moment  of  the 
attack,  and  which  had  offered  a most 
stubborn  resistance  to  the  advance  of 
the  enemy,  after  the  occupation  of  the 
orchard,  had  by  this  time  melted 
away.  The  battle  was  now  at  its 
height,  and  Sickles,  who  fearlessly  ex- 
posed himself,  was  wounded  and  car- 
ried from  the  field.  The  command  for 
the  time  being  devolved  upon  Birney. 
In  his  new  position,  he  placed  Sweitzer 
on  his  left  and  Tilton  on  his  right. 
Here  again,  for  a time,  the  battle  raged 
with  great  fury.  Attempts  were  again 
and  again  made  to  regain  lost  ground, 
and  to  repel  the  enemy’s  advance.  It 
was  all  in  vain.  Birney’s  original  front 
had  already  been  pierced ; and  Barnes’ 
briojades,  after  some  stubborn  fightinor, 
had  been  compelled  to  fall  back.  Not 
yet,  however,  was  the  struggle  to  be 
abandoned.  Hancock,  made  aware  of 
the  distressed  condition  of  Birney,  de- 
tached fi-om  his  front  Caldwell’s  splen- 
did division,  and  sent  it  to  his  aid. 
Arrived  on  the  already  blood-stained 
wheat  field,  Caldwell  pushed  his  men 
into  action.  Cross  and  Kelley  were  in 
advance,  and  were  soon  in  the  thick  of 
the  fight.  The  Confederates,  as  if 
gathering  fresh  strength,  fell  upon 
them  with  destructive  fury.  Both 


THE  PEACH  ORCHARD. 


515 


brigades  were  terribly,  punished;  and 
the  gallant  Cross,  whose  bravery  had 
been  exhibited  on  many  a battle  field, 
was  killed.  Caldwell  then  advanced 
his  other  two  brigades,  those  of  Brooke 
and  Zook.  At  this  moment,  as  one  has 
put  it,  the  “ hot  battle  boiled  and  bub- 
bled as  though  it  were  some  great  hell 
caldron.”  Zook  fell,  mortally  wounded, 
as  he  led  his  men  into  action.  Brooke 
was  more  fortunate.  He  advanced  gal- 
lantly against  the  enemy,  and  drove 
him  from  a strong  position  which  he 
held  under  cover  of  the  woods.  Cald- 
well’s troops  performed  deeds  of  valor ; 
and,  for  a moment  or  two,  it  seemed  as 
if  the  tide  of  battle  would  be  turned. 
But  no.  The  Confederates  come  rush- 
ing forward  in  tremendous  force,  through 
the  opening  made  at  the  Peach  Or- 
chard, and,  falling  upon  him  with  resist- 
less energy,  envelop  his  right  and  pen- 
etrate almost  to  his  rear.  After  losing 
one  half  of  his  men,  Caldwell,  like 
Birney  and  Barnes,  is  compelled  to 
retire.  The  victorious  Confederates 
now  rush  through  the  woods,  fall  upon 
Sweitzer,  who  has  joined  in  this  last 
attack,  and  hurl  him  before  them. 
Ayres  has  just  come  up,  with  two  bri- 
gades of  regulars,  from  the  Fifth  corps. 
In  their  onward  and  triumphant  rush, 
the  Confederates  strike  his  right  and 
rear,  and  almost  completely  envelop 
him.  It  was  only  with  great  difficulty, 
and  after  much  sacrifice,  that  he  was 
able  to  fight  his  way  back  to  his  orig- 
inal line  of  battle.  Ayres  was  thus 
made  to  share  the  fate  of  Birney,  of 
Barnes  and  of  Caldwell.  The  Con- 
federates have’  now  reached  the  base  of 


the  hill.  Here  they  halt,  and  well 
they  may ; for  the  heights  are  crowned 
by  the  battalions  of  the  Fifth  and  Sixth 
corps.  Disorganized  by  their  advance, 
and  suffering  terribly,  although  for 
the  moment  victorious,  they  hesitate 
as  to  what  to  do.  The  moment  is  op- 
portune for  a parting  blow.  Crawford, 
now  on  the  heights  with  his  brave 
Pennsylvania  reserves,  sees  his  oppor- 
tunity, and  turns  it  to  account.  Steal- 
ing down  the  heights,  he  flings  his  men 
on  the  triumphant  but  now  baffled  foe. 
A severe  struggle  ensues  for  the  pos- 
session of  a stone  wall.  For  a time, 
the  battle  rages  at  this  point  again 
with  tremendous  fury.  The  Confede- 
rates, eager  to  hold  the  position,  offer 
a most  stubborn  resistance;  but  they 
are  ultimately  driven  back  to  the 
woods,  beyond  the  wheat  field,  where 
they  rest  for  the  night. 

Such  was  the  end  of  the  struggle, 
which  for  hours  raged  so  fiercely  on 
Sickles’  left  and  left  centre.  The  posi- 
tion held  by  that  wing  at  the  com- 
mencement of  the  contest,  and  which 
had  been  defended  by  Birney  with  so 
much  valor,  had  been  finally  aban- 
doned. In  the  original  disposition  of 
Sickles’  troops,  as  we  have  seen  al- 
ready, Humphrey’s  division,  with  the 
brigade  of  Graham,  held  the  right, 
above  and  beyond  the  salient,  and  fac- 
ing to  the  west.  Humphrey’s  position 
had  been  peculiar  from  the  commence- 
ment of  the  fight.  It  will  be  remem- 
bered that  on  his  right,  in  consequence 
of  the  advanced  position  of  the  corps, 
there  was  a gap  of  nearly  half  a mile 
between  him  and  Hancock.  For  a 


516 


GETTYSBURG. 


time,  after  the  action  commenced  on 
the  left,  Humphrey  was  left  unassailed. 
When  Birney  was  sorely  pressed,  and 
when  the  combined  strength  of  Hood 
and  McLaws  was  brought  to  bear  upon 
the  salient  at  the  Peach  Orchard,  Hum- 
phrey was  able  to  send  assistance  to 
the  sister  brigade.  The  Peach  Or- 
chard had  been  taken ; the  Confede- 
rates had  rushed  through  the  gap  in 
the  National  line;  Birney  had  fallen 
back  to  the  new  position  at  the  wheat 
field,  where,  reinforced  first  by  Cald- 
well and  then  by  Ayres,  the  tide  of 
battle  again  surged  and  rolled  like  a 
tempest-tossed  sea ; but  still  Humphrey 
was  iinassailed.  Why  was  this  ? Let 
us  see.  In  the  disposition  of  his  troops, 
as  has  already  been  noticed.  General  Lee 
had  so  far  extended  his  right  beyond  the 
National  left,  that  it  was  able  to  overlap 
or  outflank  the  latter  by  at  least  two 
brigades.  The  result  of  this  was  that 
Longstreet’s  left  was  pushed  so  far 
to  the  right  that  Humphrey  was  con- 
fronted not  by  Longstreet,  but  by 
Hill.  Lee’s  instructions  to  Hill  were 
that,  in  the  first  stages  of  the  contest 
at  least,  he  should  content  himself 
with  making  demonstrations  against 
the  enemy’s  centre,  so  as  to  prevent 
reinforcements  being  drawn  to  the  as- 
sistance of  either  the  right  wing  or  the 
left.  Thus  it  was  that,  while  the  battle 
raged  most  fiercely  on  his  left,  Hum- 
phrey remained  untouched.  About  six 
o’clock  in  the  evening,  and  when  Bir- 
ney was  about  to  fall  back  from  his 
position  facing  south — a position  which 
was  nearly  at  right  angles  with  the 
division  on  his  right — Birney  notified 


Humphrey  that  Sickles  had  been 
wounded,  and  that  he  was  in  command 
of  the  corps,  and  requested  him  also 
to  fall  back,  so  as  to  connect  with  his 
right.  This  meant  that  Humphrey, 
while  holding  on  to  the  crest  on  the 
Emmettsburg  road  with  his  right, 
should  swing  back  with  his  left,  so  as 
to  make  change  of  front,  and  at  the 
same  time  keep  the  line  intact.  It 
was  a most  difficult  operation ; but  i1 
was  performed  with  skill  and  success. 
As  the  immediate  result  of  this  ma- 
noeuvre, Humphrey’s  right  was  thrown 
entirely  out  of  position;  and  when, 
finally,  the  whole  left,  and  the  troops 
which  had  been  sent  in  support,  weie 
driven  back,  and  the  forces  of  Hood 
and  McLaws  came  rushing  through  the 
gap  thus  created,  his  right  was  feai’f ully 
exposed,  his  own  coolness  and  intrepid- 
ity alone  saving  it  from  complete  de- 
struction. Hancock — who  was  now  in 
command  of  Sickles’  corps,  as  well  as 
his  own — ever  watchful,  and  seeing  the 
exposed  condition  of  Humphrey’s  right, 
sent  to  its  suppoi  t two  regiments,  the 
Fifteenth  Massachusetts  and  the  Eighty- 
Second  New  Y^ork  from  Gibbon’s  di- 
vision; and,  to  protect  him  on  the 
left,  he  pushed  forward  Willard’s  bri- 
gade, of  Hays’  division.  At  the  same 
time  that  the  triumphant  Confederates, 
having  pierced  Sickles’  line,  were  fall- 
ing heavily  on  the  left.  Hill,  abandon- 
ing his  passive  attitude,  came  down 
like  a thunderbolt  on  the  right.  Hum' 
phrey  was  thus  caught  between  two 
fires.  “I  was  attacked,”  he  says,  ‘‘on 
my  flanks,  as  well  as  on  my  front.  I 
never  have  been  under  a hotter  artll- 


Bidg'i'  a' 


HUMPHREY  SEVERELY  ATTACKED. 


517 


lery  and  musketry  fire  combined.  I 
may  have  been  under  a hotter  musketry 
fire.  For  a moment,  I thought  the 
day  was  lost.  I did  not  order  my 
troops  to  fall  back  rapidly  because,  so 
far  as  I could  see,  the  crest  in  my  rear 
was  vacant,  and  I knew  that  when 
troops  got  to  moving  rapidly,  it  was 
exceedingly  difficult  to  stop  them  just 
when  you  wanted  to  stop  them.  At 
that  moment,  I received  an  order  to 
fall  back  to  the  Found  Top  Fidge, 
which  I did  slowly,  suffering  a very 
heavy  loss.” 

Humphrey,  in  truth,  was  for  some 
time  in  most  difficult  and  critical  cir- 
cumstances. His  division,  when  left 
alone  by  the  retirement  of  Birney, 
bore  a general  resemblance  to  the  one 
side  and  the  two  ends  of  a parallelo- 
gram; and,  upon  both  his  front  and 
flanks,  the  enemy  was  rushing  with 
demon-like  fury.  The  attacking  party, 
consisting  of  the  brigades  of  Wilcox, 
Perry  and  Wright,  from  Anderson’s 
fresh  division,  had  not  been  engaged 
in  the  previous  struggles  of  the  day, 
having  been  held  in  readiness  for  this 
supreme  effort,  when  the  proper  time 
should  come.  Humphrey  was  most 
savagely  attacked  by  W right ; but  he 
cautiously  retired  his  men  until  he 
reached  the  ridge  in  his  rear,  which 
was  still,  in  consequence  of  the  origi- 
nal mistake  of  Sickles,  imperfectly  pro- 
tected. So  fierce  were  the  attacks,  and 
so  great  was  the  pressure,  that  he  was 
compelled  to  leave  behind  him  three 
of  his  guns,  the  horses  having  been 
killed.  Back  to  the  base  of  the  hill 
and  up  the  crest  he  was  compelled  to 


move,  the  enemy  still  pressing  heavily 
on  his  front.  Wilcox  and  Wright  were 
both  well  advanced.  Cemetery  Fidge, 
it  will  be  remembered,  is  at  this  point 
slightly  depressed.  It  was  also,  as 
we  have  pointed  out  already,  in  con- 
sequence of  the  advanced  position  taken 
by  Sickles,  but  imperfectly  defended. 
Determined  to  effect  a lodgment  here, 
the  Confederate  battalions  rush  up 
the  hill,  past  the  National  guns,  and 
threaten  to  take  possession  of  the 
ridge.  A little  more  success,  especial- 
ly if  well  supported,  and  they  will  be 
almost  masters  of  the  position.  Their 
apparent  success,  however,  is  to  be 
their  ruin.  They  are  now  within  range 
of  the  musketry  of  the  Second  corps, 
which  lies  concealed  behind  a stone 
wall:  The  men  of  the  Second  rise  be- 
fore them  like  an  apparition.  The 
stone  wall  seems  to  blaze.  The  Con- 
federates, reeling  and  staggering  under 
the  terrific  volley,  fall  back,  leaving 
their  comrades  in  slaughtered  heaps  on 
the  blood-stained  ground. 

Not  yet,  however,  'v^as  the  contest 
abandoned.  The  Confederates  seemed 
confident  in  the  thought  that  the  at- 
tack would  become  general,  and  that 
thus  they  would  be  able  to  hold  their 
advanced  position.  In  this  expectation, 
they  were  doomed  to  disappointment. 
Posey  and  Mahone,  of  Anderson’s  divi- 
sion, did  not  advance.  Pender's  divi- 
sion, and  that  of  Heth  to  his  left,  re- 
mained inactive.  Perry’s  brigade  had 
been  driven  back ; but  the  brigades  of 
Wilcox  and  Wright  kept  their  face  to 
the  foe,  and  performed  prodigies  of 
valor.  But  it  was  all  in  vain.  The 


2SS 


GETTYSBURG. 


:-i8 

National  position  was  momentarily 
gaining  strength.  Meade  had  been 
busy  filling  up  the  gap  between  the 
corps  of  Hancock  on  the  idglit  and  that 
of  Sykes  on  the  left.  Both  those  corps 
were  drawn  upon  largely  to  meet  the 
emergency.  A large  portion  of  the 
First  corps  and  the  greater  portion  of 
the  Twelfth  were  brouglit  over  from 
the  right,  to  strengthen  the  weak  and 
menaced  left.  Sedgwick’s  troops,  too, 
although  weary  and  footsore  with  the 
long  march  which  they  had  just  ac- 
complished, gladly  responded  to  the 
call  which  was  made  upon  them,  and 
came  to  the  front.  The  series  of  charges 
and  counter-charges,  made  at  this  part 
of  the  line  for  the  possession  of  the 
ridge,  gave  to  some  of  the  regiments 
and  brigades  splendid  opportunities  for 
winning  distinction.  The  First  Min- 
nesota, coming  up  at  a critical  and 
most  opportune  moment,  peiformed 
gallant  service,  and  mightily  increased 
its  already  rapidly  rising  reputation. 
The  same  was  true,  to  a greater  or  less 
degree,  of  the  Thirteenth  Vermont,  of 
the  One  Hundred  and  Forty-Ninth  and 
One  Hundred  and  Fiftieth  Pennsyl- 
vania regiments ; and  Lockwood’s  Mary- 
land brigade,  of  Ruger’s  division,  of 
the  Twelfth  corps,  on  that  2d  day  of 
July,  on  the  National  left,  covered  it- 
self with  glory.  The  Confederates  had 
now  well-nigh  exhausted  themselves. 
Their  losses  had  been  heavy.  Some 
of  their  best  and  most  daring  officers 
Liad  fallen.  Barksdale,  the  most  im- 
petuous leader  of  the  boldest  attack 
which  had  been  made  in  that  direction, 
was  lying,  in  his  death-agony,  inside 


the  National  lines.  Gathering  up  his 
strength  for  another  and  closing  ef- 
fort, Hancock  fell  upon  the  persistent 
foe  with  tremendous  energy.  It  was 
all  that  was  needed.  The  Confede- 
rates were  driven  back,  with  great  loss 
and  in  much  confusion;  and,  as  it  was' 
now  dusk,  the  fighting  ceased.  In  this 
final  charge,  Humphrey’s  little  band 
took  part : and  the  general  had  the 
satisfaction  of  recapturing  and  bringing 
back  his  lost  guns.  Thus  ended  the 
great  struggle  on  the  National  left. 
The  position  held  by  Sickles  in  the 
forenoon  was  lost;  but  Little  Round 
Top  had  been  secured,  and  the  enemy 
had  failed  to  effect  a lodgment  on 
Cemetery  Hill.  What  the  Confede- 
rates had  now  won  was  but  sorry  com- 
pensation for  what  they  had  lost.  Be- 
fore morning.  Little  Round  Top  will 
be  rendered  all  but  impregnable ; and 
what  with  the  shattered  remnants  of 
Sickles’  divisions,  and  the  divisions  of 
Doubleday  and  Robinson,  from  the 
First  corps,  and  a powerful  detachment, 
under  Williams,  from  the  Twelfth,  a 
new  line  will  be  formed  where  the  or- 
iginal line  ought  to  have  been,  and  the 
National  front  will  be  closed. 

Such  was  the  issue  of  events  on  the 
National  left.  Let  us  now  turn  our 
attention  to  the  National  right.  This 
position,  it  will  be  remembered,  was 
held  by  Slocum,  by  Wadsworth’s  divi- 
sion, of  the  First  corps,  and  by  How- 
ard, and  in  the  order  named,  Slocum 
being  on  Culp’s  Hill,  at  the  extreme 
right.  Opposed  to  these,  on  the  Con- 
federate left,  were  the  forces  of  General 
Ewell.  According  to  the  order  given 


CULPS  HILL. 


519 


by  General  Lee  to  his  corps  command- 
ers, Ewell,  when  Longstreet  had  fallen 
on  the  National  left,  was  to  attack 
directly  the  high  ground  on  the  ene- 
my’s right,  which  had  already  been 
partially  fortified.”  For  some  unex- 
plained reason,  the  attack  was  not  made 
until  about  six  o’clock.  During  the 
two  hours  which  had  elapsed  since  the 
fighting  commenced  on  the  left,  Meade, 
discovering  no  signs  of  any  aggressive 
movement  on  the  part  of  Ewell,  sent 
detachment  after  detachment  to  the  as- 
sistance of  the  left.  The  whole  of  the 
Twelfth  corps,  with  the  exception  of 
Greene’s  brigade,  of  Geary’s  division, 
had  thus  been  hurried  away.  The  re- 
sult was  that  the  forces  on  the  right 
were  greatly  reduced,  and  that  the  po- 
sition was  comparatively  unprotected. 
But  for  the  nerve  of  Greene,  this  unfor- 
tunate arrangement  might  have  proved 
ruinous  to  the  National  army,  and  de- 
cided the  fortunes  of  the  day.  Between 
Cemetery  Hill  and  Culp’s  Hill,  there 
is  a little  ravine  or  depression  which 
marks  the  end  of  the  one  hill  and  the 
beginning  of  the  other.  To  the  left  of 
this  ravine,  and  extending  around  the 
breast  of  Cemetery  Hill,  was  Howard’s 
corps,  under  cover  of  the  stone  wall, 
the  summit  of  the  hill  being  crowned 
by  the  batteries  of  Wiedrich  and  Rick- 
er ts.  To  the  right  of  the  ravine,  and 
on  the  extreme  left  of  Culp’s  Hill, 
guarding  the  ravine  and  the  approaches 
from  the  town,  was  Stevens’  Maine 
battery,  which  had  done  some  excellent 
work  during  the  action  of  the  first 
day.  On  the  right  of  the  battery 
was  the  breast-work  which  had  been 


thrown  up  by  Wadsworth,  and  which, 
being  carried  around  the  hill,  was 
taken  up  by  Greene.  Greene  had  re- 
fused his  right  and  carried  his  breast- 
work back  so  as  to  protect  his  flank. 
On  Benner’s  Hill,  a little  to  the  north- 
east of  Culp’s  Hill,  Ewell  had  planted 
his  advance  batteries. 

About  six  o’clock,  the  Confederate 
guns  on  Benner’s  Hill  opened  a tre- 
mendous fire.  The  National  guns  were 
quickly  got  in  range;  and,  an  eye- 
witness has  told  us,  that  in  about 
twenty  minutes,  the  batteries  on  Ben- 
ner’s Hill  were  ‘‘knocked  into  p^.” 
The  sun  was  already  near  his  setting, 
and  the  fire  of  the  Confederate  guns 
was  noticeably  slackening,  when  Ewell 
pushed  forward  from  the  town  the  two 
divisions  of  Early  and  Johnson — the 
former  on  Cemetery,  the  latter  on 
Culp’s  Hill.  Early’s  columns  consisted 
of  the  brigades  of  Hays  and  Hoke, 
and  were  headed  by  the  famous  Louisi- 
ana Tigers.  On  they  came  in  magnifi- 
cent array.  A terrible  reception  they 
knew  awaited  them ; but  there  was 
neither  fear  in  their  looks  nor  trem- 
bling in  their  footsteps.  When  within 
eight  hundred  yards,  Stevens  opened 
upon  them  with  all  his  guns,  Wiedrich 
and  Ricketts  speedily  joining  in  the 
chorus.  Quickly  wheeling  into  line, 
they  dash  up  the  hill,  a very  tempest 
of  shrapnel  and  canister  falling  upon 
them,  and  ploughing  huge  gaps  in  their 
unmasked  front.  Fearless  of  the  death- 
dealing batteries,  and  heedless  of  the 
cries  of  agony  which  come  from  com- 
rades falling  by  their  side,  on  they 
press.  They  are  now  within  muske; 


520 


GETTYSBUEG. 


range  of  the  stone  wall.  While  the 
batteries  are  being  fired  at  the  rate  of 
four  shots  a minute,  Howard’s  men  leap 
from  their  concealment,  and  pour  vol- 
ley after  volley  into  their  already  deci- 
mated ranks.  On  their  left,  and  at  the 
centre,  the  Confederates  are  beaten 
back.  Their  right,  however,  pushes 
on  with  a stubbornness  which  is  heroic, 
and  with  an  energy  which  is  irresist- 
ible. With  one  wild  leap,  and  utter- 
ing their  accustomed  yell,  they  clear 
the  stone  walls.  Nationals  and  Con- 
federates are  now  mixed  up  in  inextri- 
cable confusion.  Stevens,  fearful  lest 
he  should  be  killins^  friend  as  well  as 
foe,  is  compelled  to  cease  firing.  Wied- 
rich’s  battery  is  overrun,  his  supports 
and  his  own  men  being  swept  away  as 
with  the  force  of  a whirlwind.  At 
Ricketts’  battery,  a tremendous  strug- 
gle takes  place.  It  is  man  to  man — 
hand  to  hand.  Bayonets  are  crossed  ; 
guns  are  clubbed  , and  when  these  fail, 
handspikes,  rammers,  stones  are  freely 
used.  ‘‘  Death  on  our  own  State  soil, 
rather  than  give  up  the  guns!” — such 
was  the  cry  of  the  brave  cannoneers. 

The  situation  really  had  become  crit- 
ical. Howard’s  men  had  been  broken 
and  demoralized  by  the  fierceness  of 
the  onset.  At  this  critical  moment, 
help  arrived.  CaiToll’s  brigade,  vol- 
untarily sent  by  Hancock  when  he 
heard  the  firing,  rushed  upon  the  scene. 
The  Confederates,  surprised  by  this 
fresh  opposition,  fell  back  in  confusion ; 
and  Ricketts’  men,  again  at  their  guns, 
gave  them  a parting  salute  in  the  form 
of  double-shotted  canister.  Such  was 
the  end  of  Early’s  grand  charge,  led 


by  the  famous,  and  hitherto  invincible, 
Louisiana  Tigers.  The  Tigers  went 
back  bravely,  600  strong,  and  were 
never  afterwards  known  as  a separate 
organization. 

While  this  daring  and  desperate,  but 
unsuccessful,  effort  was  being  made  for 
the  possession  of  Cemetery  Hill,  a no 
less  daring  and  equally  desperate  effort 
was  made  for  the  possession  of  Culp’s 
Hill,  on  the  extreme  right  of  the  Na- 
tional line.  The  attack  was  made,  as 
we  have  already  indicated,  by  John- 
son’s division,  of  Ewell’s  corps,  and 
was  led  by  the  redoubtable  “ Stonewall 
brigade.”  The  position,  as  we  have 
seen,  was  held  by  Wadsworth’s  divi- 
sion, of  the  First  corps,  and  by  Greene’s 
one  brigade  of  the  Twelfth.  In  the 
absence  of  the  greater  portion  of  the 
Twelfth  corps,  the  works  which  had 
here  been  thrown  up,  and  which  were 
of  considerable  strength,  were  peculiar- 
ly at  the  mercy  of  a daring  antagonist. 
Sweeping  across  Rock  Creek,  which  at 
this  season  of  the  year  is  easily  ford- 
able, the  attacking  columns,  fired  with 
the  spirit  of  their  former  leader,  rushed 
through  the  woods,  which  spread  out 
from  the  base  of  the  hill  and  down 
towards  the  creek.  As  yet,  they  have 
encountered  no  resistance ; for  the  Na- 
tional skirmishers,  thrown  out  towards 
the  front,  yield  and  fall  back  at  the 
first  touch.  They  are  now  in  full  view, 
and  within  musket  range  of  the  breast- 
works, behind  which  Greene  and  Wads- 
worth are  entrenched.  The  breast- 
works blaze;  and  there  is  heard  the 
sharp,  clear  rattling,  as  of  thousands  of 
musket  shots.  Volley  succeeds  volley 


CLOSE  OP  THE  SECOND  DAY’S  FIGHTING. 


521 


witn  amazing  rapidity  ; and  before  this 
murderous  tire,  the  Confederate  bat- 
talions for  a moment  recoil.  Discov- 
ering that  the  breast- works  to  Greene’s 
right  are  unoccupied,  they  make  an- 
other tremendous  rush,  and,  almost 
unresisted,  gain  a foothold  within  the 
National  lines.  The  burden  of  the 
attack  now  falls  upon  Greene.  This 
veteran  soldier  had  but  few  men ; yet 
he  had  a brave  heart  and  an  enduring 
spirit;  and  happily,  too,  he  had  strong- 
ly secured  his  right  flank  by  a powerful 
earth-work.  On  this  point,  the  Con- 
federate leader  concentrates  his  strength. 
Assault  after  assault  is  made,  but  in 
vain.  Greene  makes  a gallant  resist- 
ance, repelling  every  advance  of  the 
foe  with  tremendous  loss;  and  Wads- 
worth, no  longer  so  sorely  pressed  on 
his  front,  comes  nobly  to  his  aid.  Such 
was  the  state  of  things  when  darkness 
fell  upon  the  scene,  and  Ewell,  happily 
for  the  National  army,  discontinued 
the  contest.  Greene  still  held  his  posi- 
tion; and  Johnson’s  men  occupied  the 
vacated  breast-works.  So  ended  the 
second  day’s  fighting  at  Gettysburg. 
Both  sides  had  sutfered  severely.  Gen- 
eral Meade  lost  10,000  men.  The 
Confederate  loss  must  have  been  much 
greater. 

General  Lee  was  not  dissatisfied 
with  the  result  of  the  day’s  fighting. 
It  was  his  belief  that,  from  the  success 
which  had  attended  the  efforts  of  the 
day,  “he  would  ultimately  be  able  to 
dislodge  the  enemy.”  It  Avas  his  de- 
termination, therefore,  to  continue  the 
assault  next  day.  Nor,  it  must  be  ad- 
mitted, was  General  Lee  without  good 


reason  for  so  regarding  the  situation. 
Longstreet,  if  he  had  not  been  com- 
pletely successful,  had  driven  the  Na- 
tionals before  him,  and  occupied  the 
whole  front  held  by  Sickles  and  his 
Third  corps  at  the  commencement  of 
the  fight ; Ewell,  having  thrust  his  ex- 
treme left  inside  the  breast-Avorks  on 
the  National  right,  held  a position  from 
Avhich,  if  he  was  not  driven,  he  might 
be  able  to  take  Meade’s  entire  line  in 
reverse ; and  although  the  losses  on  the 
National  side  could  not  be  greater  than 
his  own,  they  had  been  so  heavy  as  to 
AA^arrant  the  opinion  that  they  would 
have  a demoralizing  influence  on  the 
troops.  On  the  whole,  Leenvas  not  to 
be  blamed  if  he  arrived  at  the  conclu- 
sion that  fortune  Avas  on  his  side.  If 
he  had  knoAvn  more,  he  w^ould  have 
known  that  the  battle  was  lost  when 
EAvell  allowed  the  darkness  to  inter- 
rupt the  fighting;  for,  knowing  Avhat 
we  know  noAV,  there  is  scarcely  room 
for  doubt  that,  if  that  general  had 
pushed  his  advantage,  he  might  have 
played  haA^oc  Avith  the  trains,  and 
forced  the  whole  National  army  into 
an  inglorious  retreat.  As  it  was,  Lee’s 
inferences  were  more  reasonable  than 
just  or  correct ; for  the  position  gained 
in  front  of  the  National  left  was  a gain 
more  apparent  than  real ; and,  before 
the  morning  light,  the  front  of  the  left 
Avill  be  restored,  and  made  strong  and 
secure  in  what  was  intended  to  be  its 
original  position,  and  the  troops  with- 
draAvn  on  the  previous  day,  unwisely 
and  at  serious  peril,  will  be  massed 
again  on  the  exposed  and  almost  de- 
fenseless right.  It  Avas  not,  therefore, 


522 


GETTYSBUKG. 


without  good  reason  that,  while  Lee 
was  counting  with  confidence  on  vic- 
tory on  the  morrow,  Meade  and  his 
generals,  in  council  assembled,  should 
have  resolved  to  abide  in  their  position, 
and  to  ‘‘fight  it  out  at  Gettysburg.” 

During  the  darknecs,  Johnson’s  force, 
which  had  gained  a position  of  advan- 
tage, held  close  to  Culp’s  Hill.  His 
numbers  were  largely  increased ; and 
the  position  was  strengthened.  Meade, 
however,  determined  to  continue  the 
fight,  was  not  idle.  A large  num- 
ber of  guns  were  got  into  position, 
so  as  to  bear  upon  the  point  entered 
and  held  by  the  enemy.  Geary’s  divi- 
sion, in  obedience  to  orders,  returned 
to  occupy  the  abandoned  works.  When 
moving  towards  them,  all  unsuspicious 
of  danger,  the  advance  was  suddenly 
arrested  by  a volley  from  behind  a 
stone  wall.  It  was  not  until  then  that 
Geary  became'  aware  that  the  works 
were  in  the  possession  of  the  enem}'. 
He  then  took  position  on  the  right  of 
Greene ; and  his  men,  disturbed  only 
by  the  occasional  firing  of  skirmishers, 
slept  on  their  arms.  Later,  Williams’ 
division,  of  the  same  corps,  now  under 
Huger — Williams  having  assumed  chief 
command — came  up,  and  was  posted 
on  the  fiank  and  rear  of  the  enemy. 

As  early  as  three  o’clock  on  the 
j0!y  morning  of  the  3d,  there  were 
signs  of  activity  in  the  enemy’s 
front.  It  was  evident  that  an  attack 
was  intended ; and  Geary,  having  been 
informed  by  General  Kane,  who  com- 
manded his  first  brigade,  of  what  was 
going  on,  resolved  to  seize  whatever 
advantage  might  be  gained  by  opening 


the  battle  himself.  His  men  were 
aroused ; and  at  twenty  minutes  before 
four  o’clock,  he  gave  the  signal  foi-  at- 
tack by  discharging  his  pistol.  The 
battle  at  once  became  general.  A fear- 
ful struggle  ensued.  A heavy  artillery 
fire  wAs  opened  at  once  on  the  enemy’s 
position.  But,  as  the  ground  was  rug- 
ged and  broken,  and  also  covered  with 
trees,  and  as  eveiy  advantage  was  taken 
of  places  of  shelter  and  concealment, 
the  fight  partook  very  much  of  the 
character  of  sharpshooting  on  a grand 
scale.  As  the  battle  progressed,  the 
contestants  got  intermingled ; and  it 
became  more  and  more  difiicult  to  use 
the  artillery.  The  Confederates  not 
only  held  their  position,  but  charged 
again  and  again,  in  heavy  masses,  on 
the  National  lines,  only,  however,  to 
be  repulsed  with  tremendous  loss.  The 
slaughter  was  terrible.  The  sun  arose  ; 
the  day  advanced ; the  air  became 
clouded  with  dust  and  smoke  ; the  heat 
became  almost  intolerable;  but  still 
the  battle  raged.  At  last  there  is  a 
lull  in  the  long-continued  tempest. 
Then,  suddenly,  there  is  a fierce  yell 
from  thousands  of  throats  ; and  Ewell’s 
men,  having  gathered  up  their  strengtli 
for  a final  eifort,  are  seen  rushing 
forward  with  tremendous  fury.  They 
are  allowed  to  come  within  easy  mus- 
ket range,  w'hen  the  men  in  blue, 
spiinging  to  their  feet,  pour  in  upon 
them  a deliberate  volley.  It  was  the 
last  chaige  on  this  part  of  the  line. 
Discomfited  and  discouraged,  torn  and 
bleeding,  their  dead  and  wounded  com- 
panions piled  in  h.eaps  on  the  ground 
where  they  fell,  the  survivors  drew 


EWELL  DEFEATED. 


523 


back  through  the  woods  towards  Kock 
Creek,  fighting,  as  they  retired,  with  a 
courage  which  commanded  the  admira- 
tion of  their  foes.  Shouts  of  victoiy 
now  filled  the  air.  ‘‘Men,”  says  one 
who  was  present,  and  shared  in  the 
triumph,  “cheered  themselves  hoarse, 
laughed,  rolled  themselves  on  the 
ground,  and  threw  their  caps  high  in 
air,  while  others  shook  hands  with  com- 
rades, and  thanked  God  that  the  Star 
corps  had  again  triumphed.”  Geaiy, 
not  disposed  to  allow  the  Confederates 
to  re-form,  as  soon  as  this  charge  was 
repelled,  made  a vigorous  counter- 
charge ; and  the  enemy,  yielding  easily, 
the  breast-works  were  reoccupied,  and 
the  right  flank  secured.  Thus  ended 
the  fighting  on  the  right. 

Ewell  had  been  completely  bafiled 
in  his  plan.  He  had  flung  away  his 
opportunity  the  night  before ; and,  to 
reclaim  it,  he  had  now  done  his  best,  and 
failed.  He  could  not  find  fault  with 
his  men ; for  never,  even  under  Jack- 
son,  had  they  fought  more  bravely. 
“It  cannot  be  denied,”  says  General 
Kane,  who,  with  his  glorious  first  bri- 
gade, of  Geary’s  division,  bore  the 
burden  of  that  morning’s  fight,  “that 
they  fought  most  coui*ageously.”  But 
they  were  pitted  against  men  of  equal 
bravely,  of  equal  determination  with 
themselves — men  who  were  now  on 
their  own  soil,  and  fighting  for  the 
sanctity  of  their  own  homes.  Never, 
perhaps,  before,  since  the  war  com- 
menced, had  the  fighting  been  more 
determined  and  severe  than  it  was  dur- 
ing those  long,  dreary  morning  hours. 
The  ground,  after  the  battle,  red  with 


gore,  and  thickly  covered  with  the 
bodies  of  the  slain,  gave  evidence  of 
the  terrible  character  of  the  struggle. 
The  grey  and  the  blue  uniforms  were 
sometimes  found  in  one  common  heap. 
Some  poor  fellow^s,  after  hours  of  suf- 
fering, and  having  almost  bled  to 
death,  were  found  writhing  in  mortal 
agony.  The  wood  in  w^hich  the  battle 
raged  was  “torn  and  rent  with  shells 
and  solid  shot,  and  pierced  with  in- 
numerable minie  balls.”  In  the  follow- 
ing summer,  the  trees  were  leafless,  as 
if  the  mute  but  stalwart  giants  of  the 
forest  had  yielded  up  their  lives  with 
those  who  fell  beneath  their  shade. 

It  was  now  shortly  after  ten  o’clock. 
The  last  sounds  of  battle  had  died 
away.  There  was  silence  over  the 
Avhole  battle  field.  It  was  evident, 
however,  that  preparations  were  being 
made  inside  the  Confederate  lines  for 
another  gigantic  and  possibly  crown- 
ing effort.  The  morning  sky  had  been 
obscured  by  broken  clouds.  As  the 
forenoon  advanced,  the  clouds  dis- 
persed ; and  a hot  July  sun  poured 
down  his  rays  with  a tropical  intensity, 
Pickett’s  division,  of  Longstreet’s  corps, 
which  had  not  come  up  on  the  previ- 
ous day,  had  now  arrived  on  the  field. 
Stuart,  also,  after  his  long  detour,  had 
joined  Lee  with  his  cavalry.  It  soon 
began  to  be  manifest  that  the  point  of 
attack  was  to  be  the  National  left 
centre — the  depressed  part  of  the  ridge 
immediately  north  of  Little  Round 
Top.  By  noon,  the  guns  were  got 
into  position  on  the  ridge  occupied  by 
Longstreet  and  Hill.  Meade  had  an 
abundant  supply  of  the  same  instru- 


524 


GETTYSBURG. 


ments  of  war;  but,  owing  to  the  pe- 
culiarity of  the  ground,  he  could  only, 
out  of  300  guns,  make  use  of  80, 
against  those  of  the  enemy.  About 
one  o’clock,  the  report  of  a Whitworth 
gun  was  heard.  It  was  the  signal  for 
attack.  Seminary  Hill  seemed  as  if 
swept  with  a tongue  of  flame.  Then 
came  the  loud,  thundering  roar  of  artil- 
lery; and  145  guns,  from  their  angry 
mouths,  poured  death  and  destruction 
on  the  National  lines.  The  National 
commanders  ordered  their  men  to  lie 
flat  on  the  earth,  and  to  take  every  ad- 
vantage of  objects  of  protection.  All 
this  was  done;  but,  notwithstanding 
every  precaution,  the  destruction  of 
life  and  property  was  terrible.  Solid 
shot,  chain-shot,  shrapnel,  shells,  fell 
with  deadly  effect  inside  the  National 
lines.  Men  and  horses  were  dread- 
fully cut  up;  caissons  filled  with  am- 
munition were  exploded ; and  gun- 
cari’iages  and  other  pieces  of  war  ma- 
terial were  shattered  to  pieces.  The 
shot  and  shell  and  canister  fell  thick 
and  fast  in  and  around  General  Meade’s 
headquarters,  killing  men  and  horses, 
ripping  up  the  roof  and  knocking  away 
the  pillars  of  the  cottage. 

General  Hunt,  Meade’s  chief  of  ar- 
tillery, was  in  no  haste  to  reply.  Wait- 
ing until  the  first  hostile  outbreak  spent 
itself,  he  then  ordered  the  batteries  to 
open  fire.  Instantly,  the  whole  ridge, 
from  Cemetery  Hill  to  the  Eound 
Tops,  seemed  ablaze.  The  din  was  ter- 
rific, the  thunder  of  artillery  rivalling, 
in  fierce  grandeur,  the  most  magnificent 
displays  of  nature.  For  two  hours  this 
artillery  duel  lasted;  and,  during  that 


time,  war  was  exhibited  in  its  sublimer 
and  more  imposing  aspects.  In  his 
Decisive  Battles  of  the  War,  Swinton 
tells  us  that  “ as  a spectacle  this,  the 
grandest  artillery  combat  that  ever  oc 
curred  on  the  continent,  was  magnifi- 
cent beyond  description,  and  realized 
all  that  is  grandiose  in  the  circumstance 
of  war.”  A spectator  in  the  Confede- 
rate army  says  “the  air  was  made  hide- 
ous with  discordant  noises.  The  very 
earth  shook  beneath  our  feet;  and  the 
hills  and  rocks  seemed  to  reel  like  a 
drunken  man.” 

At  the  expiration  of  two  hours,  there 
was  a lull  in  the  cannonade.  Hunt, 
dreading  the  possible  exhaustion  of  his 
ammunition,  and  not  willing  to  bring 
up  loads  of  it  from  the  rear,  lest  it 
should  be  exploded,  had  ordered  a 
gradual  slackening  of  the  fire.  The 
Confederates  were  deceived.  It  was 
Lee’s  belief  that  he  had  silenced  all  the 
enemy’s  guns,  except  a few  which  still 
kept  firing  from  a clump  of  woods. 
Now  came  the  more  serious  business  of 
war.  The  fire  of  the  Confederate  guns 
also  slackened ; and  the  columns  of 
attack  were  seen  forming  on  the  edge 
of  the  woods  which  crown  the  summit 
of  Seminary  Ridge.  It  was  just  three 
o’clock.  When  formed,  the  front  was 
about  a mile  in  extent;  and,  as  it 
emerged  from  the  woods,  and  began  to 
move  steadily  and  firmly  down  the 
slope  of  Seminary  Ridge,  a thrill  of 
admiration  passed  tlirough  the  National 
ranks.  It  was  a splendid  ^igiit,  and 
w^eil  fitted  to  call  forth  admiration,  even 
in  the  breast  of  an  enemy.  The  divi- 
sions of  Hood  and  McLaws,  as  we  have 


BATTLE  OF  GETTYSBURG— SCENE  DURING  THE  LAST  DAY’S  FIGHTING. 


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THE  THIRD  DAY’S  FIGHTING. 


5^ 


seen,  had  been  sorely  tried  in  the 
fighting  of  the  2d;  and  it  was  part  of 
the  arrangement  of  Longstreet,  who 
this  day  again  was  to  play  the  part 
of  the  aggressor,  that  these  divisions 
should  cover  his  right  fiank,  while  he 
made  the  attack.  The  fresh  division 
of  Pickett,  composed  mostly  of  veteran 
Virginians,  was,  therefore,  singled  out, 
and  appointed  to  lead  the  van.  Pick- 
ett’s men  were  formed,  arranged  in 
double  line  of  battle,  the  brigades  of 
Kemper  and  Garnett  being  placed  in 
front,  and  that  of  Armistead  slightly 
in  the  rear.  On  Pickett’s  advanced 
right  was  one  brigade,  of  Hill’s  corps, 
under  General  Wilcox,  formed  in  col- 
umn by  battalions ; and  on  his  left,  but 
somewhat  in  the  rear,  was  Heth’s  divi- 
sion, also  of  Hill’s  corps,  commanded 
by  Pettigrew.  The  attacking  force 
numbered  about  18,000  men.  On  came 
the  Confederates  in  the  order  which 
we  have  described.  The  distance  be- 
tween the  two  lines  of  battle  was  about 
a mile.  For  the  attacking  party,  there 
was  a hill  to  descend  and  a hill  to  climb, 
and  a valley  between.  It  was  matter 
of  observation  that,  as  the  columns 
advanced,  the  Confederate  guns  were 
silent.  “ Why  ?”  was  the  question  put 
by  the  men  who  were  rushing  into  the 
jaws  of  death.  “ Why  ?”  said  the  men 
on  the  heights  behind.  ‘‘Why?”  said 
the  Nationals  on  the  heights  in  front. 
The  reason  was  not  known  till  after- 
wards. It  was  not  then  known  to  Lee 
himself.  His  ammunition  was  already 
exhausted.  The  silence  of  the  guns  in 
their  rear  did  not  affect  the  firm  and 
steady  step  of  the  advancing  columns. 


It  did  not  encourage  the  Nationals  to 
slacken  their  artillery  fire.  On  came 
Longstreet's  men,  in  face  of  the  wither- 
ing tempest  of  bullet  and  canister  and 
shell  which,  at  each  successive  step,  deci- 
mated their  front.  On,  on  they  came ; and 
it  was  already  a question  in  the  National 
ranks  whether  their  own  thin  line  of 
defense  could  resist  the  fierce  onset  of 
those  firm  and  compact  battalions  who 
seemed  to  fear  no  fire,  to  dread  no  foe. 

The  Nationals,  however,  were  not 
ill-prepared  for  the  attack.  Doubleday 
was  on  the  left,  with  Stannard’s  bri- 
gade, of  V ermont  troops,  well  advanced 
in  a little  grove  on  his  own  right,  and 
at  an  angle  with  the  main  line.  Han- 
cock was  more  to  the  right,  with  his 
two  divisions,  of  Gibbon  and  Hays,  in 
front.  From  the  direction  in  which  the 
assaulting  columns  were  moving,  it 
seemed  for  a time  as  if  the  first  heavy 
blow  would  fall  upon  Doubleday. 
Such,  however,  was  the  severity  of  the 
artillery  fire  from  Little  Round  Top, 
that  they  were  forced  to  bend  more  to 
their  own  left.  Still  they  moved  on, 
their  line  of  march  now  bringing  them 
more  directly  in  front  of  Hancock’s 
position.  Now  came  the  opportunity 
for  Stannard’s  brave  Vermonters.  In 
tlie  original  line  of  march,  the  direction 
was  such  that  Pickett’s  centre  would 
have  struck  the  grove  in  which  Stan- 
nard’s men  were  sheltered.  The  doub- 
lim?  in  towards  their  own  left  carried 
the  attacking  columns  somewhat  to  the 
north  of  the  grove,  but  only  so  far 
north  as  to  leave  their  exposed  light 
flank  within  easy  range  of  Stannard’s 
muskets.  The  Vermonters  were  in  no 


526 


GETTYSBURG. 


haste  to  waste  their  ammunition.  The 
Confederate  columns  were  allowed  to 
come  so  well  forward  that  their  right 
flank  was  fully  exposed.  Then,  at  the 
signal  given,  the  Vermont  men  pour 
forth  a well-directed  and  most  destruc- 
tive fire.  Volley  succeeds  volley  in 
rapid  succession ; and  the  now  trem- 
bling lines,  already  torn  and  tattered, 
are  under  the  oblique  fire  of  eight  bat- 
teries, in  charge  of  Major  McGilvray. 
Not  a few  of  Pickett’s  men,  unable  to 
endure  this  terrific  fire,  were  compelled 
to  surrender.  The  main  body,  how- 
ever, presses  on;  and,  inclining  still 
more  to  his  own  left,  Pickett  is  moving 
straight  on  the  divisions  of  Gibbon  and 
Hays.  ‘‘Hold  your  fire,  boys!  they 
are  not  near  enough  yet,”  was  Gib- 
bon’s injunction,  as  he  moved  calmly 
and  composedly  along  the  ranks.  The 
rifled  guns  of  the  National  artillery, 
having  fired  away  all  their  canister, 
were  now  withdrawn  to  await  the  issue 
of  the  struggle  between  the  opposing 
infantry.  The  hostile  lines  are  now 
within  two  and  three  hundred  yards  of 
the  National  front.  Gibbon  and  Hays 
simultaneously  open  upon  the  advanc- 
ing columns  a most  destructive  fire. 
The  response  is  swift  and  well-directed, 
the  Confederates  using  their  muskets 
for  the  first  time  since  they  began  to 
face  this  terrific  storm  of  artillery  and 
musketiy.  All  at  once  the  battle  be- 
comes general. 

The  swing  made  by  the  advancing 
columns  to  their  own  left,  after  the 
terrific  blow  received  by  them  from 
Stannard,  had  the  effect  of  flinging 
Pettigrew,  who  commanded  Heth’s  di- 


vision, of  Hill’s  corps,  well  towards 
Hays’  right.  Pettigrew’s  men  were, 
for  the  most  part,  Noi'th  Carolina 
ti’oops,  and  were  comparatively  raw 
and  unused  to  battle.  They  had  been 
deceived  into  the  belief  that  they 
would  meet  only  the  Pennsylvania  mili- 
tia. They  were  quickly  undeceived. 
Hays’  men  were  admirably  posted. 
His  right  was  w'ell  advanced;  and  the 
nature  of  the  ground  was  such  as  to 
enable  him  to  open  a simultaneous  fire 
on  Pettigrew’s  troops,  not  only  with 
his  right  and  front,  but  also  with 
several  lines  in  his  rear.  Woodruff’s 
battery  was  also  in  position;  and  the 
destructive  effects  of  a very  tempest 
of  bullets  were  to  be  aggravated  by 
showers  of  grape  and  canister.  All  at 
once,  this  ti*emendous  fire  fell  upon  the 
already  torn  and  decimated  lines  on 
Pickett’s  left ; and  they  knew  they 
were  in  the  presence  of  the  army  of 
the  Potomac.  There  was  no  more  fight 
in  them.  Terror-stricken,  Pettigrew’s 
men  broke  in  utter  confusion,  large 
numbers  of  them  flinging  down  their 
arms,  and  accepting  mercy  at  the  hands 
of  their  antagonists.  General  Pettigrew 
himself  was  wounded ; but,  being  able 
to  retain  command,  he  vainly  strove 
to  rally  his  men.  Fifteen  colors,  and 
2000  prisoners  rewarded  the  skill  and 
activity  with  which  Hays  met  the 
threatened  attack. 

While  disaster  was  thus  befalling 
the  Confederate  columns  on  the  right 
and  left,  Pickett’s  brave  Virginians 
were  pressing  forward  vigorously  to- 
wards Gibbon’s  front,  and  were  about 
to  fall  with  all  their  weight  on  Owen’s 


THE  NATIONAL  LINE  PENETRATED. 


527 


brigade,  now  temporarily  commanded 
by  General  Webb.  This  brigade  com- 
prised the  Sixty-Ninth  Pennsylvania — 
Owen’s  own — composed  mostly  of  Irish- 
men renowned  for  their  gallantry  in 
the  Peninsula;  the  Seventy-First,  or- 
iginally recruited  and  led  by  Baker, 
who  perished  at  Ball’s  Bluff,  and  now 
commanded  by  Colonel  R.  Penn  Smith  ; 
and  the  Seventy-Second,  commanded 
by  Colonel  Baxter.  It  was  a veteran 
^brigade,  and  was  now  to  be  sorely 
tested.  General  Gibbon,  to  allow  the 
artillery  to  play  upon  the  advancing 
column  with  grape-shot,  had  ordered 
this  brigade  to  fall  back  behind  the 
batteries.  The  Sixty-Ninth  and  the 
Seventy-First  took  position  behind  a 
low  stone  wall,  with  a slight  breast- 
work in  front : the  Twenty-Second  was 
behind  the  crest,  some  sixty  paces  in 
the  rear,  and  was  so  placed  as  to  be 
able  to  fire  over  the  heads  of  those  in 
front.  In  spite  of  the  dreadful  fire  of 
artillery  and  musketry  which  was 
mowing  down  their  ranks,  Pickett’s 
men  rush  bravely  on.  They  are  now 
close  to  the  stone  wall.  The  two  Na- 
tional regiments  in  front  yield  and  fall 
back  to  the  regiment  in  the  rear. 
Webb  and  his  officers  are  at  hand  ; the 
retreating  regiments  are  quickly  rallied 
and  re-formed ; and  the  second  line  is 
held.  But  the  Confederates  have  pushed 
themselves  over  the  breast-works,  and 
planted  their  battle  flags  on  the  wall. 
The  struggle  now  becomes  fierce  and 
terrific  in  the  extreme.  It  is  a hand- 
to-hand  conflict,  man  facing  man,  and 
fighting  with  the  energy  of  despair. 
The  clothes  of  the  men  are  actually 


being  burned  by  the  powder  of  the  ex- 
ploding cartridges;  and  the  National 
cannoneers,  refusing  to  retire,  are 
clubbed  and  bayoneted  at  their  guns. 
Pickett,  however,  is  now  left  entirely 
alone.  The  forces  which  were  intended 
to  cover  his  left  have  been  defeated, 
captured  or  driven  from  the  field. 
Wilcox,  whose  duty  it  was  to  come  up 
and  cover  his  right,  has  failed  to  ad- 
vance. The  right  of  his  own  division 
has  been  badly  cut  up  and  destroyed. 
Hancock,  who  this  day  revealed  all 
the  qualities  of  a great  commander  in 
actual  conflict,  now  massed  his  men  on 
the  point  which  was  in  danger.  Hall 
and  Harrow,  who  had  now  no  longer 
an  enemy  in  their  front,  were  brought 
over  with  their  brigades  to  reinforce 
the  centre.  The  Nineteenth  Massachu- 
setts, Colonel  Devereux  and  Mallou’s 
Forty-Second  New  York,  both  of  Gate’s 
brigade,  of  Doubleday’s  division,  of 
the  First  corps,  were  moved  in  the 
same  direction.  Stannard,  at  the  same 
time,  moved  forward  two  of  his  Ver- 
mont regiments  to  strike  the  enemy  on 
the  right  flank.  The  situation,  Han- 
cock tells  us,  had  now  become  very 
peculiar.  “The  men  of  all  the  bri- 
gades had,  in  some  measure,  lost  their 
regimental  organization,  but  individual- 
ly, they  were  firm.  The  ambition  of 
individual  commanders  to  cover  the 
point  penetrated  by  the  enemy,  the 
smoke  of  the  battle  and  the  intensity 
of  the  engagement  caused  this  con  fin 
sion.  The  point,  however,  was  covered. 
In  regular  formation,  our  line  would 
have  stood  four  ranks  deep.”  Pickett’s 
men  were  now  pressed  on  all  sides. 


528 


GETTYSBURG. 


The  colors  of  the  diifereiit  National 
regiments  were  well  advanced.  Cheered 
by  the  words,  and  fired  by  the  example 
of  their  officers,  the  men  pressed  brave- 
ly forward.  It  is  the  climax  of  the 
fight ; but  the  end  is  at  hand.  Pickett’s 
men  had  done  their  best  and  their  ut- 
most— they  had  fought  like  true  heroes; 
but  now,  utterly  overpowered,  and  re- 
duced to  the  last  stage  of  desperation, 
they  give  up  the  fight.  Flinging  their 
arms  from  them,  many  of  them  raise 
their  hands  in  token  of  surrender; 
others  fall  upon  the  ground  to  escape 
the  destructive  fire ; the  remainder 
seek  safety  in  flight. 

In  this  last  struggle.  Gibbon’s  divi- 
sion took  12  colors  and  2500  prisoners. 
So  far,  Hancock  had  captured  27  battle 
flags  and  4500  prisoners.  It  was  a 
magnificent  trophy.  The  losses  on  both 
sides  were  very  heavy.  The  face  of 
the  hill  and  the  low  ground  was 
literally  covered  with  the  dead  and 
wounded.  In  no  previous  battle  had 
the  officers  suffered  so  severely.  On 
the  National  side,  large  numbers  had 
been  struck  down.  Generals  Gibbon 
and  Hancock  being  among  the  wounded. 
The  Confederates  left  on  the  field  four- 
teen of  their  field-ofiScers,  only  one  of 
that  rank  escaping  unhurt ; and,  of  the 
three  bi*igade  commanders,  of  Pickett’s 
division,  Garnett  was  killed,  Armitage 
fell  within  the  National  lines,  fatally 
wounded,  and  Kemper  was  carried  off 
the  field,  dangerously  hurt. 

Substantially,  the  battle  of  Gettys- 
burg was  now  ended.  Another  feeble 
and  foolish  attempt,  however,  was  made 
on  the  National  lines.  Wilcox’s  com- 


mand, it  will  be  remembered,  had  origin- 
ally been  placed  on  Pickett’s  right,  the 
intention  being  that  it  should  cover 
that  flank.  Wilcox,  however,  failed  to 
advance,  keeping  to  the  right  when 
Pickett  bent  towards  the  left.  After 
the  repulse  of  Pickett,  Wilcox  ad- 
vanced to  the  attack  alone.  In  passing 
over  the  plain,  and  when  within  a few 
hundred  yards  of  Hancock’s  line,  he 
was  met  by  a tremendous  fire  of  artil- 
lery ; and  Stannard,  who  was  again  in 
position,  fell  upon  his  flank  and  rear, 
doing  terrible  damage,  and  capturing 
several  hundred  prisoners.  While  the 
battle  was  raging  in  Hancock’s  front, 
there  was  evidence  that  vigorous  move- 
ments were  about  to  be  initiated  by 
Ewell  against  the  extreme  National 
right,  and  by  Longstreet  against  the 
extreme  National  left.  The  main  at- 
tack, however,  was  so  much  of  a failure 
from  the  commencement  that  neither 
of  those  commanders  felt  justified  in 
rashly  risking  the  lives  of  their  men, 
and  making  what  might  prove  to  be  a 
useless  and  costly  sacrifice.  Some  of 
Longstreet’s  men  had  remained  in  the 
woods  beyond  the  wheat  fields,  in  front 
of  Little  Round  Top;  but,  after  Pickett 
and  Wilcox  had  been  driven  back, 
Crawford  charged  through  the  woods, 
driving  the  enemy  in  confusion  before 
him,  and  capturing  some  hundreds  of 
men,  with  a large  quantity  of  arms. 
During  the  day,  there  had  been  some 
severe  cavalry  engagements,  Kilpatrick 
holding  the  enemy’s  horse  in  check  on 
the  National  left,  and  Gregg  having  a 
severe  but  successful  encounter  with 
Hampton  on  the  right.  Farnsworth, 


A NATIONAL  VICTORY. 


529 


while  beading  a charge  on  the  left 
against  one  of  Hood’s  brigades,  sup- 
ported by  Stuart’s  cavalry,  was  killed, 
with  many  of  his  officers.  The  final 
charge,  made  by  Giregg  on  the  right, 
is  said  to  have  been  one  of  the  most 
brilliant  sabre  charges  made  during 
the  war.  It  had  evidently  been  Lee’s 
intention,  in  the  event  of  success  crown- 
ing his  infantry  attack,  to  make  a 
liberal  use  of  his  cavalry  force,  and,  if 
he  found  himself  unable  to  surround 
and  destroy  the  National  army,  at  least 
to  harass  its  retreat.  Happily,  success 
was  denied  him ; and  the  execution  of 
this  contingent  purpose  was  rendered 
unnecessary. 

What  remained  of  the  broken  and 
shattered  Confederate  columns,  after 
having  been  driven  across  the  lower 
ground  and  terribly  punished  by  the 
National  artillery,  was  at  length  cov- 
ered by  Wright’s  brigade,  which  had 
been  moved  forward  by  Lee  for  that 
purpose,  and  was  thus  finally  brought 
back  within  the  lines  on  Seminary 
Ridge.  Lee  did  not  choose  to  resume 
the  attack;  and  Meade  did  not  follow 
up  the  victory.  The  armies,  when 
night  came,  had  resumed  their  respec- 
tive positions  on  the  opposing  heights. 
Thus  was  fought,  for  three  weary  days, 
and  thus  was  ended,  the  famous  battle  of 
Gettysburg — ‘‘the  greatest  in  respect 
of  its  proportions,  and  the  weightiest 
in  respect  of  the  issues  involved,  of  all 
the  actions  waged  during  four  years, 
between  the  mighty  rival  armies  of  the 
East.”  The  losses  alone  entitle  it  to 
rank  with  the  first-class  battles  of  his- 
tory. The  Confederate  loss  reached 


the  enormous  aggregate  of  36,000  men, 
of  whom  5000  were  killed,  and  23,000 
wounded.  The  National  loss  was 
23,000,  of  whom  2834  were  killed, 
13,733  wounded,  and  6643  missing. 

On  the  evening  of  the  3d,  at  8.30 
o’clock.  General  Meade  wrote  to  General 
Halleck:  “The  enemy  opened  at  one 
o’clock  P.  M.,  from  about  150  guns. 
He  concentrated  upon  my  left  centre, 
continuing  without  intermission  for 
about  three  hours,  at  the  expiration  of 
which  time  he  assaulted  my  left  centre 
twice,  being,  upon  both  occasions, 
handsomely  repulsed  with  severe  loss 
to  him,  leaving  in  our  hands  nearly 
three  thousand  prisoners.  Among  the 
prisoners  are  Major-General  Armistead, 
and  many  colonels  and  officers  of  lesser 
note.  The  enemy  left  many  dead  upon 
the  field,  and  a large  number  of  wound- 
ed in  our  hands.  The  loss  upon  our 
side  has  been  considerable.  Major- 
General  Hancock  and  Brigadier-Gen- 
eral Gibbon  were  wounded.  After  the 
repelling  of  the  assault,  indications 
leading  to  the  belief  that  the  enemy 
might  be  withdrawing,  an  armed  ] econ- 
noissance  was  pushed  forward  from  the 
left,  and  the  enemy  found  to  be  in 
force.  At  the  present  hour,  all  is  quiet. 
Brigades  of  our  cavalry  have  been  en- 
gaged all  day  on  both  flanks  of  the 
enemy,  harassing  and  vigorously  attack- 
ing him  with  great  success,  notwith- 
standing they  encountered  superior 
numbers,  both  of  cavalry  and  artillery. 
The  army  is  in  fine  spirits.”  On  the 
following  day,  he  issued  an  address  to 
the  army  of  the  Potomac,  in  which,  in 
behalf  of  the  country,  he  expressed  his 


530 


GETTYSBURG. 


thanks  to  officers  and  men  for  the 
glorious  result  of  the  recent  operations. 
‘‘Our  enemy,”  he  said,  “superior  in 
numbers,  and  flushed  with  the  pride  of 
a successful  invasion,  attempted  to  over- 
come or  destroy  this  army.  Utterly 
baffied  and  defeated,  he  has  now  with- 
drawn from  the  contest.  The  priva- 
tions and  fatigues  the  army  has  en- 
dured, and  the  heroic  courage  and  gal- 
lantry it  has  displayed,  will  be  matters 
of  history,  to  be  ever  remembered  Our 
task  is  not  yet  accomplished ; and  the 
commanding  general  looks  to  the  army 
for  greater  efforts,  to  drive  from  our 
soil  every  vestige  of  the  presence  of 
the  invader.  It  is  right  and  proper 
that  we  should,  on  suitable  occasions, 
return  our  grateful  thanks  to  the  Al- 
mighty Disposer  of  events  that,  in  the 
goodness  of  His  providence,  He  has 
thought  fit  to  give  victory  to  the  cause 
of  the  just.”  On  the  same  day,  the 
following  suitable  announcement  was 
issued  by  the  president : 

“ Washington,  D.  C.,  July  4,  1863 — 10  A.  M. 

“The  president  of  the  United  States 
announces  to  the  country  that  the  news 
from  the  army  of  the  Potomac,  up  to 
ten  o’clock  P.  M.,  of  the  3d,  is  such  as 
to  cover  the  army  with  the  highest 
honor,  to  promise  great  success  to  the 
cause  of  the  Union,  and  to  claim  the 
condolence  of  all  for  the  many  gallant 
fallen  ; and  that  for  this  he  especially 
desires  that  on  this  day,  ‘ He  whose 
will,  not  ours,  should  ever  be  done,’ 
be  everywhere  remembered  and  rev- 
ej*enced  with  the  profoundest  gratitude. 

“Abraham  Lincoln.” 


Lee’s  disappointment,  by  the  complete 
failure  of  his  attack  on  the  3d,  must 
indeed  have  been  great.  His  dream 
of  invasion  was  at  an  end.  A second 
time  he  had  entered  the  Northern 
States  in  triumph.  A second  time  he 
had  bedn  compelled  to  abandon  his 
purpose,  and  to  fall  back  towards  Pich- 
mond.  This  time,  he  had  confidently 
believed  that  victory  was  within  his 
grasp.  After  an  effort  so  mighty  and 
so  persistent,  and  after  a failure  so  de- 
cided, he  could  hardly  hope  for  another 
opportunity.  One  of  his  colonels,  who 
was  present  at  his  headquarters  when, 
on  the  third  day,  the  attacking  columns 
broke  and  fell  back  in  wild  disorder, 
says,  speaking  of  Lee  : “ If  Longstreet’s 
behavior  was  admirable,  that  of  Gen- 
eral Lee  was  perfectly  sublime.  He 
was  engaged  in  rallying  and  encourag- 
ing the  broken  troops,  and  was  riding 
about,  a little  in  front  of  the  wood, 
quite  alone — his  staff  being  engaged  in 
a similar  manner,  further  to  the  rear. 
His  face,  which  is  alwmys  placid  and 
cheerful,  did  not  show  signs  of  the 
slightest  disappointment,  care  or  an- 
noyance; and  he  was  addressing  to 
every  soldier  a few  words  of  encourage- 
ment, such  as,  ‘All  this  will  come  out 
right  in  the  end : we  will  talk  it  over 
afterwards;  but,  meanwhile,  all  good 
men  must  rally.’  He  had  words  of 
kindness  for  the  wounded,  many  of 
whom,  as  they  were  carried  past,  took 
off  their  hats  and  cheered  him.  ‘ W e 
cannot  expect,’  he  said,  ‘always  to  win 
victories.’  To  Wilcox,  when  he  came 
up  with  his  shattered  division,  he  said, 

‘ All  this  has  been  my  fault ; it  is  I 


GENERAL  LEE  AFTER  THE  BATTLE. 


531 


who  have  lost  this  battle.’”  Imboden 
has  preserved  for  us  a touching  picture 
of  the  general,  as  he  saw  him  about  one 
o’clock  on  the  morning  of  the  4th  of 
July.  He  had  been  sent  for  by  Lee, 
who  directed  him  to  wait  for  him  at  his 
own  headquarters.  When  Lee  joined 
him,  there  was  not  even  a sentinel  on 
duty,  and  no  one  of  his  staff  was  about. 
“The  moon  was  high  in  the  heavens, 
shedding  a flood  of  silvery  light,  al- 
most as  bright  as  day,  upon  the  scene. 
When  he  approached  and  saw  us,  he 
spoke,  reined  up  his  horse,  and  essayed 
to  dismount.  The  effort  to  do  so  be- 
trayed so  much  physical  exhaustion 
that  I stepped  forward  to  assist  him ; 
but  before  I reached  the  saddle,  he 
had  alighted.  He  threw  his  arm  across 
his  saddle  to  rest  himself,  and,  fixing 
his  eyes  upon  the  ground,  leaned  in 
silence  on  his  equally  weary  horse, 
the  two  forming  a striking  group,  as 
motionless  as  a statue.  The  moon 
shone  full  upon  his  massive  features, 
and  revealed  an  expression  of  sadness 
I had  never  seen  upon  that  fine  face 
before,  in  any  of  the  vicissitudes  of  the 
war  through  which  he  had  (passed.  I 
waited  for  him  to  speak  until  the  silence 
became  painful  and  embarrassing,  when, 
to  break  it  and  change  the  current  of 
his  thoughts,  I remarked,  in  a sympa- 
thetic tone,  and  in  allusion  to  his  great 
fatigue  : ‘ General,  this  has  been  a hard 
day  on  you.’  This  attracted  his  atten- 
tion. He  looked  up  and  replied,  mourn- 
fully : ‘ Yes,  it  has  been  a sad,  sad  day 
to  us,’  and  immediately  relapsed  into 
his  thoughtful  mood  and  attitude.”  A 
little  later,  he  turned  to  Imboden,  and. 


straightening  himself  to  his  full  height, 
with  energy  and  excitement  in  his 
manner,  and  in  a voice  tremulous  with 
emotion,  said : General,  I never  saw 
troops  behave  more  magnificently  than 
Pickett’s  division  of  Virginians  did  to- 
day in  their  grand  charge  upon  the 
enemy.  And  if  they  had  been  sup- 
ported, as  they  ought  to  have  been^ — 
but,  for  some  reason  unknown  to  me, 
they  were  not — we  would  have  held 
the  position  they  so  gloriously  won,  at 
such  a fearful  loss  of  noble  lives,  and 
the  day  would  have  been  ours.”  After 
a moment,  he  added,  in  a tone  almost 
of  agony  : “Too  bad ! too  bad  ! 1 oh, 
too  bad  ! ! ! ” Into  the  inner  agonies  of 
that  noble  soul,  at  that  trying  moment, 
it  is  not  for  us  to  penetrate.  “We 
must  go  back  to  Virginia,”  he  soon 
afterwards  exclaimed ; and  Imboden 
received  his  instructions  to  guard  the 
trains  in  their  backward  course. 

It  was  Lee’s  conviction  that  another 
attack  would  be  beset  with  serious 
danger.  He  puts  it  mildly,  in  his  re- 
port, when  he  says  : “ The  severe  loss 

sustained  by  the  army,  and  the  reduc- 
tion of  its  ammunition,  rendered  an- 
other attempt  to  dislodge  the  enemy 
unadvisable.”  He,  therefore,  made  im- 
mediate preparations  for  a retreat. 
Ewell  was  drawn  back,  on  the  morning 
of  the  4th,  from  the  base  of  Culp’s  Hill 
and  from  Gettysburg ; and  a strong 
line  of  works  was  thrown  from  the 
seminary  towards  the  northwest ; while 
another  line  was  formed  on  the  right 
flank,  perpendicular  with  the  general 
front,  and  extending  back  as  far  as 
Marsh  Creek.  In  this  position,  he  re- 


533 


GETTYSBURG, 


mainecl  over  the  4th,  burying  his  dead, 
sending  off  the  wounded,  not  disposed 
to  resume  the  aggressive,  but,  accord- 
ing to  good  and  reliable  authority,  not 
unwilling  to  be  attacked.  The  day 
was  similarly  spent  by  the  National 
army.  It  had  been  Lee’s  intention  to 
retire  his  whole  army  on  the  night  of 
the  4th.  But  a severe  storm  had  come 
on  shortly  after  midday ; and  the  rain 
fell  in  torrents  during  the  afternoon, 
and  continued  far  into  the  night.  The 
condition  of  the  roads  made  a rapid 
retreat  impossible.  It  was  not,  there- 
fore, until  the  forenoon  of  Sunday,  the 
5th,  that  Ewell’s  corps,  which  brought 
up  the  rear,  left  its  position  near  Get- 
tysburg. After  a difficult  and  toilsome 
march,  by  the  Chambersburg  and  Fair- 
field  roads,  through  South  Mountain, 
the  Confederate  army  reach  Hagerston 
bn  the  afternoon  of  the  6th  and  the 
morning  of  the  7th  of  July. 

As  soon  as  the  Confederates  had 
abandoned  their  position  at  Gettysburg, 
General  Meade  made  preparations  to 
follow  up  the  retreat.  There  were  two 
courses  open  : he  might  make  a direct 
pursuit,  pass  through  the  South  Moun- 
tain in  their  rear,  and  press  them  down 
the  Cumberland  Valley ; or  he  might 
make  a flank  movement  by  the  east 
side  of  South  Mountaifi,  defile  through 
the  Boonsboro’  Passes,  and  either  head 
off  the  enemy  or  take  him  in  flank. 
Sedgwick’s  corps,  the  freshest  in  the 
army,  was  ordered  to  follow  the  enemy 
by  the  Fairfield  road,  and  harass  his 
real*.  On  the  evening  of  the  6th,  Sedg- 
wick overtook  the  Confederates  at  the 
Fairfield  Pass ; but  they  were  so  strong- 


ly posted  that  he  deemed  it  unadvis- 
able  to  attack.  Meanwhile,  Meade  had 
made  up  his  mind  to  pursue  the  other 
route ; and  Sedgwick  was  recalled. 
General  French,  who  since  the  evacua- 
tion of  Harper’s  Ferry  had  been  occupy- 
ing Frederick,  was  thereupon  ordered 
to  seize  the  lower  passes  of  South 
Mountain  in  advance,  and  also  to  re- 
possess himself  of  Harper’s  Ferry.  All 
this  he  did;  and,  in  addition,  by  push- 
ing forward  a cavalry  force,  he  succeed- 
ed in  destroying  a Confederate  pontoon 
bridge  which,  at  that  point,  had  been 
thrown  across  the  Potomac.  When 
Lee’s  army  reached  Williamsport,  the 
river  was  still  greatly  swollen,  and  the 
pontoon  bridge  had  been  destroyed. 
On  the  12th,  when  Meade  came  up 
with  his  whole  army,  Lee  had  taken  a 
strong  position  on  the  Potomac,  ex- 
tending from  Williamsport  to  Falling 
Waters,  and  had  thrown  up  entrench- 
ments along  his  whole  line.  Meade 
had  once  more  an  opportunity  of  strik- 
ing the  enemy  in  what  seemed  advan- 
tageous circumstances.  But  the  reasons 
wffiich  prevailed  and  prevented  an  at- 
tack after  the  battle  of  the  3d,  pre- 
vailed again,  -and  prevented  an  attack 
on  the  12th.  On  the  13th,  Lee’s 
engineers  had  succeeded  in  throwing 
over  another  pontoon  bridge ; and  the 
waters  had  fallen  so  much  that,  at  a 
certain  point,  they  were  fordable.  By 
the  aid  of  the  bridge  and  the  ford,  the 
Confederate  army  was  safely  pushed 
across  to  the  southern  side  of  the  Po- 
tomac. Meade  crossed  the  river  im- 
mediately afterwards ; but  Lee,  still 
refusing  battle,  fell  back  to  the  banks 


41 


MEADE  AND  SICKLES. 


533 


of  the  Rapidan,  where  the  opposing 
armies  took  position.  This  was  the 
end  of  the  Gettysburg  campaign. 

This  campaign,  from  first  to  last,  has 
been  a fruitful  theme  of  discussion 
among  military  critics.  Military  criti- 
cism, in  any  high  sense,  is  not  the  pur- 
pose of  this  work.  Our  aim,  rather,  is 
to  give  a clear,  intelligible  and  interest- 
ing account  of  what  actually  took  place, 
leaving  the  reader  to  come  to  his  own 
conclusions.  There  are,  however,  con- 
nected with  this  campaign,  questions 
which  are  still  discussed,  and  some  of 
which  will  never  be  settled.  These  it 
is  impossible  to  pass  over  in  absolute 
silence.  There  is  the  unsettled  ques- 
tion between  Meade  and  Sickles.  It  is 
undeniable  that  the  advanced  position 
which  Sickles  took  on  the  2d  en- 
couraged the  Confederate  attack  on 
that  day,  and  very  nearly  ruined  the 
National  prospect.  It  is  as  little  to 
be  denied  that  Sickles,  in  assuming  the 
responsibility  of  taking  such  a position, 
made  a mistake.  A more  perfect  mili- 
tary training,  a more  practised  military 
eye  would  have  made  such  a choice  of 
ground  impossible.  But  Sickles  was 
not  alone  to  blame.  It  was  Meade’s 
business  to  attend  not  to  one  part  of 
his  line,  but  to  the  whole  of  it ; and  it 
is  notorious  that,  on  his  first  arrival  on 
the  field,  his  anxiety  for  his  right  made 
him  neglectful  of  his  left.  It  is  true 
that  he  gave  Sickles  instructions  to 
continue  the  line  on  the  ridge  between 
Hancock  and  the  Round  Tops.  But 
it  is  also  true  that  Sickles  notified  him 
of  the  peculiarity  of  the  ground  in  the 
position  assigned  him,  and  of  his  desire 


and  intention  to  occupy  the  elevated 
ground  in  front.  Then,  again,  it  was 
only  at  the  last  moment,  when  the  first 
thundering  discharge  of  the  enemy’s 
artillery  was  about  to  fall  upon  the 
doomed  position,  that  Meade  came  to 
inspect  the  ground.  If  Sickles  erred 
in  judgment,  it  does  seem  as  if  Meade 
was  neglectful  of  duty.  It  is  impor- 
tant also  to  bear  in  mind  that,  but  for 
the  accidental  presence  of  General  War- 
ren at  a most  critical  moment.  Little 
Round  Top,  the  key  of  the  National 
position,  would  have  been  at  the  mercy 
of  the  enemy.  Meade  was,  no  doubt, 
justified  in  believing  that  his  orders 
would  be  obeyed ; but  it  was  clearly 
his  duty  to  see  in  time  that  they  were 
strictly  carried  out. 

There  is  the  other  question  on  which 
so  much  difference  of  opinion  exists, 
and  which  probably  ever  will  exist. 
Meade  has  been  blamed  by  many — he 
has  been  justified  by  not  a few — for  his 
excessive  caution  in  following  up  the 
victory  of  the  3d.  It  does  seem,  at 
first  sight,  as  if  he  ought  to  have  pur- 
sued his  advantage  at  once,  and  made  a 
vigorous  onset  on  the  Confederate  lines, 
when  they  were  throAvn  into  confusion 
by  the  rout  of  Pettigrew,  Pickett  and 
Wilcox.  This  was  the  opinion  of  Gen- 
eral Hancock ; and  it  was  his  belief 
that,  if  Meade  had  advanced  at  once,  he 
would  have  won  a great  victory.  It 
was  Meade’s  own  intention  to  make  an 
immediate  assault;  and  he  has  given 
us  his  reasons  why  it  was  not  done. 
‘‘The  great  length  of  the  line,”  he  says, 
“and  the  time  required  to  carry  these 
orders  out  to  the  front,  and  the  move- 


2CO 


534 


GETTYSBURG. 


ment  subsequently  made,  before  the  re- 
ports given  to  me  of  the  condition  of  the 
forces  in  the  front  and  left,  caused  it  to 
be  so  late  in  the  evening  as  to  induce 
me  to  abandon  the  assault  which  I had 
contemplated.”  Possibly,  it  was  just 
as  well  that  the  assault  was  not  made. 
Mr.  Swinton  tells  us  that,  in  a conver- 
sation had  with  Longstreet,  in  regard 
to  the  proposed  attack,  the  latter  said 
to  him  : “I  had  the  divisions  of  Hood 
and  McLaws,  that  had  not  been  en- 
gaged during  the  day ; I had  a heavy 
force  of  artillery;  and  I have  no  doubt 
that  I should  have  given  the  Federals 
as  severe  a repulse  as  that  received  by 
Pickett.”  Meade  was,  perhaps,  more 
to  blame  for  the  manner  in  which  he 
conducted  the  pursuit  when  the  enemy 
abandoned  his  position  and  fell  back 
towards  the  Potomac.  He  chose  the 
longer  route  for  a questionable  advan- 
tage ; and  his  movements  were  so  slow 
that  Lee  reached  the  Potomac  six  days 
before  him.  When  he  came  up  in 
force,  on  the  12th,  he  had  certainly  a 
splendid  opportunity  to  strike  his  an- 
tagonist; and  it  will  ever  partake  of 
the  character  of  a mystery  why  Lee, 
with  the  National  army  in  his  front, 
was  able,  with  so  much  ease  and  so 
little  molestation,  to  retire  his  whole 
army  across  the  Potomac.  There  was 
a sting  in  what  Lincoln  said  to  Meade 
shortly  afterwards : The  fruit  seemed 
so  ripe,  so  ready  for  plucking,  that  it 
was  very  hard  to  lose  it.” 

The  commanding  generals  on  both 
sides  had  causes  for  regret  and  causes 
for  joy  and  rejoicing.  General  Lee 
made  some  mistakes  during  the  three  \ 


days’  fighting  at  Gettysburg.  He  at- 
tenuated, and  therefore  weakened,  his 
lines  by  too  much  extension,  in  order 
to  cover  the  entire  front  of  the  National 
position ; his  assault  on  the  2d  ought 
to  have  been  more  concentrated,  and, 
where  cdncentrated,  more  forcefully 
sustained,  or  made  along  the  whole 
length  of  his  line;  and  “the  attack” 
on  Hancock’s  front,  on  the  3d,  to  quote 
the  words  of  Longstreet,  “should  have 
been  made  with  30,000,  instead  of 
15,000  men.”  But,  if  General  Lee 
had  reason  to  regret  the  result  at  Get- 
tysburg, he  was  not  without  reason 
for  being  proud  of  his  retreat.  Gen- 
eral Meade  was  in  a position  not  whol- 
ly dissimilar.  His  conduct  of  the  pur- 
suit reflected  on  him  but  little  credit. 
The  victory  at  Gettysburg  was  due 
more,  perhaps,  to  the  intelligence,  the 
skill,  the  pride,  the  pluck  of  the  individ- 
ual soldier,  than  to  the  superior  genius, 
the  tactical  skill,  or  the  wise  ar- 
rangements of  the  commander-in-chief. 
But  the  army  of  the  Potomac,  after  a 
series  of  painful  and  even  shameful 
reverses,  had  at  last  won  a splendid 
victory ; and  to  General  Meade,  as  its 
chief,  legitimately  and  fairly  belonged 
the  glory. 

This  great  National  victory  marked  a 
turning-point  in  the  history  of  the  Civil 
War.  A Confederate  success  at  Gettys- 
burg would  have  had  a most  damag- 
ing influence  on  the  National  cause. 
It  might,  as  we  have  already  hinted, 
have  had  the  effect  of  permanently  di- 
viding the  Union.  It  would  certainly 
have  greatly  encouraged  that  growing 
dislike  of  the  war  which  was  finding 


REYNOLDS, 


535 


powerful  expression  in  the  large  centres 
of  population ; and  there  is  reason  to 
fear  that  it  would  have  given  foreign 
governments  a pretext  for  recognizing 
the  South.  Meade’s  great  victory,  oc- 
curring as  it  did  simultaneously  with 
Grant’s  equally  glorious  victory  at 
Vicksburg,  and  followed  so  quickly  by 

Among  the  illustrious  men  who  perished  at  Gettys- 
burg, there  was  no  greater  or  more  honored  name  than 
that  of  Major-General  John  Fulton  Reynolds.  He  was 
bom  in  Lancaster,  Pa.,  in  1820.  He  graduated  at  West 
Point  on  the  30th  of  June,  1841,  and,  on  the  23d  of 
October  following,  received  his  commission  as  second 
lieutenant  in  the  Third  artillery.  He  attained  the  rank 
of  first  lieutenant  in  June,  1846,  and  served  through 
the  Mexican  War ; and,  for  his  gallant  and  meritorious 
conduct  at  Monterey  and  Buena  Vista,  was  bre vetted 
captain  and  major.  After  having  been  engaged  in 
military  service  in  California,  and  against  the  Indians 
on  the  Pacific  Coast,  he  was  appointed  aide  to  General 
Wool;  and,  on  the  3d  of  March,  18.55,  he  was  promoted 
to  a captaincy  in  the  Third  artillery.  In  May,  1861,  he 
was  appointed  lieutenant-colonel  of  the  Fourteenth  U. 
S.  Infantry.  On  the  20th  of  August,  1861,  he  was 
commissioned  brigadier-general  of  volunteers,  and  ap- 
pointed to  the  command  of  the  First  brigade  of  the 
Pennsylvania  Reserve  corps,  then  under  General  Mc- 
Call. In  June,  1862,  the  reserves  joined  the  army  of 
the  Potomac ; and  General  Reynolds  took  part  in  the 


the  surrender  of  Port  Hudson,  turned 
the  tide  of  popular  sentiment.  The 
Confederacy  was  doomed.  Its  com- 
plete collapse  was  now  merely  a ques- 
tion of  time.  After  two  years  of 
darkness  and  sorrow,  the  rainbow  of 
promise  was  revealed;  and  the  Na- 
tional heart  was  glad. 

battles  of  Mechanicsville  and  Gaines’  Mill.  He  was 
also  engaged  at  Savage’s  Station,  and  at  Charles  City 
Cross  Roads,  where  he  took  command  of  the  division, 
when  McCall  was  made  prisoner.  Later  on  the  same 
day,  he  himself  was  captured,  and  sent  to  Richmond. 
After  his  release,  he  returned  and  took  command  of  his 
division  on  the  26th  of  September,  soon  afterwards  tak- 
ing command  of  the  First  army  corps  by  virtue  of  seni- 
ority of  rank.  He  commanded  this  corps  at  the  battle  of 
Fredericksburg.  In  January,  18G3,  he  was  nominated 
major-general  of  volunteers.  At  Chancellorsville,  he 
was  in  the  reserve,  and  took  no  active  part.  On  the  12th 
of  June,  he  was  appointed  to  the  command  of  the  right 
wing  of  Hooker  s army,  having  charge  of  three  corps. 
How  he  brought  on  the  engagement  at  Gettysburg,  and 
how  he  came  by  his  sudden  and  untimely  end,  has  j ust 
been  shown.  In  General  Reynolds,  the  National  army 
lost  one  of  its  ablest  soldiers,  and  the  Union  one  of  its 
noblest  defenders.  But  for  him,  the  National  army 
might  have  failed  to  occupy  Cemetery  Ridge  and  the 
adjoining  heights ; and  the  non-occupation  of  those 
heights  might  have  led  to  defeat  at  Gettysburg. 


536 


CHICKAMAUGA  AND  CHATTANOOGA. 


CHAPTER  XXVIII. 


The  Army  of  the  Cumberland. — Bragg  and  Rosecranz. — Positions  of  t\i0  Rival  Armies. — Attempt  to  Recapture 
Fort  Donelson. — Raid  by  Davis. — Spring  Hill. — Thompson’s  Station. — Van  Dorn  and  Forrest. — Franklin. — 
Defeat  of  Van  Dorn. — Minty’s  Expedition. — Streight’s  Expedition. — Drivers’  Gap. — Duck  River. — The  Army 
of  the  Cumberland  Still  Inactive. — The  Government  Impatient. — Chattanooga. — The  National  Army  in  Mo- 
tion.— Rosecranz  Fully  Prepared. — His  Plan  of  Battle. — Hoover’s  Gap. — Tullahoma. — Bragg  Falls  Back  to 
Bridgeport. — Burnside  Ordered  to  Co-operate  with  Rosecranz. — Gillmore  Defeats  Pegram. — Sanders’  Raid. — 
Buckner  at  Knoxville. — Knoxville  Relieved. — Great  Rejoicing. — Cumberland  Gap  Occupied  by  the  Na- 
tionals.— Wild  Rumors. — Bragg  and  Rosecranz  Preparing  for  Action. — Bragg  Abandons  Chattanooga. — 
Victory  Without  a Battle. — A Grand  Opportunity  Lost. — Rosecranz’  Mistake. — Chickamauga. — The  Armies 
Confronting  Each  Other. — Disposition  of  the  Forces. — Opening  of  the  Fight. — Thomas  in  Peril. — Hazen 
Comes  to  the  Rescue.— Fighting  all  Along  the  Line. — Close  of  the  First  Day. — The  Advantage  with  the 
Nationals. — The  Second  Day’s  Fighting. — A Terrific  Cannonade. — Breckenridge’s  Fierce  Onset. — Thomas 
Calls  for  Help. — A Sad  Mishap. — The  National  Centre  Pierced. — The  Right  Driven  Back. — Thomas  Stands 
Firm,  like  a Wall  of  Iron. — The  Rock  of  Chickamauga. — Gerieral  Gordon  Granger. — Longstreet’s  Impetu- 
ous Attacks. — Thomas  Holds  His  Ground. — The  Nationals  Fall  Back  to  Chattanooga. — Thomas  the  Hero 
of  Chickamauga. — Chattanooga  Invested. — The  National  Communications  Cut. — The  Army  of  the  Cumber- 
land an  Object  of  National  Anxiety. — Grant  Summoned  to  Chattanooga. — Rosecranz  Removed  From  Com- 
mand.— Grant  at  Louisville. — In  Command. — Instructions  to  Thomas. — Reinforcements. — Arrival  of  Hooker. — 
Smith’s  Movement. — Grant  at  Nashville. — Brown’s  Ferry. — Lookout  Valley. — Wauhatchie. — Severe  Fight- 
ing.— Geary’s  Men  Performing  Prodigies  of  Valor. — Hooker  Victorious. — Commendations. — Sherman’s  Ap- 
proach.— His  Arrival  at  Bridgeport. — Grant’s  Plans  Working  Admirably. — Bragg’s  Mistake. — He  Detaches 
Longstreet. — Preparations  for  the  Attack. — Disposition  of  the  Troops. — Deception. — Bragg  Supposed  to  be 
About  to  Retreat. — Sherman  at  Brown’s  Ferry. — Grant  Impatient  of  Delay. — Thomas  Ordered  to  Advance. — 
A Splendid  Sight. — Orchard  Knob  Captured. — An  Important  Position  Gained. — Hooker  at  Lookout  Moun- 
tain.— Sherman  Crosses  the  Tennessee,  and  Takes  Position  on  the  North  of  Missionary  Ridge. — Lookout 
Creek  Swmllen  and  Impassable. — Geary’s  Movement  to  Wauhatchie. — Across  the  Creek. — A Heavy  Mist. — 
Geary’s  Success. — A Firm  Foothold  on  the  Mountain. — Lookout  Mountain  Abandoned  by  the  Confede- 
rates.— Another  Point  Gained. — A Battle  Above  the  Clouds. — Chattanooga  Valley  Abandoned. — The  Con- 
federates Concentrate  on  Missionary  Ridge. — The  Blockade  of  the  Tennessee  Ended. — The  National  Line 
United. — Grant’s  Headquarters. — Preparations  for  the  Final  Blow. — The  Battle  Plan. — Hooker’s  Delay. — 
Sherman’s  Advance. — Hooker  on  Missionary  Ridge. — Great  Success. — Sherman  Fiercely  Resisted. — Bragg 
Concentrates  on  His  Own  Right. — Sherman  Sorely  Pressed. — Repeated  and  Persistent  Attacks  on  Sher- 
man’s Front. — Grant  Remembers  Shiloh. — Hooker’s  Victory. — Bragg  Outgeneralled. — Thomas  Ordered  to 
Advance. — The  Thunderbolt  Launched. — A Terrific  Struggle. — The  Thunder  of  Artillery. — Scrambling  Up 
the  Heights. — The  Advancing  Colors. — Fighting  in  Groups. — The  Crest  Scaled. — The  Confederates  Driven 
from  the  Hill. — Flight  of  Bragg  and  Breckenridge. — Sherman  at  the  Railroad  Tunnel. — The  Battle  Still 
Raging. — The  Confederates  Driven  Back  at  All  Points. — A Great  and  Glorious  Victory.  — Grant’s  Modesty. — 
The  Pursuit. — Knoxville. — Burnside  Besieged. — Longstreet’s  Fierce  Assaults. — Burnside  on  His  Last  Day's 
Provisions. — A Gallant  Defense. — Advance  of  Sherman  to  Knoxville. — Granger’s  Cavalry. — Longstreet’s  Last 
Assault. — A Terrible  Repulse. — Dead  and  Wounded  Piled  Up  in  the  Ditch. — Longstreet’s  Retreat. — End  of 
the  Siege. — Sherman’s  Brave  Army. — Burnside  Thanks  Sherman. — End  of  the  Campaign. — Honors  to  Grant. — 
Congratulations. — Universal  Rejoicing. — Grant  the  National  Hero. — Bragg  Removed  from  Command. — The 
Confederates  Discouraged. 


OuR  attention  must  no'W  be  given  to 
the  army  of  the  Cumberland.  In 
a previous  chapter,  we  have  de- 


scribed the  famous  battles  of  Perry ville 
and  Murfreesboro,  in  both  of  which 
engagements  the  Nationals  were  vio 


FORT  DOKELSON'. 


537 


torious.  On  the  night  of  the  3d  of 
January,  1863,  Bragg  withdrew  from 
Murfreesboro ; and  Kosecranz  at  last 
grasped  his  blood-clotted  prize.  The 
army  of  the  Cumberland,  in  these  two 
battles,  had  really  covered  itself  with 
glory ; and  the  gallantry  and  skill  ex- 
hibited by  its  brave  commander  had 
drawn  towards  him  the  affections  and 
hopes  of  the  nation. 

After  the  occupation  of  Murfrees- 
boro by  Eosecranz,  Bragg  took  a 
strong  position  to  the  north  of  the 
Duck  Eiver,  his  infantry  extending 
from  Shelby ville  to  Wartrace,  his  cav- 
alry stretching  out  on  his  right  to  Mc- 
Minnville, and  on  his  left  to  Columbia 
and  Spring  Hill.  He  had  outposts  at 
Hoover’s  and  Liberty  Gaps,  about  ten 
miles  from  Murfreesboro.  His  main 
base  of  supplies  was  at  Chattanooga. 
He  had  also  a large  depot  at  Tulla- 
homa.  From  January  until  June,  the 
two  armies  thus  confronting  each  other 
lay  in  comparative  idleness,  neither 
making  any  serious  attempt  to  provoke 
battle. 

Although  there  had  not,  during  those 
six  months,  been  any  general  engage- 
ment, there  had  been  some  severe 
skirmishing,  and  several  important  side 
encounters.  Early  in  February,  an  at- 
tempt was  made  by  General  Wheeler, 
Bragg’s  chief  of  artillery,  with  4500 
mounted  men,  to  recapture  Fort  Donel- 
son.  The  garrison  was  small,  consist- 
ing only  of  some  600  men,  mostly  of 
the  Eighty-Third  Illinois,  with  a sec- 
tion of  Flood’s  battery,  and  a 32-pound 
siege  gun — the  whole  under  the  com- 
mand of  Colonel  A.  C.  Harding.  The 


object  of  the  Confederates  was,  by  re- 
occupying Fort  Donelson,  to  interrupt 
the  navigation  of  the  Cumberland,  and 
so  prevent  the  transportation  of  sup- 
plies to  Nashville  for  the  use  of  the 
National  army.  On  the  3d  of  pefe, 
February,  a little  after  mid-day,  a 
demand  was  made  for  the  surrender  of 
Fort  Donelson  and  the  garrison.  Weak 
in  numbers,  Harding  was  strong  at 
heart.  He  defied  the  foe,  and  sent  a 
small  steamer  down  the  river  to  sum- 
mon to  his  aid  some  gunboats,  which 
he  knew  were  not  far  off.  Meanwhile, 
Wheeler  and  his  men  had  approached 
within  cannon  range.  Harding  opened 
upon  them  with  his  32-pounder  and 
his  four  smaller  guns.  The  fight  con- 
tinued till  dark,  Harding  holding  his 
position,  although  he  had  lost  45  of  his 
60  artillery  horses.  At  eight  o’clock 
in  the  evening  came  up  the  gunboat 
Fair  Play,  Lieutenant -Commanding 
Fitch,  and  opened  upon  the  Confede- 
rates a raking  fire.  Wheeler  and  his 
men  were  dismayed ; and,  as  other  gun 
boats  were  seen  coming  up  to  take  part 
in  the  contest,  they  fled  precipitately, 
leaving  behind  them,  dead  on  the  field, 
some  150  men,  and  about  the  same 
number  of  prisoners.  Harding  lost 
126  men,  of  whom  50  had  been  made 
prisoners.  Fort  Donelson  was  hence- 
forth left  undisturbed.  While  Wheeler 
was  on  the  Cumberland,  General  J.  C. 
Davis,  with  two  brigades  of  cavalry, 
under  Colonel  Minty,  was  operating  in 
his  rear.  Moving  westward  from  Mur- 
freesboro, Davis  scoured  the  country, 
and,  at  the  end  of  thirteen  days,  he  re- 
turned to  camp,  with  141  of  Wheeler’s 


538 


CHICKAMAUGA  AOT)  CHATTANOOGA. 


men  as  prisoners,  among  whom  were 
two  colonels  and  several  officers  of 
rank. 

There  was  a period  of  repose.  Early 
in  March,  however,  it  became  known 
that  General  Van  Dorn,  with  a large 
mounted  force,  was  in  the  vicinity  of 
Franklin.  General  John  Colburn,  who 
was  stationed  at  Franklin,  and  General 
Sheridan,  who  was  with  the  main  army 
at  Murfreesboro,  were  ordered,  with 
their  respective  commands,  to  move 
simultaneously  against  Van  Dorn.  Col- 
Mar.  burn,  on  the  4th  of  March,  with 
some  2700  men,  some  600  of 
whom  were  mounted,  set  out  in  the 
direction  of  Spring  Hill.  He  had  ad- 
vanced but  a little  way  when  he  came 
into  contact  with  the  Confederate 
skirmishers.  These,  however,  were 
easily  repulsed.  Colburn  experienced 
no  further  resistance  during  the  remain- 
der of  that  day;  but,  as  evening  ap- 
proached, the  enemy  appeared  in  his 
front,  in  very  considerable  force.  Halt- 
ing, and  encamping  for  the  night,  Col- 
burn resumed  his  forward  movement 
early  next  morning.  Soon  after  start- 
ing, he  found  himself  attacked  by  a 
vastly  superior  force,  under  Van  Dorn 
and  Forrest.  The  Nationals  made  a 
bold  resistance ; but,  being  greatly  out- 
numbered, and  his  ammunition  being 
exhausted,  Colburn  was  compelled  to 
fall  back  and  seek  safety  in  flight,  leav- 
ing some  1300  of  his  men  in  the  hands 
of  the  enemy.  Sheridan,  with  his  di- 
vision, and  some  1800  cavalry,  under 
Colonel  Minty,  moved  flrst  towards 
Shelbyville  and  then  round  in  the  di- 
rection of  Franklin.  After  various 


skirmishes,  he  encountered  Van  Dorn 
and  Forrest  at  Thompson’s  Sta-  jjar. 
tion,  on  the  14th  of  March.  There  H. 
was  a sharp  flght;  but  the  Confede- 
rates were  ultimately  driven  back  be- 
hind the  Duck  Kiver.  Sheridan  re- 
turned to  Murfreesboro,  after  a ten 
days’  ride,  having  lost  only  5 men 
killed  and  5 wounded.  He  brought 
with  him  100  prisoners. 

In  the  beginning  of  April,  Van  Dorn 
again  appeared  in  force  in  the  neigh- 
borhood of  Franklin.  General  Gordon 
Granger  was  in  command  of  the  Na- 
tional troops  at  that  station.  Granger 
had  timely  warning  of  the  approach  of 
the  enemy,  and  made  every  preparation 
to  give  him  a warm  reception.  Granger 
had  all  but  completed  a new  fort — which 
afterwards  bore  his  name — on  the  north- 
ern side  of  the  Harpeth  River,  and  on  a 
commanding  eminence  about  fifty  feet 
above  the  stream.  The  fort,  on  which 
already  were  in  position  two  siege  guns 
and  two  rifled  cannon,  completely  com- 
manded the  approaches  to  Franklin. 
Granger’s  infantry  and  artillery  were 
under  the  immediate  command  of  Gen- 
erals Baird  and  Gilbert.  Generals 
G.  C.  Smith  and  Stanley  had  charge  of 
the  cavalry.  Baird  was  posted  so  as 
to  guard  the  ford  below  Franklin ; 
Gilbert  was  placed  so  as  to  meet  an 
attack  in  front ; Stanley  was  pushed 
out  four  miles  on  the  road  towards 
Murfreesboro;  while  Smith  was  held 
in  reserve,  to  be  ready,  if  occasion 
should  call  for  it,  to  rush  to  Stanley’s 
assistance.  On  the  10th  of  April,  April 
Van  Dorn,  with  a mounted  force 
of  about  9000  men  and  two  regiments 


RAIDING  PARTIES. 


539 


of  foot,  came  up  the  Columbia  and 
Lewisburg  turnpikes,  and  fell  heavily 
on  Granger’s  front.  Granger,  how- 
ever, was  ready  to  receive  him.  The 
National  troops  stood  firm;  and  the 
guns  from  the  new  fort  opened  upon 
the  assailants  a most  destructive  fire. 
Stanley,  seizing  his  opportunity,  rushed 
forward  and  struck  Van  Dorn  a tre- 
mendous blow  on  the  fiank.  Smith’s 
troops  were  already  in  motion,  to  sup- 
port Stanley;  and  Baird’s  men  were 
already  across  the  river  and  taking  part 
in  the  fight.  For  a time,  it  seemed  as 
if  the  Confederates  would  be  over- 
whelmed, and  driven  ingloriously  from 
the  field.  In  Granger’s  front,  they 
were  completely  defeated;  they  had 
sustained  a heavy  loss  in  killed  and 
wounded ; and  some  500  men  had  been 
made  prisoners.  Van  Dorn,  however, 
^vas  a daring  and  capable  ofiicer,  and 
not  easily  induced  to  believe  in  defeat. 
Gathering  up  his  whole  strength,  he 
fiung  himself  upon  Stanley,  before 
Smith  had  found  time  to  come  to  his 
aid ; and  such  was  the  vigor  and 
weight  of  the  onset,  that  Stanley  was 
compelled  to  fall  back,  thus  permitting 
Van  Dorn  to  recover  most  of  his  cap- 
tured men,  and,  at  the  same  time,  to 
make  good  his  escape.  The  Confede- 
rate commander  retired  to  Spring  Hill, 
v^dth  a loss  of  about  300  men  in  killed, 
wounded  and  prisoners.  Granger’s  loss 
was  comparatively  trifling,  amounting 
in  all  to  about  37  killed,  wounded  and 
missing. 

During  the  month  of  April,  there 
were  many  such  skirmishes,  not  all  of 
equal  importance,  and  some  of  them 


resulting  advantageously,  some  of  them 
disastrously  to  the  National  cause. 
Prominent  among  the  expeditions  sent 
out  at  that  date  was  that  of  Colonel 
Minty,  who,  starting  from  Murfrees- 
boro, with  a powerful  force,  scoured 
the  country  in  the  direction  of  Mc- 
Minnville, and  destroyed  a large 
amount  of  property,  making  many 
prisoners,  and  capturing  large  numbers 
of  mules  and  horses.  About  the  mid- 
dle of  that  month,  an  expedition,  com- 
posed of  the  Fifty-First  Indiana,  Eigh- 
teenth Illinois,  and  a part  of  two  Ohio 
regiments — some  1800  men  in  all — and 
commanded  by  Colonel  A.  D.  Streight, 
set  out  from  Nashville,  on  a mission 
from  which  great  things  were  expected. 
This  force  was  called  ^‘an  independent 
provisional  brigade,”  and  was  created 
for  temporary  purposes.”  Streight’s 
instructions  were  that  he  should  de- 
stroy the  railroads,  the  stores,  the 
manufactories,  in  the  rear  of  the  Con- 
federate army,  and  in  every  way 
make  retreat  difficult,  if  not  impossi- 
ble. With  his  command  on  board 
steamers,  Streight  left  Nashville  on  the 
11th  of  April.  On  reaching  Dover,  he 
disembarked  his  troops,  and  marched 
them  across  the  country  to  Fort  Henry, 
on  the  Tennessee  Fiver.  There  he 
waited  for  the  boats  which  had  gone 
around  b}^  the  Ohio.  Embarking  again, 
he  went  up  the  Tennessee  to  Eastport, 
where  he  landed  ; then,  moving  south- 
ward, he  joined  General  Dodge,  who 
was  moving  towards  Tuscumbia,  on  the 
Memphis  and  Charleston  Failroad.  It 
was  not  intended  that  he  should  remain 
in  conjunction  with  Dodge,  but  only 


540 


CHICKAMAUGA  AND  CHATTANOOGA. 


that  he  should  march  with  him  long 
enough  to  create  the  impression  that 
his  troops  formed  a part  of  that  leader’s 
command,  and  at  the  proper  time  to 
strike  off  from  Tuscumbia  towards 
Husselville  or  Moulton.  On  their  de- 
parture from  Nashville,  Streight’s  men 
were  not  provided  with  horses.  It  was 
expected  that  they  would  be  able  to 
pick  them  up  by  the  way.  When  they 
joined  Dodge,  one  half  of  the  command 
was  still  on  foot.  At  Tuscumbia,  the 
joint  forces  encountered  and  defeated 
a strong  body  of  Confederates ; and,  as 
his  men  were  well  mounted,  Streight, 
without  delay,  set  out  for  Kusselville. 
Having  reached  that  place,  he  turned 
to  the  east,  his  object  being  to  strike 
the  important  cities  of  Rome  and  At- 
lanta, in  Northern  Georgia.  At  Rome 
there  were  extensive  iron-works ; and 
Atlanta  was  a great  railroad  centre. 
Streight  was  not  to  be  allowed  to  pro- 
ceed on  his  mission  unmolested.  He 
had  scarcely  commenced  his  march, 
when  he  was  pursued  by  a powerful 
cavalry  force,  under  the  Confederate 
leaders,  Forrest  and  Roddy.  The  Na- 
tionals were  overtaken  in  the  neighbor- 
hood of  Moulton,  Lawrence  County, 
Alabama.  At  Drivers’  Gap,  of  the 
Sand  Mountain,  there  was  a severe  en- 
counter, which  lasted  the  greater  part 
of  a day.  Then  commenced  a running 
fight,  which  continued  for  four  days, 
and  during  which  there  were  two  severe 
battles  and  several  spirited  skirmishes. 
In  a circuit  of  about  one  hundred  miles, 
the  Nationals  destroyed  a laige  quan- 
tity of  corn,  collected  for  the  use  of 
the  Confederate  army,  burned  several 


bridges  and  one  cannon  foundry,  and 
captured  many  animals.  When  about 
fifteen  miles  from  Rome,  a detachment, 
which  had  been  sent  forward  to  that 
place,  fell  back  on  the  main  body ; and, 
at  the  same  time,  the  pursuers,  now 
4000  stibng,  under  Forrest,  fell  with 
great  force  on  the  National  rear.  His 
ammunition  being  now  exhausted,  and 
his  men  overpowered  by  fatigue,  Streight 
had  no  choice  but  surrender.  The  cap- 
tives were  sent  to  Libby  Prison,  M^here 
they  were  held  until  February,  1864, 
when  they  effected  their  escape  by  dig- 
ging under  the  foundations  of  the 
building.  Meanwhile,  Dodge  had  had 
better  success.  When  Streight  set  out 
for  Rome  and  Atlanta,  he  struck  off  to 
the  south ; and  having  made  a sweeping 
raid  in  Northern  Alabama  and  Missis- 
sippi, he  returned  to  his  headquarters 
at  Corinth. 

During  the  month  of  May  and  the 
greater  portion  of  June,  the  armies  of 
Rosecranz  and  Bragg  remained  in  their 
old  positions,  the  former  at  Murfrees- 
boro, the  latter  along  the  general  line 
of  the  Duck  River,  neither  evincing  any 
signs  of  a disposition  to  attack.  In 
this  month,  there  was  a prevailing  feel- 
ing of  disappointment,  because  of  the 
long-continued  inaction  of  the  army 
of  the  Cumberland.  In  some  quarters, 
this  sentiment  found  free  and  full  ex- 
pression. By  his  victory  at  Murfrees- 
boro, Rosecranz  had  won  the  affections 
and  confidence  of  the  people.  What 
he  had  done,  it  was  thought,  was  but  a 
])roof  of  what  he  could  do,  and  an  earn- 
est of  greater  things  yet  to  be  accom- 
plished by  the  army  of  the  Cumber- 


MAP  ILLUSTKATING  THE  CHICKAMAUGA  AND  CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGNS. 


I 


THE  BATTLE  GROUND. 


541 


land,  under  its  skilful  and  accomplished 
leader.  One  half  year  of  inaction,  after 
a victory  so  splendid,  had  been  sufli- 
cient  to  give  an  entirely  altered  tone  to 
the  sentiment  of  the  North.  Rose- 
cranz,  however,  was  not  without  good 
reasons  for  his  delay.  His  army,  after 
Murfreesboro,  was  in  a dreadfully  shat- 
tered condition;  and  when  gradually, 
through  rest  and  reinforcements,  he 
became  strong  enough  to  justify  an 
offensive  movement,  he  felt  restrained, 
by  military  considerations,  from  resum- 
ing the  conflict.  It  was  the  opinion  of 
Rosecranz  that  it  would  be  unwise  for 
him  to  hazard  a battle  until  the  fate 
of  Vicksburg  should  have  been  deter- 
mined. Considering  the  relative  posi- 
tions of  his  own  army  and  that  of 
Grant,  he  deemed  it  impolitic  “ to  risk 
two  great  and  decisive  battles  at  the 
same  time.”  Such,  however,  were  not 
the  views  entertained  at  headquarters 
at  Washington.  It  was  the  opinion  of 
Halleck  that  the  time  was  opportune 
for  Rosecranz  to  put  his  army  in  mo- 
tion, and,  by  falling  heavily  on  his 
antagonist,  driving  him  into  Georgia, 
and  relieving  East  Tennessee,  to  pierce 
the  very  heart  of  the  Confederacy. 
Orders  were  given  accordingly.  In  a 
former  chapter  we  have  pointed  out  the 
importance  of  this  natural  stronghold. 
Its  strategic  worth  was  seen  and  ad- 
mitted alike  by  the  National  and 
Confederate  leaders  from  the  com- 
mencement of  operations  in  the  West. 
Buell,  it  will  be  remembered,  was  de- 
tached from  the  army  of  the  West, 
after  the  battle  of  Corinth,  and  ordered 
by  Halleck  to  advance  and  take  pos- 


session of  Chattanooga.  Bragg,  how- 
ever, was  intent  on  the  same  purpose ; 
and,  pushing  forward  with  the  utmost 
rapidity,  he  outstripped  Buell  and  se- 
cured the  stronghold.  In  spite  of  the 
defeat  at  Perryville,  and  the  more 
crushing  blow  received  at  Murfrees- 
boro, Bragg  remained  master  of  Chat- 
tanooga and  the  mountain  fastnesses 
around.  The  possession  of  the  place, 
however,  had  not  ceased  to  be  an  object 
of  ambition  with  the  National  govern- 
ment ; and  the.  contest,  suspended  since 
the  battle  of  Murfreesboro,  was  about 
to  be  resumed. 

The  majestic  folds  of  the  earth’s 
surface,  known  as  the  Appalachian 
Ranges,  separate  the  Atlantic  portion 
of  the  Southern  States  from  the  Mis- 
sissippi Valley.  These  folds,  for  the 
most  part,  run  parallel  to  each  other, 
and  are  crossed  at  intervals  by  trans- 
verse depressions  or  gaps.  Such  pas- 
sages, it  can  readily  be  understood,  are 
of  great  commercial,  political,  and  mili- 
tary importance.  From  the  region  of 
Chattanooga,  the  earth-folds  range  in  a 
southwesterly  direction,  the  more  ele- 
vated ridges  being  named  respectively 
Chickamauga  Hills,  Pigeon  Mountain, 
Missionary  Ridge,  Lookout  Mountain, 
and  Racoon  or  Sand  Mountain.  The 
name  Chattanooga  signifies,  in  the  Che- 
rokee language,  “ Hawk’s  Nest.”  The 
town  of  that  name  is  built  in  one  of 
those  transverse  depressions,  on  the 
south  bank  of  the  Tennessee  River, 
and  at  the  mouth  of  Chattanooga  Val- 
ley. This  valley,  through  which  runs 
a stream  of  the  same  name,  is  flanked 
on  the  west  by  Lookout  Mountain, 


542 


CHICKAMAUGA  AND  CHATTANOOGA. 


which  rises  to  the  height  of  2400  feet, 
and  on  the  east  by  Missionary  Ridge, 
so  named,  because  it  was  an  early  and 
influential  seat  of  Catholic  missions 
among  the  Cherokee  Indians.  The  de- 
pression between  Missionary  Ridge  and 
Pigeon  Mountain  is  called  Chickamauga 
Valley.  The  two  valleys,  Chattanooga 
and  Chickamauga,  spring  from  a com- 
mon centre,  McLemore’s  Cove,  which 
is  shut  in  by  Lookout  on  the  west  and 
Pigeon  on  the  east.  Such  was  the  re- 
gion now  about  to  become  the  theatre 
of  a series  of  desperate  and  bloody 
contests. 

On  the  24th  of  June,  Rosecranz,  in 
June  obedience  to  instructions  from 
24*  headquarters,  set  his  army  in  mo- 
tion. He  had  under  him  some  60,000 
effective  men.  General  Burnside,  who 
was  in  Kentucky,  was  ordered  to  ad- 
vance through  the  mountain  passes  into 
East  Tennessee,  and  connect  his  right 
with  Rosecranz’s  left. 

Bragg’s  army,  which  consisted  of 
some  40,000  men,  was  strongly  posted  at 
Shelbyville  and  at  Wartrace,  with  out- 
posts at  Hoover’s  and  Liberty  Gaps. 
He  held  a strong  position  also  at  Tul- 
lahoma. 

Rosecranz  was  well  aware  of  the 
strength  of  Bragg’s  position;  and  it 
was  his  purpose,  from  the  outset,  so  to 
manoeuvre  as  to  tempt  him  to  take  less 
advantageous  ground.  His  real  object 
was  to  turn  the  Confederate  right.  His 
ostensible  object,  as  he  wished  it  to  be 
regarded,  was  to  fall  heavily  on  the 
Confederate  left  and  centre.  In  the 
midst  of  a rain-storm  of  almost  unpre- 
cedented severity,  the  National  army 


began  its  forward  movement.  The 
right,  which  was  under  McCook,  moved 
towards  Shelbyville.  The  centre,  under 
Thomas,  moved  towards  Manchester. 
The  left,  under  Crittenden,  marched  in 
the  direction  of  McMinnville.  Gen- 
eral G6rdon  Granger’s  reserve  corps 
moved  forward  in  support  of  McCook 
and  Thomas.  The  orders  were  sti’ictly 
obeyed  and  successfully  executed.  Sher- 
idan’s division,  of  McCook’s  command, 
led  the  advance  on  the  right.  This  was 
followed,  at  the  distance  of  a few  miles, 
by  the  divisions  of  Johnson  and  Davis. 
While  Sheridan  kept  moving  towards 
Shelbyville,  those  latter  divisions  turned 
oflt  to  the  left,  and  moved  in  the  dii^ec- 
tion  of  Liberty  Gap.  Wilder,  with  his 
mounted  infantry,  led  Thomas’  advance. 
General  Reynolds  followed,  with  the 
remainder  of  the  division.  Wilder  was 
instructed  to  halt  at  Hoover’s  Gap 
until  the  arrival  of  Reynolds.  This  h(‘, 
intended  to  do,  but  finding  the  place 
unoccupied,  he  pushed  through,  cap- 
turing a wagon-train  and  a drove  of 
beeves.  At  the  other  extremity  of  the 
gap  he  was  met  by  the  Confederates 
in  great  force.  He  was  able,  however, 
to  hold  the  gap  until  the  arrival  of 
Reynolds,  when  it  was  secured.  In  the 
meantime,  McCook  had  been  equally 
successful  at  Liberty  Gap.  Near  the 
entrance.  General  Willich,  whose  bri- 
gade led  the  column,  encountered  the 
enemy  in  very  considerable  force.  At 
the  command  of  General  Johnson,  Wil- 
lich fell  upon  the  Confederates  with 
tremendous  energy,  driving  them  be 
fore  him,  and  capturing  them  tents, 
baggage,  and  supplies.  Johnson  sent 


TULLAHOMA  ABANDONED. 


543 


Colonel  Baldwin  forward  to  clear  the 
upper  end  of  the  gap.  The  order  was 
promptly  executed ; and,  after  a sharp 
encounter,  the  position  was  occupied. 
These  were  important  gains.  But  suc- 
cess was  attending  Rosecranz  in  other 
directions  Granger  had  started  from 
Triune,  on  the  extreme  right  of  the 
National  army,  on  the  morning  of  the 
23d,  and,  having  pushed  rapidly  for- 
ward, he  reached  Christiana  without 
difficulty.  At  that  place  he  was  joined 
by  Stanley  and  his  cavalry.  The  com- 
bined forces  pressed  on  to  Guy’s  Gap, 
securing  it  after  a struggle  of  about 
two  hours.  The  Confederates  fled,  but 
were  closely  pursued  for  about  seven 
miles.  About  three  miles  from  Shel- 
byville,  they  halted,  taking  position  in 
their  rifle-pits.  A vigorous  charge  was 
made  by  Stanley’s  horsemen.  The  Con- 
federates were  driven  from  the  rifle- 
pits,  and  compelled  to  fall  back  on  the 
near  defenses  of  the  town.  It  was  now 
six  o’clock  in  the  evening.  Granger 
came  up  with  his  infantry ; Stanley 
charged  again ; and  before  seven  o’clock 
Shelbyville  was  in  the  possession  of 
the  National  troops  Wheeler  and  his 
troopers  escaped  by  swimming  Duck 
River.  In  addition  to  the  possession 
of  Shelbyville,  three  guns,  a quantity 
of  corn,  and  500  prisoners  rewarded 
the  daring  and  enterprise  of  Granger 
and  Stanley. 

Not  slow  to  perceive  the  advantages 
which  he  had  gained,  Rosecranz  pressed 
through  the  mountain  passes;  and  on 
the  27th  he  had  established  his  head- 
quarters at  Manchester.  Two  days 
later,  McCook  and  Thomas  had  also 


arrived,  with  all  their  forces.  Prepara- 
tions were  at  once  made  to  flank  Tulla- 
homa,  whither  Bragg  had  now  retii'ed. 
Wilder  was  ordered  to  move  around 
and  strike  the  railroad  in  the  Confeder- 
ate rear  at  Decherd,  and  to  destroy  the 
bridge  over  the  Elk  River.  Wilder 
had  little  difficulty  in  reaching  De- 
cherd; the  railroad  was  injured,  but 
the  bridge  defied  all  his  efforts  and  all 
his  skill.  Convinced  that  the  National 
army  was  about  to  move  upon  him  in 
force,  and  believing  that  his  position 
was  untenable,  Bragg,  on  the  night  of 
the  30th  of  June,  abandoned  his  en- 
trenched camp  at  Tullahoma,  and  fell 
back  to  Bridgeport,  Alabama.  The 
extensive  works  which  had  been  con- 
structed during  a period  of  several 
months,  between  Shelbyville,  Wartrace, 
Tullahoma  and  Decherd,  were  thus 
abandoned,  without  any  serious  blow 
having  been  struck  in  their  defense. 
“Thus  ended,”  says  Rosecranz  in  his 
report,  “ the  nine  days’  campaign, 
which  drove  the  enemy  from  two  forti- 
fied positions,  and  gained  possession  of 
Middle  Tennessee.  Conducted  during 
one  of  the  most  extraordinary  rains 
ever  known  in  that  country,  at  that 
period  of  the  year,  and  over  a soil  that 
seemed  almost  a quicksand,  our  opera- 
tions were  retarded  thirty-six  hours 
at  Hoover’s  Gap,  and  sixty  hours  at 
and  in  front  of  Manchester,  which 
alone  prevented  us  from  getting  posses- 
sion of  his  communications,  and  forcing 
the  enemy  to  a very  disastrous  battle.” 
The  National  loss  in  these  various 
operations  was  about  560  killed,  woun- 
ded and  missing.  The  Confederate 


544 


CHICKAMAUGA  AND  CHATTANOOGA. 


loss  was  about  6000,  large  numbers  of 
these  having  deserted  during  the  re- 
treat. Bragg  managed  to  carry  with 
him  all  his  guns  and  supplies  along 
the  railroad,  which  he  destroyed  as  he 
went  on.  He  pushed  on  through  the 
Cuniberland  Mountains,  crossed  the 
Tennessee  River  at  Bridgeport,  where 
he  burned  the  railroad  bridge  behind 
him,  and  made  his  way  to  Chattanooga. 
If  it  must  be  said  of  Bragg  that  he 
showed  lack  of  generalship  in  offering 
so  little  resistance  to  the  National  ad- 
vance, it  must  also  be  admitted  that  he 
conducted  his  retreat  with  marked 
ability  and  with  signal  success.  So 
complete  was  the  destruction  which  he 
worked,  as  he  moved  along,  that  it  was 
not  until  the  16th  of  August  that  the 
National  forces  commenced  to  cross  the 
Cumberland  Mountains. 

We  have  already  stated  that  General 
Burnside,  who  had  been  assigned  to 
the  command  of  the  army  of  the  Ohio, 
was  ordered  to  co-operate  with  the 
army  of  the  Cumberland.  Burnside 
assumed  his  new  command  in  March. 
He  had  had  several  small  encounters 
with  the  enemy  before  he  was  ordered 
to  act  in  conjunction  with  Rosecranz. 
By  one  detachment,  under  Gillmore,  he 
had  defeated  the  Confederate  general, 
Pegram,  at  Somerset,  and  thus  pre- 
vented a dangerous  incursion  into 
Southeastern  Kentucky.  By  another 
detachment,  under  Sanders,  he  had 
made  a successful  raid  against  the  Con- 
federates, in  the  direction  of  Knoxville. 
Sanders  passed  through  the  Cumber- 
land Mountains  from  Kentucky,  struck 
the  East  Tennessee  and  Georgia  Rail- 


road at  Lenoir  Station,  destroyed  a 
large  portion  of  the  road  which  led 
to  Knoxville,  passed  round  that  city, 
struck  the  road  again  at  Strawberry 
Plain,  and  burned  two  bridges.  After 
destroying  a large  quantity  of  war  ma- 
terial, iSanders  made  his  way  back  to 
Kentucky,  having  sustained  but  little 
loss,  and  bringing  with  him  thiee  of 
the  enemy’s  guns,  10,000  small  arms, 
and  500  prisoners.  At  the  time  this 
call  was  made  upon  Burnside  to  co- 
operate with  Rosecranz,  his  command 
had  been  considerably  diminished,  num- 
bering not  more  than  20,000  men,  the 
Ninth  army  corps  having  been  de- 
tached, some  time  before,  to  assist 
Grant  before  Vicksburg.  When  Burn- 
side began  his  march  to  form  a connec- 
tion with  the  army  of  the  Cumberland, 
General  Simon  B.  Buckner,  acting  un- 
der  instructions  from  Bragg,  was  in  com- 
mand of  about  20,000  men  in  East  Ten- 
nessee, with  his  headquarters  at  Knox- 
ville. Buckner  might  have  been  able, 
had  he  been  allowed,  to  interpose  serious 
obstacles  to  Burnside’s  advance.  Buck- 
ner, however,  was  elsewhere  needed. 
It  was  all-important  to  the  Confederacy 
that  Chattanooga  should  not  be  allowed 
to  fall  into  the  hands  of  the  Nationals. 
As  soon,  therefore,  as  Bragg  found 
that  he  was  in  peril,  he  ordered  Buck- 
ner to  evacuate  the  valley  and  hasten 
to  his  assistance  at  Chattanooga.  On 
the  approach  of  Burnside,  Buckner  fled; 
and  Knoxville  was  occupied  by  the 
National  troops,  after  a long  and  fa- 
tiguing march,  during  which  the  Con- 
federates offered  little  other  resistance 
than  that  of  burning  the  bridges  in 


BURNSIDE  AT  KNOXVILLE. 


545 


their  rear.  It  was  on  the  3d  day  of 
Sep#  September  that  Burnside  entered 
Knoxville.  By  the  citizens  and 
by  the  people  of  the  neighborhood,  he 
was  hailed  as  a great  deliverer.  As 
we  neared  Knoxville,”  says  one  who 
was  present,  the  evidences  of  the  in- 
tense devotion  to  the  Union,  dwelling 
in  the  hearts  of  the  people,  became 
more  and  more  apparent.  Along  the 
entire  route,  especially  the  last  ten  or 
fifteen  miles,  the  whole  population 
seemed  gathered  on  the  roadside  to 
give  welcome  to  the  Yankees.  On  the 
appearance  of  General  Burnside  on  the 
outskirts  of  the  town,  the  news  of  his 
arrival  spread,  and  everybody,  rich  and 
poor,  the  lame  and  the  halt,  rushed  out 
to  greet  him.  It  was  no  vulgar  curi- 
osity to  see  a man  famous  in  the  world’s 
history — it  was  the  greeting  of  an  op- 
pressed people  to  their  deliverer.  Un- 
covered, and  at  a slow  pace,  the  general 
rode  through  the  streets  to  his  head- 
quarters. His  progress  was  constantly 
impeded  by  the  rushing  of  men  to  his 
horse’s  side,  to  seize  him  by  the  hand 
and  say,  ^ God  bless  you.’  On  arrival 
at  headquarters,  a large  crowd  assem- 
bled in  the  yard,  and  were  clamorous 
for  speeches.  Brigadier-General  S.  P. 
Carter,  a native  of  East  Tennessee, 
came  forward,  and  in  a few  words  con- 
gratulated them  on  their  deliverance. 
In  response  to  repeated  calls.  General 
Burnside  then  appeared,  and  said  that 
although  his  profession  was  arms,  and 
not  speaking,  yet  he  would  take  the 
occasion  to  say  that,  from  the  moment 
he  took  command  of  the  department  of 
Ohio,  it  had  been  his  fervent  wish  to 


lead  an  army  into  East  Tennessee  to 
their  deliverance ; and  he  took  great 
pleasure  in  saying  that  he  had  come 
with  means  sufficient,  with  their  assist- 
ance, to  hold  the  country  permanently 
and  securely.”  The  same  witness  tells 
us  that,  when  the  speaking  was  ended, 
the  wildest  enthusiasm  was  manifested 
by  the  people.  “ The  garrison  flag  of 
the  United  States  was  flung  from  the 
portico,  and  the  crowd  rushed  up  and 
seized  it  in  their  hands,  many  of  them 
pressing  it  to  their  lips.  While  this 
was  taking  place  at  headquarters,  the 
troops'  had  been  waylaid  all  over  the 
city,  and  carried  off  by  violence,  to  be 
feasted,  without  money  and  without 
price,  on  the  best  which  the  land  af- 
forded.” Nor  did  this  bounteous  hos- 
pitality find  expression  towards  the 
officers  alone ; it  extended  to  the  rank 
and  file,  all  of  whom,  without  any  dis- 
tinction, were  regarded  as  deliverers. 

At  Knoxville,  the  Nationals  took 
possession  of  a large  amount  of  Con- 
federate property — such  as  locomotives, 
cars,  and  machine  shops.  On  the  4th, 
a movement,  under  the  immediate  di- 
rection of  General  Shackelford,  was 
made  upon  Cumberland  Gap.  On  the 
7th,  the  gap  was  invested;  and  a call 
was  made  for  surrender.  This,  General 
Frazier,  who  w^as  in  command  of  the 
Confederate  force  at  that  point,  refused 
to  do,  believing,  as  he  said,  that  he  was 
able  to  hold  out.  It  was  not  until  the 
arrival  of  Burnside  himself,  on  the  9th, 
that  Frazier  would  listen  to  any  pro- 
posals. On  that  day  tei*ms  were  agreed 
upon;  and  a surrender  was  made  uncon- 
ditionally. The  officers  retained  their 


546 


CHICKAMAUGA  AND  CHATTANOOGA. 


side-arms.  About  40  wagons,  200  mules, 
4000  pounds  of  bacon,  2000  bushels  of 
wheat,  a large  quantity  of  other  stores, 
and  ten  pieces  of  artillery,  were  sur- 
rendered. Some  2000  men  were  made 
prisoners.  Cumberland  Gap  was  thus 
again  in  the  possession  of  the  National 
troops;  and  the  great  valley  between 
the  Alleghany  and  the  Cumberland 
Mountains,  from  Cleveland  to  Bristol — 
of  which  Knoxville  may  be  regarded 
as  the  chief  city — was,  for  the  time  at 
least,  rid  of  armed  Confederates. 

Chattanooga  now  became  the  object 
of  universal  attention.  It  was  felt 
that  in  that  region  the  next  great 
struggle  for  supremacy  was  to  be  made. 
It  might  not  be  final  and  decisive;  but, 
however  it  might  result,  it  would  be 
certain  to  exercise  a determining  influ- 
ence on  the  ultimate  issue  of  the  con- 
test. Both  armies  were  the  objects  of 
anxious  care  to  their  respective  govern- 
ments. The  Richmond  authorities, 
trembling  for  the  safety  of  the  At- 
lantic States,  exerted  themselves  to  the 
very  utmost  to  strengthen  Bragg,  so 
that  he  might  turn  on  Rosecranz  and 
deal  him  a crushing  blow,  or  force  him 
towards  the  Cumberland.  Buckner, 
as  we  have  seen,  was  ordered  to  join 
him.  Johnson  sent  him  a strong  bri- 
gade from  Mississippi,  under  General 
Walker.  Polk  had  come  up  in  force 
from  Alabama.  Longstreet’s  corps, 
detached  from  the  army  of  General 
Lee,  was  hurrying  forward  from  Vir- 
ginia. A merciless  conscription  was 
enforced  in  Georgia  and  Alabama ; 
and  every  available  man  was  pushed 
forward  in  the  direction  of  Chatta- 


nooga. Nor  was  this  all.  In  shameful 
violation  of  the  terms  of  the  surrender, 
and  contrary  to  the  usages  of  civilized 
warfare,  Bragg’s  ranks  were  swelled  by 
thousands  of  prisoners  who  had  been 
paroled  at  Vicksburg  and  Port  Hud- 
son. Altogether,  the  Confederate  gen- 
eral was  able  to  count  on  an  effective 
force,  under  his  own  immediate  direc- 
tion, of  fully  80,000  men. 

Rosecranz  was  not  less  the  object  of 
solicitude  on  the  part  of  the  National 
government.  It  was  found  difiScult,  if 
not  impossible,  to  penetrate  the  designs 
of  the  enemy.  It  was  rumored  that 
Bragg  was  sending  reinforcements  to 
Lee,  and  that  preparations  were  being 
made  for  another  and  more  successful 
invasion  of  Maryland  and  Pennsyl- 
vania. This  rumor  received  encourage- 
ment  from  the  slight  resistance  which 
had  been  offered,  as  yet,  either  to  the 
advance  of  Rosecranz  or  to  the  advance 
of  Burnside.  It  was  soon  discovered 
that  the  rumor  had  no  foundation  in  fact. 
Trains  were  heard  running  night  and 
day,  for  thirty-six  hours,  on  the  Peters- 
burg and  Richmond  Railroad ; and 
Meade  was  able  to  report  that,  in  his 
judgment,  Lee’s  army  had  been  re- 
duced by  the  whole  of  Longstreet’s 
corps,  and  by  some  regiments  from 
Generals  Ewell  and  Hill.  Halleck 
took  immediate  steps  to  reinforce 
Rosecranz.  Burnside  received  fresh 
instructions  to  make  the  required  con- 
nections with  the  army  of  the  Cumber- 
land. General  Hurlbut,  who  was  at 
Memphis,  was  ordered  to  send  all  his 
available  forces  to  Corinth  andTuscum- 
bia,  so  as  to  be  ready  to  check  any 


EOSECRANZ  IN  CHATTANOOGA. 


547 


flank  movement  which  might  be  at- 
tempted by  the  enemy.  He  was  au- 
thorized to  call  upon  Grant  or  Sherman 
for  reinforcements,  if  such  were  needed. 
A telegraphic  communication  was  sent 
to  the  commander  at  Vicksburg,  to  send 
all  his  available  forces  to  the  line  of 
the  Tennessee  River.  Instructions  of 
like  import  were  sent  to  Schofield  in 
Missouri,  and  to  Pope  in  the  North- 
western Department.  It  was  the  deter- 
mination of  the  National  government 
that  Kentucky  and  Tennessee,  once 
more  reclaimed,  should  not  again  fall 
under  the  domination  of  the  Confed- 
eracy ; and  now  that  both  Vicksburg 
and  Port  Hudson  had  fallen,  and  the 
great  armies  of  the  West  and  South 
were  so  far  liberated,  and  able  to  lend 
a helping  hand,  there  seemed  to  be  no 
good  reason  why  this  determination,  if 
expressed  with  sufficient  vigor,  should 
not  be  attended  with  practical  and  sat- 
isfactory results. 

Eosecranz  reached  the  Tennessee  on 
the  evening  of  the  20th  of  August. 
He  made  arrangements  at  once  for  the 
crossing  of  the  river.  Crittenden,  with 
the  left  wing,  was  to  cross  at  Battle 
Creek,  and  move  on  Chattanooga ; 
Thomas,  with  the  centre,  was  to  pass 
his  corps  over  the  river — one  division 
at  Caperton’s  Ferry,  one  at  Battle 
Creek,  and  one  at  Shell  Mound.  He 
was  to  concentrate  at  Trenton,  and 
then  to  move  by  way  of  Stevens’  and 
Cooper’s  Gaps,  through  Lookout  Moun- 
tain, into  McLemore’s  Cove.  McCook 
was  to  push  two  of  his  divisions  across 
at  Caperton’s  Ferry,  while  his  other 
division,  that  of  Sheridan,  was  to  cross 


at  Bridgeport.  He  was  to  concentrate 
at  Winston’s  Gap.  Bridges  were  thrown 
across  the  river  at  the  points  indicated; 
and  by  the  8th  of  September,  the  troops 
had  crossed  and  taken  the  positions 
assigned  them.  Thomas  was  at  Tren- 
ton, and  in  possession  of  Stev^ens’  and 
Cooper’s  Gaps,  on  Lookout  Mountain. 
McCook  having  reached  Valley  Head, 
was  in  possession  of  Winston’s  Gap. 
Crittenden  having  crossed  to  Wauhat- 
chie,  was  communicating  with  Thomas’ 
right,  and  threatening  Chattanooga  by 
the  pass  over  the  point  of  Lookout 
Mountain.  It  was  the  expectation  of 
Eosecranz  that  these  combinations  would 
have  the  effect  of  inducing  Bragg  to 
abandon  Chattanooga.  In  this  expecta- 
tion he  was  not  to  be  disappointed. 
The  National  generals  had  conducted 
their  operations  with  great  expedition 
and  with  wonderful  secrecy.  It  was 
not  until  the  cavalry  of  Eosecranz,  hav- 
ing advanced  up  the  Will’s  Valley  Rail- 
road, were  already  at  Wauhatchie,  that 
Bragg  was  convinced  that  his  antago- 
nist had  crossed  or  was  crossing  the 
river ; and,  supposing  that  he  was  about 
to  be  flanked  on  his  left,  he  made  pre- 
parations for  the  abandonment  of  Chat- 
tanooga. It  was  now  the  7th  of  Sep- 
tember. Bragg  left  Chattanooga  on 
the  8th,  and  concentrated  strongly  at 
Lafayette.  On  the  following  day,  sep, 
Crittenden,  from  the  summit  of 
Lookout  Mountain,  discovered  that 
the  place  was  abandoned.  His  corps 
quickly  entered  in  and  took  possession. 
Thus,  without  any  fighting,  was  accom- 
plished the  first  great  object  of  the 
campaign. 


548 


CHICKAMAUGA  AND  CHATTANCX)GA. 


Aifairs  now  looked  hopeful  in  the 
extreme  for  the  National  arms.  There 
was  great  joy  all  over  the  North,  when 
it  became  known  that  Chattanooga  was 
occupied.  There  was  corresponding  de- 
pression of  spirit  in  the  South.  From 
the  Confederate  standpoint,  the  outlook 
now  seemed  gloomy  enough.  Pember- 
ton had  quite  recently  surrendered  a 
lai'ge  army  at  Vicksburg.  Gardner  had 
surrendered  another  army  at  Port  Hud- 
son. Lee  had  been  compelled  to  fall 
back  from  Pennsylvania,  after  sustain- 
ing heavy  losses.  And  now  Bragg, 
without  striking  a blow  for  its  defense, 
had  abandoned  Chattanooga. 

To  the  army  of  the  Cumberland  there 
had  now  arrived  a great  opportunity. 
A concentrated  effort  and  a well-di- 
rected blow  might  be  sufficient  to  crush, 
or  drive  into  helpless  retreat,  the  Con- 
federate army.  The  star  of  Rosecranz 
was  still  in  the  ascendant.  Nothing 
had  yet  happened  to  tarnish  the  glory 
which  he  had  won  at  Murfreesboro.  It 
w^as  not  doubted — there  was  no  reason 
why  it  should  be  doubted — that  the 
conqueror  at  Murfreesboro  M^ould  add 
to  his  laui*els  by  a greater  and  more 
decisive  victory  at  Chattanooga.  Let 
us  see  how  matters  turned  out. 

It  was  the  conviction  of  Rosecranz 
that  Bragg  was  in  full  retreat  towards 
Rome.  Impressed  with  this  belief,  and 
not  yet  informed  of  the  fact  that  Long- 
street  was  rapidly  coming  up  to  swell 
the  forces  of  his  antagonist,  Rosecranz, 
instead  of  concentrating  his  army  at 
Chattanooga,  scattered  them  over  a 
wide  surface  of  rough,  broken  country. 
Crittenden  was  ordered  to  leave  one 


brigade  at  Chattanooga,  as  a garrison, 
and  to  move  with  the  rest  as  far  as 
Ringgold;  Thomas  was  to  march  on 
Lafayette ; while  McCook  was  to  move 
in  the  direction  of  Alpine  and  Summer 
Creek.  These  movements  were  prompt- 
ly made;  and  when,  on  the  12th,  sep. 
it  became  positively  known  that  *2. 
Bragg  was  not  retreating  but,  on  the 
contrary,  concentrating  in  great  force 
at  Lafayette,  and  preparing  to  strike  a 
decisive  blow,  the  National  army  was 
scattered  over  an  immense  space  of 
rough,  broken  country,  the  line  extend- 
ing from  the  east  side  of  Chickamauga 
Creek  to  Alpine — a distance  of  fifty- 
seven  miles  from  flank  to  flank.  Rose- 
cranz, in  truth,  was  completely  deceived 
as  to  the  movements  and  intentions  of 
his  antagonist.  While,  on  the  9th,  he 
was  giving  orders  for  pursuit,  Bragg 
was  actually  preparing  to  assail  Thomas 
in  McLemore’s  Cove ; and  but  for  mis- 
understandings among  the  Confederate 
officers,  the  battle  might  have  been  pre- 
cipitated, and  serious  detriment  might 
have  resulted  to  the  National  army. 
It  is  difficult  to  acquit  Rosecranz  of 
blame  in  this  matter.  He  was  certainly 
found  wanting  in  vigilance.  Before 
attempting  the  hazardous  experiment 
of  so  extending  his  line,  and  thus  ren- 
dering himself  incapable,  at  any  one 
point,  of  resisting  a vigorous  attack,  he 
ought,  by  a more  thorough  reconnois- 
sance,  to  have  been  more  accurately  in- 
formed of  the  whereabouts  of  the  ene- 
my. The  truth  seems  to  be  that,  in 
his  excessive  desire  to  win  renown  by 
capturing  his  foe,  or  driving  him  in 
confusion  to  the  gulf,  the  National 


watkps-smMJL 


DIAGRAIVl  1. 


DIAGRAMS  SHOWING  THE  POSITIONS  OF  THE  ARMIES  AT  THE  BATTLES  OF 
CHICKAMAUGA  AND  MISSIONARY  RIDGE. 


'‘THE  RIVER  OF  DEATH,” 


549 


commander  partially  lost  his  head.  It 
was  the  opinion  of  more  than  one  of 
his  officers  that  the  general-in-chief  was 
in  error.  As  early  as  the  11th,  a negi*o 
had  reported  to  Wood  that  ^Hhe  balk 
of  the  rebel  army,  under  Bragg  in  per- 
son, was  at  Lee  and  Gordon’s  Mills.” 
Subsequent  developments,  according  to 
Wood,  proved  that  report  to  be  singu- 
larly correct.  In  a letter  to  Thomas, 
Negley  remarks  that  he  is  “confident 
that  Bosecranz  is  totally  misinformed 
as  to  the  character  of  the  country,'  and 
the  position,  force  and  intentions  of  the 
enemy.” 

If  Rosecranz  was  to  blame  for  the 
disposition  he  made  of  his  troops,  Bragg 
was  even  more  to  blame  for  not  seizing 
the  opportunity  which  Rosecranz  had 
created  for  him.  With  the  forces  at 
his  disposal,  he  might  easily  have 
crushed  Thomas,  Crittenden  and  Mc- 
Cook in  rapid  succession ; and,  having 
done  so,  he  could  then  have  moved 
along  the  Cumberland,  and  fallen,  like 
a destroying  angel,  on  Burnside’s  rear’ 
The  opportunity  presented  to  Bragg 
was  similar  to  that  which  Napoleon, 
by  protracted  and  skilful  manoeuvring, 
secured  at  Marengo.  Had  Bragg  been  a. 
Napoleon,  he  would  have  destroyed  the 
army  of  the  Cumberland.  Fully  alive 
to  the  peril  of  the  situation,  Rosecranz 
ordered  a concentration  of  his  forces. 
For  six  days,  Bragg  remained  compara- 
tively inactive.  W hen  the  six  days  were 
ended,  his  opportunity  was  gone  for- 
ever ; for  Rosecranz  had  already  brought 
his  scattered  forces  within  supporting 
Sep.  distance  of  each  other;  and  on 
18.  the  night  of  Friday,  the  18th, 


the  concentration  was  completed,  and 
the  army  well  in  hand. 

The  two  armies  were  now  confronting 
each  other  on  the  opposite  banks  of  the 
Chickamauga — a stream  which,  rising 
at  the  junction  of  Missionary  Ridge  and 
Pigeon  Mountain,  at  the  southern  ex- 
tremity of  McLemore’s  Cove,  flows  in 
a northern  direction  down  the  cove  by 
Crawfish  Spring.  At  Lee  and  Gordon’s 
Mills,  it  reaches  the  Lafayette  and  Chat- 
tanooga Road  Further  on,  it  joins  the 
main  creek,  and  empties  into  the  beau- 
tiful Tennessee,  a little  above  Chatta- 
nooga. Chickamauga,  in  the  Indian 
tongue,  means  “The  River  of  Death” — 
a name  which  was  soon  to  be  literally 
and  terribly  appropriate. 

Rosecranz  was  on  the  west  bank  of  the 
stream.  His  right  was  no  longer  at  Mc- 
Lemore’s Cove,  but  where  his  left  had 
been,  at  Lee  and  Gordon’s  Mills.  His 
left  was  near  the  road  across  from  Ross- 
ville.  His  reserves  were  in  the  rear  of  the 
right.  In  this  position,  as  will  be  seen 
by  a reference  to  the  map,  he  covered 
Chattanooga.  It  was  Bragg’s  inten- 
tion, by  a flanking  movement,  to  inter- 
pose between  the  National  left  and  Chat- 
tanooga. In  order,  however,  to  deceive 
his  antagonist,  he  had  sent  Wheeler, 
with  his  cavalry,  to  press  the  National 
right.  It  deserves  to  be  borne  in  mind, 
at  this  stage,  that  Bragg  had  been  great- 
ly reinforced.  Buckner  had  come  up 
from  East  Tennessee,  with  the  rem- 
nants of  the  army  of  the  Mississippi ; 
and  the  advance  of  Longstreet’s  corps, 
under  Hood,  was  already  on  the  field. 

The  morning  of  the  19th  was  gep, 
bright  and  beautiful.  A crisp, 


•J62 


.50 


CHICKAMAUGA  AND  CHATTANOOGA. 


white  frost  had  collected  on  the  grass, 
but  it  soon  disappeared,  under  the  genial 
heat  of  the  September  sun.  Soon  as  the 
morning  mist  was  dispersed,  the  rival 
hosts  were  ready  for  battle.  McCook 
was  in  command  on  the  National  right; 
Crittenden  was  in  the  centre;  Thomas 
was  on  the  left.  During  the  night, 
Bragg  had  contrived  to  push  across  the 
creek  some  30,000  men.  His  army  was 
arranged  in  two  corps,  the  right  com- 
manded by  Polk  and  the  left  by  Hood, 
Longstreet  not  yet  having  arrived  in 
person.  It  was  Bragg’s  intention  to 
strike  and  bring  on  a battle.  It  was 
Thomas,  however,  who  had  the  honor 
of  striking  the  first  blow.  It  was  now 
about  ten  o’clock.  Thomas,  on  being 
Informed  by  Colonel  D.  McCook  that  a 
Confederate  brigade  was  on  the  west 
side  of  the  Chickamauga,  and  appa- 
rently alone,  and  that  as  Reed’s  Bridge 
behind  them  was  destroyed,  he  thought 
they  might  be  easily  captured.  Thomas 
ordered  General  Brannan  to  advance, 
with  his  brigades,  on  the  road  to  Reed’s 
Bridge,  while  Baird  was  to  throw  for- 
ward the  right  of  his  division  on  the 
road  to  Alexander’s  Bridge.  It  was 
expected  that,  by  this  double  move- 
ment, the  isolated  brigade  would  be  cap- 
tured. The  battle  commenced  at  once. 

It  was  soon  discovered  that  w^hat 
seemed  a solitary  brigade  was  really  the 
advance  of  the  opposing  army.  Brannan 
soon  became  engaged  with  Forrest’s  cav- 
ed ry,  which  was  strongly  supported  by 
two  infantry  brigades,  from  Walker’s 
column.  Baird,  having  come  to  the  aid 
of  Brannan,,  the  Confederates,  after  a 
terrible  struggle^  were  driven  back  with 


great  loss.  Riddle’s  division  w^as  now 
thrown  into  the  fight ; and  the  Nation- 
als, in  their  turn,  were  driven  back, 
losing  two  batteries  and  over  500  pris- 
oners. In  this  charge.  Lieutenant  Van 
Pelt,  who  commanded  one  of  the  bat- 
teries, died  gloriously  by  the  side  of 
his  guns,  resisting  the  enemy  to  the 
last.  Thomas  now  threw  into  the  fight 
the  division  of  Reynolds;  McCook 
pushed  forward  the  division  of  John- 
son ; and  Crittenden  came  to  the  res- 
cue, with  Palmer’s  division,  which  took 
position  on  Baird’s  right.  The  Nation- 
als, tlius  strengthened,  and  outnumber- 
ing and  outflanking  the  Confederates, 
fell  upon  them  with  great  fury,  driving 
them  back  in  disorder  for  a full  mile 
and  a half,  on  their  reserves  near  the 
creek.  By  this  charge,  one  of  the  lost 
batteries  was  recovered.  It  was  now^ 
near  four  o’clock  in  the  afternoon. 
There  was  a lull  in  the  battle  for  about 
an  hour.  In  the  interval,  Brannan  and 
Baird  re-formed  their  shattered  col- 
umns, and  took  a commanding  position 
between  McDaniel’s  House  and  Reed’s 
Bridge.  The  battle  was  resumed  at 
five  o’clock.  The  divisions  of  Liddle 
and  Gist  fell  with  great  weight  and 
with  more  than  ordinary  fury  on  Rey- 
nolds’ right;  and,  while  Thomas  was 
endeavoring  to  concentrate  his  forces, 
they  fell  with  equal  weight  and  fury 
on  Johnson,  Baird  and  Van  Cleve. 
Thomas,  at  this  crisis,  was  in  great 
peril.  His  men  were  falling  back  in 
the  wildest  confusion.  At  this  critical 
moment,  Hazen,  who  covered  himself 
with  glory,  and  saved  the  day  at  Mur- 
freesboro, came  gallantly  to  the  rescue. 


ORDER  OF  BATTLE— SECOND  DAY. 


551 


He  had  been  sent  back  to  the  Rossville 
Road  to  take  charge  of  a park  of  artil- 
lery, consisting  of  four  batteries,  twenty- 
one  guns  in  all.  These,  it  appears,  had 
l)een  left  without  guards.  Hazen  had 
arrived  in  time,  not  only  to  save  the 
guns,  blit  to  turn  them  to  good  account. 
They  were  already  in  position,  on  a 
commanding  ridge,  and  manned  with 
such  infantry  supports  as  he  could  has- 
tily collect,  when  the  Nationals  fell 
back,  closely  pursued  by  the  victorious 
Confederates.  Hazen  made  no  haste  to 
use  his  guns  until  the  pursuers  were 
within  easy  range.  As  soon,  however, 
as  they  came  fully  up,  he  opened  upon 
them  a tremendous  fire.  The  effect  was 
terrific.  Checked  in  full  career,  and 
torn  to  pieces  by  the  merciless  missiles, 
the  Confederates,  leaving  their  com- 
i-ades  in  slaughtered  heaps  on  the 
ground  behind  them,  fell  back  towards 
the  creek  in  confusion  and  despair. 
Thanks  to  Hazen’s  prompt  interference, 
the  day  was  saved  on  the  left.  A charge 
was  made,  also,  by  General  Cleburne, 
fall  on  Johnson’s  front,  about  the  hour 
of  sunset;  but  he  failed  to  make  any 
impression  on  the  National  lines. 

Although  the  fighting  had  been  main- 
ly on  the  left,  the  right  had  not  re- 
mained wholly  unattacked.  From  • an 
early  hour,  there  had  been  lively  artil- 
lery firing  on  both  sides.  While  the  day 
was  yet  young,  a vigorous  attack  was 
made  by  three  Confederate  brigades,  in 
rapid  succession ; and  one  of  the  Na- 
tional batteries  was  captured.  Tlie  as- 
sailants, however,  were  in  turn  driven 
back,  and  the  guns  recoverei  Later 
in  the  day,  about  three  o’clock.  Hood 


threw  two  of  his  divisions  heavily  on 
Davis,  of  McCook’s  corps.  So  irresist- 
ible was  the  attack  that  Davis  was 
driven  back;  and  his  Indiana  battery 
fell  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy.  The 
triumph  of  Hood’s  men,  however,  was 
but  short-lived ; for  Bradley’s  brigade, 
of  Sheridan’s  division,  immediately  came 
up  and  joined  Davis.  A countercharge 
was  made,  and  with  complete  success. 
The  Confederates  were  driven  back  in 
disorder ; a large  number  of  them  were 
made  prisoners ; and  the  lost  battery  was 
recovered.  When  night  came  the  bat- 
tle ceased,  with  apparent  advantage  to 
the  National  army. 

The  night  was  spent  by  both  armies 
in  vigorous  preparations  for  a renewal 
of  the  conflict  in  the  morning.  As  soon 
as  the  engagement  closed,  Bragg  sum- 
moned his  generals  around  him ; and, 
under  the  light  of  the  blazing  camp- 
fire, he  gave  them  their  instructions. 
At  midnight,  Longstreet  arrived  in  per- 
son at  headquarters,  and  the  remainder 
of  his  troops  was  fast  coming  up.  Bragg 
divided  his  army,  as  he  had  done  on 
the  previous  day,  into  two  wings.  The 
right,  as  before,  remained  under  the 
command  of  General  Polk ; but  General 
Longstreet  assumed  command  on  the 
left.  The  right  wing  was  composed 
of  Hill’s  corps  of  two  divisions,  under 
Cleburne  and  Breckenridge ; with  the 
division  of  Cheatham,  of  Polk’s  c )ips, 
and  the  division  of  W.  H.  T.  Walker. 
The  left  was  composed  of  the  divisions 
of  Stewart,  Preston  and  Johnston,  of 
Buckner’s  corps;  with  Hindman’s,  of 
Polk’s  corps;  and  Benning’s  and  Lane’s 
and  Robertson’s  brigades,  of  Hood’s  di- 


552 


CHICKAMAtJGA  AND  CHATTANOOGA. 


vision;  and  Kershaw’s  and  Humphrey’s, 
of  McLaws’  division.  The  front  line 
of  the  right  wing  consisted  of  three  di- 
visions— Breckenridge’s,  Cleburne’s,  and 
Cheatham’s — which  were  posted  from 
right  to  left,  in  the  order  named.  Walk- 
er’s division  was  in  reserve.  The  line 
of  the  left  wing  was  composed  of  Stew- 
art’s, Hood’s,  Hindman’s,  and  Preston’s 
divisions,  from  right  to  left,  in  the 
order  named.  Rosecranz  had  also  gath- 
ered his  corps  commanders  around  him. 
After  hearing  their  reports,  he  ordered 
General  Negley,  who  had  come  down 
from  the  extreme  right,  to  report  to 
General  Thomas  early  in  the  morning. 
McCook  was  ordered  to  replace  Negley’s 
troops  by  one  of  his  own  divisions,  and 
to  close  up  well  on  Thomas.  Critten- 
den was  to  hold  his  two  divisions  in 
reserve,  and  in  the  rear  of  the  centre. 
Thomas  remained  on  the  left,  reinforced 
by  the  two  divisions  of  Johnson  and 
Palmer,  with  Brannan  and  Negley  in 
I'eserve. 

On  Sunday,  the  20th  of  Septeinbei*, 
8ep.  the  blood-red  sun  rose  on  the 
20.  valley  of  the  Chickamauga,  gild- 
ing with  roseate  hues  the  summits  of 
the  suri-ounding  hills,  an  impenetrable 
mist  hovered  low  on  the  ground  be- 
tween the  two  armies ; and  in  the  air 
there  was  a breathless  stillness  which 
well  became  the  day  of  sacred  rest,  but 
which  contrasted  strangely  with  the 
approaching  din  and  tumult  and  carnage 
of  war.  It  had  been  Bragg’s  intention 
to  resume  the  battle  at  earliest  dawn  ; 
and  instructions  to  that  effect  had  been 
given  accordingly.  Polk  was  to  strike 
the  National  left;  and  the  attack  was 


to  be  followed  up  in  rapid  succession 
all  along  the  line.  “The  left  wing,” 
says  Bragg  in  his  report,  “ was  to  await 
the  attack  by  the  right,  and  take  it  up 
promptly  when  made,  and  the  whole 
line  was  then  to  be  pushed  vigorously 
and  persistently  against  the  enemy 
throughout  its  extent.”  Bragg  was  in 
the  saddle  before  daybreak — waiting 
anxiously  for  the  sound  of  Polk’s  guns. 
But  one  hour  and  another  passed ; and 
the  battle  was  not  yet  commenced.  This 
delay  has  been  variously  explained.  It 
had  been  arranged  that  Hill  should 
make  the  first  onset ; but  that  general, 
it  is  said,  was  so  far  in  the  rear  at  Ted- 
ford’s  Ford,  that  Polk’s  order  did  not 
reach  him  until  long  after  sunrise.  An- 
other explanation  is  that,  owing  to  a 
want  of  precaution,  a portion  of  the 
Confederate  left  wing,  amounting  to  a 
whole  division,  had  been  formed  in 
front  of  Polk’s  line,  iind  that  if  the  at- 
tack had  been  made  at  the  time  ap- 
pointed, that  division  must  have  been 
slaughtered.  Whatever  the  cause,  the 
delay  was  a grievoiis  disappointment  to 
General  Bragg.  His  indignation  knew 
no  bounds,  when  he  learned  of  the 
coolness  and  indifference  manifested  by 
Polk.  Bragg’s  staff-officer,  who  had  beyn 
sent  to  ascertain  the  cause  of  the  delay, 
found  Polk  and  his  officers  brilliantly 
attired  and  seated  at  a comfortable 
breakfast.  “I  have  ordered  Hill  to 
open  the  action,”  said  Polk,  “and  I am 
waiting  to  hear  the  sound  of  his  guns. 
Ho  tell  General  Bragg,”  he  added, 
with  great  emotion,  “that  my  heart 
is  overflowing  with  anxiety  for  the 
1 attack — overflowing  with  anxiety,  sir.” 


A TEKRIFIC  STRUGGLE. 


553 


What. was  a disappointment  and  a posi- 
tive. loss  to  Bragg  was  a gain — a 
great  gain  to  Bosecranz.  His  men  bad 
been  working  like  beavers  all  night 
through.  The  lines  had  been  drawn 
closer  together  than  on  the  previous 
day.  Breast-works  and  abatis  had  been 
constructed  in  their  front.  Rosecranz, 
however,  was  not  fully  prepared  to 
receive  the  onset  of  the  enemy.  His 
troops  were  not  sufficiently  concentra- 
ted ; and  Thomas,  on  whom  it  was  all 
but  certain  the  weight  of  the  battle 
would  fall,  not  yet  joined  by  Negley, 
was  comparatively  weak.  The  delay 
gave  the  National  commander  time  to 
perfect  his  arrangements.  When  the 
fog  lifted,  and  the  enemy  commenced 
his  advance,  Rosecranz  was  ready. 

It  was  now  between  nine  and  ten 
o’clock.  All  of  a sudden,  the  thunder 
of  artillery  was  heard  on  the  extreme 
left.  With  their  usual  tactics,  the  Con- 
federates did  not  feel  their  way  towards 
the  National  position,  but,  with  concen- 
trated strength,  fell  with  overwhelming 
weight  on  the  left  which,  as  we  have 
seen,  was  held  by  Thomas.  The  attack 
was  made  by  Breckenridge’s  division, 
of  Hill’s  corps,  which  moved  forward 
in  splendid  style,  in  order  as  perfect  as 
if  on  dress  parade,  and  was  followed 
closely  by  a magnificent  battery  of  ar- 
tillery. Breckenridge  was  accompanied 
by  Cleburne,  who  advanced  on  his  left, 
and  more  towards  the  National  centre. 
Scarcely  had  the  onward  movement  of 
the  Confederates  commenced,  when  the 
din  of  battle  became  terrific.  The  sharp 
rattle  of  musketry,  mingling  with  the 
joar  of  artillery,  gaye  intensity  to  the ; 


war  thunder  which  echoed  through  the 
forest.  Breckenridge  swung  around  so 
as  to  flank  Thomas’  left.  Cleburne 
moved  directly  against  the  breast- works 
in  Thomas’  front.  As  the  first  lines  of 
the  enemy  approached  the  works,  they 
were  received  by  a withering  fire.  The 
breast-works  literally  blazed.  It  was 
one  continuous,  incessant  flame,  out  of 
which  rushed  death-dealing  volleys  on 
the  advancing  foe.  The  Confederates, 
however,  seemed  rather  to  court  death 
than  to  fear  danger.  On  and  up  against 
the  tempest  of  lead  and  iron  they 
moved  with  desperate  valor.  Line  after 
line  was  mowed  down,  as  it  advanced. 
Still,  the  tide  rolled  on.  The  broken 
heads  of  columns  were  continually  re- 
formed from  the  ranks  in  the  rear;  and 
the  brave  Confederates,  as  if  heedless 
of  death,  trampling  on  the  bodies  of 
their  dead  or  dying  companions,  pressed 
on  towards  the  breast-works.  It  seemed 
as  if  they  were  determined  to  quench 
that  volcano  with  human  blood,  and  to 
choke  it  with  living  victims.”  For  a time 
it  seemed  as  if  nothing  could  check  their 
advance.  Cleburne  was  gaining  ground 
in  front ; and  Breckenridge  was  making 
visible  progress  against  the  National 
left.  So  overwhelming  was  the  strength, 
and  so  vis^orous  were  the  onsets  of  the 
enemy,  that  Thomas  was  under  the  ne- 
cessity of  making  repeated  calls  to  Rose- 
cranz for  help. 

It  was  now  about  noon.  Repeat- 
edly held  in  check,  and  sometimes  even 
driven  back,  the  Confederates  contrived 
again  and  again  to  re-form  and  renew 
the  attack.  . Despite  the  terrific  Are  to 
which  they  were  exposed,  and  the  awful 


554 


CHICKAMAUGA  AND  CHATTANOOGA. 


i.'arnage  which  they  witnessed  as  they 
advanced,  the  dark  gray  masses  were 
gradually  closing  on  the  National  left. 
It  was  Bragg’s  determination  that  that 
wing  should  be  turned — it  was  the  key 
of  the  position;  and,  to  give  effect  to 
that  determination,  Breckenridge,  rein- 
forced by  division  after  division,  exer- 
cised all  his  skill,  and  strained  to  the 
utmost  all  his  energies.  Reinforcements 
coming  up  on  both  sides,  the  battle 
raged  with  tremendous  fury.  "Victory 
leaned  now  to  the  one  side  and  now  to 
the  other.  It  was  doubtful  with  whom 
the  palm  should  remain.  In  one  of 
those  fierce  encounters,  when  Vande- 
ver’s  brigade,  of  Brannan’s  division, 
and  a portion  of  Stanley’s,  of  Wood’s 
division,  came  up  and  strengthened  the 
wavering  line  on  the  extreme  left, 
Breckenridge,  in  what  seemed  a mo- 
ment of  triumph,  was  thrown  back  in 
great  confusion,  with  the  loss  of  Gen- 
eral Helmond  Desher,  killed ; General 
D.  Adams,  at  the  same  time,  being  se- 
verely, and  Major  Graves,  chief  of  artil- 
lery, mortally  wounded.  Breckenridge 
rallied  again  on  a commanding  ridge ; 
and  having  got  his  guns  into  position, 
and  been  reinforced  by  Walker  and 
Cheatham,  as  well  as  by  Cleburne,  he 
resumed  and  maintained  the  fight  with 
the  energy  of  despair.  Thomas’  left 
showed  signs  of  yielding ; but,  aided  by 
his  gallant  lieutenants,  he  got  his  men 
well  together  again  in  a new  position — 
his  right  on  Missionary  Ridge,  his  left 
on  an  eminence  by  the  Lafayette  Road — 
where  they  stdbd  like  a wall  of  iron. 

At  this  supreme  crisis  in  the  progress 
of  the  fight,  occurred  one  of  those  mis- 


haps, which  are  all  the  more  liable  to 
prove  disastrous,  because  they  cannot 
be  foreseen  or  provided  against,  and 
which,  when  they  do  occur,  sometimes 
more  than  neutralize  all  the  skill  of 
the  general  and  all  the  bravery  of  the 
troops.  Thomas,  hard  pressed,  was 
still  asking  for  reinforcements.  Negley 
had  been  ordered  forward  to  his  aid. 
So,  too,  had  Van  Cleve.  Rosecranz,  see- 
ing that  the  left  centre  was  in  peril, 
ordered  Wood  to  move  towards  the 
left  and  close  in  upon  Reynolds ; Davis 
and  Sheridan  were  to  move  in  the  same 
direction,  so  as  to  prevent  a break  in 
the  line.  It  so  happened,  however, 
that  Brannan  w*as  en  echelon^  slightly 
in  the  rear  of  Reynolds’  right;  and 
Wood,  in  carrying  out  the  orders,  as 
he  understood  them,  moved  by  Bran- 
nan’s  rear,  so  as  to  reach  Reynolds.  It 
was  a grievous,  and,  as  it  proved,  irre- 
parable blunder.  A gap  was  thus  cre- 
ated ; quick  as  lightning,  Longstreet, 
with  his  experienced  eye,  discovered 
his  opportunity.  With  the  swiftness  of 
thought,  and  with  the  fury  of  a thun- 
derbolt, Hood’s  division  was  thrown 
into  the  fatal  opening;  and,  striking 
right  and  left,  it  cut  the  National  army 
in  two.  It  was  in  vain  that  Davis,  of 
McCook’s  corps,  tried  to  close  in  and 
resist  the  advance  of  the  enemy.  His 
division  was  literally  cut  to  pieces. 
Palmer  and  Van  Cleve,  of  Crittenden’s 
corps,  shared  a similar  fate.  Sheridan, 
whose  position  was  to  the  right  of  Davis, 
was  left  alone,  and,  for  a time,  made  a 
gallant  fight.  Brave  as  he  was,  how: 
ever,  Sheridan  could  not  peilorm  im- 
possibilities. He,  too,  was  compelled 


«THE  ROCK  OF  CHICKAMAUGA.^ 


555 


to  give  way.  The  National  right  and 
centre,  shattered  to  fragments,  were 
soon  flying  in  wild  confusion  towards 
Rossville,  and  onwards  to  Chattanooga. 
It  seemed  a total  rout.  To  some  who 
were  present,  it  recalled  the  memory  of 
the  first  battle  of  Bull  Bun.  The  road 
to  Bossville  and  Chattanooga  presented 
a picture  not  unlike  that  which,  on  that 
fatal  21st  of  July,  was  witnessed  on  the 
road  to  Centreville  and  Washington. 
The  field  was  covered  with  thousands 
of  dead  and  dying  men ; and  all  along 
the  line  of  retreat,  artillery,  caissons, 
wagons,  horses,  mules,  and  a motley 
multitude  of  fugitives  were  mingled  to- 
gether in  inextricable  confusion.  Pow- 
erless to  resist  the  refluent  tide,  Bose- 
cranz,  Crittenden,  McCook,  and  most 
of  their  ofiicers  were  borne  backwards 
towards  Bossville.  In  front  of  the  gap 
in  Missionary  Bidge,  through  which 
passes  the  road  to  Bossville — Sheridan 
and  Davis  having  come  up  by  the  Dry 
Valley  Boad — McCook  rallied  his  shat- 
tered corps,  and  presented  a change  of 
front,  determined,  at  all  hazai’ds,  to  re- 
sist the  further  advance  of  the  enemy. 
Meanwhile,  Thomas  and  his  glorious 
left  wing,  alone  and  unaided  on  the  bat- 
tle field,  were  resisting  the  accumulated 
weight  and  fierce  onsets  of  the  enemy. 

Never,  perhaps,  in  the  history  of  war, 
did  more  depend  on  the  firmness  of  one 
individual  will,  than  now  depended  on 
the  will  of  General  Thomas.  Weak- 
ness, or  want  of  decision  on  his  part, 
at  this  trying  crisis,  would  most  cer- 
tainly have  brought  about  a terrible 
National  disaster;  and  Chickamauga 
would  have  been  remembered  with  | 


shame,  regret  and  sorrow.  Thomas, 
however,  was  not  found  wanting.  His 
clear  vision,  his  caution,  his  decisive 
purpose,  his  strong  will,  were  all  to 
find  admirable  illustration.  It  was  a 
fortunate  circumstance  that  there  was 
a perfect  rapport  between  him  and  his 
men,  from  the  division  and  bri^ade-ofii- 
cers  down  to  the  humblest  soldier  in 
the  ranks.  Thomas  could  trust  them ; 
they  had  perfect  faith  and  confidence  in 
him.  It  was  not  till  towards  the  close 
of  the  day’s  fighting,  that  the  commander 
of  the  left  wing  of  the  National  army 
was  made  aware  of  the  disaster  which 
had  befallen  the  centre  and  right.  Fully 
alive,  however,  to  the  difficulties  of  his 
own  position,. he  was  waiting  anxiously 
for  the  arrival  of  Sheridan,  whose  sup- 
port had  been  promised  him,  when 
Wood  came  up  and  took  position  on 
the  left  of  Bran  nan.  Thomas  now  with- 
drew from  his  breast- works,  and  con- 
centrated his  command  on  a slope  of 
Missionary  Bidge,  his  line  assuming  the 
form  of  a crescent,  the  flanks  resting  on 
the  lower  spurs  of  the  mountain.  This 
new  position  was  a little  to  the  west  of 
the  Bossville  Boad,  and  was  well  forti- 
fied with  ai’tillery.  Wood  had  scarcely 
had  time  to  arrange  his  troops  in  the 
position  assigned  them,  when  the  Con- 
federates fell  upon  Thomas’  line  with 
redoubled  energy,  Polk  on  his  centre 
and  left,  and  Longstreet  on  his  right. 
Thomas,  however,  was  not  to  be  driven 
from  his  position,  nor  was  his  line  to  be 
broken.  Like  a rock  he  stood,  firm 
and  invincible,  the  forces  of  the  enemy, 
like  surging  billows,  dashing  themselves 
to  pieces  at  his  feet. 


556 


CHIOKAMAUGA  AND  CHATTANOOGA. 


It  was  now  about  half-past  three 
o’clock.  Longstreet,  impatient  of  resist- 
ance, and  eager  for  an  opportunity  to 
precipitate  the  final  issue,  had  discov- 
ered an  opening  in  the  hills,  on  Thomas’ 
right,  communicating  with  a gorge  di- 
rectly in  his  rear.  Into  this  opening 
he  was  already  pouring  his  massive  col- 
umns. It  was,  indeed,  a critical  moment. 
It  seemed  as  if  all  were  lost.  Fully 
turned  in  front  and  flank,  the  National 
line  was  now  to  be  attacked  heavily 
in  the  rear.  Destruction  or  surrender 
seemed  to  be  the  only  alternatives.  In 
the  moment  of  agony,  relief  came.  Gen- 
eral Gordon  Granger,  who  had  heard 
the  roar  of  artillery  in  the  direction  in 
which  he  knew  Thomas  to  be  posted, 
hurried  forward  from  Rossville,  with- 
out orders,  at  the  head  of  Steadman’s  di- 
vision. As  soon  as  he  arrived  on  the 
held,  Thomas  directed  him  to  the  point 
of  danger.  Steadman  was  quickly  on 
the  crest  of  the  hill,  with  a battery  of 
six  guns,  and  in  perfect  command  of  the 
gorge.  It  was  not  a moment  too  soon. 
Two  divisions,  of  Longstreet’s  corps, 
were  pressing  forward  with  all  their 
might.  They  were  already  ascending 
the  southern  slope  of  the  ridge,  and 
only  a few  yards  distant  from  the  newly- 
erected  battery.  Opening  a well-di- 
I'ected  Are,  and  at  the  same  time  hurling 
against  them  the  brigades  of  Whitta- 
ker and  Mitchell,  himself  heading  the 
charge,  Steadman  drove  the  too-daring 
Confederates  down  the  ridge  and  back 
into  the  gorge,  with  terrible  slaughter. 
Steadman  had  his  horse  killed  under 
him;  and  he  was  himself  badly  injured 
by  a fall.  But  he  had  saved  Thomas 


from  destruction.  It  was  now  sunset; 
and  the  attack  in  this  direction  was  not 
repeated. 

While  this  was  going  on  in  the  rear, 
Thomas  was  hotly  engaged  by  the  Con- 
federates, both  on  front  and  flank.  In 
vain  did  Polk  dash  against  his  centre 
and  left.  In  vain  did  Longstreet  hurl 
his  well-tried  and  war-hardened  vet- 
erans on  his  right.  “ The  Bock  of  Chick- 
amauga” — the  name  which  Thomas 
that  day  won — was  not  to  be  moved. 
When  night  fell,  and  the  battle  was 
ended,  his  line  was  unbroken,  his  posi- 
tion unmoved.  Leaving  his  dead  and 
wounded  in  the  field,  Thomas,  in  obe- 
dience to  orders  from  Rosecranz,  who 
was  at  Chattanooga,  fell  back  to  Ross- 
ville, and  took  command  of  all  the 
forces.  His  ammunition  was  all  but 
exhausted.  Bi*agg  did  not  pursue.  On 
the  night  of  the  following  da}^  the 
entire  National  army  was  withdrawn 
into  the  defenses,  in  front  of  Chatta- 
noosra. 

o 

Such  was  the  battle  of  Chickamauga. 
It  was  a Confederate  victory;  but  it 
was  barren  of  results.  Chattanooga 
had  not  been  recovered.  The  losses 
on  both  sides  were  heavy.  The  Na- 
tionals lost  about  16,350  men,  and  51 
guns.  The  Confederate  loss  was  about 
18,000.  Chickamauga  was  a battle 
almost  without  a plan.  It  resulted  to 
the  credit  of  neither  of  the  generals-in- 
chief.  It  made  an  end  of  General  Rose- 
cranz ; and  it  nearly  ruined  Bragg.  It 
had  but  one  hero ; and  that  was  Gen- 
eral Thomas.  “ The  Rock  of  Chicka- 
mauga ” will  live  forever  in  American 
history. 


GRANT  IN  COMMAND. 


557 


After  the  battle  of  Chickamanga, 
Rosecranz  proceeded  to  throw  up  forti- 
fications around  Chattanooga.  In  this 
work,  he  found  an  able  and  efficient 
assistant  in  General  James  St.  Clair 
Morton.  Within  twenty-four  hours 
after  falling  back  from  Rossville,  he 
was  strongly  entrenched — so  strongly 
that  Bragg  could  not,  with  safety, 
venture  upon  an  offensive  movement. 
Bragg,  in  truth,  was  in  great  trouble. 
He  felt  bitter  disappointment  because 
the  late  battle  had  not  resulted  in  more 
complete  success.  He  was  dissatisfied 
with  the  conduct  of  several  of  his  offi- 
cers. He  had  not  lost  the  confidence  of 
Jefferson  Davis;  but  with  the  authori- 
ties at  Richmond  generally,  he  was  in 
bad  odor.  He  was  expected  by  them 
to  perform  impossibilities.  The  sug- 
gestions offered  him  were  as  numerous 
as  they  were  absurd.  Bragg,  however, 
had  will  enough  to  abide  by  his  own 
counsel,  and  sense  enough  to  attempt 
the  one  thing  which  was  practicable. 
If  he  could  not  force  his  way  into  Chat- 
tanooga, he  might  at  least  starve  the 
army  of  the  Cumberland  into  submis- 
sion or  retreat. 

With  this  end  in  view,  the  Confed- 
erate general  drew  a cordon  around  the 
city,  and  interrupted  or  cut  off  the  va- 
rious lines  of  communication.  He  made 
himself  master  of  the  south  bank  of 
the  Tennessee,  opposite  Mocassin  Point, 
and  then  broke  the  line  of  communica- 
tion between  Chattanooga  and  Bridge- 
port. He  destroyed  the  bridge  at  the 
latter  place,  and  thus  severed  the  com- 
munication with  Nashville,  the  base  of 
supplies.  He  had,  also,  entire  command 


of  the  river.  Winter  was  rapidly  ap- 
proaching; and  heavy  rains  had  already 
deluged  the  country,  making  the  roads 
impassable.  There  was  left  but  one 
way  by  which  the  wagon-trains,  which 
supplied  Rosecranz’  army,  could  move ; 
and  that  was  a circuitous  route  along 
the  bottom-land  of  the  Tennessee  and 
Sequatchie  Valleys,  and  over  the  Wal- 
dron Ridge.  On  this  route,  the  supply- 
trains  were  almost  entirely  at  the  mercy 
of  the  Confederate  cavalry.  In  one  day, 
Bragg’s  troopers  destroyed  about  300 
wagons,  and  killed  or  captured  some 
1800  mules.  It  was  not  long  until  dis- 
tress began  to  reveal  itself  in  the  Na- 
tional army.  The  animals  died  in  large 
numbers  from  sheer  starvation.  Their 
dead  bodies  lined  the  roadsides;  and 
the  soldiers,  unable  to  work  their  way 
through  the  deep  mud,  used  them  as 
they  would  have  used  stepping-stones. 
It  was  calculated  that  at  least  10,000 
horses  and  mules  had  perished  in  sup- 
plying half  rations  to  the  men.  Such 
a state  of  things,  it  was  manifest,  could 
not  long  continue. 

The  army  of  the  Cumberland  became 
a cause  of  great  anxiety  to  the  authori- 
ties at  Washington.  It  was  felt  that 
if  something  were  not  done  to  relieve 
it,  and  that  quickly,  the  army  ran  the 
risk  of  being  utterly  destroyed;  and 
Chattanooga  and  East  Tennessee  would 
again  be  brought  under  Confederate 
rule.  In  these  circumstances,  the  gov- 
ernment fell  back  on  the  conqueror  of 
Vicksburg.  Grant  was  ordered  to  Chat- 
tanooga, to  take  sole  command.  He 
was  then  at  New  Orleans,  confined  bv 
an  injury  sustained  in  falling  from  his 


558 


CHICKAMAUGA  AND  CHATTANOOGA. 


horse.  As  soon  as  he  was  able,  he  has- 
tened to  Indianapolis,  where  he  met 
Stanton,  the  Secretary  of  War,  and  re- 
ceived from  his  hands  the  order  ap- 
pointing him  to  the  command  of  the 
new  military  division  of  the  Mississippi, 
comprising  the  three  departments  and 
armies  of  the  Ohio,  the  Cumberland 
and  the  Tennessee.  By  the  same  order. 
General  Kosecranz  was  relieved  of  the 
command  of  the  department  and  army 
of  the  Tennessee.  At  the  request  of 
General  Grant,  the  department  of  the 
Cumberland  was  given  to  Thomas,  and 
that  of  the  Tennessee  to  Sherman.  On 
Oct.  fhe  18th  of  October,  Grant,  hav- 
ing  arrived  at  Louisville,  formally 
assumed  the  command,  and  issued  his 
first  order.  Bosecranz,  on  the  19th, 
after  issuing  a touching  farewell  ad- 
dress to  the  troops,  left  for  Cincinnati. 
Thither,  also,  were  ordered  Generals 
McCook  and  Crittenden,  whose  corps 
were  now  consolidated  into  one. 
From  Louisville,  Grant  telegraphed  to 
Thomas,  ‘‘  Hold  Chattanooga  at  all 
hazards.”  “ I will  hold  the  town  until 
we  starve,”  was  the  prompt  and  charac- 
teristic reply. 

It  was  not  enough,  however,  to  bring 
Grant  to  Chattanooga.  It  was  neces- 
sary that  he  should  have  under  him  a 
competent  army.  Arrangements  had 
already  been  made  for  increasing  the 
strength  of  the  National  army  at  Chat- 
tanooga. As  soon  as  it  became  known 
that  General  Longstreet  had  gone  to 
Tennessee,  instructions  were  sent  to 
Grant,  and  other  commanders  in  the 
south  and  west,  to  send  Bosecranz  all 
possible  assistance.  Grant  was  yet  at 


New  Orleans;  and  as  Sherman,  who 
represented  him  at  Vicksburg,  did  not 
receive  the  despatch  until  several  days 
had  elapsed,  there  was  some  unavoid- 
able delay  in  sending  reinforcements 
from  the  neighborhood  of  Vicksburg. 
As  early  as  the  27th  of  September, 
Sherman,  with  the  Fifteenth  corps,  in 
obedience  to  orders  from  Grant,  had 
set  out  for  Memphis,  on  his  way  to 
Chattanooga.  Meanwhile,  fearful  of 
the  consequences  which  must  result  if 
Bosecranz  should  be  tempted  to  abandon 
his  position,  and  attempt  a retreat,  the 
government  had  detached  the  Eleventh 
and  Twelfth  corps  from  the  army  of  the 
Potomac,  and  placing  them  in  charge  of 
General  Hooker,  hurried  them  along  by 
rail  to  Chattanooga.  Never  before — 
not  even  at  Solferino  and  Magenta 
— had  railroads  been  more  effectively 
used  for  transporting  troops  and  all  the 
necessary  material  of  war,  than  on  this 
occasion.  It  was  Stanton’s  project ; and 
in  giving  it  effect,  he  bent  upon  it  all 
the  energies  of  his  powerful  mind  and 
will.  His  purposes  were  admirably 
carried  out  by  General  Meigs,  the 
quartermaster-general,  and  by  Colonel 
D.  C.  McCallum,  the  government  super- 
intendent of  military  railroads.  Me- 
Callum,  who  alone  was  responsible  for 
the  conveyance  of  the  troops,  was  ably 
assisted  by  W.  Prescott  Smith,  master 
of  transportation  on  the  Baltimore  and 
Ohio  Bailroad.  In  seven  days  the  two 
corps,  some  23,000  strong,  with  artillery- 
trains,  baggage  and  animals,  were  trans- 
ferred from  the  Bapidan  to  Stevenson, 
Alabama — a distance  of  1192  milea 
Grant  reached  Nashville  on  the 


WAUHATCHIE. 


559 


Oct,  21st  of  October.  He  there  met  and 
21*  had  an  interview  with  Rosecranz 
and  Hooker.  On  the  23d,  he  arrived  at 
Chattanooga.  Next  morning  he  made 
a reconnoissance  of  the  ground,  and  de- 
termined on  his  plan  of  action.  He 
found  that  Rosecranz  had  allowed  the 
enemy  to  occupy  all  the  heights  around 
his  position,  and  that  neither  the  river 
nor  the  railroad  could  be  used.  Un- 
less the  river  or  the  roads  could  be 
opened,  there  was  no  choice  but  retreat ; 
and  retreat,  in  the  present  condition 
of  the  army,  would  be  certain  ruin. 
Thomas,  and  his  chief  engineer,  General 
William  F.  Smith,  had  decided  upon  a 
plan  by  which  they  hoped  to  be  able 
to  regain  possession  of  Lookout  Val- 
ley, and  to  re-establish  communications 
with  Bridgeport  by  way  of  Brown’s 
Ferry.  Hooker,  by  order  -of  Thomas, 
had  already  concentrated  at  the  latter 
place.  This  plan  met  the  hearty  ap- 
proval of  General  Grant,  who  proceed- 
ed immediately  to  put  it  in  execution. 
Hooker  was  to  cross  the  Tennessee  at 
Bridgeport,  and  push  on  by  the  main 
wagon-road  to  Wauhatchie,  in  Look- 
out Valley.  Palmer,  who  was  now 
opposite  Chattanooga,  was  to  move 
down  the  north  side  of  the  river  to  a 
point  opposite  Whiteside,  where  he 
was  to  cross  the  river  and  hold  the 
road  passed  over  by  Hooker.  W.  F. 
Smith  was  to  go  down  the  river  from 
Chattanooga,  under  cover  of  the  dark- 
ness, with  about  4000  troops,  to  cross 
at  Brown’s  Ferry,  and  to  seize  the 
range  of  hills  at  the  mouth  of  Lookout 
Valley.  A pontoon  bridge  was  to  be 
thrown  over  the  river  at  Brown’s  Ferry, 


so  as  to  open  communications  between 
Hooker  and  Thomas.  The  movements 
of  Hooker  and  Palmer  might  be  made 
in  open  day ; but  Smith’s  success  de- 
pended largely  on  secrecy. 

' These  mov^ements  were  promptly  and 
successfully  executed.  On  the  morn- 
ing of  the  26th,  Hooker  crossed  Or*t, 
at  Bridgeport  on  pontoon  bridges.  26, 
He  effected  a landing  on  the  south  side 
without  any  opposition,  and  pushed  on 
to  Wauhatchie,  which  he  reached  on 
the  28th.  Palmer  followed,  according 
to  instructions,  and  took  position  at 
Whiteside,  in  his  rear.  Smith’s  part 
of  the  plan,  although  beset  with  greater 
difficulty,  because  he  was  within  reach 
of  the  enemy’s  sharp-shooters  during 
his  whole  course,  was  carried  out  with 
equal  success.  His  force  consisted  of 
about  4000  men.  Of  these,  1800,  under 
General  Hazen,  embarked  on  pontoon 
boats  at  Chattanooga;  and  during  the 
dark  hours  of  the  night  of  the  26th  and 
the  morning  of  the  27th,  they  floated 
noiselessly  down  the  river,  without 
oars,  passing  the  point  of  Lookout 
Mountain,  and,  unnoticed  by  seven 
miles  of  the  enemy’s  pickets,  reached 
Brown’s  Ferry  just  about  dawn.  The 
material  for  the  construction  of  the 
pontoon  bridge  was  thus  at  the  point 
desired.  Landing  without  difficulty. 
Smith  drove  in  and  scattered  the  Con- 
federate pickets,  and  seized  a low  i*ange 
of  hills,  which  commanded  Lookout 
Valley.  A Ann  foothold  having  been 
secured,  skirmishers  were  thrown  for- 
ward ; and  by  means  of  felled  trees, 
wffiich  the  axe-men  soon  laid  low,  an 
impassable  abatis  was  thrown  up  in 


560 


CHICKAMAUGA  AND  CHATTANOOGA. 


front  of  Hazen’s  troops.  The  Confed- 
erates, unwilling  to  abandon  the  posi- 
tion, returned  and  made  a fierce  at- 
tack ; but  finding  their  efforts  useless, 
they  withdrew  up  the  valley  towards 
Chattanooga.  The  remainder  of  Smith’s 
force,  some  T200  strong,  under  General 
Turchin,  having  moved,  meanwhile, 
down  the  north  bank  of  the  stream, 
across  Mocassin  Point,  reached  Brown’s 
Ferry  before  daylight.  They  were  rap- 
idly ferried  across ; and,  by  ten  o’clock, 
a pontoon  bridge  connected  the  north 
and  south  banks  of  the  Tennessee. 
On  the  morning  of  the  28th,  as  has 
been  stated.  Hooker,  with  the  Elev- 
enth corps,  Major-General  Howard, 
and  Geary’s  division,  of  the  Twelfth 
corps,  appeared  in  Lookout  Valley,  at 
Wauhatchie,  his  left  connecting  with 
Smith  at  the  pontoon  bridge.  These 
movements  secured  for  the  Nationals 
the  possession  of  the  roads  and  the 
river;  and  all  fears  of  starvation  in 
Chattanooga  were  now  abandoned. 
‘^General  Thomas’  plan,”  said  Grant, 
in  his  telegram  to  Halleck,  “for  se- 
curing the  river  and  southside  road  to 
Bridgeport,  has  proved  eminently  suc- 
cessful. The  question  of  supplies  may 
now  be  regarded  as  settled.” 

Bragg  was  not  willing  that  his 
antagonist  should  retain  the  great 
advantage  he  had  won,  without  mak- 
ing another  attempt  to  dislodge  him. 
Lookout  Valley,  which  lies  between 
Racoon  and  Lookout  Mountains,  and 
which  has  an  average  width  of  about 
two  miles,  is  divided  towards  its  centre 
by  a series  of  wood-crowned  heights, 
some  of  them  risin<2:  to  an  elevation  of 


200  and  300  feet.  These  heights,  as 
well  as  the  more  commanding  positions 
on  Racoon  and  Lookout  Mountains, 
were  in  the  hands  of  the  Confederates. 
From  these  eminences,  the  position  and 
movements  of  the  National  army  could 
be  easily  ‘seen.  McLaws,  of  Long- 
street’s  corps,  was  on  Lookout  Moun- 
tain, eagerly  watching  Hooker.  It  was 
his  determination  to  fall  upon  and 
crush  that  branch  of  the  National 
army,  so  soon  as  he  should  see  a favor- 
able opportunity.  On  the  night  of  the 
28th,  Geary’s  division,  on  Hooker’s 
right,  was  lying  at  Wauhatchie,  How- 
arcTs  corps,  as  has  been  mentioned, 
having  been  thrown  out  in  the  direc- 
tion of  Brown’s  Ferry.  McLaws,  de- 
sirous to  take  Geary  by  surprise,  de- 
scended at  midnight,  and  with  fierce 
energy,  his  men  uttering  wild  screams 
as  they  advanced,  fell  upon  Geary’s 
pickets,  driving  them  in.  The  batteries 
on  Lookout  Mountain  now  opened  fire ; 
and  while  Geary’s  camp  was  furiously 
attacked  on  three  different  sides  by  the 
on-rushing  Confederates,  his  men  were 
exposed  to  a very  tempest  of  shot  and 
shell.  Geary,  however,  was  not  unpre- 
pared. Knowing  that  he  was  liable 
to  be  attacked  at  any  moment,  he 
had  been  holding  himself  in  a state  of 
readiness.  When,  therefore,  McLaws’ 
men  came  up,  they  were  warmly  re- 
ceived. Full  in  the  faces  of  the  too- 
confident  Confederates,  Geary’s  Jirav^e 
fellows  poured  a deadly  fire  of  mus- 
ketry. Such  a reception  had  not  been 
expected.  The  advancing  columns  re- 
coiled. Geary,  however,  was  greatly 
outnumbered;  and  the  battle  continued. 


OELAN  SMITH. 


561 


Hooker  was  ai-onsed  by  the  boom- 
ing of  cannon  and  the  shrill  rattling 
of  musketry.  He  knew,  from  the  di- 
rection whence  these  sounds  issued, 
that  Geary  had  been  attacked.  How- 
ard was  ordered  to  double-quick  his 
nearest  division — that  of  Schurz — to  the 
aid  of  Geary.  Forward  to  their  re- 
lief, boys ! ” shouted  Hooker,  as  Schurz’s 
men  streamed  past  him  through  the 
darkness.  They  had  advanced  but  a 
short  distance,  when,  suddenly,  there 
came  a blaze  of  musketry  from  the 
hills,  showing  that  the  Confederates 
were  close  at  hand,  as  well  as  in  force 
in  the  neighborhood  of  Geary’s  posi- 
tion. Tyndale’s  brigade  was  detached, 
and  ordered  to  charge  the  heights, 
while  Schurz,  with  the  remainder  of 
his  troops,  moved  on  towards  Geary. 
A thin  brisrade  of  Steinwehr’s  division, 
commanded  by  Colonel  Orlan  Smith,  of 
the  Seventy-Third  Ohio,  now  came  up; 
and  it  was  found  that  the  hill  to  the 
rear  of  Schurz  was  occupied  by  the 
enemy.  This  hill  Smith  was  ordered 
to  carry  with  the  bayonet.  The  moon 
was  shining  bright  and  clear ; but  the 
hill  was  precipitous,  seamed  with  ra- 
vines, covered  with  thick  brushwood, 
and  rose  to  the  height  of  200  feet.  It 
was  a daring — it  seemed  almost  a fool- 
hardy — expei’iment ; but  the  order  had 
been  given,  and  it  must  be  obeyed. 
On  and  up  the  slope  rushed  the  brave 
fellows  of  the  Seventy-Third  Ohio  and 
of  the  Thirty-Third  Massachusetts  un- 
til they  had  almost  reached  the  rifle- 
pits,  when  they  were  received  by  a 
volley  from  some  2000  muskets,  and 
driven  back  in  confusion  to  the  foot  of 


the  hill.  There,  however,  they  re- 
formed; and,  although  now  fully  aware 
of  the  nature  of  the  ground  and  of  the 
difficulties  to  be  encountered,  those 
noble  regiments  again  breasted  the 
hill;  and  in  spite  of  the  destructive 
volleys  which  tore  througli  their  ranks, 
and  the  shouting  and  yelling  and  taunt- 
ing sneers  of  the  men  on  the  summit, 
they  pressed  on,  without  firing  a shot, 
towards  the  blazing  rifle-pits,  and  then, 
with  one  bound,  bayonet  in  hand,  swejit 
the  enemy  before  them.  It  was  not 
until  the  enemy  was  in  full  retreat, 
and  until  shouts  of  victory  were  rend- 
ing the  midnight  air,  that  the  first  vol- 
ley was  fired.  It  was  a sort  of  parting 
salute,  given  in  a species  of  wild  glee 
by  the  Nationals,  but  not  particularly 
agreeable  to  the  retreating  foe,  and  not 
likely  soon  to  be  forgotten  by  any  of 
the  Confederates  who  survived  that 
moonlight  struggle.  Geary,  meanwhile, 
although  contending  with  vastly  supe- 
rior numbers,  and  sometimes  nearly 
overborne,  held  his  ground  with  char- 
acteristic tenacity ; and  at  length,  after 
three  hours’  fighting,  he  hurled  his  as- 
sailants back  towards  Lookout  Moun- 
tain. Thither  they  retired  for  refuge, 
leaving  on  the  field  150  of  their  num- 
ber dead,  and  in  Geary’s  hands  over* 
100  prisoners,  with  several  hundred  * 
small  arms.  It  was  now  a little  after 
four  o’clock  in  the  morning;  and  the 
battle  of  Wauhatchie  was  ended. 

The  charge  made  by  Orlan  Smith 
has  been  singled  out  as  one  of  the  most 
brilliant  charges  of  the  war.  It  de- 
lighted and  astonished  Hooker.  “No 
troops,”  he  said,  “ ever  rendered  more 


.562 


CHICKAMAUGA  AND  CHATTANOOGA. 


brilliant  service.”  It  won  special  com- 
mendation from  so  reserved  a man  as 
TIiomas.  The  bayonet  charge  of 
Howard’s  troops,”  said  he,  in  his  letter 
of  congratulation  to  Hooker,  ‘’made 
lip  the  side  of  a steep  and  difficult 
hill,  over  200  feet  high,  completely 
routing  and  driving  the  enemy  from 
his  barricades  on  its  top,  and  the  re- 
pulse, by  Geary’s  division,  of  greatly 
superior  numbers,  who  attempted  to 
surprise  him,  will  rank  among  the  most 
distinguished  feats  of  arms  in  this  war.” 
The  victory  at  Wauhatchie  secured 
the  possession  of  the  communications 
which  Smith  had  opened  up  two  days 
before.  Bragg’s  plans  were  defeated. 
Soon  afterwards,  two  little  steamboats 
were  put  upon  the  river;  by  means  of 
these,  the  railroad,  and  the  other  roads 
on  the  south  of  the  Tennessee,  supplies 
were  conveyed  to  Chattanooga ; and  the 
army  was  saved  from  actual  famine. 
Fortune  was  smiling  again  on  the  Na- 
tional arms;  and  the  star  of  General 
Grant  was  still  in  the  ascendant. 

While  these  events  were  taking  place 
at  Chattanooga,  Sherman  was  pressing 
forward  from*  Memphis.  He  had  left 
Vicksburg  for  Memphis,  on  his  way  to 
Chattanooga,  on  the  27th  of  September. 

• His  own  corps  followed  him  up  the 
river  in  steamboats.  He  had  been  pi*e- 
ceded  b}^  the  divisions  of  Osterhaus 
and  John  E.  Smith.  Arriving  at  Mem- 
phis on  the  2d  of  October,  he  received 
a letter  from  Halleck,  instructing  him 
to  move  by  the  line  of  the  Memphis 
and  Charleston  Railroad  to  Athens, 
and  to  report  thence  to  Rosecranz,  at 
Chattanooga.  He  was  to  i-epair  the 


railroads  as  he  advanced,  and  to  de- 
pend on  his  own  line  for  supplies.  On 
his  way  to  Corinth,  on  Sunday,  the 
11th,  having  with  him,  as  an  escort,  a 
battalion  of  the  Thirteenth  regulars,  he 
arrived  at  Colliersville  about  noon,  just 
in  time  to  save  the  Sixty-Sixth  Indiana, 
Colonel  D.  C.  Anthony,  from  being 
overwhelmed  and  probably  destroyed 
by  a body  of  Confedeiate  cavalry,  some 
3000  strong,  with  eight  guns,  under 
the  command  of  General  Chalmers. 
He  reached  Corinth  that  Sunday  even- 
ing. Without  delay,  he  pushed  on  to 
luka.  At  Tuscumbia,  on  the  27th,  his 
advance,  under  General  Frank  Blair, 
came  into  contact  with  a Confederate 
force,  some  5000  strong,  under  General 
S.  D.  Lee.  The  Confederate  cavalry 
were  severely  punished ; and  Lee  gave 
no  further  annoyance  to  the  troops  on 
their  march.  The  National  troops  had 
been  i*epairing  the  roads,  as  they  moved 
along,  in  obedience  to  instructions  I'e- 
ceived  from  Halleck.  On  the  same 
day  on  which  Blair  chastised  Lee, 
Sherman  received  a despatch  from 
Grant,  urging  him  to  discontinue  his 
work  on  the  i*ailroad,  and  hasten  for- 
ward with  all  possible  despatch,  with 
his  entire  force,  to  Bridgeport.  Hap- 
pily, he  had  made  arrangements  with 
Admiral  Porter  to  have  boats  waiting 
for  him  at  Eastpo.  t.  By  means  of 
these,  he  passed  his  troops  across  the 
Tennessee  and  hurried  eastward,  Blair 
covering  his  rear,  and  reached  Bridge- 
port on  the  14th.  On  the  day  follow- 
ing, he  joined  Grant  at  Chattanooga; 
and  the  two  together  reconnoitered  the 
I ground.  Grant  explaining  his  proposed 


GRANT’S  BATTLE  PLAN. 


563 


plan  of  attack,  so  soon  as  the  army  of 
the  Tennessee  was  forward  and  ready 
for  action. 

Sherman  arrived  at  Chattanooga  at 
a most  opportune  moment.  It  seemed 
as  if  the  fates  were  working  in  the  in- 
terest of  General  Grant  and  the  army 
under  his  command.  The  plans  of  the 
general  commanding  had  worked  to 
perfection ; they  had  been  admirably 
carried  out ; and  they  had  been  attend- 
ed, so  far,  with  complete  success.  And 
now,  when  Sherman,  his  trusted  right 
arm,  came  up  with  his  well-trained 
veterans,  Bragg  had  invited  attack  by 
committing  a huge  and  irreparable 
blunder.  It  was  known  to  the  Con- 
federate commander  that  Burnside,  at 
an  earlier  date,  had  general  instructions 
to  push  forward  from  Knoxville,  and 
form  a connection  with  Bosecranz.  Be- 
lieving that  if  such  a connection  were 
now  formed,  it  would  be  fatal  to  his 
prospects,  and  in  the  vain  hope  of  cut- 
ting his  rival  off,  and  beating  him  in 
detail,  he  detached  Longstreet  from  the 
army  in  front  of  Chattanooga,  and  or- 
dered him  to  attack  Burnside,  and  take 
possession  of  Knoxville.  A more  fatal 
blunder  he  could  not  have  committed. 
He  could  not,  had  such  been  his  object, 
have  played  more  completely  into  the 
hands  of  his  antagonist.  Grant  saw 
his  opportunity;  but  he  resolved  to 
wait  until  the  arrival  of  Sherman,  so 
as  to  be  able  to  turn  it  to  full  and  sat- 
isfactory account.  He  was  now  ready. 

Grant  was  not  insensible  to  the  peril- 
ous position  in  which  Burnside  was 
now  placed;  nor  was  he  indifferent  to 
hjs  calls  for  help.  But  he  knew  that 


Burnside  would  be  relieved  most  effect- 
ually by  the  plan  which  he,  himself 
proposed  to  carry  out — that  the  threat- 
ened catastrophe  at  Knoxville  would  be 
best  avei’ted  by  a decisive  victory  at 
Chattanooga.  Colonel  Wilson,  of  his 
staff,  accompanied  by  Assistant-Secre- 
tary of  War,  Charles  A.  Dana,  was, 
therefore,  sent  to  Knoxville  to  explain 
to  Burnside  the  situation.  He  was  to 
make  the  best  show  possible  in  the 
presence  of  the  enemy,  to  allow  him- 
self to  be  besieged,  but  to  hold  Knox- 
ville at  all  hazards.  Grant,  meanwhile, 
hurried  forward  his  plans,  and  made 
all  the  necessary  arrangements  for  the 
attack. 

The  great  battle  of  Chattanooga — by 
far  the  most  picturesque  battle  in  the 
war,  and  the  one  in  which  General 
Grant  most  conspicuously  showed  that 
he  was  not  only  the  fortunate  winner  of 
battles,  but  the  possessor  of  military 
abilities  of  the  very  highest  and  rarest 
order  of  excellence — was  now  about  to 
be  fought.  Grant’s  plans,  as  we  have 
seen,  were  matured  and  ready  for  exe- 
cution. It  was  now  the  middle  of  No- 
vember. Sherman’s  corps  had  arrived 
at  Bridgeport  on  the  14th.  Grant 
made  up  his  mind  to  make  the  general 
attack  on  the  21st.  He  had  discovered 
that  the  north  end  of  the  Missionary 
Bidge  was  imperfectly  guai'ded,  as, 
also,  the  western  bank  of  the  river, 
from  the  mouth  of  the  South  Chick- 
amauga,  down  towards  Chattanooga. 
This  point  invited  attack.  This,  how- 
ever, was  not  all.  A successful  blow 
given  in  that  direction  would  make  a 
junction  impossible  between  Bragg  and 


m 


CHICKAMAUGA  AND  CHATTANOOGA. 


Longstreet.  The  northern  end  of  Mis- 
sionary Ridge,  therefore,  he  singled  out 
as  the  special  point  of  attack.  While 
the  attack  should  seem  to  be  general, 
and  beai’ing  heavily  on  the  Confed- 
erate left,  he  proposed  to  mass  his  con- 
verging forces  on  the  point  thus  indi- 
cated. Sherman,  with  his  own  troops 
and  one  of  Thomas’  divisions,  was  to 
cross  the  Tennessee  just  below  the 
mouth  of  the  South  Chickamauga,  and 
secure  the  heights,  as  far  as  the  rail- 
road tunnel.  Thomas  was  to  co-operate 
with  Sherman,  by  concentrating  his 
troops  on  his  own  left,  leaving  a thin 
line  to  guard  the  works  on  the  light 
and  centre.  Hooker  was  to  assail  the 
Confederate  left,  and  drive  it  from 
Lookout  Mountain.  Grant  was  the 
more  anxious  to  make  the  attack  on 
the  21st  that,  on  the  day  before,  ho 
received  from  Bragg  a letter,  suggest- 
ing the  removal  of  non-combatants  from 
Chattanooga — a letter  intended  to  con- 
vey the  idea  that  an  attack  on  that 
place  was  meditated,  but  which  really 
confirmed  the  report  brought  by  a de- 
serter, and  confirmed  Grant  in  the  be- 
lief that  Bragg  was  about  to  retreat. 

The  general  attack  which  was  to  be 
made  on  the  21st  was  countermanded. 
Sherman  had  experienced  unexpected 
difficulty  in  passing  his  troops  across 
Brown’s  Ferry,  in  consequence  of  the 
heavy  rains.  The  pontoon  bridge  at 
last  gave  way.  Osterhaus,  whose  divi- 
sion was  still  on  the  southern  side  of 
the  river,  and  without  the  means  of 
crossing,  was  ordered  to  i-eport  to 
General  Hooker,  with  whom  he  re- 
mained. Howard  was,  at  the  same 


time,  called  to  Chattanooga,  and  tem- 
porarily attached  to  the  command  of 
General  Thomas.  On  the  afternoon  of 
the  23d,  the  Fifteenth  cor])S,  under  the 
immediate  command  of  General  Blair, 
having  flung  pontoon  bridges  across 
the  Tennessee  at  the  point  indicated 
above,  and  also  across  the  Chicka- 
inauga,  were  advancing  to  their  posi- 
tion on  the  extreme  left  of  the  National 
army. 

Grant,  now  impatient  of  delay,  and 
determined  that  if  Bragg  really  meant 
to  retii-e,  he  should  not  retire  unin- 
jured and  in  good  order,  had  instructed 
Thomas,  on  the  morning  of  the  j^ov. 
23d,  to  advance  and  give  the  en-  23. 
emy  an  opportunity  of  developing  his 
lines.  The  day  was  unusually  beauti- 
ful. The  men,  now  that  they  were 
relieved  from  their  pi*ison-house  in 
Chattanooga,  and  well  fed,  were  in 
excellent  spirits.  They  were  dressed 
in  their  best  uniforms,  and  accompanied 
by  new  bands  of  music.  The  neighbor- 
ing heights  were  crowded  with  specta- 
tors. The  magnificent  array,  the  steady 
step,  the  splendid  uniforms,  the  burn- 
ished bayonets,  glittering  in  the  clear 
November  sunlight — it  was  a holiday 
picture.  It  seemed  a dress-parade  or  re- 
view, and  was  so  regarded  for  a time  by 
the  Confederates,  who  witnessed  the 
spectacle  from  the  side  and  summit  of 
Missionary  Ridge.  Wood’s  division,  of 
Gi*anger’s  corps,  moved  in  advance  on 
the  left ; Sheridan’s  division  of  the  same 
corps,  being  on  the  right.  Palmer,  of  the 
Fourteenth  corps,  supported  Granger’s 
right,  with  Baird’s  division  refused ; 
Johnson’s  division,  of,  Palmer’s,  remain- 


ORCHAKD  KNOB. 


565 


ing  under  arms  in  the  entrenchments, 
to  be  ready  to  reinforce  at  any  point. 
Howard’s  corps  was  formed  in  mass 
behind  that  of  Granger.  As  soon  as 
Thomas’  men  began  to  move  forward, 
the  heavy  guns  of  Fort  Wood  opened 
upon  the  enemy’s  first  position.  Upon 
the  ramparts  of  the  fort.  Grant,  Thomas, 
Granger  and  Howard  stood  watching 
the  advance.  It  was  a splendid  sight. 
On  moved  the  mighty  mass,  as  if  it  had 
been  one  solid  unit.  Cheers  were 
heard  to  arise  from  the  ranks  of  the 
advancing  columns.  The  pickets  of 
the  enemy  were  seen  to  break  and  fly 
in  confusion  before  them.  In  spite  of 
the  well-directed  fire  from  its  summit, 
Wood  had  already  reached  the  base  of 
Orchard  Knob — a steep,  craggy  hill, 
rising  above  the  general  level  of  the 
valley,  midway  between  the  river  and 
the  ridge,  and  about  a mile  from  Fort 
Wood.  Without  halting.  Wood  or- 
dered his  men  to  charge.  It  was  done 
in  gallant  style,  the  rifle-pits  on  the 
summit  being  carried,  and  200  men 
made  prisoners.  A heavy  battery  was 
advanced  to  the  captured  position  from 
Fort  Wood,  and  the  place  was  held. 
This  was  an  important  gain  to  the 
Nationals. 

Simultaneously  with  this  movement 
of  General  Thomas  against  Orchard 
Knob,  a cavalry  brigade,  by  order  of 
General  Grant,  was  operating  on 
Bragg’s  extreme  right  and  rear.  This 
movement  was  scarcely  less  successful 
than  the  other,  resulting  as  it  did  in 
the  burning  of  Tyner’s  Station,  the  cut- 
ting of  the  railroad  leading  to  Cleve- 
land, the  capture  of  100  wagons,  with 


200  prisoners,  and  the  destruction  of  a 
large  quantity  of  stores. 

No  other  movement  of  any  conse- 
quence took  place  on  the  23d.  Thomas 
held  his  advanced  position.  On  Or- 
chard Knob,  and  the  low  range  of  hills 
to  the  south,  his  troops  entrenched 
themselves;  and  every  available  point 
was  covered  with  artillery.  Hooker 
had  general  instructions  from  Grant  to 
take  Lookout  Mountain,  to  cross  the 
Chattanooga  Valley  to  Rossville,  and 
thence,  by  the  Rossville  Gap,  to  advance 
upon  Missionary  Ridge.  His  immedi- 
ate instructions  were  that  he  should 
take  a position  so  as  at  least  to  be 
able  to  make  a strong  demonstration, 
but  that  if  he  felt  himself  equal  to  the 
task,  he  was  not  to  hesitate  to  make 
the  attack  and  drive  the  enemy  from 
the  mountain.  Sherman,  all  night 
through,  was  pushing  his  troops  across 
the  river.  As  early  as  daylight,  on  the 
morning  of  the  24th,  he  had  8000  jvov, 
men,  with  artillery  and  horses,  24. 
on  the  south  side  of  the  Tennessee. 
At  one  o’clock,  P.  M.,  the  march  was 
taken  up  by  three  columns  en  echelon^ 
each  head  of  column  covered  by  a line 
of  skirmishers,  with  supports.  It  was 
a dull,  drizzly  day.  The  clouds  were 
low ; and  the  movements  of  the  troops 
could  not  be  easily  seen  by  the  enemy. 
At  half-past  three  o’clock,  Sherman  had 
possession  of  the  whole  northern  ex- 
tremity of  Missionary  Ridge,  as  far 
almost  as  the  railroad  tunnel.  In  the 
afternoon  and  during  the  night,  he 
threw  up  entrenchments,  and  estab- 
lished himself  in  a really  strong  posi- 
tion. Sherman  had  thus,  so  far,  car- 


566 


CHICKAMAUGA  AND  CHATTANOOGA. 


ried  out  his  part  of  the  general  plan. 
Such  was  the  state  of  things  on  the 
National  left,  at  the  close  of  Tuesday, 
the  24th. 

On  the  National  right,  matters  were,  if 
possible,  even  more  favorable.  Hooker 
had  performed  a brilliant  feat  of  arms 
on  Lookout  Mountain.  At  four  o’clock, 
on  the  morning  of  the  24th,  he  had  re- 
ported that  his  troops  were  in  position, 
and  ready  to  advance.  Soon  after- 
wards the  movement  commenced.  It 
had  been  Hooker’s  intention  to  push  his 
men  across  Lookout  Creek,  and  strike 
the  enemy  in  front.  It  was  a hazard- 
ous undertaking;  for  Lookout  Moun- 
tain, with  its  high,  palisaded  crest,  its 
steep,  rugged  slopes,  its  numerous  rifle- 
pits,  its  encircling  lines  of  earth-works 
and  redans,  was  deemed  by  Bragg  im- 
pregnable. It  so  happened,  however, 
that  Lookout  Creek  was  so  swollen  by 
the  recent  heavy  rains,  that  it  was  im- 
passable. A direct  movement  by  the 
main  road  could  not  be  attempted  until 
temporary  bridges  were  constructed. 
Hooker,  therefore,  ordered  Geary,  with 
his  own  division,  and  Whittaker’s  bri- 
gade, of  Cruft’s  division,  to  march  to 
Wauhatchie,  to  cross  the  creek  there, 
and  move  down  on  the  right  bank, 
while  he  employed  the  remainder  of 
his  forces  in  throwing  bridges  across 
on  the  main  road.  The  day  v^as  favor- 
able for  conducting  such  operations. 
A heavy  mist  enveloped  the  mountain, 
and  spread  itself  over  the  adjoining 
valleys.  The  attention  of  the  enemy 
had  been  drawn  to  the  bridge-builders, 
of  whom  an  occasional  glimpse  could 
be  had,  as  the  mist  drifted  with  the 


breeze ; but  no  notice  had  been  taken 
of  Geary,  who  reached  his  appointed 
place  at  Wauhatchie,  unobserved.  It 
was  about  eight  o’clock  when  he  began 
to  cross  the  creek.  Passing  over  with- 
out molestation,  he  surprised  and  cap- 
tured the  picket-guard;  and  immedi- 
ately facing  to  the  north,  he  extended 
his  line  on  the  right  to  the  base  of  the 
mountain.  The  Confederates,  caught 
at  once  on  both  flank  and  rear,  offered 
a stubborn  resistance.  Meanwhile,  the 
bridges  M^ere  constructed;  and  Oster- 
haus’  division,  having  been  brought  up 
from  Brown’s  Ferry,  the  Nationals  were 
soon  in  great  force  on  the  right  bank 
of  the  creek.  Under  cover  of  the  two 
batteries — the  Ohio,  on  Bald  Hill,  and 
the  New  York,  on  the  hill  in  the  rear 
— Hooker’s  men  went  dashing  down 
the  valley,  sweeping  everything  before 
them,  capturing  the  rifle-pits,  and  mak- 
ing a large  number  of  prisoners.  At 
the  same  time  the  troops  to  the  right, 
passing  directly  under  the  muzzles  of 
the  Confederate  guns,  were  rushing  up 
the  rugged  sides  of  the  hill,  leaping 
over  boulders  and  ledges  of  rock,  cut- 
ting their  way  through  the  abatis^  and 
gradually  forcing  position  after  posi- 
tion until  the  plateau  was  cleared,  and 
the  retreating  Confederates  were  seen 
plunging  themselves  down  the  jagged 
and  pi'ecipitous  face  of  the  mountain, 
and  flying  in  confusion  and  utter  rout 
towards  Chattanooga  Valley.  Hooker 
had  not  expected  to  accomplish  so 
much  in  the  same  space  of  time.  Nay, 
he  had  been  unwilling  that  his  men 
should  attempt  so  much.  Not  know- 
ing to  what  extent  the  enemy  might 


LOOKOUT  MOUNTAIN. 


567 


be  reinforced,  and  fearing  disaster  from 
the  rough  character  of  the  ground,  he 
had  given  directions  that  the  men 
should  halt  when  they  reached  the 
high  ground.  But  aroused  to  the 
highest  pitch  of  enthusiasm,  and  with 
a flying  foe  before  them,  a halt  was 
impossible. 

It  was  now  about  two  o’clock  in  the 
afternoon ; and  such  was  the  density  of 
the  mist  which  shrouded  the  mountain 
and  hung  heavily  over  the  valley,  that 
it  was  found  necessary,  temporarily  at 
least,  to  suspend  oj^erations.  Hooker, 
not  deeming  it  advisable  to  descend 
into  the  valley  in  pursuit,  established 
his  line  on  the  east  side  of  the  moun- 
tain, his  right  resting  on  the  palisades, 
his  left  near  the  mouth  of  Chattanooga 
Creek.  The  battle  had  literally  been 
fought  above  the  clouds.  • It  was  not 
until  nightfall  that  the  sky  cleared, 
and  revealed  to  thousands,  in  the  val- 
ley below,  the  actual  progress  which 
Hooker  had  made.  As  soon  as  it  be- 
came known  that  behind  that  veil  of 
clouds  a great  battle  had  been  fought 
and  won,  and  that  the  National  arms 
had  been  victorious,  the  soldiers  gave 
way  to  the  wildest  enthusiasm;  and 
loud  cheers  for  “ Old  Hooker  ” coming 
up,  resounding  from  the  valley,  were 
echoed  and  re-echoed  among  the  blood- 
stained hills.  The  night  which  fol- 
lowed was  beautiful  in  the  extreme. 
The  mist  disappeared ; and  a full  moon 
shed  her  mellow  light  over  a scene  of 
matchless  magnificence..  It  was  Hook- 
er’s conviction  that  the  enemy  would 
withdraw  from  the  summit  of  the 
mountain  before  daylight.  In  antici- 


pation of  such  a movement,  he  de- 
tached parties  from  several  regiments, 
with  instructions  to  scale  the  palisades. 
When  morning  came,  the  Confederates 
were  gone.  In  their  haste,  they  had 
left  behind  them  20,000  rations,  the 
camp  and  garrison  equipage  of  their 
brigades,  and  a large  quantity  of  other 
war  material.  The  Eighth  Kentuck- 
ians were  the  first  to  reach  the  crest; 
and  at  sunrise,  in  the  clear,  crisp  No- 
vember air,  amid  echoing  cheers  from 
the  troops  below,  they  had  the  honor 
of  unfurling  the  National  banner  from 
Pulpit  Kock.  The  importance  of  this 
victory  at  Lookout  Mountain,  it  is 
hardly  possible  to  over-estimate.  It 
enabled  Grant  greatly  to  contract  his 
line  of  battle,  and  by  so  much  to  con- 
centrate his  strength.  It  made  an  end 
of  the  blockade  of  the  Tennessee ; and 
from  that  day  there  was  no  more  diffi- 
culty about  supplies  for  the  National 
army. 

Such  was  the  condition  of  things  on 
the  night  of  the  24th  and  the  morning 
of  the  25th  of  November.  The  Na- 
tional army  maintained  an  unbroken 
line,  with  open  communications  from 
the  north  end  of  Lookout  Mountain, 
through  Chattanooga  Valley  to  the 
north  end  of  Missionary  Bidge.  Car- 
lin had  taken  position  so  as  to  connect 
Hooker  with  the  centre ; and  Howard, 
with  the  Eleventh  corps,  having  been 
moved  up  from  the  right,  connected 
the  centre  with  Sherman.  The  Con- 
federates, having  abandoned  Chatta- 
nooga Valley,  concentrated  on  Mission- 
ary Ridge.  Their  line  extended  from 
Tunnel  Hill  to  Rossville.  Bragg’s 


m 


CHICKAMAUGA  AND  CHATTANOOGA. 


right,  consisting  of  the  divisions  of 
Cleburne,  Walker,  Cheatham,  and  Ste- 
venson, was  commanded  by  Hardee; 
his  left  was  commanded  by  Brecken- 
ridge,  and  was  composed  of  that  gen- 
eral’s own  division,  now  under  Lewis, 
and  those  of  Stewart  and  Andei'son. 
General  Grant’s  headquarters  had  been 
removed  from  Fort  Wood  to  Orchard 
Knob,  or  as  it  was  also  named,  “ Indian 
Hill” — a commanding  eminence  which 
Thomas  had  now  strongly  fortified,  and 
from  which  could  be  seen  the  embattled 
hosts  spread  out,  as  in  a vast  amphi- 
theatre. 

The  morning  of  the  25th  rose  in 
NoVi  beauty.  Far  almost  as  the  eye 
25.  could  reach,  the  sun  fell  upon  the 
compact  lines  of  polished  steel.  In 
front,  towering  up,  the  huge  form  of 
Missionary  Bidge,  its  precipitous  sides 
defying  attack,  its  summit  swarming 
with  armed  men,  and  crowned  with 
artillery ; away  to  the  right,  and  stand- 
ing out  clear  and  well-defined,  the  bold 
outlines  of  Lookout  Mountain ; Hook- 
er’s men  spread  out  in  the  valley  below 
to  the  right,  Sheiman’s  massed  in  com- 
pact phalanx  above  to  the  left,  while 
Thomas’  well-trained  bands,  eager  and 
ready  for  the  fray,  ai*e  gathered  together 
in  close  array  around  the  headquarters 
of  the  chief — such  was  the  sight  which 
met  the  eye  of  the  beholder,  as  he  stood 
on  Orchard  Knob,  on  the  morning  of 
the  day  which  was  to  witness  the  final 
struggle  and  the  crowning  National 
victory  at  Chattanooga.  It  was  a mag- 
nificent spectacle,  and  one  which  it 
rarely  falls  to  the  lot  of  mortals  to 
witness. 


At  an  early  hour  the  preparations 
were  complete.  The  sun  had  arisen, 
however,  before  the  bugle  sounded 
‘‘  Forward ! ” Hooker  had  received 
orders  to  mov^e  on  the  Confederate 
left ; Sherman  was  to  move  against  the 
right;  while  the  centre,  under  the  im- 
mediate eye  of  General  Grant,  was  to 
advance  later  in  the  day,  and  whenever 
the  developments  made  on  either  wing 
should  justify  the  attack.  Shortly  after 
sunrise.  Hooker,  who  has  left  a small 
force  on  Lookout  Mountain,  is  seen, 
with  the  mass  of  his  troops,  moving 
down  the  eastern  slope  of  the  moun- 
tain, and  sweeping  across  the  valley. 
Sherman  moves  at  the  same  time  on 
the  Confederate  right ; and  it  soon  be- 
gins to  be  evident  that  Bragg,  believ- 
ing that  the  main  attack  is  to  be  made 
on  his  right,  is  massing  his  troops  on 
Sherman’s  front.  A fierce  artillery 
duel  at  once  commenced  between  Or- 
chard Knob  and  Missionary  Ridge. 
Hooker,  pressing  on  towards  Rossville 
Gap,  encountered  an  unexpected  obsta- 
cle at  Chattanooga  Creek.  The  bridge 
had  been  destroyed  by  the  Confederates 
as  they  retired  from  the  valley  in  the 
early  morning.  It  was  an  unfortunate 
circumstance,  necessitating  as  it  did  a 
delay  of  three  hours.  As  soon  as 
the  bridge  was  completed,  the  troops 
were  pushed  over.  Rossville  Gap  was 
quickly  occupied ; and  Hooker,  moving 
Osterhaus  along  the  east  side  of  the 
ridge,  Geary  at  its  base,  with  the  bat- 
teries, on  the  west  side,  and  Cruft  on 
the  ridge  itself,  marched  northward, 
driving  the  enemy  before  him.  The 
Confederates  did  not  yield  without 


MAP  OF  THE  COUNTRY  BETWEEN  MURFREESBORO’  AND  CHATTANOOGA, 

TENNESSEE. 


MI3SI0:N'AEY  ridge. 


569 


offering  a stubborn  resistance.  It  was 
found  impossible,  however,  to  with- 
stand the  energy  and  dash  of  the  Na- 
tional troops.  The  skirmishers  were 
speedily  driven  in  and  pressed  back 
upon  the  main  body.  Cruft,  now  form- 
ing his  column  in  battle-line,  fell  with 
all  his  weight  on  the  front  line  of  the 
enemy,  Geary  and  Osterhaus,  on  both 
flanks,  opening  a murderous  fire.  The 
fighting  continued  till  sunset,  when  the 
Confederates,  having  been  driven  stead- 
ily backward  from  one  strong  position 
to  another,  although  they  resisted  nobly, 
broke  and  fled  in  wild  confusion.  The 
fugitives  who  sought  safety  by  running 
down  the  eastern  slope,  fell  into  the 
hands  of  Osterhaus ; those  who  tried 
to  escape  by  the  western  slope,  fell  into 
the  hands  of  Geary ; while  those  who 
retreated  along  the  ridge  ran  helplessly 
into  the  ranks  of  Johnson’s  division  of 
the  Fourteenth  corps,  and  were  cap- 
tured. Shortly  after  sunset,  the  victory 
on  the  National  right  was  complete. 
Breckenridge  had  proved  himself  no 
match  for  Hooker. 

Let  us  now  see  what  was  going  on 
towards  the  left  and  at  the  centre. 
On  the  morning  of  the  25th,  Sherman 
was  in  the  saddle  before  it  was  light. 
During  the  night  he  had  strongly  en- 
trenched his  position.  His  order  of 
battle  was  similar  to  that  of  Hooker. 
General  Corse,  with  three  of  his  own 
regiments  and  one  of  Lightburn’s, 
moved  forward  on  the  crest  of  the  hill; 
General  Morgan  L.  Smith,  with  his 
command,  advanced  along  the  eastern 
base  ; while  Colonel  Loomis,  supported 
by  the  two  reserve  brigades  of  General  i 


John  E.  Smith,  advanced  along  the 
western  base.  The  brigades  of  Cock- 
erell and  Alexander,  and  a portion  of 
Lightburn’s,  remained  behind,  holding 
the  position  first  occupied.  Almost 
from  the  commencement  of  the  forward 
movement,  the  advancing  columns  were 
exposed  to  the  guns  of  the  enemy. 
Without  experiencing  any  very  great 
inconvenience,  Sherman’s  troops  de- 
scended the  hill  on  which  they  had 
been  drawn  up  in  battle  order,  crossed 
the  valley  in  their  front,  and  rushed 
up  the  opposite  hill,  which  they  seized 
and  held.  At  this  point,  it  was  dis- 
covered that  the  ground  to  be  traversed 
was  not  so  free  from  obstructions  as 
had  been  supposed.  It  was  not  a con- 
tinuous ridge,  but  rather  a chain  of 
hills,  each  well  wooded  and  fortified. 
This  secondary  crest,  on  which  Corse 
had  obtained  a foothold,  was  com- 
manded by  a higher  hill,  and  thus 
exposed  to  a plunging  fire.  Between 
these  hills  was  a deep  gorge,  through 
which  passed  the  railroad  tunnel,  and 
in  which  the  Confederate  commander 
sheltered  his  masses  until  they  could 
be  brought  into  action.  Corse  called 
forward  his  reserves,  and  asked  for  re- 
inforcements. The  ridge,  however, 
was  narrow;  and  as  the  enemy,  from 
his  superior  position,  could  bring  to 
bear  upon  the  assaulting  columns  a 
destructive,  enfilading  fire  of  artillery 
and  musketry,  it  was  not  well  to  crowd 
the  men.  A severe  hand-to-hand  con- 
test ensued,  and  continued  for  more 
than  an  hour.  The  tide  of  battle 
ebbed  and  flowed,  victory  now  leaning 
to  the  one  side  and  now  to  the  other. 


570 


CHICKAMAUGA  AND  CHATTANOOGA. 


It  was  a desperate  grapple,  and  the 
loss  of  life  was  terrible.  No  decided 
progress  was  being  made  on  either 
side.  Corse  found  it  impossible  to 
carry  the  works  in  his  front ; the  Con- 
federates were  equally  unable  to  drive 
him  from  the  position  he  had  won. 
The  columns  which,  under  Loomis  and 
Smith,  moved  along  the  sides  of  the 
ridge,  encountering  fewer  difficulties, 
were  attended  with  better  success. . 
Smith  kept  gaining  ground  on  the  left 
spur  of  Missionary  Ridge,  while  Loomis 
on  his  side  got  abreast  of  the  tunnel 
and  the  railroad  embankment.  The  fire 
of  the  one  and  the  other,  striking  the 
Confederates  on  both  flanks,  and  slight- 
ly in  rear  of  their  front,  had  the  effect 
of  withdrawing  attention,  and  thus  to 
a certain  extent  of  relieving  the  as- 
saulting party  on  the  crest  of  the  hill. 

It  was  now  about  three  o’clock. 
The  battle  was  raging  with  tremen- 
dous fury.  Column  after  column  of 
the  enemy  came  streaming  down  upon 
Sherman’s  men,  gun  upon  gun  pouring 
upon  them  its  concentrated  shot  from 
every  hill  and  spur,  as  they  vainly 
struggled  in  the  valley  and  attempted 
to  force  their  way  to  the  further  height. 
Neither,  however,  was  gaining  any  ad- 
vantage. Almost  at  the  crisis  of  the 
fight,  it  seemed  to  the  anxious  watch- 
ers at  Chattanooga  as  if  Sherman  M^as 
losing  ground.  There  was,  indeed,  a 
backward  movement.  It  had  seemed 
to  General  J.  E.  Smith  that  Colonel 
Wolcott,  who  now  commanded  on  the 
crest  — Corse  having  been  wounded 
early  in  the  day — was  sorely  pressed, 
and  in  ‘ danger  of  being  overpowered. 


He,  therefore,  sent  to  his  aid  the  two  re- 
serve brigades  of  Runion  and  Mathias. 
Having  crossed  the  intervening  fields 
and  climbed  the  hillside,  in  spite  of  a 
most  destructive  fire  of  artillery  and 
musketry,^ they  effected  a junction  with 
Wolcott.  The  ridge,  however,  being 
narrow,  they  were  forced  to  take  posi- 
tion on  the  western  face  of  the  hill, 
where,  being  exposed  to  attack  on  right 
and  rear,  the  enemy,  rushing  from  the 
tunnel  gorge,  fell  upon  them  in  over- 
whelming numbers,  driving  them  down 
the  hill  and  back  to  the  lower  end  of 
the  field.  There  they  were  re-formed ; 
and  the  Confederates,  who  had  ventured 
to  pursue,  were  struck  heavily  on  their 
flank,  and  compelled  to  retire  to  the 
shelter  of  their  works  on  the  wooded 
hills.  It  was  this  backward  movement 
of  Smith’s  brigades  which,  being  seen 
at  Chattanooga,  created  the  impression 
that  a repulse  had  been  sustained  by  the 
National  left.  Sherman  has  taken  some 
pains  to  correct  this  false  impression, 
and  informs  us  that  the  “real  attack- 
ing columns  of  General  Corse,  General 
Loomis  and  General  Morgan  L.  Smith, 
were  not  repulsed,”  but,  on  the  con- 
trary, held  their  ground,  and  struggled 
“ all  day  persistently,  stubbornly  and 
well.” 

Long  and  wearily  had  Sherman 
waited  for  the  attack  in  the  centre. 
An  occasional  shot  from  Orchard 
Knob,  and  some  artillery  and  musket- 
ry fire,  away  in  the  direction  of  Look- 
out, were  the  only  signs  of  activity  in 
the  National  ranks  on  his  right.  It 
was  not  until  shortly  after  three 
o’clock,  that  he  saw  a white  line  of 


THE  THUNDERBOLT  HURLED. 


571 


smoke  in  front  of  Orchard  Knob — the 
line  extending  further  and  further  to 
the  right.  It  was  evident  that  some- 
thing decisive  was  happening.  He  had 
faith  in  the  result ; for  he  knew  that, 
by  his  repeated  and  persistent  attacks, 
he  had  compelled  Bragg  to  concentrate 
large  masses  of  his  troops  on  his  own 
right.  He  had  thus  weakened  the 
Confederate  centre,  and  created  the 
opportunity  for  Grant  and  Thomas. 

During  these  hours  of  sore  trial  and 
deep  anxiety,  Grant’s  attention  was 
quite  as  much  directed  to  the  left  as 
was  that  of  Sherman  to  the  centre. 
Grant’s  headquarters,  as  we  have  seen, 
were  at  Orchard  Knob.  He  had  a 
commanding  view  of  the  entire  battle- 
ground. He  knew  that  Bragg  was 
concentrating  on  his  own  right,  and, 
determined  to  penetrate  the  National 
left  and  force  his  way  to  Chattanooga, 
was  hurling  against  Sherman  his  well- 
disciplined  legions  in  overwhelming 
masses.  He  feared  lest  his  trusted 
lieutenant,  sorely  pressed,  should  be 
yielding  to  impatience,  because  of  the 
continued  inaction  at  the  centre.  But 
it  was  necessary  to  wait  for  Hooker, 
who,  as  has  been  stated,  had  been  de- 
layed three  hours  in  reconstructing  the 
bridge  across  Chattanooga  Creek.  It 
was  desirable,  at  least,  that  the  Con- 
federate left  should  be  well  engaged, 
as  well  as  the  Confederate  right,  be- 
fore the  decisive  blow  was  dealt  at  the 
centre.  With  any  other  commander  on 
his  left.  Grant  might  have  risked  too 
much  by  leaving  him  so  long,  unaided 
or  unrelieved,  to  struggle  against  the 
strong  position  and  the  ever-increasing 


numbers  of  the  enemy.  Grant,  how- 
ever, had  not  forgotten  Shiloh.  He 
remembered  how,  on  that  day,  at  the 
foot  t)f  the  bridge,  over  Snake  Creek, 
Sherman  had  stood  like  a wall  of  ada- 
mant, his  men  massed  around  him,  and 
presenting  to  the  almost  triumphant 
foe  what  seemed  a huge  and  solid 
shield  of  shining  steel,  effectually  re- 
sisting, and  ultimately  turning  the  tide 
of  battle.  What  he  had  done  then, 
he  had,  on  many  a battle  field  since, 
proved  his  ability  and  willingness  to 
do  again.  Grant  was  asking  much 
from  his  lieutenant;  but  he  felt  con- 
vinced that  Sherman  would  not  be 
found  wanting.  Meanwhile,  he  had 
the  satisfaction  of  perceiving  that  his 
plan  was  working  admirably.  Bragg, 
completely  out-generalled,  w^as  weak- 
ening his  own  centre,  and  preparing 
for  him  his  opportunity. 

It  was  now  half-past  three  o’clock. 
Grant  was  pacing  to  and  fro  on 
Orchard  Knob.  Concerned  for  the 
welfare  of  Sherman,  seeing  his  oppor- 
tunity rapidly  ripening,  and  impatient 
to  strike,  yet  unwilling  by  premature 
action  to  imperil  the  hoped-for  and 
what  seemed  now  the  inevitable  re- 
sult, he  kept  turning  his  eyes  wistfully 
in  the  direction  in  which  Hooker 
should  make  his  appearance.  Still 
there  were  no  signs  of  his  coming. 
Hooker,  as  the  reader  knows,  was  suc- 
cessfully moving  along  the  ridge  and 
driving  the  enemy  before  him.  But 
Grant  was,  as  yet,  ignorant  at  once  of 
the  cause  of  his  delay,  and  of  the  pro- 
gress he  had  made.  The  opportune 
moment,  however,  had  come.  He  saw 


CHICKAMAUGA  AND  CHATTANOOGA. 


that  Bragg  had  greatly  weakened  his 
centre  to  support  his  right ; and  having 
faith  that  Hooker  must  be  close  at 
hand,  he  gave  Thomas  the  order  to 
advance.  The  thunderbolt  was  hurled. 
The  signal  guns  were  fired — one — two 
three — four — five — six  ; and  the  divi- 
sions of  Wood,  Baird,  Sheridan  and 
Johnson,  long  since  impatient  of  delay, 
advanced  with  firm  and  steady  step. 
These  were  preceded  by  a double  line 
of  skirmishers,  drawn  mostly  from  the 
divisions  of  Wood  and  Sheridan.  The 
orders  were  to  carry  the  rifle-pits  at  the 
base  of  the  ridge,  and  then  to  re-form 
and  push  their  way  to  the  summit. 
The  whole  movement  was  conducted 
with  the  regularity  and  precision  of 
clock-work.  The  skirmishers  dashed 
forward,  the  main  body  following 
within  easy  supporting  distance.  Mis- 
sionary Bidge  all  at  once  seems  ablaze. 
On  all  the  forts  and  batteries  the 
heavy  guns  open  fire ; and,  from  their 
hollow  mouths  they  bellow  harsh 
thunder,  and  vomit  forth  their  missiles 
of  destruction.  Full  thirty  guns  are 
pouring  shot  and  shell  into  the  advanc- 
ing columns.  Nothing,  however,  can 
cool  the  ardor  or  restrain  the  impetu- 
osity of  the  National  soldiers.  “Roll- 
ing on  the  foe,”  on  moves  this  “fiery 
mass  of  living  valor.”  The  picture  of 
the  poet  becomes  here  a living  reality. 
The  brigades  of  Hazen  and  Willich  are 
already  at  the  base  of  the  mountain. 
Like  “bees  out  of  a hive,”  to  use  the 
expressive  words  of  General  Grant, 
the  gray-coated  Confederates  are  seen 
swarming  out  of  the  rifle-pits  and  rush- 
ing up  the  hillside.  Fired  now  with 


the  wildest  enthusiasm,  the  brave  Na- 
tionals, scarcely  taking  time  to  re-form, 
push  their  way  up  the  steep  and  rug- 
ged sides  of  the  mountain.  They  are 
fully  exposed  now  to  a terrific  fire  from 
the  enemy’s  guns,  on  the  heights  above 
them.  Shell,  canister,  shrapnel,  bullets 
are  falling  upon  them  with  deadly  ef- 
fect. Nothing  daunted,  however,  on 
they  press ; and,  from  Orchard  Knob, 
the  National  colors  are  seen  fluttering 
higher  and  still  higher,  and  gradually 
nearing  the  summit.  Order  now  be- 
gins to  disappear.  The  brigades,  partly 
because  of  the  nature  of  the  ground, 
and  partly  because  of  the  severity  of 
the  fire,  break  up  into  groups.  There 
is,  however,  neither  lack  of  purpose, 
nor  lack  of  enthusiasm.  Every  group 
has  its  flag,  and,  in  wedge-like  foi'm, 
each  eager  to  be  first  and  emulous  of 
the  other,  is  seen  pressing  onward  and 
upward.  It  seems  as  if  the  color-bearers 
are  running  a race.  To  plant  the  flrst 
color  on  the  summit  appears  to  be  the 
ambition  of  every  brigade,  of  every 
group,  of  every  soldier.  Now  they  are 
clambering  over  the  rugged  ledges,  now 
they  are  seeking  momentary  shelter 
in  the  ravines  or  behind  the  overhang- 
ing rocks ; but  they  are  ever,  in  spite 
of  the  heavy  guns  and  the  murderous 
volleys  of  musketry  from  the  rifle-pits, 
nearing  the  summit. 

Meanwhile,  the  work  of  destruction 
had  been  terrible.  The  color-bearers 
had  suffered  fearfully.  The  first  to 
reach  the  summit  was  a group  of  men 
from  the  First  Ohio,  and  a few  others 
from  other  regiments,  under  the  lead 
of  Lieutenant-Colonel  Langdon.  Six 


CAPTURE  OF  LOOKOUT  MOUNTAIN. 


VICTORY. 


573 


color-bearers  of  this  party  had  fallen, 
when  Langdon,  waving  forward  his 
men,  and  leaping  over  the  crest,  was 
instantly  shot  down.  The  breach,  how- 
ever, had  been  made ; and  the  brigades 
of  Hazen  and  Willich  were  soon  on 
the  summit.  These  were  quickly  fol- 
lowed by  the  brigades  of  Sheridan’s  di- 
vision— Sheridan  himself  taking  an  ac- 
tive part,  and  specially  commanding 
the  attention  of  General  Grant.  The 
National  advance  was  within  a few 
hundred  yards  of  Bragg’s  headquar- 
ters. There  were  still  desperate  hand- 
to-hand  struggles  after  the  Nationals 
had  reached  the  summit.  But,  as  the 
shouting  victors  came  pouring  into  the 
works,  bayoneting  the  cannoneers  at 
their  guns,  the  bold  and  resolute  front 
gave  way.  It  was  now  sunset.  The 
Confederates  were  in  full  retreat,  their 
own  guns  turned  upon  them  by  the 
triumphant  Nationals.  It  was  only 
with  difficulty  that  Bragg  was  able 
to  make  good  his  escape,  along  with 
Breckenridge,  who  by  this  time  had 
joined  him.  Missionary  Ridge  was  now 
occupied  and  held  by  the  National 
troops.  Hooker,  as  we  have  seen,  had 
been  victorious  on  the  right ; Sherman 
had  held  his  ground,  and,  after  a gal- 
lant and  protracted  struggle,  against  su- 
perior numbers,  had  driven  the  enemy 
from  his  front ; and  now  the  brave  and 
well-trusted  soldiers  of  the  army  of  the 
Cumberland  had  pierced  and  routed 
the  Confederate  centre.  The  battle  of 
Chattanooga  had  been  fought  and  won. 
It  was  another  great  victory  for  Gen- 
eral Grant.  Bragg  was  one  of  the 
most  trusted  leaders  in  the  Confed- 


erate army,  and  a special  favorite  of 
Jefferson  Davis.  He  was  defeated  not 
I by  superior  numbers,  not  by  superior 
bravery,  but  by  superior  tactics.  He 
was  defeated,  because  he  was  out-gen- 
eralled.  He  committed  his  first  mis- 
take when  he  detached  Longstreet, 
with  his  command,  and  sent  him  to 
operate  against  Burnside,  at  Knox- 
ville. He  committed  his  second  mis- 
take when  he  weakened  his  centre,  and 
moved  his  troops  to  the  right  to  ope- 
rate against  Shei-man.  Both  were  se- 
rious blunders.  It  is  surprising  how  a 
general  of  Bragg’s  experience  could 
have  committed  the  one  or  the  other, 
in  the  presence  of  such  a commander 
as  Grant.  The  first  blunder  encour- 
aged immediate  action,  concentration, 
and  aggressive  effort  against  Missionary 
Ridge.  The  second  blunder  provoked 
the  attack  on  the  Confederate  centre, 
wffiich  decided  the  battle.  In  the 
glory  resulting  from  the  victory,  Sher- 
man and  Hooker  and  Thomas  were 
fully  entitled  to  share.  Each  had  ac- 
complished the  task  assigned  him, 
nobly  and  with  complete  success.  It 
was  a victory  of  which  the  whole 
army,  from  the  general  in  command 
down  to  the  humblest  of  the  rank  and 
file,  had  reason  to  be  proud.  “ Im- 
partial history,”  says  Coppee,  whose 
description  of  Chattanooga  sometimes 
rises  to  the  grandeur  of  an  epic,  “ will 
be  just  to  all  the  acts  and  the  actors, 
but  above  them  all  will  shine,  in 
golden  characters,  the  name  of  the 
great  commander,  who,  upon  the  heels 
of  one  great  conquest,  transformed  a 
beleaguered  army  of  starving  soldiers 


574 


CHICKAMAUGA  AND  CHATTANOOGA. 


into  fiery  columns  of  attack,  and 
snatched  an  immortal  victory  out  of 
the  jaws  of  disaster  and  anticipated 
ruin.  That  man  was  Grant.’'  The 
modesty  of  the  man — the  utter  absence 
of  vain-glory — is  strikingly  revealed  in 
the  despatch  which  he  sent  to  General 
Halleck  immediately  after  the  battle. 
“Although  the  battle  lasted,”  he  says, 
“from  early  dawn  till  dark  this  even- 
ing, I believe  I am  not  premature  in 
announcing  a complete  victory  over 
Bragg.  Lookout  Mountain  top,  all  the 
rifle-pits  in  Chattanooga  Valley,  and 
Missionary  Bidge  entire,  have  been 
carried,  and  are  now  held  by  us.” 

The  final  struggle  of  the  day  was  in 
the  neighborhood  of  the  tunnel  on 
Thomas’  left  and  in  Sherman’s  front. 
At  that  point  the  Confederates  made  a 
most  obstinate  resistance.  This  resist- 
ance, and  the  darkness  which  intervened, 
prevented  an  immediate  pursuit.  Dur- 
ing the  night.  Missionary  Ridge  blazed 
with  Union  camp  fires,  the  Confede- 
rates having  fallen  back  in  the  direction 
of  Ringgold,  by  way  of  Chickamauga 
Station.  Bragg  left  behind  him  some 
600  prisoners,  besides  a large  number 
of  stragglers,  40  guns,  upwards  of 
7000  small  arms,  and  a large  quantity 
of  ammunition. 

Next  morning  Sherman,  Palmer  and 
Hooker  were  in  eager  pursuit. 
26.  Sherman  pushed  on  towards 
Greysville,  passing  Chickamauga  Sta- 
tion, where  he  found  everything  in 
flames.  Palmer  and  Hooker  advanced 
by  the  Rossville  road,  intending  to 
strike  the  railroad  between  Greysville 
and  Ringgold.  At  the  latter  place. 


Hooker  came  into  contact  with  the  Con- 
federate rear,  under  Cleburne,  who  was 
covering  Bragg’s  retreat.  A severe 
encounter  took  place,  Cleburne  turning 
and  offering  a most  stubborn  resistance. 
The  battle  lasted  the  greater  part  oi 
the  day,  both  sides  suffering  severely. 
Cleburne  did  not  retreat  until  he  had 
inflicted  on  the  Nationals  a loss  of  432 
men,  of  whom  65  were  killed,  some 
of  them  being  most  valuable  officers. 
The  Confederates  left  on  the  field  130 
in  killed  and  wounded.  The  pursuit 
was  now  discontinued,  as  Grant  felt  it 
to  be  his  first  and  most  important  duty  to 
relieve  Burnside,  who  was  at  that  time 
closely  besieged  in  Knoxville  by  the 
Confederate  forces,  under  Longstreet. 
Bragg’s  army  continued  the  retreat  to 
Dalton,  where  it  established  a fortified 
camp.  The  Nationals  fell  back  towards 
Chattanooga ; and  the  campaign  against 
Bragg  ended. 

The  immediate  result  of  the  victory 
at  Chattanooga  was  the  relief  of  Knox- 
ville. With  a brief  account  of  the 
operations  which  took  place  in  that 
direction,  we  shall  close  this  chapter. 

Burnside,  it  will  be  remembered, 
after  having  been  relieved  of  the  com- 
mand of  the  army  of  the  Potomac,  was 
assigned,  on  the  26th  of  March,  to  the 
command  of  the  department  of  the  Ohio. 
His  headquarters  were  at  Cincinnati ; 
and  his  army,  about  20,000  strong,  was 
at  Camp  Nelson,  near  Richmond,  Ken- 
tuck}^  When  Rosecranz  commenced 
his  onward  movement  towards  Chatta- 
nooga, Burnside,  who  had  been  ordered 
to  co-operate  with  him,  and  to  effect  a 
junction  between  his  own  right  and 


KNOXVILLE. 


575 


the  left  of  Rosecranz,  commenced,  on 
the  16th  of  August,  his  march  for  East 
Tennessee.  That  district  of  country  was 
then  held  by  the  Confederate  general, 
Buckner,  whose  headquarters  were  at 
Knoxville.  Burnside,  more  intent  on 
restoring  the  authority  of  the  National 
government  in  East  Tennessee,  moved 
in  the  direction  of  Knoxville.  We 
have  already  shown  how  Buckner  re- 
tired at  his  approach,  and  with  what 
enthusiasm  Burnside  and  the  National 
troops  were  received  in  that  town. 
Burnside  remained  in  Knoxville,  al- 
though repeatedly  ordered  to  rein- 
force Rosecranz,  believing  it  to  be 
all-important  that  the  place  should 
be  permanently  occupied  by  National 
troops. 

Early  in  November,  as  we  have 
seen,  Bragg  detached  Longstreet,  with 
12,000  men,  and  a heavy  body  of  cav- 
alry, with  instructions  to  move  against 
Burnside.  Longstreet’s  march  was 
less  rapid,  and,  in  consequence,  less 
successful  than  it  might  have  been. 
His  troops  were  in  wretched  condition ; 
and  reinforcements  and  supplies  did 
not  arrive  as  he  expected.  It  was  not 
until  the  14th  of  the  month  that  he 
was  able  to  cross  the  Tennessee  at 
Hough’s  Ferry,  six  miles  below  Lou- 
don. Burnside’s  advance,  which  was 
at  Loudon,  fell  back  as  far  as  Camp- 
bell’s Station,  where,  on  the  16th,  they 
turned  upon  their  pursuers.  A severe 
encounter  took  place,  Burnside  holding 
his  own  against  superior  numbers.  Ul- 
timately, however,  he  was  compelled  to 
PfoT.  fall  back  within  the  defenses  at 
17, 18.  Knoxville ; and,  on  the  17th  and 


18th,  he  was  surrounded  by  Long- 
street.  Attempts  were  made  to  storm 
the  beleaguered  town;  but  Burnside 
being  vigilant,  and  having  made  excel- 
lent arrangements  for  defense,  these 
attempts  failed.  Longstreet,  already 
fearing  that  Bragg  might  not  be  able 
to  cope  successfully  with  his  skilful 
adversary,  and  knowing  that  in  the 
event  of  a Confederate  defeat  at  Chat- 
tanooga, Grant  would  hasten  to  the  aid 
of  Burnside,  pressed  forward  the  siege 
with  the  utmost  vigor.  On  the  ]Vov, 
25th,  he  threw  a considerable  25. 
force  across  the  Holston.  His  object 
was  to  seize  the  heights  which  com- 
mand Knoxville  from  the  south  side 
of  the  river.  Vigorously  opposed  by 
the  National  forces,  he  was  not  quite 
successful.  He  was  unable  to  seize 
the  desired  position;  but  he  obtained 
possession  of  a knob  a little  lower 
down,  from  which,  at  an  elevation  of 
one  hundred  and  fifty  feet  above  the 
level  of  the  river,  he  had  complete 
command  of  Fort  Sanders,  some  five 
hundred  yards  to  the  north. 

This  advantage  had  just  been  gained, 
to  the  immense  delight  of  the  Con- 
federates, when  information  reached 
Longstreet  of  the  defeat  of  Bragg  at 
Chattanooga.  It  had  been  Longstreet’s 
hope  that,  if  he  could  not  take  the 
place  by  assault,  he  would  reduce  it 
by  famine.  Relief  was  now  at  hand. 
Famine  was  out  of  the  question.  If 
Knoxville  was  to  be  taken,  it  must  be 
taken  by  storm.  Preparations  for  a 
final  effort  were  accordingly  hurried 
forward.  The  point  chosen  for  attack 
was  Fort  Sanders,  on  the  northwest 


576 


CHICKAMAUGA  AND  CHATTANOOGA. 


angle  of  the  fortifications,  and  com- 
manding an  approach  by  the  river. 
It  was  a work  of  great  strength,  the 
ditch  being  ten  feet  deep,  and  the 
parapet  of  more  than  ordinary  height. 
Around  and  in  front  of  it,  several 
acres  of  thick  pine  timber  had  been 
slashed ; and  a perfect  entanglement 
of  wire-work  had  been  formed  by  con- 
necting stump  with  stump.  There 
were,  besides,  numerous  rifie-pits  and 
abatis.  The  fort  was  occupied  by  the 
Seventy-Ninth  New  York;  the  Twenty- 
Ninth  Massachusetts;  two  companies  of 
the  Second  and  one  of  the  Twentieth 
Michigan.  The  armament  consisted  of 
four  20-pounder  Parrott  guns.  Lieu- 
tenant Benjamin,  Burnside’s  chief  of 
artillery;  four  light  12-pounders,  com- 
manded by  Buckley;  and  two  3-inch 
guns.  The  assaulting  party  was  com- 
posed of  three  brigades  of  McLaws’ 
division,  with  those  of  Wolford,  Hum- 
phreys, Anderson  and  Bogart.  They 
were  picked  men,  the  fiower  of  Long- 
street’s  army. 

In  the  gray  of  the  morning  of  the 
]^ov.  29th,  the  assault  was  made,  with 

29*  a vigor  and  determination  not 
surpassed  in  the  previous  history  of  the 
war.  What  with  the  fierce  yells  of 
the  Confederates,  the  rattle  of  mus- 
ketry, the  screaming  of  shells,  the 
thunder  of  artillery,  the  tumult  for  a 
time  was  awful.  The  Confederates, 
as  they  approached,  were  received  with 
a deadly  fire  from  the  batteries  of  the 
fort.  Nothing  daunted,  however,  by 
the  destructive  missiles  which  flew 
thick  and  fast  around  them,  or  by  the 
sight  of  their  fallen  comrades,  on  they 


pressed,  through  the  abatis^  across  the 
ditch  and  up  the  parapet,  some  of  them 
forcing  their  way  through  the  embra- 
sures. The  obstacles  encountered,  the 
wire  net-work  particularly,  made  their 
progress  slow,  and  consequently  kept 
them  long  exposed  to  the  double-shot- 
ted guns  which  Ferrero,  the  commander 
of  the  fort,  kept  in  active  play.  When 
the  assailants  reached  the  parapet,  their 
ranks  were  greatly  thinned,  but  their 
spirits  were  not  subdued.  One  oflScer 
actually  reached  the  summit,  and,  plant- 
ing upon  it  the  flag  of  the  Thirteenth 
Mississippi,  called  for  surrender.  It 
was  a vain  call ; for  the  next  moment 
his  body,  piei*ced  by  a dozen  bullets, 
the  flag  still  in  his  hand,  was  rolling 
into  the  ditch.  Hand  grenades  were 
freely  used  by  the  defenders ; and 
they  had  a terrible  effect.  The  as- 
sault, gallant  as  it  was,  proved  a com- 
plete failure.  It  was  tried  a second 
time  by  another  column ; but  the  re- 
sult was  the  same.  The  fighting  was 
discontinued.  A truce  was  granted  to 
the  Confederates  to  carry  away  their 
wounded  and  to  bury  their  dead. 
Longstreet,  still  hoping  against  hope, 
and  unwilling  to  retire,  maintained  the 
siege.* 

Meanwhile,  relief  was  coming  from 
Grant  to  Burnside.  Why  was  this  re- 

* The  ground  in  front  of  the  fort  was  strewn  with 
the  dead  and  wounded.  In  the  ditch  alone,  were  over 
200  dead  and  wounded.  ‘*In  this  terrible  ditch,' 
says  Pollard,  “the  dead  were  piled  eight  or  ten  feet 
deep.  In  comparatively  an  instant  of  time,  we  lost  700 
men  in  killed  and  wounded  and  prisoners.  Never, 
excepting  at  Gettysburg,  was  there,  in  the  history 
of  the  war,  a disaster  adorned  with  the  glory  of  such 
devout  courage,  as  Longstreet's  repulse  at  Knoxville. ' 
— Third  Year  of  the  TFar,  p.  1G3. 


THE  SIEGE  RAISED. 


577 


lief  so  long  delayed  ? On  the  evening 
of  the  25th,  as  soon  as  success  at  Chat- 
tanooga had  been  assured,  Grant  had 
ordered  General  Gordon  Granger  to 
start  for  the  relief  of  Knoxville,  with 
his  own  Fourth  corps,  and  detachments 
from  others — 20,000  in  all.  Granger 
was  to  move  with  four  days’  rations,  ar- 
rangements having  been  made  to  send 
after  him  a steamer  with  supplies. 
When  Grant  returned  from  the  front  on 
the  28th  he  found,  much  to  his  aston- 
ishment, that  Granger  had  not  yet  got 
off,  and  that  he  was  preparing  to 
move  “with  reluctance  and  complaints.” 
Grant  fell  back  upon  Sherman,  who 
was  ever  willing  and  ever  ready.  “ I 
am  inclined  to  think,”  said  Grant,  in 
a letter  to  Sherman,  “I  shall  have  to 
send  you.  In  plain  words,  you  will 
assume  command  of  all  the  forces  now 
moving  up  the  Tennessee.”  When  he 
received  the  letter  from  Grant,  Sherman 
was  at  Calhoun,  at  the  railroad  cross- 
ing of  the  Hiawassee.  If  he  had  been 
less  of  a soldier,  he  might  easily  have 
found  cause  of  complaint.  It  was  only 
seven  days  since  he  had  marched  his 
troops  from  the  west  side  of  the  Ten- 
nessee, with  only  two  days’  rations, 
without  change  of  clothing,  with  but  a 
single  blanket-  or  coat  to  a man,  from 
himself  to  the  private  soldier.  What 
provisions  they  had  were  picked  up  by 
the  way.  Murmur  or  complaint,  how- 
ever, with  Sherman,  there  was  none. 
To  hear  was  to  obey.  It  was  enough 
for  him  that  12,000  of  his  fellow-sol- 
diers were  beleaguered  at  Knoxville, 
eighty-four  miles  away,  and  that,  if  not 
relieved  within  three  days,  they  might 


be  at  the  mercy  of  the  enemy.  With 
his  hardy  and  untiring  veterans,  Sher- 
man was  quickly  on  his  way.  The 
roads  were  bad;  and,  as  the  pontoon 
bridge  at  Loudon  had  been  destroyed, 
there  was  unexpected  difficulty  and 
consequent  delay.  After  considerable 
progress  had  been  made,  the  troops 
were  compelled  to  turn  to  the  east,  and 
to  trust  to  General  Burnside’s  bridge 
at  Knoxville.  A bridge  was  flung 
across  the  Little  Tennessee,  at  Morgan- 
town ; and  by  daybreak  on  the  Dec# 
5th  of  December,  the  entire  Fif- 
teenth  corps  was  over.  Meanwhile 
the  cavalry  command,  which  had  moved 
forward  in  advance,  had  reached  Knox- 
ville on  the  3d  of  December,  the  very 
day  on  which  Burnside  expected  his 
supplies  would  give  out.  On  the  night 
of  the  5th,  a messenger  from  Burnside 
arrived  at  Sherman’s  headquarters,  an- 
nouncing that  Longstreet  was  in  full 
retreat  towards  Virginia,  and  that  the 
National  cavalry  were  in  pursuit.  As 
soon  as  Sherman’s  cavalry  appeared, 
Longstreet,  discovering  that  his  flank 
was  turned,  raised  the  siege,  and  re- 
treated towards  K-ussellville  in  the  di- 
rection of  Virginia.  The  National 
cavalry  followed  for  some  distance  in 
close  pursuit.  Thus  ended  the  siege 
of  Knoxville. 

Burnside  had  offered  a noble  resist- 
ance, and  had  retrieved  some  of  the 
laurels  lost  at  Fredericksburg.  He 
was  not  without  obligations  to  Sher- 
man; nor  was  he  ungrateful.  In  a 
letter  to  that  general,  he  fully  acknowl- 
edged those  obligations,  and  thanked 
both  him  and  his  command  for  so 


078 


CHICKAMAUGA  AXD  CHATTANOOGA. 


promptly  coming  to  bis  relief.  “ I am 
satisfied,”  he  said,  “that  your  approach 
served  to  raise  the  siege.”  Sherman, 
too,  had  great  reason  to  be  proud  of 
himself  and  his  command.  They  had 
been  constantly  in  motion  since  they 
le  t the  Big  Black  in  Mississippi.  For 
long  periods  they  had  been  without 
regular  rations;  and  the  men  had 
marched  through  mud  and  over  rocks, 
sometimes  barefooted,  without  a mur- 
mur and  without  a moment’s  delay. 
After  a march  of  over  400  miles,  with- 
out sleep  for  three  successive  nights, 
they  crossed  the  Tennessee,  fought 
their  part  in  the  battle  of  Chattanooga, 
pursued  the  enemy  out  of  Tennessee, 
and  then  turned  more  than  120  miles 
north,  and  compelled  Longstreet  to 
raise  the  siege  of  Knoxville.  After 
the  siege  was  raised,  Sherman,  with 
consent  of  Burnside,  leaving  only  Gran- 
ger’s command,  fell  back  to  the  line  of 
the  Hiawassee. 

The  victories  at  Chattanooga  and 
Knoxville  produced  very  different 
states  of  feeling  in  the  North  and 
the  South.  There  was  great  indig- 

Foet  Sanders. — This  place  was  named  after  Briga- 
dier-General William  P.  Sanders,  who  received  his 
death- wound  while  gallantly  resisting  the  attack  made 
on  the  18th  of  November.  Sanders  was  a native  of 
Kentucky,  and  a graduate  of  West  Point.  He  had  al- 
ready made  himself  conspicuous  by  l.is  deeds  of  daring, 
and  had  secured  the  confidence  both  of  his  superior 
officers  and  of  the  rank  and  file ; but,  by  his  gallantry 
during  the  famous  and,  to  him,  fatal  encounter  on  the 
ISth,  he  won  for  himself  imperishable  renown.  In  his 
General  Field  Orders  No.  31,  and  bearing  date  Novem- 
ber 24th,  Burnside  says:  “In  memory  of  the  honored 
dead,  the  fort  in  front  of  which  he  received  his  fatal 
wound  will  be  known  hereafter  as  Fort  Sanders.”  The 


nation  among  the  Confederates;  and 
Bragg,  at  his  own  request,  was  relieved 
of  his  command.  In  the  North,  joy 
beamed  on  every  countenance,  and 
gratitude  welled  up  and  oveiflowed 
from  every  heart.  At  the  recommen- 
dation of  the  president,  the  people 
assembled  in  their  places  of  worship 
and  rendered  thanks  to  Almighty  God 
“for  His  great  adv^ancement  of  the 
National  cause.”  Honors  flowed  in 
upon  Grant.  He  received  a letter  of 
congratulation  from  the  president. 
Congress,  on  the  17th  of  Decern-  pec, 
ber,  voted  him  thanks,  also  a H. 
gold  medal,  which  was  to  be  struck 
“ with  suitable  emblems,  devices  and 
inscriptions.”  In  doing  him  honor, 
town  vied  with  town,  city  with  city. 
State  with  State,  over  the  length  and 
breadth  of  the  Union.  He  had  be- 
come ti  e National  hero. 

The  Confederates  never  recovered 
from  the  blow  received  at  Chattanooga. 
The  tide  continued  to  rise  and  swell 
and  roll  against  them.  It  wms  evident 
now  to  all  thinking  men  that  the  end 
was  i*apid]y  approaching. 

final  struggle,  for  the  possession  of  this  work,  on  the 
29th,  although  comparatively  on  a small  scale,  was,  as 
has  been  shown  in  the  text,  one  of  the  fiercest  in  the 
whole  history  of  the  war.  The  highest  valor  was  dis- 
played on  both  sides.  If  victory  on  that  day  carried 
with  it  glorj’,  defeat  was  attended  with  no  dishonor. 
The  National  troops,  one  and  all,  behaved  nobly,  and 
won  special  commendations  from  their  chief ; but  it  is 
no  disparagement  to  the  other  troops  engaged,  to  say 
that  the  heroic  defen.so  of  Fort  Sanders  added  fresh 
laurels  to  the  gallant  Seventy-Ninth  New  York  High- 
landers, who  had  already  won  distinction  at  Bull  Run, 
at  Port  Royal  Ferry,  at  James’  Island  and  at  Chantilly, 
where  the  brave  Stevens,  nobly  fighting,  fell. 


SECESSIONVILLE. 


579 


CHAPTER  XXIX. 


Operations  in  1862. T.  W.  Sherman  and  Dupont. — James’ Island. — Secession ville. — Colonel  Lamar.— General 

Stevens. — The  Gallant  Seventy-Ninth. — Pocotaligo. — Battle  of  Secessionville. — Great  Bravery  of  the  High- 
landers and  the  Michiganers. — General  Mitchell  in  Command  of  the  Department  of  the  South. — Mitchell- 
Yille. — Death  of  Mitchell. — General  Brannan  and  Mitchell’s  Plans. — General  Hunter  in  Command. — Fort  Mc- 
Allister.—Three  Attempts. — Destruction  of  the  Nashville. — A Terrific  Fire. — The  Fort  Invulnerable. — The  At- 
tempt Abandoned. — The  Case  of  the  Princess  Royal. — The  Confederate  Fleet. — The  Mercedita  and  Keystone 
State  Badly  Damaged. — Proclamation  of  Beauregard  and  Ingraham.— Judah  P.  Benjamin. — The  Confederate 
Claim. — The  National  Government  Aroused. — Misunderstanding  Between  Hunter  and  Foster. — Preparations 
for  the  Attack  on  Charleston. — The  Fortifications. — Their  Number  and  Strength. —Impregnable. — The  Na- 
tional Fleet. — Advance  of  the  Fleet. — An  Ominous  Silence. — Thunders  of  Artillery. — The  Wissahickon. — 
The  New  Ironsides. — The  Keokuk. — The  Montauk  and  Catskill. — “The  Wars  of  the  Titans.” — The  Fleet 
Overmatched. — The  Keokuk  Destroyed. — The  Retreat. — Hunter  Blamed. — “ I Could  do  Nothing  but  Pray  for 
You.” — Bravery  of  Dupont. — Fort  Sumter  the  Great  Obstacle. — “It  Must  be  got  out  of  the  Way.” — Quincy 
A.  Gillmore. — The  Atlanta. — Great  Hopes. —Dupont  Prepared  for  Her  Approach. —Great  Expectations  of  the 
Confederates. — The  Weehawken. — Captain  Rodgers. — The  Atlanta  a Prisoner. — Gillmore ’s  Plans. — Dahlgren 
Succeeds  Dupont. — Movements  on  Land  and  Water. — Higginson  and  Terry. — Fort  Wagner  Attacked.— Na- 
tional Batteries  on  Folly  Island. — Dahlgren’s  Monitors. — The  Confederates  Driven  From  Morris’  Island. — 
Assault  on  Fort  Wagner. — In  Vain. — Not  to  be  Taken  but  by  Regular  Approaches. — Work  Resumed. — 
Another  Assault. — Another  Failure. — The  Jaws  of  Death. — The  Beach  Covered  with  the  Dead  and  Dying. — 
Parallels. — Closer  and  Closer. — Gillmore’s  Preparations  Completed. — Twelve  Batteries. — Twenty-Eight  Heavy 
Guns  and  Twelve  Mortars. — An  Artillery  Duel. — Fort  Sumter  Demolished. — The  Fourth  Parallel.— Calcium 
Lights. — Preparations  for  the  Final  Assault  on  Fort  Wagner. — Forts  Wagner  and  Gregg  Abandoned. — Fearful 
Expenditure  of  Shot  and  Shell. — Attempt  to  Occupy  Fort  Sumter. — A Disastrous  Enterprise. — Two  Hundred 
Men  Killed,  Wounded  or  Captured. —Operations  Discontinued. — The  Position  Held.— Not  a Victory,  but  a 
Gain. — The  Blockade  Made  Secure. 


In  previous  chapters  of  this  work, 
1862  described  at  some  length 

the  more  important  naval  and 
coast  operations  which  were  conducted 
in  1861,  and  in  the  earlier  months  of 
1862,  special  attention  being  given  to 
the  expedition  under  Butler  and  Far- 
ragut,  to  that  under  T.  W.  Sherman  and 
Dupont,  and  to  that  under  Burnside 
and  Goldsborough.  Success  more  or 
less  brilliant  attended  them  all ; and, 
as  early  as  the  12th  of  April,  1862,  the 
first  anniversary  of  the  attack  on  Fort 
Sumter,  the  entire  Atlantic  and  Gulf 
coasts,  from  Cape  Hattei»as  to  Perdido 
Bay,  excepting  only  the  harbor  of 


Charleston  and  its  immediate  surround- 
ings, had  been  abandoned  by  the  Con- 
federates. Along  that  whole  line,  the 
National  power  was  supreme. 

Early  in  1862,  Hunter  had  succeeded 
T.  W.  Sherman  in  command  of  the 
department  of  the  South.  Hunter 
was  bent  on  doing  something  which 
might  pave  the  way  to  the  reduction  of 
Charleston.  It  would  have  been  vain 
for  Dupont,  with  the  fleet  at  his  com- 
mand, to  make  any  direct  attempt  to  pass 
the  forts.  It  was  deemed  advisable, 
however,  to  take  possession  of  Wad- 
melaw  Island,  also  John’s  and  James’ 
Islands,  and  to  advance  on  Charleston 


580 


CHARLESTON  HARBOR. 


May  by  land.  On  the  20th  of  May, 
20*  the  gunboats  Unadilla,  Pembina 
and  Ottawa  crossed  the  bar  at  the 
mouth  of  the  Stono  Kiver,  and  proceed- 
ed up  that  stream  as  far  as  its  junction 
with  W appoo  Creek,  only  a few  miles 
from  Charleston.  This  expedition  might 
have  been  attended  with  some  success 
if  the  gunboats  had  been  supported  by 
land  troops.  It  was  nearly  a fortnight, 
however,  after  the  gunboats  had  reached 
Wappoo,  when  a portion  of  the  troops, 
commanded  by  General  Benham,  ac- 
companied by  General  Hunter  himself, 
landed  on  James’  Island.  It  was  a 
week  later  when  General  Wright  ar- 
rived with  the  remainder.  Simulta- 
neously with  these  movements,  General 
Stevens  made  a successful  raid  in  the 
direction  of  Pocotaligo,  destroying  sev- 
eral miles  of  the  Charleston  and  Savan- 
nah Bailroad. 

The  appearance  of  the  gunboats  at 
Wappoo,  without  a supporting  land 
force,  was  a benefit  rather  than  an  in- 
convenience to  the  Confederates.  It 
served  to  warn  them  of  the  intention 
of  the  National  commander.  They 
were  already  in  a strong  position  at 
Secessionville,  a delightful  little  village, 
about  two  miles  from  the  Stono,  almost 
surounded  by  water,  and  accessible  by 
land  only  on  its  western  side.  At  this 
place,  the  Confederates,  under  Colonel 
J.  G.  Lamar,  taking  advantage  of  the 
time  afforded  them  by  the  non-arrival 
of  the  land  forces,  constructed  a for- 
midable battery.  Benham,  as  soon  as 
he  got  his  troops  in  order,  resolved  to 
carry  the  battery  by  assault.  It  was 
now  June;  and  the  morning  of  the 


11th  was  fixed  for  the  attack.  Lamar, 
however,  commenced  offensive  opera- 
tions the  evening  before.  Some  skirm- 
ishing followed;  and  the  meditated 
attack  was  postponed.  After  having 
made  a vain  attempt  to  silence  the  Con- 
federate guns  by  a battery  which  he 
hurriedly  constructed,  Benham  fell 
back  on  his  original  plan  of  assault. 
By  this  time  Stevens  had  returned, 
with  his  troops,  from  Pocotaligo.  On 
the  morning  of  the  16th,  Stevens,  June 
with  about  3000  men,  supported 
by  General  Wright,  with  about  the 
same  number,  advanced  to  the  attack. 
The  Eighth  Michigan  led  the  way,  fol- 
lowed close  by  the  Seventy-Ninth  New 
York  Highlanders.  It  was  a perilous 
movement.  The  Confederate  battery 
could  only  be  reached  by  pressing 
along  a narrow  strip  of  land.  The 
Confederate  pickets  were  easily  cap- 
tured ; and  it  was  hoped  that  the 
garrison,  also,  might  be  surprised  and 
made  prisoners.  Lamar,  however,  was 
watchful  and  well  prepared.  As  soon 
as  the  National  troops  began  to  press 
along  the  narrow  strip  of  land  which 
led  to  the  battery,  he  opened  upon 
them  a murderous  fire  of  grape  and 
canister  from  six  masked  guns.  The 
brave  Michigan  men  and  the  undaunted 
Highlanders  essayed  to  advance;  but, 
in  addition  to  this  pitiless  stoi*m  of  de- 
structive missiles  in  their  front,  they 
found  themselves  exposed  to  a severe 
musketry  fire  on  their  right  fiank. 
Progress  was  impossible.  General 
Wright’s  troops  came  up;  and,  in  the 
struggle  which  ensued,  they  took  an 
active  part  It  was  soon  discovered. 


THE  HIGHLANDERS. 


581 


however,  that  the  works  were  too 
strong  to  be  taken  by  assault,  and  that 
to  prolong  the  struggle  was  only  to 
make  a useless  sacrifice  of  human  life. 
The  Nationals,  therefore,  fell  back, 
having  lost  in  the  brief  encounter 
about  600  men.  Such  was  the  battle 
of  Secession ville.*  Soon  afterwards 
James’  Island  was  abandoned  by  the 

* In  no  battle  during  the  whole  war  was  greater 
bravery  displayed  than  was  witnessed  that  morning  at 
Secessionville.  A graphic  picture  of  the  affair  was 
given  at  the  time  by  a correspondent  of  the  New  York 
Herald.  It  was  the  16th  of  June,  and  about  half-past 
two  o’clock  in  the  morning,  when  General  Stevens 
moved  to  the  attack.  When  about  four  hundred  yards 
from  the  fort,  the  Confederate  guns,  as  has  been  men- 
tioned in  the  text,  opened  a tremendous  fire.  The  at- 
tacking column  was  terribly  cut  up,  the  Eighth  Michi- 
gan suffering  most  severely.  Nothing  daunted,  what 
remained  of  the  Eighth  Michigan,  the  Seventy-Ninth 
New  York  Highlanders,  the  One  Hundreth  Pennsylva- 
nia, the  Twenty-Eighth  Massachusetts,  with  portions  of 
the  Seventh  Connecticut  and  Forty-Sixth  New  York, 
pressed  forward.  Captains  Ely  and  Doyle,  and  Lieuten- 
ant-Colonel Morrison,  mounting  the  parapet  of  the 
work.  ‘ ‘ Here,  ” says  the  Herald  correspondent,  ‘ ‘ lasted 
for  a few  moments  the  most  exciting  scene  my  pen  has 
ever  attempted  to  describe.  When  the  Highlanders 
heard  of  the  terrible  slaughter  of  the  Eighth  Michigan, 
with  whom  they  had  for  many  months  been  brigaded, 
they  could  not  be  restrained,  but  advanced  with  the 
utmost  promptness  to  the  support  of  their  old  com- 
rades. Colonel  Morrison,  whose  horse  was  shot  early 
in  the  action,  led  up  his  men  on  foot,  shouting,  ‘ Come 
on,  Highlanders ! ’ and  with  Lieutenant  Lyons,  of  Gen- 
eral Stevens’  staff,  was  the  first  to  scale  the  walls  and 
mount  the  parapet  of  the  fort.  Both  were  wounded — 
Colonel  Morrison  in  the  head,  the  bullet  entering  at 
the  temple  and  coming  out  behind  the  right  ear,  and 
Lieutenant  Lyons  severely  in  the  arm.  Captain  Doyle 
was  severely  wounded  ; and  Captains  Guild,  Pratt  and 
Church  were  killed.  It  was  while  endeavoring  to  scale 
these  works  that  Captain  Hitchcock,  of  the  Seventh 
Connecticut,  was  shot  down.  Nevertheless,  the  men 
went  up,  walking  unflinchingly  into  the  jaws  of  death. 
But  very  few  escaped,  and  those  only  with  garments 
riddled  with  balls.  Colonel  Morrison,  even  after  he  was 
wounded,  discharged  the  entire  contents  of  his  revol- 
ver at  the  force  within,  and  had  the  satisfaction  of  kill- 
ing one  rebel  as  he  was  endeavoring  to  screen  himself 
in  one  of  the  numerous  ‘ rat-holes,  ’ with  which  the  in- 
terior of  the  work  abounded.  ” 


Nationals ; and,  for  a period,  no  further 
efforts  were  made  against  Charleston. 

In  the  fall  of  1862,  General  O.  M. 
Mitchell,  who  had  been  called  to  Wash- 
ington City  from  Tennessee,  took  com- 
mand of  the  department  of  the  South, 
thus  superseding  Hunter.  On  the 
16th  of  September  he  reached  Hilton 
Head,  and  established  his  headquarters 
in  the  house  occupied  by  his  predeces- 
sor. The  place  was  swarming  with 
negroes  who  had  escaped  from  their 
owners;  and  Mitchell,  with  his  usual 
vigor,  at  once  took  measures  to  make 
the  disorganized,  idle  crowd  more  com- 
fortable and  more  useful.  The  little 
town  of  Mitchellville  soon  gave  evi- 
dence of  the  taste  and  humanity  as 
well  as  the  energy  of  the  new  com- 
mander. Mitchell  was  actively  pre- 
paring for  a decisive  campaign  against 
Charleston,  when  he  was  cut  short  in 
his  work  by  an  attack  of  yellow  fever. 
He  was  removed  to  the  more  healthful 
locality  of  Beaufort;  but  he  died  on 
the  30th  of  October,  having  been  in 
his  new  command  only  some  six  weeks. 

Late  in  October,  an  attempt  was 
made,  under  the  direction  of  General 
Brannan,  to  carry  out  one  of  Mitchell’s 
plans.  Brannan  set  out  with  an  effec- 
tive force  of  about  4500  men.  His 
final  objective  was  Charleston.  His 
immediate  purpose  was  to  reach  Poco- 
taligo,  and  at  that  place  destroy  the 
Charleston  and  Savannah  Bailroad. 
Embarking  at  'Hilton  Head  on  gun- 
boats and  transports,  he  proceeded  up 
the  Broad  River  to  the  Coosawhatchie,. 
and  pushed  on  to  Pocotaligo  with  biit- 
little  difficulty.  There  he  encountered 


2GG 


582 


CHAr^LESTOX  HARBOIl. 


the  Confederate  pickets ; and,  although 
he  managed  to  drive  them  before  him, 
lie  was  unable  to  prevent  them  from 
burning  the  bridges  in  their  rear,  and 
thus  interposing  serious  obstacles  to  his 
further  advance.  A heavy  fire  having 
h;een  opened  upon  him  by  General  W. 

1].  Walker’s  artillery,  which  was  sup- 
])orted  by  a powerful  infantry  force, 
Brannan,  taking  counsel  from  prudence, 
fell  back  to  Mackay’s  Landing,  where 
he  re-embarked  for  Hilton  Head.  This 
c xpedition,  which  proved  utterly  fruit- 
less, cost  the  Nationals  at  least  300 
men. 

On  the  death  of  Mitchell,  Hunter 
resumed  command  of  the  department 
of  the  South.  Charleston  Harbor  was 
still  the  great  object  of  attention.  Its 
continued  and  successful  resistance  to  the 
National  forces  was  a fruitful  source  of 
annoyance  to  the  authorities  at  Wash- 
ington. It  was  one  of  the  original 
cradles  of  the  rebellion  ; its  precipitate 
action  had  plunged  the  nation  into  all 
the  calamities  of  the  Civil  War;  and, 
so  long  as  it  remained  an  integral  part 
of  the  Confederacy,  it  involved  the 
neutralization  of  an  army  of  30,000 
men.  It  was  of  the  utmost  importance 
that  the  forts  in  the  harbor  should  be 
reduced,  and  the  National  authority 
restored  in  the  city  and  neighborhood. 

It  was  not  until  the  spring  of  1S63, 
that  any  vigorous  operations  were 
made  in  the  direction  of  Charles- 
ton. Several  attempts,  however,  were 
made  early,  in  the  year,  to  reduce  Fort 
McAllister.  This  was  a strong  work, 
which  'was  constructed  at  Genesis 
Point,  on  the  Great  Ogeechee  River ; i 


and,  under  its  cover  lay  the  steamer 
Nashville,  which  was  waiting  to  run 
the  blockade  and  play  the  part  of  a 
privateer.  On  the  morning  of  jan, 
the  27th  of  January,  in  obe-  27. 
dience  to  instructions  from  Admiral 
Dupont,  Commander  Worden,  of  Hamp-  - 
ton  Roads  renown,  pushed  up  the  riv^er 
with  the  monitor  Montauk,  supported 
by  several  small  gunboats,  and  a mortar 
schooner,  and  opened  fire  upon  the  fort. 
The  work  was  found  to  be  stronor  be- 

o 

yond  expectation.  It  was  a casemated 
earth-work,  with  bomb  proofs,  and 
mounting  nine  guns.  Owing  to  obstruc- 
tions in  the  river,  the  Montauk  was  un- 
able to  advance  within  effective  range. 
The  sruns  of  the  fort  were  well  handled. 
The  Montauk  was  struck  thirteen  times, 
but  received  no  injury.  Having  ex- 
pended her  shells,  she  retired.  A 
second  attempt  was  made  by  Worden 
on  the  1st  of  February.  On  this 
occasion,  the  Montauk  engaged  b 
the  fort  at  the  distance  of  1400  yards. 
Her  well-directed  fire  did  some  damage 
to  the  parapets  of  the  fort.  She  was 
herself  struck  some  sixty-one  times, 
without  being  materially  injured, 

On  the  27th  of  February  a third  27. 
attempt  was  made,  and  was  attended 
with  more  success.  A reconnoissance 
having  been  made,  it  was  discovered 
that  the  Nashville  was  grounded  a 
short  distance  above  the  fort;  and 
Worden,  with  the  Montauk,  followed 
by  the  Seneca,  Wissahickon  and  Dawn, 
moved  up  the  river  as  far  as  the  ob- 
structions would  permit,  and  opened 
fire  upon  the  Nashville.  His  12  and 
15-inch  shells  fell  with  destructive 


FORT  McAllister. 


583 


effect  upon  the  doomed  ship;  and  in 
less  than  twenty  minntes  she  was 
in  flames.  One  by  one  her  heavy 
guns  exploded  with  the  heat ; her 
magazine  blew  up;  and  in  less  than 
an  hour,  the  dreaded  privateer  was 
almost  invisible.  The  Montauk  was 
struck  five  times  by  the  heavy  shot 
from  the  fort,  and  when  beyond  the 
range  of  the  guns  a torpedo  exploded 
under  her;  but  she  sustained  compara- 
tively little  injury.  In  this  effort, 
3Iar,  Worden  did  not  lose  a man.  On 
the  3d  of  March,  another  and 
even  more  formidable  attempt  was 
made  against  the  fort.  Dupont  was 
greatly  encouraged  by  the  success 
which  bad  attended  Worden;  and,  as 
his  fleet  had  been  reinforced  by  the 
arrival  of  additional  iron-clads,  he 
resolved  to  subject  their  mechanical 
appliances  to  the  full  test  of  active 
service  before  entering  upon  more  im- 
portant operations.  The  expedition, 
v/hich  consisted  of  four  monitors  and 
Several  mortar  schooners,  was  placed 
under  the  direction  of  Commander 
Drayton.  The  Passaic  led  the  way, 
with  Drayton  on  board,  being  closely 
followed  by  the  Patapsco,  Commander 
Ammen,  and  by  the  Nahant,  Com- 
mander Downes.  By  means  of  skil- 
ful pilotage,  the  Passaic  was  brought 
u]>  to  within  1000  yards  of  the  fort.  It 
was  not  found  possible  to  bring  the 
other  boats  so  near.  The  firing  com- 
menced shortly  after  eight  o’clock,  and 
was  continued  all  day  and  during  the 
night  of  the  3d.  About  250  shot  and 
shell  were  thrown  into  the  fort ; and 
the  fire  of  the  fort  fell  heavily  on  the 


Passaic,  the  other  vessels  being  some- 
what out  of  easy  range.  But  little  im- 
pression, however,  was  made  on  either 
side.  Drayton  was  making  but  little 
impression  on  Fort  McAllister ; and 
the  shot  from  the  fort  was  rattling 
harmlessly  on  the  turret  and  iron-bound 
sides  of  the  Passaic.  On  the  second  day 
the  attack  was  abandoned.  The  Pas- 
saic bore  away  with  her  some  traces  of 
the  struggle.  Where  she  was  struck 
by  the  bullets  of  the  fort,  there  were 
some  deep  indentations,  and  some  of 
the  bolts  had  been  started  by  the  vio- 
lence of  the  concussion.  It  was  Dray- 
ton’s opinion  that  the  fort  could  not  be 
made  untenable  by  any  number  of  iron- 
clads, because  the  shallow  water  and 
narrow  space  would  not  permit  them 
to  be  brought  into  position  against  it. 

There  were  other  operations  con- 
nected with  the  blockade  of  the 
Southern  ports,  some  of  which  were 
of  greater,  some  of  lesser  importance. 
On  the  29tli  of  January,  an  En-  jan, 
glish  blockade-runner,  the  Prin-  29. 
cess  Boyal,  attempted  to  run  into 
Charleston  Harbor.  She  had  come 
from  Bermuda  with  a valuable  cargo, 
having  on  board  two  marine  engines, 
several  rifled  guns,  and  large  quantities 
of  arms,  munitions  and  medicines.  She 
fell  an  easy  prey  to  the  blockading 
fleet.  The  loss  of  this  vessel  was  a 
severe  blow  to  the  Confederates.  It 
greatly  enraged  them ; and  efforts 
were  at  once  made  for  its  recapture. 
On  the  morning  of  the  31st,  the  jan, 
rams.  Palmetto  State,  Lieuten-  31. 
ant  Rutledge,  and  Chicora,  Commander 
Tucker,  ran  out  from  Cliirleston  by 


584 


CHARLESTON  HARBOR. 


the  mam  ship -channel,  and  under  a 
thick  haze,  surprised  the  blockading 
fleet.  That  fleet  then  consisted  of 
the  steamers  Housatonic,  Mercedita, 
Ottawa,  Unadilla,  Keystone  State, 
Quaker  City,  Memphis,  Augusta,  Stet- 
tin and  Flag.  The  Mercedita  was  the 
first  to  suffer.  The  Palmetto  State 
ran  into  her  with  great  force,  at  the 
moment  of  contact,  sending  into  her 
a 7-inch  shell,  which  made  a hole 
in  her  side  from  four  to  five  feet 
square,  and  penetrated  her  steam-di’um. 
Most  of  those  on  board  were  scalded 
by  the  steam,  and  several  were  killed 
outright.  The  officers  and  crew  of  the 
Mercedita  had  no  choice  but  surrender. 
The  Palmetto  State  then  rushed  upon 
the  Keystone  State,  which  was  at  the 
same  time  attacked  by  the  Chicora. 
The  Keystone  State  made  a vigorous 
resistance  ; but  when  in  the  act  of  bear- 
ing down  upon  the  nearest  ram,  with 
the  intention  of  striking  and  at  the  same 
moment  opening  a plunging  fire,  she 
was  hit  by  a heavy  shot,  which  passed 
through  her  steam-chest.  Neither  the 
Mercedita  nor  the  Keystone  State  was 
lost  to  the  Union.  The  former,  un- 
aided, succeeded  in  making  her  way 
to  Port  Royal ; the  latter  was  taken 
in  tow  by  the  Memphis,  and  moved 
to  the  same  place  in  a very  crippled 
condition. 

It  was  at  this  time  that  a joint 
proclamation  was  issued  by  General 
Beauregard,  then  in  charge  of  Charles- 
ton, and  Flag-Officer  Ingraham,  then 
commanding  the  naval  forces  of  South 
Carolina,  declaring  the  blockade  of 
Charleston  ’ “ to  be  raised  by  a supe- 


rior force  of  the  Confederate  States.” 
Judah  P.  Benjamin,  the  Confederate 
Secretary  of  State,  at  the  same  time 
issued  a circular  to  the  foreign  consule 
in  the  Confederacy,  reiterating  the 
claim  of  Beauregard  and  Ingraham 
“This,”  added  Benjamin,  “is  for  the 
information  of  such  vessels  of  youi 
nation,  as  may  choo.se  to  carry  on 
commerce  with  the  now  open  porl 
of  Charleston.” 

Such  a claim,  made  at  such  a time, 
had  a poweiful  effect  in  i-ousing  uj) 
the  government  at  Washington.  Gen- 
eral Hunter  and  Admiral  Dupont  re- 
ceived instructions  to  make  an  attack 
on  Charleston  without  further  delay; 
and  General  Foster,  with  the  greater 
portion  of  the  Eighteenth  corps,  was 
ordered  from  North  Carolina  to  the 
assistance  of  the  naval  comm  inder. 
Halleck  had,  unfortunately,  neglected 
to  write  to  Hunter,  informing  him  of 
the  instructions  which  he  had  given  to 
Foster;  and  the  result  was  that  when 
Foster  arrived.  Hunter  regarded  him 
as  an  intruder.  Foster,  at  his  own  re- 
quest, was  ultimately  allowed  to  return 
to  his  department,  his  troops  remain- 
ing as  reinforcements  to  Hunter.  While 
these  events  w^ere  occurring,  Dupont 
was  making  vigorous  pi*eparations  for 
the  attack. 

It  was  now  Sunday,  the  5th  day  of 
April.  On  the  night  of  that  April 
day,  under  the  light  of  a full 
moon,  the  National  fleet,  consisting  of 
fourteen  vessels,  anchored  off  Charles- 
ton bar.  There  were  seven  Ericsson 
monitors,  another  iron-clad,  called  the 
Keokuk,  constructed  on  a new  priu' 


585 


THE  FORTS  IH 

ciple,  and  tlie  frigate  Ironsides.  Du- 
pont was  on  board  the  James  Adger. 
The  National  fleet  had  32  guns  in 
all.  Such  a fleet,  as  the  result  proved, 
was  totally  inadequate  to  the  task 
which  it  was  called  upon  to  perform. 
Charleston  Harbor  was  fortified  almost 
to  perfection.  It  was  well  fortified  at 
the  commencement  of  the  war,  as  the 
reader  has  already  learned ; but  it  had 
now  been  long  under  the  special  care 
of  General  Beauregard,  and  his  genius 
had  made  it,  if  not  absolutely  impreg- 
nable, at  least  proof  against  any  attack 
which  could  be  made  against  it  by  the 
National  forces. 

The  forts  which  guarded  the  harbor 
were  numerous  and  strong.  There 
was  one  on  the  outward  extremity  of 
Sullivan’s  Island  and  guarding  Mafiit’s 
Channel.  There  was  another  strong 
sand  battery  on  the  same  island, 
near  the  Moultrie  House,  called  Fort 
Beauregard.  A little  further  to  the 
westward  was  Fort  Moultrie;  and  still 
on  Sullivan’s  Island,  but  yet  more  to 
the  west,  was  a strong  earth-work, 
called  Battery  Bee.  On  the  mainland, 
at  Mount  Pleasant,  was  another  strong 
battery;  and  in  front  of  Charleston, 
about  a mile  from  the  city,  was  old 
Castle  Pinckney.  In  the  channel,  be- 
tween Sullivan’s  and  Morris’  Islands, 
stood  Fort  Sumter,  the  most  formid- 
able of  all  the  works.  On  the  southern 
side  of  the  harbor,  and  near  the  city, 
was  the  Wappoo  battery,  on  James’ 
Island,  commanding  the  mouth  of  the 
Ashley  Biver.  To  the  right  of  this, 
and  on  the  same  island,  was  Fort  John- 
son', and  about  half  way  between  the 


THE  HARBOR. 

last-named  fort  and.  Castle  Pinckney, 
on  a submerged  sand  bank,  which  was 
called  the  “Middle  Ground,”  stood 
Fort  Ripley.  In  addition  to  these, 
there  were  Battery  Gregg,  on  Morris’ 
Island,  at  what  is  called  Cummings’ 
Point;  Fort  Wagner,  about  a mile  to 
the  south,  and  another  powerful  bat- 
tery at  Lighthouse  Inlet.  The  forts 
mounted,  in  all,  some  300  guns.  The 
channels,  too,  were  blocked  with  heavy 
chains  made  of  railroad  iron;  a rope, 
buoyed  up  by  empty  casks,  extended 
from  Fort  Ripley  to  Fort  Sumter;  and 
the  entire  waters  were  filled  with  tor- 
pedoes. Such  were  the  contrivances 
which  barred  the  entrance  to  Charles- 
ton Harbor  in  the  spring  of  1863. 

That  the  harbor  was  well  guarded, 
Dupont  was  well  aware;  but  of  the 
nature  and  extent  of  the  works  he 
had  no  exact  knowledge.  On  the 
morning  of  the  7th  of  April,  the  April 
fleet,  well  brought  together,  lay  7# 
within  the  bar  in  the  main  channel. 
It  was  noon  on  that  day,  before  the 
signal  was  given  to  weigh  anchor.  The 
Weehawken,  Captain  John  Rodgers, 
led  the  way.  The  other  monitors  fol- 
lowed in  the  order  here  given  : Passaic, 
Captain  Percival  Drayton ; Montauk, 
Commander  John  L.  Worden;  Pataps- 
co.  Commander  Daniel  Ammen ; New 
Ironsides,  Commander  Thomas  Turner; 
Catskill,  Commander  G.  W.  Rodgers; 
Nantucket,  Commander  Donald  M. 
Fairfax;  Nahant,  Commander  John 
Downes;  Keokuk,  Lieutenant- Com- 
mander A.  C.  Rhind.  The  gunboats 
were  the  Canandaigua,  Captain  J.  H. 
Green;  Housatonic,  Captain  W.  R.  Tay- 


586 


CHARLESTON  HARBOR. 


lor;  Unadilla,  Lieutenaiit-Comraander 
S.  P.  Quackenbush  ; Wissahickon,  Lieu- 
tenant-Commander J.  G.  Davis ; Huron, 
Lieutenant-Commander  G.  A.  Stevens. 
It  was  Dupont’s  intention  to  disregard 
the  batteries  on  Morris’  Island,  to  at- 
tack the  northwest  face  of  Fort  Sumter, 
and  to  force  his  way  up  to  the  city. 
He  was  as  yet  ignorant  of  the  great 
hawser,  and  its  dreadful  appendages, 
which  lay  in  the  path  he  had  pre- 
scribed. The  Weehawken  had  a raft- 
like contrivance  attached  to  her  bows, 
for  the  purpose  of  removing  obstruc- 
tions and  exploding  torpedoes.  Scarce- 
ly had  the  vessels  commenced  to  move, 
when  the  Weehawken,  hindered  in  her 
movements  by  the  raft  at  her  bow,  was 
brought  to  a standstill.  The  other 
vessels  were  obstructed  by  the  Wee- 
hawken ; and  nearly  an  hour  elapsed 
before  they  were  all  again  under  way. 
As  they  steered  towards  the  entrance 
of  the  inner  harbor,  an  ominous  silence 
prevailed,  not  a shot  being  fired  either 
from  the  forts  or  from  the  fleet.  At 
about  fifty  minutes  past  two,  just  as  the 
leading  vessel  was  becoming  entangled 
in  the  horrid  net-work  of  obstructions, 
the  silence  was  broken ; and  Fort 
Moultrie  began  to  thunder.  A few 
moments  afterw’ards  the  batteries  on 
Sullivan’s  Island,  Morris’  Island  and 
Fort  Sumter  also  opened  Are.  The 
Weehawken,  in  the  midst  of  the  ob- 
structions, could  not  advance ; and 
to  remain  under  this  concentric  fire 
would  be  fatal.  Hodgers,  therefore, 
withdrew  his  vessel ; and,  followed  by 
the  others,  he  attempted  to  pass  by 
Fort  Sumter,  on  the  southern  side. 


He  soon  found  his  way  blocked  by 
the  rows  of  piles  which  extended  be- 
tween the  fort  and  Cummings’  Point. 
At  this  stage  the  New  Ironsides,  in 
attempting  to  turn,  was  caught  in  the 
tide-way,  and  refused  to  obey  her  rud- 
der. The  Catskill  and  Nantucket,  who 
were  in  her  wake,  fell  foul  of  her; 
and,  for  some  fifteen  minutes,  they  re- 
mained in  this  helpless  condition,  ex- 
posed to  the  enemy’s  fire. 

Dupont,  before  he  commenced  the 
action,  had  transferred  his  headquarters 
from  the  James  Adger  to  the  New 
Ironsides.  Finding  himself  thus  en- 
tangled, and  compelled  to  come  to 
anchor,  he  signalled  to  the  other  ves- 
sels to  disregard  the  flag-ship,  and  take 
such  positions  as  might  seem  best  suited 
for  effective  work.  This  was  done  at 
once ; and,  shortly  before  four  o’clock, 
the  remaining  eight  vessels  were  ranged 
on  the  northeast  of  Fort  Sumter,  at 
distances  varying  from  550  to  800 
yards.  In  this  position,  they  were 
fully  commanded  by  Forts  Beauregard, 
Moultrie  and  Sumter,  Battery  Bee  and 
Fort  Wagner — a concentrated  fire  of  at 
least  76  guns.  The  eight  iron-clads 
could  oppose  to  this  fire  not  more  than 
16  guns.  It  seemed  already  a hope- 
less struggle.  The  iron-clads,  how- 
ever, went  resolutely  to  work,  bring- 
ing their  fire  to  bear  chiefly  on  Fort 
Sumter.  Bhind  ran  the  little  Keokuk 
ahead  of  all  the  others,  and  came  within 
500  yards  of  the  fort,  hurling  against 
it  her  immense  projectiles.  The  Mon- 
tauk  and  Catskill  were  close  in  her 
wake.  It  was  impossible,  however, 
for  the  fleet  long  to  maintain  the  un- 


THE  ATTACK  OK  THE  FORTS. 


587 


equal  struggle.  The  forts  and  earth- 
works were  armed  with  guns  of  the 
largest  calibre,  and  of  the  very  best 
construction.  “ There  was  something 
almost  pathetic,”  wrote  an  eye-wit- 
ness, ‘‘in  the  spectacle  of  those  little 
floating  circular  towers,  exposed  to 
the  crushing  weight  of  those  tons  of 
metal,  hurled  asrainst  them  with  the 
terrific  force  of  modern  projectiles,  and 
with  such  charges  of  powder  as  were 
never  before  dreamed  of  in  artillery 
firing.”  It  recalled  the  pictures  of  the 
wars  of  the  Titans,  in  the  old  myth- 
ologies. 

The  contest  lasted  about  forty  min- 
utes, not  one  of  the  guns  having  been 
under  fire  for  a longer  period.  In  that 
brief  space  of  time,  five  of  the  iron- 
clads were  wholly  or  partially  disabled. 
The  Keokuk,  which  was  of  a peculiar 
construction,  and  had  two  turrets,  was 
struck  ninety-nine  times,  nineteen  shots 
piercing  her  at  and  below  the  water- 
line. Her  turrets  were  riddled,  and 
both  her  guns  disabled.  She  had  only 
been  able  to  return  three  shots.  This 
vessel,  which  was  with  difficulty  kept 
afloat  during  the  night  by  means  of  her 
pumps,  sank  next  morning.  The  Pas- 
saic was  struck  twenty-seven  times; 
and  her  turret  was,  for  a time,  so 
jammed  that  it  could  not  be  turned. 
The  Nahant  was  also  terribly  pun- 
ished, her  turret  being  effectually 
jammed,  and  her  pilot-house  shattered. 
The  Patapsco  lost  the  use  of  her  rifle- 
gun  after  the  fifth  fire.  The  Nantucket 
had  her  15-inch  gun  permanently  dis- 
abled after  the  third  fire.  The  casual- 
ties were  few.  There  was  but  one  man 


killed — the  quartermaster  of  the  Na- 
hant. In  all,  there  were  29  wounded. 
It  was  the  conviction  of  all  the  officers 
that  any  further  attempt  would  be 
folly.  It  was  Dupont’s  belief  that  if 
the  attack  had  been  prolonged  one  half 
hour,  the  fleet  would  have  been  dis- 
abled, and  some  of  them  at  least  left  in 
the  hands  of  the  enemy.  Worden  was 
of  the  same  opinion.  “Charleston,” 
he  said,  “cannot  be  taken  by  the  naval 
force  now  present.”  The  contest  was, 
therefore,  abandoned;  and, on  the 
12th,  the  entire  fleet,  with  the  *2. 
exception  of  the  New  Ironsides,  which 
anchored  outside  Charleston  bar,  re- 
turned to  Port  Koyal  for  repairs.  Dur- 
ing the  brief  struggle  the  forts,  from 
76  guns,  fired  2209  times;  the  iron- 
clads, from  14  guns,  fired  139  times. 

It  was  the  opinion  of  some,  at  the 
time,  that  this  attack  might  have  re- 
sulted differently  if  Dupont  had  been 
vigorously  supported  by  Hunter  with 
a land  force  on  Morris  Island.  Hunter, 
it  was  thought,  might  have  given  the 
garrisons  of  Battery  Gregg  and  Fort 
Wagner  occupation,  while  the  fleet  was 
attacking  Fort  Sumter.  It  is  doubtful 
whether  such  a diversion  would  have 
materially  affected  the  result.  Certain 
it  is  that  the  land  troops  did  nothing. 
“I  could  do  nothing  but  pray  for  you,” 
wrote  Hunter  to  Dupont  the  day  after 
the  fight,  “which,  believe  me,  I did 
most  heartily.” 

It  had  now  become  apparent  to  the 
authorities  at  Washington,  that  it  was 
vain  to  attempt  to  force  a passage  to 
Charleston  so  long  as  Fort  Sumter 
guarded  the  channel.  The  reduction 


588 


CHARLESTON  HARBOR. 


of  that  fort,  therefore,  became  with 
them  a fixed  purpose.  A change  was 
made  in  the  commanders.  General  Q. 
A.  Gillmore,  who  had  distinguished 
himself  the  year  before  by  the  cap- 
ture of  Fort  Pulaski,  replacing  Gen- 
eral Hunter,  assumed  command  of 
the  department  of  the  South ; and 
Admiral  Dahlgren  took  the  place  of 
Dupont. 

Before  the  arrival  of  the  new  com- 
manders, Dupont  had  the  good  for- 
tune to  capture  the  dreaded  Confede- 
rate warrior  ship,  the  Atlanta.  That 
vessel  had  originally  been  a blockade- 
runner,  bearing  the  name  of  Fingal, 
and  had  been  built  on  the  Clyde.  She 
had  managed  to  run  up  the  Savannah 
River,  about  eighteen  months  before, 
with  a valuable  cargo,  but  had  found 
it  impossible  again  to  get  out  to  sea. 
The  Confederates  had  converted  her 
into  a war  ship,  arming  her  with  a 
thick  coat  of  oak  and  pine,  and  cover- 
ing her  with  heavy  bars  of  iron.  She 
carried  four  guns  of  large  calibre,  and 
was  furnished  with  a powerful  beak. 
Commanded  by  Lieutenant  A.  Webb, 
formerly  of  the  National  navy,  who 
had  under  him  a crew  of  160  men,  it 
was  believed  by  the  Confederates  that 
the  Atlanta  would  be  a match  for  at 
least  any  two  monitors  then  afloat.  It 
was  reported  to  Dupont  that  the  alter- 
ations on  this  vessel  had  been  complet- 
ed, and  that  she  was  about  to  force  her 
way  out  to  sea.  Dupont  resolved  to 
watch  her  movements;  and,  with  this 
end  in  view,  he  sent  the  Weehawken, 
Captain  Rodgers,  and  the  Nahant,  Com- 
mander Downes,  to  Warsaw  Sound. 


On  the  morning  of  the  17th  of  jone 
June,  the  Atlanta  was  discovered 
to  be  moving  down  the  Savannah  River, 
her  intention  evidently  being  to  fall, 
with  all  her  force,  on  the  two  moni- 
tors. She  was  accompanied  by  two 
wooden  gunboats  of  Tattnall’s  Mos- 
quito fleet,  which  were  crowded  with 
people  who  had  come  down  from  Sa- 
vannah, expecting  to  see  their  favorite 
vessel  win  an  easy  victory  over  the 
“Yankee”  monitors.  Their  expecta- 
tions were  not  to  be  realized.  The 
Weehawken  was  singled  out  for  the 
first  blow.  The  ram  is  pushing  swiftly 
forward.  The  Weehawken  reserves  her 
fire.  Rodgers  himself  is  sighting  one 
of  her  heavy  guns.  Her  powerful  an- 
tagonist is  now  within  easy  range. 
The  Weehawken  opens  fire.  Rodgers 
has  aimed  well  The  first  shot — a 15- 
inch  solid — has  carried  away  the  top 
of  the  Atlanta’s  pilot-house,  wounded 
two  of  her  pilots,  and  sent  the  vessel 
aground.  In  less  than  fifteen  minutes, 
the  Atlanta  is  prisoner  to  the  Wee- 
hawken, Rodgers  having  fired  only  five 
shots  in  all.  The  Atlanta  was  badly 
damaged,  the  last  shot  having  struck 
her  point-blank.  So  terrific  was  the 
impact  that  it  bent  in  the  iron  armor, 
shivering  the  twelve  inches  of  live 
oak  and  the  five  inches  of  Georgia 
pine.  The  Atlanta  was  afterwards 
taken  to  Philadelphia  and  exhibited. 

On  his  arrival  at  Hilton  Head,  Gill- 
more  found  that  he  had  an  available 
force  of  near  18,000  men.  After  picket- 
in^r  a line  alons^  the  coast,  about  250 
miles  in  length,  and  establishing  posts 
at  different  points,  he  could  still  count 


ONV7S/  SA/NOr 


CHARLESTON  HARBOR  AND  ITS  APPROACHES,  SHOWING  FORTS  SUMTER  AND 
WAGNER,  JAMES  ISLAND,  Etc.,  Etc. 


f 


ASSAULT  ON  FORT  WAGNER. 


589 


on  an  effective  force  of  11,000  men, 
mostly  veterans.  He  had  66  guns  and 
30  mortars.  Dahlgren  had  at  his  dis- 
posal the  frigate  Ironsides  and  six 
monitors,  three  of  which  were  being 
repaired  at  Port  Royal  With  these 
means  of  offensive  warfare,  it  was  re- 
solved to  renew  the  attempt  on  Fort 
Sumter. 

Gillmore  proposed  to  seize  the  south- 
ern end  of  Morris’  Island,  and,  with 
the  aid  of  the  fleet,  to  capture  Fort 
Wagner,  a strong  work  near  the  north 
end,  and  afterwards  Fort  Gregg,  which 
was  beyond.  These  captured,  it  was 
his  belief  that  he  would  be  able  to 
accomplish  the  destruction  of  Fort 
Sumter  by  shore  batteries.  His  first 
movement  was  to  erect  strong  batteries 
on  the  northern  end  of  Folly  Island. 
General  Vogdes,  whom  he  found  there 
with  a considerable  body  of  troops, 
had  already  constructed,  on  the  south 
end  of  the  island,  a battery  which 
commanded  the  mouth  of  the  Stono 
River.  The  new  batteries  were  com- 
pleted by  the  beginning  of  July.  They 
were  made  of  sand  and  marsh  sod,  and 
were  very  strong,  being  embrasured 
and  rivetted,  and  provided  with  maga- 
zines and  bomb  and  splinter  proofs. 
Forty-eight  heavy  guns  were  quick- 
ly got  into  position ; and  each  was 
furnished  with  200  rounds  of  ammuni- 
tion. 

It  was  necessary  for  Gillmore  to  dis- 
guise, as  much  as  possible,  his  real 
intention.  With  this  end  in  view,  and 
in  the  hope  that  he  might  be  able  to 
distract  the  attention  of  the  Confeder- 
ates^  he  ordered  General  A.  H.  Terry 


to  take  with  him  6000  troops,  to  pro- 
ceed up  the  Stono  River,  and  make 
a demonstration  on  James’  Island. 
Colonel  Higginson  was,  at  the  same 
time,  sent  up  the  Edisto  with  a body 
of  negro  troops,  with  instructions  to 
cut  the  Charleston  and  Savannah  Rail- 
road. Higginson  was  compelled  to 
fall  back,  without  having  accomplished 
his  purpose.  Terry  had  better  suc- 
cess. His  troops  were  placed  on  the 
island  without  difficulty;  and,  on  the 
night  of  the  9th  of  July,  2000  jHiy 
of  them,  under  General  Strong, 
were  transferred  in  boats  down  Folly 
River,  to  the  junction  of  that  stream 
with  Lighthou'^e  Inlet.  At  daylight 
on  the  10th,  the  batteries  which  had 
been  erected  on  the  north  end  of  Folly 
Island,  and  Dahlgren’s  monitors,  simul- 
taneously opened  fire  on  Fort  Wagner. 
Every  shot  from  the  15-inch  guns  of 
the  monitors  sent  a mass  of  rubbish 
into  the  air.  Clouds  of  dust  and  smoke 
hung  over  the  fort.  Up  to  this  time, 
Strong  and  his  men  had  been  lying 
in  concealment.  After  a two  hours’ 
cannonade,  and  while  the  attention  of 
the  Confederates  was  still  occupied  by 
the  firing  from  the  batteries  on  the 
north  of  Folly  Island,  and  from  the 
monitors.  Strong  threw  his  men  rapid- 
ly ashore ; and,  by  nine  o’clock  in  the 
morning,  he  was  in  full  possession  of 
the  Confederate  works  on  the  south- 
ern end  of  Morris’  Island,  with  1 1 guns 
and  much  camp  ecpiipage.  The  Con- 
federates fled  to  Fort  Wagner,  the 
Nationals  pursuing  as  far  as  the  Beacon 
House,  where  they  were  within  range 
of  the  guns  of  the  fort  There  they 


590 


CHARLESTON  HARBOR. 


halted,  Strong  resolving  not  to  attack 
Fort  Wagner  until  the  next  day.  Short- 
JuJy  ly  after  daylight,  on  July  11th, 
Ih  the  assault  was  gallantly  made. 
It  seemed  for  a time  as  if  success  was 
about  to  attend  the  effort.  Some  of 
the  brave  fellows  had  actually  reached 
the  parapet.  There,  however,  they 
were  met  by  a fire  so  withering  that 
they  were  compelled  to  fall  back. 

It  was  now  evident  to  the  National 
commander  that  Fort  Wagner  was  not 
to  be  easily  taken.  Gillmore  commenced 
at  once  to  make  preparations  to  assail 
it  by  regular  approaches.  The  island 
was  narrow;  and,  while  he  had  no 
reason  to  dread  any  flank  movements, 
he  could  rely  on  the  effective  co-opera- 
july  tion  of  the  fleet.  On  the  16th, 
16*  General  Terry  was  vigorously 
attacked  by  a Confederate  force,  under 
General  Hazard ; but,  being  assisted 
by  the  gunboats  in  Stono  and  Folly 
Rivers,  he  successfully  resisted  and  ulti- 
mately repelled  his  assailants.  Terry’s 
operations  on  James’  Island  were,  as  has 
been  mentioned,  originally  intended  as 
a feint.  His  object  having  been  ac- 
complished, he  withdrew  his  troops,  ac- 
cording to  previous  arrangement,  and 
joined  the  main  force  on  Morris’  Island, 
under  Gillmore,  who  was  about  to  re- 
jnly  peat  the  attack  on  Fort  Wagner. 
18.  It  was  now  the  18th  of  July. 
About  noon  of  that  day,  the  batteries, 
which  Gillmore  had  constructed  across 
the  island,  opened  fire  upon  the  fort. 
At  the  same  time,  Dahlgren  moved  up 
his  monitors,  and  opened  fire  on  both 
Fort  Sumter  and  Fort  Wagner.  Both 
forts  replied — the  latter  feebly,  and  only 


from  two  guns.  The  garrison,  fully 
persuaded  that  the  bombardment  was 
only  a preliminary  to  another  assault 
by  troops,  had  taken  shelter  in  their 
bomb-proofs.  To  the  Nationals,  it 
seemed  as  if  the  garrison  must  be  de- 
moral iz(jd.  An  assault  was  therefore 
resolved  upon.  Darkness  was  now 
approaching;  and,  as  the  cannonade 
ceased,  there  burst  forth  a tremendoui 
thunderstorm.  Whatever  might  be 
the  condition  of  the  garrison,  it  was 
observed  that  the  flag  was  flying  over 
the  fort.  The  twilight  was  deepening, 
and  the  thunderstorm  still  raging,  when 
the  storming  party  commenced  to  move 
forward.  Strong’s  brigade  moved  first, 
and  was  followed  by  that  of  Putnam. 
Strong’s  brigade  consisted  of  the  Fifty- 
Fourth  Massachusetts,  a colored  regi- 
ment, commanded  by  Colonel  Robert 
G.  Shaw;  the  Sixth  Connecticut;  the 
Forty-Eighth  New  York;  the  Third 
New  Hampshire ; the  Seventy-Sixth 
Pennsylvania  and  the  Ninth  Maine. 
The  distance  to  be  passed  was  about 
1800  yards.  When  the  head  of  the 
column  was  within  200  yai-ds  of  the 
fort,  the  Confederates  opened  fire. 
With  undaunted  courage,  their  com- 
rades falling  at  every  step,  the  Nationals 
pressed  forward.  They  had  almost 
reached  the  ditch  when  the  parapet 
blazed  with  musketry.  The  secoml 
parapet  was  reached,  and  the  National 
standard  was  planted.  One  second 
more,  and  both  standard  and  standard- 
bearer  had  disappeared.  Shaw  was 
killed;  Strong  was  mortally  wounded. 
The  brigade  was  torn  to  pieces,  the 
colored  regiment  being  almost  annthi- 


“THE  SWAMP  ANGEL” 


591 


lated.  Putnam,  with  the  Seventh  New 
Hampshire,  the  Sixty-Second  and  Six- 
ty-Seventh Ohio,  and  the  One  Hun- 
dredth New  York,  rushed  forward  and 
renewed  the  assault.  It  was  a vain 
effort — a rush  into  the  jaws  of  death. 
Putnam  fell  at  the  head  of  his  troops ; 
and  nearly  all  his  subordinates  were 
killed  or  wounded.  The  remains  of  the 
shattered  brigades  fell  back  into  the 
sheltering  darkness ; and  the  contest 
ceased.  The  ocean  beach  was  covered 
with  the  dead  and  dying.  The  National 
loss  fell  little  short  of  1500;  the  Con- 
federates did  not  lose  in  the  struggle 
more  than  100  men. 

Abandoning  the  idea  of  assault,  Gill- 
more  pushed  forward  the  works  with 
great  energy.  The  first  parallel  was 
opened  at  1300  yards  from  Fort  Wag- 
ner. Soon  afterwards  was  completed 
the  second  at  600  yards.  The  guns  of 
this  parallel  were  trained  not  only  on 
Wagner,  but  on  Sumter  and  Battery 
Gregg.  On  the  9th  of  August,  a third 
parallel  was  commenced  about  330 
yards  in  advance  of  the  right  of  the 
second.  In  addition  to  the  works  on 
the  parallels,  Gillmore  had,  after  great 
difificulty,  constructed  a battery  on  the 
marsh,  on  the  west  of  Morris’  Island. 
On  this  battery  he  had  placed  an  8-inch 
rified  Parrott  gun,  called  by  the  sol- 
diers, “The  Swamp  Angel.”  From 
this  gun,  shells  could  be  thrown  into 
Charleston,  some  five  miles  distant. 
Beauregard,  however,  was  better  sup- 
plied with  the  means  of  resistance  than 
Gillmore  was  with  the  means  of  attack. 
He  had,  perhaps,  double  the  number  of 
men,  and  five  times  as  much  artillery. 


By  this  time,  the  firing  from  all  the 
Confederate  works — from  the  batteries 
on  James’  Island,  from  Wagner,  Gregg 
and  Sumter — had  become  continuous 
and  severe.  Gillmore’s  preparations, 
however,  were  now  completed.  He 
had  in  readiness  12  batteries,  mounting 
28  heavy  guns,  and  12  mortars. 

On  the  17th,  aided  by  Dahlgren’s  H. 
gunboats,  he  opened  fire  upon  Sumter, 
Wagner  and  Gregg.  Sumter  was  the 
chief  object  of  attention.  The  firing 
was  renewed  every  morning  until  the 
24th.  The  total  number  of  shots  fired 
against  Sumter  up  to  that  date  was 
5750,  of  which  1336  missed.  On  aus*. 
that  day,  Gillmore  sent  a des-  24. 
patch  to  Halleck,  informing  him  of  the 
result.  “Fort  Sumter,”  he  said  “is, 
to-day,  a shapeless  and  harmless  mass 
of  ruins.”  This  was  the  opinion  of  the 
Confederates  themselves.  The  artil- 
lerists were,  therefore,  withdrawn  from 
the  work ; and  it  was  garrisoned  by  a 
body  of  infantry. 

Gillmore’s  attention  was  now  given 
to  Fort  Wagner.  While  his  heavy  shot 
was  battering  down  the  walls  of  Fort 
Sumter,  he  had  been  busy  constructing 
his  fourth  parallel.  It  was  now  com- 
pleted; and  he  was  able  to  plant  his 
guns  within  300  yards  of  the  fort  on 
his  front.  About  100  yards  in  front 
of  him  was  a ridge  of  sand  dunes,  from 
behind  which  the  Confederate  sharp- 
shooters kept  up  an  incessant  fire, 
greatly  to  the  annoyance  of  the  men 
engaged  in  the  advance  parallel.  The 
ridge,  however,  was  easily  cleared ; and 
a fifth  parallel  was  established  at  its 
base.  At  this  point,  the  island  is  only 


592 


CHARLESTON  HARBOR, 


twenty-five  yards  wide,  and  barely  two 
feet  high.  In  rough  weather,  this  part  of 
the  island  is  swept  by  the  sea.  It  was 
becoming  more  and  more  difficult  for 
the  men  to  push  forward  the  sap,  ex- 
posed, as  they  were,  to  the  converging 
fire  from  Fort  Wagner  and  to  the  flank 
fire  from  James’  Island.  Gillmore  had 
become  fully  convinced  that  another 
assault  was  necessary.  His  prepara- 
tions were  already  completed.  The 
light  mortars  were  moved  to  the  front 
and  placed  in  battery ; the  advanced 
trenches  were  enlarged  ; the  rifled  guns 
in  the  left  breaching  batteries  were 
trained  upon  the  fort ; and  calcium 
lights  were  prepared,  for  the  double 
purpose  of  giving  aid  to  the  cannoneers 
and  sharpshooters  and  of  dazzling  the 
Sept,  enemy.  At  dawn,  on 

the  5th  of  September,  the  New 
Ironsides,  Captain  Rowan,  moved  up 
to  within  1000  yards  of  the  sea  face  of 
the  fort;  and  simultaneously  his  broad- 
sides of  eight  guns,  carrying  11-inch 
shells,  and  the  land  batteries,  opened 
upon  the  parapet.  For  forty-two  con- 
secutive hours  the  bombardment  was 
continued.  In  a few  hours  after  the 
firing  commenced,  the  garrison  aban- 
doned their  guns  and  took  refuge  in 
the  bomb-proof.  The  final  assault  M^as 
to  be  made  on  the  morning  of  the  9th. 
All  things  were  in  readiness,  when  it 
became  known  that  the  fort  was  evac- 
uated. Fort  Gregg,  it  was  afterwards 
discovered,  was  also  abandoned.  There 
were  left  in  Wagner  eighteen  guns; 


in  Gregg,  seven.  During  the  two  days, 
122,300  pounds  of  metal  in  the  shape 
of  shot  and  shell  had  rained  upon  the 
fort ; yet  the  bomb-proof  was  substan- 
tially uninjured.  The  forts  were  im- 
mediately occupied  by  the  National 
troops ; ^ and  General  Gillmore  was 
able  to  congratulate  his  men,  by  telling 
them  that  the  whole  of  Morris’  Island 
was  in  their  hands,  and  that  the  city 
and  harbor  of  Charleston  were  at  the 
mercy  of  their  artillery. 

On  the  night  of  the  8th  of  Septem- 
ber, an  expedition  of  thirty  boats  gep, 
was  sent  from  the  fleet  to  take 
possession  of  Fort  Sumter.  It  was 
under  the  command  of  Commander 
Stephens,  of  the  Patapsco.  It  was  a 
disastrous  enterprise.  Three  of  the 
boats’  crews  had  landed.  In  the  belief 
that  the  garrison  had  abandoned  the 
fort,  they  were  attempting  to  run  up 
the  steep  ruins  to  the  parapet,  when 
they  were  greeted  with  a tremendous 
fire.  Two  hundred  of  the  assailants 
were  killed,  wounded  or  captured. 
In  their  hurried  retreat,  the  Nationals 
left  behind  them  four  boats  and 
three  colors.  Gillmore  maintained 
and  strengthened  his  position ; but 
no  further  active  etforts  were  made 
against  Charleston  during  the  remain- 
der of  the  year.  Gillmore’s  work 
had  not  been  wholly  fruitless.  He 
had  not  captured  Charleston ; he  had 
not  made  himself  complete  master  of 
the  harbor;  but  he  had  made  the 
blockade  secure. 


SIEGE  OE  SUFFOLK. 


593 


CHAPTER  XXX. 

Minor  Engagements.— General  John  J.  Peck.— Suffolk. -Defenses  of  Suffolk.— General  Longstreet.— Little 
Washington  and  New  Berne.— General  Foster.— Siege  of  Suffolk.— Vigorous  Assaults.— A Gallant  Defense.— 
The  Siege  Discontinued.— Longstreet  Ketires.— What  Might  Have  Been.— Morgan  in  Kentucky.— His  De- 
predations.—At  Green  Biver.— At  Springfield.— At  Bardstown.— At  Brandenburg.— Seizure  of  the  Alice 
Dean  and  McCombs.— At  Corydon.— General  Hobson  in  Pursuit.— The  Alice  Dean  in  Flames. —Burning 
the  Wharf  at  Brandenburg. —General  Judah.— Vandalism  at  Corydon  and  Salem.— Morgan  in  a Tight 
Place.— Sweeping  Around  Cincinnati.— Parkersburg.— At  Buffington  Ford.— Morgan  Hemmed  In.— Eight 
Hundred  Surrender.— Morgan  Attempts  to  Escape  with  the  Remainder.— Captured  at  New  Lisbon.— Taken 
to  Columbus,  Ohio.— Escape  from  Prison. —After  Knoxville.— Bean  Station.— Shackleford  in  Pursuit  of 
Longstreet.— A Vigorous  Encounter.— The  Nationals  Fall  Back.— Foster  Succeeds  Burnside.-  The  Depart- 
ment of  the  Gulf.— General  Dick  Taylor  Again.— The  Occupation  by  the  Confederates  of  Alexandria, 
Opelousas  and  Fort  de  Russy.  — Brashear  City  also  Abandoned.— General  Banks  and  General  Grant.— Pro- 
posal to  Move  on  Mobile. —Movement  upon  Texas.— Sabine  City.— General  Franklin.— Lieutenant  Crocker.— 
A Disastrous  Failure. — Atchafalaya. —Another  Movement  upon  Texas.— General  C.  C.  Washburne  Attacked 
by  Taylor  and  Green. — Brazos,  Santiago.— Brownsville. — Point  Izabel. — Banks  at  Brownsville. — His  Return 
to  New  Orleans.— Arkansas  and  Missouri. —The  Guerrillas.— Marmaduke  Falls  upon  Springfield,  Missouri.— 
A Brave  Resistance. — Marmaduke  Falls  Back. — General  Brown  Wounded. — Marmaduke  Attacked  by  Colonel 

Merrill. His  Defeat. — The  Julia  Roan. — Little  Rock. — The  Guerrilla  Leaders  in  Council. — General  Sterling 

Price. — General  McNeil. — Cape  Girardeau  Attacked  by  Marmaduke. — McNeil’s  Gallant  Defense. — Pursuit  ol 
Marmaduke.— Fort  Blunt. — Colonel  Coffey. — Honey  Springs. — Fort  Smith. — Attack  on  Helena. — The  Con- 
federates Repulsed. — McPherson’s  Expedition  to  Canton. — Steele’s  Expedition  to  Little  Rock. — At  Browns- 
ville.— Little  Rock  Captured. — The  Massacre  at  Lawrence. — Attempt  on  the  Life  of  General  Blunt.— Major 
Curtis  Killed.— Marmaduke  and  Sand watie. —Progress  Made. 


In  an  earlier  portion  of  this  work  we 
jggg  found  it  convenient  to  group  to- 
gether some  minor  engagements 
which,  not  having  direct  connection  with 
any  of  the  great  battles  or  campaigns, 
and  not  of  sufficient  consequence  to  be 
treated  in  separate  chapters,  were  yet  too 
important  to  be  altogether  overlooked. 
In  order  to  cover  some  such  engage- 
ments which  took  place  at  different 
times  in  the  year  1863,  that  example 
will,  in  this  chapter,  be  followed. 

At  the  close  of  1862,  Major-General 
John  J.  Peck  was  in  command  of  9000 
men  at  Suffolk.  The  Confederate  gen- 
erals, Pettigrew  and  French,  with 


about  15,000  men,  were  at  the  same 
time  on  the  line  of  the  Blackwater, 
threatening  Peck’s  position.  Peck 
took  such  pains  to  construct  defenses 
for  Suffolk,  that  the  authorities  at 
Richmond  believed  he  was  preparing  a 
base  of  operations  for  a movement 
against  that  city,  in  co-operation  with 
the  army  of  the  Potomac.  Counter- 
vailing measures,  in  consequence,  were 
immediately  adopted.  A series  of  for- 
tifications were  thrown  up  from  the 
line  of  the  Blackwater  to  Port  Pow- 
hattan,  on  the  James  River;  and 
in  February,  1863,  General  Long- 
street was  placed  in  command  of  all 


594 


MINOn  ENGAGEMENTS  IN  1863. 


the  Confederate  troops  in  that  region. 
He  had  under  him  a force  of  about 

30.000  men.  The  better  to  conceal 
Lis  purpose,  and  in  order  to  distract 
the  attention  and  divide 'the  forces  of 
tlie  National  commanders  at  Suffolk 
and  at  Fortress  Monroe,  where  General 

. Dix  was  in  command,  Longstreet, 
* early  in  April,  caused  it  to  be 
reported  that  he  had  gone  to  South 
Carolina,  while  D.  H.  Hill  was  ordered 
to  attack  Little  Washington,  and  me- 
nace New  Berne.  Longstreet,  having 
been  informed  by  spies  that  General 
Foster,  who  had  succeeded  Burnside  in 
command  in  that  department,  had  or- 
dered Peck  to  send  3000  men  to  oppose 
Hill,  deemed  it  a fitting  opportunity 
to  carry  out  his  purpose  in  Suffolk. 
F^eck,  however,  was  prepared ; he  had 
penetrated  Longstreet’s  designs,  and 
notified  Foster  accordingly.  Having 
Leen  reinforced  by  a division  under 
General  Getty,  he  was  about  to  send 
ihe  required  number  of  troops,  when 
he  learned  from  General  Viele,  who 
had  captured  a Confederate  mail  at 
Norfolk,  that  Hill’s  movement  was 
only  intended  as  a feint.  The  detach- 
ment was,  therefore,  detained ; and 
Admiral  Lee,  in  obedience  to  orders, 
sent  several  gunboats  up  the  Nanse- 
mond,  to  co-operate  with  the  land  forces 
in  the  defense  of  Suffolk.  Longstreet 
resolved  to  concentrate  his  strength 
and  carry  the  place  by  assault;  Hill 
was  recalled  from  North  Carolina, 
the  besiegers  now  numbering  about 

40.000  men.  Batteries  were  thrown 
up  under  cover  of  the  darkness;  and 
fire  was  opened  upon  the  boats  in  the 


river.  The  gunboats,  however,  were 
bravely  handled  ; the  land  forces,  with 
equal  gallantry,  performed  their  part; 
and,  by  the  resistance  thus  offered,  the 
assailants,  although  overwhelmingly  su- 
perior in  numbers,  were  successfully 
held  in  check.  For  twenty-four  days 
the  siege  continued,  deeds  of  great 
daring  being  performed  on  both  sides. 
Longstreet  put  forth  his  best  efforts, 
and  taxed  his  skill  to  the  utmost  to 
accomplish  his  object ; but  it  was  all  in 
vain.  Finding  it  impossible  to  give 
effect  to  his  purpose,  he  turned  his 
back  upon  Peck  and  retreated.  It  w’as 
now  the  3d  of  May — the  day  on  jjay 
which  Hooker  and  Lee  had  their 
severe  battle  at  Chancellorsville.  The 
Confederates  were  pursued  as  far  as 
the  Blackwater.  Thus  ended  the  sie^e 
of  Suffolk,  “ which  had  for  its  object 
the  recovery  of  the  whole  country 
south  of  the  James  Biver,  extending  to 
Albemarle  Sound,  in  North  Carolina, 
the  ports  of  Norfolk  and  Portsmouth, 
eighty  miles  of  new  railroad  iron,  the 
equipment  of  two  roads,  and  the  cap- 
ture of  all  the  United  States  forces 
and  property,  with  some  thousands  of 
contrabands.”  It  is  hardly  possible  to 
overestimate  the  great  services  ren- 
dered by  Peck  and  his  brave  gaiTison 
at  Suffolk.  If  the  resistance  had  been 
less  stubborn,  Longstreet  might  have 
been  able  to  rejoin  Lee  at  Chancellors- 
ville in  time  to  accomplish  the  destruc- 
tion of  the  army  of  the  Potomac.  His 
appearance  at  Chancellorsville  on  the 
2d  or  on  the  3d  of  May  would  cer- 
tainly have  proved  a calamity  to  the 
National  cause. 


MORGAN’S  RAID. 


595 


No  account  has  yet  been  given  in 
June  pages  of  the  famous  raid 

made  by  the  Confederate  parti- 
san ranger,  General  Morgan,  into  the 
States  of  Kentucky,  Indiana  and  Ohio. 
In  the  month  of  Jane,  and  before  the 
armies  of  Rosecranz  and  Bragg  came 
into  collision  at  Chickamauga,  Morgan, 
with  about  3000  mounted  men  and  six 
guns,  pushed  across  the  Cumberland 
River,  at  Barksville,  and  advanced  to- 
wards Columbia.  At  that  place,  he 
was  encountered  and  held  in  check  for 
some  three  hours  by  a small  body  of 
cavalry,  under  Captain  Custer.  After 
the  death  of  Custer,  who  was  unfor- 
tunately killed  in  the  afPray,  the  Na- 
tionals fell  back,  leaving  Morgan  to 
pursue  his  devastating  march.  At 
Green  River,  Morgan  came  into  con- 
tact with  Colonel  Moore,  who  was  at 
the  head  of  200  Michiganers,  and  well 
entrenched.  A severe  encounter  en- 
sued, the  raiders  being  repulsed,  with 
a loss  of  more  than  200  killed  and 
wounded.  Morgan  now  moved  in  the 
direction  of  Lebanon,  which  was  held 
by  Colonel  Hanson  and  the  Twentieth 
Kentucky.  The  regiment  was  small 
in  numbers ; but  Hanson,  for  some 
hours,  was  able  to  make  a brave  resist- 
ance. The  raiders  tired  the  town,  and 
Hanson  and  his  men  were  captured. 
Pushing  on  through  Springfield  and 
Bardstown,  Morgan’s  advance  reached 
jQ]y  Brandenburg  on  the  7th  of  July. 

7*  There  he  seized  two  steamers, 
the  Alice  Dean  and  McCombs,  and, 
getting  his  men  on  board,  proceeded 
across  the  river.  His  force  had  now  in- 
creased to  eleven  regiments,  numbering 


over  4000  men,  with  ten  pieces  of  artil- 
lery, including  two  howitzers.  After 
burning  the  Alice  Dean  and  the  wharf 
at  Brandenburg,  the  raiders  pushed  on 
towards  the  north,  in  the  direction  of 
Corydon,  a small  place  in  Indiana. 

Meanwhile,  General  Hobson,  with  a 
force  equal  in  numbers  to  that  of 
Morgan,  was  following  in  close  pur- 
suit. Hobson  arrived  in  time  to  see 
the  blazing  wreck  in  the  stream.  Mor- 
gan had  crossed  on  the  8th.  On  the 
day  following,  Hobson,  with  his  little 
band,  was  on  the  soil  of  Indiana.  A 
considerable  portion  of  General  Judah’s 
division,  which  had  been  stationed  in 
Kentucky,  between  the  Cumberland 
and  Barren  Rivers,  was  also  concen- 
trated and  put  in  motion  for  the  cap- 
ture of  Morgan. 

At  Corydon,  which  he  reached  on 
the  9th,  he  encountered  some  re-  jniy 
sistance  from  the  Home  Guards. 

These,  however,  were  overpowered , 
and  a wholesale  system  of  plunder, 
combined  with  vandalism  and  bru- 
tality, was  inaugurated.  Having  done 
their  work  at  Corydon,  the  raiders 
proceeded  to  Salem,  the  capital  of 
Washington  County,  where  they  cap- 
tured between  300  and  400  militia- 
men, pillaged  the  place,  destroyed  the 
railroads,  and  exacted  $1000  each  from 
three  mill-owners.  At  each  town  and 
village,  it  is  the  same  story — murder, 
plunder,  cruel  exactions,  and  wholesale 
destruction  of  property.  The  pursuers 
were  still  behind;  but  the  people, 
alarmed,  were  now  rising  in  their  own 
defense.  At  Vernon,  on  the  12th,  juiy 
Morgan  was  brought  to  a halt  12. 


596 


MINOR  ENGAGEMENTS  IN  1863. 


by  a powei*ful  body  of  militia,  under 
Colonel  Lowe.  Stealing  away  from 
the  presence  of  Lowe  under  cover  of 
the  daikness,  bis  men,  in  scattered  de- 
tachments, and  plundering  as  they  ad- 
vanced, moved  towards  Harrison,  whei*e 
they  concentrated,  preparatory  to  re- 
turning as  quickly  as  possible  to  Ken- 
tucky. Morgan  was  already  in  a tight 
place.  Hobson  was  in  his  rear;  Judah 
was  on  his  flank ; and  thousands  of 
armed  citizens  were  blocking  eveiy 
way  by  which  he  might  attempt  a re- 
trograde movement.  Sweeping  around 
Cincinnati  about  a dozen  miles  to  the 
north,  still  plundering  and  destroying, 
Morgan  pushed  on  through  the  rich 
counties  of  Southern  Ohio,  in  the  di- 
rection of  Buffington  Ford,  a short 
distance  south  of  Parkersburg.  He 
July  reached  the  ford  on  the  18th  of 
July,  and  attempted  to  cross 
under  cover  of  an  artillery  Are.  Next 
morning,  he  found  himself  completely 
hemmed  in.  Judah’s  cavalry  had  fallen 
on  his  flank ; the  head  of  Hobson’s  col- 
umn, under  General  Shackleford,  struck 
liis  rear ; and  two  armed  vessels  in  the 
river  opened  on  his  front.  In  this  ex- 
tremity, about  800  of  the  raiders  sur- 
rendered ; but  the  remainder,  headed 
by  Morgan,  attempted  to  cross  to 
Belleville,  by  swimming  their  horses. 
Only  about  300  managed  thus  to  es- 
ca})e.  Morgan,  thus  foiled,  fell  back, 
at  the  head  of  a considerable  force,  to- 
wards McArthur,  and  then  pushed  to 
the  northeast,  in  the  direction  of  New 
July  Lisbon,  where,  on  the  26th,  being 
26.  closely  pressed  by  Shackleford’s 
cavalry,  he  was  compelled  to  suri’ender. 


Morgan  and  several  of  his  officers  were 
taken  to  Columbus,  Ohio,  where  they 
were  confined  in  felons’  cells,  in  the 
penitentiary.  The  partisan  chief,  with 
six  of  his  captains,  by  undermining  the 
walls  of  their  prison,  and  thus  opening 
a passage  into  the  yard,  effected  their 
escape  in  the  following  November, 
Morgan  was  spared  to  make  another 
famous  raid,  but  it  was  to  be  his  last. 

We  have  already  given  an  account 
of  the  siege  of  Knoxville.  It  was  not 
deemed  necessary  at  the  time  to  follow 
up  Lengstreet  in  his  retreat  from  that 
place.  In  this  chapter,  space  must  be 
found  for  a brief  reference  to  the 
struggle  which  took  place  at  Bean  Sta- 
tion. After  his  unsuccessful  assault  at 
Knoxville,  and  the  withdrawal  of  his 
troops  towards  Virginia,  he  was  pur- 
sued by  cavalry,  under  Shackleford, 
Wolford,  Graham  and  Foster,  into  Jef- 
ferson County.  At  the  above-named 
station,  on  the  Morristown  and  Cum- 
berland Gap  Hoad,  Longstreet  turned 
sharply  on  his  pursuers.  It  was  about 
two  o’clock  in  the  afternoon  of  Mon- 
day, December  14th,  when  the  Dec, 
National  skirmishers  felt  the  H. 
touch  of  the  enemy,  and  were  com- 
pelled to  fall  back.  Shackleford  was 
immediately  on  hand.  His  men,  dis- 
mounting, the  horses  being  sent  to  the 
rear,  were  soon  got  into  position  on 
the  further  side  of  the  road.  Colvin’s 
battery  was  posted  on  a knoll,  in  rear 
of  the  troops,  and  three  howitzers  were 
located  on  a spur  of  the  adjoining 
mountain,  to  the  left  of  the  National 
line.  About  four  o’clock,  the  fighting 
became  general.  The  Confederates 


SABINE  PASS. 


597 


fell  with  great  force  on  the  divisions  of 
Wolford  and  Foster.  The  enemy  was 
well  provided  with  artillery,  which  was 
splendidly  served.  The  Nationals  held 
their  ground  with  great  firmness;  but 
the}^  were  compelled,  from  time  to 
time,  to  give  way,  and  at  nightfall, 
when  the  battle  ceased,  they  had  fallen 
back  about  a mile.  Shackleford,  who 
was  in  chief  command,  confessed  to  the 
loss  of  nearly  200  men.  Longstreet’s 
loss  must  have  been  greater.  Dui*ing 
the  struggle,  an  attempt  was  made  to 
strike  Shackleford’s  rear,  by  passing  a 
force  across  the  Holston,  at  Kelley’s 
Ford ; but  this  movement  was  skilfully 
prevented  by  General  Ferrero,  who 
took  the  precaution  to  guard  the  ford 
by  a strong  force  under  General  Hum- 
phrey. Longstreet  held  possession  of 
Bean  Station ; but  he  was  unable,  in 
consequence  of  the  severity  of  the 
weather,  to  turn  it  to  any  practical  ac- 
count. He,  therefore,  withdrew  his 
forces  to  the  neighborhood  of  Bull’s 
Gap,  a point  at  which  the  Eogersville 
branch  joins  the  main  road. 

It  was  about  this  time  that  General 
Burnside  retired  from  the  command  of 
the  army  of  the  Ohio.  Here,  again,  as 
in  North  Carolina,  he  was  succeeded 
by  General  John  G.  Foster.  After  the 
battle  at  Bean  Station,  and  before  the 
close  of  the  year,  there  was  some 
skirmishing  between  the  rival  forces  in 
this  department.  This  petty  warfare 
was  continued  through  the  spring  of 
1864 ; but  no  event  of  high  importance 
occurred  in  this  region  until  Morgan’s 
famous  and  final  Kentucky  raid,  in 
May  of  that  year.  | 


I Among  the  minor  operations,  of 
which  as  yet  no  notice  has  been  taken, 
mention  must  be  made  of  those  which 
were  conducted  in  the  Gulf  Depart- 
ment, and  in  the  region  west  of  the 
Mississippi,  after  the  fall  of  Port  Hud- 
son. It  will  1)6  remembered  that  when 
General  Banks  withdrew  from  Alexan- 
dria, on  the  Bed  Biver,  and  pi'oceeded 
to  Port  Hudson,  he  took  with  him  the 
greater  portion  of  his  troops,  thus  leav- 
ing the  entire  region,  from  which  he 
had  driven  the  Confederates,  once  again 
at  their  mercy.  General  Dick  Taylor 
immediately  reappeared.  Alexandria 
was  soon  reoccupied ; so  was  Ope- 
lousas ; and  a Confederate  garrison 
took  possession  of  Fort  de  Bussy. 
Taylor’s  followers,  indeed,  found  but 
little  difficulty  in  overrunning  the 
whole  country.  The  National  outposts 
were  withdrawn  into  Brashear  City. 
This,  ho\yever,  was  soon  abandoned; 
and  the  way  to  Algiers  being  left  open. 
New  Orleans  would  have  been  in  peril 
but  for  the  presence  of  Farragut  and 
his  fleet.  After  the  fall  of  Port  Hud- 
son, Banks  again  directed  his  thoughts 
to  a^o^ressive  measures.  He  was  visit- 
ed  by  General  Grant  in  September; 
and  it  was  the  opinion  and  desire  of 
both  commanders  that  a joint  move- 
ment should  be  made  against  Mobile — 
the  one  place  of  importance  on  the 
Southern  coast  then  held  by  the  Con- 
federates. Considerations  of  foreign 
policy,  however,  determined  the  gov- 
ernment to  take  steps  for  the  recovery 
and  reoccupation  of  Texas.  Banks,  ac- 
cordingly, was  oi’dered  to  move  for  the 
conquest  of  that  State.  He  was  per- 


•J6fi 


598 


MINOR  ENGAGEMENTS  IN  1863. 


mitted  to  use  his  own  judgment  as  to 
the  course  he  should  follow ; but  it 
was  suggested  that  the  most  feasible 
route  might  be  found  to  be  hy  the  Red 
River  to  Natchitoches  and  Shreveport. 
Believing  that  route  to  be  impractica- 
ble, at  that  season  of  the  year,  he  de- 
termined to  secure  Sabine  City,  at 
the  mouth  of  the  Sabine  Pass.  To 
give  effect  to  this  purpose,  an  expedi- 
tion of  4000  well-disciplined  troops 
were  placed  under  the  command  of 
General  Franklin.  The  troops  were 
to  be  landed  a few  miles  below  Sabine 
Pass.  Farragut  detached  a naval  force 
of  four  gunboats,  under  Lieutenant 
Frederick  Crocker,  to  join  the  expedi- 
tion. The  gunboats  were  the  Clifton, 
Sachem,  Arizona,  and  Granite  City. 
The  Clifton  was  the  flag-ship.  The 
expedition  proved  a complete  and  dis- 
astrous failure.  In  the  forenoon  of  the 
Sep,  8th  of  September,  the  gunboats 
8*  and  transports  crossed  the  bar  at 
Sabine  Pass.  In  the  afternoon,  the 
Clifton,  Sachem,  and  Arizona  moved 
towards  the  fort,  the  Granite  City 
being  left  behind  to  cover  the  landing 
of  a division  of  troops,  when  the  proper 
time  should  arrive.  The  fort  mounted 
eight  heavy  guns,  three  of  which  were 
rifled.  It  was  evident  that  the  garri- 
son was  well  prepai’ed.  As  the  ves- 
sels drew  near,  the  whole  eight  guns 
opened  at  once.  The  boilers  of  the 
Clifton  and  Arizona  were  immediately 
penetrated  by  shells;  the  white  flags 
were  raised ; and  twenty  minutes  after 
the  attack,  the  two  vessels  were  in  tow 
of  Confederate  steamers.  Franklin  re- 
fused to  land  his  troops,  and,  with  his 


transports,  hastened  over  the  bar,  and 
returned  to  New  Orleans.  He  left  be- 
hind him  200  men  as  prisoners,  50 
killed  and  wounded,  2 gunboats  and 
15  heavy-rifled  guns.  Fi’anklin  was 
blamed  for  not  landing  his  troops  ; but 
it  is  douVjtful  whether,  in  the  circum- 
stances,' he  could  have  acted  more 
wisely  than  he  did. 

Banks  now  concentrated  his  forces 
at  Atchafalaya,  his  intention  being  to 
march  directly  on  Shreveport.  He 
soon  found,  however,  that  the  difficul- 
ties which  lay  in  his  way  were  almost, 
if  not  entirely,  insurmountable.  Aban- 
doning the  attempt,  therefore,  he  re- 
solved to  secui'e  a lodgment  in  Texas, 
by  moving  upon  and  taking  possession 
of  the  harbors  on  its  coast. 

At  this  time,  the  position  of  General 
Banks  was  the  very  I’everse  of  com- 
fortable. The  Confederates  seemed 
irrepressible.  Driven  from  one  place, 
they  quickly  reappeared  in  another. 
Towards  the  end  of  September,  Gen- 
ei*al  Dick  Taylor,  of  the  Confederate 
ai'iny,  became  more  than  usually  active. 
He  was  still  west  of  the  Atchafalaya. 
General  Green,  his  most  efficient  lieu- 
tenant, with  his  bushwhackers,  was  con- 
stantly depredating  in  the  neighborhood 
of  Port  Hudson.  It  had  become  neces- 
sary to  make  a bold  effort  to  suppress 
those  bands  of  marauders.  With  this 
end  in  view.  General  Herron  was  sent 
with  a body  of  men  to  Morgansia. 
Deemins:  it  advisable  to  establish  an  out- 
post  some  miles  in  the  interior,  Herron 
sent  Colonel  Lake  with  the  Nineteenth 
Iowa  and  Twenty-Sixth  Indiana,  also 
6 guns  and  a support  of  150  cavalry, 


GRAND  COTEAU. 


599 


under  Colonel  Montgomery.  The  en- 
tire force  was  under  1000.  The  exist- 
ence of  this  post  became  known  to 
Sep.  Green.  On  the  night  of  the 
30th  of  September,  he  advanced 
stealthily  across  an  adjoining  bayou, 
surrounded  and  surprised  the  camp, 
and  captured  Lake  and  about  400  of 
liis  men.  The  cavalry  escaped  with 
the  loss  of  5 men.  There  were  54 
killed  and  wounded. 

In  this  connection  may  be  related 
^vith  propriety  the  unfortunate  affair 
which  happened  at  Grand  Coteau. 
When  General  Banks  was  about  to 
set  out  on  his  expedition  to  Texas,  he 
thought  it  proper  to  make  a demon- 
stration in  the  direction  of  Opelousas, 
so  as  to  create  the  impression  that  a 
movement  which  had  Alexandria  or 
Slireveport  for  its  objective  was  reallj^ 
commenced.  Four  divisions  of  the 
army  of  the  Gulf,  consisting  of  two 
divisions  of  the  Nineteenth  army  corps 
and  two  divisions  of  the  Thirteenth 
army  corps,  the  whole  under  the  com- 
mand of  Major-General  Franklin,  were 
ordered  to  Opelousas.  The  march  was 
completed  without  difficulty;  and  the 
army  encamped  at  Opelousas  and 
Barre’s  Landing,  remaining  about  eight 
Oct.  days.  On  the  27th  of  Octo- 

27*  ber,  the  backward  movement  com- 
menced, the  First  division,  of  the  Thir- 
teenth corps,  falling  back  upon  New 
Iberia.  On  the  1st  of  November,  the 
other  two  divisions — the  Third  and 
Fourth — commanded  respectiv^ely  by 
Washburne  and  Burbridge,  fell  back, 
in  obedience  to  orders,  as  far  as  Car- 
rion Crow  Bayou  and  Grand  Coteau. 


On  the  same  day,  the  Nineteenth  corps 
fell  back  in  the  same  direction.  Wash- 
burne and  Burbridge  were  ordered  to 
encamp  at  the  places  just  mentioned, 
while  the  rest  of  the  army  continued 
to  fall  back.  Washburne  assumed  su- 
preme control  of  the  two  divisions  of 
the  Thirteenth  corps,  who  were  thus 
left  to  guard  the  rear.  On  the  morn- 
ing of  the  3d,  the  Confederates  pjov, 
showed  themselves  in  considera- 
ble  strenofth  in  the  neierhborhood  of 
Burbridge’s  position,  which  was  about 
three  miles  in  advance  of  that  of  Mc- 
Ginnis, with  whom  Washburne  had 
his  headquarters. 

Burbridge,  with  one  brigade  of  the 
Fourth  division,  about  1200  strong, 
with  one  6-gun  battery  of  10-pounder 
Parrott,  and  with  about  500  mounted 
infantry,  under  Colonel  Fonda,  and  a 
section  of  Nim’s  battery,  was  on  the 
north  side  of  what  is  called  Muddy 
Bayou.  McGinnis,  with  the  Third  di- 
vision, 3000  strong,  and  one  battery, 
was  at  Carrion  Crow  Bayou.  The  two 
bayous  run  in  parallel  lines  to  the  east, 
the  banks  being  fringed  with  wood. 
The  intervening  ground  was  a smooth, 
level  prairie.  Burbridge’s  right  rear 
rested  on  a dense  thicket ; his  left 
stretched  out  about  twenty  rods  into 
the  open  ground ; the*  whole  fronted  to 
the  northwest,  in  the  direction  of  Ope- 
lousas. Later  in  the  day,  the  Confed- 
erates fell  with  tremendous  fury  on 
Burbridge’s  position,  attacking  him 
with  an  overwhelming  force  in  front 
and  on  both  flanks.  The  shock  was 
irresistible;  and  for  a time  it  seemed 
as  if  the  entire  force  would  be  cap- 


600 


MINOR  ENGAGEMENTS  IN  1863. 


tured  or  destroyed.  Washburne,  who 
had  reached  the  front  in  time  to  see 
the  commencement  of  the  struggle, 
had  already  ordered  up  the  Third  di- 
vision. McGinnis  was  ill,  and  unable 
to  command  in  person ; but  his  troops 
were  hurried  forward,  at  the  double- 
quick,  by  Bi'igadier-General  Cameron, 
of  the  First,  and  Colonel  Slack,  of  the 
Second  brigade.  They  did  not  arrive  a 
moment  too  soon.  Burbridge’s  com- 
mand had  been  driven  entirely  out  of 
the  woods;  and  the  Confederate  cav- 
alry were  charging  on  his  left,  and 
coming  down  with  force  upon  his  rear. 
As  soon  as  it  came  up,  the  Third  di- 
vision formed  in  line ; and  the  guns, 
already  within  range,  poured  shot  and 
shell  on  the  almost  triumphant  foe, 
and  checked  his  advance. 

In  the  heat  of  the  fight,  and  before 
the  arrival  of  the  Third  division,  a tre- 
mendous struggle  took  place  for  the 
possession  of  Nim’s  battery.  Exposed 
to  charge  after  charge  of  the  enemy, 
the  gunners  were  ultimately  overpow- 
ered. An  infantry  regiment — the  Twen- 
ty-Third Wisconsin — was  sent  to  their 
support ; but  it  was  soon  overwhelmed 
and  compelled  to  surrender.  One  sec- 
tion of  this  battery  was  commanded  by 
Lieutenant  Marian d.  In  spite  of  the 
strength  and  fury  of  the  enemy,  that 
gallant  officer,  after  an  almost  unparal- 
leled display  of  coolness  and  audacity, 
succeeded  in  carrying  off  his  own  sec- 
tion of  the  battery.  But  for  the 
lu’avery  of  Marland,  those  guns  would 
have  been  lost.  As  it  was,  Burbridge, 
idthough  compelled  to  fall  back,  man- 
aged to  take  with  him  every  wagon 


and  all  the  guns,  with  the  exception  of 
a 10-pounder  Parrott. 

As  soon  as  McGinnis’  division  came 
up,  Burbridge  got  his  guns  again  into 
position,  and  opened  upon  the  Confed- 
erates, now  just  checked  in  theii*  ad- 
vance, a raking  cross-fire,  which  tore 
their  ranks  in  pieces.  The  tide  of  battle 
was  now  turned.  What  was  a pursuit, 
became  a retreat.  The  Confederates 
sought  shelter  in  the  woods.  Thence, 
however,  they  were  quickly  driven, 
the  infantry  pursuing  for  about  a mile 
and  a half,  the  cavaliy  for  about  three 
miles.  The  loss  of  life  was  not  so  great 
as  the  severity  of  the  fight  might  have 
seemed  to  imply.  The  number  of  killed 
was  26;  of  the  wounded,  124;  of  the 
missing,  566.  The  Confederate  loss  was 
about  60  killed.  The  wounded  were 
carried  off  with  them  in  their  retreat ; 
65  were  made  prisoners.  Such  was  the 
battle  of  Grand  Coteau.  It  cannot  be 
called  great  or  decisive  ; but  it  was  one 
of  the  most  severely  contested  battles 
of  the  war. 

The  Nationals  lost  heavily  in  offi- 
cers. Among  the  oflScers  who  won  dis- 
tinction that  day  was  Captain  Guppy, 
of  the  Twenty-Third  Wisconsin.  After 
having  displayed  great  gallantry,  he 
was  wounded  and  made  prisoner,  with 
the  greater  portion  of  his  regiment. 
Burbridge,  Guppy,  Fonda  and  Robin- 
son received  the  special  commendation 
of  General  Washburne.  The  Nation- 
als marched  back  in  safety  to  Brasheai 
City. 

Meanwhile,  General  Banks,  at  the 
head  of  an  expedition  consisting  of 
6000  troops  and  some  war  vessels,  had 


THE  GUERILLAS. 


m 


sailed  from  New  Orleans  directly  for 
the  Rio  Grande.  Banks,  although  he 
accompanied  the  expedition,  had  placed 
in  immediate  command  General  Napo- 
leon J.  T.  Dana,  an  accomplished  and 
skilful  officer,  and  supposed  to  be  well 
acquainted  with  the  country  about  to 
be  visited.  This  expedition  was  at- 
tended with  very  considerable  success. 
But  little  opposition,  in  truth  was  en- 
countered, the  enemy  always  retreating 
as  the  Nationals  advanced.  On  the 
2d  of  November,  the  troops  debarked 
at  Brazos  Santiago,  and  advanced  in 
the  direction  of  Brownsville,  some 
thirty  miles  up  the  river.  Point  Isabel 
was  reached  on  the  8th.  Banks  having 
established  his  headquarters  at  Browns- 
ville, sent  as  many  troops  as  he  could 
spare,  further  up,  to  seize  and  occupy 
the.  water-passes  between  the  Rio 
Grande  and  Galveston.  Some  steam- 
ers were  obtained  on  the  Rio  Grande ; 
and  troops  were  transported  to  Mus- 
tang Island,  off  Corpus  Christi  Bay. 
From  that  port.  General  Ransom  ad- 
jjqv,  vanced  to  the  Aransas  Pass ; and, 
18.  on  the  1 8th  of  November,  he  car- 
ried the  place  by  assault,  capturing 
100  prisoners.  On  the  same  day,  the 
National  troops  entered  and  occupied 
Corpus  Christi.  About  the  end  of  the 
month.  General  Washburne,  now  in 
command  of  the  Thirteenth  corps, 
moved  upon  Pass  Cavallo,  at  the  en- 
trance to  Matagorda  Bay,  where  thei’e 
was  a strong  fort  called  Esperanza, 
garrisoned  by  2000  men.  The  place 
was  invested;  but  the  Confederates 
blew  up  the  magazine  and  fled.  Banks 
had  reason  to  be  proud  of  the  success 


which  attended  this  expedition.  In 
one  month  he  had  made  himself  mas- 
ter of  every  important  position  on 
the  coast  between  the  Rio  Grande  and 
Galveston,  except  the  works  at  the 
nK)uth  of  the  Brazos,  and  those  on 
Galveston  Island.  He  was  anxious  to 
pi’osecute  the  work,  especially  towards 
the  east;  but  he  knew  that  Magruder 
was  there  in  great  force,  and  that  with 
the  troops  now  at  his  disposal,  it 
would  be  hazardous  to  risk  a battle 
with  an  antagonist  of  so  much  daring 
and  so  much  skill.  Had  it  been  pos- 
sible for  him  to  obtain  sufficient  rein- 
forcements, he  might  have  been  able 
to  sweep  the  territory  clear  of  the 
Confederate  troops.  As  reinforcements 
could  not  be  found.  Banks,  leaving 
Dana  in  command  on  the  Rio  Grande, 
returned  to  New  Orleans. 

We  have  already,  in  an  earlier  chap- 
ter, recorded  the  military  events  which 
took  place  in  Missouri  and  Arkansas  in 

1862.  In  the  chapter  devoted  to  the 
guerrillas,  the  record  is  brought  down 
as  far  as  the  battle  of  Prairie  Grove,  in 
which  the  Nationals  were  completely  vic- 
torious. It  seemed  for  a time  as  if,  in  the 
entire  region  west  of  the  Mississippi, 
the  National  authority  was  firmly  estab- 
lished. It  was  not  long,  however,  until, 
as  has  already  been  related,  the  Confede- 
rates appeared  in  force  in  Texas,  recap- 
turing Galveston,  and  establishing  their 
authority  over  the  entire  State.  Early  in 

1863,  the  guerrillas  again  made  their 
presence  felt  in  Missouri  and  Arkansas, 
to  the  great  inconvenience  of  the  loyal 
inhabitants  of  those  States.  About 
the  beginning  of  January,  Marmaduke, 


602 


MINOR  ENGAGEMENTS  IN  1863. 


with  some  4000  men,  for  the  most 
part  mounted,  burst  suddenly  out  of 
Northern  Arkansas  and  fell  upon 
Springfield,  Missouri,  with  great  fury. 
The  place  was  well  fortified  with  earth- 
works; but  the  National  forces  were 
scattered  over  the  country ; and  it  was 
with  some  difiiculty  that  Generals 
Brown  and  Holland,  who  were  in  com- 
mand there,  were  able  to  bring  together 
about  1000  militia-men  to  resist  the 
onslaught  of  the  guerrilla  chief.  It 
Jan.  was  about  one  o’clock,  on  the 
afternoon  of  the  8th,  when  the 
Confederate  force,  some  3000  strong, 
appeared  before  the  town.  Firing  was 
commenced  at  once ; and  severe  but 
somewhat  desultory  fighting  was  main- 
tained during  the  remainder  of  the  day. 
The  National  troops,  although  raw 
and  inexperienced,  fought  with  great 
bravery;  and,  as  evening  approached, 
they  had  compelled  the  Confederates 
to  abandon  one  position  after  another, 
until  the  latter  were  glad  to  retreat 
under  cover  of  the  darkness.  The 
battle  had  lasted  five  hours.  The  Na- 
tionals sustained  a loss  of  164  men,  of 
whom  14  were  killed.  General  Brown 
was  severely  wounded,  and  lost  the 
use  of  his  right  arm.  Marmaduke  lost 
about  200  men,  of  whom  41  were 
killed  and  80  were  left  in  the  town  as 
prisoners. 

Marmaduke  now  marched  eastward  ; 
Jau.  dawn  on  the  10th,  his 

advance  encountered  the  Twenty- 
First  Iowa,  under  Colonel  Merrill. 
After  a sharp  skirmish,  he  succeeded 
in  flanking  the  National  troops,  and 
pushed  on  towards  Huntsville.  Mer- 


rill, however,  was  there  before  him, 
and  was  reinforced  by  the  Ninety- 
Ninth  Illinois,  and  portions  of  the 
Third  Iowa  and  the  Third  Missouri 
cavaliy,  with  a supporting  battery, 
under  Lieutenant  Wald  Schmidt.  The 
engagepfient  which  followed  on  the 
11th  was  sharp  but  brief,  Marmaduke 
being  compelled  to  retreat,  after  sus- 
taining a loss  of  300  men,  including  a 
brigadier-general  and  three  colonels. 
The  Nationals  lost  71  men,  of  whom  7 
were  killed.  Marmaduke  was  glad 
to  abandon  Missouri.  Moving  south- 
ward, he  took  position,  with  a portion 
of  his  forces,  at  Batesville,  Arkansas, 
on  the  White  River.  At  this  point 
he  was  attacked,  on  February  4th,  peb. 
by  the  Fourth  Missouri  cavalry,  4. 
under  Colonel  G.  E.  Waring,  and 
driven  across  the  stream,  with  a con- 
siderable loss  in  killed  and  wounded, 
one  colonel  and  a number  of  privates 
having  been  made  prisoners.  After 
the  battle  at  Huntsville,  a portion  of 
Marmaduke’s  men  made  their  way  to 
Van  Buren  Creek;  and  300  of  them 
were  captured  on  the  Julia  Roan,  on 
the  28th  of  January.  His  men  dis- 
persed or  fell  into  the  hands  of  the 
enemy.  Marmaduke,  greatly  discour- 
aged, repaired  to  the  headquarters  of 
the  Confederate  army  corps  at  Little 
Rock. 

During  the  next  two  months  there 
was  comparative  quiet  in  those  regions, 
although  the  guerrilla  leaders  at  Little 
Rock  were  busy  increasing  and  dis- 
ciplining their  forces  and  preparing  foi 
future  efforts.  The  guerrilla  bands, 
during  this  period,  wei*e  not,  howevt^r, 


CAPE  GIRARDEAU. 


603 


wholly  inactive.  At  this  time  occurred 
the  Sam  Gatty  affair — an  affair  which, 
being  characterized  by  great  brutality, 
rev^ealed  the  true  spirit  of  the  guer- 
rillas, and  brought  much  discredit  on 
the  Confederate  cause. 

It  was  the  middle  of  April  before 
the  Confederate  commanders  assembled 
at  Little  Rock  felt  emboldened  to  re- 
sume active  operations.  Fayetteville, 
since  the  early  spring,  had  been  occu- 
pied by  some  Union  cavaliy  and  in- 
fantry, under  Colonel  Harrison.  On 
j^pril  the  18th  of  April,  shortly  after 
sunrise,  Harrison  and  Ins  little 
band  were  attacked  by  General  W. 
L.  Cabell,  who  had  come  by  forced 
marches  over  the  Boston  Mountains 
from  Ozark.  Although  Harrison’s  men 
were  greatly  outnumbered,  they  not 
only  resisted  the  attack,  l:)ut,  after  six 
hours’  fighting,  compelled  the  enemy 
to  fall  back,  with  considerable  loss,  in 
the  direction  from  which  he  came. 
Harrison  had  lost  71  men,  of  whom  4 
were  killed;  but  Cabell  had  left  be- 
hind him  55  prisoners,  50  horses,  and 
100  shot-guns. 

A little  later,  Marmaduke  himself 
was  again  in  motion.  With  the  full 
consent  and  approval  of  his  superior 
officer,  Major-General  Sterling  Price, 
he  set  out  at  the  head  of  a large  force 
of  infantry  and  cavalry,  with  the  in- 
tention of  moving  on  Cape  Girardeau, 
which  was  at  that  time  the  depot  of  sup- 
plies for  a portion  of  General  Grant’s 
army.  Cape  Girardeau,  with  its  stores, 
was  in  charge  of  General  John  McNiel. 
When  Marmaduke  reached  Frederick- 
ton,  on  the  2 2d,  McNiel  was  at  Bloom- 


field, in  Stoddard  County;  but  hearing 
of  the  presence  of  Marmaduke  in  that 
neighborhood,  and  divining  his  object, 
he  hurried  to  the  menaced  point,  and, 
arriving  at  Cape  Girardeau  on  the  23d, 
calmly  awaited  the  approach  of  the 
guerrilla  chief.  Marmaduke  came  up 
on  the  25th,  two  days  after  the  arrival 
of  McNiel.  It  was  not  without  reason 
that  the  Confederates  counted  on  an 
easy  victory;  for  while  Marmaduke 
had  under  him  a choice  corps  of  8003 
men,  known  as  “ Price’s  First  Corps 
of  the  Trans-Mississippi  Department,” 
McNiel  could  only  muster  some  1700 
men,  and  these,  for  the  most  part,  be- 
longed to  the  militia.  But  McNiel, 
who  was  a brave  and  indefatigable 
officer,  had  made  good  use  of  the 
two  days  of  grace.  A powerful  force 
was  immediately  transported  into  Illi- 
nois ; four  guns,  rudely  mounted,  were 
placed  in  advantageous  positions;  and 
the  entire  ranks  were  considerably 
strengthened.  On  the  25th,  after  April 
a slight  skirmish,  Marmaduke  25. 
called  upon  McNiel  to  surrender,  giv- 
ing him  only  thirty  minutes  to  decide 
and  return  his  answer.  McNiel’s  an- 
swer was  prompt  and  decided.  He 
believed  he  was  able  to  defend  the 
place,  and  he  meant  to  do  so.  He 
would  not  surrender.  At  ten  o’clock 
next  morning,  after  a slight  artillery 
display,  the  call  was  again  made  for 
immediate  surrender.  This  time  Mc- 
Niel answered  with  his  guns.  After 
five  hours’  fighting,  during  which  the 
National  guns  were  admirably  handled, 
Marmaduke,  on  seeing  some  armed  ves- 
sels in  the  Mississippi  coming  to  the 


C04 


MINOR  ENGAGEMENTS  IN  1SG3. 


aid  of  the  besieged,  beat  a hasty  re- 
treat across  the  St.  Francis  Fiver,  and 
hurried  into  Arkansas,  burning  the 
bridges  behind  him.  At  this  time, 
McNiel  was  ranked  by  General  Yan- 
dever ; and  the  pursuit  of  Marmaduke 
was  conducted  by,  perhaps,  overmuch 
caution.  The  Confederate  loss  at  Cape 
Girardeau  was  some  60  killed  and 
about  300  wounded,  many  of  whom 
were  left  behind  in  the  retreat. 

This  defeat  of  Marmaduke  did  not 
put  an  end  to  the  Confederate  raids  in 
those  regions.  The  guerrilla  bands 
seemed  almost  ubiquitous.  On  the 
]^fay  20th  of  May,  the  Confederate 
20.  colonel,  Colfey,  acting  as  briga- 
dier-general, at  the  head  of  five  regi- 
ments, fell  upon  Fort  Blunt,  not  far 
from  Fort  Gibson.  The  attack  was 
made  with  great  energy  and  determi- 
nation. But  Colonel  William  A.  Phil- 
lips, with  his  garrison  of  about  1200 
men,  some  of  them  Indians,  who  could 
not  be  relied  upon,  made  a stubborn 
and  successful  resistance.  Coffey,  after 
the  loss  of  a considerable  number  of 
men,  was  driven  back  in  disorder,  and 
compelled  to  seek  safety  on  the  other 
side  of  the  Arkansas  Fiver.  On  the 
July  16th  of  July,  a bold  but  unsuc- 
16*  cessful  attempt  was  made  by  a 
mixed  Confederate  force,  composed  of 
Texans  and  Creek  Indians,  to  capture 
a train  of  wagons,  laden  with  supplies 
for  Fort  Blunt  The  assailants  were 
I’epelled  with  loss ; and  the  train  was 
saved.  About  the  same  time,  another 
attack  was  meditated  on  Fort  Blunt. 
General  Cooper,  with  a body  of  Con- 
federates, some  6000  atrong,  was  lying 


at  Honey  Spiings,  behind  Elk  Creek, 
and  about  twenty-five  miles  south  of 
Fort  Blunt,  waiting  for  the  arrival  of 
General  Cabell,  with  three  regimente 
from  Texas.  It  was  Cooper’s  inten- 
tion, so  soon  as  Cabell  came  up,  to 
move  on  Fort  Blunt.  Happily,  Gen- 
eral Blunt  had  been  made  aware  of  the 
danger  which  threatened  the  post;  and, 
by  forced  marches,  he  pushed  on  from 
Fort  Scott,  arriving  at  the  menaced 
point  in  time  to  save  it  from  the 
threatened  peril.  In  five  days  he  had 
accomplished  a journey  of  175  miles. 
Blunt  did  not  wait  for  the  attack,  but 
moved  at  once  on  Cooper’s  camp,  with 
3000  troops,  infantry  and  cavalry,  and 
12  cannon  of  light  calibre.  He  left 
Fort  Blunt  at  midnight  on  the  1 6th ; 
and  at  ten  o’clock  next  day  he  had, 
with  his  columns,  led  respectively  by 
Colonels  Phillips  and  Judson,  fallen 
heavily  on  Cooper.  The  battle  lasted 
for  two  hours;  but  Cooper,  although 
he  had  superior  numbers,  never  recov- 
ered from  the  suddenness  and  severity 
of  the  attack.  The  Confederates  were 
completely  routed.  They  fled,  in  wild 
disorder,  through  the  woods  into  the 
open  prairie,  leaving  on  the  field  150 
killed,  400  wounded,  with  a large 
number  of  prisoners,  one  disabled  gun 
and  nearly  200  small  arms.  Blunt 
lost  77  men,  of  whom  17  were  killed. 
When  Cabell  came  up  with  his  Texans, 
3000  strong,  the  battle  was  ended. 
Not  deeming  it  prudent  to  attack  the 
victorious  Nationals,  he  moved  towards 
the  South,  and  disappeared  beyond  the 
Canadian  Fiver.  The  Nationals  re- 
turned to  Fort  Blunt.  After  several 


LITTLE  KOCK. 


605 


other  skirmishes,  of  greater  or  lesser 
importance,  General  Blunt  descended 
the  Arkansas  River,  and  occupied  Fort 
Smith. 

At  that  time,  the  army  of  the  fron- 
tier, as  it  was  called,  was  greatly  de- 
pleted, by  furnishing  reinforcements  to 
General  Grant,  at  Vicksburg;  and  the 
Confederate  generals,  in  the  Trans- 
Mississippi  Department,  seized  the  op- 
portunity to  make  an  attack  on  He- 
lena. The  attack  was  made  on  the 
July  4th  of  July,  with  a force  of 
about  16,000  men,  and  was  under 
the  special  direction  of  Price  and  Mar- 
maduke.  It  was  made  about  daybreak, 
and  with  great  fury.  At  hrst,  the  Con- 
fedei*ates  were  successful  in  carrying  a 
small  fort  which  formed  part  of  the 
outworks ; but  the  gunboat  Tyler  com- 
ing up  and  opening  with  its  heavy 
guns,  the  fort  was  reclaimed,  and  the 
assailants  were  driven  back  with  a se- 
vere loss  in  killed  and  wounded.  Their 
purpose,  however,  to  carry  the  place 
by  storm  was  not  all  at  once  aban- 
doned. The  assault  was  repeated  with 
great  bravery,  Marmaduke’s  men  fall- 
ing in  heavy  masses  on  the  defenses 
of  the  town,  attacking  now  the  north 
and  now  the  south,  but  everywhere 
meeting  with  the  most  stubborn  resist- 
ance, and  being  terribly  cut  up  by  the 
National  fire,  at  short  range,  and  by 
the  heavy  missiles  from  the  gunboat. 
Foiled  at  every  point,  the  Confederates 
were  compelled  to  fall  back,  having 
sustained  a loss  of  over  1000  men  in 
killed  and  wounded,  and  more  than 
1000  prisoners.  Seeing  that  the  Na- 
tioi^als  were  being  reinforced,  they  re- 


treated, after  a day  or  two,  into  the 
interior  of  Arkansas. 

After  the  surrender  of  Vicksburg,  the 
pressure  on  General  Grant’s  army  was 
relieved,  and  expeditions  were  sent  out 
in  different  directions,  either  to  repel 
or  to  check  the  movements  of  the  Con- 
federates, who  were  still  committing 
depredations  on  both  sides  of  the  Great 
River.  One  of  these  expeditions  was 
under  the  care  of  General  McPherson, 
who,  with  the  divisions  of  Logan  and 
Tuttle,  pushed  out  in  the  direction 
of  Canton,  where  the  Confederates 
were  known  to  be  assembled  in  force. 
McPherson,  not  having  sufficient  num- 
bers at  his  disposal  to  warrant  a vigor- 
ous or  persistent  attack,  deemed  it 
prudent  to  withdraw,  and  fell  back  to 
Vicksburg  by  way  of  Clinton.  An- 
other and  more  successful  expedition 
was  entrusted  to  the  care  of  General 
Frederick  Steele,  who  was  sent  to 
Helena  with  instructions  to  organize  a 
body  of  troops,  and  to  proceed  to  the 
capture  of  Little  Rock,  the  headcpiar- 
ters  of  the  guerrillas.  At  the  begin- 
ning of  August,  he  had  collected  and 
equipped  about  GOOD  men  ; he  had  also 
secured  22  guns.  He  was  soon  joined 
by  General  Davidson,  who  had  been 
operating  in  Arkansas,  under  the  com- 
m^^nd  of  General  Hurl  but,  and  whose 
force  consisted  of  about  the  same  num- 
ber of  men,  with  18  guns.  Davidson’s 
men  were  mostly  mounted.  The  united 
foi;ce,  numbering  in  all  some  12,000 
men  and  40  guns,  set  out  from 
Helena  on  the  10th  of  August, 
Davidson  and  his  horsemen  taking 
the  lead.  The  White  River  was 


606 


MINOR  ENGAGEMENTS  IN  1863. 


crossed  at  Clarendon  ; and  a reconnois- 
sance  was  made  as  far  as  Brownsville. 
The  details  of  this  movement  are  nu- 
merous; but  as  there  was  compara- 
tively little  fighting,  it  is  unnecessary 
to  enumerate  them.  Marmaduke  had 
been  sent  out  to  Brownsville  to  offer 
Davidson  i*esistance.  Brownsville  was 
abandoned  without  a battle,  Marma- 
duke falling  back  to  Little  Bock,  and 
burning  the  bridges  in  his  rear.  The 
National  forces  were  again  concen- 
trated at  Brownsville,  Steele  having 
been  reinforced  by  True’s  brigade,  sent 
from  Memphis.  After  a series  of  suc- 
cessful encounters,  and  having  marched 
over  a most  difficult  country,  forcing 
their  way  across  rivers  and  bayous,  the 
Nationals  reached  the  outer  defenses 
Sep,  of  Little  Bock  on  the  10th  of 
September.  The  final  struggle 
was  protracted  and  severe  ; but  on  the 
evening  of  that  day  the  place  was  sur- 
rendered to  General  Davidson.  Much 
of  the  public  property  had  been  de- 
stroyed ; eight  steamers  were  found 
in  flames,  and  beyond  recovery,  when 
the  National  troops  entered  the  city; 
but  the  arsenal  was  uninjured.  About 
1000  men  were  made  prisoners.  The 
entire  National  loss  did  not  exceed  100 
in  killed,  wounded  and  prisoners.  It 
was  a campaign  of  which  Steele  had 
just  cause  to  be  proud.  Only  forty 
days  had  elapsed  since  he  arrived  at 
Helena.  With  the  capture  of  Little 
Bock  perished  one  of  the  most  impor- 
tant centres  and  nurseries  of  I’ebeldom 
in  the  western  country.  The  Confed- 
erates ultimately  fell  back  to  Bed 
Bi  ver;  and  the  National  troops,  on 


the  28th  of  October,  occupied  Arka- 
delphia. 

On  the  20th  of  August,  one  of  the 
guerrilla  leaders,  named  Quan- 
trell,  at  the  head  of  a body  of  20. 
800  men,  entered  the  city  of  Lawrence, 
Kansas,  and  murdered,  in  cold  blood, 
175  of  fits  citizens,  and  destroyed  by 
fire  property  to  the  value  of-  over 
$2,000,000.  He  was  pursued  as  soon 
as  troops  could  be  raised,  and  some  40 
or  50  of  his  men  were  killed,  oct, 
On  the  12th  of  October,  a vigor-  ^2. 
ous  encounter  took  place  about  eight 
miles  southwest  of  Arrow  Bock,  be- 
tween the  Nationals,  under  General 
E.  B.  Brown,  and  a powerful  band  of 
guerrillas  and  Indians,  under  Generals 
Shelby  and  Coffey.  The  Confederates 
were  broken  and  routed  after  a sharp 
contest,  and  pursued  as  far  as  the  Ai*- 
kansas  line.  Early  in  this  month,  a 
desperate  attempt  was  made  to  murder 
General  Blunt  and  his  staff,  who  were 
marching  towards  Fort  Scott,  Kansas. 
About  300  Confederates  had  dressed 
themselves  as  Union  soldiers,  and 
by  this  means  surprised  and  captured 
78  of  the  100  men  under  Blunt,  all  of 
whom,  including  Major  Curtis,  son  of 
General  Curtis,  were  wounded.  Blunt 
and  15  of  his  men  made  a vigorous 
resistance,  and  contrived  to  escape.  It 
was  believed  by  the  Confederates  that 
General  Blunt  was  among  the  killed ; 
and  they  I’ejoiced  accordingly.  On  tlie 
20th  of  October,  Blunt  was  relieved  of 
the  command  of  the  army  of  the  Fron- 
tier, General  McNiel  taking  his  place. 
Towards  the  end  of  October,  Marma- 
duke, at  the  head  of  2000  men,  marchcAl 


THE  INDIANS. 


G07 


from  Princeton  upon  Pine  Bluff,  a post 
on  the  south  side  of  the  Arkansas 
Kiver,  and  about  fifty  miles  below 
Little  Bock,  then  in  command  of  Colo- 
nel Powell  Clayton.  That  officer  was 
not  unprepared  for  the  attack ; and 
after  a vigorous  fight,  which  lasted 
about  five  hours,  Marmaduke  was 
forced  to  retire,  having  lost  in  the 
struggle  150  men  killed  and  wounded, 
and  33  prisoners.  Clayton’s  loss  was 
Oct.  whom  17  were  killed.  On 

the  18th  of  October,  Quantrell 
and  the  Creek  chief,  Sandwatie,  made 
an  attack  on  Fort  Gibson,  in  the  In- 
dian country.  Fort  Gibson  was  one 
of  Colonel  Phillips’  outposts.  After 
a contest  of  four  hours,  the  assailants 
were  dispersed,  and  driven  across  the 
Arkansas  Biver.  Peace  now  reigned 
for  a time  between  the  Bed  and  Mis- 
souri Bivers. 

In  the  late  winter  months  and  early 
spring  of  1863,  further  trouble  was 
given  by  the  Sioux  Indians,  under 
Little  Crow,  whose  brutalities  at  Yel- 
low Medicine,  at  New  Ulm,  and  at 
Cedar  City,  in  Minnesota,  have  al- 
ready been  described.  The  spirit  of 
those  warriors  was  greatly  broken  by 
the  execution  of  thirty  of  their  num- 
ber at  Markato,  towards  the  end 

Note. — After  the  fall  of  Vicksburg,  General  Herron, 
with  a force  of  troops  numbering  5000,  was  ordered  to 
Port  Hudson.  He  had  already  embarked,  when  the 
news  arrived  announcing  Banks’  victory.  Transfer- 
ring his  troops  to  lighter-draught  vessels,  he  proceeded, 
on  the  12th  of  July,  in  obedience  to  orders,  up  the 
Yazoo  River,  as  far  as  Yazoo  City,  under  the  convoy  of 
the  De  Kalb  and  two  tin-clad  vessels,  under  the  com- 
mand of  Captain  Walker.  A combined  attack  of  the 


of  February.  It  was  not,  however, 
until  the  following  summer,  when 
General  Pope  took  command  of  the 
department,  that  the  Sioux  War” 
was  brought  to  a close.  Vigorous- 
ly attacked  and  pursued  from  place 
to  place,  the  savage  bands  were  brok- 
en and  dispersed  among  the  wilds 
of  the  eastern  slopes  of  the  Bocky 
Mountains.  Little  Crow  himself, 
“ the  foremost  hunter  and  orator,” 
was  finally  shot  near  Hutchinson,  in 
Minnesota,  by  a Mr.  Lamson.  The 
skeleton  of  the  chief  is  preserved  in 
the  collection  of  the  Minnesota  His- 
torical Society. 

At  the  close  of  the  year,  practical 
progress  had  been  made  in  reducing  to 
subjection  the  entire  western  country. 
Vicksburg  and  Port  Hudson  had  fallen  ; 
and  the  Mississippi,  throughout  its  en- 
tire length,  was  under  the  control  of 
the  National  government.  Missouii 
was  placed  beyond  the  danger  of  inva- 
sion. The  military  power  of  the  ene- 
my was  broken  in  Arkansas  and  Kansas. 
A firm  foothold  had  been  secured  in 
Texas.  Much  work  had  yet  to  be 
done ; but  it  was  now  evident  that  the 
end  of  the  great  struggle  was  approach- 
ing, and  that  the  Union  was  to  be 
saved. 

army  and  navy  on  the  enemy’s  works  resulted  in  the 
flight  of  the  garrison.  Unfortunately,  the  De  Kalb  was 
sunk  by  a torpedo,  opposite  the  city.  Herron  won 
an  easy  victory,  capturing  and  destroying  a Confede- 
rate vessel,  formerly  a gunboat,  which  was  sheltered 
there.  He  returned  to  Vicksburg  on  the  21st  July, 
bringing  back  with  him  300  prisoners,  6 heavy  guns, 
250  small  arms,  800  horses  and  2000  bales  of  Confede- 
rate cotton. 


THE  MERIDIAN  EXPEDITION. 


COS 


CHAPTER  XXXI. 


t 

The  Opening  of  18G4. — Promise  of  Success. — Much  Work  yet  to  he  Done. — The  Confederacy  Crippled,  hut 
Kot  Subdued. — Three  Important  Strongholds.  — Meridian. — Shreveport. — Mobile. — Sherman’s  Purpose, — 
Delay. — After  Chattanooga  and  Knoxville. — Preparations  for  the  Meridian  Expedition. — Instructions  to 
McPherson  and  Hurlbut. — Sooy  Smith. — Pontotoc. — Okolona. — Sherman’s  Army  in  Motion. — The  Big 
Black. — The  Positions  held  by  the  Confederates. — Polk  in  Command. — Stephen  E.  Lee. — The  Pearl 
Liver. — Brandon. — Tallahatta. — Oktibbeha. — Meridian. — Demopolis. — A Burning  Train. — An  Easy  Vic- 
tory.— Terrible  Destruction  of  Property. — “ Jeff.  Davis’  Neckties.” — Quitman. — Lauderdale  Springs; — 
Non-Arrival  of  Smith. — Cause  of  His  Delay. — Struck  bv  Forrest. — A Panic. — A Stampede. — Smith’s  Re- 
treat.— Colliersville. — The  Negroes. — Strange  Scenes. — Devastation. — Report  of  an  Eye-Witness. — A Great 
Work  Done. — Sherman  Returns  to  Vicksburg. — Dissatisfied  with  Smith. — Forrest  in  Favor. — The  Yazoo 
Expedition. — A Rush  into  Kentucky  and  Tennessee. — At  Jackson. — Union  City. — Colonel  Hawkins. — 
Surrender. — Forrest  Moves  on  Paducah. — Fort  Anderson. — Bravery  of  Colonel  S.  G.  Hicks. — The  Confede- 
rate General,  A.  P.  Thompson,  Killed. — Fort  Pillow. — The  Garrison. — Booth  and  Bradford. — Description 
of  the  Fort. — A Savage  Assault. — A Heroic  Resistance. — Booth  Killed. — Bradford  in  Command. — The  New 
Era. — A Flag  of  Truce. — A Call  for  Unconditional  Surrender. — A Treacherous  Game. — Brutal  Massacre. — No 
Quarter. — Horrible  Scenes. — Report  of  the  Committee  of  Congress  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War. — Cniel 
Treatment  of  Major  Bradford. — Infamous  Notoriety. — Buford  at  Columbus. — In  Imitation  of  Forrest. — A 
Brutal  Threat. — Forrest  Retreats. — Sturgis’  Order  to  Pursue. — Escape  of  Forrest. — Gum  Town. — A Se- 
vere Engagement. — Defeat  of  the  Nationals. — General  Smith  in  Command. — Another  Expedition  Against 
Forrest. — A Series  of  Encounters. — Smith  at  the  Tallahatchie. — Forrest  in  Memphis. — His  Mission  so  far 
Accomplished.  — Reflections, 


The  year  1864  opened  with  promise 
of  final  success  to  the  National 
cause.  The  outlook,  however, 
was  not  without  a shadow  of  gloom. 
Richmond  still  engaged  the  attention 
and  baffled  the  efforts  of  the  army 
of  the  Potomac ; Charleston  held 
out  against  the  genius  and  energy  of 
Gillmore  and  Dahlgren ; Mobile  and 
Wilmington  continued  to  invite  and 
reward  the  daring  but  unprincipled 
enterprise  of  foreign  traders;  and  pow- 
erful Confederate  armies,  zealous  and 
eager  for  the  fight,  were  yet  in  the 
field.  But  great  battles,  involving 
great  issues,  had  been  won  by  the 
Northern  armies  during  the  previous 


year;  and  nothing  had  happened  to 
undo  the  results,  or  to  prevent  the 
Nationals  from  reaping  the  full  benefit 
of  the  victories  at  Vicksburg,  at  Port 
Hudson,  at  Gettysburg,  and  at  Chatta- 
nooga. The  waters  of  the  Mississippi 
now  rolled  unchecked  from  Cairo  to 
the  Gulf,  thus  cutting  the  Confederacy 
in  twain ; Chattanooga  being  lield  by 
the  Nationals,  the  Bichmond  govern- 
ment was  shut  out  fi*om  the  valley  of 
the  Mississippi,  and  exposed  also  to 
attack  in  the  rear;  while  the  victory 
at  Gettysburg  had  effectually  delivered 
the  Northern  mind  from  all  fear  of 
further  invasion. 

On  neitlier  side,  however,  had  the 


SOURCES  OF  STRENGTH. 


609 


war  spirit  died  out.  In  the  North, 
there  was  a more  vigorous  determina- 
tion than  ever  to  force  the  contest  to 
an  early  and  a final  issue.  In  the 
South,  although  signs  of  distress  were 
apparent,  there  was  no  disposition 
to  abandon  the  struggle.  Great  ar- 
mies, as  has  been  stated,  were  yet  in 
the  field.  There  were,  besides,  in  every 
Confederate  State,  organized  bodies  of 
armed  men  ; and  the  States  in  which 
the  National  authority  had  been  re- 
stored were  exposed  to  frequent  and 
dangerous  incursions  by  those  military 
freebooters. 

The  loss  of  Vicksburg  and  of  Port 
Hudson  had  terribly  crippled  the  Con- 
federacy in  the  west  and  southwest. 
Existence,  however,  was  still  possible. 
There  were  several  important  points 
from  which  the  means  of  subsistence 
could  be  obtained.  Of  these,  the  most 
important  were  Meridian,  Shreveport 
and  Mobile.  In  the  present  chapter, 
we  shall  confine  our  attention  to  Meri- 
dian. A glance  at  the  map  will  show 
the  importance  of  this  position.  Situ- 
ated at  the  intersection  of  the  Mobile 
and  Ohio  Railroad,  which  runs  north 
and  south,  and  the  South  Mississippi, 
which  runs  east  and  west,  it  was  a 
j)lace  of  the  highest  advantage  to  the 
Confederates,  and  greatly  aided  them 
in  prolonging  the  struggle.  It  was  in 
easy  communication  with  Selma,  the 
great  iron  centre  of  the  Confederacy, 
and  also  with  Mobile,  the  one  port, 
besides  that  of  Wilmington,  which  was 
now  open  to  the  blockade  runners. 
After  the  fall  of  Vicksburg,  it  was  in- 
tended to  move  a strong  force  on  Meri- 


dian ; but  the  weather  being  intensely 
hot,  a drought  prevailing,  and  the  men 
already  greatly  exhausted,  the  move- 
ment was  deferred.  It  became  impos- 
sible when  Sherman  was  ordered  to 
Chattanooga,  to  the  assistance  of  Rose- 
cranz.  After  Chattanooga,  and  the  re- 
lief of  Burnside,  at  Knoxville,  Sher- 
man was  again  in  a condition  to  direct 
his  thoughts  to  Meridian.  Having  re- 
turned to  Mississippi,  his  command 
was  stationed,  for  a time,  along  the 
line  of  the  Memphis  and  Charleston 
Railroad.  Towards  the  end  of  Janu- 
ary, he  received  instructions  to  proceed 
to  Vicksburg,  and  place  himself  at  the 
head  of  an  expedition  which  should 
move  eastward  from  that  city,  and  per- 
form such  service  for  the  National  cause 
as  circumstances  might  allow. 

With  as  little  delay  as  possible,  the 
necessary  arrangements  were  completed. 
Hurlbut,  whose  headquarters  were  at 
Memphis,  was  ordered  to  draw  in  all 
public  property  to  Cairo  and  Memphis, 
to  evacuate  all  places  of  minor  import- 
ance, and  especially  to  abandon  Corinth 
and  Fort  Pillow.  He  was  at  the  same 
time  ordered  to  provide  two  divi- 
sions, of  5000  each,  and  to  have  them 
ready  for  embarkation  not  later  than 
the  25th  of  January.  McPherson,  who 
was  in  command  at  Vicksburg,  re- 
ceived somewhat  similar  instructions. 
He  also  was  to  provide  two  divisions, 
of  5000  each.  General  W.  Sooy  Smith, 
chief  of  cavalry,  in  the  division  of  the 
Mississippi,  was  at  Memphis,  with  a 
mounted  force  of  about  2500.  This  force 
was  increased  to  about  10,000  strong, 
by  additions  from  Hurlbut’s  corps. 


610 


THE  MERIDIAN  EXPEDITION.’ 


The  objective  point  was  Meridian. 
Smith  was  to  move  direct  on  that  place 
from  Memphis.  Hurlbut  was  to  join 
Sherman  and  McPherson  at  Vicksburg, 
Avhence  the  united  forces  should  move 
on  Meridian,  and  there  form  a junction 
with  the  cavalry  under  Smith.  Meri- 
dian was  distant  from  Memphis  250 
miles;  from  Vicksburg,  150.  What 
Sherman  proposed  to  accomplish  by 
this  expedition,  he  himself  tells  us. 
In  a letter  to  General  Banks,  he  says : 
“I  propose  to  avail  myself  of  the 
short  time  allowed  me  in  this  depart- 
ment here  to  strike  a blow  at  Meri- 
dian and  Demopolis.  I think  I can  do 
it ; and  the  destruction  of  the  railroads, 
east  and  west,  north,  and  south  of  Me- 
ridian, wdll  close  the  door  of  rapid 
travel  and  conveyance  of  stores  from 
the  Mississippi  and  the  Confederacy 
east,  and  so  make  us  less  liable  to  the 
incursions  of  the  enemy  toward  the 
Mississippi.  I intend  to  leave  Vicks- 
burg about  the  25th  instant,  and  hope 
to  be  near  Meridian  about  February 
8th  and  10th.”  He  requested  Banks 
to  make  a feint  on  Mobile,  so  as  to 
prevent  the  enemy  at  that  place  from 
sending  reinforcements  to  Meridian. 
It  was  his  conviction  that  if  he  were 
not  resisted  by  superior  numbers,  he 
would  be  able  to  cut  off  Mobile  from 
all  connection  with  the  interior,  except 
by  way  of  the  Alabama  River.  Suc- 
cess at  Meridian,  and  a similar  success 
afterwards  at  Shreveport  would,  he 
thought,  settle  the  main  (piestion  in 
the  southwest. 

To  give  effect  to  the  purposes  thus 
indicated,  Sherman  ordered  Sooy  Smith 


to  move  from  Memphis  on  or  before 
February  1st,  taking  with  him  an  ef- 
fective force  of  7000  cavalry,  lightly 
equipped.  He  was  to  march  on  Pon- 
totoc, Okolona  and  Meridian,  making 
it  an  object  to  reach  Meridian  on  or 
about  the  10th.  His  instructions  were 
“to  disregard  all  minor  objects;  to  de- 
stroy railroad  bridges  and  corn  not 
wanted ; to  break  the  enemy’s  com- 
munications from  Okolona  to  Meridian, 
and  thence  eastward  to  Selma ; if  con- 
venient, to  send  to  Columbus,  Mis- 
sissippi, and  destroy  all  machinery 
there,  and  the  bridge  across  the  Tom- 
bigbee,  which  enabled  the  enemy  to 
draw  resources  to  the  east  side  of  the 
valley.”  With  the  understanding  that 
Smith  was  already  on  his  way,  Sher- 
man set  out  from  Vicksburg,  on  the 
3d  of  February,  at  the  head  of  peb, 
an  army  of  about  23,000  effective 
men.  A considerable  proportion  of  this 
force  was  mounted.  The  four  divi- 
sions of  which  the  army  was  composed 
were  arranged  in  two  columns,  which 
were  commanded,  the  one  by  McPher- 
son, the  other  by  Hurlbut.  Sherman 
marched  in  the  advance  with  McPher- 
son’s column.  McPherson  crossed  the 
Big  Black,  at  the  railroad  bridge ; Hurl- 
but crossed  at  Messencrer’s.  The  sol- 

O 

diers  were  provided  with  twenty  days’ 
rations.  All  unnecessary  baggage  was 
left  behind.  No  tents  were  taken ; and, 
throughout  the  march,  .all,  from  the 
commanding-general  to  the  private,  bi- 
vouacked by  camp-fires  in  the  open  air. 
The  weather  was  all  that  could  be  de* 
sired,  the  days  being  beautiful  and  the 
i nights  cool,  with  a slight  frost.  The 


TERRIBLE  DESTRUCTION. 


eii 


roads,  fortunately,  were  in  excellent 
condition. 

Sherman  was  not  ignorant  of  the 
position  and  strength  of  the  ene- 
my. By  means  of  a spy,  who  had 
brought  from  Meridian  an  official  re- 
port, it  was  learned  that  Polk  was  in 
chief  command  there.  Scattered  all 
over  the  State,  there  were  companies 
of  infantry  and  cavalry  collecting 
taxes  and  forcing  conscripts.  Loring 
was  at  Canton  with  his  infantry  divi- 
sion, some  7000  strong,  and  18  guns. 
French  was  at  Brandon,  with  3000 
men  and  10  guns.  This  force  was 
increased  to  5000  men,  by  reinforce- 
ments from  Mobile.  Forrest  command- 
(‘d  the  cavalry  in  the  district  of  North 
Mississippi ; the  South  cavalry  district 
was  in  charge  of  Stephen  E.  Lee. 
Each  of  these  latter  commanders  had 
under  him  a mounted  force  of  4000  men. 
Unless  Polk  was  largely  reinforced,  it 
was  not  unreasonable  to  conclude  that 
the  expedition  would  result  in  com- 
plete success. 

For  the  first  two  days,  Sherman  was 
allowed  to  march  unopposed.  On  the 
Pel),  5th,  the  enemy  was  encountered  ; 

and,  for  eighteen  miles,  there  was 
continual  skirmishing.  That  night  Sher- 
man’s advance  reached  Jackson,  and 
found  that  the  Confederates  had  just 
made  a precipitate  retreat.  It  was 
evident  that  the  appearance  of  the  Na- 
tionals had  been  a complete  surprise. 
A pontoon  bridge  across  the  Pearl 
River  was  left  comparatively  unin- 
jured. The  bridge  h iving  been  quick- 
ly repaired,  Sherman  pushed  forward, 
passing  rapidly  through  Brandon,  and 


reaching  Morton  on  the  9th.  At  this 
place,  McPherson,  who  led  the  ad- 
vance, was  halted  to  break  up  and 
destroy  the  railroads.  Hurlbut  now 
took  the  lead,  and  kept  it  until  he 
reached  Meridian.  At  Tallahatta, 
some  twenty  miles  from  Meridian,  ob- 
structions were  encountered  in  the 
shape  of  felled  timber.  Suspecting 
that  the  Confederates  were  trying  to 
gain  time,  in  order  to  cover  the  move- 
ment of  railroad  property  from  Meri- 
dian, Sherman  dropped  his  trains,  leav- 
ing them  in  charge  of  strong  escorts, 
and  hastened  to  the  Oktibbeha.  The 
bridge  was  found  in  flames  and  beyond 
recovery.  With  material  obtained  from 
an  old  cotton-gin  close  at  hand,  a new 
bridge  was  speedily  constructed;  and 
on  the  14th,  at  3.30  o’clock  in  the  pe|), 
afternoon.  Meridian  was  entered 
and  occupied,  the  Confederates  having 
already  retired.  Polk  had  gone  to  De- 
mopolis  that  morning  at  10.30.  One 
entire  train  was  found  burning  at  the 
depot.  With  this  exception,  all  the 
rolling-stock  had  been  removed  to 
Mobile  or  Selma.  It  was  only  eleven 
days  since  the  expedition  had  left 
Vicksburg.  Meridian,  as  we  have  seen 
already,  was  in  the  very  heart  of  the 
enemy’s  country,  yet  the  Nationals,  in 
their  eleven  days’  march,  ‘ encountered 
almost  no  opposition.  This  expedition 
did  much  to  reveal  the  inherent  weak- 
ness of  the  Confederacy.  It  was  a 
preliminary  to  the  march  to  the  sea; 
and  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  his  ex- 
perience on  this  occasion  encouraged 
Sherman  to  undertake  that  later  and 
more  daring  enterprise. 


612 


THE  MEKIDIAN  EXPEDITION. 


As  General  Smith  had  not  arrived, 
it  was  not  deemed  prudent  to  pursue 
the  Confederates.  Sherman’s  object 
was  to  destroy  this  stronghold  of  the 
Confederacy.  The  work  of  destruction 
was  commenced  at  once.  Ten  thousand 
men,  armed  with  axes,  sledges,  crow- 
bars and  clawbars,  went  to  work  with 
a will;  and,  at  the  end  of  five  days. 
Meridian,  with  its  depots,  w’arehouses, 
arsenal,  offices,  hospitals,  hotels,  and 
cantonments,  was  utterly  destroyed. 
Fire  completed  the  terrible  work  of  de- 
struction. The  inhabited  houses  alone 
were  spared.  Hurlbut  had  charge  to 
the  north  and  east  of  the  town.  Mc- 
Pherson was  entrusted  with  the  south 
and  west.  They  did  their  work  thor- 
oughly. Hurlbut  reported  the  destruc- 
tion of  60  miles  of  ties  and  iron 
burned  and  bent,  one  locomotive  de- 
stroyed, and  8 bridges  burned.  Mc- 
Pherson reported  55  miles  of  railroad 
destroyed,  53  bridges,  6075  feet  of 
trestle-work  below  Quitman,  19  loco- 
motives, 28  cars  and  3 steam  saw-mills 
burned  or  ruined.  To  make  the  work 
of  restoration  more  difficult,  the  rails, 
in  large  quantities,  when  torn  up,  were 
placed  on  the  blazing  piles  of  timber, 
brought  to  a red-heat,  and  then  twist- 
ed round  a tree  or  other  object  into 
wffiat  the  men  playfully  called  Jeff. 
Davis’  neck-ties.”  A twisted  rail  was 
henceforth  useless.  In  addition  to  the 
destruction  wrought  in  the  town  itself, 
the  railroads  were  ruined  as  far  south 
as  below  Quitman ; east  as  far  as  Cuba 
Station ; north  to  Lauderdale  Springs, 
and  west  the  whole  way  to  Jackson; 
and  among  the  places  which  shared 


the  fate  of  Meridian  were  Jackson, 
Enterprise,  Marion,  Quitman,  Hills- 
boro, Canton,  Lake  Station,  Decatur, 
Bolton  and  Lauderdale  Springs.  It 
was  rough  work,  which  will  not  soon 
be  wholly  forgiven  or  forgotten ; but 
it  was  rendered  necessary  by  the  exi- 
gencies pf  the  situation ; and,  rough  as 
it  was,  it  was  not  a violation  of  tlie 
principles  of  civilized  warfare. 

Sherman  remained  at  Meridian  for 
several  days,  impatiently  waiting  for 
Smith  and  his  cavalry.  But  he  waited 
in  vain.  Smith,  it  will  be  remem- 
bered, who  was  at  the  head  of  7000 
mounted  troops,  a brigade  of  infantiy, 
and  a respectable  artillery  force,  was 
ordered  to  leave  Memphis  on  the  1st 
of  February,  and  so  to  regulate  his 
movements  as  to  be  able  to  effect  a 
junction  with  Sherman  on  or  about  the 
10th.  Sherman  did  not  arrive  until 
the  14th.  Smith,  according  to  the  ar- 
rangements made,  ought  to  have  been 
forward.  Day  after  day  passes  by ; 
cavalry  are  sent  out  in  all  directions; 
but  tidings  of  Smith  or  of  his  troops 
are  nowhere  to  be  found.  What  has 
become  of  this  force  ? Let  us  see. 
Smith,  it  appears,  had  from  some  cause 
delayed  his  departure  from  Memphis. 
His  second  in  command  was  Brigadier- 
General  Grierson,  who  had  w^on  so 
much  distinction  by  his  famous  raid 
from  La  Grange  to  Baton  Bouge  in 
the  spring  of  the  previous  year.  The 
troops  were  gathered  in  from  Middle 
Tennessee  and  Northern  Mississippi, 
and  concentrated  at  Colliersville,  some 
twenty-four  miles  east  of  Memphis.  It 
was  not  until- the  11th  of  the  month 


SMITHES  RETREAT. 


613 


that  they  commenced  their  march  from 
Colliers ville,  a day  later  than  that  fixed 
for  their  arrival  at  Meridian.  Pushing 
on  as  rapidly  as  possible,  they  crossed 
the  Tallahatchie,  at  New  Albany,  at 
noon,  and  encamped  four  miles  south 
of  that  place.  Continuing  their  march, 
they  pressed  on  in  the  direction  of 
Okolona,  passing  through  Pontotoc  at 
one  o’clock  in  the  afternoon  of  the 
17th,  and  reaching  Okolona  on  the 
18th.  On  the  20th,  they  encountered 
the  enemy  for  the  first  time,  in  the 
neighborhood  of  West  Point.  They 
were  now  joined  by  large  bodies  of  ne- 
groes, who,  for  the  first  time,  saw  the 
National  troops.  There  was  some  hard 
fighting  on  the  20th.  It  was  resumed 
on  the  21st;  and,  on  the  22d,  Forrest 
fell  with  tremendous  force  on  the  Na- 
tional rear  and  flank  at  Okolona.  A 
scene  of  the  wildest  confusion  fol- 
lowed, the  Second  Iowa  becoming  panic- 
stricken,  and  stampeding  the  whole  of 
Colonel  McCrellis’  brigade.  Order  was 
speedily  restored ; the  Seventh  Indiana 
and  the  Second  brigade  rallying,  hold- 
ing the  enemy  in  check,  and  doing 
splendid  work.  As  twilight  approached, 
a magnificent  charge  was  made  by  the 
Seventh  Indiana,  under  the  eye  of 
General  Smith  himself,  driving  the 
enemy  back  with  terrible  slaughter  It 
was  now  dark ; and  Smith,  ignorant  of 
the  strength  of  the  enemy,  and  bf^lieving 
that  he  was  greatly  outnumbered,  or- 
dered a retreat.  The  dead  and  wounded 
were  left  on  the  field.  The  mules,  pris- 
oners and  negroes  were  placed  in  the 
advance.  At  ten  o’clock,  a halt  was 
made  until  four  in  the  morning,  when 


the  march  was  resumed.  The  Confed- 
' erates  continued  to  follow.  The  National 
rear  was  incessantly  engaged,  but  was 
successful  in  holding  the  enemy  in  check. 
On  the  afternoon  of  the  23d,  the  Talla- 
hatchie, at  New  Albany,  was  recrossed, 
and  the  bridge  destroyed.  Colliers- 
ville  was  reached  on  the  27th,  and  the 
wearied  and  dispirited  troops,  the  regi- 
ments torn  and  tattered,  were  a^ain  in 
camp.  It  was  an  unfortunate  affair, 
and  resulted  in  the  loss  of  at  least  200 
men.  A little  more  bravery  on  the 
part  of  the  National  troops,  and  the  re- 
sult must  have  been  altogether  differ- 
ent; for  the  entire  force  under  Forrest 
did  not  exceed  3000  men.  As  it  was. 
Smith  had  the  satisfaction  of  knowing 
that  he  had  burned  about  3000  bales 
of  cotton  and  over  1,000,000  bushels 
of  corn,  and  that  he  had  captured  over 
100  prisoners,  about  1000  mules,  and 
a large  number  of  negroes,  up  to  that 
date  held  in  bondage. 

Sherman,  meanwhile,  had  left  Meri- 
dian on  the  20th,  making  his 
return  march  thi'ough  Canton,  20i 
north  of  the  line  of  the  advance.  At 
Canton,  15  locomotives  were  captured, 
but  the  train  was  spared.  All  along 
his  line  of  march,  crowds  of  fugitive 
slaves  flocked  to  the  army  for  protec- 
tion. An  eye-witness  has  given  us  a 
vivid  picture  of  this  strange  scene. 
’“From  4000  to  7000  slaves  accompa- 
nied the  return  of  the  expedition.  I 
defy  any  human  being  to  look  on  the 
scene  unmoved.  Old  men,  with  the 
frosts  of  seventy  years  upon  their 
heads;  men  in  the  prime  of  manhood; 
youths,  and  children  that  could  barely 


970 


.14 


THE  MEEIDIAN  EXPEDITION. 


run ; women  with  their  babes  at  their 
breasts.  They  came,  some  of  them  it  is 
true,  with  shouts  and  careless  laughter, 
but  silent  tears  coursed  down  many  a 
cheek — tears  of  thankfulness  for  their 
great  deliverance.  There  were  faces  in 
that  crowd  which  shone  with  a joy  al- 
most inspired.  Smile  who  will,  but 
the  story  of  the  coming  of  the  Children 
of  Israel  out  of  the  land  of  Egypt  can 
never  recall  to  my  mind  a more  pro- 
found emotion  than  the  remembrance 
of  that  scene.  When  I looked  upon 
the  long  line  of  National  soldiers  filing 
throuerh  roads  in  which  our  slaughtered 
brothers  lie  thicker  than  sheaves  in  a 
harvest  held,  and  reflected  on  the  hor- 
rors to  which  this  lace  has  been  sub- 
jected by  the  foes  whom  we  are  fight- 
ing, I felt  faith  in  a God  of  justice 
renewed  in  my  heart.”  From  Canton, 
the  fugitive  negroes  were  sent  forward 
In  an  advance  train  to  Vicksburg. 
Sherman  had  again  won  for  himself 
fresh  laurels.  He  had  done  a great 
work.  If  he  had  not  accomplished 
the  great  object  of  the  expedition,  and, 
by  moving  upon  and  destroying  Selma, 
by  wheeling  around  and  taking  posses- 
sion of  Mobile,  and  thus  rendering  un- 
necessary the  future  march  to  the  sea, 
he  had,  at  least,  severely  punished  and 
greatly  crippled  the  Confederacy.  He 
had  destroyed  150  miles  of  railroad, 
10,000  bales  of  cotton,  2,000,000  bush- 
ds  of  corn,  20  locomotives,  28  cars,  67 
bridges  and  7000  feet  of  trestle-work. 
Te  had  captured  200  pilsoners,  several 
thousand  horses  and  mules  and  300 
vagons.  He  had  done  what  was  still 
more  noble — he  had  liberated  not 


fewer  than  8000  negroes.  His  own 
loss  scarcely  exceeded  170  men. 

Sherman  left  the  expedition  in  care 
of  General  Hurlbut  on  the  27th,  pgij, 
and  proceeded  to  Vicksburg,  27# 
whence  he  started,  on  the  28th,  on  a 
hurried  visit  to  New  Orleans,  to  confer 
with  Banks  and  Porter  regarding  the 
projected  campaign  against  Shreveport 
It  was  not  until  his  return  from  New 
Orleans  to  Vicksburg  that  he  learned 
the  result  of  Smith’s  attempt  to  co-ope- 
rate with  him  at  Meridian.  He  was  ill- 
satisfied  with  Smith’s  own  account  of  the 
affair.  His  reports  to  me,”  he  says, 
“ are  unsatisfactory.  He  delayed  his 
start  until  the  11th,  when  his  orders 
were  to  be  at  Meridian  on  the  10th, 
and  when  he  knew  that  I was  march- 
ing from  Vicksburg.  The  mode  of  his 
return  to  Memphis  was  not  what  I had 
expected  ; he  had  nothing  to  deal  with 
but  Forrest  and  the  militia.  I hope 
he  will  make  these  points  more  clear 
to  the  general-in-chief.” 

When  Sherman  set  out  for  Meridian, 
two  important  diversions  were  made  in 
his  favor — one  by  Farragut  against 
Mobile  Harbor,  another  by  a portion 
of  Porter’s  fleet  and  a body  of  armed 
men,  up  the  Yazoo.  The  Mobile  diver- 
sion was  completely  successful ; for, 
although  no  fighting  was  done,  the  ap- 
pearance of  the  National  fleet  led  the 
Confederates  to  expect  an  attack,  and 
prevented  them  from  sending  reinforce- 
ments to  Polk.  The  expedition  up  the 
Yazoo  was  attended  with  considerable 
success.  The  boats,  four  in  number — 
Petrel,  Marmora,  Echange  and  Romeo 
--.-were  commanded  by  Lieutenant  E 


YAZOO  CITY. 


G15 


K.  Owen.  The  land  troops,  which  con- 
sisted of  the  Eleventh  Illinois  infantry, 
Eighth  Louisiana  infantry  and  First 
Tvlississippi  cavalry — the  two  latter  col- 
ored— were  commanded  by  Colonel 
James  H.  Coates.  This  expedition 
pushed  its  way  as  far  as  Fort  Pember- 
ton. After  spending  some  days  in 
loading  cotton,  Coates  re-embarked  his 
men ; and  the  vessels  returned  to  Yazoo 
City,  with  1600  bales  of  cotton.  Hav- 
ing established  his  headquaiters  here, 
a Confederate  force  soon  appeared 
in  considerable  strength,  under  Ross 
and  Richardson.  On  the  morning  of 
Mar.  March,  a severe  en- 

counter  took  place;  and  Coates’ 
headquarters  were  literally  riddled 
with  shot  and  shell.  The  fight  lasted 
the  greater  part  of  the  day.  It  ]*aged 
most  fiercely  at  an  earth- work,  in 
the  form  of  a redoubt,  about  half  a 
mile  from  the  town.  Into  this  work 
Coates  had  thrown  Major  McKee,  with 
three  companies  of  his  own  regiment, 
the  Eleventh  Illinois.  While  Ross  was 
engaged  with  the  troops  in  the  town, 
Richardson  fell  with  great  fury  on  Mc- 
Kee, flinging  into  the  redoubt  shot  and 
shell  with  terrible  j)recision.  Richard- 
son made  a call  for  surrender,  under 
the  pretense  that  all  the  Nationals  had 
been  taken  prisoners.  McKee  returned 
an  indignant  refusal,  telling  him  if  he 
wanted  them,  to  come  and  take  them.” 
Another  call  for  surrender  was  made — 
this  time,  in  the  name  of  God  and  hu- 
manity, and  coupled  with  the  threat 
that,  in  case  of  I’efusal,  the  place  would 
be  stormed  and  reduced  in  ten  minutes. 
The  answer  was  the  same.  Richardson 


might  come  and  take  it  McKee  ex- 
pressed his  regret  that  he  should  have 
coupled  his  demand  with  a threat,  and 
assured  him  that  if  the  fight  was  to  go 
on  with  that  understanding,  he  should 
kill  every  man  he  captured.  At  this 
juncture,  the  Confederates  in  the  toAvn 
were  yielding  to  the  steady  pressure  of 
the  Nationals.  At  five  o’clock  in  the 
afternoon,  the  route  became  general, 
Coates  and  McKee  remaining  masters 
of  their  respective  positions.  It  was  a 
spirited  contest,  and  reflected  the  high- 
est credit  on  Colonel  Coates  and  his 
entire  command.  His  fighting  force, 
including  the  negroes,  scarcely  exceed- 
ed 1000  men,  while  that  of  the  ene- 
my was  scarcely  under  2300.  The 
negroes,  it  was  observed,  fought  with 
great  bravery.  In  this  engagement, 
the  Nationals  lost  18  killed,  85  Avound- 
ed  and  19  missing — the  larger  propor- 
tion of  the  killed  and  wounded  being 
colored. 

AYith  the  results  of  the  expedition 
up  the  Yazoo,  Sherman  was  but  little 
satisfied.  It  was  his  opinion,  at  the 
time,  that  Coates  would  have  done  bet- 
ter if  he  had  retained  the  boats  and 
pushed  up  the  river.  Coates,  however, 
was  best  qualified  how  to  judge.  He 
had,  by  means  of  a reconnoissance, 
made  by  Colonel  Osband  and  the  First 
Missouri  cavalry,  ascertained  that  For- 
rest was  in  force  in  Grenada.  As  it  was, 
the  expedition  drove  the  guerrillas  from 
the  banks  of  the  Mississippi,  and,  no 
doubt,  occupied  troops  which  otherwise 
might  have  given  Sherman  annoyance. 

The  unsuccessful  effort  of  General 
Smith  to  reach  Meridian,  and  unite  his 


THE  MERIDIAN  EXPEDITION. 


forces  with  those  of  Sherman,  i-edoiind- 
ed  somewhat  to  the  glory  of  General 
Forrest.  He  was  not  unwilling  to 
take  some  praise  to  himself ; and  the 
Confederate  authorities,  fully  aware 
that  but  for  him  the  disasters  which 
had  befallen  them,  through  the  Meri- 
dian Expedition,  might  have  been  much 
more  serious,  were  pleased  to  enlarge 
his  sphere  of  duty  and  to  increase  his 
authority.  Although  still  subordinate 
to  Stephen  D.  Lee,  commander-in-chief 
of  the  mounted  men  in  that  region,  he 
was  granted  a so]’t  of  roving  commis- 
sion. It  was  evident  that  a great 
struggle  was  impending,  and  must  soon 
take  place  between  the  opposing  forces 
in  Northern  Georgia.  Forrest  was 
charged  with  the  special  duty  of  keep- 
ing well  employed  the  National  forces 
then  on  the  line  of  the  Mississippi, 
from  Vicksburg  to  Cairo,  and  so  pre- 
vent them  from  reinforcing  the  army 
opposed  to  Johnston.  The  arrange- 
ments which  were  being  made  for  the 
Shreveport  or  Red  River  Expedition 
had  the  immediate  effect  of  withdraw- 
ing large  numbers  of  troops  from 
Vicksburg,  and  thus  of  weakening  the 
National  line  in  the  direction  just  men- 
tioned. Forrest  at  once  took  full  ad- 
vantage of  his  opportunity.  At  the 
head  of  a band  of  about  5000  men,  all 
imbued  with  his  own  fierce  and  trucu- 
lent spirit,  he  made  a rush  up  from 
Northern  Mississippi  into  West  Ten- 
nessee. He  rested  for  a time  at  Jack- 
son,  and  then  pushed  on  towards  Ken- 
tucky. At  that  time,  LTnion  City,  a 
fortified  place  in  the  northwestern 
part  of  Tennessee,  was  garrisoned  by 


450  of  the  Eleventh  Tennessee  caval- 
ry, under  Colonel  Hawkins.  Against 
Union  City,  Forrest  sent  a detachment, 
under  Colonel  Faulkner.  That  officer 
appeared  before  the  place  on  the 
24th  of  March,  and  demanded 
its  surrender.  Hawkins  refused,  24. 
and  was* attacked.  He  succeeded,  how- 
ever, in  driving  the  enemy  back.  A 
second  attack  was  made ; and  Hawkins, 
against  the  wishes  of  his  men,  suiTen^ 
dered  the  garrison,  with  about  200 
horses  and  500  small  arms.  A little 
more  stubborn  determination  on  the 
part  of  the  National  commander,  and 
Union  City  and  the  garrison  might 
have  been  saved; ’for,  at  the  moment 
of  surrender.  General  Brayman,  who 
had  hurried  from  Cairo  to  Hawkins’ 
relief,  was  only  six  miles  distant. 
Hickman,  on  the  Mississippi,  after  the 
fall  of  Union  City,  fell  an  easy  prey 
to  the  Confederates.  Forrest,  embold- 
ened by  success,  accompanied  by  Bu- 
ford and  General  A.  P.  Thompson, 
moved  directly  from  Jackson  on  Pa- 
ducah. This  latter  place  was  then  oc- 
cupied by  a force  not  exceeding  700 
men,  under  Colonel  S.  G.  Hicks.  Made 
aware  of  the  approach  of  Forrest, 
Hicks  threw  his  troops  into  Fort  An- 
derson, in  the  lower  suburbs  of  the 
town.  Having  made  a furious  but  un- 
successful assault  on  the  fort,  Forrest 
made  a demand  for  its  suiTender, 
threatening,  in  the  event  of  refusal,  to 
carry  the  works  by  storm  and  massacre 
the  garrison.  The  threat  was  unheed- 
ed; and  the  garrison,  obtaining  some 
effective  assistance  from  the  gunboats 
Peosta  and  Paw-Paw,  the  Confederate 


FORT  PILLOW. 


617 


general  was  compelled  to  content  him- 
self with  what  plunder  he  could  find. 
Hearing  of  the  approach  of  rein- 
forcements from  Cairo,  he  decamped 
on  the  27th,  having  lost,  it  was  es- 
timated, over  300  men  killed  and 
wounded.  Among  the  killed  was  Gen- 
eral Thompson,  who  was  torn  in  pieces 
by  a shell.  The  National  loss  was  14 
killed  and  46  wounded. 

Forrest’s  attention  was  next  turned 
to  Fort  Pillow.  Hurlbiit,  it  will  be 
remembered,  was  instructed  by  Sher- 
man to  evacuate  that  post,  before  he 
joined  him  at  Vicksburg  to  take  part 
in  the  expedition  to  Meridian.  These 
instructions,  for  some  reason  or  other, 
were  not  fully  carried  out.  The  place 
was  still  garrisoned  by  about  550  men, 
excluding  officers.  Of  the  soldiers,  200 
were  colored,  and  under  the  immediate 
command  of  Major  L.  F.  Booth.  The 
i*emainder  were  under  the  command  of 
Major  W.  F.  Bradford.  Booth  had 
April  chief  command.  On  the  morning 
of  the  13th  of  April,  Forrest  ap- 
proached the  fort,  drove  in  the  pickets, 
and  commenced  the  assault. 

The  situation  of  the  fort  was  pecu- 
liar. It  stood  on  a high  bluff,  which 
descended  precipitately  towards  the 
river,  that  side  being  covered  with 
trees,  bushes  and  fallen  timber.  Above 
and  below  the  fort,  and  extending 
back  from  the  river,  was  a ravine  or 
hollow.  The  ravine  above  the  fort, 
known  as  Cold  Creek,  was  covered 
with  trees  and  bushes.  The  ravine 
below  was  covered,  for  the  most  part, 
with  government  buildings.  The  ar- 
mament of  the  place  consisted  of  2 six- 


pounder  and  2 twelve-pounder  howitz- 
ers, and  2 ten-pounder  Parrotts.  The 
assault  was  savagely  made.  The  garri- 
son, however,  fought  with  great  brav- 
ery, fiercely  resisting  the  attempts  made 
by  the  Confederates  to  force  their  way 
into  the  outworks.  Both  officers  and 
men  fearlessly  exposed  themselves. 
The  gunboat  New  Era,  Captain  Mar- 
shall, was  at  hand,  and  attempted  to 
render  the  garrison  some  assistance; 
but  the  nature  of  the  ground  enabled 
the  Confederates  to  elude  the  fire  of 
its  guns.  About  nine  o’clock,  Major 
Booth  was  killed.  Bradford  immedi- 
ately took  command ; and,  having  called 
the  whole  force  within  the  fort,  he 
made  a gallant  resistance,  until  it  was 
past  the  hour  of  noon.  About  this 
time,  to  allow  the  guns  to  cool,  the 
fire  of  both  parties  slackened.  The  New 
Era  withdrew  for  a similar  purpose, 
having  fired  282  rounds  of  shell,  shrap- 
nel and  canister,  which  nearly  ex- 
hausted her  ammunition.  At  this  stage, 
Forrest  sent  a flag  of  truce,  with  a 
(iemand  for  unconditional  surrender 
Bradford  asked  time  to  consult  with 
his  brother-officers  and  with  the  cap- 
tain of  the  New  Era.  Another  flag  of 
truce,  and  another  demand  more  per- 
emptory than  before.  Bradford  must 
surrender  within  twenty  minutes  or  the 
assault  will  be  renewed.  Bradford 
declined,  and  prepared  to  renew  the 
struggle.  It  was  not  long  until  it  be- 
came apparent  that  Forrest  had  been 
playing  a most  treacherous  and  cow- 
ardly game.  During  the  progress  of 
the  negotiations,  he  had  been  pushing 
his  men  stealthily  forward  into  the  ra- 


618 


THE  METIIDIAX  EXPEDITIOX. 


vines,  and,  under  cover  of  the  trees 
and  bushes,  securing  advantageous  po- 
sitions, from  which,  at  the  word  of 
command,  they  could  effectually  spring 
upon  the  fort.  This  shameful  viola- 
tion of  one  of  the  most  sacred  princi- 
ples of  civilized  warfare  was  noticed 
by  Captain  Marshall,  but  he  refrained 
from  firing  on  the  foe  lest,  in  the 
event  of  defeat,  it  should  be  made  a 
pretext  for  a cruel  and  barbarous  re- 
venge. 

Pretext  for  brutality,  it  was  soon 
discovered,  was  not  necessary.  A bi*u- 
tal  massacre  had  already  been  resolved 
upon.  As  soon  as  Bradford’s  answer 
was  received,  the  signal  was  given ; 
Forrest’s  men  rushed  fi’om  the  posi- 
tions which  they  had  so  treacherously 
obtained ; and,  with  fierce  yells,  and 
such  cries  as  “No  quarter,”  “Kill  the 
damned  niggers,”  “ Shoot  them  down,” 
they  went  bounding  over  the  parapet 
and  into  the  fort.  But  little  opportu- 
nity was  allowed  for  resistance.  Panic- 
stricken,  the  troops,  black  and  white, 
threw  down  their  arms,  madly  rush- 
ing to  places  of  shelter,  and  vainly 
and  piteously  calling  for  mercy.  The 
scenes  which  followed  were  harrowing 
beyond  all  description.  An  indisci-im- 
inate  slaughter  was  at  once  commenced. 
No  work  of  the  tomahawk  or  scalping- 
knife  ever  surpassed  in  j)ure  savagery 
what  then  took  place.  No  respect  was 
paid  to  age  or  sex,  to  white  or  black, 
to  soldier  or  civilian.  It  was  a ruth- 
less butchery.  Some,  in  pure  despair, 
rushed  down  the  steep  bluff,  seeking 
shelter  in  vain  under  cover  of  the  trees. 
Some  flung  themselves  into  the  watei*. 


only  to  become  targets  for  the  Confed- 
erate rifles.  The  massacre  was  as  de- 
liberate as  it  was  brutal.  The  hosj)’- 
tals  were  entered,  and  the  sick  and 
wounded  were  either  butchered  where 
they  lay,  or  dragged  out  to  be  shot. 
Men,  in  some  instances,  were  gathered 
together  in  groups,  and  shot  down 
where  they  stood.  The  instances  of 
special  and  wanton  cruelty  were  nu- 
merous. One  poor  soldier,  who  was 
wounded  and  unable  to  stand,  was  com- 
pelled to  get  to  his  feet,  that  his  tor- 
mentors might  have  a fair  shot  at  him. 
A negro  boy  was  seen  holding  a horse 
which  a Confederate  was  mountins:. 
As  soon  as  the  savage  was  in  the  sad- 
dle, the  boy  was  shot  dead  for  his 
pains.  The  murderous  work  went  on 
until  the  darkness.  It  was  resumed, 
however,  with  the  return  of  day. 

A Committee  of  Congress  subse- 
quently took  evidence  on  the  affair. 
The  facts  brought  to  light  were  horid- 
ble  beyond  description.  Men,  it  was 
proved,  were  not  only  shot  in  cold 
blood,  and  drowned,  but  were  even 
crucified,  buried  alive,  nailed  to  the 
floors  of  houses  which  were  then  set 
on  fire.  “ No  cruelty,”  says  the  report 
of  this  committee,  “ which  the  most 
fiendish  malignity  could  devise,  was 
omitted  by  these  murderers.  From 
300  to  400  men  are  known  to  have 
been  killed  at  Fort  Pillow,  of  whom 
at  least  300  were  murdered  in  cold 
blood,  after  the  post  was  in  possession 
of  the  rebels,  and  our  men  had  thrown 
down  their  arms  and  ceased  to  offer 
resistance.”  The  case  of  Major  Brad- 
ford deserves  special  mention.  He 


GUM  TOWN. 


619 


was  being  conveyed  under  guard  to 
Jackson,  Tennessee,  when  he  was  sud- 
denly led  aside  about  fifty  yards  from 
the  line  of  march,  and  deliberately 
murdered.  After  having  pled  in  vain 
for  his  life,  on  the  ground  that  he  had 
made  a fair  and  honorable  fight,  he 
fell,  pierced  by  three  musket  balls. 
Bradford  was  a Southern  man  by  birth. 
He  had  chosen  to  remain  loyal  to  the 
Federal  government.  This  was  his  one 
offense;  but  it  was  unpardonable  in 
the  eyes  of  Forrest  and  his  myrmidons. 
The  moral  effect  of  the  Fort  Pillow 
massacre  was  highly  detrimental  to  the 
Southern  cause.  It  revealed  a spirit 
which  ^was  offensive  to  the  entire 
Christian  world ; and  from  that  day 
the  number  of  Confederate  sympa- 
thizers was  sensibly  diminished.  For- 
rest won  for  himself  an  infamous  noto- 
riety; and  the  odor  of  his  iniquity 
attached  more  or  less  to  every  member 
of  the  Confederate  government. 

On  the  day  after  the  capture  of  Fort 
Pillow,  Buford  appeared  before  Co- 
lumbus, and,  imitating  the  example  just 
set  him  by  Forrest,  demanded  an  un- 
conditional surrender.  “ Should  you 
surrender,”  he  said,  “ the  negroes  now 
in  arms  will  be  returned  to  their  mas- 
ters. Should  I be  compelled  to  take 
the  place  by  force,  no  quarter  icill  he 
shmvn  negro  troops  whatever. ''''  The  de- 
mand was  refused ; and  Buford,  not 
deeming  it  advisable  to  attack,  retired 
and  joined  Forrest,  when  both  made  a 
rapid  retreat  out  of  Tennessee.  Gen- 
eral Sturgis,  at  the  head  of  12,000 
men,  then  at  Memphis,  was  ordered  to 
follow  in  pursuit.  Forrest,  however. 


had  a good  start;  and  by  the  time 
Sturgis  reached  Bolivar,  the  Confede- 
rate I’aiders  had  crossed  Wolf  Biver, 
and  cari-ied  their  plunder  safely  into 
Northern  Tennessee.  A few  weeks 
later  it  became  known  that  Forrest 
was  gathering  together  a powerful 
force,  much  lai’ger  than  he  had  ever 
yet  commanded;  and  the  supposition 
was  that  he  meditated  another  raid 
into  Tennessee  and  Kentucky.  Stur- 
gis, who  had  now  been  reinforced  by 
General  A.  J.  Smith,  who  had  just  re- 
turned from  the  Bed  Biver  region, 
was  again  sent  after  the  bold  and 
dashing  Confederate.  The  National 
commander  had  under  him  a force  of 
9000  infantry  and  artillery,  with  some 
3000  cavalry,  under  General  Grierson. 
At  Gum  Town,  on  the  Mobile  and 
Ohio  Bailroad,  Grierson,  who  led  the 
advance,  came  into  contact  with  some 
of  Forrest’s  horsemen.  The  Confede- 
rates were  well  p(jsted  on  a command- 
ing ridge.  The  battle  soon  became 
furious ; and  Grierson  notified  Sturgis, 
who,  with  the  infantry  and  artilleiy, 
was  some  six  miles  in  the  rear. 
Sturgis  hurried  forward  at  the  double- 
quick.  The  day  was  intensely  hot ; 
and  the  inconveniences  of  the  march 
were  increased  by  a train  of  about  200 
wagons.  When  Sturgis  came  up,  he 
found  that  Grierson  was  being  sorely 
pressed ; and,  without  resting  his  men, 
or  taking  time  to  consider  the  propriety 
of  a flank  movement  on  the  enemy,  he 
hurried  his  men  into  the  very  thick  of 
the  fight.  It  was  a rash  act;  and  it 
resulted  most  disastrously.  The  Con- 
federates, flushed  with  success  in  their 


C20 


THE  MERIDIAN  EXPEDITION. 


encounter  with  Grierson  and  his  cavalry, 
fell  with  tremendous  fury  on  Sturgis’ 
infantry;  and,  in  a brief  space,  the 
entire  National  force,  utterly  defeated, 
and  hopelessly  cut  off  from  the  wagon 
train,  was  driven  back  in  confusion. 
But  for  the  gallant  resistance  made  by 
the  Second  brigade,  under  Colonel 
Winslow,  the  retreat  would  have  been 
most  disastrous.  As  it  was,  when 
Sturgis  reached  Memphis,  he  found 
that  he  had  left  behind  3500  men,  with 
everything  in  the  shape  of  stores. 

This  happened  in  June.  Early  in 
July,  another  expedition  was  sent 
against  Forrest.  It  was  placed  in 
charge  of  General  A.  J.  Smith.  For- 
rest, it  was  known,  was  in  the  neigh- 
borhood of  Tupelo,  where  he  had 
established  his  headquarters.  It  was 
estimated  that  he  had  under  him  a force 
of  about  14,000  men.  General  Smith, 
proceeding  from  Salisbury,  about  fifty 
miles  east  of  Memphis,  marched  in  the 
direction  of  Tupelo,  with  an  estimated 
force  of  1 2,000.  At  Pontotoc,  on  the 
July  12th  of  July,  Smith  felt  the 
12i  presence  of  the  enemy.  A vig- 
orous encounter  having  ensued,  the 
Confederates  were  repulsed.  At  Tu- 
pelo, on  the  13th,  the  enemy  was  en- 
countered in  still  greater  force,  and 
again  repulsed,  after  a sharp  battle. 
On  the  same  day,  the  attack  Was  re- 
peated, the  Confederates,  this  time, 
being  severely  punished,  and  driven 
from  the  field  with  heavy  loss.  Smith 
now  retraced  his  steps  towards  Mem- 
phis, and,  for  the  space  of  three  weeks, 
l^ug,  rested  his  men.  On  the  4th  of 
I*  August  he  again  set  out,  at  the 


head  of  10,000  men,  and,  entering  Mis- 
sissippi, he  advanced  as  far  as  the  Tal- 
lahatchie. He  could  find  no  trace  of 
Forrest  or  of  his  men.  The  Confede- 
rate chief,  however,  was  not  idle.  In 
the  absence  of  Smith  from  Memphis, 
he  made  a dash  upon  that  city,  enter- 
ing it  on  the  morning  of  the  Aug, 
21st,  and  making  directly  for  the  21, 
Gayoso  House,  where  he  expected  to 
find  Generals  Hurlbut,  Washburne  and 
Buckland.  He  failed  of  his  intended 
purpose ; but  he  made  some  prison- 
ers, and  carried  off  considerable  booty. 
It  was  thus  that  Forrest,  during  the 
spring  and  summer  of  1864,  gave 
occupation  to  the  National  troops 
in  those  regions,  and  prevented  rein- 
forcements from  being  sent  to  operate 
against  Johnston’s  army  in  Northern 
Georgia. 

In  this  chapter,  it  has  been  our  duty 
to  present  war  in  one  of  its  least  attrac- 
tive aspects.  Of  the  pomp,  the  splendor, 
the  magnificence  of  the  battle  field  we 
have  had  nothing  to  record.  We  have 
seen  the  war  fiend  rioting  in  destruc- 
tiveness and  savagery.  We  have  had  no 
occasion  to  admire  the  generous  impulse, 
or  to  applaud  the  noble  motive.  The 
fearful  destruction  of  property  accom- 
plished by  Sherman  was  well  fitted  to 
aggravate  the  South,  and  to  arouse  the 
spirit  of  revenge ; but  his  conduct  was 
justified  by  all  the  higher  necessities  of 
war.  The  brutality  of  Forrest  at  Fort 
Pillow  was  not  only  without  excuse- — 
it  was  in  open  violation  of  every  princi- 
ple of  honor,  of  every  high  and  gener- 
ous motive;  and  the  infamy  of  the  deed 
must  ever  attach  to  his  name. 


PKEPARATIONS. 


G21 


CIIAPTEH  XXXII. 


rreparations  for  the  Campaign. — Sherman  and  Banks. — Seasons  for  the  Campaign. — Mistaken  Opinions. — 
Banks  and  Porter. — A.  J.  Smith. — The  Plan  of  Operations. — The  Confederate  Forces. — Banks  and  Frank- 
lin.— Smith  Beconnoitering. — Fort  da  Russy. — A Brisk  Cannonade. — The  Gunboats. — Destruction  of  Fort 
de  Russy. — The  Way  to  Alexandria  Opened. — At  Alexandria. — Porter’s  Letter. — Arrival  of  Banks. — Off  for 
Shreveijort. — The  Fleet  at  the  Rapids. — Low  Water. — Discouraging  Circumstances. — The  Fleet  Above  the 
Rapids. — Banks  at  Natchitoches. — Porter  at  Grand  Ecore. — Obstructions  in  the  River. — The  New  Falls  City; — 
The  Fleet  at  Springfield  Landing. — Unpleasant  News. — Battle  at  Natchitoches. — General  A.  L.  Lee  in  Pursuit 
of  the  Enemy. — Crump’s  Hill. — Arrival  of  Franklin  at  Natchitoches. — The  Enemy  at  Bay. — AViLson’s  Farm^ — 
Patrick’s  Bayou. — Sabine  Cross  Roads. — The  Confederates  in  Force. — Kirby  Smith. — Banks  at  the  Front  and 
Taking  Personal  Control. — Order  of  Battle. — The  Battle  Begun. — The  Confederate  Attack. — The  Nationals 
Driven  Back. — Arrival  of  Franklin  and  Cameron. — A New  Line  Formed. — A Disastrous  Onslaught. — A PaniOi  — 
A Rout. — “Bull  Run  Nothing  in  Comparison.” — Pleasant  Grove. — Emory’s  Division  Checks  the  Retreat. — An- 
other Fierce  Encounter. — The  Nationals  Victorious. — The  Retreat  Resumed. — Pleasant  Hill. — Emory  Again 
Attacked. — A Fierce  Onslaught. — Arrival  of  A.  J.  Smith. — The  Confederates  Resisted  and  Routed. — A Coun- 
cil of  War. — The  Retreat  Continued. — Banks  as  a General. — His  Management  Defective. — The  Fleet  on  its 
Backward  Course. — The  Osage  Aground. — Gallantry  of  Kilby  Smith. — General  Green  Killed. — The  Eastport 
Aground. — Attempts  to  Save  Her. — Blown  Up. — The  Battery  at  the  Mouth  of  the  Cane  River. — The  Cricket 
Under  the  Fire  of  the  Battery. — A Narrow  Escape. — The  Army  at  Cane  River. — Battle  of  Cane  River. — A 
National  Victory. — Battle  at  Clouterville. — The  Army  at  Alexandria. — The  Fleet  at  the  Rapids. — The  Red 
River  Dammed. — A Great  Engineering  Feat. — Exciting  Scenes. — The  Rapids  Passed. — Honors  to  Colonel 
Bailey. — The  Army  Reinforced. — The  Signal,  Covington  and  City  Belle  Captured. — Alexandria  in  Flames.- — 
Departure  of  the  Army  and  Fleet. — A Terror-Stricken  People. — The  Army  and  Navy  at  Simmsport. — Gen- 
eral Canby  in  Command  of  the  Army. — Porter  Resumes  his  Station  on  the  Mississippi. — The  Army  at  New 
Orleans. — Smith  Proceeds  to  Memphis. — Steele’s  Movements  in  Arkansas. — Steele  at  Camden. — His  Retreatv — 
Battle  at  Jenkins  Ferry. — The  Nationals  Victorious. — Steele’s  Army  Safe  in  Little  Rock. — End  of  an  Ex- 
pedition which  was  Disastrous  in  All  its  Parts. 


General  Banks,  as  has  already  been 
mentioned,  was  making  active  pre- 
a grand  movement  up 
the  Bed  Biver,  at  the  time  Sherman  was 
engaged  on  bis  Meridian  campaign.  As 
soon  as  Sherman  returned  from  that 
expedition,  he  proceeded  to  New  Or- 
leans, and  had  an  interview  with  Banks. 
A plan  of  campaign  up  the  Bed  Biver 
was  agreed  upon ; and  all  necessary  ar- 
rangements were  completed  with  the 
utmost  despatch. 

There  were  many  reasons  why  it  was 
deemed  desirable  by  the  Washington 


parations  f or 


government,  and  particularly  by  the 
military  authorities,  to  obtain  a firm 
hold  on  the  Bed  Biver,  and  to  convert 
Shreveport  into  a National  stronghold. 
The  operations  of  the  French  in  Mexico 
had  occasioned  some  disquietude  in 
Washington;*  and  the  possession  of 
Shreveport,  it  was  thought,  with  the 
.necessary  communications,  would  make 
it  more  easy  to  re-establish  the  National 
authority  in  Texas.  It  was  the  opin- 
ion of  the  president  that  the  possession 
of  Shreveport  would  make  it  less  diffi- 
cult to  establish  a loyal  government  jn 


622 


SHREVEPORT. 


Louisiana.  Banks,  it  is  understood, 
althougli  not  greatly  in  favor  of  the 
expedition,  on  account  of  the  difficulties 
to  be  encountered  and  overcome,  was 
yet  not  unwilling  to  run  the  risk,  be- 
cause of  the  advantages  which  success 
w^ould  ensure.  There  were  immense 
supplies  of  cotton  in  Texas.  If  these 
could  be  secured,  it  would  be  a pecun- 
iary benefit  to  the  National  govern- 
ment. Halleck  had  long  been  in  favor 
of  some  sucli  movement  as  that  which 
was  about  to  be  made.  As  early  as 
November,  1862,  in  his  letter  of  instruc- 
tions to  Banks,  he  says:  “Having  the 
Red  River  in  our  possession,  it  would 
form  the  best  base  for  operations  in 
Texas.”  Grant,  with  a clearer  insight 
into  the  situation,  never  expected 
much  from  the  expedition,  believing 
it  to  be  greatly  more  important  to 
win  victories  in  Virginia  or  Georgia, 
than  in  Louisiana;  and  Sherman,  al- 
though disposed  to  lend  it  encourage- 
ment, was  of  the  opinion  that  if  it 
could  not  be  accomplished  with  the 
utmost  rapidity,  say  in  thirty  days,  it 
had  better  not  be  undertaken  at  all. 

Shreveport,  before  the  war,  was  a 
place  of  considerable  importance  and 
wealth.  At  its  port  there  were  annu- 
ally shipped  over  40,000  bales  of  cot- 
ton, besides  large  numbers  of  cattle  for 
the  supply  of  the  New  Orleans  market. 
The  capital  of  Caddo  Parish,  Louisiana, 
150  miles  west  of  Vicksburg,  and  155. 
miles  northwest  of  the  mouth  of  the  Red 
River,  as  the  crow  flies,  it  is  at  the  head 
of  navigation  for  large  steamers,  and  the 
only  accessible  point  on  the  west  side 
of  the  river,  for  more  than  100  miles. 


By  the  beginning  of  March,  the  ar- 
rangements were  completed;  and  the 
expedition  was  ready  to  start.  Banks 
was  to  move  from  New  Orleans,  by 
railroad,  to  Brashear  City,  and  thence 
by  the  Bayou  Teche  and  Opelousas  to 
Alexandria.  Admiral  Porter  was  to 
move  ffom  Vicksburg,  with  a powerful 
fleet  of  armed  steamers,  and  proceed  to 
the  mouth  of  the  Red  River.  Smith, with 
some  10,000  of  Sherman’s  veterans,  was 
to  embark  at  Vicksburg,  to  join  Porter 
and  his  fleet  at  the  mouth  of  the  Red 
River ; thence  to  proceed  up  the  river, 
and,  after  capturing  Fort  de  Russy,  to 
form  a junction  with  Banks,  at  Alex- 
andria. It  was  distinctly  understood 
that  General  Steele,  who  was  at  Little 
Rock  with  a force  of  some  15,000  men, 
would  co-operate  in  the  general  move- 
ment, and  form  a junction  with  Banks 
and  Smith  at  or  near  Shreveport. 

The  Confederate  forces,  it  was  known, 
were  strong  in  that  region,  and  favor- 
ably posted  for  offering  resistance  to 
an  invading  army.  Magruder  was  in 
Texas,  in  the  neighborhood  of  Galves- 
ton and  Houston,  with  about  15,000 
men;  Walker,  with  7000  men,  guarded 
a line  which  stretched  from  Opelousas 
to  Fort  de  Russy;  Mouton,  with  6000 
men,  lay  between  the  Black  and 
Washita  Rivers,  from  Red  River  to 
Monroe ; while  Price,  with  about  5000 
infantry,  and  from  7000  to  10,000  cav- 
alry, occupied  a line  extending  from 
Monroe  to  Camden  and  Arkadelphia. 
This  entire  force  was  under  the  direc- 
tion of  General  Kirby  Smith.  After 
leaving  a sufficient  number  of  men  to 
guard  the  Texan  coast,  and  providing 


FORT  DE  RUSSY. 


623 


for  the  wants  of  Arkansas  more  to  the 
north,  it  would  not  be  difficult  for  that 
general  so  to  concentrate  his  forces  as 
to  have  a serviceable  army  of,  at  least, 
30,000  men  on  the  line  of  the  E.ed 
Kiver,  and  so  disposed  as  to  be  able  to 
give  serious  annoyance  to  an  invading 
army. 

General  Banks,  in  consequence  of 
other  and  important  duties,  which  re- 
quired his  presence  temporarily  at  New 
Orleans,  entrusted  his  part  of  the  ex- 
pedition to  General  Franklin,  formerly 
of  the  army  of  the  Potomac.  Frank- 
lin had  instructions  to  move  on  the 
Mar.  7th  of  March,  and  to  be  at  Alex- 
andria,  if  at  all  possible,  on  the 
17th.  It  was  the  13th  before  he  was 
able  to  reach  the  Teche  region.  Ad- 
miral Porter  was  at  the  mouth  of  the 
Red  River  on  the  7th,  with  a fleet  of 
15  iron-clads  and  4 light  steamers;  and 
there,  four  days  later,  he  was  joined 
by  the  transports,  with  four  divisions 
of  Sherman’s  army,  under  General  A. 
J.  Smith,  and  the  marine  brigade, 
some  3000  strong,  under  General  Al- 
fred Ellet.  On  the  morning  of  the 
l^far,  12th,  the  entire  fleet  began  to 
12.  move  up  the  Old  River,  the 
Eastport  leading  the  way.  The  Old 
River  is  an  arm  of  the  Red  River,  and 
connects  with  the  Atchafalaya.  On 
the  same  evening,  the  fleet  anchored  off 
the  ruins  of  Simmsport,  that  place  hav- 
ing been  destroyed  during  the  siege  of 
Port  Hudson.  Next  morning,  there 
being  as  yet  no  signs  of  Banks  or  his 
troops,  Smith  disembarked  a small  force 
for  the  pui’pose  of  reconnoitering.  It 
was  soon  discovered  that  the  Confede- 


rates had  been  present  in  considerable 
numbers  at  Simmsport,  also  Bayou 
Glace  and  Yellow  Bayou,  but  that 
they  had  fallen  back  to  Fort  de  Russy, 
some  thirty  miles  distant.  Smith  de- 
cided to  land  the  whole  column  and 
march  it  overland  to  Fort  de  Russy. 
At  daybreak,  on  the  morning  of  ]>iar. 
the  14th,  the  landing  was  effect-  H* 
ed ; and  the  entire  column  moved  for- 
ward in  light  marching  order,  Moore’s 
brigade  in  advance. 

Fort  de  Russy,  situated  at  Gordon’s 
Landing,  on  the  south  bank  of  the  Red 
River,  and  some  seventy  miles  from  its 
mouth,  was  a formidable  quadrangular 
work,  with  bastions  and  bomb-proofs, 
covered  with  railroad  iron,  connected 
with  a water  battery,  the  casemates  of 
which  seemed  capable  of  withstanding 
the  heaviest  shot  and  shell.  The  ar- 
mament, as  was  afterwards  discovered, 
consisted  of  eight  heavy  guns  and  two 
field-pieces. 

About  three  o’clock  on  the  afternoon 
of  the  14th,  after  a harassing  march, 
during  which  they  had  frequent  and 
severe  encounters  with  the  enemy’s 
cavalry,  the  Nationals  reached  the 
inner  edge  of  the  woods  which  skirt 
the  open  ground  in  front  of  the  fort. 
Under  cover  of  the  woods,  two  batter- 
ies were  hastily  thrown  up.  The  pres- 
ence of  the  Nationals  had  already  been 
discovered ; and  four  guns  on  the  fort 
were  pouring  forth  shot  and  shell  on 
their  position.  The  batteries  soon 
opened  fire  in  reply.  A brisk  cannon- 
ade was  kept  up  for  the  space  of  two 
hours,  when  there  was  a heavy  f usilade, 
and  then  a vigorous  charge,  led  by  the 


624 


SHREVEPORT. 


Fifty-Eighth  Illinois  and  the  Eighth 
Wisconsin.  At  this  critical  moment, 
the  obstructions  in  the  river  having 
been  removed,  two  of  the  gunboats — 
the  Eastport  and  the  Neosho — came  up 
within  range  of  the  fort  and  fired  a 
few  shots.  It  was  not  deemed  safe  to 
continue  the  fire  from  the  gunboats,  so 
close  now’  were  the  land  troops  to  the 
fort.  A few  minutes  later  and  the 
ditch  w^as  reached  ; the  garrison  sur- 
lendered  ; and  the  flag  of  the  Union, 
planted  by  the  color-sergeant  of  the 
Fifty-Eighth  Illinois,  was  fioating  over 
th(3  works  of  Fort  de  Russy.  The 
Confederate  loss  was  250  men  made 
prisoners,  ten  guns,  1000  muskets,  and 
all  the  munitions  of  war. 

It  appeared  that  General  Walker, 
having  left  300  men  to  protect  the  fort, 
had  retired  some  hours  before,  with 
the  expectation  of  meeting  the  National 
troops  and  offering  them  battle.  Hav- 
ing taken  a different  road  from  that  by 
which  they  were  approaching,  he  failed 
to  meet  them.  His  presence  might 
have  given  a different  complexion  to 
the  fight ; there  might  have  been  a 
larger  loss  of  life  ; but  the  final  result 
could  hardly  have  been  other  than  it  was. 
A small  force  was  left  in  the  fort,  with 
instructions  to  blow  it  up.  The  work 
of  destruction  was  hastened  and  com- 
pleted by  an  accident  on  the  17th. 

The  way  to  Alexandria,  on  the  Red 
River,  about  150  miles  above,  was 
now  open.  As  soon  as  Fort  de  Russy 
bad  been  captured,  Admii’al  Poi'ter, 
determined  to  obtain  possession  of 
Alexandria  before  the  arrivah  of  the 
fugitives,  hurried  forward  his  two  fast- 


est vessels,  the  Ouachita  and  Lexing- 
ton, follow^ed  by  the  Eastport.  Gen- 
eral Smith’s  troops  were  at  the  same 
time  put  on  board  the  transports  and 
sent  up  the  river,  the  remainder  of 
the  fleet  following.  Alexandria  was 
occupied  without  opposition  on  the 
16th,  tl}e  Confederates,  after  burning 
two  steamboats  and  a considerable 
(piantity  of  cotton,  having  made  their 
escape  up  the  river,  taking  with  them 
some  of  their  own  gunboats.  At  Alex- 
andria were  found  several  thousand 
bales  of  cotton ; and  food  of  every 
kind  existed  in  abundance.  “ There 
is,”  said  Admiral  Porter,  in  a letter  to 
the  secretary  of  the  navy,  “ a surpris- 
ing abundance  of  every  kind  of  food 
in  this  country,  and  no  suffering  among 
the  people,  except  for  luxuries.  It 
would  be  folly  to  suppose  they  could 
all  be  starved  out.  The  only  way  is 
to  take  possession  of  this  rich  region, 
hold  it  with  a strong  military  and 
naval  force,  and  enforce  the  laws. 
There  are  some  good  Union  men  here 
who  have  sufft^i^ed  much.  I hope  the 
day  of  their  deliverance  has  come.” 

It  has  already  been  mentioned  that 
General  Franklin  had  not  been  able  to 
leave  the  Teche  region,  with  Banks’ 
column,  until  the  13th.  On  his  way 
he  met  with  little  opposition ; ^jar. 
and,  on  the  19th,  Banks’  cavalry, 
under  General  A.  L.  Lee,  began  to 
pour  into  Alexandria.  On  the  follow- 
ing day,  Lee  was  joined  by  General 
Charles  P.  Stone,  Banks’  chief  of  staff, 
and  other  members  of  that  officer’s 
military  famil}^  Banks,  himself,  ar- 
rived and  established  his  headquartei*s 


DISCOURAGEMENTS. 


625 


at  Alexandria  on  the  24th ; but  his 
whole  column,  composed  of  the  Nine- 
teenth and  a portion  of  the  Thirteenth 
army  corps,  was  not  fully  forward  until 
the  26th. 

It  was  the  earnest  desire  of  General 
Banks  that  Porter  should  accompany 
him  as  far  as  Shreveport,  so  that  in  any 
encounter  with  the  enemy,  he  should 
have  the  full  benefit  of  the  gunboats. 
Porter,  although  brave  and  ever  will- 
ing, could  not  be  expected  to  perform 
impossibilities ; and  difificulties  almost 
insuperable  lay  in  his  way.  Immedi- 
ately above  Alexandria  there  are  rapids 
in  the  Red  River.  At  this  time  the 
water  in  the  river  was  very  low — so 
low  that,  in  the  deeper  water  below 
the  rapids,  it  was  with  difficulty  Porter 
could  move  along  his  heavier  iron- 
clads. By  main  force,  the  Eastport 
was  dragged  over  the  rocks ; other  ves- 
sels followed ; and,  after  more  than  a 
week’s  incessant  toil,  one  half  of  the 
fieet  was  in  the  deeper  waters  above. 
The  hospital  ship,  Woodford,  was 
wrecked  in  the  rapids.  The  transports 
could  not  be  got  over;  and,  as  they 
were  desired  by  McPherson  at  Vicks- 
burg, they  were  permitted  to  return  to 
the  Mississippi.  • This  was  a great  loss 
to  General  Banks.  It  robbed  him  direct- 
ly of  3000  men,  and  indirectly  of  3000 
more,  who  were  now  needed  to  guard 
the  depot  of  supplies  at  Alexandria,  and 
the  wagon-trains  which  conveyed  the 
supplies  from  vessels  below  to  vessels 
above  the  rapids.  Banks,  indeed,  at 
this  particular  juncture,  had  much  to 
discourage  him.  He  had  not  counted 
on  any  hindrances  from  low  water  in 


the  river.  It  was  his  belief  that  the 
troops  under  Smith  might  be  spared 
from  the  expedition  within,  at  least, 
thirty  days  after  their  arrival  at  Alex- 
andria; and  he  had  so  told  Sherman. 
On  the  15th  of  March,  General  Grant 
wrote  Banks,  informing  him  that  on 
no  account  could  the  troops  detached 
from  Sherman’s  army  be  allowed  to 
remain  with  him  more  than  ten  or 
fifteen  days  longer  than  the  time  origin- 
ally specified,  and  that,  unless  he  felt 
satisfied  that  the  object  of  the  expedi- 
tion could  be  accomplished  within  that 
period,  he  was  to  return  the  troops  on 
the  day  at  first  agreed  upon,  even  if 
the  expedition  should  be  abandoned. 
“I  had  much  rather,”  said  Grant  in 
another  despatch,  “ that  the  Red  River 
Expedition  had  never  been  begun,  than 
that  you  should  be  detained  one  day 
beyond  the  1st  of  May  in  commencing 
the  movement  east  of  the  Mississippi.” 

It  had  already  become  apparent  to 
many  that  the  expedition  was  to  prove 
a failure.  Banks  must  already  have 
had  his  own  misgivings  as  to  the  wis- 
dom of  proceeding  further  up  the  river. 
It  was  now  known  that  it  would  V^e 
impossible  to  move  the  heavier  gun- 
boats beyond  Grand  Ecore.  The  sup- 
plies from  that  point  would  have  to  be 
conveyed  partly,  at  least,  in  wagon- 
trains.  These,  of  course,  would  have 
to  be  guarded;  and  to  do  this  effec- 
tually would  imply  a further  diminu- 
tion of  his  already  unduly  diminished 
army.  Then,  again,  information  had 
reached  him  that  large  bodies  of  Con- 
federates were  arriving  from  Texas  and 
Arkansas,  and  that  Taylor  and  Price 


SHREVEPORT. 


C2G 


and  Green  were  concentrating  in  great 
strength  in  his  front.  It  was  estimated 
that  the  combined  forces  of  these  gen- 
erals amounted  to  25,000  men,  with  over 
70  guns.  Add  to  all  this  that  he  had 
heard  nothing  of  Steele,  and  that  he  en- 
tertained only  a doubtful  hope  of  receiv- 
ing from  him  any  efficient  assistance. 
Banks,  however,  was  anxious  to  pro- 
ceed, and  accomplish,  if  possible,  the 
chief  object  of  the  expedition — the 
capture  of  Shreveport.  In  this  desire 
he  was  seconded  by  Smith.  The  men 
in  both  commands  seemed  as  eager  as 
their  respective  chiefs  to  complete  the 
task  they  had  undertaken. 

Banks  was  now  at  Natchitoches. 
/\pni  He  arrived  at  that  place  on  the 
4th  of  April,  Franklin,  his  sec- 
ond in  command,  having  come  up  with 
the  main  body  of  the  army  the  day 
before.  On  the  6th  the  march  was  re- 
sumed in  the  direction  of  Shreveport, 
by  the  Mansfield  road.  A.  L,  Lee, 
with  the  cavalry,  led  the  advance. 
Ransom  followed  with  two  thin  divi- 
sions, of  the  Thirteenth  army  corps. 
Emory  brought  up  the  rear  with  the 
First  division,  of  the  Nineteenth  army 
corps,  and  a brigade  of  colored  troops 
which  had  just  come  up  from  Port 
Hudson.  A.  J.  Smith,  with  his  two 
divisions,  of  the  Sixteenth  army  corps, 
followed  two  days  later.  Some  2500 
of  Smith’s  men,  under  T.  Kilby  Smith, 
had  been  sent  up  the  river  on  trans- 
ports to  act  as  a guard  to  the  fleet. 
Banks’  available  force  at  this  time  was 
estimated  to  be  about  20,000  or  25,000 
men.  Porter  had  reached  Grand  Ecore 
about  the  same  time  that  the  army 


arrived  at  Natchitoches.  It  was  at 
this  place  he  was  joined  by  the  trans- 
ports, some  20  in  number,  filled  with 
supplies,  and  having  Smith’s  troops  on 
board.  Porter,  without  delay,  com- 
pleted his  arrangements  for  a further 
movement  up  the  river.  The  river 
was  vevy  shallow,  much  to  his  annoy- 
ance. He  had,  therefore,  to  content 
himself  with  his  lighter  vessels.  The 
others  were  left  behind.  On  the  7th, 
taking  with  him  the  Cricket,  Fort 
Hindman,  Lexington,  Osage,  Neosho 
and  Chillicothe,  and  20  transports, 
with  General  Smith’s  troops  on  board, 
and  abundance  of  supplies.  Porter 
started  for  Shreveport.  It  had  been 
arranged  that  on  the  third  day  the 
fleet  should  be  opposite  Springfield, 
and  should  there  come  to  anchor  and 
communicate  with  the  army,  a portion 
of  which,  it  was  expected,  would  be 
in  the  immediate  neighborhood. 

In  his  upward  course.  Porter  tells 
us,  he  experienced  very  great  difficul- 
ties. He,  nevertheless,  reached  the 
appointed  place  within  an  hour  of  the 
time  specified.  At  that  point  he  met 
his  first  serious  obstruction.  The  Con- 
federates, determined  to  bar  the  navi- 
gation of  the  river,  had  sunk  a large 
steamer,  called  the  New  Falls  City. 
It  was  lying  right  across  the  current, 
her  ends  resting  on  each  bank,  and  her 
hull,  which  was  broken  in  the  middle, 
resting  on  the  muddy  bottom.  Porter 
had  not  had  time  to  commence  opera- 
tions to  remove  this  obstruction,  when 
a messenger  arrived  from  Banks,  bring- 
ing the  unwelcome  and  unexpected  in- 
telligence that  the  army  had  met  with 


PORTER  AT  SPRINGFIELD  LANDING. 


621 


a reverse,  and  at  the  same  time  order- 
ing General  Smith  to  return  to  Grand 
Ecore  with  the  transports  and  the 
troops.  It  was  a painful  surprise  to 
both  Porter  and  Smith.  Porter  felt 
that  a most  abrupt  end  had  come  to 
the  expedition,  at  least  for  the  present. 
‘‘We  reluctantly  turned  back,”  he 
says,  “ after  having  nearly  reached  the 
object  we  aimed  at.”  His  own  posi- 
tion now  was  one  of  great  peril  and 
of  serious  responsibility. 

What  had  happened  to  Banks  ? Let 
us  see.  It  has  already  been  stated  that 
General  Lee,  with  his  cavalry,  led  the 
National  advance.  On  the  3 1st  of 
March,  he  encountered  a small  force  of 
the  enemy  at  Natchitoches,  and,  after 
a sharp  skirmish,  drove  them  before 
him.  He  encountered  the  same  force 
again  on  the  2d  of  April,  a few  miles 
to  the  west,  put  them  to  flight,  and 
maintained  the  pursuit  as  far  as 
Crump’s  Hill,  a distance  of  twenty 
miles.  Lee  now  waited  for  the  arrival 
of  Franklin  with  the  main  body  of  the 
National  army.  Franklin  forwarded 
instructions  to  Lee  to  attack  the  enemy 
wherever  he  could  find  him,  but  to  be 
careful  to  avoid  a general  engagement. 
On  the  7th — the  same  day  on  which 
Porter  left  Grand  Ecore — the  whole 
army  being  now  in  motion,  and  the 
cavalry  force  being  largely  increased, 
Lee  skirmished  with  great  activity  and 
energy,  driving  the  enemy  before  him, 
until  he  had  advanced  some  two  or 
three  miles  beyond  Pleasant  Hill, 
about  thirty  miles  west-northwest  of 
Natchitoches.  At  this  point  he  found 
Iximself  confronted  by  the  main  body 


of  the  Confederate  cavalry,  some  2500 
strong,  and  under  the  skilful  and 
daring  leadership  of  General  T.  Green. 
They  were  drawn  up  in  line  at  the 
edge  of  a wood,  with  open  fields  in 
front.  The  place  bore  the  name  of 
Wilson’s  Farm.  Active  skirmishing 
commenced  at  once,  and  continued  for 
at  least  two  hours,  when  the  Confede- 
rates were  driven  back  into  the  woods 
near  Patrick’s  Bayou,  about  nine  miles 
from  Pleasant  Hill.  Here  Lee  halted 
for  the  day.  He  had  lost  92  men. 
He  had,  however,  inflicted  heavy  loss 
on  the  enemy. 

Lee  was  now  in  a somewhat  critical 
and  even  dangerous  position.  So,  in- 
deed, as  the  result  proved,  was  the 
entire  National  army.  Lee  was  push- 
ing forward  too  much  in  advance. 
Between  him  and  the  main  body  were 
the  wagon  trains.  If  attacked  by  a 
force  superior  in  strength  to  his  own, 
it  would  be  difficult  to  fall  back ; and 
he  ran  the  risk  of  being  overpowered 
before  relief  could  reach  him.  This 
was  precisely  the  difficulty  of  the  situa- 
tion, and  the  source  of  all  the  trouble 
which  followed.  Franklin  had  not  yet 
reached  Pleasant  Hill ; Banks,  who 
had  been  detained  at  Grand  Ecore, 
superintending  the  departure  of  the 
transports,  had  not  yet  reached  Frank- 
lin’s headquarters ; and  A.  J.  Smith 
was  still  far  in  the  rear.  Lee,  realizing 
his  difiiculty,  called  at  once  for  a sup- 
port of  infantry,  and  asked  permission 
to  leave  his  wagon  train  behind.  Lan- 
drum’s brigade,  of  the  Fourth  division, 
of  the  Thirteenth  corps,  was  hurried 
forward.  Hansom  following  with  what 


628 


SHREVEPORT. 


remained  of  the  division.  On  the 
morning  of  the  8th,*  Landrum  having 
come  up,  Lee,  who  was  accompanied 
by  four  batteries — Nim’s,  the  Chicago 
Mercantile,  the  First  Indiana,  and  Bat- 
tery G,  of  the  regular  array — pushed 
forward,  making  a liberal  use  of  his 
artillery.  The  Confederates  steadily 
fell  back  beyond  the  clearing  at  Sabine 
Cross  Roads,  until  they  had  reached  a 
clump  of  trees,  about  three  or  four 
miles  from  Mansfield.  At  this  point, 
the  Confederates  were  found  to  be 
assembled  in  great  force.  It  was  now 
manifest  to  all  that  the  advance  had 
been  made  too  rapidly.  Lee  hesitated 
to  attack,  and  so  force  a battle  in  the 
circumstances.  He  was  disposed  to 
wait  until  the  main  body  was  well  for- 
ward. He  was  no  longer,  however, 
master  of  the  situation.  The  Confed- 
erate generals,  in  truth,  saw  that  their 
opportunity  was  ripening ; and  they 
were  already  preparing  to  change  the 
curi'ent  of  battle,  and  to  turn  retreat 
into  ao:2:ressive  action  and  victory. 

Ransom  had  come  up  about  noon  with 
the  remainder  of  the  Fourth  division, 
of  the  Thirteenth  corps;  and  Banks 
arrived  at  the  front  a little  later. 
Banks  had  already  assumed  entire 
control  of  the  held.  The  cavalry  were 
in  the  centre.  Landrum  was  on  the 
right ; Ransom  was  on  the  left.  The 
skirmishing  became  gradually  more  ac- 
tive. The  Confederates,  having  ceased 
to  fall  back,  were  already  offering  a 
stubborn  resistance.  It  was  becoming 
more  and  more  apparent  that  they 
were  assembled  in  strength,  and  that 
they  were  about  to  abandon  the  merely 


defensive,  and  make  a bold  aoreressive 
effort.  Banks  sent  orders  to  Franklin 
to  huiTy  forward  the  infantry,  instruct- 
ing Lee  meanwhile  to  hold  his  ground 
until  the  arrival  of  reinforcements.  It 
was  now  about  four  o’clock.  The  skirm- 
ishing became  more  active  and  more 
general and  about  half-past  four,  the 
entire  Confederate  foi’ce,  some  8000 
foot  and  12,000  horse,  fell  like  a thun- 
dei'bolt  on  the  whole  National  line,  but 
beai’ing  most  heavily  on  the  right  Rank. 
The  shock  was  irresistible.  The  Na- 
tional troops,  still  fighting  bravely,  fell 
back  over  the  open  space  at  the  Cross 
Roads  to  the  woods  in  the  rear.  In 
this  struggle,  three  pieces  of  Nim’s 
battery  were  lost ; and  but  for  the 
bravery  of  Lee’s  cavalry,  the  National 
right  would  have  been  turned.  The 
battle  was  raging  furiously  when 
Fiainklin  came  up,  about  five  o’clock, 
with  the  Third  division  of  the  Thir- 
teenth corps,  under  General  Cameron. 
A new  line  w*as  formed.  It  was  of  no 
avail.  The  Confedei'ates,  resolute  to 
win — determined  not  to  be  balked  of 
their  prize — having  gathered  themselves 
up  for  a Rnal  effort,  came  rushing  for- 
ward with  redoubled  fury.  The  on- 
slaught was  terrific.  Cameron’s  line  was 
broken,  as  Ransom’s  had  been  befoi‘e 
it.  The  National  ranks  were  now 
thrown  into  confusion  ; and  large  num- 
bers of  the  troops,  flinging  down  their 
arras,  began  to  rush,  panic-stricken, 
from  the  held.  The  rout  soon  became 
general.  The  narrow  road,  by  which 
alone  escape  was  possible,  was  quickly 
blocked  up  by  wagon  trains,  by  artil- 
lery, by  footmen  and  horsemen,  all 


SABINE  CROSS  ROADS. 


629 


mingled  together  in  inextricable  confu- 
sion. It  was  such  a scene  as  baffles  all 
description ; and  it  seemed  as  if  no- 
thins:  could  save  the  National  advance 
from  complete  destruction.  Such  was 
the  state  of  things  in  the  front  about 
five  o’clock  on  the  afternoon  of  the  8th. 
‘‘Bull  Bun,”  said  Bansom,  afterwards, 
“ was  nothing  in  comparison.”  Lee  lost 
about  150  baggage  wagons  filled  with 
supplies.  Bansom  lost  his  guns ; and 
about  1000  of  his  men  were  captured. 
The  National  officers  suffered  severely. 
Several  of  them  were  killed,  among 
whom  were  Colonel  Webb,  of  the 
Seventy-Seventh  Ohio;  Colonel  Vance, 
of  the  Ninety-Sixth  Ohio ; and  Captain 
Dickey,  of  Bansom’s  staff.  Among  the 
wounded  were  Franklin,  Bansom,  and 
Colonel  Bobinson,  who,  with  his  cav- 
alry, was  protecting  the  wagon  train. 
Such  was  the  disastrous  battle  of  Sa- 
bine Cross  Boads. 

The  day,  however,  was  not  yet 
ended ; nor  was  it  doomed  to  close 
wholly  in  disaster  and  gloom  for  the 
National  cause.  At  Pleasant  Grove, 
some  three  miles  in  the  rear,  the  pursu- 
ers and  the  pursued  were  both  brought 
to  a halt.  General  Emory  with  his 
splendid  divisions,  pressing  forward, 
had  just  reached  Pleasant  Grove,  when 
he  learned  of  the  disaster  which  had 
taken  place  in  the  front.  With  the  in- 
stincts of  a true  soldier,  he  prepared  to 
arrest  the  tide  of  retreat.  Forming  his 
men  in  line  of  battle  at  the  edge  of  a 
wood,  with  open  ground  sloping  down 
to  the  front,  he  awaited  the  approach 
of  the  triumphant  foe.  Making  way 
for  the  flying  columns,  and  allowing 


them  to  pass  through  to  the  rear,  he 
caused  his  men  to  reserve  their  fire 
until  the  pursuers  were  close  at  hand. 
His  orders  were  faithfully  obeyed. 
The  Confederates  came  up  with  a tre- 
mendous rush,  their  ranks  somewhat 
disordered  by  success.  Full  in  their 
faces  Emory’s  men  poured,  in  rapid 
succession,  murderous  volleys  of  mus- 
ketry. Loth  to  yield  in  the  hour  of 
victory,  the  Confederates  endeavored 
to  press  on.  A fierce  and  sanguinary 
struggle  ensued.  It  was  in  vain,  how- 
ever, that  they  dashed  themselves  on 
the  solid  front  which  Emory  presented. 
They  were  mowed  down  in  heaps,  and 
compelled  to  retire.  Night  now  fell 
upon  the  scene  ; and  the  National  army 
was  saved. 

In  this  struggle.  General  Dwight, 
General  McMillan,  Colonel  Kinsey  and 
Colonel  Benedict  greatly  distinguished 
themselves  — the  last-named  officer, 
with  great  gallantry,  having  resisted 
and  repelled  repeated  efforts  made  by 
the  Confederates  to  turn  the  National 
right. 

During  the  night.  Banks  retired  his 
shattered  army  to  Pleasant  Hill,  some 
fifteen  miles  in  the  rear,  General  Emory 
covering  the  retreat.  Pleasant  Hill, 
the  position  held  by  General  Franklin 
at  the  commencement  of  the  fight,  was 
reached  between  eight  and  nine  o’clock 
on  the  following  morning.  Happily, 
General  A.  J.  Smith,  who  had  not  as 
yet  taken  any  part  in  the  strife,  had 
arrived  the  night  before  with  a portion 
of  the  Sixteenth  corps.  Preparations 
were  immediately  made  to  receive  an- 
othei*  attack.  Pleasant  Hill  is  a clear- 


272 


630 


SHTIEVEPORT. 


ing  in  the  midst  of  the  vast  pine  woods 
with  which  the  adjoining  country  is 
covered.  It  is  about  thirty-five  miles 
from  Red  River,  on  the  road  leading 
from  Natchitoches,  and  forms  a sort 
of  plateau,  which  rises  to  a perceptible 
height  above  the  surrounding  country. 
Two  lines  of  battle  were  formed — one 
in  front  by  the  division  of  General  Em- 
ory, another  behind  the  crest  of  the  hill, 
and  as  a reserve,  by  the  troops  of  Gen- 
eral Smith.  In  tlie  first  line,  Dwight 
was  on  the  right;  McMillan  in  the 
centre;  Benedict  on  the  left.  The 
Twenty-Fifth  New  York  battery  was 
placed  on  a knoll  between  the  rio;ht 
’’.nd  the  centre.  The  day  was  bcau- 
:iful,  and  reminded  many  of  a May 
lay  in  the  North.  For  the  greater 
oart  of  the  day,  as  the  Nationals,  in 
aattle  array,  awaited  the  attack  of  the 
3nemy,  the  field  resembled  a parade- 
irround  rather  than  a battle  held.  Noon 
came  and  went;  and,  although  it  was 
manifest  that  an  attack  was  meditated, 
nothing  but  the  slow  shelling  of  the 
woods,  or  a stray  shot  from  some  im- 
petuous or  impatient  picket,  gave  any 
indication  of  battle.  So  the  day  passed 
until  about  four  in  the  afternoon. 
The  skirmishing  at  that  time  became 
more  active,  as  well  as  more  general. 
There  was  again  a lull.  The  storm, 
however,  was  brewing.  It  was  now 
hortly  after  five  o’clock.  Suddenly, 
lie  Confederate  artillery  began  to 
liunder.  Under  cover  of  this  fire,  the 
;ray  coats  came  rushing  foi*th  from  the 
.voods.  In  overwhelming  numbers,  and 
inarching  at  the  double-quick,  they 
'ame,  rolling  forward  in  solid  mass 


against  the  whole  National  line.  The 
National  skirmishers  fell  back  as  they 
approached.  A tremendous  onslaught 
was  made  on  Emory’s  left,  held,  as  we 
have  said,  by  Benedict’s  brigade.  Bene- 
dict was  wounded  in  the  arm ; an3,  a 
few  moments  afterwards,  he  was  shot 
through, the  head.  His  men  fell  back, 
fighting  gallantly,  and,  reaching  the  lines 
of  General  Smith,  filed  behind  Shaw’s 
brigade.  Sweitzer,  with  his  Texan 
cavalry,  in  a brave  but  vain  endeavor 
to  penetrate  the  covering  line,  had  his 
regiment  literally  cut  to  pieces. 

Emory,  for  a brief  space,  stood  firm 
in  the  centre  and  on  the  right;  but, 
pressed  at  all  points  by  overwhelming 
numbers,  he  was  compelled  to  fall 
back  to  the  shelter  of  the  Sixteenth 
corps,  behind  the  crest  of  the  hill. 
The  Confederates  were  already  con- 
cluding that  they  were  about  to  win  an 
easy  victory.  They  were  in  grievous 
error.  General  Smith  was  all  readiness. 
His  men  were  well  trained  to  his 
peculiar  mode  of  warfare.  He  did  not 
believe  in  the  useless  waste  of  powder 
and  shot,  or  in  the  useless  waste  of 
strength.  The  Confederates,  flushed 
with  what  seems  success,  have  pushed 
their  way  up  the  hill,  almost  to  its  sum- 
mit. The  muzzles  of  the  National 
guns  are  almost  reached.  As  yet,  how- 
ever, the  guns  are  silent.  The  second 
line  of  Confederate  troops  is  seen  ad- 
vancing up  the  hill.  The  opportune 
moment  has  come.  The  signal  is  given. 
There  is  a loud,  deafening  roar,  mingled 
with  the  sharp  rattle  of  musketry. 
Seven  thousand  rifles,  and  several  bat- 
teries of  artillery,  every  gun  loaded  to 


PLEASANT  HILL. 


G31 


the  muzzle  with  grape  and  canister, 
have  poured  their  deadly  contents  on 
the  serried  ranks  of  the  advancing  foe. 
Like  a held  of  grain,  over  which  a tor- 
nado has  passed,  the  entire  Confederate 
centre  has  been  swept  to  destruction. 
Scarcely  fewer  than  1000  men  lie  dead 
or  dying  on  the  sloping  ground.  The 
word  Charge ! ” is  heard  resounding 
along  the  National  lines;  and  7000 
brave  men  rush  upon  the  shattered 
ranks  of  the  enemy.  Emory’s  division, 
now  re-formed,  joins  the  Sixteenth, 
and  takes  part  in  the  hnal  struggle. 
The  struggle  is  brief;  for,  in  a few 

minutes,  the  entire  Confederate  host  is 
' /■ 
driven  from  the  slope,  through  and  be- 
yond the  woods,  in  broken  and  con- 
fused masses.  The  pursuit  was  con- 
tinued until  dark. 

In  the  final  charge.  General  Mower, 
distinguished  throughout  all  this  cam- 
paign, surpassed  all  his  previous  efforts. 
Emory,  too,  the  hero  of  Pleasant  Grove, 
proved  himself  worthy  of  the  name  he 
had  already  won.  To  General  A.  J. 
Smith,  however,  belongs  the  chief  glory. 
It  w’as  his  veteran  Sixteenth  corps 
which  determined  the  day.  It  is  not 
to  be  forgotten  that  Smith  handled  his 
own  men  in  his  own  way.  If  Hansom 
had  been  allowed  to  do  the  same  on 
the  8th,  the  result  of  the  first  day’s 
fighting  might  have  been  different.  In 
their  flight,  the  Confederates  left  be- 
hind all  their  dead  and  wounded,  500 
prisoners,  three  battle-standards,  and  a 
large  number  of  small  arms.  Taylor’s 
battery,  which  had  been  lost  in  the 
earlier  part  of  the  action,  was  recap- 
tured. So,  also,  was  a portion  of  Nim’s 


battery,  which  had  been  lost  on  the  8th. 
A Parrott  gun,  which  the  Nationals 
had  lost,  the  previous  fall,  at  Carrion 
Crow,  was  also  retaken. 

It  was  at  first  intended  to  face  again 
to  the  north,  and  resume  the  march  to 
Shreveport.  The  idea  was  pleasing  to 
the  rank  and  file.  It  was  particularly 
agreeable  to  General  Smith,  who  was 
dissatisfied  with  the  manairement  and 
result  of  the  campaign.  Franklin,  how- 
ever, and  some  of  the  officers  of  the 
Nineteenth  corps,  for  a variety  of  rea- 
sons, deemed  it  unwise.  A council  of 
officers  was  held  on  the  evenins^  of  the 
9th,  when  it  was  agreed  to  fall  back  to 
Grand  Ecore.  Banks’  management  of 
the  expedition,  and  particularly  the 
want  of  generalship  exhibited  by  him 
in  the  first  day’s  fighting,  had  lost  him 
the  confidence  of  his  officers.  As  an 
administrg,tor  or  organizer  in  a civil 
capacity.  Banks,  at  that  time,  had  few 
equals’;  but  he  was  not  at  home  on  the 
battle  field ; nor  was  he  possessed  of 
those  qualities,  or  that  special  kind  of 
experience,  which  fit  one  for  the  suc- 
cessful management  and  control  of  a 
great  military  movement,  conducted  at 
different  and  possibly  distant  points, 
and  by  detached  bodies  of  men.  HiS’ 
military  career  acquired  some  lustre 
from  Port  Hudson ; but  the  glory  thus 
acquired  came  to  him  rather  as  an  acci- 
dent, incidental  to  his  position,  than  as 
a necessity  brought  about  by  his  great 
or  shining  military  abilities.  His  mili- 
tary position  was  due  to  his  political- 
influence — an  influence,  however,  which 
was  fairly  and  hon  stly  won.  He  had 
always  under  him  oflicers  greatly  more 


632 


SHREVEPORT. 


capable  than  himself ; and  he  showed 
his  wisdom  most  when  he  consulted 
their  opinions  and  followed  their  guid- 
ance. The  Shreveport  Expedition  ought 
to  have  been  a success.  As  it  was,  the 
National  army  had  lost  already  18  guns, 
small  arms  in  large  numbers,  5000  men, 
130  wagons  and  1200  horses  and  mules, 
and  had  accomplished  nothing. 

While  arrangements  are  being  made 
for  the  backward  movement,  let  us  turn 
our  attention  to  the  fleet  and  trans- 
ports. Porter  and  Kilby  Smith,  it  will 
be  remembered,  had  reached  Spring- 
field  Landing,  when  they  were  made 
aware  of  the  reverses  which  had  at- 
tended the  army  on  the  8th  at  Sabine 
Cross  Loads,  and  that  it  would  be 
necessary  for  them  to  ]*eturn  to  Grand 
Ecore.  It  was  no  easy  task  which  now 
devolved  on  Admiral  Porter.  Not 
without  gi’eat  difficulty  had  be  suc- 
ceeded in  getting  the  vessels  up  over 
the  rapids.  Greater  difficulty,  he  had 
reason  to  fear,  would  attend  the  return. 
The  water  in  the  river  had  not  risen — 
it  had  rather  fallen — in  the  interval ; 
and  he  had  the  certain  prospect  of 
being  seriously  annoyed  by  the  now 
diseno:aored  Confederates,  who  were 
swarmino^  alonor  the  banks  of  the  river. 
The  backward  movement,  however,  was 
commenced  at  once.  At  a place  called 
Coushatta,  the  boats  first  came  under 
the  enemy’s  fire.  The  Confederate  col- 
onel, Harrison,  was  at  that  point,  with 
nearly  2000  cavalry  and  4 guns.  The 
progress  made  by  the  boats  was  neces- 
sarily slow.  The  river  was  narrow 
and  snaggy ; and,  at  night,  it  was 
deemed  safest  to  halt,  and  wait  for  the 


returning  light.  Hamson  had  no  diffi- 
culty in  keeping-  up  with  the  fleet.  As 
he  moved  down  the  river,  his  numbers 
increased.  Smith,  meanwhile,  was  ac- 
tive on  board  the  transports.  In  order 
to  protect  his  men,  he  threw  up  barri- 
cades with  boxes,  barrels,  bales  of  hay, 
mattresses,  and  everything  else  he  could 
lay  hold  of.  The  water  being  so  low, 
the  gunboats  could  do  little  execution 
upon  the  high  banks  at  short  range; 
and  Smith  knew  that  the  safety  of  the 
fleet  depended  largely  on  his  own  men. 
On  the  hurricane-deck  of  the  Emerald, 
he  mounted  two  Rodman  guns,  which 
did  excellent  service.  On  the  12th, 
near  Pleasant  Hill  Landing,  a fierce 
attack  was  made  on  the  rear  portion 
of  the  fleet.  At  this  point,  the  Osage 
lay  aground,  a heavy  transport,  named 
the  Black  Hawk,  being  alongside  of  her, 
and  attempting  to  pull  her  off.  The 
Confederates,  under  General  Thomas 
Green,  opened  with  2000  muskets. 
The  gunboats  and  the  transports  re^ 
plied  with  promptitude  and  effect. 
Smith  brought  his  two  Rodman  guns 
to  bear  upon  the  banks  of  the  river, 
wffiere  the  enemy  was  massed  in  great 
force.  The  destruction  of  life  was 
fearful.  It  seemed  to  be  the  determi- 
nation of  Gi’een  to  capture  this  portion 
of  the  fleet.  Again  and  again  he 
pushed  his  men  to  the  edge  of  the 
bank,  till,  in  one  of  these  encounters,  a 
shot  from  one  of  the  Rodman  guns 
blew  off  his  head.  The  Confederates 
again  rallied,  only,  however,  to  be  cut 
and  torn  to  pieces  by  the  raking  canis- 
ter-shot from  the  gunboats  and  the 
transports.  While  this  struggle  was 


CANE  RIVER. 


633 


in  progress,  Harrison  appeared  on  the 
opposite  side  of  the  river;  but  so.  de- 
structive was  the  tire  which  was  brought 
to  bear  upon  him  that  he  was  compelled 
to  fall  back  and  remain  at  a distance. 
In  this  eno:a2:ement,  excellent  service 
was  rendered  by  Lieutenant  Bache, 
with  his  gunboat,  Lexington ; also,  by 
Lieutenant  T.  O.  Self  ridge,  of  the 
Osage.  Although  ultimately  compelled 
to  seek  shelter  in  the  casemates  of  the 
Osage,  too  much  praise  cannot  be  given 
to  Smith’s  men,  who,  on  the  transport, 
so  nobly  handled  the  Eodman  guns. 

These  vessels,  without  encountering 
other  serious  difficulties,  proceeded  down 
the  river  as  far  as  Campti,  where  they 
rejoined  the  advance  portion  of  the 
fleet,  which  was  grounded,  and  exposed 
to  the  enemy’s  fire  from  the  banks. 
From  this  point.  Porter,  on  board  the 
Cricket,  which  had  just  narrowly  es- 
caped capture  at  the  hands  of  the  guer- 
rillas, hurried  down  to  Grand  Ecore, 
where  he  found  Banks,  who  had  arrived 
with  the  land  troops.  At  Porter’s  re- 
quest, Banks  sent  a strong  force  up  the 
river  to  protect  the  transports  and  the 
gunboats.  Soon  after  the  arrival  of 
the  troops,  the  entire  fleet  began  to 
move  towards  Grand  Ecore,  which  was 
reached  without  further  trouble. 

The  retreat  was  resumed  with  as  lit- 
tle delay  as  possible.  Porter  started 
with  his  fleet  on  the  17th.  Banks  set 
out  with  the  army  on  the  21st.  Alex- 
andria was  the  next  point  of  destina- 
tion. Porter’s  difficulties  now  began. 
Eight  miles  below  Grand  Ecore,  the 
Eastport,  struck  by  a torpedo  under 
her  bottom  and  near  her  bow,  was 


sunk.  This  proved  a great  hindrance. 
It  was  not  until  the  21st  she  was  got 
afloat — the  day  on  which  Banks  re- 
commenced his  backward  march.  Day 
after  day,  for  six  days,  the  Eastport 
passed  through  the  same  ordeal ; and 
the  same  laboilous  process  of  hauling 
her  over  the  bars  had  to  be  repeated.  It 
was  wearisome  work,  and  could  hardly 
fail,  were  we  to  enter  into  all  the  details, 
to  prove  an  equally  wearisome  recital. 
On  the  25th,  when  about  sixty  miles 
below  Grand  Ecore,  she  again  ground- 
ed. So  much  time  had  been  wasted, 
and  so  apparently  inextricable  she 
seemed  in  her  present  position,  that  all 
further  attempts  to  save  her  were  aban- 
doned. 1 About  half-past  one  o’clock,  on 
the  26th  of  April,  she  was  blown  April 
into  fragments,  having  been  pre-  26. 
viously  charged  with  one  ton  of  pow- 
der and  other  combustibles.  The  East- 
port  was  one  of  Porter’s  best  vessels ; 
and  both  he  and  her  commander, 
Phelps,  did  their  utmost  to  carry  her 
off  in  safety.  Almost  at  the  moment 
appointed  for  the  blowing  up  of  the 
Eastport,  the  Confederates  made  a 
daring  but  unsuccessful  attempt  to 
capture  the  Cricket.  The  guerrillas 
were  quickly  routed.  The  vessels 
which  were  accompanying  the  East- 
port,  as  soon  as  she  was  blown  up, 
proceeded  down  the  river,  encountering 
no  opposition  until  they  had  reached 
a point  at  the  mouth  of  Cane  Eiver. 
The  Cricket  led  the  way,  with  Admi- 
ral Porter  on  board,  followed  close  by 
the  Juliet,  the  Champion,  and  the  Fort 
Hindman.  As  they  neared  the  point, 
they  discovered  that  the  Confederates 


C34 


SHREVEPORT. 


were  present  in  considerable  strength. 
Hounding  the  point,  the  Cricket  still 
in  front,  and  opening  with  their  bow- 
guns,  they  found  themselves  exposed 
to  the  fire  of  a powerful  battery  of  18 
guns,  which  the  Confederates  had 
quickly  got  into  position.  When  the 
Cricket  came  fully  up,  each  of  the  18 
guns  poured  forth  its  deadly  and  de- 
structive missile.  Every  shot  took  ef- 
fect on  the  little  vessel,  most  of  them 
penetrating  through  and  through.  The 
shock  was  terrific,  and  the  destruction 
almost  complete  One  gun  wac  dis- 
abled. Every  gunner  was  killed  or 
wounded.  The  chief  engineer  and  one 
of  the  pilots  were  killed  at  their  re- 
spective posts.  In  the  fire-room,  only 
one  man  escaped — all  the  others  being 
either  killed  or  wounded.  Strange  to 
say.  Admiral  Porter  escaped  unhurt, 
and  the  machinery  was  comparatively 
uninjured.  Making  use  of  some  ne- 
groes, who  were  on  board.  Porter 
manned  the  guns,  and  ran  the  vessel 
past  the  battery.  A few  miles  down 
the  river,  he  found  the  Osage  and  the 
Lexington  engaged  fighting  a field-bat- 
tery. It  was  his  intention  to  take  these 
vessels  back  to  the  assistance  of  those 
he  had  left  behind ; but  darkness  com- 
ing on,  this  was  found  to  be  impossi- 
ble. Lieutenant  Phelps  brought  the 
Juliet  and  the  Fort  Hindman  past  the 
battery  during  the  evening  gloom. 
Both,  however,  were  severely  pun- 
ished. The  pumpboat.  Champion,  hav- 
ing been  disabled,  was  set  on  fire,  and 
left  behind.  “ In  five  minutes,”  says 
Porter,  in  his  graphic  report  of  this  ac- 
tion, “the  Cricket  was  struck  thirty- 


eight  times  with  solid  shot  and  shell, 
with  a loss  of  25  killed  and  wounded  ; 
the  Juliet  about  the  same,  with  15 
killed.  The  Fort  Hindman  lost  3 
killed  and  4 or  5 wounded.”  No  fur- 
ther interruption  was  experienced  until 
the  fleet  reached  the  rapids. 

While  Admiral  Porter  was  thus 
pushing  his  way  down  the  river,  Gen- 
eral Banks,  with  the  land  forces,  had 
made  a successful  march  to  Alexandria. 
His  advance,  under  General  Emory, 
left  Grand  Ecore  on  the  22d  of  April. 
General  A.  J.  Smith  followed  wdth  his 
column,  his  rear  being  covered  by  a 
command  under  General  Kilby  Smith. 
On  the  first  day,  the  National  army 
marched  forty  miles.  It  had  reached 
Cane  Hiver,  on  the  east  side  of  which, 
and  near  a ferry,  on  an  elevation  called 
Monet’s  Bluff,  the  Confederates,  to  the 
number  of  8000,  with  16  guns,  had 
taken  a strong  position.  This  bluff 
was  flanked  by  the  unfordable  river  on 
one  side  and  by  an  almost  impassable 
swamp  on  the  other.  It  was  the  inten- 
tion of  General  Banks  to  force  a pas- 
sage across  the  river  at  this  place,  by 
making  a vigorous  attack  early  on  the 
morning  of  the  23d.  It  was  the  deter- 
mination of  the  Confederates  to  offer  a 
stubborn  resistance ; and  it  was  their 
hope  and  belief  that,  by  drawing  the 
National  advance  into  a sharp  engage- 
ment, they  w’oiild  be  able,  with  the  i e- 
mainder  of  their  forces,  then  not  far 
distant,  to  fall  with  destructive  effect 
on  the  National  flank  and  rear.  Emory, 
however,  had  moved  with  such  celerity 
that  he  antici[)ated  their  plans.  The 
Confederates  were  not  ready.  Their 


BAILEY^S  DAM. 


635 


pickets  on  the  west  side  of  the  stream 
were  easily  driven  in;  but  the  main 
portion  was  found  to  be  too  strong  to 
be  taken  by  direct  assault.  A flank 
movement  was  resolved  upon.  Gen- 
ei*al  Birge,  taking  with  him  his  own 
brigade — that  of  Colonel  Fessenden — 
and  General  Cameron’s  division,  of  the 
Thirteenth  corps,  crossed  the  river 
three  miles  above  the  ferry,  and,  late  in 
the  afternoon,  after  weary  marching, 
reached  the  desired  position,  in  the 
rear  of  the  enemy’s  stronghold.  Mean- 
while, the  advance  of  the  main  body  of 
the  jS^ational  army  was  moved  towards 
the  Cane  River,  and  within  range  of 
the  guns  on  the  bluff,  on  the  opposite 
side.  The  Confedei*ates  immediately 
opened  Are ; and  a spirited  artillery 
duel  was  maintained  for  some  hours. 
It  had  been  arranged  that  as  soon  as 
Birge  commenced  the  assault  in  the 
Confederate  rear,  the  National  reserves 
should  force  the  passage  of  the  river. 
The  plan  worked  admirably.  The  as- 
sault on  the  rear  of  the  Confederate 
position  was  made  by  Colonel  Fessen- 
den’s brigade,  the  colonel  leading  his 
men.  It  was  made  with  great  gal- 
lantry and  with  signal  success.  When 
darkness  set  in,  the  Confederates  were 
flying  in  confusion  along  the  Fort  Jes- 
sup road;  and  the  bluff  was  occupied 
by  the  Nationals.  In  this  attack,  the 
Nationals  lost  about  200  men  in  killed 
and  wounded.  Among  the  wounded 
was  Colonel  Fessenden.  On  the  inorn- 
April  23d,  the  Confederates 

23.  fell  with  great  force  on  the  rear 
of  General  A.  J.  Smith’s  column,  which 
was  covered  by  the  command  of  Gen- 


eral Kilby  Smith.  The  last-named 
general  turned  upon  the  enemy  at 
Clouterville,  on  the  Cane  River ; and, 
after  a three-hours’  encrasrement,  Gen- 
eral  Mower  fighting  wdth  great  brav- 
ery on  his  right.  Smith  repulsed  the 
Confederates  at  every  point,  and  com- 
pelled them  to  withdraw.  The  march 
towards  Alexandria  was  resumed  on 
the  afternoon  of  the  following  day ; 
and,  on  the  27th,  after  an  absence  of 
twenty-four  days.  Banks  and  his  army 
were  back  in  Alexandria.  The  back 
ward  march  from  ®rrand  Ecore  was 
successfully  managed ; and  while  it  did 
honor  to  General  Banks,  it  redounded, 
also,  to  the  credit  of  Generals  Emory, 
A.  J.  Smith  and  T.  Kilby  Smith,  who, 
by  their  skill,  bravery  and  promptitude 
of  action,  greatly  added  to  the  laurels 
they  had  already  won. 

At  Alexandria,  all  hopes  of  resum- 
ing the  Shreveport  Expedition  van- 
ished. General  Hunter  had  arrived 
with  orders  from  General  Grant,  in- 
structing Banks  to  close  the  campaign, 
as  Sherman’s  troops  w’ere  now  all 
needed  to  the  east  of  the  Mississippi. 
Those  orders  were  final.  It  was  im- 
possible, however,  to  abandon  Porter 
and  his  fleet  to  the  tender  mercies  of 
the  enemy.  Hunter,  therefore,  returned 
to  Grant  with  a letter  from  Banks,  ex- 
plaining the  situation,  and  claiming 
such  time  as  might  be  needed  to  make 
a fair  effort  to  save  the  fleet. 

We  left  Porter  at  the  rapids,  above 
Alexandria.  The  water  had  become 
so  low  that  he  had  no  hope  of  getting 
his  vessels  over  the  falls.  ‘‘  I saw 
nothing  before  me,”  he  says,  “but  the 


636 


SHREVEPORT. 


destruction  of  the  best  part  of  the 
Mississippi  squadron.”  The  difficulty, 
however,  had  not  been  unforeseen ; and 
its  solution  had  already,  for  some  time, 
l)een  engaging  the  attention  and  tax- 
ing the  genius  of  Lieutenant-Colonel 
Bailey,  Banks’  chief  engineer.  It  was 
Bailey’s  conviction  that  by  a system  of 
damming,  which  he  explained  to  both 
Banks  and  Porter,  he  could  bring  the 
fleet  safely  over  the  rapids.  Banks 
shared  in  the  belief  of  his  lieutenant. 
Porter  doubted.  Banks  gave  the  ne- 
cessary orders;  aicd,  on  Sunday,  the 
May.  1 st  of  May,  Bailey  went  to  work. 

L On  condition  that  he  should  be 
allowed  the  use  of  as  many  men  as  he 
might  deem  necessary,  he  promised  to 
complete  the  proposed  dam  within  ten 
days.  It  was  a perilous  and,  appa- 
rently, an  impossible  task.  The  falls 
were  a mile  in  length  ; the  water  was 
exceedingly  low ; and,  in  proportion  as 
the  dam  approached  completion,  the 
woi’k  and  the  workmen  would  be  in- 
creasingly at  the  mercy  of  a powerful 
current.  Three  thousand  men,  with 
from  two  to  three  hundred  wagons, 
were  soon  busily  engaged.  The  entire 
country  around  was  ransacked  for  the 
necessary  material.  The  neighboring 
steam-mills  were  demolished  for  their 
stone  and  brick  and  wood  and  iron ; 
the  adjoining  forests  echoed  with  the 
sound  of  the  axe,  and,  yielding  to  the 
persuasive  blows  of  the  sturdy  men 
from  Maine,  gave^  up  their  stalwart 
giants  of  oak  and  pine;  the  qiiariies 
resounded  with  the  stroke  of  the  ham- 
mer, and  lent  their  weight  and  strength 
to  the  daring  enterprise ; wagons  rum- 


bled to  the  river;  and  flatboats  con- 
veyed the  stone  and  wood  to  their 
destined  places.  Bailey  commenced  by 
running  out  from  the  left  bank  of  the 
river  a tree-dam  made  of  the  bodies 
of  very  large  trees,  brush,  brick  and 
stone,  cross-tied  with  heavy  timber  and 
strengthened  in  every  way  which  inge- 
nuity could  devise.  This  tree-dam  was 
run  out  about  300  feet,  at  which  point 
were  sunk  four  large  coal  barges  filled 
with  brick.  From  the  right  bank, 
cribs,  filled  with  stone,  were  built  out 
to  meet  the  barges.  At  all  points  the 
work  went  merrily  on,  the  soldiers 
lightening  their  toil  by  singing  favor- 
ite army  songs  and  certain  plantation 
melodies.  In  eight  days  the  dam  was 
all  but  completed ; and  the  water  on 
the  upper  falls  had  risen  so  high  as  to 
allow  the  Fort  Hindman,  the  Osao^e 
and  the  Neosho  to  move  down  and  be 
in  a state  to  pass  through  the  dam.  In 
another  day,  it  was  calculated,  all  the 
vessels  would  be  got  down  and  over  the 
falls.  Early  on  ■ the  9th,  how-  ]>jay 
ever,  when  the  above-named  ves- 
sels  were  about  to  pass  through,  the 
pressure  of  the  water,  which  had  i*isen 
rapidly,  and  was  flowing  at  the  rate  of 
nine  miles  an  hour,  swept  away  two  of 
the  stone  barges.  Porter  galloped  to 
the  upper  falls,  and  ordered  the  Lex- 
ington to  move  down  and  endeavor  to 
pass  through  the  gap  in  the  dam.  The 
attempt  was  made.  The  vessel  got 
over  the  upper  falls  in  safety,  but  not 
a moment  too  j‘Oon,  as  the  water  was 
already  falling  rapidly.  She  then  made 
for  the  opening  in  the  dam,  through 
w’iich  the  water  was  now  rushing  with 


PASSING  THE  RAPIDS. 


637 


tremendous  fury.  To  the  thousands 
who  lined  the  banks,  and  who  looked  on 
tremblingly  and  in  silence,  it  seemed  a 
foolhardy  experiment — a certain  rush 
to  destruction.  The  Lexington  had  on 
a full  head  of  steam,  as  she  went  bound- 
ing down  the  roaring  torrent.  Rolling 
spasmodically,  ailmost  like  a thing  of 
life,  she  hung  for  a moment  on  the 
rocks  below ; and  then,  yielding  to  the 
force  of  the  current,  she  made  one 
grand  leap  into  the  lower  deep  waters. 
A loud  and  long-resounding  cheer  an- 
nounced the  success  of  the  undertaking 
and  the  delight  of  over  twenty  thou- 
sand men.  The  Neosho  followed;  but 
she  made  the  passage  with  less  success 
than  the  Lexington.  Her  pilot  became 
frightened  as  she  approached  the  abyss, 
and  shut  off  the  steam.  It  was  a serious 
blunder,  and  well-nigh  brought  the 
vessel  to  destruction.  Her  hull  disap- 
peared under  the  water ; and  it  seemed 
as  if  she  were  lost.  It  was,  however, 
only  for  a moment.  Having  risen  again 
above  the  surface,  she  was  caught  by 
the  current,  and  swept  over  the  rocks, 
fortunately  reaching  the  deep  water 
below  with  only  one  hole  in  her  bot- 
tom— a damage  which  was  promptly 
repaired.  The  Fort  Hindman  and  the 
Osage  passed  over  “beautifully,”  Por- 
ter tells  us,  and  without  sustaining  any 
injury. 

It  was  not  deemed  safe  to  make  the 
experiment  with  the  heavier  vessels. 
Bailey,  meanwhile,  was  busy  repairing 
his  dam.  The  soldiers,  now  fully  con- 
vinced that  they  were  not  working  to- 
wards an  impossible  end,  resumed  their 
toilsome  task  with  renewed  enei'gv. 


The  dam  was  speedily  repaired ; and 
the  remaining  six  vessels — the  Mound 
City,  Caron  delet,  Pittsburg,  Ozark, 
Louisville  and  Chillicothe — with  two 
tugs,  passed  safely  through,  in  the 
presence  and  amid  the  loud,  hearty  and 
prolonged  cheers  of  the  entire  army. 
The  success  of  this  undertaking  gave 
Porter  a new  idea  of  the  possible. 
“Words,”  says  he,  “are  inadequate  to 
express  the  admiration  I feel  for  the 
abilities  of  Lieutenant  Colonel  Bailey. 
The  highest  honors  the  government  can 
bestow  on  him  can  never  repay  him  for 
the  service  he  has  rendered  the  coun- 
try.” The  government  was  not  un- 
grateful. Bailey  was  honored  by  Con- 
gress with  a vote  of  thanks  and  a medal ; 
and  he  was  promoted  to  the  rank  of 
brigadier-general. 

During  the  time  the  army  remained 
at  Alexandria,  waiting  for  the  fleet, 
it  was  reinforced  by  a large  body  of 
troops,  which  had  come  up  from  Mata- 
gorda Bay,  under  General  John  A.  Mc- 
Clernand.  A serious  misfortune,  during 
the  same  interval,  had  befallen  two  of 
the  vessels  of  the  fleet — the  Signal  and 
Covington — which  had  been  sent  down 
the  river  in  advance  as  a convoy  to 
the  transport  Warner.  On  the  5th  of 
May,  at  Dunn’s  Bayou,  about  thirty 
miles  below  Alexandria,  they  were  at- 
tacked and  overpowered  by  a strong 
Confederate  force.  The  Covington  was 
set  on  Are,  and  then  abandoned.  The 
Signal  and  the  transport  were  cap- 
tured. It  was  a very  unequal  strug- 
gle. Of  the  soldiers  on  board  the 
transport,  about  100  were  killed,  and 
150  made  prisoners.  The  remainder 


638 


SHREVEPOET. 


took  to  the  shore  and  escaped.  Not 
long  afterwards  the  City  Belle  was 
captured,  having  on  board  400  Ohio 
troops.  These  isolated  cases  seem  to  | Simmsport,  the  troops  were  vigorously 
reflect  on  the  management  at  head-  | attacked  by  a body  of  the  enemy  at 


Mississippi,  which  caused  a back  water 
in  the  Bed  Biver.  On  the  morninof  of 


the  16th,  while 


pressing  on 


towards 


quarters.  In  such  a country,  it  is  the 
fii'st  duty  of  the  naval  commander  to 
keep  his  vessels  well  together,  as  it  is 
the  first  duty  of  the  general  in  the 
field  to  move  his  men  in  masses.  The 
principle  involved  is  fundamental,  and 
ought  never  to  be  departed  from,  ex- 
cept in  extraordinary  circumstances. 

On  the  13th  of  May,  Alexandria, 
May  some  unknown  hands,  was  set 
13.  on  fire.  In  spite  of  the  efforts 
of  Generals  Banks  and  Smith,  a large 
portion  of  the  place  was  destroyed. 
On  the  following  day,  the  town  was 
evacuated;  and  both  the  army  and 
navy  were  moving  in  the  direction  of 
Simmsport.  It  was  a day  of  great  sor- 
row in  Alexandria.  General  Banks  had 
declared  his  determination  that  the  oc- 
cupation should  be  permanent.  In  con- 
sequence of  this  assurance,  the  citizens 
in  large  numbers  had  given  their  al- 
legiance to  the  National  cause.  Not  a 
few  of  them  had  joined  the  army  and 
been  sent  forward  to  Simmsport.  Know- 
ing the  fate  which  awaited  them,  the 
women  and  children  became  frantic  with 
grief,  and,  terror-stricken,  begged,  but 
begged  in  vain,  to  be  taken  on  board 
the  transports  and  conveyed  to  New 
Orleans.  It  was  one  of  those  sad  and 
sorrowful  circumstances  which  are  un- 
avoidable in  war.  On  the  16th,  the 
army  and  the  fleet  had  both  reached 
Simmsport,  Porter’s  progress  having 
been  greatly  facilitated  by  a rise  in  the 


Mansura.  On  the  20th  they  had  crossed 
the  Atchafalaya,  when  General  E.  B. 
S.  Can  by  assumed  command,  and  Banks 
hastened  on  to  New  Orleans.  In  obe- 
dience to  counter-orders  which  had  come 
from  Halleck,  with  consent  of  Grant,  per- 
mitting'that  portion  of  Sherman’s  troops 
to  remain  in  the  West,  A.  J.  Smith  pro- 
ceeded up  the  Mississippi,  halting  on 
the  way  at  Columbia,  and  dispersing  a 
body  of  Confederates,  under  Marma- 
duke.  Porter  resumed  his  station  on 
the  Mississippi ; and,  in  due  time,  the 
remainder  of  the  army,  under  General 
Canby,  reached  New  Orleans.  Thus 
ended  the  Shreveport  Expedition — an 
expedition  which  was  conducted  with- 
out capacity  or  discipline,  and  which, 
as  we  have  said  already,  revealed  the 
lack  of  true  military  genius  on  the  part 
of  General  Banks. 

This  chapter  would  be  incomplete 
without  a brief  allusion  to  the  expedi- 
tion which  was  conducted  under  Gen- 
eral Steele.  That  general,  it  will  be 
remembered,  had  been  instructed  to 
move  southward  and  co-operate  with 
Banks  in  the  movement  against  Shreve- 
poi't.  When  Banks  set  out  on  his 
northward  march,  Steele  was  at  Little 
Bock.  He  left  there  on  March  ]>|ar, 
23d,  with  12,000  infantry,  and  23. 
3000  cavalry,  under  Carr.  Camden  was 
Steele’s  first  objective ; but  he  expect- 
ed to  be  joined  by  General  Thayer  at 
Arkadelpliia,^  with  about  5000  men. 


PRAIRIE  D’ANN. 


039 


At  Camden,  if  no  serious  difficulty  in- 
terposed, he  was  to  be  joined  by  a 
small  force  under  General  Clayton. 
Thayer  left  Fort  Smith  on  the  22d ; 
and,  about  the  same  time,  Clayton 
marched  from  Pine  Bluff.  The  roads 
were  bad;  and  the  junction  of  the 
forces  according  to  instructions  could 
hardly  be  relied  upon.  When  Steele 
reached  Arkadelphia,  Thayer  was  not 
forward.  After  waiting  for  the  latter 
in  vain  for  two  days,  Steele  pushed  on 
in  the  direction  of  Washington,  with 
the  view  of  flanking  Camden.  General 
Sterling  Price,  it  was  known,  was  in 
tb^  neighborhood,  with  12,000  Con- 
federates. After  a toilsome  march, 
and  being  constantly  harassed  by  the 
cavalry  under  Marmaduke  and  Ca- 
bell, Steele  reached  Prairie  D’Ann  on 
April  the  10th  of  April,  where  he  was 
10.  joined  by  Thayer.  Price  was 
understood  to  be  here  in  great  force ; 
and  Steele  at  once  resolved  to  offer 
battle.  By  a series  of  dexterous  move- 
ments, which  succeeded  in  misleading 
Price  as  to  the  real  objective  of  his 
antagonist,  and  after  some  desperate 
skirmishing,  Steele  wheeled  around 
and  pushed  his  way  to  Camden,  taking 
possession  of  the  place  on  the  night  of 
the  15th,  in  spite  of  the  most  persistent 
efforts  of  the  enemy.  Here  he  learned 
of  the  disaster  which  he  had  befallen 
Banks  at  Sabine  Cross  Boads ; and,  feel- 
ing convinced  that  the  enemy,  already 
at  least  25,000  strong,  would  soon  be 
reinforced  by  the  army  of  General 
Kirby  Smith,  he  gave  up  all  thoughts 
of  moving  further  in  the  direction  of 
Shreveport.  His  position  at  Camden 


soon  became  the  reverse  of  comfortable. 
His  supplies  were  intercepted  ; his  for- 
aging  parties  were  cut  off;  Clayton 
could  hardly  be  expected  now  to  join 
him ; and  he  began  to  fear  for  the 
safety  of  Little  Bock.  In  these  cii- 
cumstances,  he  resolved  to  retreat  to 
his  former  stronghold.  On  the  April 
night  of  the  26th,  he  threw  ‘26. 
his  army  across  the  Washita  Biver ; 
and,  at  daylight  on  the  27th,  he  be- 
gan to  fall  back,  by  way  of  Princeton 
and  Jenkins’  Ferry,  on  the  Sabine 
Biver.  The  roads  were  in  the  most 
wretched  condition ; and  the  rain  fell 
in  torrents.  At  Jenkins’  Ferry,  he  was 
attacked  by  an  overwhelming  force,  led 
by  Kirby  Smith  in  person.  Steele'  got 
his  men  quickly  into  position ; and  the 
battle  at  once  became  general.  The 
Confederates  fell  on  the  National  lines 
with  tremendous  energy.  Again  and 
again  they  came  up  in  full  force,  now 
on  the  left,  and  now  on  the  right,  and 
finally  making  a desperate  effort  to 
crush  the  left  and  centre.  More  than 
once  the  National  lines  yielded  to  the 
tremendous  pressure  and  fierce  onsets 
of  the  enemy ; but  nothing  could  cool 
the  courage  or  relax  the  energies  of 
those  brave  Western  regiments.  Every 
charge  of  the  enemy  was  successfully 
repelled.  The  battle  had  commenced 
at  early  dawn.  It  was  now  near  noon. 
The  critical  moment  of  the  fight  had 
arrived.  The  National  left,  which  was 
held  by  the  Thirty-Third  Iowa,  whose 
ammunition  was  exhausted,  was  yield- 
ing to  the  pressure  of  the  heavy  masses 
of  the  enemy.  Four  companies  of  the 
Fortieth  Iowa  hastened  to  its  support, 


MOBILE  HARBOR. 


UO 


formed  under  a terrible  fire,  and  re- 
stored the  line.  The  tide  of  battle  now 
turned.  The  Confederates,  not  pre- 
pared for  this  fresh  advent  of  strength 
and  heroism,  began  to  fall  back.  For 
one  whole  hour,  the  Nationals  pressed 
on  their  front,  the  Confederates  slowly, 
but  steadily,  yielding  up  the  ground. 
At  noon,  the  victory  was  complete; 
and  the  Nationals  remained  masters  of 
the  held.  In  this  fierce  struggle,  Steele 
lost  700  men  in  killed  and  wounded. 
The  Confederate  loss  must  have  ex- 


ceeded 3000  men,  including  3 gen- 
eral officers.  Leaving  a burial  party 
behind,  Steele  crossed  the  Saline  Eiver 
and  continued  his  retreat.  He  was 
not  further  molested.  On  the  2d  ]^ay 
of  May,  after  a weary  march,  over  2. 
a swampy  country,  his  half-famished 
troops,  broken  and  dispirited,  were  safe 
in  Little  Rock.  The  battle  at  Jenkins’ 
Ferry  did  credit  to  Steele  and  to  his 
brave  soldiers ; but  the  expedition,  like 
that  of  which  it  was  intended  to  form  a 
paid,  was  ill-omened  and  disastrous. 


CHAPTER  XXXIII. 


One  of  the  Sources  of  Nourishment  and  Strength. — Sherman’s  Plan. — Farragut  Keconnoitres. — The  Obstruc- 
tions Visible. — Need  for  Caution. — The  Defenses. — Forts  Morgan,  Gaines  and  Powell. — The  Confederate 
Fleet. — The  Tennessee,  the  Selma,  the  Gaines,  the  Morgan. — Farragufs  Fleet. — Reinforcements. — The  Mon- 
itors.— A Consultation  on  Board  the  Hartford. — Farragut,  Canby  and  Granger. — A Land  Force  Promised. — 
Description  of  Mobile  Harbor. — The  City  of  Mobile. — Mobile  Point. —Dauphin  Island. — Sand  Island. — 
Grant’s  Pass. — Swash  Channel. — Middle  Channel. — The  Position  of  the  Forts. — Description  of  the  Ten- 
nessee.— Preparations  for  the  Attack. — Arrival  of  Granger  with  2500  Men. — Investment  of  Fort  Gaines. — The 
Fleet  in  Motion. — August  5th. — The  Tecumseh. — The  First  Shot. — Fort  Morgan  Thunders. — The  Tecumseh 
Disappears. — Torpedoes. — The  Brooklyn  Pauses,  and  Falls  Back.  — A Critical  Moment. — The  Fleet  in  Dan- 
ger.— Farragufs  Decision  and  Promptitude. — A Perilous  Position. — Fearful  Broadsides. — The  Hartford 
Ahead. — Past  Fort  Morgan. — The  Tennessee  About  to  Strike. — Missed  her  Mark. — The  Gunboats. — Their 
Raking  Fire. — The  Metacomet  in  Pursuit  of  the  Selma. — The  Selma  Captured. — The  Gaines  and  the  Mor- 
gan Under  the  Shelter  of  the  Port. — At  Anchor. — Piped  for  Breakfast. — Reappearance  of  the  Tennessee. — 
Buchanan's  Evident  Intention. — Too  Much  Confidence. — Wooden  Ships  and  Iron-Clads. — Monster  Rams  and 
Monitors. — The  Tennessee  and  the  National  Fleet. — Magnificent  Fighting. — Hard  Blows. — The  Tennessee 
Apparently  Invulnerable. — A Tremendous  Shot  from  the  Manhattan. — Closing  in  Upon  the  Monster. — Ad- 
miral Buchanan  Wounded. — The  Crew  Demoralized. — The  White  Flag. — The  Surrender. — Traces  of  Pun- 
ishment.—Joy  in  the  Land. — Praise  of  Farragut. — The  American  Nelson. — Two  Historical  Pictui'es. — The 
Work  not  yet  Completed. — The  Forts  Passed,  but  not  Taken. — Fort  Powell  Abandoned. — Attack  on  Fort 
Gaines. — The  Fort  Surrendered. — Investment  of  Fort  Morgan. — Siege  Batteries  and  Engineers  from  New 
Orleans. — General  Richard  Arnold. — Ready  for  the  Attack. — The  Bombardment  Commenced. — The  Fortin 
Flames. — Darkness. — The  Firing  Discontinued. — The  Bombardment  Resumed. — The  Morning  of  the  23d 
of  August. — The  White  Flag. — Immediate  and  Unconditional  Surrender. — General  Page. — Unsoldierly  Con- 
duct.— Joy  and  Hope. 


Although  the  great  battle  in  Mobile 
Harbor  did  not  take  place  until 
August,  1864,  and,  therefore,  sub- 
sequent to  other  naval  engagements  of 


the  very  first  importance,  this  seems 
to  be  the  fitting  time  and  place  to  tell 
the  story.  It  was,  as  we  have  seen,  one 
of  the  three  great  sources  from  which. 


THE  RIVAL  FORGES. 


641 


in  the  southwest,  the  Confederacy  drew 
nutriment  and  strength.  The  reduction 
of  Mobile  had  long  since  been  con- 
templated by  the  National  government ; 
and  when,  at  the  beginning  of  1864,  it 
was  resolved  to  strike  at  the  very  heart 
of  the  Confederacy,  by  a movement  up- 
on Meridian  and  Selma,  and  also  to  cut 
off  all  communication  with  Shreveport, 
Mobile  was  included  in  the  general 
plan.  If  General  Sooy  Smith  had  suc- 
ceeded in  joining  General  Sherman  at 
Meridian,  according  to  arrangement, 
Selma,  not  improbably,  would  have 
shared  the  fate  of  Meridian,  and  the 
final  struggle  in  Mobile  Harbor  would 
have  been  antedated  by  several  months. 
Simultaneously  with  the  movement  up- 
on Meridian,  a diversion,  it  will  be  re- 
membered, was  made  in  the  direction 
of  Mobile.  Even  before  that  date,  the 
defenses  of  that  harbor  were  occupying 
Farragut’s  attention.  As  early  as  the 
20th  of  January,  he  made  a personal 
recon noissance  of  Forts  Morgan  and 
Gaines.  The  day  was  fine,  and  the  air 
clear.  Although  he  could  not  approach 
within  a distance  of  three  or  four  miles 
from  the  forts,  he  could  distinctly  see 
the  guns  and  the  men  who  stood  by 
them.  He  could  see,  also,  the  piles  and 
other  obstructions  which,  running  out 
from  Fort  Gaines,  blocked  the  channel, 
leaving  only  a narrow  passage-way  im- 
mediately in  front  of  Fort  Morgan. 
The  Admiral  was  not  encouraged  by 
what  he  saw  to  make  any  rash  or  im- 
' mediate  attack;  but  he  did  not  the  less 
feel  that  the  reduction  of  the  defenses 
in  Mobile  Harbor  was  the  next  task  to 
which  he  must  devote  all  the  energies 


of  his  will  and  all  the  resources  of  his 
daring  and  fertile  genius. 

As  soon  as  the  army  of  General 
Banks  returned  from  the  Bed  Biver 
country,  and  General  Canby  took  com- 
mand of  the  Western  military  division, 
preparations  began  to  be  vigorously 
made  for  a movement  upon  Mobile. 
Farragut  was  not  disposed  to  break 
through  his  policy  of  caution,  until  he 
should  feel  that  the  force  at  his  dispo- 
sal justified  him  in  assuming  the  offen- 
sive ; but  he  held  his  fleet  in  a state  of 
readiness  for  any  emergency,  and  was 
prepared  to  resist  any  aggressive  move- 
ment which  might  be  made  by  the 
enemy.  He  had  need  to  be  on  his 
guard.  The  Confederate  authorities 
had  not  been  inattentive  to  the  require- 
ments of  the  harbor.  Not  contented 
with  the  forts,  torpedoes,  piles  and 
other  obstructions  which  they  had 
placed  in  the  channel,  they  had  con^ 
structed  several  powerful  iron-clads,  by 
means  of  which  they  hoped  not  only  to 
repel  invasion,  but  to  destroy  the  Na- 
tional fleet  and  raise  the  blockade.  The 
largest  of  these  vessels — the  Tennessee 
— constructed  on  the  same  principle  as 
the  famous  Merrimac  of  Hampton 
Boads  renown,  appeared  in  the  bay  on 
the  17th  of  March.  Having  been 
brought  down  Dog  Biver,  she  was 
floated  over  the  bar  with  camels.  Be. 
ferring  to  the  circumstance,  Farragut, 
writing  to  the  secretary  of  the  navy, 
says : “ Thus  you  perceive,  I am  in 
hourly  expectation  of  being  attacked 
by  an  almost  equal  number  of  vessels — 
ii*on-clad  against  wooden  vessels — and  a 
most  unequal  contest  it  will  be,  as  the 


642 


MOBILE  HARBOR. 


Tennessee  is  represented  as  impervious 
to  all  their  experiments  at  Mobile ; so 
that  our  only  hope  is  to  run  her  down, 
which  we  shall  certainly  do  all  in  our 
power  to  accomplish;  but  should  we 
be  unsuccessful,  the  panic  in  this  part 
of  the  country  wdll  be  beyond  all  con- 
trol. They  will  imagine  that  New 
Orleans  and  Pensacola  must  fall.”  On 
the  24th  of  May,  he  ran  in  shore,  and, 
getting  a good  view  of  the  monster, 
which  was  flying  the  blue  flag  of  Ad- 
miral Buchanan,  he  satisfied  himself  of 
her  dangerous  character. 

Farragut’s  fleet  consisted  of  fourteen 
wooden  ships — the  Brooklyn,  Hartford, 
Bichmond,  Lackawanna,  Monongahela, 
Ossipee,  Oneida,  Octorara,  Metacomet, 
Port  Boyal,  Seminole,  Kennebec,  Itasca, 
Galena.  Four  monitors — the  Tecumseh , 
Winnebago,  Manhattan  and  Chickasaw 
— were  promised  in  addition  to  these  ; 
but  it  was  not  until  the  latter  end  of 
July  that  these  vessels  arrived.  As 
soon  as  they  reached  him,  Farragut  felt 
that  if  he  was  only  adequately  support- 
ed by  a land  force,  he  might  venture  to 
assume  an  offensive  attitude.  Admiral 
Farragut,  Generals  Canby  and  Granger 
* held  a consultation  on  board  the  Hart- 
ford. It  was  Farragut’s  desire  that  the 
two  principal  forts — Fort  Morgan  and 
Fort  Gaines — should  both  be  invested, 
and  that,  when  the  attack  was  made 
bv  the  fleet,  the  land  forces  should  co- 
operate  and  create  a diversion  in  their 
favor.  General  Canby  agreed  to  send 
all  the  troops  at  his  disposal.  It  was 
soon  discovered,  however,  that  he  could 
not  spare  a sufficient  mitnber  of  men  to 
invest  both  forts ; and,  at  Farragut’s 


suggestion,  it  was  finally  resolved  that 
the  troops  who  were  under  the  com- 
mand of  General  Gordon  Granger 
should  give  their  attention  first  to 
Fort  Gaines. 

A general  description  of  the  city  of 
Mobile,  of  the  bay  of  the  same  name, 
and  of  ifs  means  of  defense,  will  enable 
the  reader  to  understand  the  events 
about  to  be  detailed.  The  city  of 
Mobile  is  situated  at  the  head  of  the 
bay,  about  thirty  miles  from  the  Gulf 
of  Mexico,  and  at  the  mouth  of  the 
Alabama  River.  At  the  commencement 
of  the  war,  it  had  a population  of  about 
20,000,  and  was  the  most  important 
place  in  Alabama.  It  was  used  for  a 
time  by  the  Confederates  as  a naval 
depot ; but  latterly,  fearing  for  its  safe- 
ty, they  had  the  stores  removed  up  the 
river  to  Selma.  Mobile  Bay,  wffiich 
is  large  and  commodious,  is  well  land- 
locked, a narrow  peninsula,  about  fif- 
teen miles  in  length  and  terminating 
in  Mobile  Point,  shutting  it  in  on  the 
east  and  southeast.  On  the  west,  it  is 
closed  in  by  a chain  of  low  sand  banks 
and  by  Dauphin  Island,  which  separate 
Mississippi  Sound  from  the  Gulf  of 
Mexico.  Dauphin  Island  is  about 
twelve  miles  long  from  east  to  west, 
narrow  at  its  western  extremity,  about 
a mile  in  width  towards  the  east,  and 
having  a narrow,  projecting  peninsula 
towards  the  south,  terminating  in  what 
is  called  Pelican  Point.  To  the  north 
of  Little  Dauphin  Island,  there  is  a 
channel,  called  Gi*ant’s  Pass,  wliich  con- 
nects the  bay  with  Mississippi  Sound. 
Th  is  channel,  however,  is  narrow,  and 
never  has  a depth  of  water  over  seven 


THE  TENNESSEE. 


643 


feet.  The  mouth  of  the  bay,  there- 
fore, is  between  Mobile  Point  and  the 
eastern  extremity  of  Dauphin  Island. 
About  three  quarters  of  a mile  to  the 
southwest  of  Mobile  Point  is  Sand 
Island,  about  half  a mile  long  from 
east  to  west,  with  an  attached  reef  run- 
ning west  for  about  three  miles.  This 
little  island,  with  its  chain  of  sand 
banks,  covers  the  principal  mouth  of 
the  harbor.  The  entrance  from  the 
southeast,  between  Mobile  Point  and 
Sand  Island,  is  called  Swash  Channel. 
The  entrance  from  the  southwest  is 
known  as  Middle  Channel. 

The  bay  was  well  guarded.  At  its 
mouth,  to  the  east  and  west,  stood 
Forts  Morgan  and  Gaines.  These  were 
old  works,  built  by  the  United  States 
government,  before  the  war,  at  great  ex- 
pense, and  on  the  most  approved  prin- 
ciples of  modern  construction.  They 
v/ere  fully  garrisoned,  and  well  supplied 
with  stores  of  all  kinds.  Fort  Morgan 
was  built  on  the  western  end  of  Mobile 
Point,  and  had  an  armament  of  48 
guns.  Fort  Gaines  was  built  on  the 
eastern  end  of  Dauphin  Island,  and 
mounted  21  guns.  Grant’s  Pass  was 
guarded  by  Fort  Powell,  a pentagonal 
work  without  ditches,  but  surrounded 
by  piles  which  served  also  as  a break- 
water. Across  the  Swash  and  Middle 
channels  were  placed  rows  of  piles; 
piles  and  other  obstructions  were  run 
across  from  Fort  Gaines,  so  as  to  com- 
pel the  vessels  attacking  to  come  fully 
under  the  guns  of  Fort  Morgan ; and 
the  channel  was  filled  with  torpedoes, 
the  location  of  which  Farras^ut  had  no 
means  of  knowing.  In  addition  to  all 


this,  there  were  three  gunboats — the 
Gaines,  Selma  and  Morgan — and  the 
iron-clad  ranf,  Tennessee.  The  gun- 
boats were  of  superior  construction, 
and  were  well  armed.  The  Tennessee 
was  of  gigantic  proportions,  and  of  im- 
mense strength.  She  was  209  feet  in 
length,  48  feet  in  breadth,  and  drew 
14  feet  of  water.  Her  sides,  8 feet 
thick,  had  a covering  of  two  layers  of 
iron,  each  2 inches  thick.  Her  deck 
was  covered  with  a 2-inch  iron  plating. 
Her  casemates,  which  projected  and 
overhung  so  as  to  protect  the  hull,  were 
shielded  with  6 inches  of  iron.  She 
was  fitted  with  tower  and  turret ; and 
she  carried  six  rifles — two  pivots,  7^ 
inches  bore,  and  four  6-inch  broadsides, 
capable  of  flinging  projectiles  weighing, 
respectively,  110  and  95  pounds.  She 
was  propelled  by  two  powerful  high- 
pressure  engines.  Such  were  the  ob- 
structions; and  such  were  the  actual 
means  of  resistance  which  had  to  be 
encountered  and  overcome,  before  the 
harbor  of  Mobile  could  be  said  to  be 
restored  to  the  National  government. 

A consultation,  as  has  already  been 
stated,  was  held  on  the  8th  of  July 
July,  on  board  the  flag-ship  Hart- 
ford,  by  Farragut,  Canby  and  Granger. 
At  this  consultation,  it  was  agreed 
that  Canby  should  send  from  New 
Orleans  10,000  men,  under  General 
Granger,  and  that  the  troops  should 
invest  both  Fort  Gaines  and  Fort  Mor- 
gan, while  the  fleet  was  pressing  into 
the  harbor.  It  was  subsequently  found 
that  so  many  troops  could  not  be 
spared;  and,  about  the  1st  of  August, 
Granger  arrived  with  2500  men.  It 


644 


MOBILE  HARBOR. 


was  concluded,  therefore,  only  to  invest 
Fort  Gaines.  Preparations  were  now 
made  for  an  immediate  attack. 

On  the  5th  of  August,  as  early  as 
half-past  five  o’clock,  the  fleet  was 
5*  in  motion.  The  vessels  proceed- 
ed two  abreast,  and  were  lashed  together 
in  the  following  order : The  Brooklyn, 
with  the  Octorara  on  the  port  side ; the 
Hartford  with  the  Metacomet ; the  Rich- 
mond with  the  Port  Royal ; the  Lacka- 
wanna with  the  Seminole ; the  Monon- 
gahelawith  the  Kennebec;  theOssipee 
with  the  Itasca ; the  Oneida  with  the 
Galena.  On  the  starboard  side  were  the 
monitors,  and  in  order  as  follows : The 
Tecumseh,  Manhattan,  Winnebago  and 
Chickasaw.  The  monitors  were  thus 
between  the  fleet  and  Fort  Morgan. 
A slight  wind  was  blowing  from  the 
southwest.  The  Brooklyn  was  per- 
mitted to  take  the  lead,  because  she 
carried  four  choice  guns  and  was  armed 
with  an  ingenious  contrivance  for  pick- 
ing up  torpedoes.  Farragut  took  an 
elevated  position  in  the  main  rigging 
of  the  Hartford,  near  the  top,  from 
which  he  could  overlook  all  the  vessels 
of  the  fleet.  At  47  minutes  past  six 
o’clock,  when  the  fleet  was  steaming 
steadily  up  the  main  channel,  the  Te-  ! 
cumseh  fired  the  first  shot.  Almost  i 
immediately  afterwards,  Fort  Morgan  j 
began  to  thunder.  The  Brooklyn  re- 
plied ; and  at  once  the  action  became 
general.  In  a few  moments  more, 
the  Tecumseh,  which  was  about  300 
yards  ahead  of  the  Brooklyn,  was 
seen  to  disappear  below  the  water, 
carrying  with  her  her.  gallant  com- 
mandei’,  T.  A.  M.  Craven,  and  nearly 


all  her  crew.*  She  had  struck  a tor- 
pedo, which  exploded,  tearing  a great 
hole  in  her  bottom.  At  this  critical 
moment,  when  full  under  the  guns  of 
the  fort,  and  when  sufPering  severely, 
the  Brooklyn,  as  if  appalled  by  whai 
had  happened,  paused  and  backed,  so 
as  to  m9ve  round  out  of  the  way  of  the 
torpedoes.  This  action  of  the  Brooklyn 
brought  the  whole  fleet  to  a standstill, 
and,  for  a moment,  threatened  to  hud- 
dle the  ships  together,  and  bring  about 
a disaster  similar  to  that  which  hap- 
pened in  Charleston  Harbor,  on  the 
occasion  of  Dupont’s  attack.  Farragut, 
however,  was  found  equal  to  the  emer- 
gency. Calling  upon  Drayton,  he  or- 
dered him  to  push  forward  the  Hart- 
ford, heedless  of  possible  consequences, 
and  gave  directions  for  the  rest  of  the 
vessels  to  follow.  The  Brooklyn  was 
soon  under  headway  again,  and  follow- 
ing the  Hartford.  No  more  torpedoes 
exploded.  A very  tempest  of  shot  was 
now  brought  to  bear  upon  the  fort  by 
the  entire  fleet.  A light  wind  blew 

* Captain  Tunis  Augustus  M.  Cbaven  was  a native  of 
New  Hampshire.  He  entered  the  navy  in  June,  1829, 
and  served  on  different  vessels  till  1837,  when,  at  his 
own  request,  he  was  placed  on  the  Coast  Survey.  Afcer 
having  filled  different  commands,  and  done  various 
service,  he  was,  when  the  war  broke  out,  placed  in 
command  of  the  Crusader,  which  was  stationed  at  Key 
West.  In  September,  18G1,  he  was  transferred  from  the 
Crusader  to  the  now  screw-sloop  Tuscarora,  which  was 
sent  across  the  Atlantic  to  look  after  Confederate  cruis- 
ers. Though  he  failed  to  overtake  the  Alabama,  he  yc^ 
did  good  service  in  blockading  the  Sumter  at  Gibrak 
tar,  and  in  finally  compelling  the  rebels  to  abandon 
that  vessel.  Early  in  18G4  he  was,  at  his  own  request, 
placed  in  command  of  the  monitor  Tecumseh,  aul 
sailed  in  that  vessel  for  Hampton  Roads,  where  ha 
joined  the  James  River  flotilla,  and  arrived  among  tho 
first  at  City  Point.  After  some  stay  there,  be  wai 
ordered,  with  the  Tecumseh,  to  join  the  squadron  ol 
Admiral  Farragut. 


MAP  SHOWING  THE  CITY  OF  MOBILE  AND  ITS  DEFENCES. 


fr 


FIGHT  WITH  THE  FLEET. 


645 


the  smoke  from  the  guns  of  the  fleet  in 
the  direction  of  the  fort,  thus  blinding 
the  Confederate  gunners.  From  the 
time  the  Hartford  turned  to  the  north- 
west to  clear  the  middle  ground,  so 
i*apid  and  well-directed  were  her  broad- 
sides, that  the  batteries  on  the  fort 
were  comparatively  silenced. 

At  10  minutes  before  eight  o’clock, 
w^hen  the  Hartford  had  just  passed  the 
fort,  the  other  vessels  following,  Far- 
ragut  saw  the  Tennessee,  with  a full 
head  of  steam  on,  bearing  down,  the 
evident  intention  being  to  strike  the 
flag-ship.  Happily,  the  monster  missed 
her  aim.  Her  guns  opened  on  the 
Hartford  as  she  passed  ; but  Farragut 
made  a vigorous  response,  and  kept 
moving  along.  The  Confederate  gun- 
boats Morgan,  Selma  and  Gaines  were 
ahead,  and  were  greatly  annoying  Far- 
ragut by  a raking  fire,  which  he  was 
unable  to  return.  “ The  shots  from  the 
gunboats,”  Drayton  tells  us,  “were 
delivered  with  great  deliberation  and 
consequent  effect,  a single  one  having 
killed  ten  men  and  wounded  five.”  He 
could  only  direct  his  fire  on  one  of  the 
gunboats  at  a time.  Irritated  by  this 
persistent  and  destructive  fire,  Farragut 
detached  the  Metacomet,  ordering  Cap- 
tain Jouett  to  go  off  in  pursuit  of  the 
Selma.  Jouett  executed  his  appointed 
task  nobly,  and  with  complete  success. 
The  Confederate  gunboats  were  each 
armed  with  three  powerful  guns  at 
their  stern.  Although  exposed  for  a 
time  to  the  concentrated  fire  of  each  of 
them,  Jouett  gained  on  his  antagonist; 
and,  within  an  hour,  he  had  cnptured 
the  Selma,  with  her  captain  and  the 


entire  crew,  and  driven  the  Morgan 
and  the  Gaines — the  latter  in  a crippled 
condition — under  cover  of  the  fort. 
When  night  fell,  the  Morgan  escaped 
and  made  her  way  to  Mobile.  The 
Gaines  was  run  ashore  and  burned. 

It  was  now  45  minutes  past  eight 
o’clock.  The  forts  were  passed  ; and, 
the  vessels  having  for  the  most  part 
been  brought  to  anchor,  the  men  were 
piped  to  breakfast.  The  repast  was  not 
to  be  long  or  quietly  enjoyed.  Farragut, 
from  his  commanding  position,  espied 
the  Tennessee  again  making  directly 
for  the  National  fleet,  with  a full  head 
of  steam  on,  and  making  splendid  time. 
It  was  his  opinion  that  whatever  might 
be  her  ultimate  purpose,  she  had  sin- 
gled out  the  flag-ship  as  the  first  object 
of  her  attention.  The  result  proved 
that  he  had  rightly  divined.  Without 
a moment’s  delay,  he  made  preparations 
for  the  reception  of  the  monster  iron- 
clad. The  monitors,  and  such  other 
vessels  of  the  fleet  as  he  thoimht  best 
adapted  for  the  purpose,  w^ere  imme- 
diately ordered  to  attack  the  ram,  as 
soon  as  she  came  forward,  not  only 
with  their  guns,  but  with  their  “ bows 
on  at  full  speed.”  Buchanan,  the  Con- 
federate admiral,  who  was  on  board 
the  Tennessee,  had  evidently  made  up 
his  mind  that  he  was  more  than  a 
match  for  the  whole  fleet.  He  had, 
how'ever,  underestimated  the  power  of 
the  National  fleet  quite  as  much  as  he 
had  overestimated  the  fighting  qualities 
of  his  own  iron-clad.  Of  the  fourteen 
wooden  vessels  which  constituted  the 
main  portion  of  Farragut’s  fleet,  three 
of  them  were  sloops  of  2000  tons 


1iV4, 


646  MOBILE 

burden,  carrying  heavy  armaments  of 
9-inch  Dahlgrens  and  100-pounder 
rifles.  Even  the  smaller  vessels  were 
heavily  armed.  Of  the  monitors,  two 
had  11-inch  guns,  and  one — the  Man- 
hattan— was  supplied  with  guns  of 
15-iuch  bore.  Powerful  as  Buchanan’s 
vessel  was,  it  revealed  a vast  amount 
of  both  daring  and  confidence  to  at- 
tack, single-handed,  such  a fleet  as  that 
which  obeyed  the  behests  of  a com- 
mander having  the  skill  and  experience 
of  Admiral  Farragut.  Yet  Buchanan 
was  not  wholly  without  reason  for 
trusting  his  own  ship  and  distrusting 
the  ships  of  the  enemy.  The  Merri- 
mac,  it  was  true,  had  been  defeated 
by  the  Monitor ; but  competent  critics 
had  declared  that  the  Merrimac  had  not 
been  injured  by  11 -inch  shot.  The 
Atlanta,  a vessel  of  the  same  class  as 
the  Merrimac,  had  been  captured ; but 
her  armor  was  only  four  inches  thick ; 
and,  then,  as  will  be  shown  in  a sub- 
sequent chapter,  the  Albemarle  had 
already  beaten  off  a whole  fleet.  If 
he  could  get  a fair  blow  at  each  of  the 
ships  in  succession,  it  was  Buchanan’s 
opinion  he  might  destroy  the  whole 
National  fleet,  without  himself  being 
seriously  injured.  Buchanan’s  calcula- 
tions might  have  turned  out  to  be 
more  correct,  if  the  National  fleet  had 
been  commanded  by  another  than  Far- 
ragut. The  merits  of  the  respective 
antagonists  were  now,  however,  soon 
to  be  tested. 

The  ram  was  close  at  hand.  A 
wai*m  reception  awaited  her.  The 
Monongahela,  a vessel  of  1400  tons, 
carrying  thirty  pounds  of  steam,  her 


HABBOR. 

screw  working  sixty  revolutions,  was 
the  first  to  hit  her.  Moving  in  at 
full  speed,  she  struck  the  monster  a 
fair  blow  full  in  the  side.  The  Mo- 
nongahela punished  herself  more  than 
she  punished  her  huge  antagonist.  She 
lost  her  iron  prow  and  her  cutwater. 
On  retiijing,  she  swung  around,  and 
fired  into  the  iron-clad  her  11-inch  guns. 
The  Tennessee  was  yet  apparently  un- 
harmed. The  next  blow  was  struck 
by  the  Lackawanna:  She,  too,  suf- 
fered sevei'ely.  Her  stern  was  cut 
and  crushed  to  the  plank  ends,  from 
three  feet  above  to  five  feet  below  the 
water’s  edge.  The  ram  was  still,  to 
all  appearance,  uninjured.  The  Hart- 
ford was  the  next  to  move  against  the 
apparently  invulnerable  iron-clad.  As 
the  Tennessee  shifted  her  helm  and 
shied,  so  to  speak,  the  blow  was  a 
glancing  one.  The  Hartford,  as  she 
rasped  along,  gave  her  a whole  port 
broadside  of  9-inch  solid  shot.  The 
Tennessee  did  not  as  yet  show  any 
signs  of  distress.  The  vessels  were 
now  moving  in  a sort  of  circle  around 
the  giant,  the  monitors  more  slowly 
than  the  others,  but  hitting  hard  blows 
as  opportunity  offered.  The  Chicka- 
saw now  got  under  the  stern  of  the 
Tennessee;  and  a 15-inch  shot  from 
the  Manhattan  went  tearing  through 
the  iron  plating  and  heavy  wooden 
backing  of  the  casemate  of  the  monster. 
Farragut,  now  determined  to  force  the 
fighting,  ordered  Drayton  to  strike 
again.  At  this  moment,  unhappily,  the 
Hartford  and  the  Lackawanna  came  in- 
to awkward  collision,  the  former  being 
struck ‘just  forward  of  the  mizzen-mast,. 


SURRENDER  OF  THE  TENNESSEE. 


64? 


and  cut  down  to  witbin  two  feet  of 
the  water’s  edge.  The  two  vessels 
soon  got  disentangled,  and  were  mak- 
ing again  for  the  Tennessee.  Mean- 
while, the  Chickasaw  was  pounding 
away  at  the  monster’s  stern ; the  Os- 
si  pee  was  about  to  deal  a deadly 
blow;  and  the  Monongahela,  as  well 
as  the  Lackawanna  and  the  Hartford, 
was  bearing  down  upon  her  at  full 
speed.  The  end  had  now  come.  The 
Tennessee  had  been  sorely  punished. 
Her  smoke-stack  had  been  shot  away ; 
her  steering-chains  were  gone;  and 
several  of  her  poi‘t-sh utters  had  been  so 
jammed  that  they  could  not  be  opened. 
Admiral  Buchanan  had  been  severely 
wounded  in  the  leg ; and  the  entire 
crew  had  become  demoralized.  Further 
resistance  w^as  felt  to  be  vain.  Before, 
therefore,  the  threatened  blow  could 
be  struck,  the  white  flag  was  hoisted. 
In  a few  moments  more,  the  captain  of 
the  Tennessee  came  on  board  the  Hart- 
ford, and  surrendered  his  own  sword 
and  that  of  Admiral  Buchanan.  Such 
was  the  end  of  the  famous  naval  en- 
counter in  Mobile  Harbor. 

This  great  victory  had  not  been  won 
without  some  loss.  Farragut  had  165 
killed  and  drowned.  Of  these,  113 
went  down  in  the  Tecumseh.  There 
were  25  killed  and  28  wounded  on 
board  the  Hartford.  The  Oneida  had 
8 killed  and  30  wounded.  Among  the 
latter  was  her  commander,  I.  B.  M. 
Mullany.  It  is  a fact  worthy  of  notice 
that,  on  board  the  monitors,  no  one 
was  either  killed  or  wounded.  The 
ships  bore  signs  of  severe  punishment, 
having  suffered  more  severely  at  Mobile 


than  at  New  Orleans.  A 7-inch  shell 
penetrated  the  boiler  of  the  Oneida. 
The  Chickasaw  received  one  plunging 
shot  through  her  deck.  The  turrets 
of  all  the  monitors  were  more  or  less 
injured.  All  the  wounded  of  both  fleets, 
including  Admiral  Buchanan,  were  sent 
to  Pensacola.  Buchanan’s  leg  had  to  be 
amputated. 

The  victory  in  Mobile  Bay  caused 
great  joy  throughout  the  entire  North, 
and  among  all,  everywhere,  who  were 
friendly  to  the  National  cause.  Far- 
ragut became  the  National  idol.  His 
name  resounded  throughout  the  length 
and  breadth  of  the  land.  Men  spoke 
of  him  as  the  American  Nelson;  and, 
although  there  was  a marked  contrast, 
in  many  particulars,  between  the  mod- 
est American  and  his  brilliant  English 
prototype,  the  picturesque  grandeur  of 
Farragut’s  two  great  battles — that  at 
New  Orleans  and  that  in  Mobile  Bay — 
fully  justified  the  comparison.  Far- 
ragut in  the  shrouds  of  the  Hartford, 
with  the  tempest  of  war  raging  below 
him,  is  a grand  historic  picture,  not  un- 
worthy to  hang  side  by  side  with  the 
“Death  of  Nelson.” 

Farragut’s  work  was  not  ended  with 
the  defeat  of  the  Confederate  fleet. 
The  forts  had  been  passed;  but  they 
had  not  yet  been  taken.  On  the  night 
of  the  5th,  however.  Fort  Powell 
was  abandoned  and  blown  up. 

This  was  a positive  gain  to  Farragut, 
as  it  opened  up  Grant’s  Pass,  and  so 
relieved  him  of  all  anxiety  in  regard 
to  supplies.  Fort  Gaines  and  Fort 
Morgan  remained,  the  latter  as  yet 
com{)aratively  uninjured.  We  have 


G48 


MOBILE  HARBOR. 


already  seen  that  Granger,  with  2500 
troops,  proceeded  to  invest  Fort  Gaines 
simultaneously  with  the  advance  of 
the  fleet,  A battery  of  Rodman  guns 
had  been  planted  on  a sand  hill,  with- 
in three  quarters  of  a mile  from  the 
fort.  This  battery  was  well  served, 
under  the  direction  of  Captain  Classen. 
The  best  gun  in  the  fort  was  soon 
disabled ; and  so  completely  swept 
were  the  works  that  Colonel  Ander- 
son, who  was  in  command,  could  render 
no  assistance  to  Buchanan  and  his  fleet. 
On  the  morning  of  the  flth,  Farragut 
sent  the  Chickasaw  to  the  assistance  of 
Aug.  Granger.  On  the  7th,  deeming 
farther  resistance  useless,  Ander- 
son made  an  unconditional  surrender  of 
the  fort,  with  800  men.  The  Western 
channel  was  now  under  the  control  of 
the  National  fleet. 

Fort  Morgan,  the  older  and  the 
stronger  work,  still  held  out.  Built  on 
the  mainland,  it  had  a better  chance 
than  Fort  Gaines  of  receiving  supplies 
and  reinforcements.  It  was  commanded 
by  General  Richard  L.  Page,  a Vir- 
ginian. Page  had  signalled  to  Ander- 
son, Hold  on  ” ; and,  when  that  officer 
surrendered,  he  cried,  ‘‘Coward!” — a 
dander  which  was  echoed  throughout 
die  entire  Confederacy.  An  opportu- 
iiity  was  now  to  be  given  Page  to 
display  his  heroism.  Granger’s  troops 
vere  transferred  from  Dauphin  Island 
lO  the  rear  of  Fort  Morgan.  Granger 
oon  discovered  that  regular  siege  oper- 
ations would  be  necessary.  He  sent, 
therefore,  to  New  Orleans  for  heavy 
siege  artillery  and  a body  of  engineers. 
These  were  speedily  at  hand,  under  the 


care  and  command  of  General  Richard 
Arnold.  Batteries  were  rapidly  con- 
structed behind  some  sand  hills,  within 
800  yards  of  the  fort;  and,  by  Ang. 
the  afternoon  of  the  20th,  all  20* 
the  guns  were  in  position.  On  this 
line  of  batteries  there  were  four  9-inch 
Dahlgrei^s,  on  naval  gun  carriages, 
eight  30-pounder  Parrotts,  and  sixteen 
mortars,  of  which  twelve  were  10- 
inch,  and  four  8-inch.  Another  line  of 
batteries  was  established  about  400 
yards  nearer  the  fort.  On  the  inner 
line  there  were  four  Napoleon  guns 
and  two  3-inch  rifles.  On  the  even- 
ing of  the  2ist,  General  Granger 
notifled  Farragut  that  he  would  be 
ready  to  open  Are  next  morning  at 
daylight.  Farragut  took  position  that 
night;  and,  on  the  morning  of 
the  2 2d,  at  flve  o’clock,  the  bom-  22. 
bardment  commenced.  It  was  contin- 
ued with  great  vigor  and  accuracy 
during  the  whole  day.  It  was  discov- 
ered in  the  afternoon  that  a fire  had 
broken  out  inside  the  fort.  At  dark 
the  bombardment  ceased.  The  flames 
were  still  visible ; and  it  seemed  as  if 
the  fire  was  gathering  strength.  About 
nine  o’clock,  it  began  to  be  manifest 
that  attempts  were  being  made  to  gain 
the  mastery  of  the  devouring  element; 
It  was  not  the  desire  of  either  of  the 
National  commanders  that  the  fire 
should  be  extinguished.  It  was  doing 
their  work.  The  bombardment  was, 
therefore,  resumed,  and  maintained  for 
two  hours,  when  it  was  discontinued 
for  the  night.  At  five  o’clock  next 
morning,  the  bombardment  was  again 
resumed.  Two  hours  later,  an  officer 


SURRENDER  OF  FORT  MORGAN.  649 


with  a white  flag,  accompanied  by 
about  40  men,  carrying  a boat,  were 
seen  marching  out  at  the  main  sally- 
port. It  was  evidently  their  intention 
to  proceed  to  the  flag-ship  with  a letter 
from  General  Page.  General  Bailey, 
of  the  land  forces,  advanced  towards 
them,  obtained  the  letter,  and  handed 
it  to  General  Granger.  This  latter 
officer  promised  to  communicate  its 
contents  to  the  admiral,  and  to  dic- 
tate the  terms  of  surrender  when  his 
answer  should  be  received.  Soon 
afterwards.  General  Arnold  and  Cap- 
tain Drayton  appeared  at  the  fort,  and 
demanded  its  immediate  and  uncondi- 
tional surrender,  with  the  garrison  and 
all  the  public  property.  Page  wished  to 
stipulate  for  the  removal  of  the  sick  and 
wounded  to  Mobile.  This,  however, 
could  not  be  allowed.  At  two  o’clock 
the  formal  surrender  was  made.  Out 
from  the  main  sally-port  marched  600 
men,  and  stacked  arms.  The  National 
flag  again  waved  over  the  battered  and 
smoking  walls  of  Fort  Morgan. 


It  was  found,  on  entering,  that  the 
fire  had  worked  terrible  destruction, 
and  no  doubt  hastened  the  surrender. 
Dreading  an  explosion  of  the  magazine, 
some  90,000  pounds  of  gunpowder  had 
been  thrown  into  the  cisterns.  Page, 
whose  conduct  was  severely  animad- 
verted on  by  Farragut,  in  his  letter  to 
the  secretary  of  the  navy,  was  charged 
with  throwing  bis  sword  into  a well, 
and  with  spiking  the  guns  after  the 
surrender.  With  the  defenses  of  Mo- 
bile, there  were  taken  104  guns  and 
1464  men.  Farragut’s  victory  was 
now  complete.  The  National  banner 
floated  supreme  in  the  harbor  of  Mo- 
bile ; and  blockade-running  in  that 
quarter  was  ended.  The  joy  which 
was  occasioned  by  the  victory  over 
the  fleet,  was  increased  and  intensified 
when  it  became  known  that  the  forts 
had  fallen ; and  the  conviction  gath- 
ered strength  all  over  the  land,  and 
found  free  and  full  expression,  that 
the  hour  of  final  triumph  was  close 
at  hand. 


650 


THE  WILDERNESS. 


CHAPTER  XXXIV. 

• / 

After  Chattanooga. — Divided  Counsels. — Grant  the  Popular  Hero. — General  Halleck. — “Like  a Baulky  Team.” — 

. A Change  for  the  Better. — Grant  in  Command  of  All  the  Armies. — Heavy  Besponsibilities. — His  Plan 
for  Reducing  the  Confederacy. — Letters  to  Sherman. — Instructions  to  Banks. — Sherman’s  Command. — 
The  Army  of  the  Potomac. — Meade  Retained  in  Command. — Grant  at  Meade’s  Headquarters. — Wistar’s 
Raid. — Kilpatrick's  Raid. — Custer  and  Dahlgren. — Death  of  Dahlgren. — The  Army  of  the  Potomac  Re- 
organized.— The  Corps,  Division  and  Brigade  Commanders. — Co-operative  Arrangements. — Butler  andSigel. — 
Burnside  and  the  Ninth  Corps. — Culpepper  Court  House. — The  General  Movement  Begun. — The  Army 
of  the  Potomac  in  Motion. — Crossing  the  Rapidan. — In  the  Wilderness. — Lee  Watchful  and  Ready. — Descrip- 

; tion  of  the  Wilderness. — A Blood-Red  Sun. — Old  Wilderness  Church. — The  Four  Roads. — Both  Armies  in 
Motion. — The  Battle  Begun. — Terrific  Fighting. — Warren’s  Corps. — Wadsworth  and  Crawford — Warren 
Falls  Back. — Sedgwick  and  Getty. — A Lull  in  the  Fight. — A Loud-Resounding  Cheer. — Arrival  of  Hancock. — 
The  Battle  Resumed. — A Drawn  Battle. — The  End  of  the  First  Day. — The  Second  Day. — A Great  Battle 
Imminent. — The  Opposing  Armies. — The  Order  of  Battle. — The  Attack. — Hancock's  Tremendous  Onset. — 
An  Unfortunate  Halt. — Hancock  Driven  Back. — Longstreet  Shot  by  His  own  Men. — The  Battle  Suspended. — 
Fighting  Begun  Again. — A Fire  in  the  Woods. — Hancock’s  Men  Driven  from  Their  Works. — Carroll’s 
Splendid  Charge. — The  Nationals  Saved. — End  of  the  Second  Day. — The  Rival  Armies  Bleeding  and 
Exhausted. — Grant’s  New  Movement. — Spottsylvania  Court  House. — Alsop’s  Farm. — A Warm  Reception. — 
Fortune  Favoring  the  Confederates. — An  Unfortunate  Day  for  the  Nationals. — Vigorous  Preparations  for 
Battle. — Death  of  Sedgwick. — Hancock’s  Advance. — Sheridan’s  Raid. — Yellowstone  Tavern. — Death  of  J.  E. 
B.  Stuart. — Co-operative  Movements. — Butler’s  Movements. — Bermuda  Hundred. — Gillmore  and  Beauregard. — 
Kautz. — Butler  Bottled  Up. — Sigel’s  Movements. — Sigel  Superseded  by  Hunter. — Hunter  at  Piedmont. — At 
Lynchburg. — At  Meadow  Bridge. — The  Army  of  the  Potomac  Again  in  Motion. — At  the  North  Anna. — 
Lee  Again  Ahead. — The  Fords. — The  Positions  of  the  Different  Corps. — Warren’s  Corps  at  Jericho  Ford. — 
Warren  Severely  Attacked  on  the  South  Side  of  the  River. — The  Confederates  Repulsed — Hancock  at 
Taylor's  Bridge. — Preparations  to  Take  it  by  Storm — The  Assault. — Capture  of  the  Bridge. — Burnside’s 
Difficulty. — Lee’s  Peculiar  Position. — His  Projecting  Centre. — The  Anna  Recrossed. — Another  Flank  Move- 
ment.— Across  the  Pamunkey. — Another  Race  for  Richmond. — -Lee  again  Ahead. — The  New  Base  of 
Supplies. — The  Old  Battle-Ground  of  the  Peninsula. — A Contrast. — Both  Armies  Reinforced. — The  Chicka- 
hominy. — Sheridan  Pushed  Forward. — A Cavalry  Encounter  at  Hawe’s  Store. — Hanover  Court  House. — 
Tolopotomy  Creek. — Shady  Grove. — Lee’s  Position. — Movement  on  Cold  Harbor. — Cold  Harbor  Secured  — 
Torbert  Sorely  Pressed. — Concentrating  at  Cold  Harbor. — Arrival  of  Smith  from  Bermuda  Hundred. — Line 
of  Battle. — The  Attack. — The  First  Confederate  Line  Penetrated. — The  Second  Line  Impregnable. — A Heavy 
National  Loss,  but  Cold  Harbor  Held. — A Day  of  Preparations  — The  Second  Day’s  Fighting. — A Shock  of 
Battle  Unparalleled. — Piles  of  Dead  and  Wounded. — The  Battle  Brief,  but  Decisive. — An  Emphatic  Protest. — 
The  American  Soldier. — The  Battle  of  Cold  Harbor  Ended. — Terrific  Slaughter. — Coffee  and  Tobacco. — 
Another  Flank  Movement. — Sheridan  at  Trevillian  and  Louisa  Court  House. — The  Army  in  Motion. — Across 
the  Chickahominy. — On  to  the  James. — South  of  the  James. — The  Success  of  the  Movement. — The  Campaign. — 
The  Losses. — Reflections. 


The  victory  at  Cbattaiiooga,  although 
its  far-reaching  results  were  not 
immediately  visible,  marked  a 
new  departure  in  the  progress  of  the 
war.  There  'w^as,  as  we  have  seen, 


great  joy  throughout  the  land,  when  it 
became  known  that  Grant  had  not  only 
released  the  imprisoned  and  famishing 
army,  but  that  he  had  again  plucked 
glorious  victory  out  of  disastrous  dt^- 


GRANT,  LIEUTENANT-GENERAL. 


mi 


feat,  and  snatched  fresh  laurels  from 
the  ambitious  grasp  of  one  of  the  most 
daring  as  well  as  most  trusted  generals 
of  the  Confederacy.  General  Grant 
r.ow  commanded  the  confidence  of  the 
government : he  had  become,  also,  the 
favorite,  popular  hero.  The  crisis  de- 
manded such  a man. 

It  had  long  been  apparent  that  much 
of  the  National  strength  had  been 
wasted,  because  of  divided  counsels 
and  disunited  action.  The  army,  as  a 
whole,  had  been  badly  managed.  Gen- 
eral Halleck  was,  it  is  true,  the  nomi- 
nal head  of  the  army.  His  office,  how- 
ever, was  more  a name  than  a reality. 
Military  operations  were  directed  some- 
times by  the  president  himself,  without 
the  consent  of  any  of  his  counsellors, 
sometimes  by  Halleck  or  Stanton,  with- 
out the  consent  of  the  president,  and 
not  unfrequently  by  the  generals  in 
the  field  at  their  own  volition,  and  on 
their  own  responsibility.  ‘‘  The  armies 
of  the  East  and  West,”  to  use  Grant’s 
pithy  language,  “acted  independently, 
and  without  concert,  like  a haulky  team^ 
no  two  ever  pulling  together.”  A step 
was  taken  in  the  u'ight  direction,  when 
General  Grant  was  placed  at  the  head 
of  the  military  division  of  the  Missis- 
sippi—a command  which  virtually  in- 
cluded the  entire  west  and  southwest. 
The  victory  at  Chattanooga  did  much 
to  justify  the  wisdom  of  the  arrange- 
U^ent.  Concentration  of  authority  in 
the  management  of  the  armies  of  the 
Republic  had  become  more  and  more  a 
necessity.  Grant  was  already  singled 
out  as  the  man  who  should  take  the 
reins  in  hapd,  and  give^  unity  and  direc- 


tion to  all  the  troops  in  the  field. 
Early  in  1864,  the  rank  of  lieutenant- 
general  was  revived  in  his  favor  ; 
and,  on  the  9th  of  March,  Grant, 
who  had  been  summoned  to  Washing- 
ton, was  received  in  the  Executive 
Chamber,  and  presented  to  the  cabinet. 
In  handing  him  his  commission.  Presi- 
dent Lincoln  said : 

General  Grant — The  nation’s  apprecia- 
tion of  what  you  have  done,  and  its  reliance 
upon  you  for  what  remains  to  be  done  in  the 
existing  great  struggle,  are  now  presented  with 
this  commission,  constituting  you  lieutenant- 
general  in  the  army  of  the  United  States. 
With  this  high  honor  devolves  upon  you, 
also,  a corresponding  responsibility.  As  the 
country  herein  trusts  you,  so.  under  God,  it 
will  sustain  you.  I scarcely  need  to  add  that, 
with  what  I here  speak  for  the  nation,  goes 
my  own  hearty  personal  concurrence.” 

•Grant’s  reply  was  as  modest  as  it 
was  brief.  He  said  : 

Mr.  President — I accept  the  commission, 
with  gratitude  for  the  high  honor  conferred. 
With  the  aid  of  the  noble  armies  that  have 
fought  on  so  many  fields  for  our  common 
country,  it  will  be  my  earnest  endeavor  not  to 
disappoint  your  expectations.  I feel  the  fuU 
weight  of  the  responsibilities  now  devolving 
on  me ; and  I know  that  if  they  are  met,  it 
will  be  due  to  those  armies,,  and,  above  all,  to 
the  favor  of  that  Providence  which  leads  both 
nations  and  men.” 

On  the  10th,  he  made  a rapid  visit, 
with  Meade,  to  the  army  of  the  Mar, 
Potomac.  On  the  same  day,  a 
special  order  of  the  president  assigned 
him  to  the  command  of  all  the  armies. 
The  next  day,  he  hurried  westward  to 
Nashville,  where  he  had  made  arrange- 
ments to  meet  Sherman  for  consulta- 
tion. r:  , V . 


652 


THE  WILDERNESS. 


Grant  had  great  reason  to  be  proud 
of  the  position  to  which  he  had  attained. 
Success  had  attended  his  efforts  on  the 
field  of  battle ; and  a grateful  people, 
lavish  of  their  favors,  had  showered 
upon  him  their  choicest  gifts.  His, 
however,  was  not  a head  to  be  easily 
turned.  Vanity  or  vainglory  found  no 
place  in  his  character.  He  bore  his 
honors  meekly;  and,  soldier-like,  he 
thought  of  his  companions-in-arms — 
those  who  had  shared  with  him  the 
hardships  and  perils  of  the  battle  field, 
and  who  were  now  fully  entitled  to 
participate  in  his  honors.  When  first 
made  aware  of  the  intentions  of  the 
government,  he  wrote  to  Sherman  a 
characteristic  letter. 

‘‘While  I have  been  eminently  successful  in 
the  war,  in  at  least  gaining  the  confidence  of 
the  public,  no  one  feels  more  than  I how 
much  of  this  success  is  due  to  the  energy  and 
skill  of  those  whom  it  has  been  my  good  for- 
tune to  have  occupying  subordinate  positions 
under  me.  There  are  many  officers  to  whom 
these  remarks  are  applicable,  in  a greater  or 
less  degree,  proportionate  to  their  ability  as 
soldiers;  but  what  I want  is  to  express  my 
thanks  to  you  and  McPherson,  as  the  men  to 
whom,  above  all  others,  I feel  indebted  for 
whatever  I have  had  of  success.  How  far 
your  advice  and  assistance  have  been  of  help 
to  me,  you  know.  How  far  your  execution  of 
whatever  has  been  given  you  to  do  entitles 
you  to  the  reward  I am  receiving,  you  cannot 
know  as  well  as  I.  I feel  all  the  gratitude  this 
letter  would  express,  giving  it  the  most  flatter- 
ing construction.” 

In  bis  new  position,  heavy  responsi- 
bilities devolved  on  General  Grant. 
He  was  entrusted  with  the  care  of  all 
the  armies  of  the  Republic.  It  w'as 
necessary  for  him  to  take  into  consider- 
ation not  one  army  only,  or  one  section 


of  the  country,  but  the  entire  field  of 
actual  and  possible  operations.  The 
theatre  was  large.  The  National  navy 
had  succeeded  in  blockading  almost 
the  entire  sea-coast.  There  were  garri- 
sons at  Plymouth,  Washington  and 
New  Berne,  in  North  Carolina.  Foot- 
holds had  been  secured  at  Beaufort, 
Folly  Island,  Morris’  Island,  Hilton 
Head  and  Port  Royal,  in  South  Caro- 
lina. The  same  was  true  of  Fernan- 
dina,  St.  Augustine,  Key  West  and 
Pensacola,  in  Florida.  New  Orleans, 
with  its  river  approaches,  was  in  the 
hands  of  the  Nationals;  and  a small 
garrison  had  been  established  at  the 
mouth  of  the  Rio  Grande.  The  Mis- 
sissippi was  garrisoned  at  various  points 
from  St.  Louis  to  its  mouth.  Posts 
were  established  along  the  entire  line 
of  the  Arkansas.  The  line  of  the  Ten- 
nessee and  the  Holston  was  guarded  by 
National  troops ; and  a small  but  firm 
foothold  had  been  secured  in  Georgia, 
south  of  Chattanooga.  Although  Vir- 
ginia was  still  debatable  territory,  the 
Nationals  were  in  possession  of  Nor- 
folk, Fortress  Monroe  and  some  adjoin- 
ing territory.  It  was  necessary  to 
maintain  all  these  garrisons,  to  pre- 
serve these  various  footholds,  to  protect 
their  communications,  and  to  provide 
them  with  needed  supplies.  This,  how- 
ever, was  not  all.  The  Confederates 
were  yet  strong  in  the  field.  One 
powerful  army,  under  Lee,  lay  along 
the  south  bank  of  the  Rappahannock, 
confronting  the  army  of  the  Potomac. 
Another  poweHul  army,  under  Johns- 
ton, was  securely  encamped  at  Dalton, 
guarding  the  approaches  to  Atlanta, 


© le  L.  y„  s„  e 


i M T. 


AS  HE  APPEARED  DDPJN; 


'HE  WAR, 


f 


GRANT^S  PLANS. 


the  second  capital  and  stronghold  of 
the  Confedei’acy.  A third  powerful 
army,  under  Kirby  Smith,  held  sway 
in  Texas  and  Southern  Arkansas.  In 
Northeastern  Mississippi,  Forrest,  with 
a strong  body  of  cavalry,  was  scouring 
the  country  at  will.  After  three  years 
of  hard  fighting,  during  which  there 
had  been  an  almost  unparalleled  ex- 
penditure of  blood  and  treasure,  such 
was  still  the  situation.  In  order  to  re- 
store the  Union,  it  was  necessary  to 
crush  out  those  armies,  and  so  break 
the  military  power  of  the  Confederacy. 
Such  were  the  onerous  duties  and  re- 
sponsibilities which  now  devolved  upon 
General  Grant.  Success  had  hitherto 
attended  his  movements  and  crowned 
his  efforts.  It  remained  to  be  seen 
whether,  in  his  new  position,  he  would 
be  as  faithfully  accompanied  by  the 
smiles  and  favors  of  fortune. 

Let  us  now  see  how  Grant  proposed 
to  accomplish  these  herculean  labors. 
Sherman,  it  is  to  be  remembered,  simul- 
taneously with  the  elevation  of  Grant, 
was  placed  in  command  of  the  military 
division  of  the  Mississippi,  composed 
of  the  departments  of  the  Ohio,  the 
Cumberland,  the  Tennessee  and  the 
Arkansas.  General  J.  B.  McPherson 
was,  at  the  same  time,  assigned  to  the 
command  of  the  department  and  army 
of  the  Tennessee.  General  Halleck, 
having  been  relieved  from  duty  as 
general-in-chief,  was  appointed  chief 
of  staff  at  Washington,  under  the  di- 
rection of  the  secretary  of  war  and  the 
lieutenant-general  commanding.  Grant, 
as  we  have  seen,  had  gone  to  Nashville 
on  the  11th  of  March,  to  consult  with 


Sherman.  On  the  17th,  and  juar, 
while  still  with  Sherman,  he  is-  U. 
sued  General  Orders  No.  1.  In  obedi- 
ence to  the  order  of  the  president,  he 
assumed  command  of  the  armies  of  the 
United  States;  and  his  headquarters 
were  to  be  in  the  field  and,  until  further 
orders,  with  the  army  of  the  Potomac. 
On  the  19th,  he  left  Nashville  for 
Washington,  and  proceeded  thence, 
with  as  little  delay  as  possible,  to  the 
headquarters  of  General  Meade,  at  Cul- 
pepper Court  House.  Steps  were  im- 
mediately taken  for  reconstructing  the 
army,  and  getting  it  ready  for  battle. 
Meanwhile,  Grant’s  plans  were  assum- 
ing somewhat  of  a definite  shape.  He 
had  discussed  with  Sherman,  at  Nash- 
ville, the  course  which  ought  to  be 
pursued  all  over  the  battle  area.  In  a 
letter  written  to  Sherman  on  April 
4th,  Grant  stated  his  views  with  great 
freedom  and  with  considerable  fulness. 
It  was  his  intention,  if  the  enemy  did 
not  anticipate  him,  to  take  the  initia- 
tive in  the  spring  campaign.  With  this 
end  in  view,  he  had  sent  a special  mes^ 
senger  to  Banks — at  that  time,  as  hag 
already  been  related,  on  his  way  to 
Shreveport — instructing  him  to  finish 
up  the  expedition,  to  send  back  to 
Sherman  the  men  he  had  borrowed, 
and  to  hurry  forward  preparations  for 
an  attack  on  Mobile.  For  himself,  he 
had  decided  to  stay  with  the  army  of 
the  Potomac;  and  he  was  making  ready 
to  attack  Lee’s  army  wherever  it  might 
be  found.  In  a few  days  he  would  be 
strengthened  by  the  addition  of  25,000 
effective  men,  under  General  Burnside. 
Co-operative  movements  were  to  ];)« 


654 


THE  WILDERNESS. 


conducted  by  General  Butler  and  by 
General  Sigel.  Butler  was  to  be 
joined  by  Gillmore,  with  10,000  men 
from  the  department  of  the  South.  His 
’force  would  thus  be  increased  to  30,000 
men.  With  W.  F.  Smith  commanding 
Lis  right  wing  and  Gillmore  his  left, 
Butler  was  to  move  on  Bichmond,  from 
Foi'tress  Monroe,  by  the  south  side  of 
t he  James  River.  Sigel,  who  had  been 
chai'ged  with  the  protection  of  West 
Vii'ginia  and  the  frontiers  of  Pennsyl- 
vania and  Maryland,  was  to  collect  all 
his  available  forces,  to  arrange  them  in 
two  columns,  and  to  move  them — one 
from  Beverley,  Virginia,  and  the  other 
from  Charlestown,  on  the  Kanawha — 
against  the  Virginia  and  Tennessee 
Railroad.  Advancing  from  opposite 
points,  and  converging  towards  a com- 
mon centre,  it  was  expected  that  these 
co-operative  movements  would  distract 
Lee’s  attention,  and  compel  him  to  send 
detachments  from  his  main  force  to 
protect  his  westward  lines  of  supplies. 
For  Sherman,  Grant  had  no  instruc- 
tions other  than  those  already  given. 
He  did  not  propose  to  lay  down  for 
him  a plan  of  campaign.  He  was 
to  move  against  Johnston’s  army,  to 
break  it  up,  to  advance  into  the  ene- 
my’s country,  and  to  inflict  what  dam- 
age he  could.  Some  ten  days  later, 
writing  to  Sherman,  Grant  was  more 
explicit : 

“What  I now  want  more  particularly  to  say 
is  that,  if  the  two  main  attacks — yours  and 
the  one  from  here — should  promise  great  suc- 
cess, the  enemy  may,  in  a fit  of  desperation, 
abandon  one  part  of  their  line  of  defense  and 
throw  their  whole  strength  upon  a single  army, 
believing  a defeat  with  one  victory  to  sustain 


them  better  than  a defeat  all  along  their 
whole  line,  and  hoping,  too,  at  the  same  time, 
that  the  army,  meeting  with  no  resistance, 
will  rest  perfectly  satisfied  with  its  laurels, 
having  penetrated  to  a given  point  south, 
thereby  enabling  them  to  throw  their  whole 
force  first  upon  one  and  then  on  the  other. 
With  the  majority  of  military  commanders, 
they  might  do  this ; but  you  have  had  too 
much  experience,  travelling  light,  and  subsist- 
ing upon  the  country,  to  be  caught  by  any 
such  ruse.  I hope  my  experience  has  not  been 
thrown  away.  My  directions,  then,  would  be, 
if  the  enemy  in  your  front  shows  signs  of  join- 
ing Lee,  follow  him  up  to  the  extent  of  your 
ability.  I will  prevent  the  concentration  of 
Lee  upon  your  front,  if  it  is  in  the  power  of 
this  army  to  do  it.” 

Such  was  the  general  plan  of  cam- 
paign for  the  armies  generally  for  the 
spring  of  1864.  It  is  evident,  from  the 
tenor  of  these  instructions,  that  Grant’s 
thoughts  were  becoming  more  and 
more  occupied  with  two  main  centres 
of  action.  There  was  the  army  of  Lee 
guarding  Richmond ; and  there  was 
the  army  of  Johnston,  who  had  suc- 
ceeded Bragg,  covering  the  approaches 
to  Atlanta.  If  these  two  armies  could 
be  broken  and  scattered,  or  destroyed, 
the  Confederacy  would  be  at  an  end. 
Richmond  and  Atlanta,  with  their  rival 
armies — these  were  now  to  become  the 
absorbing  centres  of  attraction.  It 
was  part  of  Grant’s  plan  that  when 
the  proper  hour  arrived,  the  blow 
should  be  struck  simultaneously  in  the 
west  and  in  the  east.  Leaving  Sherman 
for  the  present,  let  us  now  turn  our 
faces  eastward,  and  contemplate  the 
mighty  hosts  who  are  preparing  for 
battle  on  the  banks  of  the  Rapidan. 

During  the  winter  of  1863-4,  the 
army  of  the  Potomac  and  the  army  of 


WISTAR^S  RAID. 


656 


Northern  Virginia  lay,  the  former  on 
the  northern,  the  latter  on  the  south- 
ern bank  of  the  Rapidan.  Meade’s 
headquarters  were  at  Culpepper  Court 
House,  on  the  Orange  and  Alexandria 
Railroad,  about  seventy -five  miles 
northwest  of  Richmond  in  a direct 
line.  Lee’s  headquarters  were  at 
Orange  Court  House,  on  the  same  line 
of  railroad.  The  battle  of  Gettysburg 
had  been  fought  and  won  on  the  3d  of 
July,  1863.  On  the  5th,  Lee  com- 
menced his  retreat  back  towards  Vir- 
ginia. The  pursuit  was  continued  as 
far  as  Williamsport,  where,  on  the 
12th,  the  Confederate  chief  succeeded 
in  retiring  his  whole  army  across  the 
Potomac.  Meade  followed  into  Vir- 
ginia; and,  after  a series  of  daring, 
sometimes  perilous,  but  withal  ineffect- 
ual manoeuvres,  made  on  both  sides, 
the  rival  armies  went  into  winter  quar- 
ters, as  above  indicated. 

In  the  earlier  months  of  the  year, 
and  before  the  commencement  of  the 
great  campaign,  there  were  several  de- 
sultory and  unimportant  movements, 
which,  although  not  destined  to  exer- 
cise any  perceptible  infiuence  on  the 
war,  were  yet  sufficient  to  break  up 
the  dull  monotony  of  camp  life  in  win- 
ter time. 

The  first  of  these  movements  occurred 
early  in  February,  and  originated  with 
General  Butler,  then  commanding  in 
Virginia  and  North  Carolina.  Public 
feeling  was  greatly  excited  all  over  the 
North  because  of  the  cruel  treatment  of 
the  National  prisoners  of  war  at  Rich- 
mond. Butler  resolved  to  make  a bold 
effort  to  effect  the  deliverance  of  the 


prisoners.  His  suggestions  found  favor 
at  headquarters;  and  arrangements  were 
made  by  which  he  was  to  have  a species 
of  co-operative  aid  from  the  army  peb. 
of  the  Potomac.  On  the  5th  of 
February,  General  Wistar,  with  a col- 
umn of  cavalry  and  infantry,  about 
1500  strong,  set  out  from  New  Kent 
Court  House,  and  pushed  rapidly  to 
the  north.  Suitable  demonstration  was 
made  by  the  army  of  the  Potomac, 
General  Sedgwick  pushing  portions  of 
the  army  across  at  three  different  fords 
— Ely’s,  Barnett’s  and  Germania.  Wis- 
tar reached  Bottom  Bridge  at  half-past 
two  on  the  morning  of  the  6th,  having 
marched  forty -seven  miles  in  sixteen 
and  a half  hours.  His  presence  there 
became  known  in  Richmond,  and  cre- 
ated the  wildest  excitement.  A large 
portion  of  the  garrison  had  been  with- 
drawn to  reinforce  Pickett  in  North 
Carolina.  It  was  feared  that  the  city 
might  be  successfully  invaded,  and  that 
the  National  prisoners  would  be  liber- 
ated. The  alarm  bells  were,  therefore, 
rung,  and  the  Home  Guard  assembled. 
The  raid,  however,  proved  a failure. 
Such  were  the  obstructions  at  Bottom 
Bridge,  and  so  well  guarded  was  the 
whole  line  of  the  Chickahominy,  that 
Wistar  found  it  impossible  to  cross  the 
stream.  The  attempt  was  finally  aban- 
doned about  noon ; and  the  return 
march  was  made  to  New  Kent  with 
great  rapidity  and  without  loss. 

Later  in  the  same  month,  there  was 
another  and  more  formidable  move- 
ment, similar  in  its  origin  and  general 
character,  and  having  the  same  end  in 
view— the  liberation  of  the  National 


656 


THE  WILDERNESS. 


prisoners  in  Richmond.  It  was  spoken 
of  at  the  time,  and  afterwards,  as  Kil- 
patrick’s raid.  The  movement  was 
PfI),  manifold.  On  the  27th,  a body 
27.  of  infantry,  under  General  Sedg- 
wick, left  camp  near  Culpepper  Court 
House,  and  moved  in  the  direction  of 
Madison  Court  House,  some  fifteen 
miles  to  the  southwest.  The  day  fol- 
lowing, General  Birney  advanced,  with 
a division,  in  the  same  direction.  Sedg- 
wick occupied  Madison  Court  House 
and  the  heic^hts  along  Robertson’s  River. 
Birney  occupied  James  Cit}^,  somewhat 
to  the  west  of  Culpepper  Court  House. 
On  the  28th,  a body  of  cavalry,  under 
General  Custer,  was  pushed  forward  in 
the  direction  of  Charlottesville,  where 
the  railroad  fi*om  Lynch bui’g  forms  a 
junction  with  that  of  the  Orange  and 
Alexandria.  The  capture  of  this  place 
would  have  been  most  damaging  to 
Lee’s  communications  with  the  west. 
In  ten  hours,  Custer  was  within  four 
miles  of  Charlottesville,  where  he  sur- 
prised a camp  of  Stuart’s  cavalry,  with 
horse  batteries.  The  camp  equipage 
was  destroyed ; and  six  caissons  were 
blown  up.  For  the  want  of  the  neces- 
sary material,  it  was  found  to  be  im- 
possible to  spike  the  guns.  The  enemy 
rallied  rapidly  and  in  great  force  ; and 
Custer  found  it  necessary  to  retreat. 
On  his  backward  course,  however,  he 
worked  considerable  damage,  destroy- 
ing mills  and  other  property.  Night 
coming  on,  he  lost  his  way,  and  was 
compelled  to  bivouack  in  the  woods. 
,Next  morning,  about  nine  o’clock,  hav- 
ing discovered  his  way,  he  found  his 
passage  completely  blocked  by  Stuart’s 


cavalry.  He  was  near  Stannardsville. 
Ordering  a charge,  he  cut  his  way 
through  in  the  most  gallant  manner, 
and  returned  to  Madison  Court  House, 
without  the  loss  of  a single  man,  and 
bringing  with  him  about  50  prisoners, 
a large  number  of  negroes  and  some 
300  horses. 

General  Kilpatrick,  on  the  28th,  left 
Culpepper,  at  the  head  of  some  peb. 
5000  or  6000  cavalry  and  horse  28. 
artillery.  Crossing  the  Rapidan  at  Ger- 
mania and  Ely’s  fords,  and  sweeping 
around  Lee’s  right  fiank,  he  reached 
Spottsylvania  Court  House  on  the  even- 
ing of  the  29th.  At  this  point,  he  des- 
patched Colonel  Ulric  Dahlgren,  with 
about  500  of  his  picked  men,  with  in- 
structions to  move  in  a southwesterly 
direction  towards  Frederickshall,  where 
it  was  known  a large  number  of  Con- 
federate guns  were  stored.  It  was 
Kilpatrick’s  hope  that  Dahlgren,  after 
making  a successful  raid  through  Louisa 
and  Goochland  counties,  would  be  able 
to  strike  Richmond  on  the  south,  Mobile 
he  himself  was  entering  it  from  the 
north  or  northwest.  Kilpatrick,  mean- 
while, pushed  rapidly  forward,  leaving 
evidence  of  his  desolating  visit  every- 
where behind  him.  At  Beaver  Dam 
Station,  he  encountered  and  defeated 
the  Confederates,  under  Bradley  T. 
Johnson.  He  then  struck  across  the 
South  Anna,  and  cut  the  Fredericks- 
burg and  Richmond  Railroad,  at  Kilby 
Station.  On  the  1st  of  March,  he  was 
close  upon  the  Confederate  capital.  He 
advanced  within  the  first  and  within 
the  second  lines  of  defense;  but  he 
looked  in  vain  for  any  signs  of  the 


KILPATRICK^S  RAID. 


^37 


. 

presence  of  Dahlgren.  When  within 
half  a mile  of  the  city,  he  was  effectual- 
ly resisted,  and  compelled  to  fall  back. 
Sv*eking  safety  in  flight,  he  moved  in 
the.  direction  of  Mechanicsville,  the 
enemy  following  in  vigorous  pursuit. 
Ilaving  succeeded  in  crossing  the  Chick- 
ahominy,  he  pushed  towards  the  Pa- 
miinkey.  This  latter,  however,  he  found 
it  impossible  to  ford.  Crossing  the 
Richmond  and  York  River  Railroad, 
he  moved  in  the  direction  of  White 
House,  where  he  met  a relief  party, 
which  Butler  had  sent  up  from  New 
Kent  Court  House.  At  this  point  the 
pursuit  ceased,  the  retreat  being  con- 
tinued down  the  peninsula.  Kilpatrick 
had  failed  in  his  main  purpose,  and 
he  had  lost  150  men;  but,  by  the  de- 
struction of  stores  and  railroad  prop- 
erty, and  by  the  capture  of  500  prison- 
ers and  a large  number  of  horses,  he 
had  inflicted  a damaging  blow  on  the 
Confederacy. 

What,  meanwhile,  had  become  of 
Dahlgren  ? He  had  faithfully,  as  far 
at  least  as  was  possible,  carried  out 
the  instructions  given  him.  Following 
the  prescribed  route,  he  had  reached 
Frederickshall,  and  destroyed  the  rail- 
road. Had  he  been  an  hour  earlier,  he 
would  have  intercepted  Lee,  who  had 
just  passed  over.  Pushing  forward,  he 
would  have  been  on  the  outskirts  of 
Richmond  in  sufllcient  time  to  co-oper- 
ate with  Kilpatrick,  but  for  the  treach- 
ery of  a negro  guide,  who  led  him  out 
of  his  way.  As  it  was,  he  did  not 
reach  the  outer  lines  until  late  in  the 
afternoon  of  the  2d  of  March.  Flurry- 
ing down  the  north  bank,  he  passed 


the  outer  works  without  difficulty,  and 
was  pressing  forward  with  great  energy 
towards  the  inner,  when  the  enemy  fell 
upon  him  with  overwhelming  force. 
Observing  no  signs  of  Kilpatrick,  and 
soon  learning  that  his  attempt  had 
failed,  Dahlgren  deemed  it  prudent  to 
retrace  his  steps.  It  was  his  only 
chance  of  safety.  The  situation,  how- 
ever, was  desperate.  The  Confederate 
militia,  aroused  by  the  unwelcome  visit 
of  Kilpatrick,  swarmed  around  him, 
panting  for  revenge.  He  had  to  flght 
his  way  at  every  turn  and  bend.  In 
one  of  his  encounters  he,  with  Major 
Cook  and  about  100  men,  became  sep- 
arated from  the  main  body  of  his  com- 
mand. Thus  isolated,  he  had,  on  the 
night  of  the  3d,  fought  his  way  to  the 
Mattapony,  and  crossed  at  Dabney’s 
Ferry.  Here,  however,  he  fell  into  an 
ambush,  and  was  completely  surround- 
ed. Dahlgren  and  several  of  his  com- 
panions were  killed.  The  remainder 
of  his  little  band  were  made  prisoners. 
The  fate  of  this  unfortunate  young 
leader  created  great  excitement  in  the 
North.  He  was  the  son  of  Admiral 
Dahlgren  ; and,  although  only  twenty- 
one  years  of  age,  he  had  given  proof 
not  only  of  great  daring,  but  of  singu- 
lar ability  as  a cavalry  officer.  He  had 
already  lost  a foot  in  the  service  of  his 
country ; and,  at  the  time  of  his  death, 
he  was  still  suffering  from  the  unhealed 
wound. 

These  expeditions,  although  inspired 
by  the  noblest  and  best  of  motives,  and 
in  every  sense  praiseworthy,  all  proved 
more  or  less  abortive.  Richmond  was 
not  to  be  taken ; the  prisoners  were 


C58 


THE  WILDER^^ESS. 


not  to  be  delivered  by  sucli  means. 
The  work,  however,  was  now  to  be 
done  in  a different  and  more  effective 
style. 

March  was  drawing  to  a close  when 
General  Grant  arrived  at  Culpepper 
Court  House,  and  established  his  head- 
quarters with  the  army  of  the  Potomac. 
His  first  attention  was  given  to  the  re- 
organization of  that  army.  Consoli- 
dation had  become  a necessity,  from 
the  reduced  numbers  of  some  of  the 
divisions.  Preliminary  to  all  other  ar- 
rangements, Grant  had  wisely  conclud- 
ed to  retain  in  chief  command  Major- 
General  Meade.  By  his  victory  at 
Gettysburg,  Meade  had  won  the  re- 
spect and  confidence  of  the  army, 
the  approbation  of  the  public,  as 
well  as  a world-wdde  renown.  He  had 
proved  himself  to  be  a skilful  tactician; 
and  he  had  the  advantage  of  possessing 
a thorough  knowledge  of  the  army  in 
all  its  departments.  Under  the  new 
arrangement,  he  sustained  to  Grant  the 
same  relations  that  the  corps  command- 
ers sustained  to  himself.  Meade  and 
Sherman  stood  on  the  same  level. 
They  were  Grant’s  first-lieutenants. 
Grant  gave  his  instructions  to  Meade, 
who  had  the  handling  of  the  army  and 
the  working  out  of  all  the  details. 
The  arrangement  proved  to  be  agree- 
able to  both  parties ; and  it  was,  doubt- 
less, the  best  possible  in  the  circum- 
stances. Grant  said,  afterwards : 

“Commanding  all  the  armies,  as  I did,  I 
tried,  as  far  as  possible,  to  leave  General  Meade 
in  independent  command  .of  the  army  of  the 
Potomac.  ]\Iy  instructions  for  that  army  were 
all  througli  him,  and  were  general  in  their 
nature,  leaving  all  the  details  and  execution 


to  him.  The  campaigns  that  followed  proved 
him  to  be  the  right  man  in  the  right  place. 
His  commanding  always  in  the  presence  of 
an  officer  superior  to  him  in  rank  has  drawn 
from  him  much  of  that  public  attention  which 
his  zeal  and  ability  entitled  him  to,  and  which 
he  would  otherwise  have  received.” 

In  its  new  form  the  army  of  the  Po- 
tomac was  consolidated  into  three  corps 
— the  Second,  Fifth  and  Sixth — which 
were  commanded  respectively^  by  Han- 
cock, AVarren  and  Sedgwick.  These 
were  men  of  high  character  and  of 
proved  ability,  although  their  excel- 
lences were  naturally  not  all  of  the 
same  kind.  Major-General  Winfield 
Scott  Hancock  had  long  been  a prom- 
inent leader  in  the  army  of  the  Poto- 
mac. His  magnifient  personal  presence 
won  for  him,  at  Williamsburg,  the  title 
of  ‘‘superb”;  and  he  was  possessed  of 
those  magnetic  qualities  which,  on  the 
field  of  battle,  attract  and  inspire  the 
soldier.  At  Gettysburg  he  shone  like 
a star  of  the  first  magnitude ; and,  while 
he  saved  the  National  army  and  con- 
verted defeat  into  victory,  he  covered 
himself  with  glory^  Major-General 
Governeur  K.  AVarren,  placed  in  com- 
mand of  the  Fifth  corps,  an  officer  of 
engineers,  and  comparatively  a ymung 
man,  had,  on  several  important  occa- 
sions, revealed  not  only  dash  and 
daring,  but  the  higher  qualities  of  gen- 
eralship, such  as  quickness  of  percep- 
tion of  danger  or  of  opportunity^  pres- 
ence of  mind,  promptitude  of  action, 
and  skill  in  combination.  But  for  his 
(piick  discernment  and  prompt  and  de- 
termined action,  at  Little  Bound  Top, 
on  the  second  daygat  Getty^sburg,  the 
National  left  might  have  been  turned, 


REORGANIZATION. 


659 


and  the  whole  army  thrown  into  con- 
fusion, and  probably  routed.  His  ad- 
vancement had  been  rapid,  but  it  had 
not  been  beyond  his  deserts.  The  com- 
mander of  the  Sixth  corps  was  Major- 
General  John  Sedgwick,  of  Freder- 
icksburg renown,  the  man  who,  more 
than  any  other,  sustained  the  reputa- 
tion of  the  army  of  the  Potomac  and 
the  dignity  of  the  National  cause,  at 
Chancellorsvdlle.  Sedgwick  was  as 
brave  as  he  was  modest,  as  able  as  he 
was  unpretentious.  The  high  honor 
of  commanding  the  army  of  the  Poto- 
mac he  had  more  than  once  declined. 
Such  were  the  three  men  on  whom 
Meade  depended  for  the  execution  of 
his  orders  and  the  directions  of  the 
general-in-chief.  A better  choice  could 
hardly  have  been  made. 

The  division  commanders  had  been 
chosen  with  equal  care.  Those  of  the 
Second  corps  were  respectively  Barlow, 
of  the  First  division ; Gibbon,  of  the 
Second  ; Birney,  of  the  Thii-d ; Carr,  of 
the  Fourth.  Those  of  the  Fifth  corps 
were,  in  the  same  order,  Griffin,  Robin- 
son, Crawford,  Wadsworth.  Those  of 
the  Sixth  corps  were  Wright,  Getty 
and  Prince. 

The  brigade  commanders,  also,  were 
men  of  known  capacity  and  tried  abili- 
ty. They  were,  of  the  Second  corps. 
Miles,  Smyth,  Frank  and  Brooke,  of 
the  First  division ; Webb,  Owens  and 
CaiToll,  of  the  Second;  Ward  and  Hays, 
of  the  Third  ; Mott  and  Brewster,  of 
the  Fourth.  Of  the  Fifth  corps,  they 
were  Barnes,  Bartlett  and  Ayres,  of 
the  First  division  ; Leonard,  Baxter 
and  Dennison,  of  the  Second;  McCand-  | 


less  and  Fisher,  of  the  Third ; Cutler, 
Bice  and  Stone,  of  the  Fourth.  Of 
the  Sixth  corps,  they  were  Torbert, 
Upton,  Burnham  and  Shaler,  of  the 
First;  Wheaton,  Grant,  Neill,  Eustis, 
of  the  Second;  Morris  and  Russell,  of 
the  Third. 

The  inspectors-general  were  respec- 
tively Lieutenant-Colonel  C.  H.  Mrr- 
gan,  of  the  Second  ; Lieutenant-Colonel 
H.  C.  Bankhead,  of  the  Fifth  ; Lieuten- 
ant-Colonel M.  T.  McMahon,  of  the 
Sixth.  The  chiefs  of  artillery,  taking 
them  in  the  same  order,  were  Colonel 
J.  C.  Tidball,  Colonel  C.  S.  Wainright 
and  Colonel  C.  H.  Tompkins.  The  cav- 
alry were  entrusted  to  the  able  hands 
of  Major-General  Philip  H.  Sheridan. 
Brigadier-General  Henry  J.  Hunt  re- 
mained in  charge  of  the  artillery.  Col- 
onel H.  S.  Burton  being  second  in 
command.  The  onerous  duties  of  the 
quartermaster’s  department  still  de- 
volved on  the  able  shoulders  of  Briga- 
dier-General Rufus  Imyalls."^ 

O 

* General  Grant's  staff  was  composed  as  follows : 
Brigadier-General  John  A.  Rawlins,  chief  of  staff; 
Lieutenant-Colonel  T.  S.  Bowers,  assistant  adjutant- 
general  ; Lieutenant-Colonel  C.  B,  Comstock,  senior 
aide-de-camp ; Lieutenant-Colonel  O.  E.  B.  Babcock, 
aide-de-camp ; Lieutenant-Colonel  F.  T.  Dent,  aide- 
de-camp  ; Lieutenant-Colonel  Horace  Porter,  aide-de- 
camp;  Lieutenant-Colonel  W.  L.  Duff,  assistant  in- 
spector-general ; Lieutenant-Colonel  W.  R.  Rowley, 
secretary ; Lieutenant-Colonel  Adam  Badeau,  secretary ; 
Captain  E.  S.  Parker,  assistant  adjutant-general ; Cap- 
tain George  K.  Leet,  assistant  adjutant-genei'a!,  in 
charge  of  office  at  Washington ; Captain  P.  T.  Hudson, 
aide-de-camp;  Captain  H.  W.  Jones,  assistant  quarter- 
master, on  duty  at  headquarters ; First-Lieutenant 
William  Dunn,  junior,  Eighty-Third  Indiana  Volun- 
teers, acting  aide-de-camp. 

General  Meade’s  chief  of  staff  was  Major-General  A. 
A.  Humphrey,  a field-officer  of  engineers,  who,  as  a di- 
vision commander,  had  won  distinction  at  Gettysburg. 
His  adjutant-general  was  General  Seth  Williams,  an  offi- 
cer admirably  qualified  for  the  special  duties  of  his  post. 


6G0 


THE  WILDERNESS. 


Such,  under  its  new  organization, 
was  the  army  of  the  Potomac.  This, 
however^  was  not  the  only  force  on 
which  General  Grant  could  rely.  On 
its  way  from  East  Tennessee,  the  Ninth 
army  corps,  under  General  Burnside, 
had  rendezvoused  at  Annapolis,  where 
it  had  recruited  and  added  a whole  di- 
vision of  colored  troops.  On  the  23d  of 
April  April,  Burnside’s  troops  were  re- 
23.  viewed  in  Washington  by  Presi- 
dent Lincoln,  and  marched  at  once  to 
Culpepper  to  join  the  army  of  the  Poto- 
mac. Burnside  remained  for  a time  in 
separate  command,  receiving  his  orders 
not  through  Meade,  but  directly  from 
Grant.  The  united  strength  of  the  four 
corps  gave  Grant  a movable  column 
of  about  140,000  men  of  all  arms. 
These  figures,  however,  did  not  fully 
represent  his  eifective  strength.  There 
\vere,  in  addition,  the  co-operative 
forces — those  under  Butler,  33,000 
strong,  and  those  under  Sigel,  some 
20,000  strong;  and  Grant  could  count 
with  confidence  on  a portion,  at  least, 
of  the  100,000  men  promised  for  one 
hundred  days  by  the  governors  of  Ohio, 
Indiana,  Illinois  and  Iowa. 

The  army  of  Northern  Virginia,  as 
General  Lee’s  army  was  called,  was 
greatly  inferior  in  numbers  to  that  of 
the  Potomac.  It  had,  for  the  time, 
been  much  reduced  by  furloughs.  At 
the  beginning  of  May,  the  entire  force 
at  Lee’s  disposal — foot,  horse  and  artil- 
lery— did  not  exceed  60,000.  It  was 
divided  into  three  corps,  commanded 
respectively  by  Ewell,  Hill  and  Long- 
street.  The  three  corps  lay  en  echelon. 
Ewell  was  on  the  left  and  somewhat  in 


advance,  his  own  right  resting  on  the 
river ; Hill  was  in  the  centre,  at  Orange 
Court  House ; Longstreet  was  further 
to  the  south,  at  Gordonsville. 

By  the  end  of  April,  General  Grant’s 
arrangements  were  completed ; and 
everything  was  in  readiness  for  a gen- 
eral forward  movement.  Sherman, 
‘ ’ 

whose  operations  will  be  detailed  in  a 
subsequent  chapter,  was  awaiting  the 
signal  to  march  from  Chattanooga. 
Meade  was  ready  to  march  the  army 
of  the  Potomac  across  the  Rapidan,  his 
instructions  being  to  turn,  if  possible, 
the  Confederate  right,  and  interpose 
between  Lee  and  Richmond.  Butler, 
who  had  been  fully  instructed  as  to 
the  pa]*t  he  should  take  in  the  cam- 
paign, was  ready  to  move  up  the 
James,  in  the  direction  of  City  Point. 
Sigel,  having  arranged  his  army  in  two 
columns — the  one  under  General  Crook, 
to  opei*ate  on  the  Kanawha,  the  other 
under  his  own  care,  to  opei’ate  on  the 
Shenandoah — was  prepared  to  move 
whenever  the  signal  should  be  given. 

On  the  night  of  the  3d  of  May,  the 
army  of  the  Potomac  broke  up  ^jay 
its  encampments;  and,  in  two  col-  3. 
limns,  it  began  to  move  toward  the 
Rapidan,  the  right  from  Culpepper, 
and  the  left  from  Stevensburg.  On  the 
same  day,  Butler  moved  from  Fortress 
Monroe.  Sigel  had  already  set  out  as 
directed,  two  days  before. 

For  the  present,  ’we  shall  remain 
with  and  follow  the  fortunes  of  the 
army  of  the  Potomac.  The  right  col- 
umn of  that  army,  made  up  of  the  corps 
of  Warren  and  Sedgwick,  moved  in 
the  direction  of  Germania  Ford.  The 


ACROSS  THE  RAPIDAN. 


661 


left,  which  consisted  of  Hancock’s  corps, 
moved  in  the  direction  of  Ely’s  Ford. 
All  during  the  night  and  the  greater 
part  of  the  following  day,  the  banks  of 
the  river  presented  a lively  scene.  It 
was  such  a scene  as  even  the  eye  of  the 
war-hardened  veteran  rarely  looks  up- 
on. One  hundred  and  forty  thousand 
men,  including  some  10,000  cavalry, 
with  artillery  in  proportion,  and  an 
army-train  of  4000  wagons,  were  press- 
ing towards  the  river,  or  crossing  the 
bridges,  or  spreading  thetnselves  out  in 
huge  masses  on  the  banks  beyond.  Be- 
fore nio^ht,  Meade  had  taken  his  entire 
army  across  the  river.  Warren’s  corps, 
forming  the  advance  of  the  right  col- 
umn, with  Wilson’s  cavalry  division  in 
front,  reached  Germania  Ford  at  six 
May  o’clock  on  the  morning  of  Thurs- 
4*  day,  the  4th  , and,  as  soon  as  the 
bridge  was  laid,  began  the  passage, 
w’hich  was  completed  by  one  o’clock. 
Sedgwick’s  column  followed  immediate- 
ly afterwards.  Hancock,  with  the  left 
column,  Gregg’s  cavalry  division  pre- 
ceding, crossed  at  an  early  hour;  and 
by  nine  o’clock  he  was  at  Chancellors- 
ville,  where  he  rested  for  the  remainder 
of  the  day.  Warren,  after  crossing 
the  river,  had  pushed  on  to  Old  Wil- 
derness Tavern,  where  he  bivouacked. 
Sedgwick,  who  was  the  last  to  cross, 
remained  for  the  night  near  the  river. 
The  cavalry  were  well  thrown  out 
towards  Orange  Court  House,  Fred- 
ericksburg and  Todd’s  Tavern.  Burn- 
side, with  the  Ninth  corps,  was  still 
at  Culpepper  Court  House,  where  he 
had  been  ordered  to  remain  for  twenty- 
four  hours,  when,  it  was  supposed. 


the  first  and  second  columns  would  be 
safely  on  the  southern  banks  of  the 
Bapidan.  The  wagon-trains,  also,  for 
the  present,  were  left  on  the  northern 
banks.  Such  was  the  general  posi- 
tion of  General  Grant’s  forces  on  the 
night  of  the  4th  and  the  morning  of 
the  5th. 

Lee  had  not  been  ignorant  of  Gi*ant’s 
movements.  ^rom  the  signal-station 
on  the  summit  of  Clark’s  Mountain,  he 
had  a wide  and  commanding  view  of 
the  entire  country;  and  the  beacon-fires 
which  blazed  throughout  the  night, 
rendered  conspicuous  by'  the  all-sur- 
rounding gloom,  showed  that  he  was 
concentrating  his  scattered  forces,  and 
preparing  for  the  onset  of  the  foe.  It 
was  evident  that  Lee  had  concluded 
that  it  was  best  for  him  to  allow  Grant 
to  cross  the  river  unopposed,  and  to 
offer  him  battle  afterwards.  He  might 
have  acted  differently.  He  might  have 
allowed  a portion  of  the  opposing  army 
to  pass,  and  then,  by  destroying  the 
means  of  passage,  attempted  to  destroy 
the  isolated  fraction.  He  might  have 
directly  opposed  the  passage  of  the 
river,  and,  by  occupying  advantageous 
positions,  prevented  them  from  deploy- 
ing. Neither  of  those  courses,  however, 
commended  themselves ; and  following 
the  example  which  he  had  set  at  Fred- 
ericksburg, he  gave  his  antagonist  full 
oppoi’tunity  to  cross  the  river,  to  take 
position,  and  more  fully  to  develop  his 
plans.  His  position  behind  Mine  Run 
was  strong  ; and  for  a whole  winter  it 
had  defied  the  skill  of  Meade,  and 
all  the  valor  of  the  army  of  the  Po- 
tomac. Even  if  Grant  did  attempt 


276 


662 


THE  WILDERNESS. 


to  turn  his  right,  he  could  rely  on  his 
well-trained  legions  for  support;  and 
the  country,  with  which  he  was  thor- 
oughly familiar,  was  better  adapted  for 
purposes  of  resistance  than  for  purposes 
of  attack. 

W e are  now  fairly  in  the  Wilderness. 
It  is  a wild  and  desolate  region  of  worn- 
out  tobacco-fields,  covered  with  scraggy 
oaks  and  pines,  sassafras  and  hazel,  and 
intersected  with  narrow  roads  and  deep 
ravines.  It  is  a strange  battle-ground  ; 
yet  it  is  here,  amid  these  jungles,  on 
these  narrow  wood  roads,  and  in  these 
deep  ravines,  that  is  about  to  be  fought 
one  of  the  mightiest  and  most  bloody, 
if  not  most  decisive,  battles  of  the  war. 
Manifestly,  Grant  had  not  intended  that 
the  battle  should  take  place  in  the 
forest.  He  felt  proud  because  of  the 
success  which  had  attended  the  crossing 
of  the  Rapidan.  It  was  confessedly  a 
perilous  operation ; and  the  fact  that  it 
had  been  accomplished  “in  the  face  of 
an  active,  large,  well-appointed,  and 
ably-commanded  army,”  was  well  fitted 
to  relieve  his  mind  of  the  most  “ serious 
apprehensions.”  It  was  his  hope,  if 
not  his  conviction,  that  another  day’s 
march  would  enable  him  to  push  the 
M’my  beyond  the  Wilderness,  and,  using 
it  m a mask,  to  advance  rapidly  on  Gor- 
ionsville,  and  take  a position  between 
Lee’s  army  and  the  Confederate  capital. 
It  was  Grant’s  expectation,  in  fact,  that 
Lee,  as  soon  as  he  was  made  aware  of 
the  movements  of  the  National  army, 
vould  fall  back  towards  Richmond. 
With  this  end  in  view,  Sheridan  was 
instructed  to  move,  with  Gregg’s  and 
Torbert’s  divisions,  against  the  Confed- 


erate cavalry  in  the  direction  of  Hamil- 
ton’s Crossing;  Wilson,  with  the  Third 
cavalry  division,  was  to  move  to  Craig’s 
Meeting  House  on  the  Catharpin  Road, 
and  thence  to  send  out  detachments 
along  the  different  avenues  by  which 
the  enemy  might  approach;  Hancock, 
with  hi^  Second  corps,  was  to  ad- 
vance to  Shady  Grove  Church,  and 
thence  to  extend  his  right  towards  the 
Fifth  corps,  at  Parker’s  Store;  Warren, 
with  his  Fifth  corps,  was  to  move  to 
Parker’s  Store,  and  to  extend  his  right 
towards  the  Old  Wilderness  Tavern, 
where  Sedgwick  was  ordered  to  take 
position. 

On  the  morning  of  Thursday,  the 
5th,  these  orders  w^ere  put  in  ex-  j^ay 
ecution.  As  early  as  five  o’clock,  5. 
the  different  columns  were  in  motion, 
and  pushing  towards  the  positions 
respectively  assigned  them.  A blood- 
red  sun,  as  if  ominous  of  the  dread- 
ful slaughter  which  was  soon  to  fol- 
low, was  pouring  his  slanting  beams 
through  the  openings  in  the  woods,  al- 
ready beautiful  and  richly  clad  with  the 
green  robes  of  early  summer.  It  soon 
became  apparent  that  Lee  was  neither 
ignorant  of  the  plans  of  his  antagonist, 
nor  willing  to  allow  him  to  execute 
his  purpose  without  offering  at  least  a 
stubborn  resistance.  From  the  Con- 
federate centre  at  Orange  Court  House, 
about  twenty  miles  from  Grant’s  pre- 
sci*ibed  line  of  march,  two  roads  run, 
in  a northeasterly  direction,  towards 
Fredericksburg.  That  to  the  north  is 
an  old  turnpike ; the  other  is  a plank- 
road.  There  is  another  road,  called  the 
Stevensburg  plank  road,  which,  run- 


THE  FOE  FELT. 


663 


ning  from  Culpepper  Court  House  in 
a southeasterly,  direction,  crosses  the 
turnpike  before  mentioned,  and  termi- 
nates in  the  plank  road.  At  the  junc- 
tion of  the  Stevensburg  plank  road 
^vith  the  turnpike  is  the  Old  Wilder- 
ness Tavern.  Five  miles  more  to  the 
southeast,  where  the  two  plank  roads 
meet,  is  the  Old  Wilderness  Church. 
Before  the  Stevensburg  road  unites 
with  the  plank  road,  there  branches  off 
another  road,  called  the  Brock  road, 
which  runs  first  almost  due  south, 
crossing  the  plank  road,  and  then  more 
to  the  southeast  to  Spottsylvania  Court 
House.  The  two  almost  parallel  roads 
running  northeast  from  Orange  Court 
House  are  generally  spoken  of  as  the 
Orange  turnpike  and  the  Orange 
plank  road.  Along  these  two  roads, 
Lee,  having  already  rightly  divined 
the  purpose  of  Grant,  had  pushed  the 
larger  portion  of  his  army.  It  was  his 
intention  to  strike  the  National  army 
in  the  flank,  and  force  a battle  in  the 
Wilderness.  He  had  left  behind  him 
the  strong  defenses  of  Mine  Run ; but 
he  could  fall  back  upon  them,  as  a 
})lace  of  refuge,  in  the  event  of  disaster. 
0;i  the  morning  of  the  5th,  Ewell, 
who  had  moved  by  the  Orange  turn- 
].-ike,  and  Hill,  who  had  moved  by  the 
Oiange  plank  road,  were  both  in  the 
near  neighborhood  of  Old  Wilderness 
Tavern  ; but  the  Nationals  knew  it  not. 
Thus  it  happened  that  Warren,  almost 
as  soon  as  he  commenced  his  forward 
movement,  found  himself  in  collision 
with  the  enemy. 

Warren’s  orders,  it  will  be  remem- 
bered, were  that  he  should  resume  his 


march  by  the  earliest  dawn,  on  the 
morning  of  the  5th,  and  that  he  should 
take  position  at  Parker’s  Store  on  the 
Orange  plank  road,  his  right  extending 
to  Old  Wilderness  Tavern.  By  way  of 
precaution,  and  in  order  to  secure  the 
route  for  Sedgwick’s  corps,  he  threw 
the  division  of  Griflin  out  on  the  Orange 
turnpike ; and,  taking  advantage  of  a 
wood  road  which  led  in  a southwester- 
ly direction  towards  Parker’s  Store,  he 
pushed  forward  the  division  of  Craw- 
ford, followed  by  that  of  Wadsworth 
and  that  of  Robinson,  to  the  point  in- 
dicated. These  movements  were  scarce- 
ly  begun  when  the  foe  was  felt.  All 
of  a sudden,  Griffin’s  skirmishers  on  the 
turnpike  fell  back;  and,  at  the  same 
moment  almost,  Crawford’s  advance, 
which  was  now  near  Parker’s  Store, 
was  surprised  to  see  the  troops  in  front 
galloping  back.  Griffin  had  touched 
Ewell ; and  Crawford  had  come  into 
contact  with  the  van  of  Hill’s  column. 
Further  advance  was  deemed  perilous. 
The  prescribed  movements  were,  there- 
fore, temporarily  suspended.  Such  was 
the  condition  of  affairs  when,  about 
eight  o’clock.  Grant  and  Meade  arrived 
at  Old  Wilderness  Tavern.  It  was 
not  the  opinion  of  either  of  those  com- 
manders that  the  Confederates  were 
present  in  any  great  force.  On  the 
contrary,  it  was  the  belief  of  both  that 
Lee  had  fallen  back,  that  he  was  con- 
centrating his  forces  further  to  the 
south,  and  that  the  troops  with  which 
Griffin  and  Crawford  had  come  into 
contact  were  portions  of  the  Confed- 
erate right,  which  had  been  left  as  a 
rear-guard  to  cover  the  retreat.  To 


664 


THE  WILDERNESS. 


capture  or  brush  away  this  force,  and 
to  obtain  possession  of  the  defenses  at 
Mine  Run,  now  became  their  object; 
and  orders  were  given  accordingly. 
As  the  strength  of  the  Confederates 
had  been  developed  mainly  on  the 
turnpike  and  in  Griffin’s  front,  it  was 
resolved  to  make  the  attack  at  that 
point.  Crawford  was,  accordingly,  or- 
dered to  suspend  operations  on  the 
plank  road,  while  Wadsworth’s  divi- 
sion was  disposed  in  line  on  Griffin’s 
left,  with  the  sister  division  of  Robin- 
son in  support.  Wadsworth,  having 
ordered  McCandless’  brigade  to  take 
position  on  Wadsworth’s  left,  with- 
drew wdth  the  remainder  of  his  divi- 
sion, but  not  without  experiencing 
some  sharp  treatment  at  the  hands  of 
the  enemy,  who  followed  and  fired  into 
the  rear  of  his  column.  Meanwhile, 
Hancock,  who,  as  we  have  seen,  had 
that  morning  marched  southward  from 
Chancellorsville  in  the  direction  of 
Shady  Grove  Church,  and  who  was 
therefore  quite  out  of  position  for  a 
battle  at  Chancellorsville,  was  recalled, 
and  was  ordered  to  unite  with  the 
main  body,  by  a movement  up  the 
Brock  road. 

The  ground  on  which  the  struggle 
was  about  to  begin, — a struggle  greatly 
more  severe  than  was  anticipated  by 
the  National  leaders — was  a sort  of 
clearance  in  the  forest.  As  seen  from 
Warren’s  headquarters,  near  the  Old 
Wilderness  Tavern,  there  was  a little 
brook  fiowing  in  a northeasterly  direc- 
tion. The  brook  is  bridged  at  the 
turnpike,  wffiich  soon  afterwards  rises 
to  a ridge,  on  the  southern  slope  of 


which  is  Major  Lacy’s  house,  in  the 
midst  of  a lawn  and  green  meadows. 
Beyond,  the  hills  were  covered  with 
pines  and  cedars.  On  the^right  of  the 
turnpike  the  thicket  was  very  dense. 
A little  more  to  the  right  was  a ravine 
which  divided  the  forces  of  Griffin  and 
Ewell.  On  this  strange  battle  field 
were  soon  to  meet,  in  the  deadly  shock 
of  battle,  nearly  a quarter  of  a million 
of  civilized  troops.  At  noon  the  pre- 
parations were  completed;  and  War- 
ren, with  the  divisions  of  Griffin  and 
Wadsworth,  advanced  to  the  attack. 
It  was  made  with  tremendous  energy, 
and  at  first  with  complete  success. 
The  Confederate  advance,  which  con- 
sisted of  Johnson’s  division  alone,  was 
easily  driven  back;  and  if  the  brigades 
of  Ayres  and  Bartlett  had  been  more 
vigorously  supported,*  Ewell’s  corps 
might  have  been  involved  in  hopeless 
disaster.  As  it  was  the  Nationals,  in 
what  seemed  the  moment  of  victory, 
were  speedily  brought  to  a standstill. 
Johnson  had  been  driven  back  to  the 
main  body  of  Ewell’s  command.  Rodes, 
with  his  fresh  division,  rushed  to  the 
rescue,  when  the  shattered  column 
quickly  re-formed.  At  this  moment 
the  battle  raged  with  tremendous  fury. 
It  had  been  intended  that  Warren’s 
right  should  be  sustained  by  Wright’s 
division,  of  the  Sixth  corps ; but  owing 
to  the  denseness  of  the  woods,  and  the 
total  absence  of  roads,  Wright  was  un- 
able to  get  up  in  time.  On  Warren’s  ex- 
posed fiank,  therefore,  the  Confederates 
fell  with  fearful  energy.  The  tide  of 
battle  was  now  turned.  Griffin’s  bri- 
gades, overwhelmed  by  the  force  of  the 


ARRIVAL  OF  HANCOCK. 


665 


enemy,  were  driven  back  with  the  loss  of 
two  guns  and  several  prisoners.  Wads- 
worth’s division,  on  the  left,  had  been 
equally  unfortunate.  In  striving  to 
form  a connection  with  that  of  Griffin, 
it  had  moved  in  a wrong  direction, 
completely  exposing  its  left  flank.  On 
this  the  Confederates  opened  a murder- 
ous fire,  compelling  the  entire  division 
to  fall  back  in  disorder.  McCandless’ 
brigade,  of  Crawford’s  division,  which, 
as  we  have  seen,  was  stationed  to  the 
left  of  Wadsworth,  fared  even  worse. 
Occupying  an  isolated  position,  and 
exposed  at  all  points,  it  offered  pecu- 
liar temptation  for  attack.  Not  slow 
to  take  advantage  of  the  opportunity, 
the  Confederates  rushed  upon  it  with 
great  fury  and  in  overwhelming  num- 
bers. For  a moment,  it  seemed  as  if 
the  entire  brigade  was  doomed  to  cap- 
ture or  destruction.  After  severe  fight- 
ing, during  which  were  performed 
deeds  of  great  valor,  McCandless  suc- 
ceeded in  cutting  his  way  through,  but 
not  without  the  loss  of  two  whole 
regiments.  Warren,  having  thus  lost 
all  he  had  gained  by  the  first  suc- 
cessful onset,  and  having  sacrificed  at 
least  3000  men,  fell  back  and  formed 
a new  line  of  battle  more  to  the  rear, 
but  still  in  front  of  the  Old  Wil- 
derness Tavern,  and  across  the  turn- 
pike. 

While  Warren  was  thus  engaged  in 
the  centre,  Sedgwick,  with  the  Sixth 
corps,  having  come  up,  was  ready  to 
take  position  on  his  right.  Hancock, 
however,  had  not  had  time  to  return,  as 
ordered,  and  take  position  on  his  left. 
Some  four  miles  east  of  Parker’s  Store, 


as  has  already  been  indicated,  the 
plank  road  is  intersected  by  the  Brock 
road.  Hill,  it  will  be  remembered, 
was  pressing  along  the  plank  road. 
Hancock,  by  the  Brock  road,  was 
pushing  forward  to  the  point  of  inter- 
section. It  was  all-important  that  this 
strategic  point  should  not  fall  into  the 
hands  of  the  enemy.  As  there  was 
danger  that  Hill  might  reach  that 
point  before  the  arrival  of  Hancock, 
Meade  ordered  General  Getty,  with 
his  division  of  the  Sixth  corps,  to  ad- 
vance and  hold  the  position.  The  order 
was  promptly  obeyed.  It  was  not, 
however,  a moment  too  soon,  for  Hill’s 
divisions  were  already  well  forward; 
and  Getty,  long  before  the  arrival  of 
Hancock,  felt  the  presence  and  pressure 
of  the  foe.  In  spite  of  the  rapidly 
increasing  weight  of  his  antagonist, 
Getty  stoutly  held  his  position.  The 
situation,  however,  was  becoming  every 
moment  more  critical.  It  was  now 
near  three  o’clock  in  the  afternoon. 
There  was  a lull  in  the  fight.  Sud- 
denly there  was  heard  a loud-resound- 
ing cheer.  It  came  from  Hancock’s 
men,  who,  with  almost  incredible  ra- 
pidity, were  pushing  through  the  de- 
files of  the  forest. 

On  his  arrival,  Hancock  took  posi- 
tion along  the  Brock  road,  facing  west- 
ward. He  immediately  commenced  to 
throw  up  breast-works.  These,  how- 
ever, were  not  yet  completed,  when  he 
was  ordered  to  attack  with  his  whole 
corps,  Getty  supporting  the  advance. 
Birney,  with  his  own  command  and 
that  of  Mott,  was  thrown  forward  on 
Getty’s  right  and  left,  on  both  sides  of 


C66 


THE  WILDERNESS. 


the  plank  road.  A section  of  Hicketts’ 
battery,  and  a company  of  the  First 
Penns^dvania  artillery,  followed  close 
in  the  rear  of  the  infantry.  It  soon 
became  manifest  that  the  enemy  was 
present  in  great  force,  although  such 
was  the  density  of  the  forest  that  nei- 
ther army  could  see  the  other.  Getty, 
strengthened  as  he  was  by  Birney  and 
Mott,  was  making  no  headway.  Han- 
cock, now  pushing  forward  the  bri- 
gades of  Carroll  and  Owen,  of  Gib- 
bon’s division,  and  the  Irish  brigade, 
of  the  Second  Delaware,  under  Colonel 
Smythe,  made,  to  use  the  language  of 
General  Lee,  “ repeated  and  desperate 
assaults  but  it  was  all  in  vain.  Hill’s 
corps,  which  consisted  of  the  divisions 
of  Anderson,  Heth  and  Wilcox,  all  of 
them  West  Point  men,  not  only  suc- 
cessfully resisted  but  repelled  every 
attack.  The  afternoon  was  wearing 
away.  The  battle  continued  to  rage 
with  great  fury,  the  tide  of  victory 
inclininof  now  to  this  side,  now  to 
that,  but  remaining  with  neither.  Dur- 
ing the  heat  of  the  light,  and  when 
the  Confederates  made  one  of  their 
desperate  and  apparently  successful 
onslaughts,  the  section  of  Eicketts’ 
battery,  which  was  moved  along  the 
plank  road,  was  actually  captured, 
the  men  and  horses  suffering  terri- 
bly. It  was  soon,  however,  recap- 
tured by  Carroll’s  brigade.  It  was 
afterwards  withdrawn  and  replaced  by 
a section  of  Dow’s  Sixth  Maine  bat- 
tery. Hancock  had  done  his  best,  but 
apparently  in  vain.  Mott’s  command 
had  already  given  way;  and  Hays, 
while  attempting  to  fill  up  the  break 


in  the  line,  was  shot  dead,  at  the  head 
of  his  brigade."^ 

The  heavy  and  long-continued  firing 
towards  the  junction  of  the  plank 
and  Brock  roads,  had  already  attracted 
the  attention  of  Grant  and  Meade.  It 
was  evident  that  the  battle  was  fierce- — 
that  th6  Confederates  were  present  in 
great  force,  and  that  Getty  and  Han- 
cock were  being  taxed  to  the  very  ut- 
most. By  way  of  furnishing  relief  to 
these  two  commanders,  Wadsworth, 
with  his  own  division  and  Baxter’s 
brigade,  of  Robinson’s  division,  was 

* Alexander  Hays,  brigadier-general  of  United 
States  volunteers  and  brevet  lieutenant-colonel  in  the 
United  States  army,  was  born  at  Pittsfield,  Pa,,  in 
1820.  He  graduated  at  West  Point  in  1844.  Among 
his  classmates  were  Grant,  Hancock  and  Pleasonton. 
He  entered  the  army  as  brevet  second-lieutenant  of 
the  Fourth  United  States  infantry.  As  a second-lieiiten- 
ant  of  the  Eighth  infantry,  he  entered  upon  the  Mexi- 
can campaign,  daring  which  he  greatly  distinguished 
himself  and  rose  in  his  profession.  Soon  afterwards,  he 
was  appointed  acting-assistant  adjutant-general  to  Bri- 
gadier-General Lane,  and  won  distinction  in  the  battle 
near  Atlixo.  In  April,  1 848,  he  resigned  his  position 
in  the  army,  and  engaged  in  the  manufacture  of  iron, 
in  Venango  county,  Pa.  On  the  outbreak  of  the  Civil 
War,  he  entered  the  service  as  colonel  of  the  Sixty- 
Third  Pennsylvania  volunteers,  and  was  appointed 
captain  in  the  Sixteenth  regiment  of  infantry,  to  date 
from  May  14,  1801,  In  the  Peninsula  he  was  attached, 
with  his  regiment,  to  the  First  brigade  of  Kearney’s 
division,  of  Heintzelman’s  corps.  At  the  close  of  the 
seven  days’  contest,  he  was  nominated  for  a brevet  of 
lieutenant-colonel.  He  took  part  in  the  Maryland 
campaign,  and  was  appointed  a brigadier-general  of 
volunteers.  He  m-hs  wounded  at  Chancellorsville,  while 
at  the  head  of  the  Second  brigade,  of  the  Third  division. 
Second  army  corps.  At  the  battle  of  Gettj’sburg,  he 
commanded  the  Third  division  of  his  corps,  and,  after 
the  wounding  of  Hancock,  was  temporarily  in  ci)m- 
j mand.  When  the  army  of  the  Potomac  was  reorgan- 
ized, Hays  was  placed  in  command  of  the  Second 
brigade,  Bimey’s  Third  division,  of  the  Second  corps. 
In  this  capacity  he  fought,  and  gallantly  met  his  death, 
in  the  Wilderness.  Hays  was  frank,  brave,  quick  and 
energetic,  and  greatly  beloved  by  his  men.  Although 
not  in  the  highest  position,  his  death  was  a serious  los.s 
to  the  army  of  the  Potomac. 


PREPARING  FOR  THE  SECOND  DAY. 


667 


ordered  to  move  southward  through 
the  forest,  and  strike  Hill  on  the  flank 
and  rear.  It  was  a most  difficult  ope- 
ration. Such  was  the  density  of  the 
forest,  and  so  great  were  the  obstacles 
encountered  in  the  face  of  skirmishers 
who  were  evidently  familiar  with  every 
inch  of  the  ground,  that  darkness  had 
set  in  before  Wadsworth  was  in  a po- 
sition to  strike  as  directed.  His  troops 
rested  on  their  arms  for  the  night, 
ready  to  take  advantage  of  their  fa- 
vored position  in  the  morning.  To- 
wards midnight,  all  was  silent  in  the 
Wilderness.  Hancock  had  failed  to 
drive  Hill  back  on  the  plank  road. 
Hill  had  been  equally  unsuccessful  in 
his  attempt  to  dislodge  Hancock.  All 
along  the  line  the  Nationals  and  Con- 
federates lay  so  close  to  each  other  that 
the  soldiers  of  both  armies  drew  water 
from  the  same  brook.  As  in  the  earlier 
part  of  the  day,  a ravine  divided  both 
the  opposing  armies  in  two.  Hancock 
was  separated  from  Warren  and  Sedg- 
wick. Ewell  was  unable  to  form  a con- 
nection with  Hill.  The  battle-ground 
was  thickly  strewn  with  dead  and  dy- 
ing men.  Such  was  the  end  of  the 
first  day  in  the  Wilderness. 

It  was  evident  to  all  that  a great 
battle  would  be  fought  on  the  morrow. 
The  ground  was  ill  adapted  for  civil- 
ized warfare.  Other  ground,  however, 
could  not  now  be  chosen.  The  incon- 
veniences, it  was  felt,  were  common. 
On  both  sides  the  commanders  were 
hopeful,  if  not  confident ; and  the  rank 
and  file  were  in  excellent  spirits.  If 
neither  had  been  successful,  neither  had 
any  reason  to  be  ashamed  of  defeat. 


Lee  had  failed  to  defeat  Grant  by 
striking  him  on  his  flank.  Grant  had 
failed  to  carry  out  his  purpose  of  turn- 
ing Lee’s  right.  Each  had  failed  in 
his  original  purpose ; but  both  were 
now  face  to  face,  with  the  Inevitable 
of  battle  before  them. 

Night  was  spent  by  both  command- 
ers in  preparing  for  the  conflict  of  the 
coming  day.  Burnside,  it  will  be  re- 
membered, had  been  left  at  Culpepper 
Court  House  with  the  Ninth  corps,  his 
instructions  being  to  hold  that  place 
for  at  least  twenty-four  hours  after  the 
departure  of  the  main  body  of  the 
army.  He  had  already  been  ordered 
forward ; and  shortly  after  day-break, 
on  the  morninof  of  the  6th,  he  was  on 
the  field,  and  taking  position  between 
the  troops  of  Warren  and  Hancock. 
He  had  marched  with  great  rapidity  a 
distance  of  thirty  miles,  and  crossed 
both  the  Rappahannock  and  the  Rapi- 
dan.  Grant’s  line  of  battle  was  five 
miles  long,  and  was  facing  westward. 
It  lay  in  the  following  order : Sedg- 
wick on  the  right;  Warren  in  the  cen- 
tre ; then  Burnside ; then  Hancock  on 
the  extreme  left.  Hancock,  in  addition 
to  his  own  powerful  corps,  had  Getty’s 
division,  of  the  Sixth  corps,  and  Wads- 
worth’s division,  of  the  Fifth,  both  on 
his  own  right.  On  the  Confederate 
side,  Ewell  was  on  the  left ; Hill  on 
the  right;  and  Longstreet,  who  had 
been  left  at  Gordons ville,  was  hurrying 
forward  to  reinforce  Hill.  The  point 
of  convergence  of  both  armies  embraced 
the  turnpike  and  plank  road,  and  the 
space  between.  It  had  become  evident 
to  both  commanders  that  the  real  con- 


668 


THE  WILDERNESS. 


flict  would  take  place  in  the  neighbor- 
hood of  the  plank  road,  on  Grant’s  left. 
It  was  to  be  the  same  battle  field  as  on 
the  previous  day — ground  on  which  it 
would  be  impossible  to  use  either  artil- 
lery or  cavalry,  and  on  which  manoeu- 
vring of  any  kind  would  be  totally 
out  of  the  question.  The  300  guns  of 
the  combatants  were  to  remain  idle ; 
and  of  the  200,000  men  about  to  meet 
in  a great  death  struggle,  not  more  than 
1000  would  be  visible  at  any  one  mo- 
ment to  any  one  man.  Grant’s  order 
was  given  as  soon  as  he  heard  the  re- 
ports of  the  different  commanders.  It 
was  simple.  Attack  along  the  whole 
line  at  five  in  the  morning.”  Lee  had 
decided  to  deliver  an  overwhelming 
blow  on  Grant’s  left ; but  as  it  would 
be  impossible  to  do  so  before  the  arri- 
val of  Longstreet,  he  resolved  to  dis- 
tract attention,  and  so  gain  time  by 
making  a demonstration  on  the  Na- 
tional right.  Just  fifteen  minutes  be- 
fore the  time  appointed  by  Grant  for 
the  general  attack,  a sudden  discharge 
of  musketry  in  the  direction  of  Sedg- 
wick announced  the  fact  that  Lee  was 
as  ready  for  battle  as  his  antagonist. 
This  attack,  however,  was  not  of  seri- 
ous moment.  It  was  not  pushed  with 
vigor.  Sedgwick  was  able  to  hold 
his  own,  and  even  to  push  his  front 
forward  a few  hundred  yards.  The 
general  plan  of  battle,  as  Grant  had 
arranged  it,  was,  therefore,  undis- 
turbed. 

At  five  o’clock  precisely,  Warren  and 
Hancock  advanced  to  the  attack.  Han- 
cock, however,  was  doomed  to  bear 
the  principal  burden  of  the  fight. 


With  him,  therefore,  we  must  remain 
and  witness  the  tide  of  battle,  as  it 
ebbs  and  flows  in  his  front.  Dreading 
an  attack  in  great  force,  he  had  taken 
the  precaution  to  throw  up  earth-works 
on  the  Brock  road.  Holding  these 
works  with  his  left,  he  threw  forward 
his  right  ^nd  centre,  consisting  of  two 
divisions,  under  Birney,  Getty’s  com- 
mand, and  the  brigades  of  Owen  and 
Carroll,  of  Gibbon’s  division.  Half 
and  half  work  formed  no  part  of  Han- 
cock’s calculations.  He  meant  to  strike 
a firm  and  decisive  blovv^  While  Bir- 
ney and  Getty  made  the  direct  attack 
along  the  plank  road  and  on  both 
sides  of  the  same,  Wadsworth,  having 
worked  his  way  across  that  part  of  the 
Second  corps  which  was  advancing 
along  the  right  of  the  plank  road,  was 
ready  to  strike  Hill  clean  on  the  left 
flank.  The  direct  and  flank  move- 
ments were  made  almost  simultane- 
ously ; and  so  furious  was  the  onset 
that,  after  an  hour’s  severe  fighting, 
the  ground  along  Hill’s  entire  front 
was  carried,  and  the  line  driven  back 
through  the  woods  for  about  a mile 
and  a half.  Hill’s  troops,  in  fact,  could 
not  be  halted  until  they  had  overrun 
the  trains,  artillery,  and  even  the  head- 
quarters of  the  Confederate  commander. 
The  rifle-pits  had  ])een  captured,  with 
many  prisoners,  and  five  stands  of 
colors.  It  seemed  as  if  the  battle  were 
already  won.  Another  vigorous  onset, 
and  the  presumption  is  that  Lee’s  army 
will  be  cut  in  two.  The  divisions  of 
Heth  and  Wilcox,  of  Hill’s  corps,  have 
been  litei*ally  shattered  to  pieces. 

At  this  supreme  moment,  from  som^ 


DEATH  OF  WADSWORTH. 


m 


cause  not  yet  sufficiently  explained — 
most  probably  because  of  the  disen- 
tegration  of  Hancock’s  line,  brought 
about  by  the  rough  and  tangled  ground 
over  which  it  had  passed — the  victors 
paused  in  their  triumphant  progress. 
The  pause  was  fatal.  It  was  now 
about  seven  o’clock.  Hancock  set 
about  rearranging  his  troops,  and  get- 
ttni^  them  into  battle  order.  He  had 
been  reinforced  by  Stevenson’s  divi- 
sion, of  Burnside’s  corps;  and  Wads- 
worth’s division  was  now  brought  into 
proper  line  of  battle.  Getty’s  divi- 
sion, now  completely  exhausted,  was 
replaced  by  Webb’s  brigade,  from 
Gibbon’s  command  on  the  left;  and 
Frank’s  brigade,  of  Barlow’s  division, 
was  pushed  forward  from  the  same 
flank.  In  making  these  arrangements, 
however,  two  precious  hours  were  wast- 
ed. These  hours  of  inaction  proved 
a great  gain  to  the  Confederates.  Hill’s 
remaaining  divisions  found  time  to  come 
up.  Longstreet,  too,  was  already  close 
at  hand.  Hancock  was  as  yet  ignorant 
of  the  near  presence  of  Longstreet. 
He  had  looked  for  him  in  another  di- 
rection. It  was  known  the  night  pre- 
vious that  he  was  marching  up  from 
Orange  Court  House ; and  the  unavoid- 
able conviction  was  that  his  object  was 
to  strike  Hancock  in  the  left  flank  and 
rear.  It  was  because  of  this  conviction 
that  Hancock  had  only  advanced  his 
right  divisions,  leaving  his  left,  under 
Gibbon,  in  charge  of  the  works  on  the 
Brock  road.  Hancock  had  correctly 
judged.  Longstreet  had  really  been 
making  such  a movement.  So  Sudden, 
however,  and  so  overwhelming  had  been 


the  attack  on  his  front,  that  Lee,  fear- 
ing for  the  safety  of  his  whole  army, 
ordered  Longstreet  to  discontinue  his 
flank  movement,  and  to  come  to  the 
assistance  of  Hill.  His  arrangements 
completed,  Hancock  resumed  the  ad- 
vance with  great  energy.  The  line  in 
his  front  no  longer  yielded  to  his  touch. 
Again  and  again  he  attempted  to  press 
back  the  enemy;  but  it  was  all  in 
vain.  The  battle  now  rasfed  aorain 
with  great  fury,  deeds  of  daring  being 
performed  on  both  sides.  Lee  had  ex- 
hibited great  personal  bravery.  When 
Gregg’s  Texans  came  up,  he  put  him- 
self at  their  head,  and  was  with  diffi- 
culty dissuaded  from  leading  them  to 
the  attack.  For  two  hours  the  tide  of 
battle  ebbed  and  flowed.  It  soon  began 
to  be  evident  that  Longstreet  was  pre- 
sent in  force,  and  that  he  was  directing 
the  movements  of  the  Confederates  in 
Hancock’s  immediate  front.  Finding 
it  impossible  to  make  any  headway, 
nay,  feeling  more  and  more  the  irre^ 
sistible  pressure  of  the  foe,  Hancock 
ultimately  falls  back,  and  re-forms  on 
the  original  line  along  the  Brock  road. 
It  is  now  about  eleven  o’clock.  The 
situation  is  becoming  more  critical 
every  moment.  Wadsworth,  after  ex- 
hibiting great  gallantry,  has  just  fallen, 
pierced  through  the  head  with  a bullet; 
and  his  command  is  in  utter  rout.'^  It 

* James  Samuel  Wadsworth,  brigadior-general  of 
volunteers,  was  born  in  Geneseo,  Livingston  county, 
N.  Y.,  October  30th,  1807.  He  was  the  son  of 
James  Wadsworth,  extensive  landowner  }md  philan- 
thropist of  Geneseo.  He  studied  at  Hartford  and 
afterwards  at  Yale,  where  he  graduated.  Choosing  law 
as  a profession,  he  spent  some  time  in  the  office  of  the 
great  lawyer  and  statesman,  Daniel  Webster.  He  took 
an  active  part  in  the  Free-Soil  movement,  which  divided 


670 


THE  WILDERNESS. 


seems  as  if  no  force  can  check  the  fierce, 
onward  rush  of  the  now  triumphant 
Confederates.  A few  moments  more 
and  Hancock  may  be  driven  from  his 
works,  and  the  National  left  doubled 
up.  At  this  supreme  moment,  when 
the  Confederates  seem  about  to  reap 
the  rewards  of  victory,  there  is  a sud- 
den pause  in  the  battle.  Why,  no  one 
could  tell.  It  afterwards  appeared 
that,  when  about  to  deal  a decisive 
blow  both  on  Hancock’s  front  and  left 
flank,  Longstreet  was  shot,  by  mistake, 
by  his  own  men.  He  had  been  riding 
with  his  staff  at  the  head  of  his  col- 
umn, when  the  cavalcade  suddenly  con- 
fronted a portion  of  the  flanking  force, 
and  was  mistaken  for  a party  of  Na- 
tional horsemen.  It  was  an  unfortunate 
occurrence  for  Longstreet,  and,  indeed, 
for  the  whole  Confederate  army ; but 
it  was  the  salvation  of  Hancock,  and, 
probably,  of  the  entire  army  of  the 
Potomac. 

Although  the  fighting  had,  so  far, 
been  mostly  done  by  the  National 
left,  the  centre  and  right  had  not  been 
idle.  Sedgwick,  who  was  attacked  in 
the  early  morning,  but  who  had  suc- 
cessfully maintained  his  position,  had 

the  democracy  of  the  State.  He  voted  for  the  repub- 
lican candidates  for  presidential  honors  in  1856,  and 
again  in  1860.  Like  his  father,  he  took  a deep  interest 
in  all  educational  and  philanthropic  movements.  He 
was  commissioner  to  the  Peace  Convention  held  in 
Washington,  in  1861.  When  communication  with  the 
capital  was  cut  off,  he  chartered  two  ships  on  his  own 
responsibility,  loaded  them  with  provisions,  and  pro- 
ceeded with  them  to  Annapolis.  He  commenced  his 
military  career  as  a volunteer  aide  to  General  McDowell, 
and  was  present  at  the  first  battle  of  Bull  Run.  On 
McDowell's  recommendation,  he  was  appointed  briga- 
dier-general of  volunteers,  August,  1861.  In  March, 
1862,  he  became  military  governor  of  the  District  of 


labored  in  vain  to  cai*ry  certain  in- 
trenchraents,  behind  which  Ewell  had 
sheltered  his  men.  His  attempts  had 
been  frequently  repeated;  his  losses, 
in  consequence,  were  great.  Two  of 
Warren’s  divisions  had  been  detached 
and  sent  to  the  assistance  of  Hancock. 
The  other  two  divisions — those  of  Grif- 
fin and  Crawford — held  a simply  defen- 
sive attitude.  It  was  part  of  the  plan 
of  the  day  that  Burnside,  advancing 
through  the  opening  between  Warren 
and  Hancock,  should  co-operate  in  the 
general  advance.  It  was  not,  however, 
until  the  afternoon  that  he  became  en- 
gaged with  the  enemy ; and  the  results 
were  unimportant.  It  had,  in  fact, 
already  become  apparent  that  a mistake 
had  been  committed,  in  permitting 
Burnside  to  remain  in  independent 
command. 

After  the  repulse  of  Hancock  by 
Longstreet,  there  was  an  almost  un- 
broken lull  along  the  whole  line  of 
battle  until  about  four  o’clock.  When 
Longstreet  was  wounded,  Lee  took  for- 
mal charge  of  that  part  of  the  field. 
He  was  slow,  however,  in  making  his 
dispositions.  Hancock  had  turned  to 
good  account  the  time  which  had  been 

Columbia.  In  November  of  that  year,  he  was  the  re- 
publican canditate  for  governor  of  New  York,  but  was 
defeated  by  Mr.  Seymour,  the  democratic  candidate. 
In  December  following,  he  was  assigned  to  the  com- 
mand of  a division  in  the  army  of  the  Potomac.  At 
Fredericksburg  and  at  Chancellors vi lie,  he  revealed 
some  of  the  first  qualities  of  a military  commander; 
and  at  Gettysburg,  his  division  saved  the  first  day. 
When  the  army  of  the  Potomac  was  reorganized.  Gen- 
eral Wadsworth  was  assigned  to  the  command  of  the 
Fourth  division,  of  the  Fifth  corps.  At  the  head  of 
this  division,  as  has  been  shown  in  the  text,  ha  bravely 
met  his  death.  Wadsworth’s  career  illustrated  all  the 
higher  and  nobler  characteristics  of  the  genuine  patjdoL 


CARROLL’S  SPLEIS-DID  CHARGE. 


671 


allowed  him.  Reinforcements  had  been 
sent  him  by  Meade ; his  position  had 
been  greatly  strengthened ; and,  * his 
front  having  been  cleared  by  a well- 
executed  movement  made  by  Colonel 
Leasiire,  he  was  fully  prepared  to  meet 
the  enemy.  He  had  already  received 
orders  from  Grant  to  resume  the  attack 
at  six  o’clock.  He  was  not  to  be  al- 
lowed to  wait  so  long.  Shortly  after 
four  o’clock,  Lee,  who  by  this  time  had 
got  the  troops  of  Longstreet  and  Hill 
well  in  hand,  hurled  them  against  Han- 
cock’s lines.  It  was  evidently  intended 
that  the  blow  should  be  fatal.  The 
Confederate  columns,  four  in  number, 
came  rolling  forward,  firm,  solid  and 
resolute,  as  if  they  meant  destruction. 
Without  halting  or  firing  a shot,  they 
approached  the  edge  of  the  abatis^  less 
than  a hundred  paces  from  Hancock’s 
front.  Here  they  paused  and  opened 
a furious  fire  of  musketry,  which  was 
kept  up  with  great  vigor.  It  had 
little  effect,  however,  on  Hancock’s 
men,  who  were  safe  behind  their 
breast-works,  and  who  replied  with  be- 
coming energy  to  the  Confederate  mus- 
keteers. While  this  was  going  on,  a 
fire,  which  had  broken  out  in  the 
woods  in  the  afternoon,  communicated 
with  the  log  breast-works,  which  soon 
became  a mass  of  flame.  The  smoke 
and  flame,  which  were  driven  by  the 
wind  in  the  faces  of  the  Nationals,  thus 
preventing  them  from  firing  from  the 
parapet,  gave  an  advantage  to  the  Con- 
federates. Not  slow  to  seize  the  oppor- 
tunity, Lee’s  men  rushed  forward,  broke 
through  the  first  line,  pressed  into  the 
breast-works,  and  crowded  them  with 


their  standards.  At  this  critical  mo- 
ment, when  some  of  the  Nationals  wei  e 
already  in  full  retreat  towards  Chan- 
cellorsville,  Carroll,  of  Gibbon’s  divi- 
sion, in  obedience  to  orders  from 
General  Birney,  rushed  forward  by  the 
left  flank,  and,  falling  with  tremendous 
fury  on  the  triumphant*  Confederates, 
routed  them  with  great  slaughter,  re- 
claimed the  works,  and  saved  the  day. 
At  this  point  the  attack  was  not  re- 
sumed. 

Later  in  the  day,  and  just  befoi'e 
dark,  a vigorous  attack  was  made  by 
Ewell  on  the  right  and  front  of  Sedg- 
wick’s corps,  on  the  extreme  National 
right.  It  was  a complete  surprise  to 
the  Nationals ; and,  although  Sedgwick 
quickly  got  his  corps  into  order,  and  re- 
pelled the  attack,  it  was  not  until  Gen- 
erals Seymour  and  Shaler,  of  Ricketts’ 
division,  had  been  captured,  with  about 
4000  of  their  oflicers  and  men.  It  was 
now  dark.  The  sound  of  battle  ceased. 
The  wearied  soldiers,  lying  in  many 
cases  beside  dead  or  wounded  com- 
rades, fell  asleep  on  their  arms.  The 
piteous  moanings  of  the  wounded  alone 
disturbed  the  surrounding  solitude. 
The  battle  of  the  Wilderness,  proper- 
ly so  called,  was  ended. 

The  two  days’  fighting  had  result- 
ed in  serious  loss  to  both  armies. 
The  loss  on  the  National  side  reached 
the  high  figure  of  20,000  men,  of 
whom  probably  5000  were  made  pris- 
oners. On  the  part  of  the  Con- 
federates the  loss  was  proportionate- 
ly great,  the  lowest  estimate  being 
10,000,  of  whom  but  few  were  cap- 
tured. Among  the  killed  on  the 


672 


THE  WILDERNESS. 


National  side  were  Generals  Wads- 
worth, Hays  and  Webb;  and  Han- 
cock, Getty,  Gregg,  Owen,  Bartlett 
and  Carroll  were  wounded,  some  of 
them  severely.  Of  the  Confederate 
( fficers.  Generals  Jones,  Jenkins  and 
Stafford  were  killed ; and  Generals 
Longstreet,  P^grain,  Pickett  and  Hun- 
ter were  wounded.  Such  a bush-fight 
had  never  been  fought  before. 

The  7th  was  Saturday.  On  the 
jljay  moi*ning  of  that  day,  the  rival 
7*  armies  still  confronted  each  other 
in  the  Wilderness.  Both  were  bleed- 
ing and  exhausted;  and  on  neither  the 
one  side  nor  the  other  was  there  any 
disposition  to  renew  the  contest.  In 
the  National  ranks,  there  were  not  a 
few  who  were  of  the  opinion  that  a 
backward  march  across  the  Rapidan 
would  soon  be  ordered.  Such  thoughts, 
however,  found  no  place  in  the  mind 
of  General  Grant.  His  eye  was  fixed 
on  Richmond ; and,  although  seas  of 
blood  might  lie  between  him  and  the 
Confederate  capital,  he  was  not  to  be 
driven  from  his  purpose,  or  turned  aside 
from  the  object  of  his  ambition.  Dur- 
ing the  course  of  the  day,  it  became  more 
and  more  apparent  that  Lee  was  falling 
back  in  the  direction  of  Richmond.  It 
was  Grant’s  belief  that  Lee,  convinced 
of  his  inability  to  maintain  the  contest 
in  the  open  field,  had  decided  to  retire 
and  await  an  attack  behind  his  own 
works.  His  own  mind  was  quickly 
made  up ; and  he  resolved,  by  a flank 
movement  on  the  Confederate  right, 
to  interpose  his  whole  force  between 
Lee  and  Richmond.  Orders  were  given 
accordingly ; and,  shortly  after  night- 


fall, the  entire  National  army  was  on 
its  way  to  Spottsylvania  Court  House, 
some  thirteen  miles  further  to  the 
southeast.  Warren  led  the  way,  fol- 
lowed by  Hancock,  both  on  the  Brock 
road.  Sedgwick  and  Burnside  moved 
on  an  exterior  route,  by  way  of  Chan- 
cellors ville,  where,  during  the  coui'se 
of  the  afternoon,  the  army  trains  had 
been  parked.  By  this  movement,  it 
will  be  perceived.  Grant  abandoned 
Germania  Ford,  and  gave  Lee  an 
opportunity  to  cut  off  his  communica- 
tions. This,  however,  was  of  the  less 
consequence,  that  the  latter  general 
was  now  under  the  necessity  of  taking 
care  of  his  own  communications,  his 
right  flank  being  already  seriously 
threatened.  Germania  Ford,  in  fact, 
was  now  of  little  use  to  Grant;  and 
Lee  might  take  possession,  or  not,  as  he 
thought  fit.  Lee  was  not  slow  to  dis- 
cover the  real  object  of  his  antagonist, 
and  to  take  measures  accordingly. 
Anderson,  who  now  commanded  Long- 
street’s  corps,  received  orders  to  move 
from  the  breast-works  and  take  a posi- 
tion from  which  he  would  be  able  to 
advance  on  Spottsylvania  Court  House 
in  the  early  morning.  Not  finding  a 
suitable  place  for  bivouacking,  in  con- 
sequence of  the  fire  in  the  woods,  An- 
derson kept  moving  on  all  night  in 
the  direction  of  the  Court  House.  It 
thus  happened  that  AVarren  and  An- 
derson, the  former  by  the  Brock  road, 
the  latter  by  a parallel  road  a little 
further  to  the  west,  were  simultane- 
ously marching  to  the  same  point. 

It  W’as  about  nine  o’clock  in  the 
morninoj  when  Warren  bei^an  to  move 


ALSOFS  FARM. 


673 


his  column.  His  desire  was  to  reach 
Spottsylvania  Court  House  before  the 
enemy  could  have  time  to  be  there  in 
anything  like  force.  Unfortunately, 
howevei’,  his  course  was  greatly  ob- 
structed, and  his  progress  hindered. 
At  Todd’s  Tavern  he  was  delayed  for 
two  hours,  the  road  being  blocked  by 
Meade’s  cavalry  escort.  About  two 
miles  further  on,  and  near  one  of  the 
tributaries  of  the  Po,  he  was  again 
brought  to  a standstill  by  the  cavalry 
division  of  General  Merritt,  who,  the 
day  before,  and  up  to  a late  hour  of 
the  night,  had  been  engaged  fighting 
Stuart.  At  this  point  he  lost  three 
hours.  It  was  already  daylight and 
when  he  resumed  the  advance,  the 
road  was  obstructed  with  barricades  of 
heavy  trees.  Considerable  time  was 
consumed  in  removing  these;  and  it 
lyfay  was  not  until  eight  o’clock  on 
Sunday  morning  that  the  head 
of  Warren’s  column,  composed  of  two 
brigades,  under  Robinson,  emerged 
from  the  woods,  and  took  position  on 
the  open  ground  at  what  was  called 
Alsop’s  Farm.  This  open  ground  or 
clearing  covei*ed  a space  of  about  150 
acres,  and  was  distant  from  Spott- 
sylvania Court  House  some  two  miles. 
At  this  point,  the  road  from  Todd’s 
Tavern  forks — one  branch  leading  to 
the  Court  blouse,  and  the  other  to 
Laurel  Hill.  The  open  space  was 
traversed  by  an  inconsiderable  stream 
called  the  Ny;  and  the  ground  be- 
yond, which  ascended  towards  Spottsyl- 
vania, was  again  covered  with  woods. 
Warren’s  advance  was  half  way  across 
the  clearing,  and  on  the  point  of 


commencing  the  ascent  of  the  crest, 
when,  all  of  a sudden,  the  ridge 
blazed  with  cannon,  and  a murder- 
ous musketry  fij’e  burst  forth  from 
the  woods.  It  was  an  unlooked-for 
reception.  The  National  line  stag- 
gered, and  fell  back.  A stampede 
seemed  to  be  imminent.  Robinson 
exerted  himself  to  the  utmost  to  hold 
his  men  to  their  work.  Getting  his 
batteries  into  position  on  the  right,  he 
returned  the  enemy’s  fire  promptly  and 
with  vigor.  He  was  soon,  however, 
severely  wounded  in  the  knee;  and 
his  men,  thus  left  without  their  leader, 
and  retaining  a lively  recollection  of 
their  bitter  experience  in  the  Wilder- 
ness, fell  back  in  some  confusion  to 
the  woods,  where,  through  the  personal 
exertions  of  General  Warren  himself, 
they  were,  after  some  difficulty,  rallied 
and  re-formed.  Soon  afterwards  came 
up  Griffin’s  division,  which  met  with  a 
similar  reception,  with  a like  result. 
Meanwhile,  Crawford’s  division  and 
that  of  Wadsworth,  now  commanded 
by  Cutler,  had  reached  the  battle- 
ground. Crawford  advanced  on  Grif- 
fin’s left ; Cutler  advanced  on  his  right; 
and,  in  a brief  space,  the  woods  on 
both  flanks  wei*e  cleared  of  the  enemy. 
Warren’s  entire  corps  was  now  drawn 
up  in  battle  line;  and  the  troops,  as 
if  convinced  that  another  fierce  and 
bloody  battle  was  about  to  be  fought, 
proceeded  of  their  own  accord  to  throw 
up  intrenchments.  Such  was  the  com- 
mencement of  the  great  struggle  at 
Spottsylvania  Court  House.  The  fight- 
ing had  been  severe.  The  losses  were 
' heavy.  On  the  National  side,  about 


674 


THE  WILDERNESS. 


1300  men  were  put  hors  de  combat. 
Some  of  the  regiments  were  almost 
cut  to  pieces.  The  First  Michigan, 
which  went  into  the  fight  200  strong, 
came  out  with  only  23  men  uninjured. 
The  heat  was  most  intense ; and  large 
numbers  of  the  men  suffered  from  sun- 
stroke, The  engagement  of  Sunday 
morning,  the  8th  of  May,  is  known  as 
the  battle  of  Alsop’s  Farm. 

It  was  the  head  of  Longstreet’s 
corps,  commanded,  as  we  have  already 
seen,  by  Anderson,  with  which  Warren 
had  come  in  collision.  It  was  an  unex- 
pected collision ; and,  resulting  as  it 
did,  it  was  in  the  last  degree  unfortu- 
nate to  the  National  cause.  If  Ander- 
son had  not  been  at  Spottsylvania 
Court  House  ahead  of  Warren,  there 
can  be  no  doubt  that  the  story  of 
that  morning’s  fight  would  have  been 
altogether  different.  How  mysterious- 
ly the  fates  seemed  to  be  working  in 
the  interest  of  the  Confederates ! How 
much  had  been  done  for  them  by  that 
fire  in  the  woods!  It  had  given  them 
their  opportunity,  and  almost  a victory, 
the  day  before.  It  had  prevented 
Anderson  from  bivouacking,  and,  by 
compelling  him  to  march  all  night,  had 
enabled  him,  without  any  knowledge 
or  purpose  of  his  own,  to  anticipate 
the  arrival  of  Warren,  and  so  to  inter- 
pose an  obstacle  to  the  advance  of 
Grant’s  army.  And  how  strange  that 
Meade’s  own  cavalry  should  have 
blocked  the  way  of  his  own  infantry ! 
Every  obstruction  put  in  Warren’s  way 
was  a benefit  to  Lee.  Every  moment 
Warren  was  delayed  was  a double  gain 
to  the  Confederates.  But  for  the  fire 


in  the  woods,  which  hastened  Ander- 
son’s onward  march,  and  but  for  the 
unfortunate  obstructions  which  hin- 
dered Warren’s  progress,  the  National 
advance,  it  is  reasonable  to  presume, 
would  first  have  reached  the  clearing 
at  Alsop’s  Farm.  In  such  a case,  the 
first  great  purpose  of  General  Grant 
would  have  been  accomplished — Gen- 
eral Lee’s  ris^ht  would  have  been  turned. 
As  it  was,  Lee  had  succeeded  in  plant- 
ing his  army  right  across  Grant’s  line  of 
march,  and  in  establishing  a powerful 
bulwark  of  defense  on  the  Spottsyl- 
vania Bidge.  This  movement  upon 
Spottsylvania  brought  prominently  in- 
to view,  and  shed  fresh  lustre  on,  the 
great  abilities  of  the  two  rival  com- 
manders. The  hand  of  Lee  and  the 
hand  of  Grant  were  distinctly  visible. 
Skill  in  combination,  promptitude  of 
action  and  rapidity  of  movement  en- 
titled the  one  to  the  victory ; and  tem- 
porary failure  only  served  to  bring  into 
more  conspicuous  relief  the  military 
science  which  characterized  the  general 
plan  of  the  other. 

After  the  experience  of  the  morning, 
Warren  did  not  feel  himself  strong 
enough  to  renew  the  attack.  He 
awaited,  therefore,  the  arrival  of  Sedg- 
wick, who  came  up  in  the  afternoon, 
and,  in  the  absence  of  Meade,  assumed 
command.  Meade,  with  the  whole  of 
Hancock’s  corps,  except  the  division 
of  Gibbon,  had  remained  at  Todd’s 
Tavern,  where,  it  was  feared,  the  Con- 
federates were  about  to  make  an  attack 
in  force.  With  the  two  corps,  Sedg- 
wick believed  himself  strong  enough 
! to  attempt  to  drive  the  enemy  from 


DEATH  OF  SEDGWICK. 


675 


his  favored  position  on  the  ridge;  but 
it  was  nearly  sundown  before  his  dis- 
positions were  completed.  Towards 
evening,  a fruitless  assault  was  made 
by  a New  Jersey  brigade,  under  Gen- 
eral Neill ; and  General  Crawford, 
who  again  attempted  to  advance,  was 
vigorously  encountered  by  Ewell,  and 
driven  back  a full  mile,  with  the  loss 
of  about  100  men  made  prisoners.  On 
the  whole,  Sunday,  the  8th,  was  an 
unfortunate  day  for  the  Nationals.  In 
the  race  for  Spottsylvania,  the  Confed- 
erates were  clearly  the  winners ; and 
the  prize  was  of  almost  inestimable 
value.  On  the  night  of  the  above- 
mentioned  day,  Lee’s  army  was  well 
forw^ard,  and  firmly  entrenched  on  the 
liigh  ground  on  the  Spottsylvania  side 
of  the  clearing. 

On  the  morning  of  Monday,  the 
]»Iay  9th,  Meade’s  entire  army,  having 
arrived,  was  formed  in  order  of 
battle  in  front  of  the  Confederate  lines. 
Sedgwick  took  position  on  the  left  of 
W arren.  Burnside  was  posted  on  the 
left  of  Sedgwick.  Hancock,  who  had 
come  up  from  Todd’s  Tavern  at  an 
early  hour,  formed  in  line  on  Warren’s 
right,  on  high  ground  which  over- 
looked the  valley  of  the  River  Po. 
The  disposition  was,  therefore,  as  fol- 
lows: Burnside  on  the  left;  then  Sedg- 
wick; then  Warren,  with  Hancock  on 
the  right.  The  wings  were  thrown 
forward,  so  as  to  encircle  the  Confede- 
rate position.  A small  creek,  a branch 
of  the  Ny,  lay  between  the  position  of  the 
enemy  and  that  of  Warren  and  Sedg- 
wick ; it  also  separated  Hancock  from 
Warren.  Sheridan,  with  a strong  cav- 


alry force,  set  out,  in  the  morning,  on 
a grand  raid,  his  object  being  to  cut 
Lee’s  railroad  communications  with 
Richmond.  The  day  w^as  spent  chiefly 
in  throwing  up  iutrenchments,  and 
otherwise  preparing  for  battle.  There 
were  frequent  skirmishes ; and,  all  day 
long,  the  Confederate  sharpshooters, 
taking  advantage  of  their  peculiarly 
favored  position,  were  unusually  active. 
While  the  day  was  yet  young,  not  a 
few  of  the  Nationals  had  fallen  vic- 
tims to  their  unerring  and  deadly  aim. 
Among  these  was  General  Sedgwick. 
He  had  been  standing  in  the  breast- 
works, on  the  extreme  right  of  his  own 
corps,  and  giving  instructions  as  to  the 
posting  of  some  guns.  He  was  at- 
tended by  certain  members  of  his  staff. 
The  balls  of  the  sharpshooters  were 
whistling  past  them,  some  of  them 
dangerously  near.  One  or  two  of  those 
present  showed  signs  of  nervousness. 
“Pooh!  pooh!  men,”  said  Sedgwick, 
“they  could  not  hit  an  elephant  at  that 
distance.”  He  had  scarcely  uttered 
the  words,  when  he  fell  dead  on  the 
ground,  the  blood  streaming  from  his 
nostrils.  A bullet  had  pierced  his  face 
just  below  the  left  eye.  Death  was 
instantaneous.  A serene  smile  rested 
on  his  features,  as  if  connected  with 
his  last  words.  The  death  of  Sedg- 
wick was  a severe  blow  to  the  National 
cause.  He  was  one  of  the  most  com- 
petent and  most  trusted  soldiers  in  the 
army  of  the  Potomac.  He  was  sincere- 
ly lamented  by  the  entire  army;  and, 
as  soon  as  the  fact  of  his  death  became 
known,  the  nation  mourned  the  loss  of 
a true  patriot,  a brave  soldier  and  a 


678 


THE  WILDERNESS. 


true  nian.^'  General  Wright  succeeded 
to  the  command  of  the  Sixth  corps. 

On  the  morning  of  Tuesday,  the 
Iffay  10th,  everything  indicated  com- 
plete  preparation  for  battle. 
Grant  occupied  substantially  the  same 
position  as  on  the  previous  day.  His 
line  stretched  about  six  miles  on  the 
north  bank  of  the  Po,  in  the  form 
of  a crescent,  the  wings  thrown  for- 
ward. The  Second  corps,  across  the 
Po,  held  a line  on  the  right,  nearly 
parallel  to  the  road  from  Shady  Grove 
Church  to  the  Court  House ; the  Fifth 
held  the  centre,  on  the  east  side  of  the 
Po ; the  Sixth  held  the  left,  facing 
^the  Court  House ; the  Ninth  was  still 
further  to  the  left;  and  in  front  of  all 
was  a dense  forest.  Lee  held  Spottsyl- 

* Majok-Genekal  John  Sedgwick  was  born  in  Con- 
necticut about  1815.  He  graduated  at  West  Point  in 
1837.  Among  his  classmates  were  Benham,  Hooker, 
Arnold  and  French,  of  the  National  army,  and  Bragg, 
Eaily  and  Pemberton,  of  the  Confederate  service.  He 
took  part  in  the  Mexican  War,  and  distinguished  him- 
self in  the  attack  on  the  San  Cosmo  Gate,  which  re- 
sulted in  the  capture  of  the  city  of  Mexico.  At  the 
outbreak  of  the  Civil  War,  he  held  the  position  of  lieu- 
tenant-colonel of  the  Second  United  States  cavalry. 
On  the  31st  of  August,  1861,  he  was  commissioned  a 
brigadier-general  of  volunteers,  and  placed  in  command 
of  a brigade  of  the  army  of  the  Potomac.  We  soon 
after  find  him  commanding  the  Third  division,  of  the 
Second  corps,  under  General  Sumner.  He  fought,  and 
won  distinction,  in  the  Peninsular  campaign.  At  An- 
tietam  he  bore  himself  like  a very  hero  of  romance, 
being  twice  wounded.  With  his  record  at  the  battle 
of  Chancellorsville  and  at  Gettysburg,  the  reader  has 
already  been  made  familiar.  On  the  reorganization  of 
the  army  of  the  Potomac,  he  was  one  of  three  corps 
commanders  whom  Meade  wished  to  see  retained 
in  high  command.  Meade  loved  and  trusted  him, 
and,  on  more  than  one  occasion,  left  him  in  command 
of  the  entire  army.  His  career  in  the  Wilderness,  with 
its  untimely  end,  has  been  related  in  the  text.  Kind 
and  gentle  in  his  bearing,  he  was  yet  firm  of  character, 
and  a strict  disciplinarian.  His  corps  was,  in  conse- 
quence, one  of  the  best  in  discipline  and  morale  in  the 
whole  army. 


vania  and  the  ground  to  the  north  of 
the  Court  House.  His  left  rested  on 
Glady  Pun,  bending  to  the  north,  and 
was  sheltered  by  strong  works;  his 
right,  curving  also  to  the  north,  rested 
on  the  Ny;  his  centre,  slightly  thrown 
forward,  w^as  posted  on  commanding 
ground.,  The  entire  position  was  well 
supported  by  breast- works.  Not  much 
fighting  had  been  done  on  the  Monday. 
Towards  the  evening,  Hancock  made 
a movement  across  the  Po,  his  object 
being  to  capture  a wagon  train  which 
was  seen  moving  along  the  road  lead- 
ing to  Spottsylvania.  The  river  was 
crossed  without  difficulty;  but  night 
came  on  before  the  operation  could  be 
completed.  When  morning  dawned, 
the  original  object  of  the  movement 
no  longer  existed ; for  the  Confederate 
train  was  already  safe  behind  the  lines 
at  the  Court  House.  Hancock,  how- 
ever, was  bent  on  giving  effect  to  his 
purpose,  to  the  extent,  at  least,  of  se- 
curing a lodgment  nearer  the  enemy’s 
position.  In  developing  his  movement, 
he  found  it  necessary  again  to  cross 
the  Po,  which  runs  first  almost  due, 
east,  and  then,  as  it  nears  the  Court 
House,  makes  a sharp  bend  to  the 
south.  Two  miles  west  of  the  Court 
House,  it  is  spanned  by  a wooden 
bridge.  The  approaches  to  the  bridge, 
however,  were  all  so  completely  com- 
manded by  the  enemy,  that  a passage 
at  that  point  was  deemed  impractica- 
ble. Not  to  be  hindered  in  his  pur- 
pose, Hancock  had  just  succeeded  in 
thromng  across  the  brigade  of  Brooke, 
a short  distance  above,  when,  by  order 
of  General  Meade,  the  whole  movement 


BATTLE  OF  SPOTTSYLVANIA  COURT-HOUSE. 


LAUREL  HILL. 


er? 


was  suspended.  It  had  been  decided 
at  headquarters  to  make  an  attack  on 
Laurel  Hill,  a strong  position  in  front 
of  Warren  and  Wright;  and  Hancock 
was  ordered  to  send  two  divisions  to 
assist  in  the  proposed  assault.  The 
divisions  of  Gibbon  and  Birney  were  at 
once  retired,  the  enemy  taking  advan- 
tage of  the  backward  movement,  and 
falling  heavily  on  Birney’s  rear.  Bar- 
low’s division,  of  Hancock’s  corps,  was 
left  alone  on  the  south  side  of  the  Po. 
As  the  enemy  showed  a disposition  to 
attack,  this,  too,  was  quickly  with- 
drawn. It  was  already  almost  too 
late ; for  Barlow’s  skirmishers  were 
already  yielding  to  the  vigorous  pres- 
sure of  the  enemy.  Two  brigades  of 
the  division  were  got  off  without  seri- 
ous difficulty ; but  the  brigades  of 
Brooke  and  Brown  were  fiercely  at- 
tacked, and  compelled  to  hold  off  the 
foe  at  every  step  of  their  backward 
progress.  The  difficulties  of  their  po- 
sition were  aggravated  by  a fire,  which 
broke  out  in  the  woods  between  them 
and  the  river.  Those  five  brigades, 
however,  were  not  to  be  dismayed. 
They  succeeded  at  once  in  repelling  the 
assailants  and  in  recrossing  the  stream. 
The  remarkaVde  coolness  and  self-pos- 
session of  the  men  alone  saved  them 
from  great  disaster.  As  it  was,  they 
sustained  the  loss  of  many  men  in 
killed  and  wounded,  and  one  gun — 
the  first  gun  ever  lost  by  the  Second 
corps.  Not  a few  of  the  wounded 
were  left  to  perish  in  the  flames. 
This  movement  of  Hancock  was  as  un- 
fortunate in  its  result,  as  it  was  ill- 
judged  in  its  inception.  It  revealed 


the  metal  of  the  men,  and  the  pluck 
and  endurance  of  the  chiefs  of  brigades 
and  divisions;  but  it  reflected  no  glory 
on  the  corps  commander. 

Meanwhile,  the  Nationals  had  made 
two  unsuccessful  attempts  on  Laurel 
Hill.  This  was,  perhaps,  the  most  for- 
midable point  along  the  entire  front 
of  the  enemy’s  position.  It  had  been 
attacked  in  the  forenoon  by  the  bri- 
gades of  Webb  and  Carroll.  It  was 
attacked  more  fiercely  in  the  after- 
noon by  the  divisions  of  Crawford  and 
Cutler.  These  attempts  but  revealed 
the  enormous  strength  of  the  position. 
When  Hancock  arrived  and  joined 
Warren,  arrangements  were  made  for 
a united  assault  by  the  entire  strength 
of  the  Fifth  and  Sixth  corps.  It 
was  now  five  o’clock  in  the  afternoon. 
The  assault  was  made  in  splendid  style. 
In  the  face  of  a most  withering  fire, 
the  Nationals  in  thousands — now  in 
steady  line,  now  as  if  in  broken  groups, 
their  standard-bearers  always  conspicu- 
ous— were  seen  struggling  up  the  slopes, 
and,  at  one  or  two  points,  even  pene- 
trating the  breast-works.  It  was  found 
impossible,  however,  to  effect  a lodg- 
ment or  to  press  on  against  the 
decimating  fire.  The  Nationals  were 
compelled  to  fall  back,  and  not  with- 
out dreadful  loss.  An  hour  later, 
notwithstanding  the  fearful  loss  of  life 
in  the  previous  encounter,  the  assault 
w^as  repeated.  It  was  made,  if  possi- 
ble, with  even  greater  bravery : it  was 
repulsed  with  a still  more  dreadful 
slaughter.  The  army  of  the  Potomac 
had  already  witnessed  much  dreadful 
work.  It  had  never  before  witnessed 


C78 


THE  WILDERNESS. 


such  work  as  this.  Not  once,  since 
the  commencement  of  the  war,  had 
such  masses  of  men,  in  obedience  to 
orders,  marched  to  destruction.  In 
these  two  assaults  alone,  the  Nationals 
lost  nearly  6000  men.  Among  the 
killed  were  Generals  J.  C.  Hice"^'  and 
T.  G.  Stevenson. 

It  was  not,  however,  a day  of  dis- 
aster along  the  whole  line.  To  the 
left  of  Warren,  a vigorous  assault  was 
made  on  what  seemed  a weak  point  in 
the  Confederate  line  by  two  brigades 
of  the  Sixth  corps — twelve  picked  regi- 
ments, under  Colonel  Upton.  The  at- 
tack was  a complete  success.  The  first 
line  of  intrenchments  was  carried ; and 
several  guns,  with  over  900  prisoners, 
were  captured.  Upton  expected  assist- 
ance from  Mott ; but  the  latter  failed 
to  come  to  the  rescue.  Unable,  with- 
out support,  to  maintain  the  advantage 
he  had  won,  Upton  fell  back  to  the 

* James  Clay  Eice,  a brigadier-general  of  volun- 
teers, was  born  at  Worthington,  Mass.,  December  27th, 
1829.  His  early  life  was  spent  in  a struggle  to  obtain 
an  education  ; and,  in  1854,  he  graduated  with  high 
honors  at  Yale  College.  After  some  experience  as  a 
teacher  and  editor,  he  studied  law  in  Natchez,  Miss., 
and  was  admitted  to  the  bar  in  that  State.  He  was  in 
New  York  and  practising  law  when  the  Civil  War  broke 
out.  He  entered  the  service  as  a private  in  the  Gari- 
baldi Guard.  He  soon  rose  to  be  colonel  of  the  Forty- 
Fourth  New  York  volunteers,  which  he  led  through 
the  Peninsular  campaign,  under  McClellan,  and  at 
Manassas,  under  Pope.  He  was  sick  and  unable  to  be 
present  at  Antietam ; but  he  fought  at  Fredericksburg, 
at  the  head  of  his  regiment,  also  at  Chancellorsville, 
A'here  he  was  temporarily  in  command  of  a brigade, 
and  again  at  Gettysburg,  where  he  greatly  distinguished 
himself.  After  Gettysburg,  on  the  recommendation  of 
Meade,  he  was  made  brigadier-general  of  volunteers, 
In  which  capacity  he  fought  in  the  Wilderness  and  on 
the  banks  of  the  Po,  where  he  gallantly  met  his  death. 
His  last  words  were,  “Turn  me  over,  that  I may  die 
with  my  face  to  the  enemy.”  Eice  was  a man  of  deep 
religious  principle. 


National  lines,  carrying  with  him  his 
prisoners,  but  leaving  the  captured 
guns  behind. 

Such  was  the  terrible  10th  of  May 
at  Spottsylvania  Court  House.  The 
losses  on  both  sides,  for  the  wdiole  day, 
were  heavy.  The  National  loss  was 
estimated  at  10,000.  The  Confederate 
loss,  including  killed,  wounded  and 
missing,  was  probably  not  under  9,000. 
On  neither  side,  however,  was  there 
any  disposition  to  yield.  On  the  con- 
trary, both  commanders  were  resolved 
to  renew  the  conflict  on  the  morrow; 
and  preparations  were  made  accord- 
ingly. 

On  the  morning  of  the  11th,  Gen- 
eral Grant  sent  a characteristic 
despatch  to  the  secretary  of  war.  H. 
^‘We  have  now,”  he  wrote,  “ended 
the  sixth  day  of  very  hard  fighting. 
The  result  to  this  time  is  much  in  our 
favor.  Our  losses  have  been  heavy,  as 
well  as  those  of  the  enemy.  I think 
the  loss  of  the  enemy  must  be  greater. 
We  have  taken  over  5000  prisoners  in 
battle,  while  he  has  taken  from  us  but 
few,  except  stragglers.  I 'propof^e  to 
fight  it  out  on  this  line^  if  it  takes  all 
summer y As  to  the  wisdom  of  the 
determination  expressed  in  this  final 
sentence,  different  opinions  have  been 
entertained  and  expressed.  General 
Grant  had  certainly  another  course  open 
to  him.  He  might  have  executed  an 
effective  turning  operation,  by  moving 
southward  and  crossing  the  James 
River;  and  many  competent  critics 
have  declared  that  by  adopting  such  a 
course  at  this  stage,  the  success  which 
ultimately  rewarded  his  efforts  would 


THE  SALIENT. 


679 


have  been  secured  with  at  least  equal 
expedition,  and  certainly  at  a less  costly 
sacrifice  of  human  life.  It  is  always 
more  easy  to  say  what  might  have 
been  done,  and  what  could  have  been 
done,  when  the  past  is  looked  at  in  the 
light  of  the  present.  General  Grant 
knew  he  was  confronted  by  a powerful, 
wily,  skilful  antagonist — a commander 
in  every  respect  his  equal,  and  in  some 
senses  his  superior.  He  knew  that  he 
could  count  on  superior  numbers;  but 
he  was  aware  also  that  he  was  opposed 
by  an  army  which,  in  discipline  and 
morale^  had  never  been  surpassed  in  the 
history  of  human  warfare.  What  diffi- 
culties might  be  attendant  on  a change 
of  base  he  could  neither  foretell  nor 
foresee.  . In  this  overland  campaign,  in 
ti’uth,  as  at  Vicksburg,  General  Gi*ant, 
while  holding  tenaciously  to  his  pur- 
pose, was  climbing  the  ladder  of  expe- 
rience. His  success  had  not  yet  been 
gi-eat;  but  it  had  been  encouraging. 
Each  successive  day  was  giving  force 
to  his  determination  and  strength  to 
his  grasp;  and  out  of  the  darkness,  if 
darkness  it  could  be  called,  he  was 
gradually  working  his  'way  to  a clearer 
light — to  a fuller  knowledge  of  the 
necessities  and  possibilities  of  his  sit- 
uation. He  would  fight  it  out  on  this 
line  if  it  took  all  summer — such  was 
his  determination ; but  it  did  not  by 
any  means  follow  that,  if  another  and 
more  advantageous  course  offered,  he 
would  close  his  eyes  to  the  opportu- 
nity. Whatever  might  be  the  inherent 
value  of  the  determination,  the  declara- 
tion of  the  same  gladdened  the  Na- 
tional heart,  and  filled  it  Muth  hope; 


and  the  words  in  which  it  was 
couched  have  assumed  permanent  form, 
and  added  a fresh  phrase  to  English 
speech. 

The  11th  was  Wednesday.  The 
morning  rose  bright  and  clear.  The 
two  opposing  armies  lay  in  close  prox- 
imity to  each  other.  As  the  day  ad- 
vanced there  was  some  skirmishing ; 
but  on  neither  side  was  any  attempt 
made  to  provoke  a general  engage- 
ment. Both  commanders,  it  was  evi- 
dent, were  preparing  for  battle;  nor 
could  doubt  remain  in  any  mind  that, 
whatever  might  be  the  result,  another 
and  even  more  fearful  encounter  at 
Spottsylvania  was  imminent.  Grant 
was  still  bent  on  carrying  out  his 
policy  of  continuous  hammering.  His 
success,  however,  on  the  Tuesday,  in 
his  repeated  attacks  on  the  enemy’s 
left  and  left  centre,  had  not  been  en- 
couraging. There  was  no  reason  to 
hope  that  another  attack,  made  in  the 
same  direction,  'would  be  attended  with 
any  better  results.  It  was  resolved, 
therefore,  to  strike  a bold  and  effective 
blow  on  the  enemy’s  right  centre.  At 
that  point,  and  near  the  Landrum 
House,  Lee’s  lines  formed  a salient. 
It  was  Grant’s  conviction  that  the 
point  was  vulnerable.  Arrangements 
for  the  attack  were  made  forthwith. 
Hancock,  who  was  chosen  to  strike  the 
blow,  was  ordered  to  leave  his  en- 
trenchments in  front  of  A.  P.  Hill,  and, 
by  moving  to  the  left,  to  take  position 
between  the  Sixth  and  Ninth  corps. 
The  movement  was  to  have  the  sup- 
port of  the  entire  army.  Wright  was 
to  extend  his  left,  and  to  concentrate 


680 


THE  WILDERNESS. 


on  that  wing.  Warren  was  to  make  a 
diversionaiy  movement  on  the  Confed- 
erate left,  in  his  own  front,  the  object 
being  to  give  the  enemy  sufficient  em- 
ployment in  that  direction,  and  so  pre- 
vent the  withdrawal  of  his  troops  for 
the  relief  of  the  menaced  point.  Burn- 
side, for  a similar  reason,  was  to  make 
a vigorous  assault  on  the  extreme  left. 
Rain  fell  heavily  in  the  afternoon. 
When  night  came  the  rain-storm  had 
not  abated ; and,  as  the  moon  was  in 
its  first  quarter,  the  night  was  dark 
and  dismal.  Soon  after  midnight,  un- 
der cover  of  the  darkness  and  the 
storm,  Hancock  moved  out  from  his 
intrenchments,  and,  guided  by  the 
compass,  passed  in  rear  of  Warren 
and  Wright,  and  took  position  within 
1200  yards  of  the  enemy’s  front,  at 
the  point  to  be  attacked.  Barlow’s 
division,  in  two  lines  of  masses,  was 
placed  on  the  left;  Birney’s  division, 
in  two  deployed  lines,  was  placed  on 
the  right;  Mott’s  division,  Hancock’s 
Fourth,  supported  Birney;  and  Gib- 
bon’s division  was  held  in  reserve. 
Of  the  actual  strength  of  the  position 
about  to  be  attacked,  the  Nationals 
knew  nothing.  It  might  be  weak  and 
defenseless.  It  might  be  well  forti- 
fied, and  proof  again  ,t  any  attack.  It 
mattered  not.  Hancock  was  ready, 
waiting  for  the  first  streak  of  early 
dawn,  to  launch  forth  his  brave  battal- 
ions to  victory  or  to  death. 

It  is  now  half-past  four  o’clock  on 
jlay  the  morning  of  Thursday,  May 
*2.  the  12th.  A heavy  fog  is  rest- 
ing on  the  entire  surrounding  country ; 
and  the  feeble  light  of  the  rising  sun 


struggles  hard  to  penetrate  the  gloom. 
Hancock’s  divisions  are  already  in  mo- 
tion. Steadily  and  silently  they  move 
towards  the  salient — Barlow  over  open 
ground,  which  extends  up  to  the  Con- 
federate lines,  Birney  through  the 
thickly  wooded  ground  more  to  the 
right.  Not  a shot  has  yet  been  fired 
— not  a word  uttered.  More  than 
half  of  the  intervening  distance  has 
already  been  crossed.  Suddenly,  there 
is  a loud -resounding  cheer,  which 
rings  along  the  whole  line.  Sponta- 
neously, the  men  take  the  double- 
quick.  On  they  roll,  like  a resistless 
wave.  Nothing  can  now  restrain  their 
fierce  impetuosity.  They  have  reached 
the  ahatis^  torn  it  up,  and  tossed  it 
aside.  With  wild  cries,  timy  rush 
bounding  over  the  intrenchments,  Bar- 
low  and  Birney’s  men  entering  almost 
simultaneously.  Inside  the  intrench- 
ments there  is  a terrible  hand-to-hand 
struggle,  the  bayonet  and  the  clubbed- 
musket  being  freely  used.  Nothing, 
however,  can  save  the  doomed  Confed- 
erates. Some  4000  men,  including 
General  Johnson,  of  Ewell’s  corps,  and 
General  George  H.  Stewart,  are  sur- 
rounded and  captured  ; and  with  them 
thirty  pieces  of  artillery  and  as  many 
colors.  Meanwhile,  the  remainder  of 
the  Confederate  force,  stricken  with 
terror  and  thrown  into  the  wildest  con- 
fusion, have  fallen  back,  seeking  safety 
in  the  rear. 

This  attack  of  Hancock’s  was  justly 
regarded  as  the  most  brilliant  feat  of 
arms  yet  accomplished  in  the  cam- 
paign. Never  was  surprise  more  com- 
plete or  more  successful.  The  officers 


A GREAT  BATTLE. 


681 


were  taken  at  their  breakfast.  The 
captured  generals  were  greatly  morti- 
fied. When  brought  into  his  presence, 
Hancock  received  them  courteously, 
extending  his  hand.  Johnson  took  it, 
but,  with  tears  in  his  eyes,  declared 
that  he  would  rather  have  died  than 
been  made  a prisoner.  Stewart  be- 
haved with  less  gallantry.  Hancock 
had  known  him  before.  ‘‘How  are 
you,  Stewart  ? ” said  Hancock,  as  he 
offered  him  his  hand.  The  reply  was 
haughty  and  indignant.  “ I am  Gen- 
eral Stewart,  of  the  Confederate  army ; 
and,  under  present  circumstances,  I de- 
cline to  take  your  hand.”  “And  un- 
der any  other  circumstances,  general,” 
said  Hancock,  with  great  coolness,  “I 
should  not  have  offered  it.” 

An  hour  only  had  elapsed  since  the 
column  of  attack  was  formed.  Along 
with  the  prisoners,  which  he  sent  to 
Grant,  Hancock  sent  a note  hastily 
written  in  pencil,  saying;  “I  have 
finished  up  Johnson,  and  am  now 
going  into  Early.”  This  second  task, 
as  we  shall  soon  see,  he  found  to  be 
less  easy  of  accomplishment  than  the 
former.  Early,  like  Johnson,  com- 
manded a division  of  Ewell’s  corps. 
At  the  point  penetrated,  Lee’s  army, 
as  we  have  seen,  formed  a salient. 
Hancock  had,  therefore,  by  his  first 
success,  thrust  a wedge  between  the 
Confederate  right  and  centre.  It  was 
his  hope  that  he  would  be  able  to  cut 
Lee’s  army  in  two ; and  there  can  be 
no  doubt  that  if  sufficient  provision 
had  been  made,  promptly  and  in  force, 
to  follow  up  the  advantage  Hancock 
had  won  by  his  first  brilliant  assault, 


the  desired  end  would  have  been  ac- 
complished. As  it  was,  Hancock’s 
ti’oops,  flushed  with  success,  and  incap- 
able of  being  restrained  after  the  cap- 
ture of  the  intrench  men  ts,  pressed  on 
through  the  forest  in  the  direction  of 
Spottsylvania,  driving  the  flying  enemy 
before  them.  At  the  distance  of  half 
a mile,  they  were  suddenly  brought 
to  a halt  in  their  triumphant  career. 
They  had  reached  a fresh  line  of 
breast-works.  Behind  these  works 
Ewell  had  taken  shelter;  and  rein- 
forcements had  reached  him  from  the 
corps  of  Anderson  and  Hill.  The 
National  advance  was  now  effectually 
checked.  It  was  not  only  impossible 
to  make  headway — it  was  impossible 
to  remain  in  the  position  in  which  they 
found  themselves.  The  tide  of  battle 
was  now  turned.  Gathering  them- 
selves up  for  a supreme  effort,  the 
Confederates,  in  overwhelming  num- 
bers and  in  magnificent  array,  rushed 
fi’oni  the  breast-works,  and,  falling  with 
crushing  weight  on  Hancock’s  men, 
now  slightly  disordered  by  their  fear- 
less rush  through  the  woods,  drove 
them  back  to  the  line  which  they  had 
captured  in  the  early  morning.  Here, 
however,  Hancock  managed  to  rally 
his  troops;  and,  getting  them  into  line 
on  the  right  and  left  of  the  angle  of 
the  works,  he  stoutly  resisted  the  fierce 
and  repeated  onsets  of  the  enemy,  and 
firml}^  held  his  position.  His  situation, 
however,  was  becoming  every  moment 
more  critical.  Lee  was  resolved,  if 
possible,  to  recover  the  lost  line  of 
works  ; and,  with  this  end  in  view,  he 
was  putting  forth  the  most  Herculean 


682 


THE  WILDERIS'ESS. 


efforts,  and  bringing  his  entire  strength 
to  bear  on  the  one  point.  It  was  now 
six  o’clock — one  hour  and  a half  since 
the  first  onset.  Hancock  was  still 
holding  his  position ; but  relief  was 
sorely  needed.  At  this  opportune  mo- 
ment, when  most  needed,  relief  came. 
Wriglit,  who  had  been  hurried  forward 
with  his  Sixth  corps,  arrived  on  the 
ground,  and  took  position  on  the  right 
of  the  salient.  Hancock,  thus  relieved, 
concentrated  his  troops  on  the  left  of 
the  angle.  A little  later,  about  eight 
o’clock,  and  with  a view  to  relieve  the 
pressure  on  Hancock  and  Wright, 
Burnside  and  Warren  were  ordered 
to  attack  along  their  whole  fronts. 
The  battle  now  raged  furiously  at 
every  point.  No  evidence  was  given 
that  Lee  had  changed  his  purpose. 
The  last  line  at  the  salient  was  still  the 
object  of  his  ambition.  On  Hancock 
and  Wright  he  dealt  his  heaviest  and 
most  terrific  blows.  Again  and  again, 
and  in  rapid  succession,  he  rolled 
against  them  his  heavy  masses.  He 
seemed  resolved  to  dislodge  them. 
Seeing  this,  and  becoming  convinced 
that  Burnside  and  Warren  were  pro- 
ducing no  impression  on  their  re- 
spective fronts.  Grant  detached  two 
divisions  from  the  Fifth  corps — those  of 
Cutler  and  Griffin — and  sent  them  to 
the  aid  of  the  Second  and  Sixth  corps 
at  the  angle  which  was  still  regarded 
as  the  prize  of  battle,  and  where  was 
the  focus  of  the  fight.  Five  times  did 
Lee  hurl  his  heavy  columns  against  the 
National  lines  entrusted  with  the  de- 
fense of  this  position.  Five  times, 
after  severe  hand-to-hand  fighting,  in 


which  the  slaughter  on  both  sides  was 
dreadful,  were  the  attacking  columns 
repulsed.  It  was  not  until  after  mid- 
night that  Lee  withdrew  his  shattered 
and  bleeding  lines  and  re-formed  them 
in  his  interior  position.  Hancock  held 
the  works  he  had  captured  in  the  morn- 
ing. The  battle  had  lasted  twenty 
hours.  The  losses  on  either  side  were 
about  10,000  men. 

Such  was  the  great  battle  of  Spott- 
sylvania  Court  House.  Although  not 
a decisive  victory,  it  was  a positive 
gain  to  the  National  cause.  Its  moral 
effect  w^as  great.  It  was  one  of  the 
bloodiest  battles  of  the  war.  The 
sight  presented  at  the  angle  where  the 
tide  of  battle  surged  and  roared  from 
earliest  dawn  till  past  midnight  of  that 
summer  day,  as  described  by  eye-wit- 
nesses, was  something  shocking  to  wit- 
ness. The  bodies  of  the  dead  and 
wounded  were  piled  in  heaps,  aiM  min- 
gled together  in  wild  confusion.  It 
was,  as  one  has  said,  ‘‘an  angle  of 
death — one  hideous  Golgotha.”  The 
severity  of  the  musketry  fire  was  evi- 
denced by  the  condition  of  the  forest 
after  the  battle.  The  trees  were  not 
only  pierced  by  the  bullets,  but  literally 
cut  down.  At  Washington,  as  a relic  of 
this  fight,  there  is  preserved  the  trunk 
of  an  oak  tree  which  was  cut  through 
and  through  by  bullets.  The  trunk  is 
about  twenty  inches  in  diameter. 

On  the  morning  of  the  13th,  the  two 
armies  confronted  each  other,  ]^|ay 
Hancock  holding  his  advanced 
position,  and  the  Confederates  firmly 
intrenched  behind  an  inner  and  shorter 
line.  Lee’s  position,  in  truth,  was  a* 


MEADE’S  ADDRESS  TO  THE  TROOPS. 


083 


invulnerable  as  ever.  The  troops  on 
both  sides,  as  well  they  might  be,  were 
sorely  exhausted.  The  rain  which  set 
in  on  the  11th  continued  to  fall.  The 
ground,  in  consequence,  was  soaked, 
and  the  roads  were  heavy.  On  this 
day  there  was  some  manoeuvring; 
and  a severe  engagement,  which  lasted 
several  hours,  took  place  between  the 
forces  of  Burnside  and  those  of  A.  P. 
Hill.  Nothing  was  gained  on  either 
side.  It  was  now  the  ninth  day  since 
the  army  of  the  Potomac  crossed  the 
Eapidan.  In  that  brief  space  of  time, 
it  had  lost  nearly  30,000  men,  includ- 
ing a large  number  of  officers.  It  was 
a fearful  sacrifice  of  human  life,  suffi- 
cient to  appal  the  stoutest  heart.  There 
were,  indeed,  throughout  the  land  not 
a few,  who,  looking  only  at  the  sacri- 
fice, and  heedless  of  the  results,  pro- 
nounced the  battles  in  the  Wilderness 
and  at  Spottsylvania  useless  butcheries. 
Such  was  not  the  opinion  of  the  gen- 
erals in  the  field.  It  was  not  the 
opinion  of  Secretary  of  War  Stanton, 
who  nobly  sustained  Grant,  and  who, 
by  his  daily  bulletins,  cheered  and 
buoyed  up  the  hopes  of  the  people. 
Taking  advantage  of  the  lull  on  the 
13th,  General  Meade  addressed  the 
following  stirring,  congratulatory  epis- 
tle to  his  troops : 

Soldiers  : The  moment  has  arrived  when 
your  commanding  general  feels  authorized  to 
address  you  in  terms  of  gratulation. 

‘‘For  eight  days  and  nights,  almost  without 
intermission,  in  rain  and  sunshine,  you  have 
been  gallantly  fighting  a desperate  foe,  in  po- 
sitions naturally  strong,  and  rendered  doubly 
so  by  intrenchments. 

^You  have  compelled  him  to  abandon  his 


fortifications  on  the  Rapidan,  to  retire  and 
attempt  to  stop  your  onward  progress;  and 
now  he  has  abandoned  the  last  intrenched  po- 
sition so  tenaciously  held,  suffering  a loss  in 
all  of  18  guns,  22  colors,  and  8000  prisoners, 
including  two  general  officers. 

“ Your  heroic  deeds  and  noble  endurance 
of  fatigue  and  privations  will  ever  be  memor- 
able. Let  us  return  thanks  to  God  for  the 
mercy  thus  shown  us,  and  ask  earnestly  for 
its  continuation. 

“Soldiers!  your  work  is  not  yet  over.  The 
enemy  must  be  pursued,  and,  if  possible,  over- 
come. The  courage  and  fortitude  you  have 
displayed  renders  your  commanding  general 
confident  your  future  efforts  will  result  in 
success. 

“ While  we  mourn  the  loss  of  many  gallant 
comrades,  let  us  remember  the  enemy  must 
have  suffered  equal,  if  not  greater  losses. 

“We  shall  soon  receive  reinforcements, 
which  he  cannot  expect.  Let  us  determine 
to  continue  vigorously  the  work,  so  well 
begun,  and,  under  God’s  blessing,  in  a short 
time  the  object  of  our  labors  will  be  accom- 
plished.” 

For  five  days  more,  from  the  1 3th  to 
the  18th,  the  armies  remained  rela- 
tively in  the  same  position — Grant  con- 
tinually throwing  out  towards  the  left, 
in  the  hope  of  overlapping  and  break- 
ing the  Confederate  right,  the  enemy 
ever  bristling  out  in  breast-works,  and 
successfully  repelling  every  assault. 
The  result  of  this  continual  manoeu- 
vring was  that  Grant’s  army,  which  on 
its  arrival  occupied  a position  four  or 
five  miles  to  the  northwest  of  Spottsyl- 
vania Court  House,  was,  at  the  end  of 
ten  days,  occupying  a position  almost 
due  east  of  that  place,  the  left  resting 
at  Massaponax  Church,  some  four  miles 
distant.  Grant  having  gradually  be- 
come convinced  of  the  impossibility  of 
making  any  impression  on  Lee’s  front 


684 


THE  WILDERNESS. 


or  flank,  at  last  resolved  upon  a turn- 
ing operation,  by  which  he  hoped  to 
bring  him  out  of  his  intrenchments. 
On  the  19th,  he  received  from  Wash- 
ington reinforcements  sufficient  to 
make  up  for  all  his  losses ; and  in  the 
afternoon  of  that  day,  much  to  the  de- 
light of  the  soldiers,  who  were  glad  to 
turn  their  backs  on  the  bloody  lines  at 
Spottsylvania,  orders  were  given  for  a 
movement,  to  be  made  at  midnight, 
towards  the  North  Anna.  Lee,  quick 
to  discern  the  purpose  of  his  antago- 
nist, and  sleeplessly  vigilant,  from 
some  cause  or  other  suspected  Grant’s 
desi^.  Eesolved  to  hinder  the  in- 

O 

tended  movement,  and  so  gain  time  for 
the  transference  of  his  own  troops  to  a 
new  base,  he  ordered  Ewell  to  make  a 
vigorous  demonstration  on  the  extreme 
National  right.  Late  in  the  after- 
noon, Ewell  executed  the  movement  as 
directed.  He  crossed  the  Ny,  above 
the  right  flank,  seized  the  road  leading 
to  Fredericksburg,  and  captured  the 
ammunition-train  coming  up  from  that 
place.  The  National  right  flank  was 
guarded  by  a body  of  foot  artillerists 
who  had  just  come  up  from  the  de- 
fenses at  Washington,  and  who  had 
never  before  been  in  battle.  They 
v/ere  under  the  command  of  General 
R.  O.  Tyler.  Ewell’s  attack  was 
promptly  met,  the  artillerists,  ignorant 
of  the  Indian  devices  to  which  the 
veterans  were  accustomed  to  resort 
while  fighting  in  the  woods,  fearlessly 
exposing  themselves,  firing  furiously, 
and  ultimately  compelling  the  enemy 
to  fall  back  from  the  road  and  into  the 
woods  beyond.  Tyler’s  men  suffered 


severely;  but  the  honor  of  repulsing 
the  enemy  belongs  to  them.  Soon 
afterwards,  some  of  the  veterans  of  the 
Second  and  Fifth  corps  came  up,  and, 
continuing  the  pursuit,  captured  sev- 
eral hundred  prisoners.  In  conse- 
quence of  this  attack,  the  movement  to 
the  North  Anna  was  delayed  until  the 
following  night.  Grant’s  losses,  which 
we  have  already  enumerated  up  to  the 
13th,  had  been  gi’eatly  increased  in  the 
interval,  probably  by  not  less  than 
10,000  men,  making  the  fearful  aggre- 
gate, since  the  crossing  of  the  Rapidan, 
over  40,000  men  in  killed,  wounded  and 
missing;  yet  it  was  not  without  hope 
and  confidence  he  turned  his  face  to- 
wards Richmond.  Fi*edericksburg  had 
been  ^ the  base  of  supplies  since  the 
army  entered  the  Wilderness.  Thither, 
also,  had  been  conveyed  the  sick  and 
wounded.  As  the  army  moved  in  the 
direction  of  Richmond,  new  bases  were 
opened  at  Port  Royal  and  afterwai’ds 
at  White  House.  The  management 
of  this  department  continued  to  reflect 
the  highest  credit  on  Chief-Quarter- 
master Ingalls. 

It  is  time  now  that  our  attention 
should  be  given  to  certain  outside 
movements  which  were  being  carried 
on  simultaneously  with  those  events  con- 
nected with  the  main  army  in  the  Wil- 
derness and  at  Spottsylvania.  These 
were  Sheridan’s  raid  and  the  co-opera- 
tiv^e  movements  of  Burnside  and  Sigel. 

Sheridan,  it  will  be  remembered,  in 
obedience  to  orders,  set  out  on  the 
morning  of  the  9th  with  por- 
tions  of  the  three  divisions  of 
his  corps,  commanded  respectively  by 


SHERIDAN^S  RAID. 


685 


Merrit,  Wilson  and  Gregg.  His  instruc- 
tions were  to  engage  the  enemy’s  cav- 
alry, to  destroy  the  Fredericksburg  and 
Virginia  Central  railroads,  to  threaten 
Richmond,  and  finally  to  communicate 
with,  and  draw  supplies  from  Butler’s 
force  on  the  James  River.  Cutting 
loose  from  the  main  army,  he  swept 
over  the  Po  and  the  Ta;  and  crossing 
the  North  Anna,  he  struck  the  Vir- 
ginia Central,  and  captured  Beaver 
Dam  Station.  Sending  out  his  men, 
he  destroyed  about  ten  miles  of  the 
track,  also  two  locomotives,  three 
trains  of.  cars,  and  1,500,000  rations. 
Thei*e,  too,  he  recaptured  400  Na- 
tionals, who  had  been  made  prisoners 
in  tbe  Wilderness,  and  who  were  on 
their  way  to  Richmond.  At  Beaver 
Dam  Station  he  was  overtaken  by  a 
body  of  Confederate  cavalry,  under 
General  J.  E.  B.  Stuart,  who  had  fol- 
lowed him  from  the  Rapidan.  Stuart 
fell  upon  him  heavily,  both  on  flank 
and  rear;  but  Sheridan,  although  he 
sustained  some  losses,  was  not  hin- 
dered in  his  onward  progress.  He 
crossed  the  South  Anna  at  Ground- 
squiri’el  Bridge;  and  by  daylight  on 
the  morning  of  the  11th,  he  had 
captured  Ashland  Station,  on  the  Fred- 
ericksburg road.  After  destroying  six 
miles  of  the  road,  a train,  and  a large 
quantity  of  stores,  he  proceeded  to- 
wards Richmond.  On  the  same  day, 
at  Yellowstone  Tavern,  a few  miles 
north  of  Richmond,  he  again  came  into 
collision  with  Stuart.  A severe  con- 
contest  ensued,  Sheridan  finally  obtain- 
ing possession  of  the  turnpike,  and 
driving  the  Confederate  cavalry  back 


towards  Ashland  and  across  the  north 
fork  of  the  Chickahominy.  In  this  en- 
counter, General  Stuart  was  mortally 
wounded  ; and  thus  passed  out  of  sight 
one  of  the  most  conspicuous  figures  of 
the  war.*  Sheridan  pushed  on,  his 
men  greatly  emboldened  by  their  success 
at  Yellowstone  Tavern  ; and  approach- 
ing Richmond,  he  made  a bold  dash  on 
the  outer  line  of  works.  This  he  easily 
carried — Custer’s  brigade  capturing  a 
section  of  artillery  and  100  men.  t'ind- 
ing  the  second  line  too  strong  to  be 
assailed  with  any  prospect  of  success, 
Sheridan  retraced  his  steps,  and  retired 
rapidly  to  the  crossing  of  the  Chicka- 
hominy, at  Meadow  Bridge.  There  he 
found  the  bridge  partially  destroyed, 
with  the  enemy  in  some  force  in  his 
front  and  pressing  also  on  his  i*ear. 
Repulsing  the  enemy  in  his  rear,  he 
rebuilt  the  bridge,  under  a most  gall- 
ing fire,  and  crossed  a portion  of  his 
troops.  The  remainder  made  a detour 
by  way  of  Cold  Harbor,  and  crossed 


* Jaraes  E.  B.  Stuart,  a major-general  in  the  Confed- 
erate service,  was  born  in  Patrick  County,  Virginia, 
about  1832.  He  graduated  at  West  Point  in  1854,  and 
w'as  commissioned  a cavalry  officer.  He  had  reached 
the  rank  of  first-lieutenant  when  he  resigned.  May 
14th,  1861.  He  had  seen  some  active  service  in  the 
Indian  country,  and  had  come  to  be  known  as  a brave 
soldier  and  a dashing,  fearless  rider.  He  was  present 
and  fought  at  Bull  Run,  became  brigadier-general  in 
September,  1861,  and  afterwards  organized  the  Con- 
federate cavalry  in  Virginia.  He  became  conspicuous 
by  his  celebrated  raid  on  McClellan’s  rear  on  the  13th 
and  14th  of  June,  1862.  When  Lee  entered  Maryland, 
in  August  of  that  year,  Stuart,  in  the  midst  of  a terrific 
thunderstorm,  fell  upon  Pope’s  headquarters,  and  cap- 
tured many  private  papers  and  some  plans  of  campaign. 
In  all  the  subsequent  movements,  up  until  his  death,  of 
the  army  of  Northern  Virginia,  Stuart  played  a promi- 
nent part.  After  being  wounded  at  Yellowstone  Tav- 
ern, he  was  conveyed  to  Richmond,  where  he  died 
a day  or  two  afterwards. 


686 


THE  WILDERNESS. 


the  Chickahominy  at  Bottom  Bridge — 
ground  rendered  forever  memoraV)le  by 
the  Peninsular  campaign.  Haxall’s 
Landing  was  reached  on  the  14th. 
Communication  from  that  point  was 
opened  with  General  Butler;  supplies 
were  received ; and  the  wearied  troops 
were  allowed  three  days  to  rest  and 
refit.  Sheridan  then  returned  leisurely, 
by  way  of  Baltimore  Store,  White 
House  and  Hanover  Court  House;  and, 
on  the  25th  of  May,  he  rejoined  the 
army  of  the  Potomac. 

Let  us  now  see  what  success  had 
attended  the  co-operative  movements. 
Butler,  as  has  been  stated,  moved  from 
]^ay  Fortress  Monroe  on  the  4th  of 
May,  and  concentrated  at  York- 
town  and  Gloucester.  He  had  already 
been  joined  by  Gillmore,  with  the 
Tenth  corps,  and  W.  F.  Smith,  with  a 
portion  of  the  Eighteenth.  He  had, 
also,  a division  of  horse  at  Noi*folk  and 
Portsmouth,  under  General  Kautz. 
His  entire  force  amounted  to  over 
30,000  men.  Gillmore  had  built  up  a 
great  reputation  by  his  approaches  on 
Morris  Island,  and  by  his  splendid 
artillery  practice  against  the  city  of 
Charleston.  Smith  had  won  distinction 
under  McClellan  in  the  peninsula,  and 
under  Giant  at  Chattanooga,  where 
his  skilful  engineering  greatly  contri- 
buted to  the  success  of  the  Nationals. 
Kautz,  too,  was  a daring  and  capable 
officer.  At  first,  it  seemed  as  if  Butler 
proposed  to  move  upon  Richmond  by 
the  old  route  of  McClellan.  This  view 
of  the  case  received  some  encoura2:e- 

o 

ment  from  the  fact  that  he  had  already, 
on  the  1st  of  May,  sent  to  West  Point 


a brigade  of  infantry  and  a body  of 
cavaliy,  some  1800  strong — the  former 
by  water,  the  latter  by  land.  The  real 
object  of  this  movement  was  to  mask 
his  main  design.  It  was  his  belief 
that  the  presence  of  these  troops  at 
West  Point  would  attract  the  enemy 
towards , Richmond,  and  that  in  the 
meantime  he  would  be  able  to  execute 
the  principal  part  of  his  programme. 
As  soon  as  this  was  accomplished,  and 
he  had  reached  the  point  intended,  the 
troops  at  West  Point  were  to  march 
across  the  peninsula,  and  join  the 
main  body. 

On  the  night  of  the  4th,  Butler 
embarked  his  troops  on  transports, 
dropped  down  the  York,  passed*  For- 
tress Monroe,  turned  into  the  James, 
and  advanced  up  that  river,  preceded 
by  a fleet  of  gunboats.  On  the  fol- 
lowing day,  and  without  encountering 
any  opposition,  he  put  on  shore,  on  the 
south  side  of  the  James,  at  Wilson’s 
wharf,  one  brigade  of  colored  troops 
under  General  Wild,  at  Fort  Powhat- 
tan  two  regiments,  at  City  PoiiJ, 
Hinks’  division,  and  landed  the  main 
body  a mile  or  two  above,  at  Ber- 
muda Hundred — a neck  of  land 
formed  by  the  James  and  the  Appo 
mattox,  and  capable  of  being  strongly 
fortified.  Butler  immediately  pro- 
ceeded to  throw  up  intrenchments; 
and  the  gunboats  were  disposed  so  us 
to  protect  the  flanks. 

Simultaneously  with  this  movement 
of  the  main  body,  Kautz,  with  3000 
cavalry,  started  from  Suffolk,  forced  a 
passage  over  the  Blackwater,  and,  push- 
ing westward,  struck  the  Weldon  Riiil- 


THE  ARMY  OP  THE  JAMES. 


road  at  Stony  Creek,  and  burned  the 
bridge. 

Butler’s  advance  had  not  been  made 
a moment  too  soon.  After  the  depar- 
ture of  Gillmore  for  the  north — Beau- 
regard, having  no  foe  in  his  immedi- 
ate neighborhood,  hastened  to  follow. 
Gathering  together  what  troops  could 
be  obtained  from  Charleston,  Savan- 
nah and  Florida,  he  hurried  towards 
the  James.  By  the  time  Butler  reached 
Bermuda  Hundred,  the  van  of  Beaure^ 
gard’s  army  had  reached  Petersburg. 
The  cutting  of  the  railroad  by  Kautz, 
and  the  destruction  of  the  bridge,  re- 
tarded for  a time  the  arrival  of  the 
main  body;  but  Butler  was  soon  to 
have  in  his  front  a powerful  and  skil- 
ful antagonist,  one  who  would  test  his 
strength  and  fully  tax  his  ingenuity. 

At  Bermuda  Hundred,  the  6th  was 
spent  in  strengthening  the  defenses,  and 
in  making  reconnoissances.  Early  on 
May  7th,  General  Brooks  was  sent, 
7*  with  five  brigades,  to  destroy  the 
Richmond  and  Petersburg  Railroad. 
The  enemy  was  found  in  a strong 
position,  covering  the  i*oad  from  Wal- 
thal  Junction  to  Chester  Station.  The 
cavalry  at  first  fell  back  to  the  line 
of  the  infantry.  A line  of  battle  was 
immediately  formed;  and  Brooks  ad- 
vanced to  the  attack,  driving  the  Con- 
federates from  their  vantage  ground 
back  upon  the  railroad.  There,  how- 
ever, a determined  stand  was  made. 
After  some  severe  fighting,  during 
which  a bridge  which  crossed  one  of 
the  tributaries  of  the  Appomattox  was 
destroyed,  the  National  right  was 
pushed  back  in  turn ; and,  finally,  both 


es7 

parties  withdrew.  On  the  9th,  May 
another  and  more  vigorous  ad- 
vance  was  made  upon  the  railroad. 
The  great  object  was  to  hinder  or  pre- 
vent the  arrival  of  the  troops  from  the 
South.  Beauregard’s  men,  however, 
were  already  well  forward ; as  Kautz, 
unable  to  hold  the  road,  or  to  advance* 
to  Petersburg,  had  returned  to  City 
Point,  and  left  the  Confederates  free 
to  push  their  way  to  Petersburg.  The 
attack  on  the  9th  was  made  by  three 
divisions  of  the  Tenth  corps,  under 
Terry,  Ames  and  Turner,  with  two  di- 
visions of  the  Eighteenth,  under  Weit- 
zel  and  Wistar — Gillmore  and  Smith 
commanding  their  respective  corps. 
They  marched  from  camp  at  daylight, 
and  reached  the  I’ailroad  at  four  ditfer- 
ent  points.  By  noon,  not  less  than 
four  miles  of  i*ail  were  torn  up  and 
destroyed.  The  Confederates  were  en- 
countered in  force  near  Snake  Creek, 
where  they  occupied  a strong  line  of 
earth-works.  A severe  battle  ensued, 
the  Nationals  finally  driving  the  enemy 
across  the  creek,  and  destroying  the 
railroad. 

Elated  by  his  successes  on  the  9th, 
General  Butler  sent  to  Stanton  a des- 
patch in  which,  taking  too  hopeful  a 
view  of  his  own  position,  he  unwisely 
belittled  the  resources  and  ability  of 
his  antagonist.  Ignorant  as  yet  of  the 
fate  which  had  befallen  Kautz,  he  en- 
larged on  the  successes  of  that  general 
as  well  as  of  his  own.  He  had  ob- 
tained a position,  he  said,  in  which, 
with  proper  supplies,  he  could  hold 
out  against  the  whole  of  Lee’s  army; 
he  had  cut  Beauregard’s  army  hope- 


688 


THE  WILDERNESS. 


lessly  in  two ; he  Lad  whipp*ed  D.  H. 
Hill,  after  a severe  and  well-contest- 
ed figLt;  and  he  assured  the  war 
secretary  that  Grant  would  not  be 
troubled  with  any  further  reinforce- 
ments to  Lee  from  the  army  of  Beau- 
regard. A few  days  more  will  show^ 
how  greatly  General  Butler  was  de- 
ceived. He  had  made  up  his  mind  to 
effect  a passage  across  Snake  Creek  on 
the  morrow,  and  crowd  the  enemy  to- 
wards Petersburg.  That  night,  how- 
ever, he  received  information  to  the 
efPect  that  Lee  was  in  full  retreat  to- 
wards Bichrnond,  with’  Grant  in  pur- 
suit; and  fearing  that  he  might  soon 
have  the  army  of  Northern  Virginia  on 
his  hands,  he  recalled  his  troops  from 
Snake  Creek,  strengthened  his  lines, 
and  prepared  to  march  north  to  take 
part  in  the  investment  of  the  Confed- 
erate capital.  During  the  10th,  there 
was  some  fighting  at  Snake  Creek, 
some  charges  and  counter-charges — nei- 
ther party  gaining  on  the  other.  On 
the  11th,  both  armies  rested. 

How  much  General  Butler  had  de- 
ceived himself,  and  what  precious  op- 
portunities had  already  been  lost,  was 
soon  to  be  made  apparent.  It  ought 
to  have  been  possible  for  the  army  of 
the  James  to  capture  Petersburg.  It 
might  even  have  succeeded  in  captur- 
ing Bichrnond.  The  capture  of  the 
one  or  the  other  would  certainly  have 
had  the  effect  of  placing  the  Confed- 
erates at  a serious  disadvantage ; and  it 
could  hardly  have  failed  to  hasten  the 
inevitable  end.  With  the  arrival  of 
the  army  of  Beauregard,  the  opportu- 
nity offered  to  the  army  of  the  James 


was  hopelessly  gone.  Petersburg  was 
secured  to  the  Confederates;  and  Bich- 
mond  was  not  to  be  taken  from  them 
except  by  the  destruction  of  the  army 
of  General  Lee.  It  would  be  unjust, 
perhaps,  to  blame  either  General  But- 
ler or  General  Grant,  because  richer 
fruit  was j not  already  plucked  by  the 
army  of  the  James;  but  it  is  not  to  be 
denied  that  the  clockwork-like  accu- 
racy of  motion  which  characterized 
the  army  of  General  Grant  at  luka  and 
Corinth,  which  was  a prominent  and 
striking  feature  at  Vicksburg,  which 
was,  if  possible,  even  a more  promi- 
nent and  still  more  striking  feature  at 
Chattanooga,  was  wanting  to  that  huge 
and  complicated  machine  which  was 
set  in  motion  on  the  4th  of  May,  when 
the  army  of  the  Potomac  advanced 
from  Culpepper  Court  House  to  the 
fords  of  the  Bapidan.  There  is  a 
limit,  after  all,  to  the  ability  of  mor- 
tals. General  Grant’s  instructions  to 
Butler  may  have  been  imperfect  or 
they  may  have  been  indefinite;  Gen- 
eral Butler  may,  on  the  other  hand, 
have  been  wanting  in  discretion;  but 
it  surely  implied  a condition  of  mind 
at  once  over-exacting  and  unrea- 
sonable, to  expect  that  the  original 
plan  of  campaign  for  the  entire  army 
would  be  carried  out  according  to  the 
strict  letter  of  the  instructions  given, 
or  that  success  would  attend  its  every 
movement,  and  at  every  point. 

After  the  rest  on  the  11th,  there 
were  signs  of  life  and  activity  again 
inside  the  lines  of  the  army  of  the 
James.  On  the  12th,  a general  advance 
was  made  in  the  direction  of  Bich- 


CO-OPERATIVE  MOVEMENTS. 


68t 


l^lay  mond.  General  Butler  ordered 
12.  a heavy  column  northward — 
the  right  under  General  Smith,  who 
moved  on  the  turnpike,  leading  to 
Fort  Darling;  the  left  under  General 
Gillmore,  who  followed  the  line  of 
railroad  further  to  the  west.  The 
Confederates  fell  back  before  them ; 
and  Generals  Butler  and  Smith  estab- 
lished their  headquarters  that  night  at 
the  mansion  of  Dr.  Friend,  about  nine 
miles  from  Richmond.  Gillmore  was 
equally  well  advanced  on  the  National 
left.  It  was  ari*anged  that  a general 
attack  should  be  made  next  morning 
on  the  enemy’s  position  at  Proctor’s 
Creek.  When  morning  dawned,  it 
was  discovered  that  he  had  retired  to  a 
strong  line  of  intrenchments  in  his 
rear.  General  Gillmore  succeeded  in 
turning  the  right  of  this  new  position ; 
but  such  was  the  strength  of  the 
works,  and  so  formidable  seemed  the 
interior  lines  of  defense,  that  the  as- 
sault was  delayed  until  the  16th. 

The  night  of  the  15th  was  calm  and 
beautiful.  A lovely  moon,  but  slightly 
obscured  by  a few  fleecy  clouds  which 
floated  across  the  heavens,  lit  up  the 
scene.  In  the  National  camp  all  was 
quiet;  but  everything  indicated  pre- 
paredness for  the  proposed  assault  in 
the  early  morning.  As  the  morning 
hours  advanced,  but  before  it  was  yet 
dawn,  a thick  fog  arose  from  the  river 
and  enwrapped  the  surrounding  coun- 
try in  gloom.  As  yet  there  were  no 
signs  of  life  in  the  National  camp. 
All  of  a sudden  the  stillness  of  the 
early  morning  hours  was  disturbed, 
and  the  lone  echoes  were  aroused 


by  a fierce  outburst  of  musketry  and 
the  loud  thundering  of  artillery.  ]^ay 
Beauregard,  taking  advantage  of 
the  fog,  had  fallen  upon  the  National 
army  with  his  entire  force.  It  was  a 
complete  surprise  to  Butler,  who  was 
ill-prepared  to  resist  such  an  attack. 

Beauregard  had  evidently  made  him- 
self familiar  with  Butler’s  position. 
He  knew  the  ground ; and  he  had 
made  his  arrangements  with  admirable 
skill.  The  National  line,  although 
unduly  extended,  failed  to  reach  the 
river  on  the  right.  There  was  a nyle 
and  a half  of  open,  undulating  country 
between  Smith’s  right  and  the  James. 
Beauregard’s  object  was  to  turn  Butler’s 
right  flank  and  get  to  his  rear;  but 
the  more  effectually  to  accomplish  his 
purpose,  he  resolved  to  strike  heavily 
in  front,  while  he  had  given  instruc- 
tions to  General  Whiting — who  had 
been  left  behind  on  the  Petersburg  and 
Richmond  Railroad,  in  the  rear  of  Gill- 
more— to  make  a simultaneous  onset, 
and  so  cut  off  the  National  retreat. 
Such  a plan,  if  fully  carried  out,  could 
hardly  have  failed  to  prove  disastrous 
to  Butler’s  army. 

It  seemed  for  a time  as  if  Beaure- 
gard’s expectations  would  be  fully  re- 
alized. The  first  fierce  blow  fell  upon 
Smith’s  right,  which  was  held  by  Heck- 
man’s brigade,  of  Weitzel’s  division. 
The  blow  was  as  overwhelming  as  it 
was  sudden.  Heckman  made  a gallant 
fitrht : but  he  was  soon  surrounded  and 
made  prisoner.  The  much-coveted  po- 
sition was  already  all  but  won.  The 
right  flank  had  been  turned ; and  the 
Confederates  were  pressing  on  to  seize 


690 


THE  WILDERNESS. 


the  road  which  leads  to  Bermuda  Hun- 
dred. It  seemed  as  if  all  were  lost. 
Plappily,  deliverance  was  at  hand.  The 
night  before,  General  Butler  had  or- 
dered three  regiments  of  Ames’  divi- 
sion, of  Gillmore’s  corps,  to  pass  over 
and  reinforce  Smith  on  the  right. 
During  the  darkness  they  had  been 
pressing  forward  to  their  appointed 
])osition.  The  advance  regiment — the 
One  Hundred  and  Twelfth  New  York — 
was  just  coming  up.  It  was  almost  im- 
mediately joined  by  the  Ninth  Maine, 
when  the  two  met  the  Confederates  at 
the  point  where  the  transverse  road, 
along  which  they  were  moving,  crosses 
the  road  wdiich  leads  to  Bermuda  Hun- 
dred. At  the  moment  of  what  seemed 
victory — when  about  to  seize  the  road 
on  which  his  hopes  were  so  ardently 
bent,  and  on  the  possession  of  which  so 
much  depended — the  triumphant  foe 
was  brought  to  a standstill ; and,  per- 
plexed by  this  sudden  and  unexpected 
manifestation  of  strength,  he  (piickly 
withdrew.  The  line  of  retreat,  if  re- 
treat should, be  necessary,  was  so  far 
safe. 

Meanwhile,  a fierce  attack  had  been 
made  on  Smith’s  front.  It  was  at- 
tended with  less  success  than  the 
attack  on  his  flank.  A device  which 
had  proved  a means  of  salvation  to  a 
portion  of  Burnside’s  army  in  front  of 
Fort  Sanders,  at  Knoxville,  was  here 
again  adopted  wdth  success.  Tele- 
graph wire,  it  appears,  was  found  plen- 
tifully in  the  neighborhood.  Smith,  a 
day  or  two  before,  had  < aused  a large 
amount  of  this  wire  to  be  wound 
around  the  tree-stumps  which  were 


abundant  in  the  front  of  his  lines. 
The  wire  was  carried  from  stump  to 
stump,  and  formed  a species  of  wire 
net-work.  When,  therefore,  the  Con- 
federates, unconscious  of  the  danger 
which  awaited  them,  came  rushing 
forward  through  the  dense  fog,  they 
tripped  ,and  stumbled,  becoming  inex- 
tricably entangled  in  the  meshes  of 
wire,  and  falling  an  easy  pre}"  to  the 
bayonet  or  rifle  of  the  National  soldier. 
Discovering  that  no  impression  could 
be  made  on  the  front  of  the  National 
right,  and  apparently  indifferent  to  the 
National  left,  Beauregard  massed  his 
forces  again,  in  larger  numbers,  against 
Smith’s  right,  this  time  taking  fuller 
advantage  of  the  opening  between  him 
and  the  rivei*.  Smith  fell  back  and 
formed  a new  line,  his  right  now  more 
close  to  the  James.  Gillmore,  also, 
yielded  to  the  movement  and  fell  back. 
Beauregard  pressed  closer  and  closer, 
with  increasing  numbers;  he  evident- 
ly expected  Whiting  to  strike,  as  di- 
rected, in  the  rear  of  the  National 
army,  and  cut  off  its  retreat.  Whit- 
ing, however,  for  some  reason  or  other, 
failed  to  obey  the  behests  of  his  chief ; 
and  General  Butler,  trembling  for  the 
safety  of  his  trains,  his  communica- 
tions, and  the  depot  on  the  James,  or- 
dered the  withdrawal  of  the  whole 
army  within  the  lines  at  Bermuda  Hun- 
dred. Beauregard  followed  him  up, 
and,  as  he  could  not  penetrate  the  lines, 
proceeded  to  cast  up  intrenchments  In 
Butler’^  front.  In  these  operations  of 
the  16tn,  the  Nationals  lost  over  4000 
men.  The  Confederate  loss  exceeded 
3000.  Butler  was  now  in  a position  in 


BUTLER  !^ND  SIGEL. 


691 


which  he  had  no  reason  to  dread  the 
enemy ; but  he  was  literally  locked  in 
on  the  land  side.  On  both  flanks, 
however,  he  had  the  rivers  at  his  com- 
mand ; and  it  was  still  possible  for 
him,  taking  advantage  of  his  water 
communications,  to  strike  a vigorous 
blow  for  the  capture  of  Petersburg. 
He  was,  indeed,  making  preparations 
for  some  such  elfort,  when  he  received 
orders  from  Grant  to  send  two  thirds 
of  his  effective  force  to  the  assistance 
of  the  army  of  the  Potomac,  then  in  the 
vicinity  of  the  Chickahominy.  Thus 
it  was  that  Butler  came  to  be  “ bottled 
up  at  Bermuda  Hundred.” 

General  Kautz,  meanwhile,  made 
another  successful  raid  ; but  it  had  no 
practical  bearing  on  General  Butler’s 
plans.  We  have  seen  already  that, 
after  his  raid  on  the  Weldon  Railroad, 
Kautz,  finding  it  impossible  to  hold 
the  road,  returned  to  City  Point.  This 
was  on  the  8th.  On  the  12th,  he  ven- 
tured forth  again.  Moving  from  rail- 
road to  railroad,  over  a wide  extent  of 
country,  he  struck  a large  number  of 
stations,  among  which  were  Coalfield, 
Powhattan,  Chula,  Wilson’s,  Welville, 
White  and  Black,  Jarrett’s  and  others, 
and  then  returned  to  City  Point  on  the 
17th.  At  most  of  these  points,  he 
burned  the  depots,  tore  up  the  tracks, 
destroyed  the  stores,  and  made  havoc 
generally  with  freight-trains  and  loco- 
motives wherever  he  found  them.  It 
is  true  that  this  raid  was  not  of  any  di- 
rect or  immediate  benefit  to  General 
Butler;  but  it  nevertheless  brought 
forth  precious  fruit,  and,  like  all  the 
other  raids  of  a similai*  kind,  had  a 


most  important  bearing  on  the  final 
issue.  It  weakened  the  South  generally; 
and  it  tended  to  isolate  Richmond,  and 
hasten  the  end.  So  much  for  the  co-oper- 
ative movement  under  General  Butler, 
It  is  time  now  to  turn  to  Slorel, 
and  see  how  he  carried  out  his  part 
of  the  general  plan.  It  will  be  re- 
membered that  he  was  ordered  to 
divide  his  troops  and  make  a con- 
joint movement  up  the  Shenandoah 
and  up  the  Kanawha.  Sigel  himself, 
with  one  portion,  was  to  move  up  the 
Shenandoah.  Crook,  with  another  por- 
tion, accompanied  by  a division  of  cav- 
alry, under  Averill,  was  to  move  up 
the  Kanawha.  The  objectives  were 
respectively  Staunton  and  Lynchburg. 
These  • movements,  which  commenced 
on  the  1st  of  May,  were  less  produc- 
tive of  good  results  than  those  of  But- 
ler and  Kautz.  Crook  advanced  from 
Charleston,  with  Averill’s  cavalry  in 
advance.  On  the  10th  of  May,  Ave- 
rill, who,  with  2000  cavalry,  had  been 
ordered  to  move  towards  Wytheville, 
for  the  purpose  of  destroying  the  lead 
mines  at  that  place,  was  met  by  a cav- 
alry force,  under  Morgan,  and  was  de- 
feated. Crook  himself,  with  GOOO, 
moved  towards  Dublin  Station,  where 
he  was  met  by  a Confederate  force, 
under  McCausland ; and  although  he 
proved  himself  the  victor,  after  a se- 
vere fight,  it  was  not  until  he  had  lost 
700  men,  of  wLom  some  125  were 
killed.  He  destroyed  some  miles  of 
railroad;  but  on  Morgan  coming  up 
with  a strong  force,  he  withdrew,  fall- 
ing back  to  Meadow  Bridge.  Sigel 
had  no  better  luck  than  his  subordi- 


692 


THE  WILDERNESS. 


nates.  When  near  New  Market,  on 
the  15th,  he  was  met  by  General 
Breckenridge,  whom  Lee  had  sent  to 
resist  the  invasion.  Breckenridge  fell 
upon  Sigel  with  tremendous  fury,  driv- 
ing him  down  the  valley  to  the  shel- 
ter of  Cedar  Creek,  near  Strasburg, 
with  a loss  of  700  men,  6 guns  and 
1000  small  arms.  Sigel’s  expedition, 
in  all  its  departments,  whatever  the 
cause,  had  proved  a complete  failure. 
It  is  not  wonderful  that,  in  the  circum- 
stances, General  Grant  should  have 
thought  fit  to  relieve  him.  General 
Hunter,  who  had  already  made  a figure 
in  the  war,  particularly  on  the  southern 
coast,  was  placed  in  command. 

Hunter,  according  to  instructions 
received  from  Grant,  at  the  head  of 
about  9000  men,  moved  upon  Staunton 
with  the  view  of  destroying  the  rail-^ 
road  leading  thence  towards  Charlotte- 
ville.  He  had  instructions,  also,  to 
move  upon  Lynchburg.  At  Piedmont, 
near  Middle  Eiver,  a tributary  of  the 
Shenandoah,  in  Augusta  County,  and 
not  far  from  Staunton,  on  June  5th, 
he  encountered  a Confederate  force  of 
about  the  same  number  of  men,  under 
Generals  Jones  and  McCausland.  These 
were  all  the  concentrated  forces  in  that 
region,  Breckenridge  having  been  re- 
called, with  the  greater  part  of  his 
command,  to  assist  in  the  defense  of 
Richmond.  Hunter  had  a complete 
success.  After  a severe  and  obstinate 
battle,  which  ended  only  with  the  day- 
light, he  was  master  of  the  field,  hav- 
ing routed  his  antagonist,  and  captured 
1500  prisoners,  with  3 pieces  of  artil- 
lery. The  Confederate  general,  Jones, 


was  killed.  On  the  8th,  he  was  joined 
by  Crook  and  Averill,  when  he  moved 
from  Staunton  towards  Lynchburg,  by 
way  of  Lexington.  By  taking  this 
course,  it  appears,  he  disappointed 
Grant,  who  expected  him  to  appear 
at  Gordonsville,  whither  he  had  sent 
Sheridap  to  meet  him.  Arrived  be- 
fore Lynchburg,  Hunter  found  the 
place  too  strong  to  justify  any  serious 
attempts  at  its  reduction ; and  as  re- 
inforcements were  coming  by  railroad 
from  Lee’s  army,  while  his  own  sup- 
plies of  ammunition  were  all  but  ex- 
hausted, he  deemed  it  prudent  to  retire. 
Not  considering  it  safe  to  fall  back  by 
the  road  he  had  come,  he  retreated  by 
way  of  Salem,  hotly  pursued  by  the 
enemy.  At  Meadow  Bridge,  he  ex- 
pected to  find  abundant  supplies;  for 
only  a few  days  before.  Crook  and  Ave- 
rill  had  left  at  that  place  1,500,000 
rations,  in  charge  of  two  Ohio  regi- 
ments. The  place  had  been  set  upon  by 
a band  of  guerrillas ; and  rations  and 
men  had  equally  disappeared.  It  was 
not  until  the  27th,  nine  days  after  his 
retreat  from  Lynchburg,  five  days  after 
he  had  visited  Meadow  Bridge,  that 
Hunter  obtained  rations  for  his  troops. 
They  had  sutfered  terribly ; but  they 
had  inflicted  vast  injury  on  the  Con- 
federates, by  the  destruction  of  foun- 
dries, factories,  mills  and  other  prop- 
erty.  Such  were  the  results  of  the 
co-operative  movements  under  Butler 
on  the  one  hand,  and  under  Sigel  and 
Hunter  on  the  other.  They  weakened 
the  South ; but  they  were  not  other- 
wise of  any  immediate  practical  benefit 
to  General  Grant. 


PRISON  CAMP  AT  ANDERSONVILLE. 


GRANT  AT  THE  NORTH  ANNA. 


693 


We  now  retui'n  to  the  army  of  the 
Potomac.  We  left  it  at  Spottsylvania 
Court  House,  about  to  resume  its 
march  towards  Richmond.  The  move- 
ment was  commenced  about  midnight, 
]^ay  on  the  20th.  Hancock  led  the 
way,  with  Torbert’s  cavalry  in 
advance.  Moving  first  eastward  as  far 
as  Mattaponax  Church,  under  cover  of 
the  remaining  corps,  he  then  turned  to 
the  south  and  pushed  his  way  to  Mil- 
ford Station,  on  the  Fredericksburg 
and  Richmond  railroad,  some  seventeen 
miles  south  of  his  point  of  starting. 
He  crossed  the  Mattapony  at  Milford 
Bridge,  from  which  the  enemy  had 
been  dislodged  by  Torbert’s  cavalry, 
and  about  a mile  from  the  river,  on  a 
ridge  of  hills,  formed  his  column  in 
line  of  battle.  Lee,  no  doubt,  antici- 
pated some  such  movement;  and,  al- 
though unwilling  to  run  any  risk  by 
striking  his  antagonist  while  executing 
his  flank  march,  he  was  not  prepared 
to  be  outstripped  in  the  race  for  Rich- 
mond. As  soon  as  he  was  made 
aware  of  Hancock’s  advance.  Long- 
street’s  corps  was  headed  southward, 
and  set  in  motion.  Warren  followed 
Hancock  on  the  morning  of  the  21st, 
when  Ewell  was  pushed  after  Long- 
street.  Wright  and  Burnside,  with 
the  Sixth  and  Ninth  corps,  were  still 
within  the  lines  at  Spottsylvania,  where 
they  were  confronted  by  Hill.  Burn- 
side left  on  the  afternoon  of  the  21st, 
having  first  made  a demonstration  with 
Ledlie’s  brigade,  of  Crittenden’s  divi- 
sion, so  as  to  deceive  the  enemy  and 
detain  him  in  his  position.  Later, 
Wright  was  preparing  to  follow,  when 


Hill,  deeming  the  opportunity  favor- 
able for  a deadly  blow,  fell  upon  his 
retiring  column  with  great  weight. 
The  assault,  however,  was  repulsed 
without  difficulty;  and  Wright  pro- 
ceeded on  his  southward  march.  Hill 
at  the  same  time  following  in  the 
wake  of  Longstreet  and  Ewell, 

On  the  morning  of  the  23d,  the 
National  army,  having  marched  over  a 
country  which,  for  beauty  and  fertility, 
presented  a striking  contrast  to  the 
Wilderness  and  the  region  around 
Spottsylvania,  arrived  on  the  northern 
bank  of  the  North  Anna.  Lee,  having 
the  inside  track,  had  won  the  race. 
He  was  already  well  posted  on  the 
south  side  of  that  stream. 

Grant’s  position  was  now  one  of  con- 
siderable difficulty.  In  pursuing  his 
flank  movement,  it  was  necessary  for 
him  to  cross  the  river.  It  was  natural 
to  conclude  that  Lee  would  offer  a 
stubborn  resistance.  To  accomplish 
his  purpose  Grant  must  needs  hold  his 
troops  well  together,  and  handle  them 
with  caution  and  with  delicate  skill. 

The  Grand  Army,  as  we  have  said,  had 
reached  the  banks  of  the  North  Anna — 
the  right,  under  Warren,  at  Jericho 
Mills;  the  left  leaning  upon  the  Rich- 
mond and  Fredericksburg  railroad,  and 
covering  Taylor’s  Bridge.  In  front  of 
the  army  there  were  three  fords,  known 
respectively  as  Jericho,  Island,  Chester- 
field or  Taylor’s  Bridge.  Gi-ant,  who 
had  already  reached  the  railroad  cross- 
ing, was  resolved  to  push  across  the 
river  with  as  little  delay  as  possible. 
Warren,  with  the  Fifth  corps,  was  or- 
dered to  cross  at  Jericho  Ford;  Ham 


»80 


694 


THE  WILDERNESS. 


cock,  with  the  Second  corps,  was  to 
cross  at  Taylor’s  Bridge.  These  cross- 
ings were  about  four  miles  apart. 

Warren  was  allowed  to  cross  with- 
out opposition.  Lee’s  attention  had 
been  so  fully  occupied  with  M^hat  he 
considered  the  necessities  of  the  lower 
ford,  that  he  had  wholly  neglected  the 
foi'd  above.  Warren,  however,  was  not 
to  be  allowed  to  have  things  entirely  his 
own  way.  He  had  just  got  his  corps 
into  position — Cutler  on  the  right,  Grif- 
fin in  the  centre,  and  Crawford  on  the 
left  — when  he  was  set  upon  in  the 
most  savage  manner  by  a sti’ong  body 
of  Confederates,  under  Colonel  Brown. 
Brown,  whose  force  did  not  prove  so 
strong  as  at  first  it  seemed — being 
only  one  brigade  of  Wilson’s  division 
of  Hill’s  coi'ps — vras  easily  repulsed. 
This  brigade  was  quickly  joined  by 
the  three  other  brigades  of  the  divi- 
sion ; and  as  Heth’s  division,  also  of 
Hill’s  corps,  at  the  same  time  came  up, 
the  Confederates  resumed  the  attack 
with  great  energy.  The  attack  fell 
chiefly  on  GriflSn,  who  held  his  ground 
with  great  firmness.  While  fully  en- 
gaging GriflSn’s  attention  in  front, 
the  Confederate  commander  detached 
Brown,  with  his  brigade,  for  the  pur- 
pose of  assaulting  Warren  on  his  right 
flank.  Brown  was  at  first  completely 
successful.  Cutler,  who,  as  we  have 
seen,  held  Warren’s  right,  was  just 
getting  into  position  when  he  was 
struck  heavily,  his  whole  division 
thrown  into  confusion,  and  Griffin’s 
right  flank  exposed.  Griffin  saved 
himself  by  refusing  the  exposed  flank, 
and  by  hunying  forward  Bartlett’s 


brigade  to  the  menaced  point,  thus  re- 
storing the  line.  It  was  while  exe- 
cuting this  movement  that  one  of 
Bartlett’s  regiments — the  Eighty-Third 
Pennsylvania — ran  full  against  Brown’s 
column,  and,  by  securing  the  first 
fire,  completely  turned  the  tide  of 
battle.  I One  of  McCoy’s  men  caught 
Brown,  and  dragged  him  inside  the 
National  lines.  The  hostile  brigade 
turned  and  fled  in  utter  confusion,  the 
gallant  Eighty-Third  pouring  a volley 
of  musketry  into  its  flank  and  rear. 
At  all  points,  in  front  of  the  National 
right,  the  repulse  of  the  enemy  w^as 
complete.  Warren  had  lost  350  men; 
but  he  had  inflicted  a much  heavier 
loss  on  the  enemy.  He  held  1000 
prisoners ; and  he  had  secured  the 
position. 

Hancock,  on  the  left,  had  a much 
more  difficult  task  to  perform.  At 
Taylor’s  Bridge,  the  Confederates  had 
constructed  works  of  great  strength. 
The  ground  was  peculiarly  favorable  for 
defense.  On  the  north  side  there  is  a 
tongue  of  land,  formed  by  the  North 
Anna  and  Long  Creek,  which  for  some 
distance  runs  parallel  with  the  river. 
On  this  piece  of  ground,  Hancock  had 
established  himself.  In  his  front,  and 
guarding  the  northern  approach  to  the 
bridge,  was  an  extended  redan,  with  a 
wet  ditch  in  front  and  rifle-trenches  in 
the  rear.  On  the  southern  bank,  which 
commands  the  northern,  there  was 
another  work  of  similar  construction. 
These  works  were  held  by  McLaws’ 
division,  of  Longstreet’s  corps,  the 
larger  number  of  troops  being,  of 
course,  on  the  south  side.  Several 


BURNSIDE  REPULSED. 


695 


luindred  yards  intervened  between 
Hancock’s  lines  and  the  bridge-head. 
The  ground  was  bare,  and  gradually 
ascended  as  it  neared  the  bridge.  It 
was  necessary,  in  order  to  gain  a foot- 
ing on  the  other  side,  to  carry  the 
bridge  and  the  defenses.  To  Birney’s 
\vell-tried  division,  Hancock  assigned 
the  perilous  duty.  Birney  selected  for 
the  work  the  two  brigades  of  Pierce 
and  Egan.  In  order  to  afford  some 
protection  to  the  storming  party.  Col- 
onel Tidball  got  into  advantageous  po- 
sition three  sections  of  artillery.  It 
was  now  within  an  hour  of  sundown. 
All  things  were  ready  for  the  attack. 
At  a given  signal,  the  storming  bri- 
gades begin  to  advance.  At  the  same 
instant,  the  guns  of  the  enemy  open 
upon  them  a most  murderous  fire. 
The  wisdom  of  Tidball’s  arrangement 
is  now  brought  prominently  to  light. 
His  batteries  reply  to  those  of  the 
enemy  with  excellent  effect.  Over 
the  open  ground,  and  up  the  incline, 
the  brave  fellows  rush  at  the  double- 
quick.  In  a few  seconds,  they  are 
seen  clambering  over  the  parapet.  A 
second  more,  and  the  National  and 
i*egimental  colors  are  floating  over  the 
redan.  It  was,  indeed,  a perilous  un- 
d r taking;  it  was  a brave,  even  heroic 
effort;  but  it  was  an  easy  victory.  In 
'that  brief,  rapid  rush  over  the  open 
ground,  150  brave  men  had  perished; 
but  the  garrison  had  fled  precipitately 
over  the  bridge,  leaving  behind  some 
30  men,  who,  unable  to  escape,  were 
captured  in  the  ditch.  During  the 
night,  several  unsuccessful  attempts 
were  made  to  regain  what  had  been 


lost,  and  even  to  burn  the  bridge.  On 
the  following  morning  it  was  discov- 
ered that  the  advanced  works  on  the 
south  side  of  the  river  were  also  aban- 
doned ; and  Hancock,  without  expe- 
riencing any  further  resistance,  pushed 
across  the  bridge  his  entire  corps; 
Wright,  at  the  same  time,  effected  a 
crossing  at  Jericho  Ford,  and  took  po- 
sition on  Warren’s  right. 

Three  of  the  army  corps — the  Second, 
Fifth  and  Sixth — were  thus  on  the 
south  side  of  the  North  Anna  Biver. 
The  Ninth  corps — that  of  Burnside — 
forming  the  National  centre,  alone  re- 
mained on  the  north  side.  It  was  ne- 
cessary that  this  corps  should  be  got 
across  before  any  further  advance  was 
made  by  the  other  troops.  This,  it 
was  soon  found,  was  a difficult,  nay,  in 
the  circumstances,  an  impossible  task. 
Lee,  as  we  have  seen,  when  Warren 
crossed  the  river,  flung  back  his  left 
w’ing,  resting  it  on  Little  Fiver;  and 
when  Hancock  crossed,  he  flung  back 
his  right,  resting  it  on  the  Hanover 
marshes.  With  his  centre,  he  still 
clung  to  the  river.  Thus  it  vras  that 
his  line  assumed  the  form  of  an  obtuse- 
angled  triangle,  the  vertex  thrust  out 
towards  the  North  Anna.  It  followed 
from  this  arrangement  that,  while  he 
could  easily  move  from  wing  to  wing 
by  interior  lines,  his  strongest  point 
was  his  centre.  By  a singular  coinci- 
dehce,  resulting  also  from  the  peculiar 
form  his  line  had  assumed.  Grant’s 
centre  was  his  weakest  point.  When, 
therefore,  Burnside,  on  the  24th,  jyfay 
attempted  to  cross,  his  advance  24. 
division,  under  Crittenden,  was  quickly 


606 


THE  WILDERXESS. 


met  and  repulsed,  with  heavy  loss. 
An  attempt  was  made  by  Warren  to 
connect  with  Burnside,  by  sending 
Crawford’s  division  in  that  direction. 
This  attempt  also^  failed,  Crawford 
being  attacked  by  an  overwhelming 
force,  and  only  after  much  difficulty 
and  great  loss  regaining  his  position. 

Grant  was  thus  completely  check- 
mated. After  a pause  of  two  days,  he 
came  to  the  conclusion  that  Lee  was 
too  firmly  intrenched  to  be  dislodged 
by  any  further  movement  on  his  front. 
He  had  recourse  again  to  his  flanking 
tactics.  Ordering  Warren  and  Wright 
to  make  demonstrations  in  their  front, 
and  sending  Wilson,  with  a cavalry 
force,  to  destroy  the  Central  Railroad, 
he  recrossed  the  North  Anna  on  the 
May  night  of  the  26th;  and  heading 
26.  first  well  to  the  east,  then  to  the 
south,  he  resumed  his  march  towards 
Richmond.  His  immediate  objective 
was  the  Pamunkey,  which  is  formed 
by  the  junction  of  the  North  and  South 
Anna  rivers.  The  Sixth  corps,  pre- 
ceded by  two  divisions  of  cavalry, 
under  Sheridan,  who  had  rejoined  the 
main  army,  led  the  van.  It  was  fol- 
lowed by  the  Fifth  and  Ninth.  Han- 
cock, with  the  Second,  held  position 
till  the  morning  of  the  27th,  when  he 
covered  the  rear.  On  the  same  morn- 
ing, about  nine  o’clock,  Sheridan  took 
possession  of  Hanover  Ferry  and  Han- 
overtown,  the  latter  on  the  south  side 
of  the  Pamunkey,  and  distant  from 
Richmond  about  fifteen  miles,  from 
White  House  about  sixteen.  On  the 
following  morning,  Saturday,  the  28th, 
the  entire  army  was  south  of  the  Pa- 


munkey, and  in  communication  with 
its  new  base  at  White  House.  Lee 
was  already  in  motion  by  a shorter 
route,  and  was  intrenching  himself  in 
a strong  position,  prepared  to  dispute 
the  passage  of  the  Chickahominy  be- 
fore the  army  of  the  Potomac  had 
reached  the  Pamunkey;  but  Grant  had 
really  made  a great  gain  by  establish- 
ing a new  base  of  supplies  at  White 
House,  on  the  York  River,  and  in 
easy  communication  with  the  waters 
of  Chesapeake  Bay. 

We  are  now  back  on  the  old  bat- 
tle-ground of  the  peninsula — ground 
which,  if  not  sacred,  has  at  least  been 
rendered  famous  by  a campaign  which, 
in  spite  of  some  noble  examples  of  he- 
roism and  self-sacrifice,  in  spite  of  cer- 
tain splendid  exhibitions  of  military 
skill,  in  spite  even  of  a magnificent 
and  memorable  retreat,  must  ever  be 
regarded  as  a National  disaster,  and,  to 
a certain  extent,  also,  as  a National 
disgrace.  The  great  army  of  the  Po- 
tomac is  again  here ; but,  happily,  it  is 
now  in  different  hands.  Now,  as  then, 
the  public  is  interested  and  excited  by 
frequent  reports  of  changes  of  base; 
but  the  reported  changes  of  base  imply 
victory,  not  defeat.  They  imply  that 
the  enemy  is  being  driven  closer  and 
closer  to  his  last  stronghold,  nearer 
and  nearer  to  his  final  harbor  of  hope. 
Lee  never  handled  his  men  with  more 
consummate  skill ; his  war-hardened 
veterans  were  never  more  enduring, 
more  active  or  more  subservient  to  his 
will ; but  he  is  now  opposed  to  an  an- 
tagonist who  is  single  of  purpose,  in- 
flexible of  will,  tenacious  of  his  grasp. 


AT  THE  TOLOPOTOMY. 


G97 


and  who  uses  his  armies  to  win  battles, 
rather  than  to  win  political  distinction 
or  the  praises  of  men. 

At  this  stage,  both  armies  were 
being  considerably  strengthened  by 
reinforcements.  The  bottling  np  of 
Butler  at  Bermuda  Hundred  allowed 
Beauregard  to  send  the  greater  portion 
of  his  troops  to  the  assistance  of  Lee; 
and  Breckenridge,  relieved  from  any 
severe  pressure  in  Western  Virginia, 
was  reported  to  be  already  in  the 
neighborhood  of  Hanover  Court  House, 
with  5000  infantry  and  two  brigades 
of  cavalry,  under  Wickham  and  Lomax. 
Grant  was  also  receiving  reinforce- 
ments, W.  F.  Smith  being  now  on  his 
way  from  Bermuda  Hundred,  with 
about  two  thirds  of  Butler’s  best 
troops.  Convinced  that  a crisis  was 
at  hand,  both  parties  had  been  vigor- 
ously concentrating.  Now  that  the 
Nationals  were  on  the  southwestern 
bank  of  the  Pamunkey,  the  direct  road 
to  Richmond  was  across  the  Chicka- 
hominy.  Grant  immediately  made  ar- 
rangements to  ascertain  the  position 
and  strength  of  the  enemy.  Sheridan, 
j^Iay  on  the  28th,  was  pushed  forward 
28.  on  the  Hanover  road,  with  three 
brigades  of  cavalry,  under  Davis,  Gregg 
and  Custer.  At  Hawe’s  Store  they 
encountered  the  Confederate  cavalry, 
under  Fitz-Hugh  Lee  and  Hampton. 
A severe  battle  ensued,  the  troopers 
dismounting,  and  fighting  for  several 
hours  with  great  obstinacy.  The  Con- 
federates finally  retired  across  the  To- 
lopotomy,  leaving  Sheridan  in  posses- 
sion of  the  position  which  commanded 
aa  important  junction  of  roads.  Re- 


connoissances  were  now  made  by  the 
army  in  force.  Wright  moved  on  Han- 
over Court  House ; Hancock  moved  on 
the  road  leading  from  Hawe’s  Store,  in 
the  same  direction;  Warren  advanced 
towards  Shady  Grove  Church ; while 
Burnside’s  troops  were  so  disposed  as 
to  be  in  readiness  to  go  to  the  support 
of  either  the  Second  or  Fifth  corps. 
Wilson’s  cavalry  covered  the  right 
and  rear  of  the  National  army;  while 
Torbert  and  Gregg  were  moving  in 
front  of  the  left.  These  movements 
were  not  completed  without  some  hard 
experience.  Wright  reached  Hanover 
Court  House  without  much  opposi- 
tion. It  was  otherwise,  however,  with 
Hancock  and  Warren,  both  of  whom 
encountered'  stubborn  ^ opposition,  and 
wei’e  temporarily  held  in  check.  Han- 
cock’s progress  was  arrested  at  Tolo- 
potomy  Creek;  and,  in  spite  of  the 
most  vigorous  efforts,  he  found  it  im- 
possible to  make  any  headway.  War- 
ren was  brought  to  a standstill  not 
far  from  Shady  Grove  Church,  at  a 
point  where  the  road  is  crossed  by  the 
main  branch  of  the  Tolopotomy.  At 
this  point,  it  was  found,  Ewell  was 
posted  in  great  strength.  It  soon 
began  to  be  apparent  that  the  enemy 
was  bent  on  turning  Warren’s  left,  by 
moving  along  the  Mechanicsville  pike. 
Crawford  quickly  covered  that  road 
by  a brigade  of  his  reserves,  under 
Colonel  Hardin.  This  brigade  was  fu- 
riously assailed  by  Rodes,  at  Beth- 
esda  Church,  and  compelled  to  fall 
back  to  the  Shady  Grove  road,  the 
enemy  pressing  closely.  At  this  point, 
i Crawford  brought  up  the  remainder  of 


698 


THE  WILDERNESS. 


the  reserves,  and,  with  the  aid  of  a 
powerful  battery,  effectually  repelled 
the  assailants.  At  dusk,  the  National 
left  was  extended  so  as  to  cover  the 
Mechanicsville  road.  When  Meade 
was  made  aware  of  the  assault  made 
on  Warren,  he  ordered  an  attack  along 
the  whole  line.  Only  Hancock,  of  the 
other  corps  commanders,  received  the 
order  in  time  to  act  before  dark. 
With  characteristic  promptitude,  he 
pressed  forward  Barlow’s  division, 
drove  in  the  Confederate  pickets,  and 
captured  the  rifle-pits.  These  move- 
ments had  the  effect  of  developing 
the  enemy’s  position.  Lee,  it  was 
found,  was  posted  in  great  strength  in 
advance  of  the  Chickahominy ; his  left 
at  Hanover  Court  House,  and  covering 
the*  railroad;  his  centre  in  front  of 
Atlee’s  Station ; his  right  at  Mechan- 
icsville, and  covering,  as  we  have  seen. 
Shady  Grove.  Such  was  the  general 
condition  of  affairs  on  the  night  of 
the  30th. 

Grant,  bent  upon  his  purpose,  impa- 
tient of  delay,  but  realizing  the  diffi- 
culty, if  not  impossibility,  of  forcing 
his  army  across  the  Chickahominy  by  a 
direct  attack  on  Lee’s  front,  fell  back 
on  his  old  tactics — a flank  movement 
by  Lee’s  right.  A movement  was, 
therefore,  made  upon  Cold  Harbor — a 
point  which  commanded  all  the  roads, 
leading  on  the  one  hand  to  White 
House,  and  on  the  other  to  Bichmond. 
May  It  was  now  the  31st  of  May. 

3 b On  that  day,  a division  of  Sheri- 
dan’s cavalry,  under  General  Torbert, 
captured  and  held  the  place,  in  spite 
of  the  efforts  of  a strong  conjoint  force 


of  Confederate  cavalry  and  infantry. 
On  the  following  day,  Wednesday,  the 
1st  of  June,  an  effort  was  made  June 
by  a body  of  Confederates,  under  b 
General  Hoke,  to  regain  possession  of 
Cold  Harbor.  The  Confederates  were 
repulsed.  Hoke,  however,  was  quickly 
reinforchd  ; and  about  noon  he  returned 
to  the  attack.  It  was  now  evident 
that  the  Confederate  commander  had 
divined  the  object  of  his  antagonist, 
and  that  he  was  also  fully  aware  of 
the  value  of  the  position.  Sheridan 
sent  word  back  that  Torbert  was  sore- 
ly pressed.  He  was  immediately  di- 
rected to  hold  on  at  all  hazards,  until 
he  was  relieved  by  the  infantry.  Mean- 
while, Wright,  with  the  Sixth  corps, 
after  marching  all  night  from  the  ex- 
treme right  of  the  National  army,  was 
approaching  the  scene  of  conflict.  So, 
too,  w^as  W.  F.  Smith,  with  the 
Eighteenth  corps,  which  had  been 
strengthened  by  four  divisions  of  the 
Tenth,  making  an  aggregate  of  16,000 
men.  Smith,  his  command  on  board 
transports,  had  left  Bermuda  Hundred 
on  the  29th  May.  After  passing  down 
the  James,  and  ascending  the  York 
and  Pamunkey,  he  reached  White 
House  on  the  following  day.  There 
he  received  orders  to  move  upon  New 
Castle.  It  was  not  until  he  had 
reached  that  place,  and  when  he  had 
gone  out  of  his  way  some  twelve  or 
fifteen  miles,  that  he  was  informed  that 
a mistake  had  been  committed,  and 
that  he  must  make  a counter-march  im- 
mediately on  Cold  Harbor.  Without 
a moment’s  delay,  the  ordered  move- 
ment was  commenced ; and  about  three 


COLD  HARBOR. 


699 


o’clock  in  the  afternoon  of  the  1st  of 
June,  shortly  after  the  arrival  of  W right, 
Smith,  with  his  command,  reached  Cold 
Harbor.  His  men  sorely  needed  rest, 
after  a continuous  march  of  twenty- 
five  miles;  but  no  rest  was  yet  to  be 
granted  them.  Orders  here  awaited 
him  from  General  Meade  to  take  posi- 
tion on  the  right  of  the  Sixth  corps, 
and  to  co-operate  with  Wright  in  an 
immediate  attack  on  the  enemy.  Pre- 
parations for  attack  were  made  accord- 
ingly. Wright,  with  the  Sixth  corps, 
took  post  in  front  of  Cold  Harbor — 
Ricketts  on  his  right,  Russell  in  the 
centre,  and  Neill  on  the  left.  Smith, 
w’ith  his  command,  took  part  on  the 
right  of  the  Sixth — Martin  dale  on  his 
right,  W.  H.  T.  Brooks  in  the  centre^ 
and  Devens  on  the  left. 

It  was  now  past  five  o’clock,  and  the 
day  was  fast  speeding  to  its  close.  Be- 
tween the  two  armies  there  was  a 
broad,  open,  undulating  field,  about 
two  thirds  of  a mile  in  width.  Beyond 
this  open  ground,  there  was  a thin 
strip  of  woods;  and  a little  further  be- 
yond there  was  somewhat  of  a forest. 
In  the  interval,  and  immediately  in  the 
rear  of  the  first  woods,  the  Confed- 
erates had  constructed  lines  of  rifle- 
trenches.  At  a given  signal,  the  Na- 
tionals rushed  over  the  open  space; 
and,  in  spite  of  a murderous  fire,  they 
caiTied  the  first  line  of  rifle-trenches. 
The  success  was  most  complete  in  front 
of  Smith’s  left  and  the  right  of  the 
Sixth  corps.  Vigorous  efforts  were 
made  to  capture  the  second  line.  Several 
desperate  struggles  ensued.  The  second 
line  was  found  to  be  impregnable.  The 


first  line,  however,  was  held;  and  in 
the  thin  wood,  under  the  shelter  of  the 
trees,  and  under  hurriedly-constructed 
bullet-proofs,  which  the  last  few  weeks’ 
experience  had  taught  them  to  make, 
the  men  went  to  sleep  on  their  arms. 
In  this  encounter.  Grant  had  lost  2000 
men ; but  the  sacrifice  had  not  been 
made  in  vain  ; for  he  had  laid  his  hands 
firmly  on  Cold  Harbor. 

Thursday,  the  2d  of  June,  was  spent 
in  making  preparations  for  an-  jung 
other  vigorous  assault.  With  not  2. 
a little  difiniculty,  and  with  some  sacri- 
fice, Grant  and  Meade  succeeded  in 
completing  their  arrangements.  In  at- 
tempting to  take  the  positions  assigned 
them,  both  Burnside  and  Warren  were 
vigorously  assailed  and  severely  pun- 
ished. The  new  disposition  of  the  dif- 
ferent corps,  from  left  to  right,  was  as 
follows:  — Hancock,  Wright,  Smith, 
Warren,  Burnside.  The  line  of  battle 
extended  from  Tolopotomy  Creek,  cov- 
ering Bethesda  Church,  across  the  road 
from  Cold  Harbor  to  the  Chickahom- 
iny.  Sheridan,  with  a large  body  of 
cavalry,  was  guarding  the  left  flank, 
all  the  lower  fords  of  the  Chicka- 
hominy,  and  as  far  east  as  White 
House.  Wilson,  with  another  cavalry 
force,  was  guarding  the  right  flank. 
During  the  2d,  Lee  had  been  quite  as 
active  as  his  antagonist.  He  kept  him- 
self well  informed  of  all  the  move- 
ments of  the  opposing  forces;  and  he 
greatly  strengthened  his  position,  which 
was  naturally  very  strong,  by  means  of 
slashings  and  rifle-trenches.  Longstreet 
was  in  the  centre,  A.  P.  Hill  on  the 
right,  Ewell  on  the  left.  Reference  to 


TOO 


THE  WILDERNESS. 


the  map  will  show  that  we  are  here  on 
what  may  be  called  classic  or  historic 
ground.  It  was  here  that  was  fought, 
some  two  years  before,  the  battle  of 
Gaines’  Mill.  The  positions  of  the 
combatants,  however,  happened  to  be 
reversed — Lee  occupying  that  formerly 
held  by  McClellan,  and  Grant  occupy- 
ing that  formerly  held  by  Lee.  Such 
was  the  situation  of  the  rival  armies 
on  the  night  of  the  2d  of  June.  But 
for  a severe  thunderstorm  which  broke 
out,  accompanied  by  heavy  rains,  the 
assault  would  have  been  made  that 
evening.  As  it  was,  orders  were  given 
by  Grant  for  a general  attack  along 
the  whole  line,  at  half-past  four,  on  the’ 
following  morning.  Lee  was  equally 
prepared ; and,  if  not  equally  sanguine 
of  ultimate  success,  he  was  equally  reso- 
lute to  win,  if  he  could. 

At  earliest  dawn,  on  the  morning  of 
June  Friday,  the  3d,  the  National 
army  was  in  motion.  A driz- 
zling rain  was  falling,  as  the  troops  ad- 
vanced silently,  but  swiftly,  over  the 
open  ground  towards  the  Confederate 
intrenchments,  in  which  could  already 
be  seen,  through  the  dim  morning  light, 
the  well-known  gre}"  uniform  and  the 
rows  of  glittering  steel.  The  onset 
was  terrific,  and  on  a scale  of  magni- 
tude surpassing  anything  yet  witnessed 
in  the  war.  The  resistance  was  equal- 
ly grand,  and  on  a scale  of  proportion- 
ate magnitude.  Never,  perhaps,  in  the 
history  of  previous  warfare  was  such 
a shock  of  battle  experienced.  In  a 
space  of  time  which  has  been  various- 
ly estimated  from  ten  minutes  to  half 
an  hour,  the  battle  was  fought  and 


won,  and  some  15,000  men  were  killed 
or  wounded.  It  took  hardly  more 
than  ten  minutes  of  the  figment  men 
call  time,”  says  Swinton,  “to  decide 
the  battle.  There  was  along  the  whole 
line  a rush — the  spectacle  of  impreg- 
nable w^orks — a bloody  loss — then  a 
sullen  falling  back,  and  the  action  was 
decided.  Conceive  of  this  in  the  large, 
and  we  shall  then  be  able  to  descend 
to  some  of  the  points  of  action,  as  they 
individualize  themselves  along  the  line.” 
Of  such  a battle  it  may  safely  be  said 
that  no  one,  during  the  actual  minutes 
it  covered,  could  think  of  it,  far  less 
witness  it,  as  a whole.  Unlike  most 
of  the  other  great  battles,  such  as  An- 
tietam,  Fredericksburg,  Chancellors- 
ville,  Gettysburg,  and  the  assaults  on 
Vicksburg,  which  w^ere  of  some  dura- 
tion, and  could  be  contemplated  as  a 
whole,  this  could  be  seen  and  known 
only  in  fragmentary  detail;  and  so 
brief  was  the  struggle  that  it  was  a 
memory  almost  as  soon  as  it  became  an 
experience. 

Some  facts,  however,  have  been  pre- 
served, and  with  the  help  of  these,  we 
are  enabled  to  glance  along  the  lines  at 
the  moment  of  attack,  and  while  the 
struggle  lasted.  Hancock,  who  held 
the  National  left,  pushed  forward  at 
the  hour  appointed  the  divisions  of 
Barlow  and  Gibbon,  with  Birney  sup- 
porting. Barlow,  with  his  division 
formed  in  two  lines,  encountered  the 
enemy  in  a piece  of  hollow  ground,  in 
front  of  his  works.  Driving  him  from 
it,  he  pi’essed  into  the  works  them- 
selves, capturing  several  hundred  pris- 
oners, a battle-flag  and  three  guns,  turn- 


THE  NATIONALS  REPULSED. 


701 


ing  the  guns  upon  their  owners,  and 
forcing  them  back  in  confusion.  It 
was  only  a brief  victory;  for  before 
Barlow’s  second  line  had  time  to  come 
up,  Hill’s  men  rallied  in  stronger  force, 
and,  returning  with  tremendous  en- 
ergy, reclaimed  the  captured  works. 
Barlow  was  driven  back  some  fifty  or 
sixty  yards.  Here,  however,  in  an  ad- 
vantageous position,  far  in  advance  of 
his  original  line,  he  halted ; and  quick- 
ly covering  his  front,  he  held  his 
ground  so  firmly  that  he  could  not  be 
dislodged.  Gibbon  advanced  at  the 
same  time  with  Barlow;  but  his  pro- 
gress being  checked  by  a swamp,  which 
widened  as  he  neared  the  enemy’s 
works,  his  command  was  separated, 
and,  consequently,  weakened.  With 
great  bravery,  however,  the  troops 
pressed  forward;  and  in  spite  of  the 
destructive  fire  which  fell  full  in  their 
faces,  some  of  them  actually  gained  the 
works.  Colonel  McMahon,  with  a 
portion  of  his  brigade,  reached  the 
parapet,  and  planted  upon  it  his  colors. 
The  next  moment  he  fell  mortally 
wounded,  and  died  in  the  hands  of  the 
enemy.  Among  the  officei’s  of  Gib- 
bon’s command  who  met  a similar  fate 
were  Colonels  Porter,  Morris,  McKeen 
and  Haskell.  General  Tyler  was 
wounded.  Gibbon  was  unable  to  hold 
any  part  of  the  Confederate  works; 
but  some  of  his  troops  gained  an  ad- 
vanced position  in  which  they  could 
not  be  reached,  and  from  which  they 
could  not  with  safety  escape.  Han- 
cock had  already  lost  3000  men. 

The  National  centre,  under  Wright 
and  Smith,  was  not  more  fortunate. 


They  made  the  assault  with  great  gal- 
lantry, and  were  rewarded  with  a tem- 
porary success.  They  were  soon,  how- 
ever, repulsed,  and  with  tremendous 
loss  of  life.  The  most  they  could  do 
was  to  hold  a position  somewhat  in 
advance  of  their  original  lines.  The 
fighting  in  front  of  Warren  and  Burn- 
side was  unimportant.  Warren’s  line 
was  too  thin  and  too  extended  to 
justify  a concentrated  effort.  Except 
with  his  artillery,  of  which  he  made 
good  and  effective  use,  he  remained  si- 
lently on  the  defensive.  Burnside  did 
not  advance  at  the  hour  designated; 
and  when,  later  in  the  day,  he  claimed  to 
have  gained  an  advantageous  position 
from  which,  with  two  of  his  divisions, 
he  could  fall  effectively  on  Lee’s  right 
fiank,  the  attack  on  the  Confederate 
right  had  failed.  Meade,  therefore, 
countermanded  the  attack  on  the  left. 

General  Wilson,  it  will  be  remem- 
bered, was  posted  with  his  cavalry  on 
the  extreme  right  of  the  Nation^al 
army.  During  the  course  of  the  morn- 
ing he  had  a severe  but  unsuccessful 
encounter  with  the  Confederate  caval- 
ry, under  Wade  Hampton.  Later,  he 
fell  upon  an  infantry  brigade,  of  Heth’s 
division,  which  had  been  sent  to  en- 
velop Burnside,  and  routed  it,  taking  a 
number  of  prisoners. 

The  unsuccessful  effort  made  in  the 
early  morning  by  the  National  left, 
and  also  by  the  National  centre,  had 
really  determined  the  issue  of  the  bat- 
tle. It  was  the  feeling  of  the  officers, 
as  well  as  of  the  men  themselves,  that 
more  could  not  be  done — that  any  fur- 
ther attempt  to  force  the  Confederate 


702 


THE  WILDERNESS. 


lines  would  be  a useless  waste  of  life. 
That  such  was  the  general  judgment, 
received  a striking  confirmation,  during 
the  course  of  the  forenoon,  from  a cir- 
cumstance which  is,  perhaps,  without 
a parallel  on  any  battle  field.  Some 
hours  after  the  first  attack.  General 
Meade,  yielding,  no  doubt,  to  the  stub- 
born and  unconquerable  will  of  Grant, 
sent  ordei’s  to  each  corps  commandei’ 
to  renew  the  attack,  without  any  re- 
gard to  the  troops  on  his  right  or  left. 
The  order  was  communicated  in  the 
usual  way  by  the  commanders  to  their 
subordinate  officers,  by  these  again  to 
their  subordinates,  and  so  on  through 
the  accustomed  channels,  until  it 
reached  the  men.  By  a singular  unan- 
imity of  sentiment  and  will,  not  a man 
stirred.  It  was  a silent  but  emphatic 
“No!” — an  unexampled  manifestation 
of  unanimous  conviction,  and  a striking 
proof  of  the  intelligence  of  the  Ameri- 
can soldier. 

By  one  o’clock,  the  bloody  battle  of 
Cold  • Harbor  was  ended.  The  Na- 
tional loss  in  this  engagement  and  in 
the  preliminaiy  skirmishes,  was  re- 
ported at  over  13,000  men  in  killed, 
wounded  and  missing.  The  Confed- 
erate loss  was  trifling  in  comparison. 

For  ten  days  the  two  armies  con- 
fronted each  other,  each  endeavoring 
to  strengthen  its  position.  There  was 
severe  but  partial  fighting  on  the  4th, 
5th  and  6th,  the  Confederate  assaults 
in  every  instance  being  vigorously  re- 
pelled. During  those  days,  so  close 
were  the  opposing  lines  that  friendly 
salutations  were  exchanged,  and  much 
kindly,  good-natured  feeling  manifest- 


ed. The  National  soldier  had  plenty 
of  coffee,  but  he  was  not  so  well  sup- 
plied with  tobacco.  The  Confedei'ate 
soldier  had  plenty  of  tobacco,  but  he 
was  ill-supplied  with  coffee.  The  com 
modities  were  freely  exchanged,  to  the 
gratification  of  both  parties.  On  the 
7tb,  thiere  was  a brief  truce  of  two 
hours,  during  which  the  dead  were 
buried  and  the  wounded  removed. 

Meanwhile,  Grant  had  become  con- 
vinced of  the  impossibility  of  accom- 
plishing more  by  direct  assault  on  the 
enemy’s  lines.  It  had  been  his  hope 
that  he  would  be  able  to  beat  Lee 
north  of  Richmond ; and  then,  after 
destroying  his  communications  north 
of  the  James,  to  besiege  Richmond  or 
follow  his  antao^onist  south,  if  he  should 
retreat.  It  was  still  possible  for  Gran  t 
to  move  by  Lee’s  left  flank,  and  to  in- 
vest Richmond  from  the  north ; but 
while,  by  adopting  that  course,  Iw. 
would  still  be  easily  able  to  cover  the 
approaches  to  Washington,  he  would 
be  exposed  to  other  and  serious  incon- 
veniences. Abiding  by  the  example 
which  he  had  followed  throughout  the 
campaign  hitherto,  he  resolved  to  exe- 
cute another  flank  movement  by  his 
own  left,  and,  forcing  his  way  across 
the  Chickahominy,  to  press  towards 
the  James.  It  was  all-important  that 
Washington  should  be  rendered  as  safe 
as  possible  against  any  incursions  of 
the  enemy.  It  was  important,  also, 
that  while  pushing  his  way  across  the 
Chickahominy,  Lee’s  cavalry  should  be 
engaged  in  some  other  direction.  To 
accomplish  this  double  purpose,  Sheri- 
dan was  despatched,  with  two  divisions 


ACROSS  THE  CHICKAHOMINY. 


703 


of  his  cavalry,  to  destroy  more  effect- 
ually all  the  railroads  in  Lee’s  rear. 

On  the  7th,  Sheridan  started  with 
June  divisions  of  Torbert  and 

7*  Gregg.  He  accomplished  his 
work  with  promptitude  and  success. 
He  struck  and  desti-oyed  the  Rich- 
mond and  Fredericksburg  Road,  at 
Chesterville  Station.  He  struck  and 
destro^^ed  the  Virginia  Central,  at 
Trevillian  Station,  where  he  encoun- 
tered and  routed  some  of  Hampton’s 
horsemen.  The  work  of  destruction 
was  carried  on  as  far  as  Louisa  Court 
House,  where  a stronger  force  was  en- 
countered. Sheridan  then  fell  back  upon 
Trevillian,  at  which  place  the  Confed- 
erate cavalry  had  concentrated  in  great 
strength.  After  a severe  and  bloody 
battle,  Sheridan  withdrew;  and,  sweep- 
ing around  by  way  of  Spottsylvania 
Court  House  and  Gurney’s  Station,  he 
reached  White  House,  and  rejoined 
the  army  of  Grant. 

Preparations,  meanwhile,  had  been 
steadily  going  on,  with  a view  to  a 
rapid  movement  on  the  James.  Still 
maintaining  the  appearance  of  a desire 
to  strike  some  of  the  bridges  of  the 
Chickahominy,  in  the  neighborhood  of 
Cold  Harbor,  Grant  was  steadily  mov- 
ing more  and  more  in  the  direction  of 
his  own  left.  By  gradually  refusing  his 
right  and  developing  his  left,  he  had 
put  a large  portion  of  his  army  within 
easy  distance  of  the  lower  crossings  of 
that  river.  There  was  no  evidence,  as 
yet,  that  Lee  had  any  suspicion  of  his 
real  motive ; although  it  is  difficult  to 
believe  he  was  ignorant  of  some  of  the 
operations^  which  were  being  carried  on. 


On  the  10th  and  the  llth.  Grant  had 
caused  to  be  destroyed  the  railroad 
from  Despatch  Station  to  White  House, 
and  had  shipped  on  barges  all  the  rails, 
sleepers  and  ties  to  the  latter  place  for 
use  below.  The  work,  it  is  true,  had 
been  done  with  the  utmost  quietness ; 
but  still  the  doubt  remains  whether 
Lee  did  not  close  his  eyes  to  a move- 
ment which,  probably,  he  did  not  wish 
to  hinder.  On  the  night  of  Sunday, 
the  12th,  the  movement  to  the  jmie 
James  was  commenced.  Warren, 
who  took  the  lead,  preceded  by  Wil- 
son’s division  of  cavalry,  crossed  the 
Chickahominy  at  Long  Bridge ; and, 
taking  position  on  the  Long  Bridge 
road  where  it  crosses  White  Oak 
Swamp,  he  made  certain  dispositions 
calculated  to  mislead  the  enemy  as  to 
the  purpose  of  the  National  com- 
mander. Hancock  followed  Warren, 
and  marched  at  once  to  Wilcox  Land- 
ing, on  the  James.  Wright  and  Burn- 
side, taking  an  exterior  route,  crossed 
at  Jones’  Bridge,  lower  down,  and 
marched  to  Charles  City  Court  House. 
Smith,  with  his  command,  marched  at 
the  same  time  to  White  House,  where 
he  took  transports,  and  returned  to 
Bermuda  Hundred  by  water.  The 
trains  crossed  the  Chickahominy  at 
Cole’s  Ferry. 

Lee  discovered  the  withdrawal  of 
the  National  army  on  the  morning  of 
the  13th ; but  in  place  of  following  it 
up,  he  retired  at  once  to  Richmond. 
Some  delay  was  experienced  in  cross- 
ing the  James,  in  consequence  of  the 
absence  of  sufficient  pontoon  material. 
On  the  night  of  the  14th,  a pontoon 


704 


THE  WILDERNESS. 


bridge,  over  two  thousand  feet  in 
length,  was  thrown  across  the  river 
at  Douthard’s;  and  by  noon  of  the 
June  16th,  the  entire  army  of  the  Po- 
tomac  was  south  of  the  James. 
On  all  concerned,  the  crossing  of  the 
Chickahoininy,  tlie  march  to  and  cross- 
ing of  the  James,  reflected  the  highest 
credit.  The  success  of  the  whole 
movement  was  complete.  Thus  ended 
a campaign  of  forty-three  days — one  of 
the  most  momentous  and  certainly  one 
of  the  most  interesting  in  the  war.  It 
had,  on  the  whole,  been  well  con- 
ducted; in  some  respects,  indeed,  the 
management  was  perfect.  During  that 
lengthened  period,  in  that  tangled  wil- 
derness, where  wagon  travel  was  next 
to  impossible,  and  where  the  base  was 
so  often  changing,  the  vast  National 
army,  of  more  than  100,000  men,  never 
suffered  for  want  of  food.  It  had 
been,  however,  a bloody  and  ruinous 
campaign,  and  fearfully  destructive  of 
human  life.  The  losses  on  the  one 
side  and  on  the  other  have  been  vari- 
ously estimated.  Swinton,  who  in 
these  matters  is  generally  both  careful 
and  accurate,  gives  the  enormous  ag- 
gregate of  the  National  loss  at  60,000 
men — a number  greater  than  the  entire 
strength  of  Lee’s  army  at  the  opening 
of  the  campaign.  Lee’s  loss,  accord- 
ing to  the  same  authority,  M^as  about 

18.000  or  20,000,  the  ratio  being  one 
to  three.  Dr.  Draper,  who  has  written 
more  recently,  but  who  is  evidently 
disposed  to  lessen  the  disproportion, 
estimates  the  National  loss  at  over 

54.000  and  the  Confederate  loss  at 
32,000.  The  truth,  it  is  possible,  lies 


between.  The  presumption  is  that  in 
Draper’s  columns,  the  Confederate  loss 
is  greatly  exaggerated.  When  we  re- 
member that  the  Confederates  fought, 
for  the  most  part,  behind  their  de- 
fenses, and  that  the  Nationals,  after 
the  first  two  days’  fighting  in  the  Wil- 
deiTiess^  were  always  the  aggressors, 
the  estimate  of  Swinton  seems  to  be 
the  moi’e  reasonable.  Swinton’s  esti- 
mate, of  course,  includes  Burnside’s 
losses;  but  neither  he  nor  Draper  in- 
cludes in  his  estimate  the  losses  sus- 
tained by  Butler’s  command  and  by 
that  of  Sigel  and  Hunter. 

The  story  told  in  this  chapter — the 
story  of  the  Overland  Campaign,  as  it 
has  properly  been  named — will  ever  be 
read  with  pride,  if  not  with  pleasure, 
by  the  American  people.  The  justice 
or  the  injustice,  the  right  or  the  wrong 
attaching  to  the  contending  parties,  will 
ultimately  be  forgotten;  but  to  latest 
generations,  men  will  proudly  speak 
of  the  army  of  the  Potomac  and  the 
army  of  Northern  Virginia — of  Grant 
and  Lee ; of  Meade  and  Hancock,  and 
Sedgwick  and  Warren,  and  Wright 
and  Burnside  ; of  Longstreet  and  Hill 
and  Ewell ; and  of  the  glorious  rank 
and  file  of  both  armies.  It  was  one  of 
those  grand,  protracted  contests  of 
which  no  section  of  the  American 
people  have,  or  will  ever  have,  any  just 
cause  to  be  ashamed.  On  the  merits 
of  the  campaign,  as  a whole,  much  has 
been  said  and  written ; and  not  a little 
difference  of  opinion  exists.  Harsh 
things  have  been  said  of  General 
Grant;  and  by  not  a few  the  policy 
jDursued  in  this  campaign,  from  first  to 


SOUTH  OF  THE  JAMES. 


705 


last,  has  been  severely  condemned. 
He  fought,  we  are  told,  when  he  might 
have  flanked;  he  dashed  his  men  to 
death  against  the  invulnerable  lines  of 
the  enemy,  when  he  might  have  accom- 
plished all  he  actually  did  accomplish 
with  comparative  ease  and  with  but  lit- 
tle loss  of  life.  His  tactics  have  been 
contrasted  with  those  of  his  great  rival 
Lee,  on  the  one  hand,  and  with  those 
of  his  great  lieutenant,  Sherman,  on  the 
other;  and  the  National  commander 
has  been  exhibited  in  the  unfavora- 
ble light  of  being  unnecessarily  and 
recklessly  wasteful  of  the  lives  of  his 
men^  These  judgments,  based  on  too 
narrow  a view  of  the  entire  situation, 
have  had  no  eflPect  on  the  masses  of 


The  Overland  Campaign  was,  as  has  been  mention- 
»ed  in  the  text,  largely  destructive  of  human  life.  The 
ofl&cers  suffered  severely.  Among  those  already  named, 
but  of  whom  no  notice  has  yet  been  given,  was  Briga- 
dier-General Thomas  G.  Stevenson.  He  was  killed  at 
Spottsylvania  on  the  10th  of  May,  1864.  Stevenson 
was  a Bostonian  by  birth.  At  an  early  age  he  mani- 
fested a predilection  for  military  life.  He  rose  from 
the  ranks,  and  was  major  of  the  4th  battalion  of  Mas- 
sachusetts infantry  at  the  commencement  of  the  war. 
As  a drill-master,  he  acquired  a great  reputation. 
He  was  colonel  of  the  24th  regiment  of  Massachusetts 
infantry,  and  served  under  Foster  in  Burnside’s  North 


the  American  people,  who  choose  to 
see  in  General  Grant  the  hero  who 
proved  himself  the  saviour  of  his 
country,  and  who  at  this  stage  of  his 
career  was,  by  hard  blows  and  contin- 
uous hammering,  crushing  out  the  life 
of  the  rebellious  Confederacy.  It  is 
not  claimed  that  the  conduct  of  the 
campaign  was  perfect.  It  would  not 
be  diflicult  to  exhibit  defects — defects 
in  the  general  plans  themselves,  de- 
fects in  the  mode  of  execution — to 
show  where  opportunities  were  lost 
and  blunders  committed ; but  in  view 
of  so  much  heroism,  so  much  unex- 
ampled courage,  such  splendid  work, 
we  have  a voice  only  for  praise ; none 
for  censure  or  complaint. 


Carolina  Expedition,  in  1862.  He  took  part  in  the 
capture  of  Roanoke  Island  and  New  Berne.  He  was 
appointed  brigadier-general  in  December,  1862.  He 
afterwards  took  part  in  the  operations  in  Charleston 
Harbor,  assisting  in  the  reduction  of  Morris  Island, 
and  commanding  the  reserves  at  the  assault  on  Fort 
Wagner.  Having  returned  to  the  North  to  recruit 
his  health,  in  the  fall  of  1863,  Burnside,  who  had  a 
high  opinion  of  his  ability,  placed  him  in  command 
of  the  First  division  of  the  Ninth  corps.  In  this 
capacity  he  took  part  in  the  battle  of  the  10th  of  May 
at  Spottsylvania.  He  was  cut  down  at  the  early  age  of 
twenty-eight. 


L 


706 


ATLANTA. 


CHAPTER  XXXV. 


Bherman’s  Atlanta  Campaign. — Strength  of  his  Army. — General  Johnston’s  Army. — Description  of  Atlanta. — 
Operations  against  Dalton. — Buzzard  Roost. — Snake  Creek  Gap.j-Kilpatrick  wounded. — Johnston  evacuates 
Dalton, — Operations  against  Resaca  — Johnston  crosses  the  Etowah. — Occupation  of  Rome. — Johnston 
falls  back  on  Allatoona  Pass. — The  March  upon  Dallas. — Battles  of  Pumpkin  Vine  Creek  and  New  Hope 
Church. — Allatoona  Pass  turned. — General  Blair  joins  Sherman  with  the  Seventeenth  Corps. — Garrisons  left. 

-March  to  Big  Shanty. — Kenesaw,  Pine,  and  Lost  Mountains. — Confederate  Defe,nses. — Georgia  Militia. 
— Operations  against  Pine  Mountain, — Death  of  General  Polk. — Lost  Mountain  taken, — Continuous  rain. — 
Battle  of  Kulp  House. — Assault  on  Kenesaw  Mountain. — Death  of  General  Harker. — Johnston  abandons 
Kenesaw  Mountain. — Occupation  of  Marietta. — Nickajack  Creek. — Advance  to  the  Chattahoochee — John- 
ston’s Position  again  turned. — His  Defenses  on  the  Chattahoochee. — Mills  destroyed  at  Roswell. — Sherman 
crosses  the  Chattahoochee. — Johnston  retires  upon  Atlanta. — Approach  to  Atlanta. — General  Rousseau’s 
Raid. — Johnston  superseded  by  Hood. — Battle  of  Peach  Tree  Creek. — Hood  Abandons  his  Outer  Line  of 
Defenses — Battle  of  July  22d. — Death  of  General  McPherson. — Wheeler’s  Attack  on  Decatur. — Attack  on 
the  Fifteenth  Corps. — Biographical  Sketch  of  General  McPherson. — General  Garrard’s  Operations  at  Cov- 
ington.— Expeditions  against  the  Macon  and  Western  Railroad. — General  Stoneman’s  Raid. — Destruction 
effected  at  Gordon. — Defeat  and  Capture  of  Stoneman. — General  McCook’s  Raid  — General  Howard  succeeds 
General  McPherson. — Sherman’s  Lines  extended  southward. — Attack  on  the  Fifteenth  Corps. — Resignation 
of  General  Hooker. — Change  in  important  Commands, — Hood’s  Defenses. — The  City  shelled. — New  Plans 
of  General  Sherman. — Wheeler’s  Raid. — Kilpatrick’s  Attempt  on  the  West  Point  and  Macon  Railroads. — 
Movement  of  Sherman’s  Entire  Army  towards  the  Railroads  — Battle  of  Jonesboro. — Hood  evacuates  and 
General  Slocum  enters  the  City. — Repulse  of  General  Wheeler  at  Dalton, — Defeat  of  General  Sturgis  — 
Depopulation  of  Atlanta. 


It  has  already  been  made  plain  to 
18'T  the  reader  that  General  Grant’s 
* entire  attention  was  not  given  to 
the  army  of  the  Potomac.  His  battle- 
plan  contemplated  the  dealing  of  two 
deadly  blows — one  on  Richmond  the 
otlier  on  Atlanta.  To  effect  this  double 
]:>urpose,  he  had  concentrated  at  t^vo 
separate  points,  two  powerful  armies. 
The  one  was  on  the  northern  bank  of  the 
Rapidan,  its  right  at  Culpepper  Court 
House,  and  was  under  the  immediate 
direction  of  General  Meade.  The  other 
^vas  in  the  neighborhood  of  Chatta- 
nooo^a,  and  was  entrusted  to  the  care  of 
General  Sherman.  We  have  already 
traced  the  progress  of  Meade’s  army 
.from  the  Rapidan  to  the  James.  Let  us 


now  give  our  attention  to  the  army  of 
General  Sherman. 

The  total  force  under  Sherman  was 
over  98,000  men  of  all  arms,  with  254 
guns.  It  was  composed  of  three  separ- 
ate organizations,  the  army  of  the  Cum- 
berland, Major-General  Thomas ; the 
army  of  the  Tennessee,  Major-General 
McPherson ; and  the  army  of  the  Ohio, 
Major-General  Schofield.  The  army  of 
the  Cumberland  comprised  the  Fourth 
corps,  Howard;  the  Fourteenth  coip>s. 
Palmer;  and  the  Twentieth  corps, 
Hooker — in  all  60,773,  including  3828 
cavalry.  The  army  of  the  Tennessee 
comprised  the  Fifteenth  corps,  Logan: 
the  Sixteenth  coips.  Dodge;  and  after- 
wards the  Seven teentli  corps,  Blair — ir 


DESCRIPTION  OF  ATLANTA. 


707 


all  24,465  men,  including  624  cavalry. 
The  army  of  the  Ohio  consisted  of  the 
Twenty-third  corps;  in  all  13,559,  in- 
cluding 1679  cavalry.  As  soon  as  Grant 
had  crossed  the  Kapidan,  he  telegraphed 
Sherman  to  advance  from  Chattanooga. 
On  the  morning  of  the  6th  of  May,  and 
^vllen  about  to  move,  the  position  of 
the  three  armies  was  as  follows:  the 
army  of  the  Cumberland  was  at  Ring- 
gold,  on  the  Western  and  Atlantic  Rail- 
road, twenty-three  miles  southeast  of 
Chattanooga;  the  army  of  the  Tennessee 
was  at  Gordon’s  Mill,  on  the  Chicka- 
mauga,  eight  miles  west  of  Ringgold; 
and  the  army  of  the  Ohio  near  Red  Clay, 
about  ten  miles  northeast  of  Ringgold. 

The  Confederate  army,  commanded 
by  Lieutenant-General  Joseph  E.  John- 
ston, lay  in  and  about  Dalton,  fifteen 
miles  south  of  Ringgold,  on  the  railroad, 
his  advance  at  Tunnel  Hill,  about  mid- 
way between  Ringgold  and  Dalton. 
The  force  under  Johnston,  consisting 
mostly  of  veteran  troops,  comprised  the 
corps  of  Generals  Hardee,  Hood,  and 
Polk,  and  General  Wheeler’s  division 
of  about  10,000  cavalry,  numbering  in 
all  not  more  than  60,000  men. 

In  some  respects  the  campaign  before 
General  Sherman  resembled  that  of 
General  Grant  from  the  Rapidan  against 
Richmond.  Its  objective  point  was 
Atlanta,  the  possession  of  which  it  was 
believed  was  hardly  of  less  importance 
bo  the  Confederacy  than  the  capital  of 
Virginia.  Atlanta  had  been  before  the 
war  an  important  centre  of  railroad 
communication  for  the  Western,  Atlan- 
tic, and  Gulf  States,  and  a principal 
manufacturing  town  of  the  South,  with 


a population  of  about  15,000.  Laid  out 
in  a circle  two  miles  in  diameter,  in  its 
centre  was  the  passenger  depot  of  four 
railroads,  radiating  to  Chattanooga, 
Augusta,  Macon  and  Montgomery. 
Here  also  were  railroad  machine-shops, 
an  extensive  rolling  mill,  foundries,  man 
ufactories  of  gun-carriages,  pistols,  tents, 
caps,  cartridges,  shot  and  shell,  shoes, 
clothing,  and  other  military  supplies, 
under  the  direction  of  the  Confederate 
government.  The  population  had  risen 
during  the  war,  by  the  accession  of  per- 
sons employed  under  the  government 
and  the  amval  of  refugees,  to  not  less 
than  20,000.  It  was  supposed  that  the 
capture  of  Atlanta,  with  its  vast  military 
stores  and  costly  machinery,  would  be 
a blow  to  the  resources  of  the  Confed- 
eracy hardly  less  fatal  than  the  capture 
of  Richmond. 

The  utmost  efforts  were  put  forth  by 
the  Confederate  authorities  to  make 
Atlanta  secure.  The  line  of  approach 
was  made  as  difficult  for  Sherman  as  the 
nature  of  the  country — in  itself  easy  of 
defense — and  the  resources  of  Johnston 
would  admit.  Should  Sherman  succeed 
in  making  his  way  over  the  mountain 
region  and  in  crossing  the  rivers,  both  of 
which  afforded  many  strong  defensible 
positions  for  Johnston’s  army,  he  would 
still  have  his  hardest  task  before  him  in 
the  formidable  works  around  Atlanta, 
with  an  army  depleted  by  many  battles 
and  the  necessity  for  leaving  garrisons 
at  various  points.  Sherman’s  line  of 
communication  would,  at  the  same  time, 
be  lengthened  and  exposed,  while  John- 
ston in  falling  back  upon  Atlanta  would 
be  approaching  his  base  and  his  supplies. 


708 


ATLANTA. 


A reconnoissance  of  General  John- 
May  ston’s  position  at  Dalton  satisfied 
fi«  General  Sherman  that  it  could 
not  be  carried  by  an  attack  in  front, 
even  should  the  enemy  abandon  his 
works  at  Tunnel  Hill.  Immediately 
south  of  Tunnel  Hill  is  a valley  about 
three  miles  long  and  about  three-quar- 
ters of  a mile  wide,  bounded  by 
Rocky  Face  Ridge,  a thickly  wooded, 
steep,  and  rugged  mountain,  which  com- 
inands  the  railroad  and  other  approaches 
to  Dalton,  and  extends  southward  many 
miles  on  the  west  side  of  the  railroad 
and  of  the  Oostanaula.  A narrow  moun- 
tain pass  called  Buzzard  Roost,  about 
midway  between  Tunnel  Hill  and  Dal- 
ton, is  the  outlet  to  the  valley, ' and 
through  this  pass  runs  the  railroad  to 
Dalton.  By  means  of  formidable 

batteries,  and  a line  of  rifle-pits  at  its 
northern  entrance,  this  pass  had  been 
rendered  impregnable,  so  that  Dalton 
was  absolutely  secure  against  attack 
from  the  northwest;  on  its  northeast 
side  the  town  was  protected  by  strong 
works  on  Mile  Creek.  General  McPher- 
son was  therefore  directed  to  move 
rapidly  southward  with  the  army  of 
the  Tennessee  from  his  position  at  Gor- 
don’s Mill,  by  way  of  Ship’s  Gap,  Vil- 
lano  w,  and  through  Snake  Creek  Gap — a 
pass  in  Rocky  Face  Ridge  further  south 
— ^upon  Resaca,  a station  about  eighteen 
miles  south  of  Dalton,  where  the  rail- 
road from  that  place  crosses  the  Oosta- 
naula. The  object  of  this  movement 
was  to  compel  General  Johnston  to 
evacuate  his  position  at  Daltonfwhen 
McPherson  would  be  in  a position  to 
harass  his  flank,  while  the  main  body 


of  the  National  army  pushed  him  south- 
ward. While  McPherson’s  flanking 
movement  was  in  progress.  General 
Thomas  was  to  make  a show  of  attack- 
ing in  force  in  front  of  Buzzard  Roost, 
and  Schofield  with  the  aiTny  of  the 
Ohio  was  to  close  up  with 
Thomas’  left.  Accordingly  on  7. 

the  7th,  General  Thomas  advanced  from 
Ringgold  to  Tunnel  Hill,  which  was 
easily  carried  by  the  Fourteenth  corps 
under  General  Palmer,  the  enemy  retir- 
ing to  his  stronger  position  at  Buzzard 
Roost.  The  same  evening  the  National 
line  was  established  about  a mile  south 
of  Tunnel  Hill.  A demonstration  iu 
force  was  made  on  the  8th  against 
Rocky  Face  Ridge  and  Buzzard  Roost. 
The  Fourth  corps  under  Howard  suc- 
ceeded in  carrying  the  lidge,  but  its  crest 
was  found  too  narrow  to  permit  of  an 
attack  being  made  from  it  on  the  pass 
with  any  prospect  of  success.  General 
Schofield  in  the  mean  time  brought 
up  the  army  of  the  Ohio  and  closed 
with  the  left  of  Thomas,  which  was  held 
by  How^ard. 

On  the  same  day  McPherson  suc- 
ceeded in  passing  through  Snake  Creek 
Gap,  suiq)rising  a force  of  Confederate 
cavalry  there,  and  approached  within 
a mile  of  Resaca,  which,  however, 
proved  too  strong  to  be  carried  by 
assault.  He  therefore  fell  back  to  a 
strong  position  at  the  west  end  of  Snake 
Creek  Gap.  General  Sherman  finding 
that  McPherson’s  flank  demonstration 
had  failed  of  its  intended  effect,  set  the 
whole  of  his  army  in  motion  for  Snake 
Creek  Gap,  with  the  exception  of  two 
divisions  of  Howard’s  corps  and  some 


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EVACUATION  OF  DALTON. 


709 


cavalry,  left  to  threaten  the  front  of 
Buzzard  Boost.  The  National  loss  on 
the  8th  and  9th  was  about  750  killed, 
wounded,  and  missing,  the  greater 
number  being  only  slightly  wounded. 

Besaca  is  situated  on  a peninsula 
formed  by  the  junction  of  the  Conasauga 
^vith  the  Oostanaula,  across  which,  from 
river  to  river,  the  Confederates  had  con- 
structed a continuous  line  of  rifle-pits 
with  strong  field-works,  their  flanks 
being  protected  by  the  two  rivers.  A 
line  of  retreat  southward  was  left  open 
across  the  Oostanaula. 

On  the  13th  of  May  the  army  of 
May  Oeneral  Sherman  passed  through 
13.  Snake  Creek  Gap  and'  got  into 
position  in  Sugar  Valley, -a  tract  on  the 
east  side  of  the  ridge  much  broken  by 
hills  covered  with  a dense  undergrowth. 
In  covering  the  movement,  while  press- 
ing the  enemy  toward  Besaca,  General 
Kilpatrick  received  a flesh-wound, 
which  unfitted  him  for  active  duty  for 
several  months.  The  National  lines 
were  advanced  during  the  day  toward 
Besaca,  so  that  the  right,  under  McPher- 
son, rested  on  the  Oostanaula  about 
two  piiles  below  the  town,  and  extended 
north  to  the  centre  under  Thomas — the 
left,  under  Schofield,  extending  from 
Thomas’  left  to  the  Conasauga,  near 
Tilton,  a railroad  station  about  midway 
between  Besaca  and  Dalton. 

In  the  mean  time  General  Johnston 
had  observed  Sherman’s  movement  and 
detected  its  object ; and  considering  his 
position  at  Dalton  no  longer  tenable,  he 
had  moved  southward  on  the  12th,  and 
having  the  shorter  line  of  march,  reached 
Besaca  with  his  entire  force  before  the 


army  of  Shennan  had  got  through 
Snake  Creek  Gap.  Dalton  was  immedi- 
ately occupied  by  the  divisions  of 
Howard’s  corps  left  before  Buzzard 
Boost,  which  following  in  the  rear  of 
Johnston  joined  the  National  left  on  the 
1 4th  near  Tilton.  Sherman,  in  thus  com- 
pelling Johnston  to  evacuate  a position 
of  such  extraordinary  strength  as  that 
of  Dalton,  demonstrated  his  ability  to 
make  his  way  to  Atlanta,  between 
which  and  Dalton  no  position  was  likely 
to  be  held  by  the  Confederates  which 
might  not  be  as  easily  turned. 

On  the  morning  of  the  14th  the 
Confederates  were  in  complete 
readiness  to  receive  an  attack,  14. 
having  spent  the  previous  night  in 
strengthening  their  already  formidable 
earth-works.  General  Hardee  held 
their  right.  General  Hood  their  centre, 
and  General  Polk  their  left.  At  an 
early  hour  skirmishing  commenced.  A 
body  of  infantry  with  cavalry  was  sent 
across  the  Oostanaula  to  threaten  Cal- 
houn in  the  rear,  further  south  on  the 
railroad,  by  which  movement  General 
Sherman  hoped  to  turn  Johnston’s  left, 
and  thus  cut  off  his  retreat,  but  this 
the  nature  of  the  ground  rendered 
impossible.  At  noon  there  was  heavy 
firing  along  the  whole  line.  About  one 
o’clock  an  attempt  was  made  by 
Palmer’s  corps  from  the  left  centre  to 
break  the  enemy’s  line  and  force  him 
from  an  elevated  position  in  the  immedi- 
ate front.  To  reach  the  point  aimed  at, 
it  was  necessary  to  descend  the  slope  of 
a hill  commanded  by  the  enemy’s  artil- 
leiy,  to  ford  a stream  bordered  with  a 
thick  growth  of  bushes  and  vines,  and 


283 


710 


ATLANTA. 


then  to  cross  a space  intersected  by- 
ditches  and  otherwise  obstructed. 
Under  a murderous  fire  of  musketry 
and  artillery  the  hill  was  descended 
and  the  stream  crossed;  but  the  troops 
becoming  confused  among  the  ditches 
and  obstructions,  and  finding  no  shelter 
from  which  the  plunging  fire  of  the 
enemy  might  be  returned,  were  forced 
to  retire,  after  losing  1000  of  their 
number.  Further  to  the  left,  about  the 
same  time.  General  Judah’s  division  of 
the  Twenty-Third  corps  and  Newton’s 
division  of  the  Fourth,  drove  the  enemy 
from  an  important  position  on  their 
outer  line.  By  this  means,  although 
the  position  taken  was  not  held,  the 
National  line  was  advanced.  Artillery 
was  also  got  into  a position  which  pre- 
vented the  enemy  from  occupying  the 
works.  At  both  extremities  of  the  line 
heavy  skirmishing  took  place,  the  den- 
sity of  the  woods  and  undergrowth 
preventing  the  use  of  artillery. 

About  three  in  the  afternoon.  General 
Johnston  massed  a heavy  force  on  the 
road  to  Tilton  with  the  view  of  turning 
the  National  left  flank,  held  by  Stanley’s 
division  of  the  Fourth  corps.  The 
attack  was  made  with  overwhelming 
numbers,  who  rushed  on  with  loud  yells, 
and  with  such  impetuosity  that  Stanley’s 
troops  were  forced  in  confusion  from 
the  hill  on  which  they  were  posted. 
The  movement  ordered  by  Johnston 
had  been  detected  early  enough  to  per- 
mit of  Hooker’s  corps  being  moved  from 
the  centre  to  reinforce  the  National 
left.  The  enemy’s  advance  was  soon 
checked;  and  Stanley’s  troops  having 
been  rallied,  the  Confederates  were. 


about  dusk,  driven  back  to  their  lines 
with  severe  loss. 

While  this  movement  was  going  on. 
General  McPherson  sent  the  Fifteenth 
corps  with  a portion  of  the  Sixteenth 
across  Camp  Creek,  to  carry  a hill  and 
rifle-pits  on  the  enemy’s  left  in  front  of 
Kesaca,  This  was  effected,  and  -vdth 
little  loss.  As  this  position  commanded 
the  w^orks,  the  railroad,  and  the  trestle 
bridges  across  the  Oostanaula,  desperat-e 
efforts  were  made  by  the  enemy  after 
dark  to  retake  it,  but  in  vain.  Heavy 
columns  with  fixed  bayonets  moved  up 
to  the  very  crest  of  the  hill,  but  were 
compelled  to  retire  in  confusion  before 
the  steady  fire  of  the  National  troops. 
At  ten  o’clock  fighting  was  over  for  the 
day. 

Both  armies  strengthened  their  posi- 
tions during  the  night;  and  on 
the  morning  of  the  15th,  under  15. 
cover  of  severe  skirmishing,  prepara- 
tions were  made  by  General  Sherman 
for  an  assault  upon  two  fortified  hills, 
on  the  enemy’s  extreme  right,  the  key 
of  the  whole  position.  General  Hook- 
er’s corps  was  moved  to  the  extreme 
left,  Howard’s,  Schofield’s,  and  Palm- 
er’s to  the  right.  Soon  after  one 
o’clock.  Hooker  sent  Butterfield’s  divi- 
sion forward  as  the  assaulting  column, 
supported  by  the  divisions  of  Geary 
and  Williams.  After  several  attacks 
the  Confederates  were  driven  from  a 
portion  of  their  lines ; and  a lodgment 
was  secured  under  the  projecting  works 
of  a lunette  mounting  4 guns.  Further 
advance,  however,  was  found  impossi- 
ble, owing  to  a severe  fire  from  neigh- 
boring rifle-pits,  and  the  troops  seeking 


JOHNSTON  RETREATS. 


711 


such  shelter  as  was  available,  contented 
themselves  with  holding  the  position 
gained.  Towards  the  close  of  the  after- 
noon General  Hood’s  corps  made  an 
unavailing  effort  to  dislodge  them. 
Later,  under  cover  of  night,  and  in 
spite  of  a sharp  fire  from  the  Confeder- 
ates, the  ends  were  dug  out  of  the  works 
and  the  guns  hauled  out  with  ropes.  As 
soon  as  a breach  was  made  the  troops 
rushed  in,  and  after  a fierce  struggle 
made  themselves  masters  of  the  lunette. 

General  Johnston  abandoned  his 
position  during  the  night,  leaving 
Ijehind  another  four-gun  battery  and  a 
(piantity  of  stores,  and  retreated  toward 
Kingston,  thirty-two  miles  south  of 
Resaca  on  the  railroad.  Resaca  was  im- 
mediately occupied  by  the  troops  of 
General  Thomas,  who  succeeded  in  saving 
the  wagon  road  bridge.  The  railroad 
bridge,  however,  had  been  burnt.  J ohn- 
ston’s  army  owed  its  escape  from  Sher- 
man at  Resaca  to  the  impracticable 
11  ature  of  the  valley  between  the  town  and 
Snake  Creek  Gap,  which  greatly  retarded 
the  passage  of  troops,  and  afforded  the 
Confederate  army  time  to  march  from 
Dalton  by  comparatively  good  roads, 
wdiich  Johnston  with  wise  foresight  had 
kept  in  order.  Had  the  National  army 
arrived  first  at  Resaca,  nothing  could  have 
saved  the  army  of  the  Confederates. 
Once  in  their  strong  position  at  Resaca, 
it  cost  much  severe  fighting  to  make 
them  abandon  it.  The  total  National 
loss  in  the  two  days’  fighting  was  not 
less  than  4000  killed  and  wounded, 
while  that  of  the  Confederates  probably 
did  not  exceed  2500,  as  they  fought  for 
the  most  part  behind  earth- works. 


The  Confederate  loss  included  about 
1000  prisoners. 

The  whole  army  started  in  pursuit  of 
Johnston,  General  Thomas,  directly  on 
his  rear,  crossing  the  Oostanaula  at 
Resaca,  General  McPherson  at  Lay’s 
Ferry,  a few  miles  to  the  southwest, 
while  General  Schofield,  making  a wide 
detour  to  the  left  of  Thomas,  marched 
by  obscure  roads  across  the  Conasauga 
and  Coosawattee  rivers,  which  unite 
near  Resaca  to  form  the  Oostanaula. 
On  the  1 7th  the  march  was  contin- 
ued  southward  by  as  many  roads  17. 
as  could  be  found,  in  a direction  parallel 
with  the  railroad,  but  no  enemy  was 
seen  till  wfithin  the  vicinity  of  Adairs- 
ville,  thirteen  miles  south-southwest  of 
Resaca,  between  the  railroad  and  the 
Oostanaula.  There,  about  sunset,  the 
advance  division  under  General  Newton 
had  a shaip)  skirmish  with  the  enemy’s 
rear-guard.  Next  morning  the  Confed- 
erates had  disappeared,  but  were  found 
again  in  force  four  miles  beyond  King- 
ston, on  ground  comparatively  open  and 
well  adapted  for  a grand  battle.  They 
held  strong  works  at  Cassville,  five 
miles  east  of  Kingston,  and  on  the  19th 
dispositions  were  made  for  a general 
engagement.  While,  however,  Sherman 
was  converging  on  the  Confederate  posi- 
tion, Johnston  retreated  in  the  night 
across  the  Etowah,  burning  the  bridges 
at  Cartefsville,  thus  leaving  the  country 
north  of  the  Etowah  in  the  possession 
of  General  Sherman.  It  had,  however, 
been  completely  stripped  of  supplies. 
Sherman  now  gave  his  troops  a few 
days’  rest,  the  army  of  Thomas  lying 
near  Cassville,  McPherson’s  about  King- 


712 


ATLANTA. 


ston,  and  Schofield’s  at  Cassville  depot 
and  toward  the  Etowah  Bridge.  In  the 
mean  time  the  railroad,  which  had 
received  but  little  injury,  was  restored 
to  runnino;  order.  Trains  laden  with 
sipplies  arrived  at  Kingston  on  the 
20th,  and  the  wounded  were  sent  back 
to  Chattanooga,  with  which  place  tele- 
graphic communication  also  was  kept  up 
as  the  army  advanced. 

General  Jefferson  C.  Davis  had  on 
the  I7th  marched  towards  Home,  at 
the  confiuence  of  the  Oostanaula  and 
Etowah,  fifteen  miles  west  of  Kingston. 
After  a sharp  fight  on  the  19th  he  got 
possession  of  the  town,  several  forts, 
eight  or  ten  large  guns,  and  large  quan- 
tities of  stores,  as  well  as  valuable  mills 
and  foundries. 

General  Johnston  retired  upon  Alla- 
toona  Pass,  an  almost  impregnable 
position  on  the  railroad,  about  five  miles 
south  of  the  Etowah  Kiver.  General 
Sherman  determined  not  even  to 
attempt  the  pass  in  front,  but  to  turn 
it.  Accordingly,  on  the  23d,  leaving 
garrisons  at  Borne  and  Kingston,  and 
carrying  with  him  in  wagons  supplies 
for  twenty  days,  he  put  the  army  in 
motion  for  Dallas,  a town  about  fifteen 
miles  south-southwest  of  Allatoona 
Pass,  and  eighteen  miles  directly  west 
of  Marietta,  hoping  by  thus  threatening 
Marietta  to  compel  Johnston  to  evacu- 
ate the  pass.  The  roads  through  the 
rugged  and  densely  wooded  region  to 
be  traversed  were  few  and  bad,  and  the 
march  was  necessarily  slow.  The 
movement  and  its  objects  were  soon 
detected  by  Johnston,  who  also  set  his 
troops  in  motion  toward  Dallas,  to  pro- 


tect the  approaches  to  Marietta.  In  the 
march  upon  Dallas,  McPherson,  holding 
the  National  right,  made  a detour  south- 
westward  by  Van  Wert,  about  fourteen 
miles  west  of  Dallas,  while  Thomas 
moved  nearly  due  south,  wdth  Schofield 
on  his  left.  On  the  25th,  Hooker’s 
corps,  th^e  advance  of  General  Thomas, 
moving  on  the  main  road  to  Dallas, 
when  near  Pumpkin  Vine  Creek,  met 
portions  of  Hood’s  and  Hardee’s  corps; 
and  a severe  contest  took  place 
for  a position  at  New  Plope  25. 
Church,  where  three  roads  meet,  from 
Ack worth.  Marietta,  and  Dallas.  The 
enemy,  however,  having  hastily  throA\T] 
up  earth-works,  and  night  coming  on  ac- 
companied by  heavy  rain,  he  retained 
possession  of  the  roads.  Hooker  lost 
600  men  in  this  affair.  Next  morning 
the  Confederates  were  found  well 
intrenched,  substantially  in  front  of  the 
road  leading  from  Dallas  to  Marietta. 
It  was  necessary,  therefore,  to  make 
dispositions  on  a larger  scale.  McPher- 
son was  moved  up  to  Dallas,  Thomas 
was  deployed  against  New  Hope 
Church,  and  Schofield  moved  toward 
the  left  so  as  to  strike  and  turn  the 
enemy’s  right.  Owing  to  the  difficult 
nature  of  the  country,  these  movements 
occupied  two  days,  and  were  attended 
with  heavy  skirmishing ; but  as  the 
vicinity  wsls  for  the  most  part  densely 
wooded,  artillery  could  not  be  used, 
and  the  casualties  were  comparatively 
few.  On  the  28th,  just  as  McPherson 
was  closing  up  to  Thomas  in  front  of 
New  Hope  Church,  he  was  repeatedly 
and  desperately  attacked  by  a large 
Confederate  force,  and  the  contemplated 


BIG  SHANTY  AND  MARIETTA. 


713 


movement  was  temporarily  checked,  but 
the  enemy  was  finally  driven  back  with 
a loss  of  2000  killed  and  wounded. 

After  the  delay  of  a few  days  the 
movement  toward  the  left  was  resumed, 
McPherson  taking  up  the  position  in 
front  of  New  Hope  Church  which 
Thomas  had  previously  occupied,  Thom- 
as and  Schofield  taking  positions  still 
further  to  the  left.  This  movement  was 
June  ^ff^cted  on  the  1st  of  June.  All 
1.  the  roads  leading  back  to  Alla- 
toona  and  Ackworth  were  occupied. 
General  Stoneman’s  cavalry  pushed  into 
the  east  end  of  Allatoona  Pass,  and 
General  Garrard’s  marched  around  by 
the  rear  to  its  west  entrance.  These 
movements  being  effected  without 
opposition,  the  pass  fell  into  Sherman’s 
possession.  He  found  it  admirably 
adapted  for  use  as  a secondary  base, 
and  gave  the  necessary  orders  for  its 
defense  and  garrison,  and  for  the  recon- 
struction of  the  railroad  bridge  over 
the  Etowah,  thus  restoring  his  commun- 
ications by  railroad,  by  which  stores 
were  again  brought  to  his  camps. 
Still  working  toward  the  left.  General 
Sherman  determined  on  the  4th  to  leave 
Johnston  in  his  intrenched  position  at 
New  Hope  Church,  and  moved  towards 
the  railroad  above  Ackworth,  which  was 
reached  on  the  6th  of  June.  Here  the 
army  remained  several  days;  and  here 
on  the  8th  General  Blair  arrived,  with 
two  divisions  of  the  Seventeenth  coi’ps, 
and  Colonel  Long’s  brigade  of  cavalry 
of  General  Garrard’s  division,  which  had 
been  awaiting  horses  at  Columbia.  This 
addition  to  Sherman’s  forces  made  up 
for  his  losses  in  battle  and  for  the 


diminution  of  his  numbers  by  garrisons 
left  at  Besaca,  Rome,  Kingston,  and 
Allatoona  Pass.  On  the  9th, 
communications  in  the  rear  beino*  9. 

O 

secure  and  supplies  abundant,  the 
movement  was  resumed  and  the  march 
continued  to  Big  Shanty,  the  next  station 
on  the  railroad  east  of  Allatoona  Pass. 

Between  Big  Shanty  and  Marietta 
intervenes  a mountainous  district  full 
of  defensible  positions,  covering  per- 
fectly the  town  of  Manetta,  and  the 
railroad  as  far  as  the  Chattahoochee. 
Three  conical  peaks  in  this  region, 
links  in  a continuous  forest-covered 
chain,  form  prominent  features  in  the 
landscape.  These  are  Kenesaw  Moun- 
tain, Pine  Mountain,  and  Lost  Mountain. 
Kenesaw  Mountain,  a double  peaked  em- 
inence, and  hence  sometimes  called  the 
Twin  Mountain,  1200  feet  high,  lies 
immediately  northwest  of  Marietta  and 
west  of  the  railroad.  Lost  Mountain 
lies  west  of  Marietta.  Pine  Mountain, 
a rugged  cone-shaped  peak,  half  a mile 
to  the  north  of  these  and  opposite 
the  space  between  them,  foims  the 
apex  of  a triangle  of  which  the  others 
form  the  base.  On  each  of  these  moun- 
tains the  enemy  had  signal  stations  from 
which  the  movements  of  Sherman’s 
army  could  be  easily  noted.  The  hill- 
tops were  covered  with  batteries;  and 
on  the  spurs  leading  from  them 
might  be  seen  large  numbers  of  men 
felling  trees,  digging  rifle-pits,  and  in 
other  ways  preparing  for  a desperate 
defense.  The  Confederate  lines  extended 
about  two  miles  westward  from  the 
railroad,  on  which  their  right  rested. 
Their  works,  which  compilsed  several 


ru 


ATLANTA. 


successive  lines  of  intrenchments,  con- 
sisted of  log  barricades  with  earth 
thro^vn  against  them,  and  a formidable 
abatis^  to  which  was  added  in  many 
places  a chevaux-de-frise  of  pointed 
fence-rails.  The  parapet  thus  formed 
was  from  six  to  eight  feet  thick  at  the 
top,  for  the  infantry,  and,  where  field- 
guns  were  posted,  from  twelve  to  fifteen 
feet  thick.  The  force  at  the  disposal 
of  General  Johnston  at  this  time  was, 
according  to  the  reports  of  prisoners, 
deserters,  and  scouts,  nine  divisions  of 
7000  men  each,  in  addition  to  which 
Governor  Brown  had  sent  to  his  assis- 
tance an  auxiliary  force  of  15,000  Geor- 
gia militia,  who,  though  undisciplined, 
were  capable  of  good  service  behind 
earth-works  and  as  laborers  in  the  con- 
struction of  fortifications.  Hardee’s 
corps  held  the  Confederate  right,  Polk’s 
the  centre,  Hood’s  the  left.  Their 
cavalry,  to  the  number  of  about  15,000, 
operated  on  the  right  and  left  flanks  and 
on  the  National  rear. 

The  National  lines  were  gradually 
advanced  toward  the  Confederate  posi- 
tions. McPherson’s  command,  now 
transferred  to  the  extreme  left,  moved 
towards  Marietta,  his  right  on  the  rail- 
road ; Schofield,  shifted  to  the  right, 
moved  on  Lost  Mountain  ; Thomas, 
remaining  in  the  centre,  moved  on 
Kenesaw  and  Pine  Mountains.  General 
Garrard’s  cavalry  covered  the  left  wing, 
and  General  Stoneman’s  the  right. 
General  McCook  guarded  the  rear,  the 
railroad  communications,  and  the  depot 
at  Big  Shanty.  By  the  11th  the  lines 
were  close  up;  and  dispositions  were 
then  made  to  break  the  enemy’s  line  of 


defense  between  Kenesaw  and  Pine 
Mountains.  On  the  1 4th,  during  j|,n0 
a heavy  cannonade  by  the  Fourth  14. 
corps.  General  Polk,  who  commanded 
on  Pine  Mountain,  was  struck  by  the 
fragment  of  a shell  and  killed ; and  the 
same  night.  Hooker’s  corps,  moving 
round  ijts  base  to  cut  ofi  their  retreat, 
the  Confederates  abandoned  their  works 
on  Pine  Mountain,  carrying  off,  how- 
ever, their  guns  and  war  material.  On 
the  morning  of  the  15th,  Stanley’s 
division  of  the  Fourth  corps  quietly 
occupied  the  position. 

After  the  abandonment  of  Pine 
Mountain,  General  Johnston  drew  back 
his  centre  to  a strong  line  of  intrench- 
ments  connecting  Kenesaw  and  Lost 
Mountains.  The  15th,  16th,  and  17th 
were  occupied  with  incessant  skir- 
mishing. On  the  afternoon  of  the  15th, 
General  Schofield  carried  the  first  line 
of  the  Confederate  works  at  the  foot  of 
Lost  Mountain.  During  the  17th,  the 
left  and  centre,  which  were  so  far 
advanced  that  a general  engagement 
would  otherwise  have  resulted,  remained 
quiet.  The  right  and  left  centre  were 
advanced  more  than  a mile,  to  a line  of 
defensive  works  which  the  enemy  had 
evacuated.  Towards  evening,  after 
heavy  skirmishing,  the  enemy’s  left 
was  dislodged  from  the  intrenchments 
at  Lost  Mountain  and  the  long  line  of 
breast-works  connecting  it  with  Kene- 
saw Mountain.  The  Confederates  were 
pressed  at  all  points,  and  skirmishing 
continued  in  dense  forests  and  across 
difficult  ravines,  until  they  were  again 
found  strongly  posted  and  intrenched, 
with  Kenesaw  Mountain  as  a salient, 


ASSAULT  ON  KENESAW. 


715 


their  right  wing  thro^vn  back  to  cover 
Marietta,  and  their  left  behind  Nose’s 
Creek,  covering  the  railroad  back  to  the 
Chattahoochee.  They  were  thus  enabled 
to  contract  and  strengthen  their  lines. 
During  these  operations  the  rain  fell 
almost  continuously  for  three  weeks, 
making  the  narrow  wooded  roads  mere 
mud  gulleys  and  a general  movement 
impossible.  But  every  opportunity  was 
taken  to  advance  the  National  lines  closer 
and  closer  to  the  enemy ; and  the  men 
kept  up  incessant  picket  firing. 

On  the  2 2d  the  enemy  made  a sudden 
J line  attack  on  portions  of  Hooker’s  and 
Schofield’s  corps  on  the  National 
right  near  the  Kulp  House.  The  blow 
fell  mostly  on  the  divisions  of  Generals 
Williams  and  Hascall.  The  ground 
was  comparatively  open;  but  though 
the  skirmish  lines  and  an  advanced 
regiment  of  General  Schofield’s — sent 
out  to  hold  the  enemy  in  check  until 
preparations  for  his  reception  could  be 
completed — were  driven  in,  yet  when 
the  enemy  reached  the  National  line  of 
battle  he  received  a terrible  repulse. 
Many  prisoners  were  taken,  and  the 
Confederates  were  compelled  to  aban- 
don their  dead  and  wounded.  The 
National  centre  was  now  established  in 
front  of  Kenesaw  Mountain ; but  so 
man}"  men  were  required  to  hold  the 
railroad  and  the  line  along  the  base  of 
the  mountain,  that  only  a small  force 
was  left  with  which  to  attempt  a flank 
movement  to  the  right.  There  was, 
however,  now  no  alternative  but  to 
assault  the  enemy’s  lines  or  turn  his 
position.  Either  course  had  its  difficul- 
ties and  dangers.  Both  the  enemy  and 


his  own  officers  expected  Sherman  to 
outflank.”  General  Sherman  deter- 
mined to  assault.  His  reason  for  a 
departure  from  the  course  which  had 
hitherto  been  so  successful  was,  that  an 
army  to  be  efficient  must  not  settle 
down  to  one  single  mode  of  offence,  but 
must  be  prepared  to  execute  any  plan 
likely  to  result  in  success.  The  part  of 
the  enemy’s  lines  selected  to  be  assault- 
ed was  the  left  centre.  A strong 
column,  if  thrust  through  at  that  poinf , 
and  pushed  on  boldly  two  and  a half 
miles,  would  reach  the  railroad  below 
Marietta  and  cut  off  the  enemy’s  right 
and  centre  from  the  line  of  retreat  which 
could  then  be  overwhelmed  and  de- 
stroyed. On  the  24th  of  June,  there- 
fore, General  Sherman  ordered  that  an 
assault  should  be  made  at  two  points 
south  of  Kenesaw  Mountain  on  the 
27th,  thus  affording  three  days  foi* 
preparation  and  reconnoissance.  One 
of  these  assaults  was  to  be  made  near 
Little  Kenesaw  by  General  McPherson’s 
troops,  the  other  about  a mile  further 
south  by  those  of  General  Thomas. 

On  the  morning  of  the  27th,  at  the 
hour  and  in  the  manner  prescribed, 
the  assaults  were  made ; but  both  failed, 
and  many  valuable  lives  were  June 
lost,  including  that  of  General  27. 
Plarker.  At  six  in  the  morning,  Blair’s 
corps,  holding  the  extreme  left  of  Mc- 
Pherson’s line,  moved  on  the  east  side 
of  the  mountain,  while  the  corps  of 
Dodge  and  Logan  assaulted  the  adjoin 
ing  northern  slope.  The  brunt  of  the 
attack  was  borne  by  three  brigades  of 
Logan’s  corps,  which,  pushing  impetu- 
ously up  the  hill  scattered  the  Confed- 


716 


ATLANTA. 


erate  skirmishers  and  captured  some  of 
theii*  rifle-pits,  making  also  some  pris- 
oners. These  troops  pressed  forward 
till  they  arrived  at  the  foot  of  a pre- 
cipitous cliff  thirty  feet  high,  from 
which  the  enemy  poured  a plunging 
Are  and  rolled  down  huge  stones. 
Here  the  line  retired  and  fortifled  on 
the  extreme  right.  For  the  second  and 
more  important  attack,  portions  of  the 
divisions  of  Newton  and  Davis  were 
selected.  When  the  signal  was  given, 
the  troops  charged  up  the  slope  of  the 
mountain  in  face  of  a murderous  fire 
from  a battery  on  the  summit,  pene- 
trated two  lines  of  abatis^  carried  a line 
of  rifle-pits  beyond,  and  reached  the 
works ; but  a destructive  fire  of  mus- 
ketry and  artillery  from  the  enemy  soon 
made  it  necessary  to  recall  the  men. 
General  Newton’s  troops  returned  to 
their  original  line,  while  the  brigade  of 
Davis  threw  up  breast-works  between 
those  they  had  carried  and  the  main 
line  of  the  enemy.  The  entire  contest 
lasted  little  more  than  an  hour;  but  it 
cost  General  Sherman  3000  men  in  killed 
and  wounded,  while  the  enemy,  fighting 
behind  breast-works,  suffered  little. 

During  the  day  there  had  been  some 
sharp  skirmishing  with  the  enemy’s 
left  wing;  and  General  Cox’s  divi- 
sion pushed  forward  to  a point  nine 
miles  south  of  Marietta  and  not  more 
than  three  from  the  Chattahoochee. 
From  his  elevated  position  on  Kenesaw 
Mountain,  General  Johnston  had  been 
able  to  watch  Sherman’s  movements 
and  to  judge  correctly  at  what  point 
the  main  attack  would  fall,  and  had 
been  ready  to  receive  it  with  his  main 


force.  Though  Sheiman  admitted  that 
this  attempt  was  a complete  and  costly 
failure,  he  yet  took  upon  himself  the 
entire  responsibility,  claiming  that  it 
was  not  altogether  without  good  fruits, 
inasmuch  as  it  satisfied  Johnston  that 
he  would  assault,  and  that  boldly,  when 
an  assault  appeared  to  be  the  surest 
means  of  success. 

General  Sherman  could  not  rest  long 
under  the  imputation  of  defeat  or 
failure.  He  almost  immediately  com- 
menced preparations  to  turn  the  enemy’s 
left.  On  the  1st  of  July,  Generals 
Hooker  and  Schofield  advanced  1. 
about  two  miles  to  the  right,  and 
McPherson  was  ordered  to  shift  rapidly 
his  whole  force  from  the  extreme  left 
to  the  extreme  right  of  the  National 
lines  and  push  on  to  Nickajack  Creek, 
which  falls  into  the  Chattahoochee  four 
miles  below  the  railroad  bridge.  Gen 
eral  Garrard  with  his  cavalry  was  sent 
to  occupy  McPherson’s  place  in  front 
of  Kenesaw,  while  General  Stoneman 
moved  on  his  flanks  to  strike  the  river 
near  Turner’s  Ferry,  two  and  a half 
miles  below  the  railroad  bridge.  ]\Ic- 
Pherson  commenced  his  movement  on 
the  night  of  the  2d.  The  effect  was 
instantaneous.  The  object  of  the  move- 
ment was  at  once  detected  by  General 
Johnston,  who  without  further  delay 
prepared  to  evacuate  Kenesaw  Mountain 
and  fall  back  to  the  Chattahoochee. 
Simultaneously  with  McPherson’s  move- 
ment, Johnston’s  rear-guard  abandoned 
the  works  which  for  three  weeks  had 
been  so  resolutely  defended;  and  before 
dawn  on  the  morning  of  the  3d 
the  National  pickets  occupied  the  3. 


THE  CHATTAHOOCHEE. 


717 


crest  of  Kenesaw.  General  Thomas’ 
whole  line  was  then  moved  forward  to 
the  railroad  and  thence  southward  to 
the  Chattahoochee;  and  General  Sher- 
man entered  Marietta  at  half-past  eight 
in  the  morning,  just  as  the  enemy’s 
cavalry  left  the  town.  General  Logan’s 
corps,  which  had  not  moved  far,  was 
ordered  back  to  Marietta  by  the  main 
road;  and  McPherson  and  Schofield 
were  instructed  to  cross  Nickajack 
Creek,  attack  the  enemy  in  flank 
' and  rear,  and,  if  possible,  harass  him 
while  crossing  the  Chattahoochee. 
Johnston  was  too  good  a general  to 
be  thus  caught ; and  he  had  covered  his 
movement  well.  He  had  constructed  a 
strong  tete-du-pont  at  the  Chattahoochee 
'svith  an  advanced  intrenched  line  across 
the  road  at  Smyrna  camp-meeting 
ground,  five  miles  from  Marietta  where 
General  Thomas  found  him,  his  flanks 
protected  by  Mckajack  and  Eotten- 
wood  Creeks.  In  his  retreat,  Johnston 
left  behind  about  2000  men,  principally 
stragglers,  who  were  made  prisoners. 

General  Johnston  was  obliged  to 
leave  his  new  position  by  another  flank 
movement ; and  on  the  night  of  the  4th 
he  fell  back  to  the  Chattahoochee,  which 
he  crossed  with  the  main  body  of  his 
army,  leaving  Hardee’s  corps  on  the 
right  bank.  General  Sherman  left  a 
garrison  in  Marietta  and  moved  up  to 
the  Chattahoochee.  On  the  evening 
of  the  5th,  the  troops  of  Thomas  and 
McPherson  occupied  a line  extending 
from  a short  distance  above  the  railroad 
bridge  to  the  mouth  of  Nickajack  Creek, 
while  those  of  Schofield  were  posted  in 
the  rear  of  Smyrna  as  a reserve.  The 


enemy  lay  behind  a line  of  unusual 
strength,  covering  his  pontoon  bridges 
and  the  railroad,  and  beyond  the  river. 
Heavy  skirmishing  during  the  5th  along 
the  entire  front  demonstrated  the 
strength  of  the  enemy’s  position,  which 
it  became  apparent  could  be  turned  only 
by  crossing  the  river,  a deep  and  rapid 
stream,  passable  only  by  means  of 
bridges,  except  at  one  or  two  difficult 
fords. 

General  Sherman  judged  that  it 
would  be  easier  to  cross  the  river  at 
once,  before  the  enemy  had  time  to 
make  a more  thorough  preparation  and 
regain  confidence.  Accordingly,  Scho- 
field was  ordered  to  move  eastward 
from  his  position  near  Smyrna,  to  cross 
near  the  moutb  of  Soap’s  Creek,  eight 
miles  north  of  the  railroad  bridge,  and 
effect  a lodgment  on  the  east  bank. 
This  was  most  successfully  and  skilfully 
accomplished  on  the  7th  of  July,  j^jy 
General  Schofield  completely  7. 
surprising  the  guard  and  capturing  a 
gun,  and  immediately  afterwards  laying 
pontoon  and  trestle  bridges,  and  taking 
up  a strong  position  on  high  and  com- 
manding ground  from  which  good  roads 
led  eastward.  At  the  same  time  Gen- 
eral Garrard  moved  rapidly  on  Eosewell, 
a town  near  the  Chattahoochee,  nearly 
due  north  of  Atlanta,  and  about  seven 
miles  above  the  point  where  Schofield 
crossed,  and  destroyed  there  some 
woollen  and  cotton  mills,  from  which 
the  Confederate  armies  had  been  long 
supplied.  Garrard  was  then  ordered 
to  secure  the  ford  at  Eosewell  and  hold 
it  till  relieved  by  infantry.  As  General 
Sherman  intended  transferring  the  army 


718 


ATLANTA. 


of  tlie  Tennessee  from  the  extreme  right 
to  the  left,  he  ordered  Thomas  to  send 
his  nearest  division  of  infantry  to 
Kosewell  to  hold  the  ford  till  McPher- 
son could  send  up  a corps  from  the 
neighborhood  of  Nickajack  Creek. 
General  Newton’s  division  was  sent, 
and  held  the  ford  till  the  arrival  of 
Dodge’s  corps,  which  was  soon  followed 
by  McPherson’s  whole  army.  On  th^ 
9th  a crossing  was  effected  at  Kosewell 
and  a good  bridge  constructed,  while 
the  enemy  was  amused  by  feints, 
extending  from  Power’s  Ferry,  four 
miles  above  the  railroad  bridge,  to 
Turner’s  Ferry,  three  miles  below  it. 
Under  cover  of  the  same  demonstrations 
General  Howard  also  built  a bridge  at 
Power’s  Ferry.  Thus  during  the  9th 
three  good  points  of  crossing  were 
secured  above  the  position  of  the  enemy, 
with  good  roads  leading  to  Atlanta. 
General  Johnston  then  took  the  alarm; 
and  on  the  night  of  the  9th  withdrew 
Hardee’s  corps  to  the  left  bank,  aban- 
doned his  tete-du-pont^  burnt  his  bridges, 
and  left  Sherman,  on  the  morning  of 
July  master  of  all 

10.  the  country  north  and  west  of 
the  Chattahoochee.  The  Confederate 
army  then  fell  back  to  the  outer  fortified 
lines  around  Atlanta,  abandoning  the 
whole  line  of  the  river,  except  the  left 
wing,  which  remained  a short  time  in 
the  neighborhood  of  Turner’s  Ferry, 
expecting  an  attack  in  that  quarter. 
General  Sherman,  however,  rapidly  and 
quietly  moved  the  remainder  of  the 
army  of  the  Tennessee  to  its  old  position 
on  the  extreme  left. 

One  of  the  objects  of  General  Sher- 


man’s campaign,  the  advancement  of 
the  National  lines  from  the  Tennessee 
to  the  Chattahoochee,  had  now  been 
attained ; and  Atlanta  was  only  eight 
miles  distant.  The  main  armies  remained 
quiet  in  their  camps  on  the  Chattahoo- 
chee from  the  10th  of  July  to  the  16th. 
In  the  mean  time  stores  were  collected 
at  Allatoona,  Marietta,  and  Mining’s 
Station  ; the  railroad  guards  and  garil- 
sons  were  strengthened,  and  the  bridges 
and  roads  leading  across  the  river  were 
improved.  The  railroad  was  in  com- 
plete order ; and  stores  had  been  brought 
by  it  as  early  as  the  8th  within  a mih; 
of  the  bridge.  A sufficient  force  Avas 
detailed  to  go  to  the  left  bank  of  the 
river  to  occupy  the  works  of  the  enemy. 
These  were  found  to  be  of  the  most 
formidable  character,  extending  more 
than  five  miles  along  the  river,  with 
almost  impenetrable  lines  of  abatis. 

In  anticipation  of  the  present  jiosition 
of  affairs, General  Sherman  had  collected 
a well-appointed  cavalry  force,  about 
2000  strong,  at  Decatur,  Ala.,  Avith 
orders,  on  receiving  notice  by  telegraph, 
to  push  rapidly  soutliAvard,  cross  the 
Coosa  at  the  railroad  brids^e  or  the  Ten 
Islands,  and  to  push  on  thence  by  tlm 
most  direct  route  to  Opelika,  Avith  the 
object  of  destroying  effectually  the 
railroad  running  westAvard  from  that 
place,  and  thus  cutting  off  from  J ohn- 
ston’s  army  an  important  source  of 
supplies  and  reinforcement.  The  com- 
mand of  this  expedition  Avas  given  to 
General  Kousseau,  commanding  the 
district  of  Tennessee.  As  soon  as 
Johnston  was  Avell  across  the  Chatta- 
hoochee, and  Sherman  had  commenced 


JOHNSTON  REMOVED  FROM  COMMAND. 


719 


manoeuvring  on  Atlanta,  the  requisite 
notice  was  given;  and,  on  the  10th  of 
July,  General  Rousseau  commenced  his 
march.  He  passed  through  Talladega, 
reached  the  railroad  on  the  16th  about 
twenty-five  miles  west  of  Opelika,  and 
broke  it  up  all  the  way  back  to  that 
place,  as  well  as  several  miles  of  the 
branch  railroads  leading  towards  West 
Point  and  Columbus.  Then  turning 
northward  he  arrived  at  Marietta  on  the 
2 2d,  his  loss  not  having  exceeded  30 
men. 

The  sudden  abandonment  of  his 
formidable  line  of  defenses  on  the  left 
bank  of  the  river,  by  General  Johnston, 
occasioned  the  utmost  dissatisfaction 
with  his  conduct  of  the  campaign, 
especially  in  Atlanta,  where  it  was 
expected  he  would  make  a stand  on  the 
Chattahoochee,  which  it  was  argued  he 
could  easily  do,  being  in  the  immediate 
neighborhood  of  his  supplies.  His 
retreat  from  the  Chattahoochee  was  the 
crowning  offence  with  the  enemies  of 
this  able  general,  whose  inferiority  of 
force  had  made  it  impossible  to  avoid 
Sherman’s  outflanking  movements,  but 
who  had  nevertheless  kept  his  army  in 
a compact  body,  with  insignificant 
losses  of  guns  or  material  of  war.  His 
removal  was  loudly  demanded ; and  on 
the  17th,  in  accordance  v^dth  orders 
from  the  Confederate  War  Department, 
he  turned  over  his  command  to  General 
Hood.  With  this  change  in  commanders 
commenced  a change  in  the  character 
of  the  campaign  in  accordance  with  the 
difference  in  the  genius  of  the  two  gen- 
erals, which  it  was  hoped  would  have 
an  important  influence  on  the  morale  of 


the  troops,  discouraged  by  a long 
succession  of  retreats  from  fortified 
positions. 

The  whole  of  General  Sherman’s 
aimy  crossed  the  Chattahoochee  j||]y 
on  the  17th,  with  the  exception  11. 
of  Davis’  division  of  the  Fourteenth 
corps,  left  to  watch  the  railroad  bridge 
and  protect  the  rear,  and  preparations 
were  made  to  move  upon  Atlanta.  The 
aimy  of  the  Cumberland,  now  occujjying 
the  right  and  right  centre,  rested  on  the 
river  just  above  the  railroad  bridge. 
The  left  centre  was  occupied  by  the 
army  of  the  Ohio,  the  left  by  the  army 
of  the  Tennessee.  The  line  thus  formed 
made  a grand  right- wheel  march,  of 
which  the  army  of  the  Cumberland  was 
the  pivot ; and  on  the  evening  of  the 
17th  came  into  a position  along  the  Old 
Peach  Tree  road,  about  northeast  of  the 
railroad  bridge.  On  the  18th,  the  left 
wing,  swinging  round  rapidly,  struck 
the  Georgia  Railroad  about  two  miles 
west  of  Stone  Mountain,  a huge  mass 
of  granite  fifteen  miles  northeast  of 
Atlanta.  General  McPherson,  with  the 
aid  of  Garrard’s  cavalry,  which  moved 
on  his  flank,  broke  up  about  four  miles 
of  this  road,  while  General  Schofield 
occupied  Decatur,  six  miles  east  of 
Atlanta,  and  General  Thomas  moved 
his  troops  up  towards  Peach  Tree  Creek, 
a small  stream  flowing  southwestward 
to  the  Chattahoochee,  a little  above  the 
railroad  bridge.  The  Confederates 
believing  that  their  left  was  the  real 
point  of  attack,  and  that  Sherman  would 
approach  Atlanta  from  the  southwest, 
and  oppose  these  movements  with  an 
inadequate  force  of  infantry  and  a few 


720 


ATLANTA. 


cavalry.  Thus  McPherson  and  Schofield 
were  able  on  the  19th  to  pass  eastward 
of  Decatur  within  the  naturally  strong 
defensive  lines  of  Nance’s  and  Peach 
Tree  Creeks ; and  on  the  same  day 
Thomas,  moving  more  directly  from  the 
north,  though  meeting  mth  more  oppo- 
sition, succeeded  in  crossing  Peach  Tree 
Creek  in  front  of  the  enemy’s  intrenched 
lines.  The  National  armies  then  lay  in 
a curved  line  north  and  northeast  of 
Atlanta,  extending  from  the  railroad 
which  runs  between  Atlanta  and  the 
river  to  the  Georgia  Railroad  and  some 
distance  south  of  it. 

On  the  20th,  the  National  lines 
moved  still  nearer  Atlanta ; but  as  a 
gap  existed  between  the  lines  of  Scho- 
field and  Thomas,  two  divisions  of 
Howard’s  corps  of  Thomas’  army  were 
moved  to  the  left  to  connect  with 
Schofield.  By  this  movement  Newton’s 
division  of  Howard’s  corps  was  left 
alone  to  hold  an  important  position  on 
the  road  leading  from  Atlanta  to  Buck- 
head.  General  Hood  soon  detected  the 
weak  point,  and  was  not  slow  in  taking 
advantage  of  the  opportunity  thus 
afforded  him.  He  was  soon,  therefore, 
in  a position  in  which  he  was  ready  to 
strike  a blow  which  might  go  far  towards 
retrieving  many  disasters.  General 
Sherman  had,  however,  sent  orders  to 
Newton  and  the  rest  of  the  army  of  the 
Cumberland  to  close  up  rapidly  towards 
the  left.  Newton  accordingly  moved 
to  a prominent  ridge,  where  his  troops 
stacked  arms  and  made  a temporary 
lialt,  but,  beyond  throwing  up  piles  of 
logs  and  rails,  made  no  defensive 
preparations,  no  attack  being  appre- 


hended, prisoners  just  brought  in  having 
reported  that  there  was  no  considerable 
force  of  the  enemy  within  a mile  and  a 
half.  Hood  had  in  the  mean  time 
been  massing  his  forces  in  the  woods 
immediately  in  front  of  the  position  of 
General  Newton  and  of  General  Hook- 
er’s forc^e,  which  was  approaching  from 
the  right,  hoping  to  fall  upon  his  adver- 
saries while  in  motion  and  cut  the 
National  army  in  two.  At  four  j^iy 
o’clock  in  the  afternoon  he  ad-  20. 
vanced  suddenly  from  the  woods,  ^vith- 
out  skirmishers,  directly  on  the  position 
of  Newton.  His  appearance  was  alto- 
gether imexpected ; nevertheless  the 
National  troops  instantly  sprang  to 
arms,  and  from  behind  their  log  and 
rail  breast- works  poured  a deadly  fire 
into  the  dense  masses  of  the  enemy. 
Well-served  batteries  also,  which  New- 
ton had  posted  on  his  banks,  aided  to 
keep  the  Confederates  in  check. 

General  Hooker’s  whole  corps  was 
uncovered ; and  it  had  to  fight  on  compa- 
ratively open  ground.  Geary’s  division 
was  thrown  back  in  some  confusion. 
Rallying  quickly  it  recovered  its  ground 
and  kept  the  enemy  in  check  till  Ward’s 
division  came  up.  Ward  met  the 
enemy’s  charge  by  a counter-charge, 
and  after  a brief  but  fierce  struggle 
drove  him  back.  The  division  of 
Williams,  further  to  the  right  and  next 
to  that  of  Geary,  though  desperately 
attacked,  repulsed  every  onset  with 
heavy  loss.  The  battle  had  lasted  four 
hours,  when  Hood  drew  his  forces 
rapidly  back  to  their  intrenchments, 
leaving  on  the  field  600  dead,  and  1000 
severely  wounded,  a number  of  prisoners, 


GENERAL  McPHERSON. 


721 


and  seven  regimental  flags — liis  total 
loss  being  estimated  by  General 
Sherman  at  not  less  than  5000.  The 
National  loss  was  1900,  sustained 
principally  by  the  corps  of  General 
Hooker,  upon  which  fell  the  brunt  of 
the  battle.  General  Johnston’s  division 
of  Palmer’s  corps  had  also  been  engaged, 
but  being  well  defended  its  loss  was 
comparatively  light. 

The  Confederates  kept  within  their 
intrenched  position  during  the  21st, 
their  right  beyond  the  Georgia  Railroad 
and  their  left  extended  towards  Turner’s 
Ferry,  at  a general  distance  of  four 
miles  from  Atlanta.  In  the  course  of 
the  day  a strongly  fortified  hill  in  front 
of  the  extreme  National  left,  which 
completely  commanded  Atlanta  and  the 
two  principal  roads  leading  north  and 
isouth  from  the  city,  was  carried  by 
General  Leggett’s  division  of  the  Seven- 
teenth corps,  though  with  a loss  of  750 
men.  Two  desperate  but  unsuccessful 
attempts  to  regain  this  position  were 
made  by  the  Confederates,  who  when 
they  finally  retired  left  their  dead  and 
wounded  on  the  slope  of  the  hill. 

On  the  morning  of  the  2 2d,  the  whole 
of  the  advanced  line  of  the  enemy  was 
found  abandoned,  which  led  Sherman  to 
suppose  that  Hood  was  about  to  give 
up  Atlanta  mthout  further  contest. 
He  was,  however,  only  preparing  to 
repeat  on  a larger  scale  the  experiment 
the  20th.  Pretending  to  be  falling 
back  upon  the  city,  he  hoped  to  decoy 
General  Sherman  into  a rapid  advance, 
and  then  suddenly,  with  all  his  force, 
strike  the  National  army  while  in 
motion,  at  such  weak  points  as  should 


offer.  Unsuspectingly  Sherman  pushed 
his  troops  beyond  the  abandoned  works. 
He  found  the  enemy  occupying  a line 
of  finished  redoubts  completely  covering 
the  approaches  to  the  city,  and  actively 
engaged  in  connecting  these  redoubts 
with  curtains,  strengthened  by  rifle- 
trenches,  abatis  and  chevaux-de-frise. 
Satisfied  that  Hood  meant  to  fight, 
Sherman  immediately  resumed  the  dis- 
positions for  pressing  towards  the  city 
on  its  east  and  northeast  fronts.  The 
National  line  by  these  movements  be- 
came so  contracted,  that  the  Sixteenth 
corps,  under  General  Dodge,  which 
formed  the  right  of  the  army  of  the 
Tennessee,  was  crowded  out  of  its  posi- 
tion, and  was  directed  to  march  to  the 
extreme  left  of  the  line,  to  aid  in  the 
defense  of  the  hill  which  had  been  car- 
ried by  the  Seventeenth  corps  the  day 
before,  and  which  was  still  held  by 
Leggett’s  division. 

At  ten  in  the  morning,  and  about 
the  time  the  movement  was  j^jy 
commenced.  General  Sherman, 
in  company  with  General  Schofield,  was 
examining  the  enemy’s  lines,  when  he 
was  joined  by  General  McPherson,  who 
described  the  condition  of  things  on  his 
flank  and  the  disposition  of  his  troops. 
Sherman  explained  to  him  that  if  seri- 
ous resistance  were  met  in  Atlanta,  as 
seemed  probable,  he  should  extend  to 
the  right,  and  did  not  want  much  dis- 
tance gained  on  the  left.  McPherson 
then  described  the  hill  occupied  by 
Leggett’s  division  as  essential  to  the 
occupation  of  any  ground  to  the  east 
and  south  of  the  Augusta  Railroad. 
Sheiman  therefore  ratified  McPherson’s 


723 


ATLANTA. 


disposition  of  his  troops,  and  modified 
a previous  order  sent  him  in  writing  to 
employ  Dodge’s  corps  in  breaking  np 
the  railroad,  and  sanctioned  its  going, 
as  already  ordered  by  McPherson,  to 
Ins  left,  to  hold  and  fortify  the*position 
there.  McPherson  remained  with  Gen- 
eral Sherman  till  noon,  when  reports 
arrived  indicatino^  a movement  of  the 
enemy  towards  the  left  fiank.  He  then 
mounted  his  horse  and  rode  away  with 
his  staff. 

General  Sherman  had  the  day  before 
sent  Garrard’s  cavalry  to  Covington,  on 
the  Augusta  Railroad,  forty-two  miles 
east  of  Atlanta,  with  instructions  to 
send  out  detachments  from  that  point 
to  destroy  the  two  bridges  across  the 
Yellow  and  Ulcofanhatchee  rivers,  trib- 
utaries of  the  Ocmnlo^ee.  McPherson 
liad  also  left  his  wagon  train  at  Decatur, 
under  a guard  of  three  regiments  com- 
manded by  Colonel  Sprague. 

Soon  after  the  departure  of  McPher- 
son, sounds  of  musketry  to  the  left  and 
rear,  rapidly  growing  into  volume  and 
accompanied  by  the  roar  of  artillery^ 
were  heard,  and  about  the  same  time 
the  reports  of  guns  in  the  direction  of 
Decatur.  There  could  be  no  doubt 
now  as  to  what  the  enemy  was  about. 
Hood  was  throwing  a superior  force  on 
the  National  left  flank  while  he  held 
the  National  forces  with  his  forts  in 
front,  the  only  question  being  as  to  the 
amount  of  force  at  his  disposal.  Orders 
were  immediately  sent  to  all  parts  of 
the  right  and  left  centre  to  give  full 
employment  to  the  enemy  along  the 
whole  line,  and  for  Schofield  to  hold  as 
large  a force  as  possible  in  reserve 


awaiting  developments.  Not  more 
than  half  an  hour  had  elapsed  after 
McPherson  had  parted  from  Sherman, 
when  his  adjutant-general.  Colonel 
Clarke,  rode  up  and  reported  him  killed 
or  a prisoner.  He  had  ridden  to 
General  Dodge's  column,  moving  as 
before  described,  and  had  sent  off  nearly 
all  his  stafit'  and  orderlies  on  various 
errands,  and  taken  a narrow  road  that 
led  through  the  woods  to  the  left  and 
rear  of  General  Giles  A.  Smith’s  divi- 
sion, which  was  on  General  Blair’s 
extreme  left.  A few  minutes  after  he 
had  entered  the  woods  a sharp  volley 
was  heard  from  the  direction  in 
which  he  had  gone,  and  his  horse  had 
come  out  riderless,  with  two  wounds. 
Sherman  immediately  despatched  a staff 
officer  to  General  Logan,  commanding 
the  Fifteenth  Corps,  directing  him  to 
assume  command  of  the  army  of  the 
Tennesee  and  hold  the  ground  already 
chosen,  especially  the  hill  occupied  by 
General  Leggett’s  division. 

Already  the  whole  line  was  engaged 
in  battle.  McPherson  upon  reaching 
the  left  had  found  the  Sixteenth  coiq)s 
going  into  position  to  prolong  the  flank, 
and  at  that  time  facing  to  the  left  in  a 
direction  perpendicular  to  the  main 
line.  Between  the  right  of  the  Six- 
teenth coiqis  and  the  left  of  the  Seven- 
teenth was  a wooded  space  of  about 
half  a mile.  Shortly  after  twelve  j^iy 
o’clock  the  enemy  emerged  from  22, 
the  woods  in  front  of  these  corps  m 
three  columns,  and  attacked  the  Six- 
teenth corps.  Tliree  desperate  assaults 
were  repulsed  by  Dodge,  in  the  last  of 
w^hich  the  enemy  suffered  severely  from 


ATTACK  ON  DECATUR. 


723 


the  National  batteries.  It  was  during 
the  hill  in  the  battle  which  now  occurred 
that  McPherson  had  attempted  to  ride 
through  the  woods  to  G.  A.  Smith’s 
division  on  the  left  of  the  Seventeenth 
corps,  it  having  been  reported  that  the 
enemy  was  about  attempting  to  push 
a force  through  the  gap  above  mentioned 
between  the  two  corps.  After  sending 
the  only  remaining  member  of  his  staff 
with  orders  to  obtain  a brigade  from 
Logan’s  command  and  throw  it  across 
the  gap,  with  a single  orderly  he  struck 
into  the  road  before  mentioned.  The 
enemy’s  skirmish  line,  however,  had 
already  advanced  close  up  to  the  road, 
and  before  he  was  aw\are  he  was  within 
fifty  feet  of  it.  A volley  brought  him 
to  the  ground,  mortally  wounded. 

Wangelin’s  brigade,  the  one  ordered 
up  from  Logan’s  command,  arrived 
in  time  to  partially  check  the  Confed- 
erates, but  not  soon  enough  to  prevent 
a portion  of  their  force  getting  in  the 
rear  of  the  Seventeenth  corps,  while 
other  masses  of  troops  were  pushed 
against  the  hill  held  by  Leggett,  whose 
division,  as  well  as  that  of  G.  A.  Smith, 
was  attacked  in  front  and  rear,  and 
obliged  to  fire  alternately  from  behind 
their  own  breast- works  and  an  aban- 
doned parapet  of  the  enemy.  Leggett’s 
troops  held  firmly  a fortified  angle  at 
the  top  of  the  hill,  against  which  the 
Confederates  threw  their  columns  with 
desperate  but  fruitless  energy.  In  the 
mean  time  Smith,  who  had  been  com- 
pelled to  draw  back  his  more  exposed 
lines,  and  in  doing  so  to  abandon  two 
guns,  took  up  a new  line,  whose  right 
c.onnected  with  the  division  of  Leggett, 


his  left  drawn  back  and  facing  south- 
east. The  Confederates  could  make 
no  impression  on  this  new  formation  of 
the  corps,  whose  deadly  fire  compelled 
them  to  recoil  again  and  again,  mowing 
down  whole  ranks  at  a time  and  cover- 
ing the  ground  and  ditches  with  dead 
and  w^ounded  men.  A portion  of  the 
force  that  had  penetrated  the  gap  before 
mentioned,  renewed  the  attack  on  the 
right  flank  of  the  Sixteenth  corps,  and 
captured  on  its  first  advance  a 6-gun 
battery  which  was  moving  unsupported 
along  a narrow  road  through  the  woods. 
They  w'ere  soon  checked,  how^ever,  by 
tlie  divisions  of  Sw^eeney  and  Fuller, 
and  driven  back  with  the  loss  of  many 
prisoners.  Several  of  Sweeney’s  regi- 
ments had  expended  their  ammunition, 
but  charged  with  the  bayonet,  when  the 
enemy  broke  and  fled.  At  about  half- 
past three  the  Confederates  desisted 
from  their  attack  on  the  left  flank, 
having  sustained  very  heavy  loss  and 
gained  no  ground. 

In  the  mean  time  two  divisions  of 
Wheeler’s  cavalry,  wdth  a section  of 
artillery,  had  taken  a wide  circuit  to  the 
eastw^ard  and  fallen  upon  Decatur  un- 
opposed— Sherman  having  sent  Gar- 
rard’s cavalry  to  Covington,  as  before 
stated — and  attempted  to  capture  the 
wagon  trains ; but  Colonel  Sprague  cov- 
ered them  with  great  skill  and  success, 
sending  them  to  the  rear  of  Schofield 
and  Thomas,  and  not  withdrawing 
from  Decatur  till  every  wagon  was 
safe,  except  three  which  the  teamsters 
had  abandoned. 

A pause  in  the  battle  occurred  about 
four  o’clock.  Hood  was  massing  troops 


ru 


ATLANTA. 


for  an  attack  on  the  Fifteenth  corps, 
now  commanded  by  General  M.  L. 
Smith,  which,  immeSiately  adjoining  the 
Seventeenth  corps,  held  the  right  of  the 
army  of  the  Tennessee,  behind  strong 
breast- works.  At  half -past  four,  while 
fche  attention  of  the  extreme  left  was 
occupied  by  a pretended  attack,  a heavy 
force  of  the  enemy,  two  lines  deep, 
inarched  directly  on  the  left  of  the 
Fifteenth  corps,  driving  in  two  regi- 
ments of  skirmishers  and  capturing  two  i 
guns.  Lightburn’s  brigade,  which  held 
this  part  of  the  line  protected  by  breast- 
U'orks,  kept  the  enemy  at  bay  by  well- 
directed  discharges  of  20  pounder  Par- 
rott guns.  Presently  a second  strong 
column  of  the  enemy  appeared,  and 
rapidly  and  steadily  approached,  heed- 
less of  the  fearful  furrows  made  in  its 
ranks  by  well-directed  artillery.  The 
attack  had  now  become  sufficiently  for- 
midable ; but  when  a third  column  of 
the  Confederates  was  seen  pouring  in  on 
the  rear  through  a deep  cut  in  the 
Georgia  Railroad,  Lightburn’s  troops,  to 
avoid  certain  capture,  retired  in  confu- 
sion to  the  second  line  of  breast- works 
500  yards  from  the  main  line;  and  the 
abandoned  works  with  two  batteries 
fell  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy.  The 
position  lost  was  one  of  the  utmost 
importance,  and  Sherman  sent  orders  to 
Schofield — which,  however,  he  had  an- 
ticipated— to  make  the  Fifteenth  corps 
regain  its  ground  at  any  cost.  To  aid 
the  movement,  batteries  from  Schofield’s 
corps  were  so  posted  that  by  means  of 
them  the  enemy  and  his  works  beyond 
miglit  be  shelled,  and  the  approach  of 
reinforcements  prevented.  The  Con- 


federates were  on  the  point  of  turning 
the  captured  Parrott  guns  upon  the 
inner  National  line,  when  the  Fifteenth 
corps,  supported  by  some  of  Schofield’s 
troops,  advanced  with  loud  cheers  to 
the  attack.  After  a fierce  struggle,  in 
which  the  fight  was  sometimes  hand  to 
hand  acj'oss  the  narrow  parapet,  the  ene- 
my was  driven  out  of  the  works  and  the 
guns  retaken.  Repeated  discharges  of 
grape  and  canister  into  the  retreating 
masses  caused  fearful  carnag^e.  Thus 
ended  the  battle,  by  far  the  bloodiest 
that  had  yet  been  fought  in  Georgia. 
The  Confederates  were  defeated  at  all 
points.  Their  dead  left  in  front  of  the 
National  lines  numbered  2200  from 
actual  count,  of  which  800  were  deliv- 
ered to  them  under  flag  of  truce.  Their 
total  loss  in  killed  was  computed  by 
General  Logan  at  3240 ; in  addition  to 
which  they  lost  3000  prisoners,  includ- 
ing 1000  wounded  and  many  commis- 
sioned officers.  Owing  to  the  closeness 
and  desperation  of  the  conflict,  the  pro- 
portion of  killed  was  unusually  large. 
Hood  could  ill  afford  these  heavy  losses, 
as  his  force  was  originally  smaller 
than  Shennan’s.  The  total  National 
loss  was  3722,  the  greater  part  being 
killed  and  wounded.  Sherman’s  army, 
however,  had  sustained  an  irrepai’a- 
ble  loss  in  the  death  of  General  Mc- 
Pherson. “ He  was  ” said  Sherman : 

a noble  youth,  of  striking  personal 
appearance,  of  the  highest  professional 
capacity,  and  with  a hearf  abounding 
in  kindness  that  drew  to  him  the  affec- 
tions of  all  men.”  His  body  was  recov- 
ered and  carried  in  the  heat  of  battle 
to  General  Sherman,  who  sent  it,  in 


MAP  OF  THE  COUNTRY  BETWEEN  CHATTANOOGA,  TENNESSEE,  AND  ATLANTA, 

GEORGIA. 


I 


/ 


CAVALRY  EXPEDITIONS. 


725 


charge  of  his  personal  staff,  back  to 
Marietta,  on  its  way  to  his  Northern 
home.* 

Garrard,  with  his  cavalry,  returned 
jQly  from  Covington  on  the  24th, 
24.  having  tlioroughly  accomplished 
his  mission  to  destroy  the  bridges  over 
the  Yellow  and  Ulcofauhatchee  rivers, 
besides  burning  a train  of  cars,  2000 
bales  of  cotton,  and  the  depots  at  Cov- 
ington and  Conger’s  Station.  He  also 
broke  up  the  railroad  between  those 
two  places  for  seven  miles,  and  brought 
in  200  prisoners  and  some  good  horses, 
having  lost  in  the  expedition  only  two 

* General  James  Birdseye  McPherson  was  born 
in  Sandusky  Co,,  Ohio,  on  the  14th  of  November,  1828, 
and  entered  the  Military  Academy  at  West  Point  in 
1849.  He  graduated  at  the  head  of  his  class  on  the 
30th  of  June,  1853,  and  was  then  appointed  brevet 
second  lieutenant  of  engineers  and  assistant  instructor 
of  practical  engineering  at  the  Academy.  He  remained 
in  this  position  till  1854,  when  he  was  appointed 
assistant  engineer  on  the  defenses  of  New  York  harbor. 
In  1857,  he  was  in  charge  of  the  construction  of  Fort 
Delaware,  and  subsequently  of  the  fortifications  on 
Alcatras  Island,  in  San  Francisco  Bay,  In  1861  he 
was  placed  in  charge  of  the  fortifications  in  Boston 
harbor.  In  the  same  year  he  was  made  captain,  and 
in  November  became  aide-de-camp  to  General  Halleck 
in  the  Western  Department,  with  the  rank  of  lieuten- 
ant colonel.  He  was  chief  engineer  of  the  army  of 
the  Tennessee  in  the  expeditions  against  Forts  Henry 
and  Donelson,  and  he  was  also  at  the  siege  of  Corinth. 
In  May,  1862,  he  was  appointed  brigadier-general  of 
volunteers,  and  in  the  following  month  general  super- 
intendent of  military  roads  in  West  Tennessee.  In 
September  of  the  same  year  he  was  on  the  staff  of 
General  Grant,  with  the  rank  of  major-general  of 
volunteers.  Subsequently,  he  was  appointed  brigadier- 
general  of  the  regular  army,  his  rank  dating  from 
August,  1st,  1863.  Two  months  later  he  led  a column 
into  Mississippi,  and  defeated  the  enemy  at  Canton. 
In  Sherman’s  expedition  to  Meridian  he  was  second  in 
command,  and  in  the  Atlanta  campaign  commanded 
the  army  of  the  Tennessee.  McPherson  was  distin- 
guished for  bravery,  industry,  and  indefatigable 
energy.  In  the  language  of  General  Grant,  he  was 
“one  of  the  ablest  engineers  and  most  skilful  gener- 
als ” 


men.  The  Georgia  Eailroad  being  now 
unavailable  to  the  enemy,  Sherman 
turned  his  attention  to  the  railroad 
connecting  Atlanta  with  Macon,  the 
only  avenue  left  by  which  supplies  could 
be  brought  to  the  enemy.  For  this 
purpose  he  organized  his  cavalry  into 
two  large  bodies,  to  move  in  concert 
from  each  wing  of  the  army,  while  the 
army  of  the  Tennessee  was  to  be  shifted 
at  the  same  time  by  the  right  to  East 
Point,  a station  six  miles  southwest  of 
Atlanta,  at  the  junction  of  the  Macon 
and  West  Point  roads.  Stoneman  was 
transferred  to  the  left  flank,  and  Gar- 
rard’s cavalry  added  to  his  own,  making 
an  effective  force  of  5000  men.  On  the 
right  flank  McCook,  to  whose  command 
was  added  the  cavalry  brought  by  Gen- 
eral Kousseau,  had  an  aggregate  force 
of  4000  men.  These  two  well-appoin 
ted  bodies  of  cavalry,  which  Sherman 
considered  more  than  a match  foi 
Wheeler,  were  directed  to  move  in  con 
cert,  Stoneman’s  by  the  left  around 
McDonough,  McCook’s  by  the  right  on 
Fayetteville.  On  the  night  of  the  28tb 
they  were  to  meet  on  the  Macon  Eailroad, 
near  Love  joy’s,  thirty  miles  south  of 
Atlanta,  and  break  up  the  track  thor- 
oughly. The  enemy’s  communications 
would  then  be  all  destroyed,  and  it  was 
hoped  the  speedy  evacuation  of  Atlanta 
would  follow. 

Just  before  starting  on  the  expedition 
Stoneman  requested  permission  to  pro 
ceed,  after  accomplishing  the  proposed 
destruction  of  the  railroad,  to  Macon  and 
Anderson ville,  and  release  the  Union 
prisoners  there.  To  this,  as  there  was 
a possibility  of  success,  and,  to  use 


984 


726 


ATLANTA. 


Sherman’s  words,  “something  captiva- 
ting in  the  idea,”  consent  was  given  by 
General  Sherman,  on  the  condition, 
however,  that  Wheeler’s  cavalry  should 
first  be  defeated,  and  that  Stoneman 
should  make  the  attempt  with  his  own 
cavalry  only,  that  of  Garrard  to  return 
immediately  to  his  ovui  flank  of  the 
National  army. 

The  two  expeditions  set  out  on  the 
July  Stoneman  marching  as  pro- 

27.  posed  towards  McDonough,  and 
sending  Garrard  to  Flat  Kock  to  cover 
his  movement.  McCook  moved  down 
the  west  bank  of  the  Chattahoochee. 
But  Stoneman,  instead  of  proceeding  to 
Lovejoy’s,  turned  off  almost  immediately 
towards  the  Georgia  Railroad,  following 
it  as  far  as  CovinsTton.  He  then  struck 
due  south  to  the  east  of  the  Ocmulgee, 
for  Macon,  sixty  miles  distant,  and  ar- 
rived in  the  vicinity  of  that  place  on  the 
30th.  A detachment  was  sent  eastward 
to  Gordon,  on  the  Georgia  Central  Rail- 
road, where  11  locomotives  and  several 
trains  loaded  with  stores  were  destroyed, 
and  several  bridges  between  that  place 
and  Macon.  But  having  learned  that 
on  the  previous  day  the  prisoners  in 
Macon  had  been  sent  away  to  Charles- 
ton, Stoneman  decid  ed  to  return  at  once, 
without  attempting  to  reach  either 
Macon  or  Anderson ville.  He  accord- 
ingly turned  northward  in  the  evening 
July  following  morning, 

31.  when  about  twenty  miles  from 
Macon,  encountered  a heavy  force. 
Dismounting  a portion  of  his  command, 
as  the  country  was  unfavorable  for  cav- 
alry operations,  he  threw  them  forward 
as  skirmishers.  He  soon,  however. 


found  himself  surrounded  by  a superior 
force.  He  then  gave  directions  to  the 
greater  part  of  his  troops  to  cut  their 
way  as  well  as  they  could  through  the 
enemy’s  lines,  while  he  with  several 
hundred  men  and  a section  of  artillery 
occupied  their  attention.  He  was  finally 
compelled  to  surrender.  One  of  his 
three  brigades  was  captured  with  him; 
one,  under  Colonel  Capron,  was  sur- 
prised and  scattered  on  its  way  back, 
and  the  third,  under  Colonel  Adams, 
arrived  almost  intact  within  the  Nation- 
al lines.  Garrard  remained  at  Flat 
Rock  till  the  29th,  awaiting  orders 
from  Stoneman,  when  he  marched  to- 
wards Covington;  but  learning  there 
that  he  had  gone  southward,  returned 
to  his  position  on  the  left  flank  of  the 
army. 

McCook,  who  marched  along  the  west 
side  of  the  Chattahoochee,  on  arriving 
at  Rivertown,  crossed  on  pontoons  and 
marched  to  Palmetto  Station,  on  the 
West  Point  Railroad,  twenty-five  miles 
south  of  Atlanta,  and  destroyed  the 
track  there.  He  then  moved  eastward 
upon  Fayetteville,  and  burnt  500  army 
wagons,  killed  800  mules,  and  made 
prisoners  of  several  hundred  quarter- 
masters’ men.  He  reached  the  appoint- 
ed rendezvous  at  Lovejoy’s  on  the  night 
of  the  28th,  burnt  the  depot  and  tore 
up  a section  of  the  railroad;  but  his 
work  of  destruction  being  interfered 
with  by  an  accumulating  force  of  the 
enemy,  and  hearing  nothing  of  Stone- 
man, he  turned  off  towards  the  south- 
west and  marched  to  Newman,  a station 
on  the  West  Point  Railroad.  Here  he 
encountered  an  infantiy  force  of  the 


MAGNIFICENT  ADVANCE  REPULSED. 


727 


enemy  on  its  way  from  Mississippi  to 
Atlanta,  wMcli  had  been  delayed  by  the 
break  he  had  effected  on  the  road  at 
Palmetto.  This  force,  with  the  pursu- 
ing cavalry,  hemmed  him  in,  and  he  was 
compelled  to  drop  his  prisoners  and  cut 
his  way  out,  in  doing  which  he  lost 
some  500  officers  and  men.  The  total 
losses  of  Stoneman’s  and  McCook’s 
(commands  amounted  to  not  less  than 
1500  men.  Owing  to  Stoneman’s  failure 
to  co-operate  with  McCook  at  Lovejoy’s, 
the  damage  done  to  the  Macon  Eailroad 
Avas  not  effectual,  and  the  communica- 
tions of  Hood  in  the  direction  of  Macon 
were  soon  restored.  Atlanta  obtained 
a respite  of  at  least  a month. 

While  these  raids  against  the  South- 
ern railroad  communications  of  Atlanta 
liad  been  going  on,  the  army  of  the 
Tennessee,  now  under  the  command  of 
]Maj or- General  Howard — appointed  by 
the  president  to  succeed  General  Mc- 
Pherson— ^had,  in  accordance  with  the 
plans  of  Sherman,  been  drawn  out  of 
its  intrenchments  on  the  left  flank,  and 
moved  during  the  27th,  behind  the  rest 
of  the  army,  to  a position  on  the  extreme 
right,  the  right  flank  being  held  by  the 
corps  of  General  Logan.  The  line  of 
the  army  was  thus  prolonged  southward 
beyond  Proctor’s  Creek,  and  facing 
eastward.  About  ten  in  the  morning 
all  the  army  was  in  position,  and  the 
men  were  busily  engaged  in  throwing 
up  the  usual  defense  of  logs  and  rails. 
Davis’  division  of  the  Fourteenth  corps 
liad  been  ordered  by  Sherman,  on  the 
day  before,  to  move  down  to  Turner’s 
Ferry,  and  thence  towards  Whitehall  or 
East  Point,  and  if  possible  to  reach  the 


flank  of  Howard’s  new  line,  so  that  in 
case  Hood  should  attempt  to  repeat  the 
experiment  of  the  2 2d,  and  attack  any 
part  of  the  army  while  in  motion,  his 
force  might  be  taken  in  flank  at  an  un- 
expected moment. 

Hood  was  not  long  in  finding  out 
that  the  army  of  Sherman  was  swinging 
round  towards  the  Macon  Eailroad,  and 
massed  troops  in  the  same  direction  to 
oppose  the  movement.  At  noon  July 
on  the  28th,  the  Confederates  28. 
moved  out  of  Atlanta  by  the  Bell’s  Ferry 
road,  formed  in  the  open  fields  behind 
a rising  ground,  and  advanced  in  paral- 
lel lines  directly  against  the  Fifteenth 
corps,  expecting  to  find  it  detached  and 
unsupported.  Fortunately  Logan’s 
troops  had  thrown  up  breast-works,  and 
though  the  advance  of  the  Confederate 
columns  was  magnificent,”  as  Sherman, 
who  witnessed  it,  said,  it  was  only  to 
be  followed  by  a recoil  before  steady 
volleys  of  musketry  and  incessant  dis- 
charges of  grape  and  canister.  In  spite 
of  the  efforts  of  their  officers  the  men 
broke  and  fled,  and  though  rallied  again 
and  again,  at  some  parts  of  the  line  as 
often  as  -six  times,  they  were,  about 
four  o’clock  in  the  afternoon,  compelled 
to  retire,  with  a loss  of  not  less  than 
5000.  Logan’s  loss  was  reported  at  less 
than  600.  Had  Davis’  division  come 
up  at  any  time  before  four  o’clock,  this 
complete  repulse  of  the  enemy  might 
have  been  made  a disastrous  rout. 
Owing  to  the  difficult  nature  of  the 
country  through  which  his  march  lay, 
and  the  absence  of  roads,  Davis  was  un- 
fortunately delayed.  This  was  the  last 
attempt  of  - the  enemy  to  check  the 


ATLANTA. 


r28 


extension  of  Sherman’s  lines  by  the 
flank ; and  though  the  extensions  south- 
ward were  met  by  well  constructed  forts 
and  rifle-pits  between  the  National  army 
and  the  railroad  to  and  below  East  Point, 
the  defensive  was  strictly  adhered  to. 
The  National  line  was  prolonged  on  the 
1st  of  August  still  further  southward  be- 
yond East  Point,  by  transferring  Scho. 
field’s  army  and  Palmer’s  corps  to  the 
right. 

About  this  time  several  changes  in 
important  commands  took  place.  Hook- 
er, offended  because  of  the  appointment 
of  General  Howard  as  the  successor  of 
McPherson,  resigned  his  command  of 
the  Twentieth  corps,  and  General  Slo- 
cum was  appointed  in  his  place.  Slocum 
was  at  Vicksburg,  and  until  he  arrived 
the  command  devolved  on  General  S. 
H.  Williams.  Palmer  at  the  same  time 
resigned  his  command  of  the  Fourteenth 
corps,  and  was  succeeded  by  General 
Jefferson  C.  Davis.  The  command  of 
the  Fourth  corps,  vacated  by  the  pro- 
motion of  General  Howard,  was  given 
to  General  D.  S.  Stanley. 

From  the  2d  to  the  15th  of  August, 
the  National  line  was  extended  still 
further  to  the  right,  in  the  hope  of 
flanking  Hood  in  that  direction.  The 
Twenty-Third  corps,  supported  by  the 
Fourteenth,  was  transferred  from  the 
left  to  a position  below  Utoy  Creek — 
a small  stream  flowing  westward  to 
the  Chattahoochee — where  it  joined  on 
Logan’s  right  and  formed  the  right 
flank.  Peilley’s  brigade  of  Cox’s  divi- 
Ang.  made  an  attempt  on  the  5th 
5.  to  break  through  the  enemy’s  line 
about  a mile  below  Utoy  Creek,  but 


failed,  losing  about  400  men.  On  the 
next  day,  however,  the  position  was 
turned  by  General  Hascall,  and  General 
Schofield  advanced  his  whole  line  close 
up  to  and  facing  the  enemy  below  Utoy 
Creek.  Still  he  could  get  no  foothold 
on  either  the  West  Point  or  Macon 
Kailro^d.  The  enemy’s  line,  in  which 
was  now  a large  body  of  Georgia  militia, 
at  this  time  was  about  fifteen  miles  long, 
extending  from  near  Decatur  to  East 
Point  and  beyond,  and  his  positions 
were  so  masked  by  the  hills  and  woods 
that  the  weak  parts  of  the  line  could 
not  be  discovered. 

Along  the  west  side  of  the  railroad 
from  Atlanta  to  East  Point,  a distance 
of  six  miles,  the  enemy  had  an  admira- 
bly constructed  line  of  defenses,  within 
which  was  a second  line,  consisting  of 
a series  of  redoubts  of  great . thickness 
of  parapet  connected  throughout  by  a 
continuous  infantry  parapet,  covered  by 
abatis^  chevaux-de-frise,  and  other  im- 
pediments. The  inner  line  of  works 
completely  surrounded  the  city,  and 
extended  southwestward  as  far  as  and 
around  East  Point,  thus  covering  the 
point  of  junction  of  the  West  Point 
and  Macon  Railroads.  The  National 
army  had  been  so  shifted  by  successive 
movements  from  its  first  position,  in 
which  it  had  threatened  the  city  on  the 
north  and  northeast,  that  now,  while 
the  northern  approaches  were  covered 
by  its  extreme  left,  the  extreme  right 
lay  southwest  of  Atlanta,  and  in  a line 
parallel  with  the  railroad,  at  an  average 
distance  of  two  and  a half  miles,  the 
intervening  space  being  a narrow  belt 
of  rough  wooded  countiy,  the  scene  of 


THE  GRAND  MOVEMENT  POSTPONED. 


729 


constant  skirmisliing.  Hood’s  position 
seemed  to  be  impregnable ; and  altbougb 
his  numbers  were  inferior  to  those  of 
Sherman — yet  his  advantage  in  holding 
the  interior  lines  made  up  in  a great 
measure  for  his  want  of  men,  and  the 
contest  seemed  likely  to  be  indefinitely 
protracted.  Sherman  became  satisfied 
that  the  enemy’s  lines  could  be  carried 
by  assault  only  at  a fearful  sacrifice  of 
life,  and  determined  to  adopt  another 
plan  of  operations.  His  object  now 
was  to  get  possession  of  the  Macon 
Railroad,  the  only  line  left  by  which 
Hood’s  army  could  be  reinforced,  and 
on  which  it  was  wholly  dependent  for 
supplies.  This  effected.  Hood  might  be 
compelled  to  evacuate  the  city  or  sur- 
render. To  gain  this  end  Sherman 
determined  to  move  his  entire  army. 
But  before  moving,  he  had  a battery  of 
four  44-inch  rified  guns  put  in  position, 
and  a steady  fire  opened  upon  the  city 
— the  object  being  to  impress  the  enemy 
with  the  conviction  that  regular  siege 
operations  were  commenced.  Several 
extensive  fires  were  also  thus  caused  in 
the  city,  and  the  running.of  trains  on  the 
Macon  Railroad  was  interrupted;  but 
the  enemy  resolutely  held  the  forts, 
mlling,  apparently  to  see  the  city  laid  in 
ashes  rather  than  abandon  them.  Sher- 
man therefore  commenced  his  new  move- 
ment, which  amounted  to  nothing  less 
than  raising  the  siege  of  Atlanta  and 
taking  the  field  with  his  main  force,  and 
using  it  against  the  communications  of 
Atlanta  instead  of  against  its  intrench- 
ments. 

By  the  16th  of  August,  Sherman  had 
completed  his  plans,  according  to  which 


the  Twentieth  corps,  under  Wil-  Aug. 
liams,  was  to  be  moved  back  to  the  ^ ^ • 
intrenched  position  at  the  Chattahoo- 
chee Bridge,  and  the  main  army  was  to 
march  to  the  West  Point  Railroad,  near 
Fairborn,  and  afterwards  to  the  Macon 
road  at  Jonesboro,  the  wagons  loaded 
with  provisions  for  fifteen  days.  But 
before  putting  these  plans  in  execution^ 
Sherman  learned  that  Wheeler,  with  a 
force  of  cavalry,  variously  estimated 
at  from  6000  to  10,000  men,  had 
passed  around  by  the  east  and  north. 
Making  his  appearance  on  the  Nation- 
al lines  of  communication,  he  captured 
900  head  of  cattle,  and  made  a break 
on  the  railroad  near  Calhoun.  Sher- 
man, therefore,  thinking  that  in  the 
absence  of  Wheeler’s  cavalry,  the  'task 
he  had  marked  out  for  the  whole  army 
might  be  accomplished  by  a strong 
mounted  force,  suspended  his  orders  for 
the  grand  movement  by  the  right  flank, 
and  dispatched  Kilpatrick — who  had 
now  recovered  from  the  wound  he  re- 
ceived at  Resaca — with  a force  of  5000 
well-appointed  cavalry  to  tear  up  the 
railroads.  Kilpatrick  left  his  camp 
near  Sandtown  on  the  18th  and  struck 
the  West  Point  Railroad  at  Fairborn, 
the  Macon  Railroad  at  Love  joy’s;  but 
being  much  harrassed  by  a body  of  in- 
fantry and  by  Ross’s  cavalry,  was  not 
able  to  effect  any  permanent  damage  on 
the  roads — not  enough  to  interrupt  their 
use  for  more  than  ten  days.  He  then 
returned  northward  and  eastward,  and 
reached  Decatur  on  the  2 2d. 

It  now  became  apparent  to  Sherman 
that  his  original  plan  must  be  carried 
out.  All  the  army  commanders  were 


730 


ATLANTA. 


at  once  notified  to  send  their  surplus 
wagons,  the  sick  and  wounded,  and  in- 
cumbrances of  all  kinds,  back  to  the 
intrenched  position  at  the  Chattahoochee 
Railroad  Bridge,  and  that  the  movement 
must  commence  on  the  night  of  the  25th. 
The  Twentieth  corps  marched  back  to 
the  bridge.  The  Fourth  corps,  under 
General  Stanley,  was  dra^vn  out  of  its 
line  on  the  extreme  left,  and  marched 
to  a position  below  Proctor’s  Creek. 
The  movement  was  continued  on  the 
night  of  the  26th,  the  army  of  the 
Tennessee  being  drawn  out  and  moved 
rapidly  by  a circuit  towards  Sandtown 
and  across  Camp  Creek  ; the  army  of 
the  Cumberland  south  of  Utoy  Creek. 
The  army  of  the  Ohio  remained  in  its 
position.  A third  movement  placed 
the  army  of  the  Tennessee  on  the  West 
Point  Railroad  above  Fairborn,  the 
army  of  the  Cumberland  above  Red 
Oak,  and  the  army  of  the  Ohio  near 
Diggs  and  Mims.  The  whole  front  of 
the  city  was  thus  uncovered,  much  to 
the  astonishment  of  the  Confederates, 
who,  for  a short  time,  not  being  able  in 
any  other  way  to  account  for  these 
strange  operations,  supposed  that  Sher. 
man  had  begun  a retreat. 

The  28th  of  August  was  devoted  by 
Aug.  Sherman  to  the  destruction  of  the 
West  Point  Railroad,  between 
Fairborn  and  Red  Oak,  and  for  some 
distance  above.  The  work  was  thor- 
oughly done.  The  road  was  destroyed 
for  twelve  and  a half  miles,  the  ties 
being  burnt,  and  the  rails  twisted.  Sev- 
eral cuts  were  made  across  the  road  and 
filled  up  with  logs,  trunks  of  trees, 
fragments  of  rock,  and  earth,  among 


•/ 

which  were  placed  shells  prepared  as 
torpedoes,  to  explode  in  case  of  an 
attempt  to  clear  them  out.  Sherman, 
after  having  personally  inspected  this 
work,  and  seen  that  the  destruction  was 
so  complete  that  it  would  be  very 
difficult  to  restore  the  road  to  working 
condition,  ordered  the  whole  army  to 
move  next  day  eastward  by  several 
roads — Howard,  on  the  right,  towards 
Jonesboro ; Thomas,  in  the  centre,  by 
Shoal  Creek  Church  to  Couch’s,  on  the 
Decatur  and  Fayetteville  road  ; and 
Schofield,  on  the  left,  about  Morrow’s 
Mills. 

Hood  now  began  to  understand  the 
object  of  these  movements ; but  still 
unaware  that  Sherman’s  whole  army 
was  marching  on  his  communications, 
he  contented  himself  with  sending  only  a 
part  of  his  force,  the  corps  of  Hardee 
and  S.  D.  Lee,  to  Jonesboro,  remaining 
himself  in  Atlanta  with  Stewart’s  coi*ps 
and  the  Georgia  militia. 

The  several  columns  of  Sherman’s 
army  were  again  in  motion  in  a south- 
easterly direction  on  the  30th.  Aug. 
Thomas,  in  the  centre,  encounter-  30, 
ing  little  opposition,  attained  his  posi- 
tion at  Couch’s  early  in  the  afternoon  ; 
Schofield  being  near  the  enemy,  moved 
cautiously  on  a circle  around  East  Point, 
and  came  into  position  towards  Rough 
and  Ready ; Howard,  who  had  the 
outer  circle,  and  therefore  a greater 
distance  to  move,  met  with  some  opposi- 
tion, which,  however,  he  easily  overcame, 
passed  Renfrew,  .the  point  indicated  for 
him  in  the  orders  of  the  day,  and 
at  night  halted  within  half  a mile  of 
Jonesboro.  Next  morning,  finding 


MOVEMENT  ON  JONESBORO, 


731 


himself  in  the  presence  of  the  heavy 
force  under  Generals  Hardee  and  Lee, 
Howard  deployed  the  Fifteenth  corps, 
and  disposed  the  Sixteenth  and  Seven- 
teenth on  its  flank. 

Sherman  had  in  the  meantime,  as 
soon  as  he  learned  that  Howard  had 
passed  Renfrew,  directed  Thomas  to 
send  to  that  place  a division  of  Davis’ 
corps,  also  to  move  Stanley’s  corps  in 
connection  with  Schofield’s  force,  to  wards 
Rough  and  Ready,  and  then  to  send 
for^vard  a strong  detachment  to  feel  for 
the  railroad.  Schofield  was  also  ordered 
to  move  boldly  forward  and  strike  the 
railroad  near  Rough  and  Ready.  These 
Aug.  movements  were  progressing  on 
31.  the  31st,  when  the  Confederates 
moved  out  of  their  works  at  Jonesboro, 
and  attacked  the  position  of  HoVard, 
but  were  steadily  and  repeatedly  re- 
pulsed. After  a contest  of  two  hours’ 
duration,  they  withdrew,  losing  in  killed, 
wounded,  and  captured,  3000  men, 
besides  general  officers,  including  Major- 
General  Anderson,  mortally  w^ounded. 
Howard’s  loss  was  slight,  as  his  men 
fought  behind  breast-works.  It  was 
observed  on  this  occasion  that  the  Con- 
federate troo]3s  had  begun  to  lose  the 
enthusiasm  and  dash  which  had  hitherto 
characterized  their  attacks. 

Hearing  the  sounds  of  battle  about 
noon,  Sherman  renewed  his  orders  to  push 
the  other  movements  on  the  left  and 
centre,  and  about  four  o’clock  received 
reports  that  Howard  had  thoroughly 
repulsed  the  enemy  at  Jonesboro ; that 
Schofield  had  reached  the  railroad  a 
mile  below  Rough  and  Ready  and  was 
busy  breaking  it  up  ; that  Stanley  was 


on  the  road  below  Schofield,  and  was 
also  breaking  it  up,  and  that  General 
Davis’  corps  had  struck  the  road  within 
four  miles  of  Jonesboro.  Orders  were 
then  given  for  the  whole  army  to  move 
on  Jonesboro  ; Thomas  from  the  north, 
with  Schofield  on  his  left.  Howard 
was  to  hold  the  Confederates  in  their 
fortifications  till  the  rest  of  the  army 
could  close  in  upon  them.  The  troops 
were  also  ordered  to  continue  the  des 
truction  of  the  railroad  as  they  moved 
along  it.  Garrard  was  charged  to 
w^atch  the  roads  northward,  and  Kil- 
patrick was  sent  southward  along  the 
west  bank  of  the  Flint  River,  to  threaten 
or  attack  the  railroad  below  Jonesboro. 
It  was  expected  that  the  whole  army 
would  be  able  to  close  in  on  Jonesboro 
by  noon  on  the  1st  of  September;  but 
the  corps  of  Davis  alone,  having  a com 
paratively  short  distance  to  travel,  w^as 
up  in  time,  and  was  deployed  facing 
southwai’d,  its  right  in  connection  with 
the  corps  of  Howard,  its  left  on  the 
railroad.  Stanley  and  Schofield  were 
moving  along  the  Rough  and  Ready 
road,  breaking  it  up  at  the  same  time, 
and  Sherman  fearing  that  night  would 
come  on  before  their  arrival,  and  that 
the  enemy  would  then  be  able  to  escape 
him  without  a fight,  ordered  the  corps 
of  Davis  to  assault  the  enemy’s  works 
at  once.  The  troops  advanced  to  the 
attack  across  open  fields  under  a wither- 
ing artillery  and  musketry  fire.  After 
a desperate  fight,  which  lasted  two 
hours,  they  drove  the  Confederates  from 
their  works,  capturing  two  4-gun  batter- 
ies— one  of  them  Loomis’,  lost  at  Chick- 
amauga — some  battle-flags,  and  a large 


732 


ATLANTA. 


number  of  prisoners,  including  the 
greater  part  of  Govan’s  brigade,  ^Yitb 
its  commander,  which  had  formed  part 
of  the  celebrated  fighting  division  ” of 
Cleburne.  Repeated  orders  were  sent, 
urging  the  rapid  advance  of  Stanley 
and  Schofield,  but  the  want  of  roads  and 
the  difficult  nature  of  the  country  pre- 
vented their  coming  up  and  getting  into 
position  for  attack  before  further  oper- 
ations were  rendered  impracticable  by 
the  approach  of  night.  Had  they 
been  able  to  close  in  upon  Hardee  a few 
hours  earlier,  his  entire  force  would  in 
all  probability  have  been  captured.  As 
it  was,  Hardee  had  to  evacuate  the  place 
during  the  night  and  fall  back  seven 
miles  to  Lovejoy’s,  where  he  intrenched 
in  a naturally  strong  position.  About 
two  o’clock  in  the  morning  the  watchers 
in  Sherman’s  camp  heard  in  the  direction 
of  Atlanta,  about  twenty  miles  distant, 
the  sounds  of  heavy  explosions,  followed 
by  a succession  of  minor  ^reports  re- 
sembling the  rapid  firing  of  cannon  and 
musketry.  About  four  o’clock  similar 
sounds  were  heard,  indicating  a night 
attack  on  the  city  by  Slocum,  or  that 
Hood  was  blowing  up  his  magazines 
and  preparing  to  evacuate.  Never- 
theless, when  the  approach  of  day  made 
It  clear  that  Hardee  had  abandoned  his 
works  at  Jonesboro,  Sherman  moved 
his  army  in  pursuit.  Hardee  was  found 
in  his  intrenched  position  at  Lovejoy’s, 
liis  fianks  protected  by  a branch  of 
W alnut  Creek  to  the  right  and  a small 
confluent  of  the  Flint  River  to  his  left. 

In  the  mean  time,  in  Atlanta  the 
utmost  consternation  and  excitement 
had  arisen  when  it  became  known  that 


the  main  army  of  Sherman  had  got 
between  Hardee’s  force  and  the  city. 
Hood  immediately  gave  orders  for  the 
evacuation  of  his  works  and  the  remov- 
al of  as  much  of  the  ammunition  and 
stores  as  was  possible  with  his  limited 
means  of  transportation,  and  for  the 
destrucijion  of  the  rest.  Large  quanti- 
ties of  provisions  in  the  public  store- 
houses were  distributed  to  the  inhabi- 
tants and  to  the  troops.  The  I’olling 
stock  of  the  railroads,  consisting  of 
about  100  cars  and  6 locomotives,  were 
gathered  together  near  the  rolling-mill 
in  the  evening,  by  which  time  all  the 
troops  except  the  rear-guard  had  got 
away.  The  cars  were  then  laden  with 
the  surplus  ammunition,  and,  together 
with  the  depots,  storehouses,  and  all 
that  could  be  of  use  to  the  National 
army,  set  on  fire  about  midnight.  This 
occasioned  the  series  of  explosions  that 
had  been  heard  in  Sherman’s  camp. 
Slocum,  at  the  Chattahoochee  Bridge, 
also  hearing  these  sounds,  sent  out  early 
in  the  morning  of  the  2d  of  Sep-  gept, 
tember  a strong  reconnoitring  2. 
column,  which  pushing  forward  with- 
'out  meeting  any  opposition,  arrived 
at  Atlanta  about  nine  o’clock,  when  the 
mayor  made  a formal  surrender  of  the 
city,  only  requesting  the  security  of 
private  property  and  protection  for  non- 
combatants,  which  were  readily  guaran- 
teed. Ward’s  division  then  marched 
into  the  city  with  drums  beating  and 
colors  flying,  and  the  National  banner 
was  raised  over  the  court-house  amid 
hearty  cheers  from  the  troops.  Eleven 
heavy  guns  were  found  in  the  fortifica- 
tions, and  a number  which  had  been 


REMOVAL  OF  CIVILIANS.. 


733 


buried  were  subsequently  dug  up. 
There  were  also  found  3 locomotives 
uninjured,  3000  muskets  in  good  order, 
and  a quantity  of  tobacco  and  other 
stores.  Of  the  valuable  machinery  in 
the  Confederate  Government  work- 
shops, part  had  been  removed  to  Augus- 
ta and  Macon,  and  part  destroyed. 

The  object  of  Sherman’s  movement 
against  the  Macon  Railroad  having  been 
attained,  by  the  surrender  of  Atlanfa, 
he  gave  up  the  pursuit  of  Hardee’s  force. 
To  follow  it,  through  a country  covered 
wdth  forests,  would  have  been  useless. 
He  therefore  issued  orders  on  the  4th  for 
the  return  of  the  army  by  slow  marches 
towards  Atlanta.  On  the  5th  it  was 
back  at  Jonesboro  ; on  the  7th  it  moved 
to  Rough  and  Ready,  and  on  the  8th 
camps  were  selected — for  the  army  of 
the  Cumberland  around  Atlanta,  for 
the  army  of  the  Tennessee  about  East 
Point,  and  for  the  army  of  the  Ohio 
at  Decatur. 

Sherman’s  final  success  in  compelling 
the  evacuation  of  Atlanta  was  owing  in 
a great  degree  to  the  mistake  made  by 
Hood  in  sending  ofi  his  cavalry  under 
Wheeler  to  operate  against  the  National 
communications  far  beyond  the  reach 
of  recall,  thus  enabling  Sherman’s  cav- 
alry, followed  quickly  by  his  main  army, 
to  fall  upon  the  railroads  south  of  At- 
lanta. Up  to  the  time  of  Wheeler’s 
raid,  Sherman’s  railroad  communications 
between  Atlanta  and  Chattanooga  had, 
owing  to  his  skilful  dispositions,  been 
scarcely  interrupted.  In  Chattanooga 
had  been  accumulated  a sufficient  quan- 
tity of  stores  to  render  the  army  indepen- 
dent of  Nashville;  and  when  Sherman 


heard  of  Wheeler’s  departure,  which 
took  place  soon  after  the  unfortunate 
raid  of  Stoneman,  he  felt  no  uneasiness, 
as  it  left  him  superior  in  cavalry  to  his 
adversary.  Wheeler  struck  the  railroad 
at  Adairsville,  midway  between  Atlanta 
and  Chattanooga,  and  captured  there 
900  head  of  beef  cattle ; proceeding 
then  northward,  he  did  some  damage  at 
Calhoun.  On  the  14th  he  made  his 
appearance  at  Dalton,  and  demanded, 
in  order  ^Ho  prevent  the  effusion  of 
blood,”  an  immediate  and  unconditional 
surrender.  Colonel  Siebold,  who  was 
in  command  of  the  garrison  of  500  or 
600  men,  replied  in  the  negative ; and 
sending  word  to  General  Steedman, 
commanding  at  Chattanooga,  he  held 
out  against  the  Confederates  till  the 
following  day,  when  reinforcements 
arrived.  Wheeler  then  went  to  East 
Tennessee;  and  the  railroad  between 
Atlanta  and  Chattanooga  was  immedi- 
ately restored  to  running  order.  Sub- 
sequently he  destroyed  a large  part  of 
the  railroad  between  Chattanooga  and 
Knoxville ; and  during  the  latter  part  of 
August  and  the  first  week  in  September 
he  endeavored  to  break  up  the  railroad 
and  interrupt  telegraphic  communica- 
tions between  Chattanooga  and  Nash- 
ville. He  was,  however,  compelled  to 
i*etire  southward  pursued  by  Generals 
Rousseau,  Steedman,  and  Granger,  to 
wards  Florence,  in  northern  Alabama. 

Having  determined  to  remove  all 
civilians  from  Atlanta  and  to  retain  the 
town  for  military  purposes  exclusively, 
Sherman  issued  an  order  dated  gept. 
5th  September  ordering  all  fami-  5. 
lies  living  in  Atlanta  whose  male 


734 


ATLANTA. 


representatives  were  in  the  Confederate 
service,  or  had  gone  south,  to  leave  the 
city  within  five  days.  All  northern 
citizens  not  connected  with  the  army, 
unless  they  obtained  from  him  or  from 
General  Thomas  permission  to  remain, 
were  also  to  leave  the  city  in  five  days  or 
to  be  liable  to  imprisonment.  To  facil- 
itate the  removal  of  the  inhabitants, 
the  number  of  whom  had  greatly 
diminished  during  the  progress  of  the 
siege,  Sherman  proposed  to  Hood,  still 
remaining  at  Love  joy’s,  a truce  of  ten 
days.  Hood  agreed  to  the  proposal, 
although  he  protested  against  the 
measure  as  one  of  unnecessary  cruelty. 
Sherman  replied  in  a characteristic  let- 
ter to  Hood,  showing  that  the  conduct 
of  Johnston  and  other  Confederate 
commanders  afforded  sufficient  prece- 
dent for  his  action.  The  inhabitants 
who  still  remained  in  Atlanta  were  very 
miwilling  to  be  sent  away,  and  the 
mayor,  James  M.  Calhoun,  addressed  a 
letter  to  Sherman,  asking  a reconsider- 
ation of  the  order  to  which  the  latter  re- 
plied, showing  in  clear  and  forcible 


language  the  propriety  of  the  measiu-e  he 
had  determined  on,  at  the  same  time  dem- 
onstrating that  the  hardships  of  war  so 
much  complained  of  had  been  brought 
upon  the  Southern  people  by  their  own 
action.  The  truce  agreed  upon  extended 
from  the  12th  of  September  to  the  2 2d 
and  wa^  subsequently  prolonged.  The 
National  Government  furnished  trans- 
portation as  far  as  Kough  and  Ready, 
for  such  of  the  inhabitants  as  wishexl 
to  move  southward,  and  for  those  desir- 
ing to  move  northward,  as  far  as  Chat- 
tanooga. They  were  permitted  to  take 
with  them  their  movable  property,  for 
which  also  transportation  was  furnished. 
Negroes  who  chose  to  do  so  were  allowed 
to  go  with  their  masters.  Of  those  who 
remained,  the  men  were  put  in  govern- 
ment employ,  and  the  women  and 
children  were  sent  outside  the  lines. 
During  the  truce  there  were  removed 
to  Rough  and  Ready  446  families,  com- 
prising 705  adults,  860  children,  and 
470  servants.  The  amount  of  house- 
hold goods  removed  was  an  average  of 
1,651  pounds  to  each  family. 


PETERSBURG. 


735 


CHAPTER  XXXVI. 


The  Army  of  the  Potomac, — Description  of  Petersburg. — Movement  on  Petersburg  under  Gillmore  and 
Kautz. — The  Eighteenth  Corps  at  Bermuda  Hundred. — The  Outer  Defenses  of  Petersburg  taken, — 
Movement  of  Terry  against  the  Petersburg  and  Richmond  Railroad, — Army  of  the  Potomac  before 
Petersburg. — Four  Days  of  Unsuccessful  Assaulting. — The  Confederate  Troops  reoccupy  their  Lines  in 
Front  of  Butler’s  Position. — Attack  on  Sheridan’s  Wagon  Train  at  White  House. — Movement  against  the 
Weldon  Railroad. — Skirmish  at  Davis’  Farm.— Fire  directed  against  the  Appomattox  Bridges.- -Deep 
Bottom  occupied  by  Foster. — The  Movement  against  the  Weldon  Railroad  resumed. --The  National  Line 
broken  through.— Disastrous  Consequences. — Heavy  Losses  in  Prisoners. — Advance  of  Wright  towards  th.e 
Weldon  Railroad. — The  Vermont  Brigade  driven  back. — Attack  on  the  Tenth  Corps.  — Sheridan’s  Cavalry 
attacked  while  on  the  March  from  White  House. — Friendly  intercourse  between  Pickets. — Petersburg 
Bombarded. — March  of  the  Sixth  Corps  to  the  Relief  of  Wilson’s  Cavalry. — Raid  of  Wilson  and  Kautz 
against  the  Weldon  and  Danville  Railroads. — The  Weldon  Railroad  cut  — Railroad  Destruction  at  Burkes- 
ville  and  on  the  Danville  Road. — Battle  at  Staunton  Bridge. — Fight  at  Stony  Creek  and  Reams’  Station  — 
Disastrous  Rout  of  Wilson’s  Column. — Escape  of  Kautz’s  Command. — Long  Route  taken  by  Wilson, — 
The  Weldon  Railroad  cut  by  the  Sixth  Corps — A Demonstration  frustrated.  — Confederate  Assault  on  a 
National  Earth  work. — The  Fourth  of  July  in  the  Lines  before  Petersburg. — A sudden  Attack  reiDulsed'. 
— A Dead  Lock. — Effect  of  incessant  hard  Fighting. — Grant  retains  Butler  in  his  Command. — Change  in 
Corps  Commanders. — Occupation  of  Strawberry  Plains. — The  Mine  at  Petersburg — The  Feint  at  Deep 
Bottom. — Demonstrations  towards  Richmond. — Lee  hurries  large  numbers  of  Troops  to  the  North  Side  of 
the  James. — Explosion  of  the  Mine. — Advance  of  the  Storming  Column. — Delay. — The  Repulse. — Rout 
of  Ferrero’s  Colored  Division. — The  Fort  recaptured  by  the  Confederates. — Delay  in  burying  the  Dead. — 
Causes  of  Failure. — Explosion  of  a Confederate  Mine. — Deserters. — Terrific  Explosion  at  City  Point. — 
Perseverance  of  Grant. — Gradual  Exhaustion  of  the  Southern  Fighting  Element. — The  Dvitch  Gap  Canal. 
— Movements  North  of  the  James. — Fight  at  Strawberry  Plains — Demonstrations  at  Deep  Bottom. — 
Battle  of  Deep  Run. — Ludlow’s  Movement  from  Dutch  Gap. — Operations  against  the  Weldon  Railroad. — 
Battle  at  Davis’  Farm. — Battles  for  the  Weldon  Railroad. — Destruction  of  the  Track. — Battle  of  Reams’ 
Station. — Pickett  attacks  Butler’s  Position. — HeaA^y  Bombardment  of  Petersburg. — Gregg’s  Recconnois- 
sance  towards  Stony  Creek. — A tacit  Truce  broken. — Redoubt  captured  by  De  Trobriand. — Extension  of 
the  City  Point  Railroad. — General  Hampton’s  great  Cattle  Raid, — Movement  from  Deep  Bottom  towards 
Richmond. — Battle  of  Chapin’s  Farm. — Capture  of  Battery  Harrison. — Capture  of  New  Market  Heights. 
— Repulse  at  Fort  Gilmer. — Reconnoissance  by  Kautz  and  Terry  towards  Richmond. — Attack  on  Battery 
Harrison  repulsed. — Movement  towards  the  South  Side  Railroad. — Capture  of  Fort  McRae. — Repulse  of 
Potter’s  Division. — Kautz’s  Cavalry  surprised  and  routed. — Repulse  of  the  Enemy  by  Terry. — Reconnois- 
sances. — Simultaneous  Movements  North  of  the  James  toAvards  Hatcher’s  Run — Battle  of  Hatcher’s  Run. 
— Gregg’s  Raid  to  Stony  Creek  Station. — Warren’s  Operations  on  the  Weldon  Railroad  towards  Hicksford. 


Without  tlie  loss  of  a wagon  or  a 
single  piece  of  artillery,  the  army 
*of  the  Potomac  had  been  trans- 
ferred from  the  north  bank  of  the 
Chickahominy  to  the  south  side  of  the 
James.  The  Confederates  were  aware 
that  some  such  movement  was  intended ; 
but  they  had  not  counted  on  its  being 
executed  with  so  much  celerity.  As  the 


wearied  soldiers  marched  along  the  dusty 
roads,  they  met  with  little  annoyance 
save  from  the  heated  atmosphere  and 
the  burning  sun.  The  column  which 
moved  from  Long  Bridge  to  Wilcox’s 
Wharf,  it  is  true,  had  a sharp  engage- 
ment with  the  enemy  near  White  Oak 
Bridge,  on  the  borders  of  the  swamps ; 
but  Wilson’s  cavalry  and  Crawford’s 


736 


PETERSBURG. 


advanced  division  of  tlie  Fifth  corps, 
with  a loss  of  not  more  than  200  men, 
drove  them  back.  Making  allowance 
for  stragglers,  and  for  a skirmishing 
line  cut  off  at  Cold  Harbor,  the  entire 
loss  attending  the  movement  did  not 
exceed  400  men.  It  had  been  Grant’s 
first  intention  to  fall  upon  Lee’s  army 
again  and  again  from  the  Rapidan  to 
the  Chickahominy,  and  by  a succession 
of  heavy  blows  to  break  it  up,  or  so 
^veaken  it,  that  when  it  should  at  last  fall 
back  upon  Richmond,  that  city  would 
prove  an  easy  conquest  for  his  victor- 
ious legions.  His  scheme  failed.  The 
numerical  strength  of  the  enemy  proved 
greater  than  had  been  supposed;  and 
General  Lee  was  careful  in  his  retro- 
grade movements  never  to  fight  except 
in  impregnable  positions. 

Petersburg  was  now  the  immediate 
object  of  Grant’s  attention.  In  any 
attempt  to  approach  Richmond  from 
the  south,  the  occupation  of  Petersburg 
must  be  an  important  preliminary  step. 
The  holding  of  that  city  would  sever 
the  enemy’s  communications  southward, 
and  afford  many  material  advantages 
in  the  investment  of  Richmond.  Grant 
had  wished  to  gain  possession  of  it  in 
the  outset;  and  in  his  grand  plan  of 
campaign  he  had  arranged  that  it 
should  be  taken  and  held  by  the  army  of 
the  James,  which,  however,  had  proved 
inadequate  to  the  task.  Situated  on 
the  right  or  south  bank  of  the  Appo- 
mattox, at  a distance  of  22  miles  south 
of  Richmond,  and  10  miles  southwest 
of  the  James  at  City  Point,  and  having 
a population  at  the  beginning  of  the 
war  of  o\'er  18,000,  Petersburg  ranked 


as  the  third  town  in  Virginia.  It  was 
the  focus  of  convergence  of  five  rail- 
roads: the  Richmond  road  running  north  ; 
the  Weldon  road  running  south  to  the 
Carolinas ; the  South  Side  road  running 
west  to  Lynchburg ; the  Norfolk  road 
running  southeast  and  the  short  road 
running  northeast  to  City  Point.  The 
town  was  defended  by  a series  of  skil- 
fully constructed  earth-works,  consisting 
not  only  of  square  redoubts,  but 
also  of  well-established  rifle-trenches, 
extending  around  it  in  a semicircle, 
both  ends  resting  on  the  river,  the  north- 
ern extremity  being  strengthened  by 
batteries  on  the  opposite  side  of  the 
stream. 

General  Butler,  it  will  be  remembered, 
had  already  made  a demonstration  against 
Petersburg.  Having  been  frequently 
informed  by  deserters  that  the  garrison 
was  much  weakened  by  the  withdrawal 
of  troops  to  reinforce  Lee,  he,  early  in 
the  month  of  June,  made  preparations 
for  sending  a force  in  that  direction. 
A pontoon  bridge  was  constructed,  to  be 
thrown  across  the  Appomattox,  and 
gun-boats  were  sent  up  the  river  to 
reconnoitre.  The  expedition  was  placed 
under  the  charge  of  General  Gillmore, 
who  led  the  infantry  column,  about 
3500  men,  consisting  of  Hawley’s  brig- 
ade of  the  Tenth  corps,  and  a brigade 
of  colored  troops  under  General  Hinks. 
The  cavalry  1400  strong,  was  com- 
manded by  Kautz.  It  was  arranged 
that  Gillmore,  having  crossed  to  the 
east  bank  of  the  Appomattox  by  the 
pontoon  bridge,  should  proceed  by  the 
turnpike  road  towards  the  town,  and 
attack  it  from  that  direction,  Avhile 


THE  OUTER  DEFENSES. 


73: 


Kautz,  also  crossing  the  river,  should 
fetch  a wide  circuit  and  make  his  attack 
on  the  south  or  southwest  side  of  the 
town ; the  movements  of  the  two  bodies 
of  troops  to  be  so  timed  that  they  should 
enter  the  place  simultaneously  at  differ- 
ent points.  It  was  hoped  that  the  town 
might  thus  be  captured,  and  that  if  not 
held,  at  least  all  its  supplies  and  stores 
of  ammunition  might  be  destroyed. 
Butler  was  to  make  a demonstration 
in  the  mean  time  as'ainst  Fort  Clifton. 

On  the  8th  of  June,  shortly  after 
dusk,  the  pontoon  bridge  was  laid  down 
near  Point  of  Eocks,  and  about  mid- 
night Kautz’s  cavalry  crossed  by  it, 
quickly  followed  by  Hawley’s  brigade, 
which  was  soon  afterwards  joined  by 
the  colored  brigade  of  Hinks.  Before 
eight  o’clock  in  the  morning,  Follett’s 
battery  was  brought  up  in  front  of  the 
woods  near  Point  of  Eocks,  and  began 
to  shell  the' Confederate  lines  near  Fort 
Clifton.  The  gun-boats  Commodore 
Perry  and  General  Putnam  also  opened 
fire  on  the  same  position.  A brisk  fire 
was  kept  up  thus  till  noon.  A battery 
which  the  enemy  brought  down,  and 
which  threw  30-pounder  shells  at  Gen- 
eral Weitzel’s  signal  station,  was  soon 
silenced.  In  the  mean  time  Gillmore 
June  Kautz  had  pressed  on,  mak- 
9.  ing  a detour  so  as  to  avoid  the 
fire  of  Fort  Clifton,  and  were  rapidly  ap- 
proaching Petersburg.  The  infantry 
met  with  no  serious  opposition  till 
vdthin  about  two  miles  of  the  town, 
when  the  Confederate  skirmish  lines 
were  encountered,  but  quickly  driven 
back.  Arrived  in  front  of  the  town, 
and  sufficiently  near  to  be  able  to 


examine  the  fortifications  critically, 
Gillmore  came  to  the  conclusion  that 
they  were  too  strong  to  be  attempted 
by  the  force  under  his  command.  He, 
therefore,  withdrew  his  troops  about 
noon,  and  got  back  to  camp  the  same 
evening.  In  the  mean  time  Kautz  on 
his  side  had  forced  the  intrenchments 
and  actually  engaged  the  enemy  in  the 
streets.  But  the  Confederates  concen- 
trated against  him  what  force  they 
had ; and  he  was  compelled  to  retire, 
although  he  carried  off  with  him  40 
prisoners.  His  loss  was  only  about  20 
killed  and  wounded. 

At  one  o’clock  on  the  morning  of  the 
1 5th,  the  Eighteenth  corps  which 
had  arrived  at  Bermuda  Hundred  1 5 . 
on  the  previous  evening,  in  transports, 
by  way  of  Fortress  Monroe,  set  out  for 
Petersburg.  Kautz’s  cavalry  in  the 
advance  crossed  the  Appomattox  by 
the  pontoon  bridge  near  Point  of  Eocks. 
Brooks’  and  Martindale’s  divisions  fol- 
lowed together  with  Hinks’  two  brigades 
of  colored  troops.  The  route  taken  was 
the  same  as  that  pursued  a week  pre- 
vious by  Gillmore  and  Kautz.  Soon 
after  daylight  Kautz,  advancing  along 
the  City  Point  road,  encountered  skir- 
mishers, and  drove  them  out  of  a small 
earth-work.  The  troops  of  Hinks  and 
Brooks  followed  rapidly,  and  soon  after- 
wards, near  Harrison’s  Ci*eek,  a line  of 
rifle-trenches  with  two  12-pounders  was 
discovered,  from  which  solid  shot  flew 
over  the  head  of  the  column.  Hinks 
deployed  skirmishers,  scattered  the  ene- 
my through  some  neighboring  woods 
and  finally  secured  a position  near 
Bavlor’s  Farm,  from  which  the  Fifth 


738 


PE  TERSBURG. 


and  Twenty-Fifth  colored  regiments  car- 
]’ied  the  enemy’s  works,  capturing  one 
of  the  guns  and  turning  it  on  the 
i-etreating  Confederates.  The  division 
of  Brooks  now  moved  up,  with  Burn- 
ham’s brigade  in  the  advance  and 
entered  a strip  of  woods  which  con- 
cealed the  main  outer  line  of  the  defenses 
of  Petersburg,  about  two  miles  from 
the  town.  Hinks  then  moved  his  divi- 
sion towards  the  left,  on  the  Jourdan 
Point  road,  while  Martindale,  with 
Stannard  in  the  advance,  moved  on  by 
the  river  road.  A line  was  thus  formed 
in  front  of  the  Petersburg  intrench- 
ments,  in  which  Martindale  held  the 
light.  Brooks  the  centre,  and  Hinks  the 
left.  Active  skirmishing  went  on  while 
these  positions  were  being  taken,  and 
the  lire  of  the  sharpshooters  told  severely 
on  the  troops.  Just  before  sunset,  the 
ui'der  was  given  to  carry  the  enemy’s 
works  by  assault ; and  the  whole  line 
rushed  forward,  swept  the  entire  range 
of  rifle-pits  in  spite  of  a heavy  artillery 
Are,  and  drove  the  enemy  from  the 
intrenchments.  Sixteen  guns,  a battle- 
flag,  and  300  prisoners  were  taken. 
Had  an  adequate  supporting  force  been 
at  hand,  the  second  line  of  works  might 
have  been  taken  with  comparative  ease. 
The  National  Joss  was  about  500  men. 
The  Second  corps  began  to  arrive  in 
the  evening,  and  before  morning  the 
whole  of  it  had  reached  the  scene  of 
action.  During  the  night  Birney’s 
division  held  the  captured  earth- works, 
against  which  the  enemy  knowing  their 
value,  made  demonstrations,  but  in  vain. 
While  the  infantry  were  thus  operating 
towards  Petersburo^  from  the  northeast, 


Kautz,  on  the  extreme  left,  with  Spear’s 
brigade  in  the  advance,  moved  against 
the  enemy’s  works  near  the  Norfolk 
Bailroad  and  on  the  Baxter  road.  After 
a brisk  cannonade  on  the  position, 
which  was  well  fortified  with  arfillery, 
a charge  was  made  by  Kautz’s  men 
armed  \vith  carbines ; but  the  work 
proved  too  strong  to  be  carried,  and 
Kautz  was  compelled  to  retire.  So  far 
Petersburg  had  been  defended  by  its 
local  garrison,  but  the  Confederate 
troops  in  the  neighborhood  were  rapidly 
concentrating  to  its  aid. 

On  the  morning  of  the  16th,  General 
Butler  having  learned  that  a por-  j^ne 
tion  of  the  Confederate  forces  in  16. 
front  of  his  intrenchments  at  Bermuda 
Hundred  had  been  hurried  olf  to  Peters- 
burg, sent  out  General  Terry  with  a 
part  of  the  Tenth  corps  to  reconnoitre. 
The  Confederates  gave  way  before 
them ; and  the  reserves  coming  up,  their 
line  was  broken  through,  and  finally 
the  railroad  was  reached  near  Walthal 
Junction.  While  a working  party  tore 
up  the  track  and  pulled  down  the  tele- 
graph for  about  two  miles,  the  main 
body  of  General  Terry’s  force  moved 
along  the  road  by  which  it  w^as  sup- 
posed Lee’s  advance  was  approaching. 
But  the  Confederates  at  length  came 
dowm  upon  them  in  force  and  compelled 
a retreat.  The  result  of  the  movement 
was,  that  travel  by  the  railroad  was 
interrupted  for  about  a day. 

In 'the  mean  time  the  National  troops 
were  gathering  around  Petersburg. 
Early  on  the  morning  of  the  16th,  Bir- 
ney  sent  Colonel  Egan’s  brigade  against 
a redoubt  on  his  left,  which  was  carried 


CONFEDERATE  POSITION  CARRIED. 


739 


and  held^  with  the  loss  of  about  100 
men.  An  attempt  was  made  to  push 
forward  the  picket  lines,  when  skir- 
mi  sh  i ng  and  artillery  firing  ensued.  But 
reinforcements  for  the  Confederates 
were  now  rapidly  aniving  from  various 
(quarters,  and  in  such  numbers  that  it 
^vas  thought  advisable  not  to  push  the 
troops  forward  till  the  arrival  of  Burn- 
side’s corps.  Kautz,  however,  had 
moved  out  with  his  cavalry  to  the  left 
across  the  Norfolk  Kailroad,  to  occupy 
ground  for  the  Ninth  and  Fifth  corps. 
In  the  afternoon  Burnside,  having 
crossed  the  James  by  the  pontoon  bridge, 
came  up  with  the  Ninth  corps,  after 
a severe  forced  march  from  Charles 
City  Court  House.  Line  of  battle  was 
then  formed,  with  the  Second  corps  in 
the  centre,  the  Eighteenth  corps  on  the 
right,  and  the  Ninth  corps  on  the  left. 
Birney’s  division  held  the  right  of  the 
Second  coip)s.  General  Barlow’s  the  left. 
To  the  left  of  Barlow  was  General  Pot- 
ter’s division  of  the  Ninth  corps.  The 
ground  between  the  opposing  lines, 
though  broken  and  rugged,  was  rather 
open,  with  here  and  there  fields  of  grain. 
At  six  o’clock  the  attack  was  commenced 
and  kept  up  for  three  hours.  Bimey’s 
division  carried  the  crest  in  its  front, 
and  held  it.  Barlow’s  advanced  brig- 
ade found  more  difficulty,  the  enemy 
being  somewhat  concentrated  in  its 
front.  At  length  Miles’  brigade  of 
Barlow’s  dNision  and  Griffin’s  of  Pot- 
ter’s division,  charging  in  face  of  a de- 
structive artillery  fire,  succeeded  in 
gaining  a foothold  in  the  rifle-pits  out- 
side of  the  stronger  works.  The  troops 
V>eing  here  annoved  by  the  enemy’s  fire. 


Barlow  detennined  to  make  an  assault 
on  his  main  works ; and  Burnside 
prepared  a column  to  make  the  attempt 
in  connection  with  him.  But  the  enemy 
haying  opened  a severe  fire  upon  Burn- 
side’s troops,  cutting  off  a skinnish  line 
of  300  men  in  Barlow’s  front ; the 
assault  was  deferred/  till  morning. 
Birney’s  loss  during  the  three  hours’ 
fighting  was  about  500  men.  Potter’s 
division  in  its  charge  on  the  rifle-pits 
lost  about  the  same  number.  The  right 
had  not  taken  an  important  part  in  the 
contest  and  had  suffered  but  little. 
The  total  National  loss  since  the  begin- 
ning of  the  action  was  between  1500 
and  2000,  Avhile  that  of  the  Confederates 
owing  to  their  advantage  of  position, 
was  comparatively  small. 

On  the  morning  of  the  17th,  at  four 
o’clock,  Burnside  ordered  Potter’s 
division  to  take  the  works  in  its  17. 
front ; and  Griffin’s  brigade,  supported 
by  Curtin’s,  carried  it  with  a rush,  cap- 
turing 6 guns,  16  officers,  400  men,  and 
a stand  of  colors.  A pause  then  oc- 
curred in  the  assault ; but  sharp  skir 
mishing  was  carried  on  by  the  picket 
lines,  and  the  artillery  on  both  sides 
kept  up  a steady  fire.  In  the  afternoon 
Potter’s  division  was  relieved  by  the 
divisions  of  Wilcox  and  Ledlie.  An 
advance  by  Ledlie’s  division  was  then 
ordered ; and  the  charge  was  gallantly 
made,  covered  by  a brisk  artillery  fire. 
The  intrenchments  were  reached ; after 
a short  but  bloody  contest  over  the 
breast- works,  the  Confederates  were 
driven  out  of  them  and  the  position 
was  carried;  and  although  several  at- 
tempts were  made  by  the  enemy  to 


710 


PETERSBURG. 


recover  the  lost  ground,  it  was  firmly 
held.  Burnside,  now  so  near  was 
actually  able  to  throw  shot  into  the 
town.  The  other  portions  of  the  line 
had,  during  the  day,  been  engaged  in 
skirmishing,*  but  without  attempting 
any  decisive  assault.  The  enemy’s 
jiosition,  opposite  the  Second  corps — 
temporarily  commanded  by  Birney,  in 
the  absence  of  Hancock,  who  was  suf- 
fering from  an  old  wound — was  deemed 
too  strong  to  be  attacked  with  any  hope 
of  success.  Barlow’s  division,  on  the 
left  of  the  Second  corps,  had  taken  part 
in  Burnside’s  charge  in  the  morning, 
and  rendered  efficient  service.  On  the 
right,  the  greater  part  of  the  Eighteenth 
corps,  under  General  Smith,  was  relieved 
from  the  position  it  had  carried  ; and 
recrossing  the  pontoon  bridge  over  the 
Appomattox  at  night,  it  regained  the 
intrenchments  at  Bermuda  Hundred  in 
the  morning.  The  divisions  of  Hinks 
and  Martindale,  on  the  extreme  right, 
remained,  as  they  could  not  be  vdth- 
drawn  to  advantage.  The  Fifth  corps, 
under  Warren,  came  up  on  the  left,  and 
was  massed  there  in  the  rear  of  Burn- 
side. About  nine  o’clock  at  night  the 
enemy  appeared  in  force  on  Birney’s 
front,  but  was  driven  back.  Somewhat 
later,  under  cover  of  a vigorous  shelling 
from  the  Confederate  batteries,  the 
enemy  suddenly  reappeared  in  two 
columns,  one  in  front,  the  other  in  flank, 
and  made  a desperate  and  finally  suc- 
cessful effort  to  recover  the  works  taken 
by  Burnside  during  the  afternoon. 
Leaping  the  defenses  in  the  dark,  the 
Confederates  succeeded  in  drivins:  out 
the  National  troops. 


On  the  same  day,  eaj'ly  in  the  mom- 
in  g,  a body  of  the  enemy,  consisting  of 
parts  of  the  divisions  of  Pickett  and 
Fields,  attacked  the  National  lines  near 
the  James.  Foster’s  division  of  the 
Tenth  corps,  which  held  a line  extend- 
ing from  near  Ware  Bottom  Church 
towards  the  Appomattox,  was  pushed 
back  some  little  distance. 

It  was  now  the  morning  of  the  18th. 
The  National  line  in  front  of 
Petersburg  was  disposed  as  fob  18. 
lows,  from  right  to  left : two  divisions 
of  the  Eighteenth  corps,  under  Martin- 
dale  and  Hinks ; the  Sixth  under  W right ; 
the  Second  under  Birney;  the  Ninth 
under  Burnside,  and  the  Fifth  undei 
Warren.  It  had  been  intended  to  make 
another  assault  at  four  o’clock  in  the 
morning  ; but  skirmishers  having  been 
sent  out,  it  was  found  that  the  enemy 
had  abandoned  the  works  immediately 
in  front  for  an  inner  series  of  defenses. 
New  combinations,  therefore,  became 
necessary.  Skirmishing  and  artillery 
firing  went  on  while  the  enemy’s  new 
defensive  line  was  being  reconnoitred. 
A general  advance  of  the  three  corps  on 
the  left  was  ordered  at  noon.  Gibbon’s 
division  of  the  Second  corps  was 
pushed  forward,  while  the  rest  of  the 
corps  threw  out  double  lines  of  skir- 
mishers to  divert  the  enemy’s  attention. 
Gibbon’s  troops  moved  promptly  up 
towards  the  works,  which  were  near  the 
railroad  to  City  Point ; but  when  they 
got  out  from  under  cover  they  wei*e 
suddenly  struck  by  a murderous  enfilad- 
ing fire  on  the  left.  For  a time  the 
men  pressed  vigorously  forward ; but 
their  ranks  were  so  swept  by  incessant 


THE  WELDON  RAILROAD, 


741 


volleys,  that  at  last  even  the  veterans 
recoiled.  The  breast-works  were  not 
even  reached  when  the  men  began  to 
retire,  leaving  their  dead  and  wounded 
on  the  field.  At  four  o’clock  in  the 
afternoon  another  storming  party  was 
organized.  It  consisted  of  Mott’s  divi- 
sion, with  detachments  from  the  two 
other  divisions,  all  of  the  Second  corps. 
Shortly  before  five  in  the  afternoon, 
Mott  moved  out  his  force  in  two  col- 
umns, and  the  two  leading  brigades 
burst  upon  the  enemy  in  gallant  style  ; 
but  in  spite  of  an  exhibition  of  the  most 
resolute  bravery,  they  were  forced  back 
with  terrible  loss,  by  a concentrated 
artillery  and  musketry  fire.  The  Sixth 
and  Ninth  corps  were  little  more  suc- 
cessful than  the  Second;  Martindale’s 
division  of  the  Eighteenth  corps,  al- 
though at  first  attended  with  some  suc- 
cess, shared  the  same  experience  as  the 
others.  The  fighting  was  continued 
into  the  night,  but  gradually  died  away 
in  picket  firing.  The  losses  during  the 
day  had  been  very  heavy,  especially  on 
the  part  of  the  Second  corps.  During 
the  whole  operations  from  the  15th  to 
the  18th  of  June,  the  estimated  loss  in 
killed,  wounded  and  missing  was  not 
under  9000  men.  The  four  days’ 
assaults  had  had  no  other  result  than 
the  decimation  of  the  storming  columns. 

During  the  19th,  arrangements  were 
made  under  a flag  of  truce  for  burying 
the  dead,  and  carrying  off  the  wounded 
between  the  lines.  The  Sixth  corps, 
which  had  been  on  the  north  side  of 
the  Appomattox,  near  Port  Waltlial, 
was  relieved  by  the  Eighteenth  coi’ps, 
and  moved  into  line  'on  the  right. 


General  Ferrero’s  division  of  the  Ninth 
coi-ps,  also  arrived,  and  was  posted  in 
the  front.  Three  Confederate  rams 
descended  the  James,  nearly  as  far  as 
Dutch  Gap,  but  were  soon  driven  back 
by  the  fleet.  The  Confederates  contin- 
ued to  intrench  on  the  west  side  of  the 
Appomattox  as  industriously  as  the 
National  troops  did  on  the  east  side  ; 
and  having  no  apprehensions  of  imme- 
diately losing  Petersburg,  they  made 
some  movements  in  other  directions. 
Beauregard  in  his  huiTy  to  reinforce 
Petersburg  had  hastily  deserted  his  old 
lines  in  front  of  Bermuda  Hundred ; 
and  the  Tenth  corps,  as  has  been  stated, 
made  use  of  the  opportunity  to  cut  the 
Petersburg  and  Bichmond  Eailroad  ; 
but  when  they  were  driven  back,  the 
Confederates  reoccupied  their  works, 
and  from  these  lines  made  a slight 
demonstration  in  front  and  some  raiding: 
movements  in  the  neighborhood  of  the 
James.  On  the  night  of  the  19th,  they 
succeeded  in  destroying  the  wharves  at 
Wilcox’s  and  Westover  Landings,  and 
sent  small  bodies  of  troops  along  the 
river  to  do  whatever  other  mischief  they 
could.  They  also  threw  up  earth- works 
near  Turkey  Bend ; but  they  were  easily 
shelled  out  of  them  by  the  gun-boats. 

On  the  21st,  active  movements  were 
again  commenced  by  the  main  June 
army,  and  once  more  by  the  left  21. 
flank,  with  the  object  of  severing  the 
communications  to  the  south  of  Peters- 
burg by  the  Weldon  Eailroad.  On  the 
previous  night  the  Second  corps  had 
been  moved  from  its  position  in  the 
right  centre  of  the  line  to  the  left,  the 
gap  thus  formed  being  closed  up  by  the 


742 


PETERSBURG. 


extension  of  tRe  Ninth  corps  and  part 
of  the  Eighteenth.  It  then  struck  across 
the  Norfolk  Kailroad,  and  marched 
rapidly  southward,  though  under  an 
intensely  hot  sun  and  through  clouds 
of  stifling  and  blinding  dust,  with  the 
steadiness  which  had  so  often  charac- 
terized it  during  flank  marches  in  pres- 
ence of  the  enemy.  Grriflin’s  division  of 
the  Fifth  corps  was  detached  to  follow ; 
the  Sixth  corps  was  also  moved  out  in 
support.  Before  noon  the  main  column 
halted ; but  in  the  afternoon  Barlow’s 
division  of  the  Second  corps,  with  sharp- 
shooters skirmishing  in  advance,  was  sent 
forward,  and  struck  the  enemy’s  lines 
in  the  neighborhood  of  the  Jerusalem 
road  which  runs  southward  from  Peters- 
burg, about  midway  between  the  Nor- 
folk and  W eldon  railroads.  The  division 
was  then  halted  and  put  into  position, 
and  skirmishers  were  advanced.  These 
met  a stout  resistance  from  dismounted 
cavalry  pickets;  and  almost  immedi- 
ately, infantry  were  discovered  in  force 
with  artillery  planted  in  earth-works. 
It  was  evident  that  the  enemy  under- 
stood the  value  of  the  Weldon  Railroad, 
and  was  prepared  as  well  as  determined 
to  defend  it.  After  a severe  skirmish 
Barlow’s  advanced  line  withdrew  and 
rejoined  the  main  column.  Gibbon  had 
in  the  mean  time  reconnoitred  towards 
Petersburg,  but  without  result.  On  the 
extreme  left  the  enemy’s  movements 
were  so  threatening  that  a squadron 
of  cavalry  was  sent  round  to  protect 
that  flank.  The  Second  corps  was  then 
retired  to  form  in  position  for  the  night, 
with  Barlow’s  division  on  the  left,  Mott’s 
in  the  centre,  and  Gibbon’s  on  the  right. 


Beyond  Gibbon’s  division  was  Griffin’s 
of  the  Fifth  corps.  The  Sixth  corps 
was  intended  to  be  posted  between  the 
Second  corps  and  the  Weldon  Railroad. 
Ricketts’  division  came  up  and  took  a 
position  on  Barlow’s  left,  and  the  othei 
division  followed.  There  was  a little 
cavalry  skirmishing  on  the  extreme  left, 
and  the  Confederate  scouts  made  a 
slight  dash  in  the  evening  towards  the 
National  position;  but  the  day  closed 
Avithout  any  more  important  movement. 
The  fight  in  the  afternoon  took  place 
on  what  was  known  as  Davis’  Farm, 
about  3 miles  from  the  city  and  within 
a mile  of  the  railroad. 

The  day  was  comparatively  quiet  in 
the  lines  east  of  Petersburg.  The  Con- 
federates early  in  the  morning  opened 
fire  towards  the  headquarters  of  the 
Sixth  corps,  which  had  not  at  that  time 
moved  out ; and  there  was  more  or  less 
firing  during  the  day,  especially  towards 
the  right.  The  bridges  over  the  Appo- 
mattox connecting  Petersburg  and 
Pocahontas  now  underwent  a daily 
shelling  from  the  National  batteries. 
The  fire  directed  on  the  railroad  bridge 
caused  great  annoyance  to  the  enemy, 
as  it  tended  materially  to  obstruct  the 
passage  of  cars. 

Some  important  movements  took  place 
during  the  day,  to  the  north  of  Peters- 
burg. Early  in  the  morning  Foster’s 
division  of  the  Tenth  corps,  crossed  to 
the  north  side  of  the  James  River  by  a 
pontoon  bridge  laid  by  General  Weitzel 
on  the  previous  evening,  to  a point 
between  Aiken’s  Landing  and  Four 
Mile  Creek.  Foster  advanced  towards 
the  Kingsland  road,  drove  in  the  enemy’s 


FOSTER  AT  DEEP  BOTTOM. 


748 


pickets  and  intrenclied  at  Deep  Bottom, 
about  10  miles  from  Bicbmond.  On  the 
opposite  side  of  the  river  was  the  bat- 
tery of  the  enemy  known  as  Howlett’s. 
Near  this  point  a fight  between  the  moni- 
tors and  Confederate  rams  took  place ; 
but  though  the  latter  were  aided  by 
the  battery,  they  were  driven  back  to 
their  usual  position  on  the  west  side 
of  Dutch  Gap.  The  heavy  Dahlgren 
guns  soon  silenced  the  battery;  and  in 
the  evening  they  were  opened  on  the 
enemy  manoeuvring  in  front  of  Foster. 
Foster  was  thus  enabled  to  hold  his 
own  for  some  time  without  molestation. 
Meanwhile  the  Eighteenth  corps  again 
left  its  camp  near  Bermuda  Hundred, 
once  more  crossed  the  pontoon  bridge, 
marched  to  the  lines  in  front  of  Peters- 
burg, and  took  the  position  vacated 
l)y  the  Sixth  corps.  The  result  of  the 
^’arious  army  movements  on  the  21st 
was,  that  at  night  the  different  com* 
niands  lay  as  follows : Foster’s  division 
was  north  of  the  James  at  Deep  Bottom ; 
the  remainder  of  the  Tenth  corps  being 
with  Butler  at  Bermuda  Hundred.  In 
the  intrenchments  east  of  Petersburg, 
the  right  was  held  by  Smith,  the  centre 
by  Burnside,  the  left  by  W arren.  Three 
or  four  miles  to  the  south,  threatening 
the  Weldon  Bailroad,  were  the  corps  of 
Hancock  and  Wright,  with  Griffin’s 
division  of  Warren. 

The  movement  against  the  Weldon 
Bailroad  was  resumed  early  on  the  2 2d. 
Now  that  the  capture  of  Petersburg  had 
June  considered  out  of  the 

22.  question  for  the  present,  the  sev- 
erance of  the  Weldon  Bailroad  became 
a primary  object.  The  Sixth  corps,  the 


whole  of  which  had  come  up  during  the 
night,  prepared  to  move,  in  conjunction 
with  the  Second  corps,  directly  against 
the  railroad.  The  position  of  the 
Second  corps  was  near  the  Jemsalem 
road.  Gibbon’s  right  resting  on  the  left 
of  the  road,  with  Griffin’s  division  of 
the  Fifth  on  the  further  side.  Gibbon’s 
troops  were  already  well  up  to  the 
enemy’s  works  and  needed  only  to  go 
into  position  and  intrench,  as  any  further 
advance  on  their  part  might  bring  on  a 
general  engagement  before  the  line  was 
properly  established.  The  left  of  the 
line,  therefore,  consisting  of  the  Sixth 
corps  with  the  divisions  of  Barlow  and 
Mott  of  the  Second  was  ordered  to  ad- 
vance, the  movement  to  commence  at 
daybreak.  By  some  misunderstanding 
the  march  was  delayed.  At  last  the 
two  corps  began  to  move,  at  the  same 
time,  though  independently  of  each 
other,  each  commander  having  been 
cautioned  to  protect  his  fiank  well  in 
case  connection  were  not  made  with  the 
other  corps.  The  line  had  been  deploy- 
ed in  rather  an  open  style,  and  covered 
a wide  extent  of  ground,  which  being 
difficult  and  intricate,  and  the  movement 
made  in  presence  of  the  enemy,  it 
was  thought  desirable  to  mass  more 
closely.  Accordingly  Barlow,  who  held 
Hancock’s  left,  pressed  well  in  to 
the  right  and  threw  two  brigades  into 
reserve,  the  remainder  of  his  troops 
forming  the  advance  line.  But  on 
entering  the  woods  a gap  began  to  form 
between  his  left  and  the  right  of  the 
Sixth  corps,  and  he  placed  some  regi- 
ments to  guard  his  flank.  Meanwhile, 
Mott  had,  without  difficulty,  obtained 


744 


PETERSBURG. 


the  position  indicated  for  him  and  had 
begun  to  intrench ; Gibbon  was  already 
in  position ; and  Barlow  having  moved 
forward  sufficiently  was  also  about  to 
intrench,  when  the  startling  sound  of 
musketry  was  heard  on  his  flank,  and 
soon  afterwards  in  his  rear.  With  a 
view  of  checking  the  movement  against 
the  railroad,  the  Confederate  force  under 
Hill  was  approaching  in  several  col- 
umns, preceded  by  a dense  cloud  of 
skirmishers.  The  Sixth  corps  was  far 
distant  on  the  left  and  i*ear.  A wide 
gap  was  thus  left  in  the  National  line ; 
but  it  was  happily  filled  up  in  time  to 
prevent  fatal  results.  Quick  to  take 
advantage  of  the  mistake  committed. 
Hill  pushed  on  an  entire  division,  with 
Mahone’s  brigade  in  the  advance,  into 
the  intervening  space.  The  attack  was 
made  with  tremendous  energy.  Barlow 
was  the  first  to  feel  the  weight  of  the 
onset.  His  division  bending  under  the 
blow  was  quickly  rolled  up,  thus  ex- 
posing Mott’s  left  flank.  Mott  in  turn 
was  struck  heavily  and  fell  back,  leaving 
exposed  the  left  of  Gibbon.  Gibbon 
shared  the  fate  of  Mott  and  Barlow. 
The  intrenchments  of  each  of  the  three 
divisions  were  captured.  Such  was  the 
suddenness  and  impetuosity  of  the 
attack,  and  so  great  was  the  confusion 
resulting  from  it,  that  several  whole 
regiments  were  swept  off  and  captured 
almost  without  a fight.  McKnight’s 
battery,  which  had  been  ably  handled, 
was  surrounded  and  captured  entire. 
The  career  of  the  enemy,  however,  was 
now  checked  by  the  firmness  of  the 
Twentieth  Massachusetts  under  Captain 
Patten,  who  executed  a change  of  front 


with  remarkable  coolness,  courage  and 
skill.  The  broken  corps  was  at  length 
rallied.  Miles’  reserve  biigade  of  Bar- 
low’s division  was  brought  up;  Clark’s 
New  Jersey  battery  on  the  right  of  the 
Jerusalem  road  withstood  successfully 
the  concentrated  fire  of  the  enemy ; 
Gibbon’^  division,  or  rather  what  was  left 
of  it,  was  also  rallied,  and  the  beginning 
of  a new  line  was  soon  formed. 

It  was  now  towards  evening.  After 
an  unsuccessful  effort  made  by  Gibbon 
to  capture  the  lost  battery,  Meade 
came  to  the  front.  Observing  that 
the  enemy’s  troops  were  not  in 
sufficient  number  to  cope  with  his 
own  if  well  handled,  Meade  again 
sent  forward  the  Second  and  Sixth 
corps.  The  Sixth  met  with  little  oppo- 
sition, and  attained  the  position  aimed 
at  earlier  in  the  day.  The  Second  corps 
went  through  the  woods  in  strong 
skirmishing  lines,  and  succeeded,  though 
not  without  some  effort,  in  regaining  a 
parjj  of  the  ground  from  which  it  had 
beeni  driven.  It  then  went  into  intrench- 
ments, and  passed  the  night  in  throwing 
up  works  and  placing  batteries  for  the 
protection  of  the  line.  The  division  of 
Griffin  also  came  up  and  covered  the 
right.  The  loss  sustained  in  this  un- 
fortunate and  unskilfully  managed 
affair  was  principally  in  prisoners,  some 
2000  having  been  taken  by  the  enemy, 
including  50  or  60  officers;  the  numbei 
of  killed  and  wounded  was  only  about 
500.  Four  guns  also  were  lost  and 
several  colors.  Picket  firing  was  kepi 
up  all  night,  as  tlie  last  advance  had 
placed  the  opposing  lines  in  close  prox- 
imity. A reconnoissance  and  advance 


SKIRMISHING  AND  CANNONADING. 


745 


made  at  daylight,  disclosed  the  fact  that 
the  Confederates  were  strongly  in- 
trenched along  the  east  side  of  the 
Weldon  Railroad.  To  the  east  of  Pe- 
tersburg a sharp  artillery  and  musketry 
fire  was  kept  up  all  night;  but  on 
neither  side  was  an  advance  attempted. 

On  the  23d,  Wright  moving  out  to 
the  extreme  left,  found  that  the  enemy’s 
lines  did  not  extend  far  in  that  direction. 
June  ^ reconnoitring  force  to 

23.  the  railroad,  which  was  reached 
mthout  opposition,  and  the  telegraph 
wires  were  cut.  The  Vermont  brigade, 
consisting  of  three  regiments,  was  at 
once  pushed  forward  with  instructions 
to  hold  the  road ; but  the  troops  had 
hardly  reached  their  destination  when  a 
division  of  the  enemy  under  Anderson 
came  down  upon  their  flank  and  drove 
them  back,  capturing  several  hundred 
prisoners,  and  then,  flushed  with  success, 
after  pushing  back  the  Vermont  brigade 
to  the  main  body,  commenced  a general 
attack.  The  result  w^as  that  Wright 
withdrew  his  line  towards  evening  to 
the  cover  of  breast- works.  Little  else 
of  importance  occurred  during  the  day. 

On  the  24th  the  enemy  opened  a 
furious  artillery  fire  in  front  of  the 
Eighteenth  corps.  At  its  close,  a charge 
June  made  by  Hoke’s  brigade 

24,  on  Stannard’s  division  of  the 
Tenth  corps.  The  attack  fell  chiefly  on 
the  brigade  of  Colonel  Henry,  who,  ob- 
serving that  the  attacking  force  was  not 
large,  drew  in  his  skirmishers;  and 
Avhen  the  enemy  commenced  to  run 
over  his  lifie-pits,  he  caused  the  For- 
tieth Massachusetts,  armed  vdth  the 
iSpencer  repeating- rifle,  to  open  fire 


upon  them.  This,  with  artillery  in  flank, 
easily  separated  the  enemy’s  skirmishing 
line  from  his  reserve;  and  about  150 
prisoners  fell  into  Henry’s  hands.  On 
the  evening  of  the  same  day,  Sheridan’s 
cavaliy  was  attacked  while  on  the  inarch 
from  White  House  to  rejoin  the  main 
army.  A brigade  of  infantry  was  sent 
to  his  relief;  but  the  affair  was  very 
bloody,  and  the  rear-guard  suffered 
severely.  The  enemy  was  beaten  off 
at  length  ; and  the  wagon  train,  several 
miles  in  length,  was  saved,  but  not 
before  a loss  of  500  or  600  had  been  sus- 
tained. Sheridan’s  force  crossed  the 
James  in  safety  on  the  25th,  four  or  five 
miles  above  Fort  Powhatan,  at  a point 
where  the  pontoon  bridges  could  be 
guarded  by  gun-boats. 

During  the  25  th  the  enemy  was  busily 
engaged  in  repairing  the  Weldon  Rail- 
road, and  the  National  forces  in  strength- 
ening them  positions.  All  along  the 
line,  owing  to  the  proximity  of  the 
opposing  pickets,  there  was  skirmishing, 
with  occasional  artillery  firing,  but  no 
serious  fighting.  About  ten  o’clock  at 
night  a sharp  attack  was  made  on  the 
right  of  the  Fifth  corps  and  on  the  left 
of  the  Ninth.  It  was  commenced  by  a 
heavy  artillery  fire,  which  lasted  about 
an  hour,  followed  by  the  advance  of  a 
strong  skirmish  line  up  to  the  National 
breast-works ; but  the  enemy  was  easily 
repulsed,  and  the  loss  was  not  great  on 
either  side. 

From  the  26th  to  the  29th,  compara- 
tive quiet  prevailed  in  the  camps,  broken 
occasionally  by  picket  firing,  skirmishing 
near  the  working  parties,  and  desultoiy 
cannonading.  From  the  front  of  Smith’s 


746 


PETERSBURG. 


corps  a 30-pouiider  Parrott  shell  was 
thrown  into  the  city  every  five  minutes, 
and  with  such  regularity  that  it  came 
to  be  called  the  Petersburg  express.” 
The  earth- works  along  the  National 
lines  underwent  constant  improvement 
until  they  became  almost  impregnable. 
About  eleven  o’clock  on  the  morning  of 
the  27th,  the  Confederates,  much 
annoyed  by  the  regular  fire  of  the  30- 
j)Ounder  Parrott  on  the  city,  opened 
from  their  heavy  guns  on  the  west  side 
of  the  Appomattox.  The  batteries  in 
Smith’s  front,  where  many  guns  were 
now  in  position,  opened  in  reply,  and 
shelled  the  city,  as  well  as  the  enemy’s 
batteries  beyond  the  river,  till  noon. 
The  opposing  pickets  along  some  parts 
of  the  line  entered  into  an  agreement 
not  to  fire  u]Don  each  other,  and-  the 
result  was  an  unusual  degree  of  quiet 
for  a little  while  ; but  Birney  found  it 
necessary  to  prohibit  the  more  intimate 
intercourse  which  this  state  of  things 
had  a tendency  to  bring  about.  By 
the  Second  corps  on  the  left,  some  move- 
ments were  made  with  the  view  of 
guarding  against  hostile  demonstrations 
on  the  fiank.  Hancock,  now  convales- 
cent, resumed  command  of  this  corps  in 
the  evenino-.  At  one  o’clock  in  the 

O 

morning  of  the  28th  there  was  a false 
alarm ; and  the  Eighteenth  corps  got 
under  arms.  About  this  time  some  very 
heavy  siege  guns  were  got  into  position, 
and  a bombardment  of  the  city  was  com- 
menced by  bursting  a shell  over  it  every 
quarter  of  an  hour  during  the  night. 
This  fire  was  continued  for  some  time ; 
and  on  the  night  of  the  30th  it  caused  a 
confiagration  in  the  town  The  weather. 


which  for  many  days  and  nights  had  been 
intensely  hot,  causing  great  suffering  to 
the  men,  whether  on  the  march  or  in 
camp,  now  grew  a little  cooler.  The 
excessive  heat  had  been  severely  trying 
to  the  wounded.  The  agents  of  the 
Sanitary  and  Christian  Commissions 
availedf  themselves  of  the  opportunity 
afforded  by  these  days  of  comparative 
quiet  to  distribute  vegetables  and  luxu- 
ries among  the  troops,  and  in  other 
ways  to  contribute  to  their  comfort. 

In  the  movement  against  the  Weldon 
Eailroad,  it  had  been  arranged  that 
Wilson  and  Kautz  should  co-operate 
with  a strong  cavalry  force.  About  two 
o’clock  in  the  morning  of  the  2 2d  of 
June,  Wilson  and  Kautz  set  out  from 
Blackwater  Creek,  a little  south  of  Prince 
George  Court  House.  Wilson  was  in 
command.  The  united  force  numbered 
6000  to  8000  men,  with  3 batteries  of  four 
guns  each,  half  rifled  ordinance,  and  half 
light  12-pounders,  besides  a battery  of 
four  small  mountain  howitzers.  The  col- 
umn struck  the  Weldon  Eailroad  at 
Eeams’  Station,  tore  up  and  burnt  the 
track  for  several  hundi’ed  yards,  and  de- 
stroyed the  water  tank,  depot  and  public 
buildings,  as  well  as  a saw’-mill  at  Dutch 
Cross  Eoads.  Moving  westward  as  far 
as  Dinwiddie  Court  House,  the  command 
proceeded  northward  to  the  Petersburg 
and  Lynchburg  Eailroad,  striking  it  at 
Sutherland  Station,  and  marching  thence 
westward  to  Ford’s  Station,' about  22 
miles  from  Petersburg,  the  brigade  of 
Kautz  being  in  the  advance.  At  this 
point,  which  was  reached  before  even- 
ing, several  miles  of  the  track  were 
destroyed  as  well  as  2 locomotives  and 


THE  BRIDGE  AT  STAUNTON  RIVER. 


747 


16  cars  ; tlie  depot  and  some  stores  were 
also  burnt.  All  this  was  accomplished 
before  midnight,  when  the  command 
bivouacked.  In  the  morning,  about  two 
o’clock,  Kautz  again  set  out  in  advance, 
and  by  rapid  marching  soon  left  a wide 
gap  between  his  portion  of  the  column 
and  that  under  Wilson.  His  course  lay 
along  the  railroad  in  the  direction  of 
Burkesville,  the  point  of  intersection  of 
the  Lynchburg  and  Danville  railroads. 
He  reached  Wilson’s  Station  about  four 
o’clock.  Black  and  White  about  seven 
o’clock,  and  Nottaway  at  noon,  whence 
he  hurried  on  to  Burkesville.  At  this 
place  the  depots,  cars,  and  similar  prop- 
erty were  destroyed,  as  well  as  sev- 
eral miles  of  the  track  eastward  and 
westward.  The  railroad  here  was  con- 
structed of  strap  rails  laid  on  longitu- 
dinal stringers  of  dry  yellow  pine. 
While  the  the  rear  was  engaged  in 
burning  and  otherwise  destroying  the 
depots  and  other  buildings  along  the 
road,  advanced  parties  collected  dry 
rails,  piled  them  up  against  the  stringers 
and  set  the  whole  on  fire.  This  was 
done  with  so  much  method  and  celerity 
that  miles  of  the  railroad  were  burning 
at  once. 

The  main  part  of  the  column,  some 
miles  in  the  rear,  near  Nottaway  Court 
House,  encountered  about  three  o’clock 
in  the  afternoon  a Confederate  force  on 
its  right  flank,  consisting  of  two  regi- 
ments under  Colonel  Barringer  and 
General  Hearing.  The  Second  brigade, 
under  Colonel  Chapman,  was  formed  in 
June  ^ sharp  fight  ensued, 

23.  which  lasted  till  nightfall,  when 
the  enemy  withdrew,  carrying  off  34 


prisoners.  The  loss  on  each  side  was 
about  60.  Wilson’s  troops  bivouacked 
at  Nottaway ; Kautz  bivouacked  not 
far  from  Burkesville.  Both  commands 
marched  t(^wards  Meherrin  in  the  morn- 
ing— Wilson’s  across  the  country, 
Kautz’s  along  the  railroad — formed  a 
junction  there,  and  moved  on  to  Keys- 
ville,  where  the  column  bivouacked  for 
the  night,  Kautz’s  men  having  worked 
hard  all  day  on  the  railroad,  of  which 
they  destroyed  18  miles  of  the  track 
besides  other  railroad  property.  The 
march  and  the  work  of  destruction  were 
resumed  early  on  the  25th ; and  the 
whole  column  pressed  rapidly  forward 
till  about  three  o’clock  in  the  afternoon, 
when  the  advance  came  up  to  the  cov- 
ered bridge  over  the  Staunton  Biver. 
From  Burkesville  to  this  bridge,  a dis- 
tance of  about  35  miles,  the  railroad 
track  had  been  thoroughly  destroyed 
Eastward  of  Burkesville  the  track  had 
also  been  torn  up,  making  an  aggre- 
gate of  50  miles  of  railroad  put  out  of 
running  order.  It  was  very  desir- 
able that  the  bridge  also  should  be 
destroyed,  as  it  would  consume  much 
time  to  replace  it.  But  the  Confederates 
were  well  aware  of  its  value ; and  while 
Wilson  and  Kautz  had  been  destroying 
the  track,  they  had  collected  in  the 
neighborhood  of  the  brids^e  a consider- 
able  force  of  Virginia  and  North 
Carolina  militia,  some  of  whom  had 
been  brought  up  from  Danville.  They 
had  also  made  such  good  use  of  their 
time  as  to  throw  up  intrenchments  in 
front  of  the  bridge,  and  construct  earth- 
works, in  which  they  had  placed  some 
artillery.  They  had  besides,  placed  a 


748 


PETERSBURG. 


piece  of  ordnance  on  an  armored  car, 
^7hicll  could  be  moved  on  the  railroad. 
On  tbe  approach  of  the  National  troops 
June  the  enemy  opened  fire  with  grape 
and  canister.  Kautz’s  four  regi- 
ments at  once  deployed  on  the  right  and 
left  of  the  main  road.  Sharp  skirmish- 
ing, with  considerable  loss  on  the  side 
of  Kautz,  was  kept  up  for  some  time  ; 
but  it  soon  became  evident  that  under 
the  circumstances  the  National  troops 
could  accomplish  nothing  without  suf- 
fering .disastrously;  and  they  were 
compelled  to  withdraw,  after  having 
burnt  The  railroad  depot.  The  chief 
object  of  the  raid  had,  however,  been 
now  accomplished ; and  at  night  the 
column  moved  eastward  reaching 
Weylsburg,  about  daylight  on  the 
26th.  After  an  hour’s  halt  the  line  of 
march  was  again  taken  up,  the  route 
chosen  for  the  return  lying  through 
Christianville  and  across  Meherrin 
Creek,  and  thence  to  Double  Bridges 
on  the  No  tt  a way.  The  enemy’s  cavalry 
brigade  again  appeared,  this  time  on 
the  left  flank,  and  some  unimportant 
skirmishing  followed.  The  Nottaway 
River  was  reached  about  noon  on  the 
28th  at  Double  Bridges ; and  the  pickets 
stationed  there  were  easily  driven  across 
the  bridge  by  McIntosh’s  second  bri- 
gade, which  was  in  the  advance.  It 
had  been  intended  to  cross  the  Weldon 
Railroad  at  Jarrett’s  Station  ; but  infor- 
mation having  been  received  that  a 
large  force  composed  of  militia  and  reg- 
ulars from  Weldon  had  been  collected 
there,  the  route  was  changed  to  Stony 
Creek,  about  midway  between  Jarrett’s 
and  Reams’  stations.  McIntosh’s  bri- 


gade wdth  the  Second  Ohio  and  Third 
Indiana,  dashing  across  the  biidge,  met 
at  once  a spirited  resistance.  Never- 
theless the  men  all  got  over,  and  Mc- 
Intosh formed  line  of  battle ; but 
a considerable  Confederate  force  was 
found  lying  on  the  road  to  the  station. 
After  spme  skirmishing,  the  National 
troops  found  it  necessary  to  act  on  the 
defensive ; and  they  got  together  as 
rapidly  as  possible  a breast- work  of 
rails,  logs,  and  eai-th,  in  the  usual 
manner.  It  was  not  long  before  they 
had  to  repel  several  charges. 

Wilson,  now  fearing  that  if  he 
remained  long  in  that  vicinity  the  ene- 
my might  gather  about  him  a force 
from  which  he  could  not  escape,  deter- 
mined to  withdraw  ; and  about  eleven 
at  night  he  sent  off  the  command  of 
Kautz  with  the  wagons  and  ammunition 
trains,  and  between  1000  and  200) 
negroes,  collected  on  the  march,  towards 
Reams’  Station.  Wilson  himself  fol- 
lowed before  daylight  with  the  remain- 
der of  his  force,  with  the  exception  of 
3 regiments  left  in  the  intrenchments 
to  do  what  they  could  towards  detain- 
ing the  enemy.  Kautz,  on  approaching 
Reams’  Station,  found  the  Confederates 
posted  in  great  strength,  and  was  at 
once  pressed  in  front  and  rear  by  both 
cavalry  and  artillery.  When 
Wilson  came  up  with  the  bulk  of  29. 
his  force,  he  attempted  to  form  line  of 
battle  ; but  he  was  very  soon  attacked 
and  defeated,  and  his  entire  force  thrown 
into  confusion.  Of  course  the  detach- 
ment left  at  Stony  Point  could  not  long 
hold  out ; it  was  flanked  and  pai*tly  cut 
off.  The  situation  of  Wilson’s  column 


RETURN  OF  WILSON’S  CAVALRY. 


749 


now  became  extremely  critical;  it  was 
almost  entirely  surrounded  by  a greatly 
superior  force;  and  it  soon  became  a 
question,  not  wbetber  tbe  National  cav- 
alry could  bold  their  ground,  but 
whether  they  could  not  be  captured  in 
a body.  The  plan  finally  adopted,  per- 
haps the  best  under  the  circumstances, 
was  for  each  regiment  or  squadron  to 
make  its  escape  separately  as  it  best 
could.  Kautz  turned  otf  nearly  due 
south  with  his  command.  Detachments 
moved  in  various  directions ; and  a 
general  stampede  was  made  for  the  lines 
near  Petersburg,  over  ditches  and  fences, 
through  swamps  and  woods,  and  along 
concealed  by-paths,  to  escape  the  fiercely 
pursuing  foe,  who  chased  the  fugitives 
close  up  to  the  National  lines.  On  the 
night  of  the  28th,  the  main  part  of 
Kautz’s  command  reached  the  picket 
reserve  in  a state  of  terrible  exhaustion 
and  excitement,  and  remained  there 
through  the  night.  They  did  not  reach 
their  old  camp  till  the  evening  of  the 
30th.  Squads  and  solitary  horsemen 
continued  to  straggle  back  within  the 
lines  for  two  or  three  days.  Badly  as 
Kautz’s  troops  had  fared,  they  might 
have  had  much  worse  fortune  had  it 
not  been  for  their  commander’s  intimate 
knowledge  of  the  country,  which  en- 
abled him  to  get  his  men  through  rapid- 
ly. But  they  were  all  thoroughly  used 
up,  some  of  the  men  coming  in  asleep 
in  their  saddles. 

Wilson  was  so  long  without  being 
heard  from,  that  it  was  feared  he  had 
been  captured  with  all  his  men.  The 
main  part  of  his  force  did  not  ride  in 
till  the  1st  of  July.  He  had  retreated 


in  the  night  by  the  road  leading  south- 
eastward towards  Suffolk,  and  making  a 
wide  circuit,  secured  safety  at  the  ex- 
pense of  a long  route.  He  crossed  the 
Nottaway  about  30  miles  from  Peters- 
burg, and  the  Blackwater  at  the  County 
Boad  bridge;  turning  then  northward 
he  made  his  way  to  Cabin  Point,  and 
rode  thence  into  the  Union  lines  about 
5 miles  from  Fort  Powhatan.  His 
entire  force  was  in  wretched  plight  when 
it  returned.  Both  men  and  horses  were 
worn  out  and  jaded  to  the  last  degree. 
Their  clothing  and  accoutrements  were 
torn  and  spoiled,  and  their  horses  hardly 
able  to  walk.  They  had  lost  their  all. 
The  enemy  had  got  possession  of  the 
entire  wagon  train — 16  guns,  nearly  all 
their  caissons,  and  many  horses.  The 
total  loss  in  men  was  about  1500.  Of 
the  large  number  of  negroes  collected, 
the  greater  part  were  recaptured.  The 
ambulances,  filled  with  sick  and  wound- 
ed, had  been  left  on  the  field  at  Beams’ 
Station,  under  a hospital  flag.  Notwith- 
standing the  unfortunate  termination  of 
the  expedition.  Grant  expressed  himself 
satisfied  with  the  result,  inasmuch  as 
the  Danville  Bailroad  had  received 
so  much  damage  that  considerable 
time  must  elapse  before  it  could  be 
restored  to  working  order.  The 
Sixth  corps,  which  had  set  out  for 
Beams’  Station  in  the  hope  of  relieving 
General  Wilson’s  force,  did  not  arrive 
until  all  was  over.  The  Confederates 
had  disappeared  from  that  point;  and 
the  troops  took  advantage  of  their 
absence  to  destroy  the  railroad  and 
telegraph  for  some  miles.  Many 
fugitive  negroes,  who  had  followed 


750 


PETERSBURG. 


Wilson’s  cavalry,  took  refuge  with 
the  Sixth  corps. 

It  was  now  the  1st  of  July.  Little 
of  moment  occurred  during  the  day  in 
the  lines  before  Petersburg.  About  ten 
July  o’clock,  however,  a heavy  musket- 
1.  ry  fire  from  the  Confederates 
broke  out  in  front  of  the  Ninth  corps, 
followed  presently  by  a charge  upon 
an  earth-work  which  General  Ledlie 
had  for  some  days  been  engaged  in 
throwing  up.  After  a sharp  but  short 
conflict  the  Confederates  were  driven 
back  with  considerable  loss,  as  the  posi- 
tion was  well  defended  by  flanking 
batteries.  The  firing  continued  at  in- 
tervals through  the  night.  About  three 
o’clock  in  tlie  afternoon  of  the  2d  of 
July  a sharp  artillery  fire  was  opened 
by  the  enemy  on  the  line  of  the  Eight- 
eenth corps,  and  was  warmly  responded 
to  by  the  National  batteries.  This  con- 
tinued for  about  two  hours,  without 
any  important  result.  On  the  evening 
of  the  3d  there  was  some  firing  on  the 
rio:ht  centre. 

The  Fourth  of  July  was  celebrated 
in  the  lines  before  Petersburg  by  a 
national  salute  of  34  shots  from  a 30- 
pounder  Parrott  in  front  of  Smith’s 
position,  followed  by  a general  play  of 
artillery  on  the  steeples  of  Petersburg. 
The  military  bands  also  played  national 
airs  all  along  the  line. 

Comparative  quiet  reigned  until  the 
7th,  when  a battery  of  heavy  guns  in 
front  of  the  Fifth  corps  opened  fire 
upon  a body  of  Confederates  who  were 
observed  to  be  throwing  up  a new  work. 
A general  cannonading  and  afire  of  sharp- 
shooters followed.  In  the  morning 


and  early  part  of  the  8th  there 
was  little  firing.  About  four  8. 
o’clock  in  the  afternoon  however,  the 
Confederates  springing  suddenly  to 
their  feet,  with  their  accustomed  battle- 
yell,  poured  a volley  of  musketry  into 
the  intrenchments  in  front  of  Turner’s 
division,  on  the  left  of  the  Eighteenth 
corps.  They  then  quickly  deployed  a 
skirmishing  line,  and  moved  raj)idly  on 
the  works  along  the  front  of  Martindale 
and  Stannard.  The  entire  space  be- 
tween^the  opposing  lines  was  soon  cov- 
ered with  a dense  cloud  of  mingled 
smoke  and  dust ; and  the  musketry  fir- 
ing was  very  sharp  for  a time ; but  the 
enemy  was  driven  back  without  having 
reached  the  breast- works.  In  the  mean 
time  the  batteries  all  along  the  front  of 
the  three  corps  on  the  right  were  open- 
ed; and  shot  and  shell  were  thrown 
not  only  into  the  space  which  the  Con- 
federates had  attempted  to  ci-oss,  but 
into  the  city  and  over  the  Appomattox. 
The  superior  weight  of  metal  of  the 
National  batteries  soon  overpowered 
those  of  the  enemy.  The'  loss  in  this 
affair  was  not  very  great  on  either  side, 
although  the  Confederates  got  the  worst 
of  it,  as  they  were  uncovered  in  their 
unsuccessful  charge,  while  their  oppo- 
nents were  well  protected.  The  cannon- 
ading was  all  over  at  dusk. 

After  this,  there  was  again  for 
some  days  a pause  in  the  fight.  It 
^\as  not  until  the  18th,  that  hostilities 
took  again  any  very  active  shape.  On 
that  day,  a 13 -inch  mortar,  which  after 
some  difficulty  had  been  got  into  posi- 
tion in  front  of  the  Eighteenth  coi-ps, 
began  to  throw  its  huge  shells  into  the 


THE  MINE. 


751 


enemy's  works.  On  the  following  day 
there  was  steady  artillery  firing  in  front 
of  the  Ninth  and  Eighteenth  corps  as 
well  as  from  the  batteries  of  the  Fifth. 
A heavy  rain,  the  first  of  any  account 
since  the  army  left  Spottsylvania  Court 
House,  began  to  fall  early  in  the  morn- 
ing, and  continued  all  day  and  into  the 
night.  Its  cheering  influence  on  the 
army  was  of  great  value.  There  was 
enough  of  it  to  lay  and  thoroughly 
penetrate  the  dust,  which  owing  to  the 
long-continued  drought  and  the  ceaseless 
tread  of  many  feet,  had  become  several 
inches  deep  in  the  camps. 

On  the  same  day  General  Grant 
rescinded  an  order  of  the  War  Depart- 
ment by  which  General  Butler  was 
relieved  of  his  command.  Grant  not 
only  restored  Butler,  but  in  addition  to 
the  Tenth  and  Eighteenth  corps,  he 
gave  him  command  of  the  Nineteenth 
corps,  just  arrived  at  Fortress  Monroe 
from  the  South,  and  of  which  General 
Emory’s  division  had  gone  to  aid  in  the 
defense  of  Washington.  Not  long  after 
this,  General  Smith  was  relieved  of  the 
command  of  the  Eighteenth  corps,  and 
was  succeeded  temporarily  by  General 
Martindale,  and  then  permanently  by 
General  Ord.  General  Gillmore  also, 
who  had  been  relieved  of  the  command 
of  the  Tenth  corps,  was  succeeded 
temporarily  by  Generals  Brooks  and 
Terry,  and  permanently  by  General 
Birney,  formerly  of  the  Second  corps. 

About  ten  o’clock  in  the  forenoon  of 
the  20th,  the  fire  of  the  13-inch  mortar 
was  directed  across  the  river.  This  was 
responded  to  by  a concentrated  artillery 
fire  from  the  enemy,  which  in  its  turn 


was  replied  to  by  the  National  30- 
pounders  and  8-inch  mortars,  togetht*!* 
with  the  light  batteries.  This  lasted 
four  hours  without  any  important 
result.  The  Confederates  had  estab- 
lished a battery  of  Whitworth  guns  at 
Strawberry  Plains,  about  a mile  from 
the  pontoon  bridge  over  the  James,  from 
which  they  were  able  to  deliver  an 
enfilading  fire  on  the  gun-boats,  and  had 
disabled  the  Mendota.  A Maine  regi- 
ment was  moved  out  to  occupy  the 
position,  which  it  succeeded  in  doing 
on  the  21st,  but  was  driven  out  of  it 
again  at  night.  With  the  help  of  the 
gun-boats,  the  Nationals  quickly  recov- 
ered the  position.  Cannonading  was 
kept  up  for  the  next  four  or  five  days ; 
but  there  was  no  general  engagement. 

At  this  date  there  was  completed  an 
important  work  which  had  been 
commenced  by  Burnside  just  a 26. 
month  before,  and  when  the  conviction 
had  been  forced  upon  the  National 
commanders  by  the  disastrous  repulse 
of  several  storming  columns,  that  the 
defenses  around  Petersburg  were  im- 
pregnable against  direct  assault.  This 
was  nothing  less  than  a great  mine 
which  had  been  constructed  under  one 
of  the  most  important  of  the  enemy’s 
works.  The  idea  of  this  mine  originated 
with  Lieutenant-Colonel  Pleasants,  of 
the  Forty-Eighth  Pennsylvania,  who,  as 
well  as  many  men  of  his  regiment,  had 
been  familiar  with  mining  operations 
before  the  war.  To  the  men  of  this 
regiment  the  construction  of  the  mine 
was  intrusted  and  by  them  completed. 
The  work  of  excavation  was  begun  on 
the  25th  of  June,  with  the  utmost 


752 


PETERS  BUEG. 


precautions  as  to  secrecy,  in  the  side 
of  a ravine  surmounted  by  an  earth- 
work in  front  of  the  position  of  the 
Ninth  corps,  and  was  perseveringly 
pushed  on  towards  the  doomed  fort, 
situated  about  2000  yards  from  the  city. 
The  distance  to  be  mined  was  about 
500  feet.  The  mine  was  .constructed 
in  the  usual  manner,  the  surface 
having  been  first  carefully  measured 
by  tri angulation.  As  the  excavation 
went  on,  the  earth  was  brought  out 
and  thrown  on  works,  so  as  not  to  give 
rise  to  inquiries  by  being  allowed  to 
accumulate  in  great  heaps.  The  gallery 
was  made  in  the  usual  shape,  about  4 
feet  wide  at  the  bottom  and  sloping 
upwards  so  as  to  be  narrower  at  the  top. 
The  height  was  about  4i  feet.  The 
ground  rose  towards  the  fort,  and  the 
tunnel  was  so  cut  as  to  slope  in  an  up- 
ward direction.  Difficulties  in  the  shape 
of  water  and  quicksands  were  encounter- 
ed and  overcome,  th  ough  the  mine  remain- 
ed very  damp.  When  the  locality  of  the 
foi*t  was  reached,  there  was  only  about 
20  feet  of  the  earth  intervening;  and  the 
sound  could  be  distinctly  heard  overhead 
of  the  nailing  of  planks  and  timbers, 
indicating  that  the  occupants  of  the  fort 
were  making  a floor  for  their  artillery. 
Wings  were  then  extended  to  the  right 
and  left,  in  which  8 magazines  were 
formed,  4 in  each  gallery,  carefully 
tamped  ” or  separated  by  packings  of 
sand-bags  and  wood.  Wooden  pipes 
were  laid  along  the  tunnel  to  within 
100  feet  of  the  magazines.  The  ventila- 
tion of  the  mine  was  effected  by  sinking, 
just  within  the  exterior  line  of  works 
to  the  side  of  the  tunnel,  a shaft,  at  the 


bottom  of  which  a fireplace  was  built 
with  a grating  opening  into  the  gallery, 
and  by  means  of  a fire  kept  burning  at 
this  point  a current  of  air  was  caused. 
The  smoke  issuing  from  the  top  of  the 
shaft  of  course  could  not  be  concealed, 
but  attention  was  diverted  from  it  by 
keeping  fires  at  various  places  along  the 
line.  Finally,  when  all  was  complete, 
the  chanj3ers  were  charged  with  about 
four  tons  of  gunpowder.  To  keep  the 
enemy  from  obtaining  a knowledge  of 
what  was  going  on,  intercourse  between 
the  opposing  picket  lines  was  strictly 
prohibited;  and  an  incessant  skirmishing 
and  artillery  fire  was  kept  up  in  front 
of  the  Ninth  corps,  even  while  all  along 
the  rest  of  the  line  there  was  compara- 
tive inaction.  The  plan  of  assault  w^as, 
to  explode  the  mine  and  immediately 
afterwards  open  a cannonade  from  all 
the  guns  along  the  line,  numbering 
nearly  100.  Then,  before  the  enemy 
could  recover  from  the  confusion  and 
dismay  which  would  be  naturally  created 
by  the  explosion  and  sudden  burst  of 
a tremendous  artillery  fire,  a strong 
storming  party  was  to  rush  through  the 
gap  which  it  was  supposed  would  be 
made  in  the  line  of  the  enemy’s  works, 
and  endeavor  to  carry  the  position 
beyond — a very  strongly  fortified  crest, 
called  Cemetery  Hill,  completely  com- 
manding the  city,  and  the  key  of  the 
enemy’s  position.  The  National  lines 
had  for  a long  time  been  gradually 
pushed  forward  till  they  were  now 
not  more  than  150  yards  distant  from 
those  of  the  enemy,  the  nearest  point 
being  the  undermined  fort.  The  inter- 
vening space  was  swept  by  the  enemy’s 


THE  FEIN^T  AT  DEEP  BOTTOM. 


753 


artillery;  and  near  the  fort  itself  abatis 
and  various  other  entanglements  had 
been  placed. 

To  add  to  the  probability  of  success, 
Grant  determined,  before  exploding  the 
mine  and  commencing  the  assault,  to 
induce  Lee  to  draw  off  a large  propor- 
tion of  his  troops  from  Petersburg  by 
making  a feint  in  another  direction. 
With  this  end  in  view  he  began  a series 
of  movements  which  indicated  a design 
to  transfer  operations  to  the  neighbor- 
hood of  Richmond.  Grant’s  line  at 
this  time  was  not  less  than  20  miles 
long.  On  its  extreme  right,  across  the 
James  at  Deep  Bottom,  just  above  Four 
Mile  Creek,  Foster,  with  his  division  of 
the  Tenth  corps,  had  been  for  a long 
time  in  possession  of  an  intrenched 
camp — a position  of  considerable  im- 
portance, since,  so  long  as  it  was  held, 
the  enemy  could  neither  make  a demon- 
stration on  the  National  right  flank 
from  Malvern  Plills,  which  they  still 
occupied,  nor  any  successful  attempt  to 
obtain  on  the  James  a position  from 
which  it  would  be  possible  to  blockade 
the  river.  It  also  constituted  an  excel- 
lent base  for  an  advance  on  Richmond 
from  the  southeast,  by  three  parallel 
roads,  and  thus  served  admirably  for  the 
feint  now  about  to  be  made  in  that  di- 
rection. A pontoon  bridge,  thoroughly 
protected  by  gun-boats,  lay  across  the 
James  in  the  rear  of  Foster’s  position  ; 
but  in  his  front  was  a large  force  of  the 
enemy,  effectually  barring  any  advance 
on  his  part.  About  a mile  and  a half 
below  the  position  of  Foster,  at  Straw- 
berry Plains,  also  held  by  a small 
National  force,  a second  pontoon  bridge 


was  thrown  across  the  river  on  the  21st 
of  July,  and  on  the  following  day  a bri- 
gade of  the  Nineteenth  corps  crossed 
by  it  and  secured  the  bridge  head. 
The  Confederates  made  a large  addition 
to  their  force  in  front  of  Foster’s  posi- 
tion ; and  on  the  26th  there  was  in  that 
direction  rapid  and  heavy  artillery  and 
musketry  firing,  in  which  the  gun-boats 
took  part.  Skirmishing  also  was  con- 
tinued through  the  day  by  Foster’s 
infantry,  with  a loss  of  about  50  men. 
In  the  the  mean  time,  at  four  o’clock  in 
the  afternoon  of  the  26th,  the  Second 
corps  quietly  began  to  march  from  its 
position  on  the  extreme  left  of  the  line 
before  Petersburg,  soon  followed  by 
Sheridan’s  cavalry,  which  had  been 
lying  in  camps  around  its  flank  and  rear 
The  column  moved  very  rapidly  with 
out  straggling — Barlow’s  division  first, 
Mott’s  and  Gibbon’s  next,  to  Point  of 
Rocks  on  the  Appomattox — and  crossed 
the  river  early  in  the  evening.  The 
march  was  then  continued  to  the  James, 
which  was  reached  by  midnight  at 
Jones’  Neck,  and  before  daylight  the 
crossing  began  by  the  pontoon  bridge, 
which  had  been  covered  with  grass  and 
hay,  to  prevent  noise.  The  cavalry 
followed  soon  after  daybreak,  and 
passed  the  infantry  on  the  New  Market 
road.  A line  of  battle  was  then  formed, 
in  which  the  cavalry  of  Sheridan  and 
Kautz  held  the  right.  The  Second 
corps  lay  at  Strawberry  Plains,  the 
brigade  of  the  Nineteenth  corps  on  its 
left,  with  Foster  in  his  old  position  at 
Deep  Bottom  on  the  extreme  left. 

In  front  of  the  Second  corps  lay  a 
body  of  the  enemy  under  General 


754 


PETERSBURG. 


Kershaw,  along  a road  skirting  a pine 
forest,  and  in  rifle-pits,  with  a battery  of 
four  20-pounder  Parrott  guns.  Up  to 
this  position  from  near  the  bridge  ran  a 
road,  by  which  the  Second  corps,  about 
July  seven  o’clock,  began  to  advance, 

27.  the  skirmishers  spreading  out 
across  the  open  space  in  front  of  the 
enemy,  while  the  gun-boat  Mendota  in 
the  stream  opened  fire  with  her  100- 
pounder  Parrotts.  A rapid  fire  was 
opened  at  the  same  time  from  the  en- 
emy’s batteiy.  In  the  mean  time,  how- 
ever, Miles  with  his  brigade  of  Barlow’s 
division,  having  made  a rapid  movement 
under  cover,  got  on  the  flank  of  the 
enemy’s  position  and  made  a brisk 
charge.  Kershaw  immediately  retreat- 
ed, abandoning  his  battery,  which  proved 
to  be  one  taken  from  Butler  at  Drury’s 
Bluff  two  months  before. 

On  the  28th,  the  troops  north  of  the 
James  continued  to  make  demonstra- 
tions; and  the  gun-boats  occasionally 
shelled  the  woods.  At  nine  o’clock  in 
the  morning  a general  advance  of  the 
cavalry  was  ordered ; and  after  a march 
of  three  miles,  Sheridan  came  upon  a 
strong  infantry  force.  His  command 
then  quickly  dismounted  and  formed 
j„iy  in  a belt  of  woods,  Greggs’  divi- 

28.  sion  on  the  right,  Torbert’s  on 
the  left.  Torbert’s  division  on  being 
attacked  fell  back  into  the  woods,  but 
was  soon  rallied;  and  the  brigades  of 
Merritt  and  Davies  making  a charge, 
the  enemy  broke  and  left  the  field,  after 
losing  about  150  men  in  killed,  wounded, 
and  prisoners,  besides  the  colors  of  two 
North  Carolina  regiments.  Gregg’s 
division,  losing  a gun  and  many  men. 


was  steadily  forced  back  until  about  five 
o’clock  in  the  afternoon,  when  it  was 
relieved  by  the  arrival  of  Gibbon’s  di- 
vision of  the  Second  corjps.  The  demon- 
strations were  continued  on  the  29th; 
and  a train  of  about  400  empty  wagons 
was  sent  over  one  of  the  pontoon  bridges 
to  the  north  side  of  the  James,  as  if  an 
advance  in  great  force  towards  Malvern 
Hills  were  intended.  Nearly  20,(500  men 
and  20  cannon  had  now  actually  been 
sent  over;  and  the  suspicions  of  the 
enemy  were  aroused  at  last  to  such  an 
extent  as  to  produce  the  effect  desired 
by  Grant.  Lee  hurried  off  from  Peters- 
burg a large  force  to  the  Bichmond  side 
of  the  James;  and  as  early  as  the  even- 
ing of  the  28th,  Mott’s  division  of  the 
Second  corps  was  secretly  moved  back 
to  Petersburg.  After  dark  the  remain- 
der of  that  corps  and  all  the  cavalry 
recrossed  the  river,  and  marching  all 
night  arrived  before  daybreak  in  the 
lines  before  Petersburg. 

The  time  for  the  explosion  of  the 
mine  had  now  come.  Soon  aftei*  mid- 
night of  the  29th  all  the  troops  were 
got  into  position.  The  Ninth  corps, 
which  was  to  head  the  assault,  was 
drawn  up  in  front  of  the  mine,  Ledlie’s 
division  in  the  advance,  Willcox’s  and 
Pottei^’s  next,  in  support,  and  Ferrero’s 
consisting  of  colored  troops,  in  the  rear. 
The  Eighteenth  corjjs,  had  been  with- 
drawn from  its  position  on  the  light  of 
the  Ninth  corps  and  posted  in  its  rear. 
Mott’s  division  of  the  Second  corps,  just 
returned  from  the  north  side  of  the 
James,  was  moved  into  the  position 
vacated  by  the  Eighteenth  coiqis ; and 
the  other  divisions  of  the  Second  coiqis 


INSIDE  THE  CRATER. 


755 


as  they  arrived  were  placed  in  adjoin- 
ing positions.  The  whole  force  was 
closely  massed,  only  the  necessary  gar- 
risons being  left  in  the  more  distant 
iiitrenchments.  Thus  the  assaulting 
force  consisted  of  the  Ninth  corps  sup- 
])orted  by  the  Eighteenth,  with  the 
Second  corps  in  reserve  on  the  right 
and  the  Fifth  on  the  left.  The  cavalry 
were  to  operate  on  the  left  if  opportun- 
ity should  offer.  The  time  for  lighting 
the  fuse  was  fixed  at  half-past  three  in 
the  morning  of  the  30th ; and  the  troops 
at  that  hour  were  in  entire  readiness, 
impatiently  awaiting  orders. 

At  the  appointed  moment  the  fuse 
was  lit;  but  the  mine  did  not  explode. 
The  fuse  was  imperfect.  It  had  been 
spliced  in  two  places ; and  at  one  of  the 
splices,  the  fire  had  stopped.  Two  brave 
men  who  had  faith  in  the  mine,  and 
who  had  toiled  at  it  night  and  day 
under  Pleasants,  volunteered  to  go  in 
and  apply  the  match  afresh.  Grant 
and  Meade  were  at  the  front.  It  is  now 
ten  minutes  to  five  o’clock.  The  earth 
ill  the  neighborhood  trembles ; and  then 
^vith  a tremendous  explosion,  what  seems 
a conical  mountain  rises  in  the  air, 
streaked  and  serried  with  lightning. 
For  a moment,  it  hangs  poised;  and 
then  the  beholder  sees  in  mid  air,  tim- 
ber,  stone,  earth,  bodies  and  limbs  of 
men,  and  some  of  the  heavy  guns  of  the 
work.  Two  hundred  men,  many  of 
them  still  asleep,  had  been  blown  into 
fragments.  It  was  a horrible,  shocking 
' alYair.  So  soon  as  the  mass  fell  to  earth, 
100  guns  opened  fire  upon  that  living 
Golgotha. 

liCt  us  now  see  what  advantage  was 


gained  by  the  desperate  but  not  wholly 
unjustifiable  experiment.  Success  de- 
pended entirely  upon  rapidity  of  action. 
A huge  gateway  had  been  opened  to 
Cemetery  Ridge,  and  thence  into  Peters- 
burg. But  where  is  the  storming  col- 
umn? Ledlie’s  division  which  had  been 
selected  by  lot  was  slow  to  move. 
When  it  did  move,  it  halted  in  the  centre 
for  at  least  an  hour.  Ferrero  who  with 
his  colored  troops  was  to  follow  Ledlie, 
could  not  advance,  as  the  crater  was 
choked.  Burnside  was  ordered  to  move 
forward  all  his  troops ; but  still  there 
was  delay.  Ord,  now  in  command  of  the 
Eighteenth  corps,  was  peremptorily  ord- 
ered by  Meade  to  press  into  the  gap ; but 
he  declared  it  to  be  impracticable ; and 
no  doubt,  he  spoke  the  truth.  There 
was  no  other  way  by  which  the  troops 
could  advance,  except  by  the  crater,  and 
that  was  now  crowded,  literally  blocked. 

The  scene  inside  the  crater,  when 
first  entered  by  the  Nationals,  is  not  to 
be  described.  It  was  a Pandemonium 
of  horror.  In  the  huge  chasm,  some 
200  feet  long,  60  feet  wide,  and  30  feet 
deep,  were  scattered  the  debris  of  the 
work,  with  the  torn  and  tattered  frag- 
ments of  human  beings.  Some  of  the 
more  fortunate  victims  were  half -buried 
and  piteously  calling  for  help.  Not  a 
few  were  calling  for  water ; and  the  cry 
was  general  “Yanks,  for  God’s  sake, 
take  me  out ; I’ll  do  as  much  for  you 
some  time.”  In  such  a scene  of  chaos 
and  agony,  it  is  not  to  be  wondered  at 
if  the  National  soldiers,  left  for  the 
most  part  without  competent  leaders, 
should  have  halted,  and  yielded  to  the 
claims  of  humanity.  The  halting 


PETERSBURG. 


75  >3 

however,  was  ruinous  ; for  it  gave  the 
Confederates  time  to  recover  from  the 
alarm  and  stupor  occasioned  by  the  explo- 
sion ; ^nd  the  well  directed  fire  of  the 
guns  on  Cemetery  Kidge  falling  upon  the 
now  unfortunate  Nationals  aggravated 
the  horrors  of  that  scene  of  agony  and 
death.  It  was  impossible  to  advance  ; 
it  was  impossible  to  retire ; and  the 
officers  who  were  present  had  no  longer 
any  control.  The  carnage  was  frightful. 
It  was  not  a valley  of  the  Shadow^  of 
Death.  It  was  a valley  of  Death  itself. 

As  early  as  nine  o’clock,  Burnside 
was  directed  to  withdraw  his  troops  at 
pleasure.  It  was  two  o’clock  before  the 
order  was  carried  out  and  not  until 
General  Bartlett  who  led  the  attack, 
had  been  captured  with  the  greater 
portion  of  his  staff.  The  mine  had 
proved  a great  and  sorrowful  failure. 
Although  no  new  thing  in  war,  it  was 
a barbarous  conception ; and  success 
through  such  a channel  would  hardly 
have  been  glory. 

The  National  loss  was  about  5000, 
while  that  of  the  Confederates,  includ- 
ing 200  prisoners,  did  not  much  exceed 
July  10^^*  On  Sunday,  the  31st,  a 
31.  flag  of  truce  was  sent  to  the  ene- 
my  with  a request  for  permission  to 
bury  the  dead  and  care  for  the  wounded ; 
but  owing  to  an  informality  this  was 
not  obtained  till  Monday,  when  an 
armistice  took  place  in  the  morning 
from  five  till  nine.  In  the  mean  time 
many  of  the  severely  wounded  died 
from  exposure,  in  great  suffering,  much 
aggravated  by  the  extremely  hot 
weather ; and  the  bodies  of  the  slain 
had  become  so  discolored  and  swollen 


from  lying  in  the  sun,  that  the  remains 
of  the  white  men  could  scarcely  bf 
distinguished  from  those  of  the  negroes 
The  failure  of  the  mine  w^as  a great 
disappointment.  It  was  expected  by 
many  that  Petersburg  w^as  about  to  fall. 
Grant,  himself,  shared  the  disappoint- 
ment ; but  he  was  not  discouraged. 
As  soon’  as  the  truce  was  concluded, 
the  firing  was  resumed.  On  the  4th 
of  August,  Grant  left  for  Washington. 
On  this  day  also  a short  engage- 
ment  took  place  on  the  James  I. 
between  the  gun-boats  and  a battery  on 
the  north  bank.  For  five  days  previous, 
intercourse  between  pickets  had  been 
prohibited  by  the  enemy.  This  circum- 
stance, and  the  report  of  deserters  that 
mining  was  going  on,  led  to  suspicions 
that  an  attack  might  be  expected. 
These  suspicions  proved  to  be  well- 
founded.  About  five  o’clock  on  the 
evening  of  the  5th,  a mine  was  Aug. 
fired  by  the  enemy  in  front  of  the  5 • 
Eighteenth  corps,  and  followed  up  by 
rapid  and  continuous  musketry  firing. 
But  the  mine  failed,  having  been 
exploded  several  rods  outside  of  the 
head  of  a sap  it  was  intended  to  reach. 
A considerable  mass  of  earth  was  throwm 
into  the  air;  but  the  dust  and  smoke 
had  hardly  subsided  when  the  National 
troops  were  busily  engaged  pouring 
volleys  into  the  enemy’s  works,  from 
which  no  charge  was  made.  There  was 
considerable  artillery  firing  for  a time ; 
but  the  loss  was  not  heavy  on  either 
side. 

On  the  9th,  about  noon,  a terrific 
accidental  explosion  took  place  at  City 
Point.  An  ordnance  boat  lying  at  the 


MAP  SHOWING  THE  POSITIONS  OF  THE  ARMIES  NEAR  PETERSBURG,  VA. 


DUTCH  GAP  CANAL. 


757 


wharf  suddenly  blew  up  with  a contin- 
uous roar  that  was  heard  in  all  direc- 
Aug.  for  many  miles.  The  cause 

9.  of  the  explosion  is  unknown,  but 
it  is  supposed  to  have  been  the  dropping 
of  a case  of  fixed  ammunition.  Its 
effect  was  most  disastrous,  in  the  loss  of 
life,  in  the  number  of  persons  frightfully 
mutilated,  and  in  the  destruction  of 
property.  The  boat  and  another  near 
it  were  blown  to  fragments.  The  bluff 
close  by  was  penetrated  by  a vast  quan- 
tity of  shells,  balls,  bullets,  and  frag- 
ments of  various  ammunition,  and  a 
number  of  buildings  were  thrown  down. 
Parts  of  vessels  and  houses  mingled 
with  limbs  and  pieces  of  human  bodies 
were  scattered  around  in  all  directions; 
and  even  the  boats  on  the  river  did  not 
escape.  Between  60  and  70  persons 
were  killed  and  about  130  were  wound- 
ed. The  majority  of  the  sufferers  were 
laborers,  many  of  them  colored. 

The  repulse  of  the  National  forces  in 
the  attack  on  Cemetery  Hill,  led  to  the 
belief  that  operations  at  Petersburg 
would  cease  for  some  time.  Grant, 
however,  was  not  a man  to  be  so  easily 
discouraged.  The  Confederates  had, 
it  is  true,  constructed  near  the  side  of 
the  fort  destroyed  by  means  of  the  mine, 
a new  work,  from  which  they  opened 
fire  on  the  National  lines  on  the  12th  of 
August ; and  the  defenses  of  Petersburg 
were  apparently  as  strong  and  as  perti- 
naciously defended  as  they  had  been 
two  months  before.  But  the  war  was 
sustained  on  the  part  of  the  Confederacy 
only  by  the  most  strenuous  efforts ; and 
its  armies  were  kept  up  to  a point  at 
which  the  defensive  could  be  success- 


fully maintained  only  by  a conscription 
of  the  most  ruthless  character.  The 
best  part  of  the  Southern  fighting  ele- 
ment had  long  been  consumed ; and  old 
men  and  boys  now  constituted  almost 
the  only  recruits  that  could  be  obtained. 
None  knew  this  better  than  General 
Grant ; and  upon  this  fact  he  seems  to 
have  placed  much  reliance,  and  drawn 
from  it  encouragement  to  persevere.  He 
knew  that,  although  the  soldiers  of  the 
Confederates  had  no  superiors,  every 
battle  and  skirmish  diminished  their 
numbers.  He  knew  also  that,  although 
the  Confederate  government  controlled 
almost  the  entire  resources  of  the  South, 
they  were  rapidly  wasting  away,  and 
that  finally  the  States  in  rebellion  must 
succumb  from  sheer  exhaustion. 

A work,  which  it  was  supposed  would 
prove  of  great  value,  was  commenced 
by  Butler  about  the  middle  of  August. 
This  was  the  construction  of  a canal  at 
Hutch  Gap,  on  the  James,  where  a 
bend  in  the  river,  11  miles  south-south 
east  of  Bichmond  in  a direct  line,  forms 
a peninsula  called  Farrar’s  Island,  con- 
nected with  the  north  bank  by  a neck 
of  land  about  175  yards  wide.  A navi- 
gable channel  cut  across  this  neck  would 
save  a circuit  of  not  less  than  6 miles 
around  the  bend.  The  preliminary 
survey  was  made  on  the  7 th  of  August, 
and  a large  number  of  workmen  com- 
menced digging  soon  afterwards.  It 
was  Butler’s  expectation  that  this  canal, 
when  completed,  would  prove  of  im- 
mense service  to  the  National  army.  It 
would,  he  conceived,  be  deep  enough  to 
allow  the  passage  of  large  war  vessels ; 
and  he  felt  confident  that  the  iron-clads 


758 


PETERSBURG. 


would  then  be  able  to  ascend  to  the 
upper  part  of  the  river,  without 
passing  by  the  circuitous  channel  around 
the  peninsula,  which  was  full  of  torpe- 
does, and  other  obstructions,  besides 
being  guarded  by  Confederate  gun-boats, 
whose  usual  station  was  at  Dutch  Gap. 
When  completed  and  occupied  it  would 
also  flank  the  enemy’s  strong  and  impor- 
tant position  at  Howlett’s,  opposite  the 
southwestern  extremity  of  Farrar’s 
Island,  from  which  the  jiver  was  swept 
at  this  point  with  heavy  batteries.  It 
would  be  a long  step  in  the  approach 
to  Fort  Darling,  and  would  make 
necessary  on  the  part  of  the  enemy  a 
new  and  more  extended  line  of  defense, 
and  thus  find  occupation  for  a large 
number  of  their  troops.  On  the 
10.  1 0th  of  August  a force  was  thrown 

across  the  river  at  this  point ; and  the 
work  was  prosecuted  with  impunity  un- 
til the  12th,  when,  soon  after  daybreak, 
the  enemy  collected  in  the  vicinity  in 
such  force  that  the  National  gun-boats 
opened  fire  upon  him  and  kept  it  up 
several  hours.  On  the  following  morn- 
ing two  Confederate  rams  ap^ared, 
and  taking  a position  under  the  lee  of 
Farrar’s  Island,  where  they  were  shel- 
tered from  the  fire  of  the  National  gun- 
boats, began  to  shell  the  negro  troops 
engaged  in  digging  the  canal.  The 
battery  at  Hewlett’s  also  opened  fire, 
and  was  replied  to  by  the  National 
battery  at  Crow’s  Nest,  near  Dutch  Gap. 
The  river  being  full  of  obstructions  at 
the  extremity  of  Farrar’s  Island,  the 
National  gun -boats  could  not  get  near 
enough  to  take  paii;  in  the  engagement. 
The  troops  on  the  isthmus  had  already 


thrown  up  intrenchments  along  a 
portion  of  the  line  of  the  proposed  canal ; 
and,  though  exposed  to  a fire  from 
Howlett’s  battery  on  the  west,  and  from 
2 gun-boats  on  the  north,  which  contin- 
ued till  noon,  they  were  able  to  remain 
at  work.  A gun  at  Howlett’s  battery 
was  disabled  by  a shot  from  that  at 
Crow’s  Nest.  The  enemy  showed  signs 
of  a determinatio]!  to  dispute  energet- 
ically the  National  advance  in  this  di- 
rection. On  the  13th,  operations  on  the 
canal  were  covered  by  another  move- 
ment on  the  part  of  Grant,  to  the  north 
of  the  James,  made  in  the  hope  of  again 
inducing  Lee  to  send  away  a portion  of 
his  forces  from  Petersburg  to  favor  a 
new  movement  against  the  Weldon 
Railroad. 

The  Second  corps,  which  had  been 
moved  up  from  Petersburg,  was  put  on 
board  of  a fleet  of  transports  at  City 
Point;  and  on  the  13th  the  ves-  Aug. 
sels  went  down  the  river,  with 
the  bands  playing,  as  if  bound  for  For- 
tress Monroe.  The  movement  was  pur- 
posely made  in  an  ostentatious  manner, 
in  order  that  it  might  be  noted  by  the 
enemy,  and  cause  him  to  believe  that 
Grant  was  sending  a portion  of  his 
forces  to  Washington.  When  night 
fell,  the  transports  were  headed  up  the 
river,  and  ascending  at  full  speed  soon 
reached  Deep  Bottom,  where  the  troops 
were  all  put  on  shore  by  noon  on  the 
following  day.  On  the  same  night, 
two  divisions  of  the  Tenth  corps  crossed 
the  James  by  the  pontoon  bridge  to  the 
same  point,  as  did  also  Gregg’s  cavalry 
division,  and  joined  Foster  in  his  old 
position  there.  Early  on  the  morning 


STRAWBERRY  PLAINS. 


759 


of  the  14tli,  Foster’s  brigade  was  moved 
out  towards  Strawberry  Plains,  where 
the  enemy  was  found  strongly  posted 
in  intrenchments  situated  on  command- 
ing ridges  covering  the  Kingsland  road, 
with  a line  of  rifle-pits  in  front.  As  the 
advance  pressed  forward,  considerable 
skirmishing  took  place ; but  the  enemy 
gradually  fell  back  to  the  rifle-pits, 
which  at  length  were  charged  and  easily 
taken  by  the  Tenth  Connecticut  and 
Twenty  - Fourth  Massachusetts,  with 
about  100  prisoners.  The  enemy  was 
in  the  mean  time  hurrying  troops  over 
from  his  right  to  the  region  of  Malvern 
Hills;  and  it  became  essential  that  the 
National  force  should  form  in  order  of 
battle,  and  push  forward  as  rapidly  as 
possible.  Accordingly,  Gregg’s  cavalry 
swept  out  to  the  National  right,  clearing 
the  roads  of  the  enemy’s  pickets,  and 
opening  the  way  for  the  Second  corps. 
Aug.  Most  of  the  day  was  consumed  in 
14.  getting  the  troops  into  position. 
When  the  line  was  formed,  the  cavalry 
covered  the  right  flank  of  the  Second 
corps,  which  stretched  towards  the  left 
as  far  as  Four  Mile  Creek.  On  the 
other  side  was  the  Tenth  corps,  its  right 
resting  on  the  creek,  its  left  on  the 
intrenched  bluff  at  Deep  Bottom.  The 
gun-boats  in  the  river  took  such  posi- 
tions that  they  were  able  to  shell  the 
Confederate  works  occasionally.  An 
attempt  was  made  to  push  the  whole 
line  forward  in  the  evening.  The  Tenth 
corps  charging  the  enemy’s  outer  works 
in  a line  of  woods  about  a mile  from  the 
pontoon  bridge,  after  a sharp  engage- 
ment succeeded  in  carrying  them,  at  the 
same  time  capturing  four  8-inch  brass 


howitzers  and  a number  of  piisoners. 
In  the  centre  of  the  line.  Gibbon’s  and 
Barlow’s  divisions  of  the  Second  corps 
moved  out  towards  the  Confederate 
works,  and  succeeded  in  establishing 
themselves  some  distance  in  advance  of 
the  position  which  they  had  carried  in 
the  feint  made  two  weeks  before.  The 
assault  was  now  made  by  Gibbon’s  divi- 
sion, Colonel  Macy’s  brigade  in  the 
advance.  Crossing  a cornfield  and  going 
over  a hill,  they  descended  into  a ravine, 
where  a stream,  flowing  through  swampy 
land  and  thick  brush,  formed  an  impene- 
trable barrier.  The  charge  was  made 
under  a severe  artillery  fire  of  the 
enemy,  which  also  raked  the  ravine. 
Natural  obstacles  rendering  any  further 
progress  impossible,  the  men  availed 
themselves  of  what  shelter  they  could 
find,  and  after  a short  time  were  with- 
drawn. The  entire  loss  sustained  by 
the  Tenth  and  Second  corps  was  about 
1000  men. 

Skirmishing  was  kept  up  all  day  on 
the  15th,  the  object  being  to  extend  the 
line  to  the  right  and  secure  a stronger 
position.  The  Tenth  corps  was  moved 
across  Four  Mile  Creek  and  placed 
on  the  right  of  the  Second,  the  15. 
cavalry  in  the  mean  time  covering  the 
right  flank  and  skirmishing.  Holding 
a position  on  the  Charles  City  Boad, 
they  confronted  there  detachments  of 
the  enemy’s  cavalry,  which  with  other 
reinforcements  had  been  hurried  over 
from  Petersburg  during  the  preceding 
day  and  night.  Supposing  that  Grant 
was  threatening  Malvern  Hills,  the 
enemy’s  infantry  was  pushed  as  rapidly 
as  possible  in  that  direction,  while  his 


PETERSBURG. 


:60 


cavalry  was  kept  on  the  roads  lead- 
ing northwestward  towards  Kichmond. 
There  was  constant  manoeuvring  and 
heavy  skirmishing  during  the  day,  in 
the  course  of  which  about  300  men 
were  killed  or  wounded  on  the  part  of 
the  Nationals,  without  any  important 
advantage  having  been  gained.  The 
intense  and  debilitating  heat  during 
this  and  the  preceding  day  not  only  had 
a very  depressing  effect  on  the  troops, 
but  caused  some  loss  by  sunstroke  and 
exhaustion. 

More  decided  efforts  were  made  to 
Aug.  advance  on  the  16th.  Gregg’s 
16.  cavalry  stretching  out  on  the 
Charles  City  Road,  on  the  extreme  right, 
covered  that  flank.  On  his  left  was 
Colonel  Craig’s  brigade  of  Mott’s  divi- 
sion of  the  Second  corps ; then  came  the 
Tenth  corps  and  the  remainder  of  the 
Second.  The  extreme  left  at  Deep  Run 
was  held  by  colored  troops.  The  region 
in  which  the  movements  were  about  to 
take  place  was  covered  with  dense 
forest  and  undergrowth,  with  only  here 
and  there  a small  cleared  space.  To  the 
difficulties  thus  presented  to  the  man- 
oeuvres of  troops  was  added  the  intense 
heat  of  the  day,  which  was  one  of  the 
most  sultry  and  oppressive  of  the  season. 
The  earliest  movement  was  made  by  the 
cavalry  of  Gregg;  along  the  Charles 
City  Road  as  far  as  Deep  Bottom  Creek 
or  Deep  Run,  where  he  was  joined  by 
a brigade  of  Barlow^’s  division  under 
Miles.  Further  progress  was  disputed 
by  a brigade  of  Fitz  Hugh  Lee’s  cavalry, 
which,  how^ever,  was  quickly  driven 
back  wdth  the  loss  of  its  commander, 
who  w^as  killed  while  attempting  to 


rally  his  men.  The  column  then  pushed 
forward  on  the  same  road  near  to 
White’s  Tavern,  not  more  than  7 miles 
from  Richmond,  where  the  enemy  was 
found  intrenched  in  a position  too  strong 
to  justify  attack.  Miles  then  withdrew 
his  brigade  towards  the  right  of  the 
main  lin^  under  Birney,  marching  back 
by  the  route  which  he  had  taken  in 
advancing.  On  seeing  this,  the  enemy, 
collecting  from  various  quarters  a con- 
siderable force  at  White’s  Tavern, 
moved  rapidly  down  upon  Gregg’s 
command  in  the  afternoon,  and  drove 
it  back  to  Deep  Run,  where  Gregg  made 
a stand,  and  easily  maintained  himself 
for  some  time.  Meanwhile  there  had 
been  some  very  sharp  fighting  on  the 
centre  of  the  line.  Terry’s  division  of 
the  Tenth  corps  pushed  forward  into 
the  wooded  region  between  the  Central 
and  Charles  City  roads,  Foster’s  brigade 
in  front.  Pond’s  and  Hawley’s  in  support, 
with  Craig’s  brigade  of  the  Second  corps 
on  the  right.  After  a toilsome  march 
under  a burning  sun,  over  ground  much 
broken  with  ravine  and  jungle,  the  en- 
emy’s picket  line  was  at  last  found  and 
driven  in.  Artillery  firing  followed, 
and  some  slight  works  and  a few  pris- 
oners were  captured.  The  main  works 
were  then  charged  upon  by  Pond’s 
brigade,  supported  by  Hawley’s  and 
some  colored  troops ; and  after  an  hour’s 
hard  and  close  fighting  at  short  range 
in  the  dense  woods,  in  which  the  loss 
on  both  sides  was  severe,  the  intrench- 
ments  were  carried,  200  prisoners  being 
taken  and  some  colors.  The  National 
troops  then  occupied  the  intrenchments 
and  prepared  to  hold  them  against  the 


DEEP  BOTTOM. 


761 


Confederates  should  they  return  in 
force.  About  this  time  Colonel  Craig 
with  his  brigade  was  despatched  to  the 
assistance  of  Gregg’s  cavalry,  which  the 
enemy,  having  received  reinforcements, 
was  driving  back  rapidly.  In  the  en- 
gagement which  followed,  Craig  was 
killed ; and  his  brigade,  partly  in  con- 
sequence of  this,  being  throAvn  into  con- 
fusion, fell  back,  losing  many  prisoners. 
The  cavalry  and  infantry  on  the  right 
having  now  given  way,  the  Confederates 
concentrated  their  efforts  against  the 
infantry  in  the  centre,  upon  which  they 
made  a series  of  desperate  assaults,  and 
at  length  got  possession  of  the  works 
which  had  been  won  from  them  with 
such  hard  fighting ; and  notwithstanding 
that  Birney,  about  six  o’clock,  made  an 
effort  to  regain  them,  they  held  the 
position.  Having  succeeded  in  forcing 
back  the  right,  the  enemy  was  now  able 
to  direct  an  enfilading  fire  on  the  centre ; 
and  the  whole  National  line  w'-as  with- 
drawn at  dark,  having  sustained  during 
the  day  a loss  of  some  1500  men,  that 
of  the  enemy  being  nearly  as  great. 
The  line  at  night  was  substantially  the 
same  as  it  had  been  in  the  morning. 

While  these  events  were  taking  place 
on  the  right,  Major  Ludlow,  at  Dutch 
Gap,  moved  out  about  1000  men  on  trans- 
ports to  Aiken’s  Landing,  and  marched 
thence  to  Cox’s  Ferry,  two  or  three 
miles  above  Dutch'  Gap,  where  he  in- 
trenched. On  the  afternoon  of  the 
following  day,  Howlett’s  battery  and  a 
Confederate  ram  opened  fire  on  the 
men  engaged  in  digging  the  canal, 
which  was  replied  to  by  the  battery  at 
Crow’s  Nest  and  by  the  monitors. 


After  dark,  Ludlow  seeing  that  he 
would  not  be  able  to  maintain  himself 
in  his  advanced  position  at  Cox’s  Ferry, 
withdrew  his  troops  and  returned  to 
his  old  position  at  Dutch  Gap. 

On  the  17th,  there  was  little  or  no 
fighting  on  the  right.  Between  four  and 
six  in  the  afternoon,  the  killed  of  the 
day  before  were  buried  under  a fiag  of 
truce,  each  party  taking  charge  of  its 
own  dead.  The  18th  also  was  quiet  in 
the  immediate  neighborhood  of  Deep 
Bottom ; but  at  night  a fierce  assault  was 
made  on  the  intrenchments  of  the  Tenth 
corps,  by  a division  of  the  enemy,  who 
charged  in  column  on  a portion  of  the 
line  held  by  Terry’s  division  and  Aug. 
W.  Birney’s  colored  brigade.  18. 
The  firing  was  very  close  and  very 
heavy  for  an  hour,  but  the  Confederates 
were  repulsed  with  a loss  of  not  less 
than  1000  men.  On  the  19th,  there 
was  some  skirmishing,  but  no  general 
engagement.  The  aggregate  National 
loss  in  this  second  demonstration,  at 
Deep  Bottom,  was  estimated  at  not  less 
than  5000 ; that  of  the  enemy  at  3000. 
But  the  movement  had  answered  its 
purpose;  and  the  troops  were  rapidly 
marched  back  to  the  lines  before  Peters- 
burg, a division  of  the  Second  corps 
arriving  there  by  the  morning  of  the 
20  th. 

Little  of  importance  occurred  at 
Petersburg  while  the  bloody  struggle 
was  going  on  in  the  neighborhood  of 
Deep  Bottom.  Artillery  and  picket 
firing  went  on  till  the  evening  of  the 
15th,  when  it  was  suspended  for  a short 
time  by  an  extraordinary  rain  storm, 
which  swept  away  many  tents  and 


762 


PETERSBURG. 


sutlers' booths  and  flooded  the  trenches. 
On  the  morning  of  the  18th,  at  one 
o’clock,  the  enemy  opened  a tremendous 
fire  all  along  the  line,  and  continued  it 
for  two  hours ; but  no  assault  followed. 
About  an  hour  after  the  cannonading 
ceased,  operations  against  the  Weldon 
Railroad  were  commenced  by  the  move- 
ment of  the  Fifth  corps  in  that  direction. 
Leaving  camp  with  four  day’s  rations, 
the  march  was  directed  towards  Reams’ 
Station;  and  between  seven  and  eight, 
the  advance  arrived  at  Six  Mile  Station, 
near  which  a mile  of  the  track  was  torn 
up,  and  the  rails  destroyed.  Little 
opposition  was  experienced  during  this 
movement,  which  was  quite  unexpected 
by  the  enemy;  and  while  the  first  divi- 
sion under  Griffin  was  engaged  in 
destroying  the  railroad  track,  the  other 
divisions  advanced  two  or  three  miles 
towards  Petersburg,  driving  in  the  skir- 
mishers. At  Yellow  Tavern,  about  ten 
o’clock,  the  column  encountered  a bri- 
gade of  cavalry,  which  was  driven  back 
as  far  as  Davis’  Farm,  two  and  a half 
miles  from  Petersburg.  But  at  this 
point  a force  of  the  enemy,  consisting 
of  two  divisions  of  Hill’s  coiq)s  under 
Heth  and  Mahone,  came  hurrying  down 
the  railroad.  The  National  line  was 
immediately  formed  in  the  open  field, 
the  Third  division  under  Crawford  on 
the  right  of  the  railroad,  and  the  Second 
Aug.  under  Ayres  on  the  left.  About 
18.  two  o’clock  the  enemy  emerged 
from  the  woods  in  front  and  made  an 
impetuous  charge.  For  a time  the  two 
divisions  under  Crawford  and  Ayres 
got  the  worst  of  it,  and  were  driven 
half  a mile  down  the  railroad ; but  the 


Fourth  division  under  Cutler  and  some 
other  troops  coming  up,  the  Nationals 
were  enabled  to  stretch  out  around  and 
were  successful  in  flanking  the  enemy’s 
left.  This  turned  the  tide  of  battle ; and 
the  Confederates  were  finally  repulsed. 
The  contest  was  over  before  dark ; and 
the  National  troops  immediately  went 
to  work  throwing  up  breast-works. 
Although  heavy  rain  fell  at  night,  and 
the  enemy,  fearing  another  attack,  thi’ew 
shells  into  the  lines  from  midnight  till 
daybreak,  the  National  troops  were 
found  strongly  intrenched  on  the  rail- 
road 2i  miles  south  of  Petersburg.  The 
loss  on  the  part  of  the  Nationals,  inclu- 
ding 160  prisoners,  was  somewhat  over 
1000;  that  of  the  Confederates,  in- 
cluding 30  prisoners,  was,  by  their  own 
account,  only  about  500. 

The  Fifth  corps  had  thus  secured  an 
intrenched  position  on  the  Weldon  Rail- 
road. It  was  not  likely,  however,  that 
the  Confederates  would  allow  it  to  be 
quietly  retained.  If  left  isolated,  the 
troops  would  very  soon  be  driven  off  or 
surrounded  and  captured.  It  was  thus 
of  the  utmost  importance,  that  this  new 
position  on  the  extreme  left  should  be 
connected  with  the  main  line  before 
Petersburg;  and  reinforcements  were 
accordingly  set  in  motion.  The  enemy 
having  withdrawn  nearer  to  the  city 
during  the  night,  leaving  only  a picket 
line  in  front,  the  National  skirmishers 
were  pushed  forward  early,  on  the  morn- 
ing of  the  19th.  The  whole  line  fol- 
lowed, throwing  up  breast-works  as  they 
proceeded,  and  planting  batteries  to 
strengthen  the  advanced  position.  This 
went  on  without  opposition  till  about 


THE  WELDON  RAILROAD. 


763 


ten  o’clock,  when  a short  skirmish 
occurred  in  front  of  the  picket  lines  on 
the  right,  at  which  point  the  enemy  was 
reconnoitring.  The  troops  had  all  got 
into  line  about  noon ; but  a portion  of 
the  gap  between  the  right  of  the  Fifth 
coi-ps  and  the  old  line  of  intrenchments 
near  the  Jerusalem  road  still  remained 
unoccupied.  The  new  line  when  ar- 
ranged stood  as  follows : Willcox’s  diWs- 
ion  of  the  Ninth  corps  having  just  arrived 
held  the  extreme  right;  then  came  a 
brigade  of  Cutler  of  the  Fifth  corps; 
then  Crawford;  then  Ayres;  then  on 
the  extreme  left  Griffin’s  division  and 
the  remainder  of  Cutler’s.  The  railroad 
ran  between  the  divisions  of  Ayres  and 
Aug,  Crawford.  About  four  o’clock, 
11b  heavy  rain  falling  at  the  time. 
General  A.  P.  Hill  broke  suddenly  upon 
the  line,  with  both  divisions  of  his  corps, 
under  Mahone  and  Heth.  Mahone, 
having  with  him  the  brigades  of  Cling- 
man  and  Colquitt  as  well  as  his  own, 
attacked  the  right  with  great  fury,  first 
striking  the  picket  line,  which  consisted 
of  Bragg’s  brigade.  The  advanced  regi- 
ment was  quickly  driven  back  from  the 
cornfield  where  it  had  been  posted,  to 
the  National  breast-works,  losing  many 
men.  The  enemy  had  discovered  the 
gap  at  this  part  of  the  line,  and  rushed 
through  it  like  a torrent,  thus  getting 
between  the  divisions  of  Willcox  and 
Crawford.  Desperate  artillery  and 
musketry  fighting  ensued.  But  Will- 
cox’s brigades  were  kept  closely  massed, 
Hartranft  on  the  right,  Humphrey  on 
the  left ; and  they  remained  unbroken. 
Hill  then,  while  keeping  Willcox  and 
Crawford  occupied  in  front  with  Cling- 


man’s  and  Mahone’s  brigades,  des- 
patched part  of  Colquitt’s  brigade  to 
drive  in  that  under  Bragg.  After  des- 
perate fighting  this  was  accomplished, 
and  the  right  of  Crawford’s  division, 
where  Lyle  was  posted,  was  completely 
flanked.  Colquitt,  joined  by  other 
forces,  succeeded  in  getting  a front, 
flank,  and  rear  fire  on  a part  of  Craw- 
ford’s division,  the  consequence  of  which 
was  that  more  than  1500  men,  compris 
ing  nearly  the  whole  of  Hartshorn’s  bri- 
gade and  part  of  Lyle’s  and  Wheelock’s, 
were  cut  off  and  captured. 

While  this  was  occurring  on  the  right 
of  the  railroad,  the  divisions  on  the  left 
under  Ayres,  Griffin,  and  Cutler  were 
attacked  by  the  troops  under  Heth. 
The  advance  of  the  Confederates  was 
made  with  great  impetuosity;  the  Na- 
tional picket  line  was  driven  in,  and  the 
advanced  intrenchments  were  soon  taken; 
but  at  the  second  and  main  line  the 
Confederates  received  a bloody  repulse, 
not,  however,  before  Hayes’  brigade  of 
regulars,  who  had  held  their  post  with 
great  firmness,  were  badly  cut  up.  The 
line  on  their  right  and  left  having  been 
forced  back;  they  became  exposed  to  an 
enfilading  fire,  and  sustained  a heavy 
loss  in  killed  and  wounded,  besides  500 
or  600  captured.  Among  the  captured 
and  wounded  was  General  Hayes. 

Very  opportunately,  just  at  the  time 
when  the  right  centre  had  become 
broken  and  the  centre  was  giving  way, 
the  First  and  Second  divisions  of  the 
Ninth  coip)s  under  Potter  and  White 
came  up.  Although  they  had  made  a 
long  and  toilsome  forced  march  over 
roads  now  reduced  to  mud  by  the  late 


704 


PETERSBURG. 


heavy  rains,  they  were  immediately 
formed  and  sent  in  on  the  charge ; and 
the  enemy  was  overlapped  and  turned. 
In  the  meantime  the  battle  had  become 
so  confused  on  Crawford’s  right  that 
the  combatants  could  not  be  distin- 
guished ; and  the  artillery  now  directed 
on  that  point,  swept  down  friend  and 
foe  alike.  The  result  was,  that  the 
contest,  was  decided  against  the  Confed- 
erates ; and  the  disordered  lines  of  the 
National  troops  were  soon  rallied. 
Night,  however,  had  fallen  before  the 
battle  was  entirely  over.  The  National 
loss  in  killed  and  wounded  was  esti- 
mated at  1500.  The  Confederates  had 
lost  about  the  same  number.  In  pris- 
oners they  lost  not  more  than  250,  while 
they  captured,  mostly  from  the  divisions 
of  Ayres  and  Crawford,  not  less  than 
2700,  including  9 field  officers  and  60  or 
70  line  officers.  On  the  following  day, 
the  20th,  there  was  some  cannonading, 
but  no  general  fighting. 

On  the  21st  the  enemy  made  another 
effort  to  recover  the  W eldon  Kail- 
21.  road.  The  National  line  lay  sub- 
stantially as  it  did  on  the  19th,  the  first 
three  divisions  of  the  Ninth  corps 
holding  the  right  and  the  Fifth  corps 
the  left.  Cutler’s  division  lay  across 
the  railroad,  Crawford’s  being  on  its 
right,  Griffin’s  and  Ayres’  on  its  left. 
At  four  o’clock  in  the  morning  the 
Confederates  opened  a heavy  artillery 
fire  along  the  whole  line,  from  the  left 
to  the  Appomattox,  and  about  seven 
o’clock  made  a feint  towards  the  Ninth 
corps.  At  nine  the  attack  commenced 
in  earnest,  with  a terrific  fire  of  both 
solid  shot  and  shell  from  all  their  bat- 


teries, which  was  replied  to  with  at 
least  equal  power.  Shortly  afterwards 
the  enemy’s  column  emerged  from  -the 
woods  and  dashed  in  fine  style  across 
the  open  space  in  front  of  the  National 
breast- works.  It  was  intended  that  the 
attack  should  be  made  in  two  columns, 
one  in  front,  the  other  in  flank ; but  the 
flanking  column  on  the  left  of  the  rail- 
road, instead  of  striking  the  extreme 
left,  under  Griffin,  fell  upon  the  right 
of  Ayres’  division  and  the  left  of  Cutler’s. 
The  National  skirmishers  were  soon 
driven  in,  and  their  pits  taken ; but  on 
approaching  the  works,  the  Confederates 
were  received  with  a steady  fire  of 
musketry,  and  although  they  again  and 
again  advanced  to  the  charge,  they 
were  always  repulsed.  On  the  right, 
they  did  not  succeed  in  reaching  the 
main  works,  and  suffered  much  frori 
both  artillery  and  musketry.  On  tie 
left,  a column  which  approached  by  the 
Vaughan  road  was  caught  with  a cross 
fire;  large  numbers  threw  down  their 
arms  and  surrendered,  and  the  remain- 
der exposed  to  a hot  fire,  hastily  with- 
drew. An  effort  to  flank  the  extreme 
left  also  failed.  The  main  force  of  the 
attack,  however,  fell  on  the  divisions  of 
Ayres  and  Cutler.  The  battle  was  brief 
— lasting  only  two  hours.  It  was 
nevertheless  one  of  the  most  desperate 
contests  of  the  campaign.  In  the 
struggle  the  Confederate  generals, 
Saunders  and  Lamar  were  killed. 

On  the  morning  of  the  2 2d  it  was 
discovered  that  the  enemy,  had  retired 
and  intrenched  himself  about  3 miles 
from  Petersburg.  Skirmishers  were 
then  thrown  out,  and  both  armies  went 


REAMS’  STATION. 


765 


to  work  industriously  with  the  spade. 
The  picket  lines  were  busily  engaged  in 
skirmishing  all  day ; but  there  was  no 
general  engagement.  During  the  pre- 
vious week,  one  division  of  the  Second 
corps  had  been  withdrawn  from  Deep 
Bottom  and  hurried  back  to  Petersburg. 
It  took  possession  of  the  intrenchments 
vacated  by  the  Fifth  corps  when  it 
marched  for  the  W eldon  Railroad.  The 
other  two  divisions,  with  Gregg’s  caval- 
ry and  the  Tenth  corps,  also  left  Deep 
Bottom  on  the  night  of  the  20th,  where 
Foster’s  brigade  remained  alone.  March- 
ing rapidly  all  night,  the  two  divisions 
of  the  Second  corps  reached  the  lines 
of  the  Ninth  on  the  morning  of  the  21st, 
and  on  the  2 2d  Barlow’s  division,  tem- 
porarily commanded  by  Miles,  was  set 
to  tearing  up  the  track  of  the  Weldon 
Railroad  in  the  rear  of  the  Fifth  corps 
towards  Reams’  Station,  in  which  it  was 
joined  by  Gibbon’s  division  on  the  fol- 
lowing day  The  Fifth  corps  also  tore 
up  a portion  of  the  track  towards  Peters- 
burg, so  that  by  the  night  of  the  24th 
the  railroad  was  thoroughly  destroyed 
from  a point  four  miles  below  Peters- 
burg down  to  two  miles  below  Reams’ 
Station.  The  cavalry  under  Gregg 
covered  the  work  of  the  infantry  during 
these  operations,  and  had  several  skirm- 
ishes with  the  enemy. 

On  the  morning  of  the  25th,  Gibbon’s 
division  of  the  Second  corps  moved 
Aug.  railroad  below  Reams’ 

25.  to  continue  the  work  of  destruc- 
tion; but  when  about  a mile  below  the 
station,  its  advance,  consisting  of  caval- 
ly,  was  suddenly  checked  and  driven 
back  by  the  enemy’s  picket  line. 


Smyth e’s  brigade  of  infantry  was  at 
once  pushed  forward  and  deployed  as 
skirmishers,  the  cavalry  retiring  behind 
them.  Smythe  drove  back  the  enemy’s 
skirmish  line  some  distance,  but  pres- 
ently meeting  a stronger  force,  was 
himself  compelled  to  fall  back  to  the 
main  body  of  the  division,  which  was 
now  in  line  of  battle,  the  Third  brigade 
on  the  right  of  the  track,  the  First  on 
the  left,  the  other  troops  in  support. 
Before  noon  the  enemy  had  appeared 
in  some  force  on  Gibbon’s  left,  making 
towards  his  rear;  but  this  movement 
was  checked  by  a party  of  Gregg’s  cav- 
alry, and  the  Confederates  were  driven 
off.  A little  later  some  cavalry  of  the 
enemy  appeared  in  front,  in  the  direction 
of  Dinwiddie  Court  House,  but  were 
checked  by  Chapman’s  cavalry  brigade. 
While  this  desultory  lighting  was  going 
on  in  the  neighborhood  of  Gibbon’s 
division.  General  Hill  was  making  pre- 
parations to  attack  that  under  Miles  at 
Reams’  Station.  It  occupied  the  old 
intrenchments  constructed  by  the  Sixth 
corps,  which  in  a semicircular  form  par- 
tially surrounded  the  station,  and  cov- 
ered the  railroad  both  above  and  below 
that  point.  The  enemy  appeared  in 
front  of  Miles  soon  after  twelve  o’clock, 
and  Hancock  immediately  ordered  Gib- 
bon to  fall  back  and  form  a junction  with 
the  left  of  Miles.  The  cavalry  followed, 
and  was  disposed  so  as  to  cover  the 
left  flank  and  rear.  Gibbon  arranged 
his  line  so  that  it  faced  the  south  and 
southeast,  looking  down  the  railroad. 
About  two  o’clock  the  enemy’s  skirmish 
line  advanced  and  swept  forward  with 
the  accustcfmed  battle  yell;  but  it  soon 


766 


PETERSBURG. 


tell  back  in  confusion  under  a sharp 
fire  from  infantry  and  artillery,  suffering 
severely.  Skirmishing  followed  till 
aboui;  half-past  three,  when  the  enemy’s 
column  emerged  from  the  woods  in  close 
hue  of  battle,  and  with  bayonets  fixed 
1‘ushed  towards  the  National  works.  At 
the  distance  of  twenty  paces  it  was  met 
by  a murderous  fire  of  musketry  and  of 
artillery  from  4 batteries,  when  it  re- 
coiled, broke,  and  hastened  back  under 
cover,  having  suffered  friglitful  loss. 
Another  assault,  made  an  hour  later, 
had  a similar  result. 

The  Confederates  now  began  to  fell 
trees  for  the  purpose  of  planting  batter- 
ies; and  notwithstanding  shells  were 
thrown  among  them,  they  succeeded  at 
length  in  getting  a very  heavy  concen- 
tric fire  upon  the  National  lines,  into 
which  they  poured  shell  and  shot  with- 
out an  instant’s  cessation  for  twenty 
minutes,  and  with  a most  destructive 
effect.  The  result  was  that  the  Nation- 
al troop-s  became  to  a certain  extent 
demoralized ; and  when  at  last  the 
shelling  ceased  and  the  enemy’s  storm- 
ing column  again  advanced  with  renewed 
fury,  the  fire  with  which  it  was  received 
was  less  vigorous  than  before.  The 
left  and  centre  of  Miles’  division,  upon 
which  the  blow  fell,  allowed  the  enemy 
to  gain  the  breast-works,  and  after  a 
bloody  hand-to-hand  contest,  the  Nation- 
al lines  were  broken  through,  and  a 
general  rout  followed,  although  some 
regiments  and  companies  remained 
fighting  with  heroic  determination.  Of 
the  12  guns  which  had  been  used  with 
such  destructive  effect  during  the  day, 
9 were  lost.  At  this  crisis  a part  of 


Gibbon’s  division  was  hurried  across 
the  rear  from  the  left,  under  a heavy 
fire,  to  the  support  of  Miles,  a distance 
of  more  than  half  a mile,  and  arrived 
in  time  to  drive  back  the  enemy  in  that 
quarter,  though  at  a fearful  cost  in 
killed  and  wounded.  Thus  aided.  Miles 
was  enabled  to  rally  his  division  and 
partially  restore  his  lines.  But  whih3 
a portion  of  Gibbon’s  troops  were  thus 
employed,  a fierce  attack  was  being 
made  on  the  left  by  a large  force  of  the 
enemy,  consisting  of  Heth’s  division  of 
infantry  and  Hampton’s  division  of  cav- 
alry, equalling  in  impetus  that  which 
had  been  made  on  the  centre.  Gibbon’s 
troops,  already  exhausted  by  their  exei*- 
tions,  were  hurried  back  to  the  left, 
where  the  enemy  was  in  great  force. 
Although  desperately  resisted  by  some 
brave  regiments,  who  allowed  them- 
selves to  be  cut  to  pieces  rather  than 
give  way,  the  Confederates  overpowei-ed 
all  opposition ; and  Hancock  was  finally 
compelled  to  withdraw  his  corps  from 
Beams’  Station  and  retire  towards  the 
lines  of  the  Fifth  coi-ps.  Gregg  had  in 
the  mean  time  brought  his  dismounted 
cavalry  to  the  assistance  of  the  infantry 
and  the  enemy,  who  had  suffered  very 
severely,  did  not  pursue.  Thus  ended 
the  battle  of  Beams’  Station — one  of 
the  most  obstinately  contested  battles  of 
the  war.  The  National  loss  was  very 
heavy,  amounting  to  not  less  than  3000 
of  which  2000  were  prisoners.  Seven 
stands  of  colors  and  9 cannon  were  alsc 
lost.  The  enemy’s  loss  in  killed  and 
wounded  was  about  1 500.  The  Nation 
al  forces  continued  to  hold  the  Weldon 
Bailroad  at  Yellow  Tavern. 


FRIENDLY  FEELING. 


767 


Od  the  25th  the  Eighteenth  corps, 
on  the  right  of  the  National  line  before 
Petersburg,  and  the  Tenth  corps  at 
Deep  Bottom  and  Bermuda  Hundred, 
had  begun  exchanging  positions.  These 
movements  produced  a demonstration 
on  the  part  of  General  Pickett  in  front 
of  Butler’s  position.  Opening  fire  from 
the  long  silent  artillery,  the  enemy 
reinforced  his  skirmish  line  and  ad- 
vanced it  against  that  of  General  Butler. 
A sharp  fight  ensued  ; but  the  enemy 
soon  withdrew,  losing  60  prisoners. 
The  killed  and  wounded  were  few  on 
either  ^ side.  The  movement  of  the 
troops  was  then  continued,  and  was 
completed  during  the  night  of  the  26th. 

The  shelling  of  Petersburg  was  re- 
sumed with  great  vigor  on  the  29th, 
and  was  continued  for  some  time  all 
along  the  line  with  a fury  unparalleled 
for  many  weeks,  but  the  casualties  re- 
sulting from  it  were  few.  There  was 
at  the  same  time  considerable  artil- 
lery firing  between  batteries  and  gun- 
boats. on  the  James  in  the  vicinity  of 
the  Dutch  Gap  Canal,  the  work  on 
which,  was  being  vigorously  prosecuted. 

Since  the  destruction  of  a portion  of 
the  Weldon  Bailroad  the  enemy  had 
had  recourse  to  wagons,  to  convey  their 
supplies  from  Stoney  Creek,  eight  miles 
south  of  Beams’  Station,  around  by  the 
Boyd  ton  plank  road  to  Petersburg ; 
Sept.  September, 

2.  Gregg  made  an  important  recon- 
noissance  in  that  direction.  At  daylight 
his  cavalry,  supported  by  Crawford’s 
division  of  the  Fifth  corps,  moved  out 
some  distance;  and  Smith’s  brigade 
marched  up  the  Vaughan  road  towards 


the  plank  road  and  in  the  direction  of 
Petersburg.  The  plank  road  was  dis- 
covered to  be  well  fortified  Beturning, 
Smith  was  attacked  by  some  of  the 
enemy’s  cavalry,  but  escaped  without 
much  loss.  The  whole  force  then  re- 
turned to  camp. 

As  usual  during  periods  of  compara- 
tive inaction,  friendly  intercourse  be- 
tween pickets  and  the  exchange  of 
newspapers  began  to  take  place  aloug 
a part  of  the  lines.  When  such  a tacit 
truce  existed,  the  men  were  accustomed 
to  walk  about  at  their  ease  in  front  of 
the  works,  trusting  fully  in  the  honor 
of  their  antagonists.  But,  on  the  1st 
of  September,  while  a large  number 
were  thus  promenading  outside  the 
trenches,  the  -National  batteries  com- 
menced playing  on  the  town,  and  a 
volley  of  musketry  was  fired  in  reply 
from  the  Confederate  works,  on  the 
exposed  troops,  of  whom  some  200 
were  killed  or  wounded.  This  put  an 
end  to  amicable  relations  for  some  time. 
On  the  night  of  the  4th,  about  eleven 
o’clock,  news  of  the  fall  of  Atlanta 
having  arrived  in  camp,  a salute  was 
ordered  of  100  shotted  guns  all  along 
the  line  from  the  extreme  right  to  the 
extreme  left.  To  the  roar  of  the  artil 
lery  the  troops  added  their  enthusiastic 
cheers,  and  the  enemy,  apprehending  a 
general  attack,  replied  briskly,  but  the 
firing  was  discontinued  about  one 
o’clock. 

For  several  days  along  Grant’s  now 
extended  lines,  little  of  importance 
occurred  beyond  the  usual  desultory 
cannonading  at  intervals.  On  the  left, 
near  the  Jerusalem  plank  road,  the 


768 


PE  L’ERSBURG. 


National  and  Confederate  lines  had 
been  for  some  time  in  such  close  prox- 
imity, that  at  one  point  the  opposing 
})ickets  could  converse  without  diffi- 
culty. Hancock  determined  to  drive 
the  enemy  out  of  this  advanced  posi- 
tion, as  being  too  commanding  and 
dangerous,  and  gave  orders  to  Mott, 
whose  division  lay  opposite  to  the  point 
in  question,  to  direct  a movement 
against  it.  Accordingly,  at  one  o’clock 
Sept.  morning  of  the  10th,  the 

10,  Ninety-Ninth  Pennsylvania  and 
the  Twentieth  Indiana  were  sent  under 
General  He  Trobriand  to  carry  the 
work.  The  approach  was  made  silently, 
the  enemy’s  picket  line  was  surprised, 
and  the  position  was  flanked  and  taken, 
with  very  little  flring.  The  affair  was 
a perfect  success.  The  enemy  opened 
an  artillery  fire,  and,  somewhat  later, 
made  a vigorous  but  unsuccessful  effort 
to  recover  the  lost  ground.  Ninety 
prisoners  were  taken,  while  the  Nation- 
al loss  was  less  than  20. 

On  the  14th  the  long  continued  de- 
sultory flring  was  followed  by  a fierce 
cannonade  directed  on  Petersburg,  shells 
being  thrown  into  the  city  for  two 
hours  at  the  rate  of  20  a minute.  This 
the  enemy  replied  to,  by  bombarding 
the  single  towers  which  had  been 
erected  on  the  Appomattox,  and  by 
shelling  the  working  party  on  the  Hutch 
Gap  Canal.  Very  early  on  the  morn- 
ing of  the  15th,  movements  of  the  ene- 
my’s cavalry  on  the  left  having  been 
reported,  a brigade  of  the  Fifteenth 
corps,  preceded  by  several  regiments  of 
cavalry,  was  sent  out  towards  the 
Vaughan  road.  The  enemy’s  lines  at 


Poplar  Spring  Church  were  broken 
through,  and  reconnoissances  made 
in  various  directions  ; but  although 
Hearing’s  cavalry  was  encountered  and 
a little  skirmishing  took  place,  the 
troops  finally  returned  to  camp  without 
having  discovered  the  character  of  the 
enemy’^  movement,  which  proved  to  be 
the  most  daring  and  successful  raid  of 
the  campaign.  Setting  out  from  Kearns’ 
Station  on  the  morning  of  the  15th, 
Hampton,  with  a body  of  cavalry,  con- 
sisting of  4 brigades,  and  2 batteries, 
marched  rapidly  around  the  National 
left,  and  appeared  suddenly  on  the 
morning  of  the  16th,  in  the  rear  of  the 
centre.  His  object  was  to  seize  a herd 
of  2500  cattle  at  Sycamore  Church, 
about  a mile  south  of  Coggin’s  Point 
on  the  James,  and  nine  miles  northeast 
of  Prince  George  Court  House.  Spear’s 
cavalry  brigade  was  picketed  around 
the  point  to  be  attacked ; but  the  ene- 
my rushed  in  so  unexpectedly,  gept, 
that  it  was  taken  completely  by  16. 
surprise.  The  pickets  were  quickly 
driven  in  ; and  two  regiments,  the 
Thirteenth  Pennsylvania  and  the  First 
Histrict  of  Columbia,  were  entirely 
broken  and  stampeded,  the  latter  being 
captured  entire  with  all  its  horses,  arms, 
equipments,  wagons,  and  camp.  The 
enemy,  by  making  a wide  detour  around 
the  National  left,  had  succeeded  com- 
pletely in  concealing  his  movements. 
As  soon  as  the  cattle  were  secured,  they 
were  driven  off.  Hampton’s  troopers 
then  set  out  on  their  return,  pursued 
by  the  divisions  of  Gregg  and  Kautz, 
as  far  as  Belcher’s  Mill  on  the  Jerusa- 
lem plank  road.  At  this  point  the 


CHAPIN’S  FARM. 


769 


Confederates  under  Rosser  and  Bearing 
made  a stand  and  repulsed  an  attack 
made  on  them  by  the  brigades  of  Smith 
and  Stedman.  The  other  portions  of 
Hampton’s  column  moved  off  with  the 
cattle  at  their  leisure.  By  this  daring 
and  skilful  operation,  Hampton  se- 
cured an  abundant  supply  of  meat 
for  Lee’s  army.  Besides  the  cattle,  he 
carried  off  300  prisoners,  200  mules, 
and  32  wagons.  Among  the  captures 
was  also  a telegraphic  construction 
corps  of  40  men,  with  their  train  and 
20  miles  of  wire.  The  entire  loss  of 
the  enemy  did  not  exceed  50.  While 
Hampton’s  raid  was  in  progress,  the* 
entire  skirmish  line  of  the  Fifth  corps 
was  driven  into  the  intrenchments,  with 
the  loss  of  90  men  made  prisoners. 
From  the  16th  to  the  23d,  sharp  picket 
firing  was  kept  up  along  the  line,  re- 
sulting in  many  casualties. 

On  the  night  of  the  28th,  the  army 
Sept.  James,  under  Butler,  con- 

28.  sisting  of  the  Tenth  corps  under 
Birney,  holding  the  right  of  the  main 
line  before  Petersburg  ; the  Eighteenth 
corps,  under  Ord,  at  Bermuda  Hun- 
dred, and  Kautz’s  division  of  cavalry, 
were  quietly  but  rapidly  moved  from 
their  positions,  in  light  marching  order, 
to  the  James,  over  which  they  crossed, 
on  muffled  pontoon  bridges,  the  Tenth 
corps  to  Beep  Bottom,  and  the  Eight- 
eenth to  Aiken’s  Landing,  about  mid- 
way between  Beep  Bottom  and  Butch 
Gap.  At  daylight  on  the  morning  of 
the  29th,  the  Eighteenth  corps  advanced 
by  the  Varina  road,  which  runs  in  a 
northwesterly  direction  to  the  New 
Market  road.  Having  proceeded  about 


a mile  the  enemy’s  pickets  were  met, 
and  skirmishing  began,  Stannard’s  di- 
vision in  the  advance.  Two  or  three 
miles  from  Aiken’s  Landing,  a long  line 
of  intrenchments  was  found  running 
westward  from  the  road  to  the  James, 
and  ending  there  in  a well-constructed 
foi-t.  The  region  traversed  by  these 
intrenchments  is  in  the  neighborhood 
of  Chapin’s  and  Ball’s  bluff's,  and  was 
known  as  Chapin’s  Farm.  In  front  of 
the  fortifications  was  an  open  plain. 
Line  of  battle  was  formed  in  the  woods 
on  the  edge  of  this  plain,  Stannard’s 
division  on  the  left  near  the  river, 
Heckman’s  on  the  right.  The  third 
division  under  Paine  was  operating  with 
the  Tenth  corps  on  a different  road. 
In  front  of  Stannard  were  strong  con- 
nected forts,  including  the  works  known 
as  Battery  Harrison.  The  latter  was 
well  provided  with  artillery  and  sur- 
rounded by  a wide  and  deep  ditch.  In 
front  of  Heckman  was  a line  of  rifle- 
pits  defended  by  infantry.  The  troops 
having  been  formed  under  cover  of  the 
woods,  dashed  across  the  plain  under  a 
heavy  fire  from  the  forts  and  rifle-pits 
and  from  the  gun-boats  in  the  river, 
and  carried  the  entire  line  of  works, 
including  Battery  Harrison,  capturing 
16  pieces  of  artillery  and  200  prisoners. 
The  attack  was,  in  fact,  a surprise. 
Fortunately  there  were  but  few  troops 
in  the  works,  and  these  mostly  inex- 
perienced, or  the  affair  would  have 
been  much  more  bloody.  As  it  was, 
the  success  was  purchased  at  a heavy 
cost,  the  National  loss  being  about  800. 
The  fighting  was  all  over  by  ten  o’clock ; 
and  the  men  were  set  to  work  throwing 


770 


PETERSBURG. 


up  breast- works  and  strengthening  their 
position.  The  Confederate  gun-boats 
and  batteries  on  the  other  side  of  the 
James,  however,  kept  up  such  an  annoy- 
ing fire  that  it  was  found  impossible  to 
liold  the  portion  of  the  works  on  the 
left  near  the  river.  They  were  there- 
fore abandoned. 

The  Tenth  corps  had  in  the  mean 
time  marched  from  Deep  Bottom 
towards  New  Market,  crossing  Four 
Mile  Creek.  The  enemy  was  found  at 
the  junction  of  that  road  with  the  New 
Market  road,  where  strong  breast-works 
had  been  constructed  in  a commanding 
position  called  New  Market  Heights,  a 
marshy  tract  of  ground  in  front,  covered 
with  stunted  trees  and  a dense  under- 
growth besides  being  obstructed  by  an 
ahatis.  Over  this  piece  of  difficult 
ground  Paine’s  colored  troops  were 
directed  to  charge.  In  spite  of  the 
formidable  obstacles  in  their  path,  and 
under  a very  destructive  musketry  hre, 
they  rushed  to  the  works  and  carried 
them  at  the  point  of  the  bayonet  with- 
out firing  a shot.  This  position  being 
the  key-point  of  the  line  of  defenses, 
was  stoutly  defended  by  the  Confeder- 
ates ; but  nothing  could  withstand  the 
impetuous  onset  of  the  colored  troops. 
Terry’s  division  of  the  Tenth  corps 
pushed  in  on  the  right  and  flanked  the 
enemy,  who  fell  back  from  the  heights, 
and  Terry  immediately  occupied  them. 
The  National  loss  was  about  1500,  sus- 
tained chiefly  by  the  colored  division; 
tliat  of  the  enemy  was  much  less.  Bir- 
ney  then  pushed  on  in  the  direction  of 
Richmond,  along  the  New  Market  road, 
to  the  point  where  the  Mill  road  enters 


it,  three  miles  west  of  New  Market. 
After  carrying  some  feebly  defended 
earth -works  here,  the  advance  drove  the 
enemy  as  far  as  the  junction  of  the 
Varina  and  New  Market  roads,  six 
miles  southeast  of  Richmond.  Here, 
on  Laurel  Hill,  was  found  a substantial 
foT*tifica,tion  called  Fort  Gilmer,  consist- 
ing of  a semicircular  main  work  with 
other  works  on  each  side,  a wide  and 
deep  ditch  extending  in  front  of  the 
intrenchments.  The  advance  was  im- 
mediately deployed  on  the  right,  and 
W.  Birney’s  colored  brigade  on  the 
left.  About  two  o’clock  an  assault 
was  ordered,  and  several  charges  were 
made ; but  each  time  the  troo^^s  were 
compelled  to  retire  with  great  loss, 
a severe  artillery  and  musketry  fire 
from  both  flank  and  front  comj)letely 
sweeping  the  open  space  over  which 
the  storming  parties  had  to  move.  The 
colored  troops  on  the  left  succeeded  in 
reaching  the  ditch  ; but  the  few  men 
who  mounted  the  parapet  never  return- 
ed. It  soon  became  evident  that  the 
position  was  too  strong  to  be  taken,  and 
before  dusk  the  troops  were  called  off. 
The  enemy  was  left  in  secure  possession 
of  Laurel  Hill,  having  suffered  but  little 
loss,  while  that  of  the  Nationals  was 
not  less  than  500. 

Kautz  having  early  in  the  morning 
reconnoitred  the  roads  before  the  ad- 
vance of  the  infantry  columns,  turned 
off  about  nine  o’clock  to  the  right  and 
moved  up  the  Central  road  towards 
Richmond,  in  which  direction  he  met 
no  opposition  till  within  two  or  three 
miles  of  the  city,  when  a fort  near  the 
tollgate  opened  upon  him.  Terry  also, 


BATTERY  HARRISON. 


771^ 


whose  division  had  been  sent  to  the 
support  of  Kautz,  marched  across  from 
the  New  Market  to  the  Central  road, 
and  pressing  on  rapidly  came  within 
sight  of  the  spires  of  Richmond.  But 
both  withdrew  about  sundown.  The 
':ountry  had  been  found  full  of  fortifi- 
cations, and  the  enemy  everywhere 
showed  a disposition  to  resist.  The  line 
of  the  army  at  night  was  formed  with 
the  Tenth  corps  in  the  centre,  the  cav- 
alry on  the  right,  and  the  Eighteenth 
corps  on  the  left. 

About  two  in  the  afternoon  of  the 
30th,  the  Confederates,  having  been 
largely  reinforced  from  Petersburg 
during  the  night  and  morning,  appeared 
in  great  force  in  front  of  Battery  Har- 
lison  and  the  line  of  captured  works 
now  held  by  the  Eighteenth  corps. 
Their  plan  of  attack  was,  to  break 
through  these  and  separate  the  Eight- 
eenth and  Tenth  corps.  The  blow  fell, 
therefore,  on  the  right  of  the  Eighteenth 
and  the  left  of  the  Tenth.  The  action 
^vas  commenced  by  a cannonade  from 
Sept.  enemy  of  fifteen  or  twenty 
30.  minute.^’  duration,  followed  by  a 
charge  on  Paine’s  colored  division,  now 
getting  position  on  the  right  of  the 
Eighteenth  corps,  and  on  W.  Birney’s 
colored  brigade,  on  the  left  of  the  Tenth. 
But  Paine  and  Birney  held  their  ground 
wdl,  delivering  a withering  fire  of 
musketry,  while  the  batteries  made 
great  devastation  in  the  charging  col- 
umn. The  weight  of  the  attack  fell, 
however,  on  Stannard’s  division.  Form- 
ing in  three  strong  lines  on  the  edge  of 
the  woods,  the  Confederates  charged 
upon  it  with  great  fury  under  cover  of 


a hot  shelling  from  their  gun-boats  and 
an  enfilading  fire  from  the  batteries  on 
the  other  side  of  the  river.  Stannard’s 
men  had  been  instructed  to  lower  their 
pieces ; and  their  fire  was  incessant  and 
murderous.  Three  times  the  Confed- 
.erates  charged;  but  each  time,  although 
they  got  near  the  works,  they  were 
driven  back  with  great  slaughter  to 
their  cover  in  the  woods.  They  lost 
in  this  affair,  including  200  prisoners, 
of  whom  20  were  ofiicers,  nearly  800 
men.  The  National  loss  did  not  exceed 
200.  At  night  heavy  rain  fell,  continu- 
ing through  the  following  day  and 
night;  and  the  surface  of  the  country 
was  soon  covered  with  deep  mud,  ren- 
dering the  movement  of  artillery  and 
wagons,  and  even  the  march  of  troops, 
exceedingly  difficult. 

These  movements  on  the  north  side 
of  the  James  having,  as  was  intended, 
induced  Lee  to  send  off  a great  part  of 
his  forces  i^n  that  direction,  Grant,  who 
had  for  several  days  been  making  pre- 
parations for  the  movement,  despatched 
on  the  30th  a column  from  the  left  fiank. 
The  National  force  remaining  near 
Petersburg  while  the  army  of  the  James 
was  operating  towards  Richmond,  con- 
sisted of  three  corps  and  the  second 
division  of  cavalry.  Of  these  the 
Second  corps  and  parts  of  the  Fifth  and 
Ninth  were  now  left  to  hold  the  long 
line  of  the  Weldon  Railroad  and  Peters- 
burg intrenchments,  while  two  divisions 
of  the  Ninth  corps  with  two  divisions 
and  a brigade  of  the  Fifth  were  consti- 
tuted a column  of  advance  under 
Warren.  On  the  29th,  a reconnoissance 
had  been  made  by  Gregg’s  cavalry 


772 


PETERSBURG. 


supported  by  two  brigades  of  infantry, 
towards  the  Poplar  Spring  Cburcb 
road  beyond  tlie  Vaughan  turnpike. 
On  reaching  the  Weldon  Kailroad 
Gregg  struck  off  to  the  south  of  Yellow 
Tavern,  but  after  sending  the  different 
brigades  in  various  directions  fell  back 
again.  About  five  o’clock  the  enemy, 
who  had  followed  Gregg  on  his  return, 
attacked  him  with  two  pieces  of  artillery; 
and  skirmishing,  resulting  in  little  loss 
to  either  side,  continued  till  dark,  when 
Gregg  returned  to  his  former  lines. 

On  the  following  morning  the  column 
under  Warren  set  out  from  Four  Mile 
Station  on  the  Weldon  Kailroad,  the 
headquarters  of  the  Fifth  corps,  the 
cavalry  under  Gregg  on  the  extreme  left, 
while  the  divisions  of  Griffin  and  Ayres, 
with  Hoffman’s  brigade  of  the  Fifth 
corps,  followed  by  the  divisions  of 
Willcox  and  Potter  and  several  batter- 
ies, moved  out  in  the  direction  of  Poplar 
Grove,  on  the  South  Side  Kailroad,  15 
miles  west  of  Four  Mile  Station.  The 
march  was  made  in  a northwesterly 
direction ; and  soon  after  twelve  o’clock, 
having  struck  the  Squirrel  Level  road, 
Peebles’  Farm  was  reached,  about  three 
miles  from  the  railroad  and  four  or  five 
southwest  of  Petersburg.  Here  was 
discovered  a redoubt,  called  Fort 
McKae,  in  which  were  several  small 
rifled  guns,  and  connected  with  it  a 
strons:  line  of  intrenchments  on  com- 
manding  ridges.  In  front  was  an  open 
space  of  ground  swept  by  the  guns  of 
the  redoubt.  The  task  of  charging 
over  this  and  capturing  the  crest  was 
assigned  to  Griffin’s  division,  which- 
advanced  in  three  lines,  one  behind 


another,  and  carried  the  works,  driving 
the  enemy  out  at  every  point  and  taking 
about  50  prisoners  and  one  gun.  The 
National  loss  was  about  150.  The 
column  then  re-formed ; and  the  march 
being  resumed  the  enemy  was  found 
occupying  a strong  work  on  a hill  half 
a mile  further  on.  At  five  o’clock 
Potter’s  division,  attempting  to  press 
up  the  acclivity  on  which  the  Confed- 
erates were  posted,  sustained  a severe 
repulse,  and  being  in  its  turn  charged, 
was  thrown  into  confusion.  A flanking 
column  of  the  enemy  now  appeared  in 
great  force,  broke  in  between  the  divis 
ions  of  the  Fifth  and  Ninth  corps,  and 
swept  off  more  than  1500  prisonei*s^ 
chiefly  from  Potter’s  division.  The 
further  progress  of  the  enemy,  how^ever, 
was  checked  by  the  rapid  approach  of 
Griffin’s  division.  The  National  loss 
was  over  2500,  of  which  1600  belonged 
to  Potter’s  division.  The  Confederate 
loss  did  not  exceed  500. 

On  the  1st  of  October  the  enemy 
made  two  attacks  on  the  division 
under  Ayres,  but  both  were  easily  1 . 
repulsed.  Another  was  made,  in  the 
pouring  rain,  by  Hampton’s  cavalry 
division,  upon  Gregg,  who  covered  the 
left  flank  beyond  the  Vaughan  road. 
Hampton  succeeded  in  driving  him 
back  from  one  line  of  intrenchments  to 
another,  but  finally  retired  taking  with 
him  100  prisoners.  The  National  force 
continued  to  hold  intrenchments  four 
miles  from  the  South  Side  Kailroad, 
connecting  on  the  right  with  the  old 
line  of  works  at  Petersburg ; but  the 
enemy  retained  and  used  the  railroad. 
On  the  2d,  General  Mott  moved  out 


ATTACK  ON  THE  NATIONAL  EIGHT. 


773 


towards  the  Boydton  plank-road,  over 
which  supplies  were  now  conveyed  in 
wagons  to  Petersburg ; but  the  enemy 
was  found  strongly  intrenched  in  front 
of  the  road,  and  Mott  was  compelled  to 
r tire,  with  a loss  of  100  men. 

Meanwhile,  there  had  been  some 
activity  on  the  north  side  of  the  J ames. 
On  the  morning  of  the  1st  of  October, 
General  Terry,  preceded  by  Kautz’s 
cavalry,  made  a reconnoissance  towards 
Richmond  on  the  Central  or  Darbytown 
and  Charles  City  roads.  When  within 
3 miles  of  the  city  the  Confederate  skir-  ‘ 
mishers  were  encountered  and  driven  in, 
and  Terry  continued  to  advance  until 
he  approached  the  main  line  of  defenses, 
which  ran  across  both  roads ; but  fur- 
ther progress  was  prevented  by  vigor- 
ous shelling  on  the  part  of  the  enemy. 
After  reconnoitring  carefully,  Terry 
and  Kautz  returned  at  night,  having 
suffered  but  little  loss.  The  rain  and 
mud  caused  a suspension  of  operations, 
beyond  reconnoitring  and  intrenching. 
Nothing  of  importance  occurred  till  the 
7th,  when  the  enemy  made  a sudden 
and  partially  successful  attempt  to  turn 
the  right  flank  of  the  army  of  the  James. 
This  flank  lay  in  a line  running  to  the 
northeast  of  Battery  Harrison,  where 
the  Eighteenth  corps  was  firmly  in- 
trenched, about  7 miles  south  of  Rich- 
mond. To  the  right  of  the  Eighteenth 
corps  lay  the  Tenth,  across  the  New 
Market  and  Central  roads  ; and  on  the 
extreme  right  was  the  cavalry  of 
General  Kautz,  consisting  of  only  two 
brigades  under  Spear  and  West,  with 
t^vo  batteries,  each  of  four  3-inch  rifled 
guns,  resting  on  the  Charles  City  road. 


at  a distance  of  5 miles  southeast  of 
Richmond.  At  an  early  hour  in  the 
morning  a large  force  of  the  enemy 
under  General  Anderson,  consist- 
ing  of  two  full  divisions  of  in-  7. 
fantry  and  a brigade  of  cavalry,  ap- 
proached by  the  Darbytown  and  Charles 
City  roads,  and  fell  unexpectedly  upon 
Kautz’s  cavalry.  Taken  completely  by 
surprise  Kautz’s  troops  broke  into  a 
perfect  rout  and  scattered  over  the 
country  in  the  rear,  followed  by  the 
batteries,  which  being  left  without  sup- 
port could  not  remain  in  safety.  They 
were  soon  imbedded  in  mud,  and  cap- 
tured with  all  the  caissons  and  most  ()f 
the  horses.  Kautz  lost  300  of  his  men 
in  captured,  killed  and  wounded.  The 
Confederates  having  now  stampeded  the 
National  cavalry  and  got  possession  of 
the  Central  road,  advanced  towards  the 
Tenth  coi*ps,  which  lay  in  a strongly 
intrenched  line,  its  right  held  by  Terry, 
who  with  the  first  division  covered  the 
New  Market  road, — the  troops  being 
disposed  in  rifle-pits  in  the  thick  woods. 
On  the  left  of  the  line  of  the  Tenth 
corps  the  ground  was  open ; and  on  this 
side  was  posted  the  artillery,  consisting 
of  four  6-gun  batteries,  so  planted  as 
not  only  to  sweep  the  ground  in  front, 
but  to  some  extent  that  over  which  the 
right  must  be  approached  by  the  enemy. 
Of  Terry’s  division,  upon  which  the 
attack  fell.  Pond’s  brigade  held  the  left, 
Abbott’s  the  centre,  and  Plaisted’s  the 
right.  Curtis’  brigade  of  Foster’s  divis- 
ion was  also  brought  up  and  placed  in 
line  with  these.  When  the  Confeder- 
ates approached,  between  nine  and  ten 
o’clock,  they  found  themselves  under  a 


290 


774 


PETERSBURG. 


cross  fire  of  artillery  from  the  National 
left.  An  attempt  was^  made  to  reply 
by  two  batteries;  but  these  were  soon 
overpowered.  In  the  meantime  Field’s 
infantry  division  dashed  over  the  open 
space  at  the  double-quick,  and  in  spite 
of  the  felled  trees,  succeeded  in  gaining 
the  woods  on  the  National  right.  The 
National  troops  in  the  woods  remained 
quiet  till  the  enemy  got  very  close,  in 
front  of  the  centre  under  Abbott,  when 
the  four  brigades  above  mentioned  rose 
from  their  places  of  concealment  and 
poured  into  the  advancing  column  a 
most  destructive  fire — that  of  Abbott’s 
brigade,  which  was  partially  armed  with 
tlie  Spencer  repeating  rifle,  proving  very 
deadly,  as  the  fighting  took  place  within 
short  range.  The  Confederates,  how- 
ever, continued  the  struggle  for  some 
time.  At  length,  after  a vain  though 
desperate  rush  on  Pond’s  brigade,  they 
were  compelled  to  withdraw.  Terry’s 
division  was  then  put  bi  motion  to 
follow  and,  if  possible,  to  fiank  the 
enemy,  causing  him  to  fall  back  to  the 
Charles  City  road,  leaving  the  Central 
road  to  the  National  troops.  While  the 
struggle  was  proceeding  on  the  right  of 
the  army  of  the  James,  a demonstration 
was  made  by  the  enemy  on  the  left,  at 
Battery  Harrison,  but  without  result. 
The  National  loss  during  the  day  did 
not  exceed  500. 

There  was  another  breathing  spell, 
whick  lasted  for  several  days.  The 
Nationals  continued  to  intrench  busily 
along  the  lines  they  held.  The  enemy’s 
iron-clads  near  Cox’s  Ferry  annoyed  to 
some  extent  the  picket  line  on  the  left 
fiank  of  the  Eighteenth  corps  with  an 


enfilading  fire ; but  comparatively  few 
casualties  occurred.  The  work  on  the 
Dutch  Gap  Canal  was  prosecuted  indus- 
triously, subject  to  an  artillery  fire  from 
Howlett’s  battery,  which,  however,  the 
National  gun-boats  and  batteries  suc- 
ceeded in  temporarily  silencing  on  the 
11th.  j On  the  13th,  General  Butler  put 
87  prisoners  at  labor  under  the  enemy’s 
fire  at  the  canal,  in  retaliation  for  Con- 
federate ill-treatment  of  National  color- 
ed soldiers  at  Fort  Gilmer. 

On  the  12th,  General  Terry,  tempora- 
rily commanding  the  Tenth  corps,  made 
a reconnoissance  in  force  towards 
the  right,  taking  with  him  the  first  12 . 
division  under  Ames,  the  colored  divis- 
ion under  W.  Birney,  and  a part  of 
Kautz’s  cavalry  division.  The  column 
set  out  in  the  evening,  but  halted  during 
the  night.  In  the  morning  it  moved 
again,  and  struck  the  Central  road  near 
the  point  from  which  Kautz’s  command 
was  driven  on  the  7th.  The  cavalry 
then  stretched  out  to  the  Charles  City 
road,  dismounted  and  deployed  as  skir- 
mishers, thus  covering  the  extreme  right 
between  that  road  and  the  Central  road ; 
while  W.  Birney  deployed  on  the  left  of 
the  Central  road,  and  Ames  on  the  right 
towards  the  left  of  the  cavalry.  About 
seven  o’clock  the  Confederate  videttes 
were  encountered  on  the  Charles  City 
road,  and  driven  back  over  a mile, 
towards  a series  of  intrenchments  which 
blocked  the  way.  There  they  halted ; 
and  as  soon  as  the  Nationals  were 
within  easy  range,  they  opened  a sharp 
and  merciless  fire.  This  was  quickly 
returned ; but  Terry’s  object  being  to 
discover  the  length  and  strength  of  this 


CHARLES  CITY  ROAD. 


775 


new  line  of  the  enemy,  he  kept  his 
troops  as  much  as  possible  under  the 
shelter  of  a strip  of  woods  in  front  of 
the  works.  Continuing  to  push  out 
brigades  in  reconnoitring  charges,  at 
various  points,  he  soon  felt  the  whole 
series  of  intrenchments ; but  made  no 
serious  demonstrations,  except  on  the 
enemy’s  extreme  left,  which,  it  was  sup- 
posed, was  overlapped  by  the  National 
light,  and  which  Pond’s  brigade  was 
ordered  to  turn.  The  works  at  this 
point  were,  however,  found  to  be  re- 
fused ; and  as  the  National  troops 
rushed  forward  they  were  caught  by  an 
enfilading  fire  and  suffered  severely. 
This  encouraged  the  Confederates  to 
sally  from  their  breast- works  on  other 
parts  of  the  line,  and  charge  with  all 
their  available  force.  It  was  not,  how- 
ever, attended  with  much  success  ; and 
soon  after  four  in  the  afternoon  the 
National  troops  were  withdrawn  un- 
broken. Before  darkness  fell,  they  were 
back  within  their  own  intrenchments. 
The  losses  were  unimportant. 

On  the  left,  to  the  west  of  the  Wel- 
don Bailroad,  a reconnoissance  was 
made  on  the  8th,  somewhat  similar  to 
that  made  by  Terry  and  Kautz.  It  was 
a general  advance  of  the  Fifth  and  Ninth 
corps,  the  object  being  to  feel  the  ene- 
my’s position,  to  push  forward  the  lines, 
and  to  occupy  if  possible  all  the  series 
of  works  connected  with  Fort  McRae 
which  had  been  taken.  The  Fifth  corps, 
temporarily  under  Crawford,  moved  out 
on  the  West  Halifax,  Vaughan,  and 
Squirrel  Level  roads ; and  of  the  Ninth 
coiq)s,  temporarily  under  •Parke,  Pot- 
ter’s division  pushed  out  near  the  Pe- 


gram  House,  and  Will  cox’s  took  the 
Church  road,  Ferrero’s  division  being 
left  in  reserve.  Willcox  got  as  far  as 
the  Boydton  plank  road,  but  found  it 
strongly  defended  by  lines  of  intrench- 
ments. After  a day  spent  in  skirmish- 
ing and  hard  marching,  both  corps  re- 
turned to  camp. 

In  front  of  the  Second  corps  at  Pe- 
tersburg  a great  deal  of  skirmishing 
and  mortar  firing  occurred  from  time 
to  time,  especially  at  the  redoubt  where 
the  picket  lines  were  closest — a work 
which  had  been  captured  by  De  Trob- 
riand  about  a month  before,  and  since 
named  Fort  Sedgwick.  The  soldiers 
gave  it  the  name  of  “ Fort  Hell”  On 
the  8th  this  firing  was  very  severe,  and 
on  the  11th  the  enemy’s  cannonading 
was  so  vigorous  and  prolonged  that  it 
was  thought  a general  attack  on  the 
National  lines  was  intended. 

There  was  comparative  quiet  again 
until  the  26th.  In  the  meantime,  Grant 
had  been  completing  his  plans  for  an- 
other movement  against  the  stubborn 
defenses  of  Richmond.  He  proposed 
to  make  a strong  feint  on  the  right 
by  the  army  of  the  James,  which  was 
to  move  as  if  aiming  to  get  round  the 
left  flank  of  the  enemy,  and  at  the  same 
time  to  execute  a series  of  operations  of 
a more  determined  character  by  the 
army  of  the  Potomac,  with  the  object 
of  turning  the  enemy’s  right  flank  near 
the  South  Side  Railroad.  On  the  even- 
ing  of  the  26th  the  whole  army  was 
ordered  to  be  in  readiness  to  move  at 
daybreak,  on  the  following  morning. 
Up  to  this  time  the  proposed  movement 
had  been  kept,  as  was  supposed,  pro- 


?76 


PETERSBURG. 


ioundly  secret;  and  nothing  was  done 
which  could  give  rise  to  a suspicion,  on 
the  part  of  the  enemy,  that  an  advance 
would  be  made  for  some  days.  On  this 
evening,  however,  all  disguise  was  aban- 
doned ; and  such  arrangements  were 
made  that  if  the  contemplated  move- 
ment proved  successful,  it  would  be 
possible  without  inconvenience  perma- 
nently to  leave  the  old  camp.  The  sick, 
the  baggage,  the  commissary  stores, 
camp  equipage,  and  other  property, 
were  sent  to  City  Point;  the  sutlers 
also  took  their  goods  thither.  Rations 
for  three  days  were  issued  to  the  cav- 
alry, and  for  four  days  to  the  infantry. 
The  intrenchments  at  Petersburg  were 
to  be  held  by  the  artillery,  with  only 
such  infantry  support  as  was  absolutely 
necessary. 

The  great  movement  of  the  army  of 
the  Potomac  commenced  on  the  27th. 
Before  dawn  the  entire  army,  with  the 
exception  of  the  detachments  from  each 
corps  left  in  the  trenches,  was  on 
27.  the  march — Gregg’s  cavalry  on 
the  extreme  left  moving  towards  Reams’ 
Station  and  then  in  a westerly  direc- 
tion ; next  on  the  right  Egan’s  second 
and  Mott’s  third  division  of  the  Second 
corps,  with  three  batteries  under  Major 
Hazard,  moving  southwesterly  down  the 
Vaughan  road ; then  Warren’s  Fifth 
corps  on  the  Squirrel  Level  road ; and 
last  of  all,  on  the  extreme  right,  the 
Ninth  corps  under  Parke,  moving  as 
did  all  the  columns  in  a southwesterly 

direction  towards  Hatcher’s  Run 

a small  stream  rising  near  Sutherland 
Station  on  the  South  Side  Railroad,  and 
flowing  in  a southeasterly  direction  to 


Rowanty  Creek,  a tributary  of  the  Not- 
taway.  It  was  intended  that  the  two 
divisions  of  the  Second  corps  and 
Gregg’s  cavalry  should  march  as  se- 
cretly and  as  rapidly  as  possible  by  a 
wide  detour  around  the  enemy’s  right 
flank,  and  should  then  seize  the  line  of 
defenses  on  Hatcher’s  Rim  at  the  point 
where  tlie  Boydton  road  crosses  it,  from 
which  to  the  South  Side  Railroad  it  was 
supposed  little  opposition  would  be  met. 
The  Fifth  and  Ninth  corps  were  at  the 
same  time  to  demonstrate  against  the 
works  at  Hatcher’s  Run,  directly  in 
front;  and  the  Fifth  was  to  form  con- 
nection with  the  Second  corps  there, 
the  Ninth  remaining  on  the  right  of  the 
Fifth.  Hancock  and  Gregg  reached 
Hatcher’s  Run  by  the  Vaughan  road  at 
half-past  seven.  The  road,  at  this  point, 
was  found  much  obstructed  with  felled 
trees ; and  the  banks  of  the  stream,  par- 
tially cleared  so  as  to  give  range  from  a 
line  of  rifle-pits  on  the  opposite  bank, 
were  held  by  a small  force  of  dismounted 
cavalry.  Egan’s  division  rapidly  de- 
deployed;  and  Smyth’s  brigade,  form, 
ing  the  flrst  line,  quickly  forded  the 
stream,  carried  the  slight  defenses,  took 
about  20  prisoners,  and  dispersed  the 
remainder  of  the  small  force.  About 
noon  Hancock  and  Gregg  reached  the 
Boydton  road.  The  enemy  was  found 
fully  on  the  alert ; and  Gregg’s  troops, 
covering  the  left,  were  opened  upon 
from  artillery  and  the  carbines  of 
Young’s  dismounted  cavalry.  Grant 
and  Meade  were  both  on  the  ground  at 
this  time ; and  although  it  was  evident 
that  the  eilemy  had  received  informa- 
tion of  the  movement  in  time  to  de- 


BOYDTON  ROAD. 


777 


pri’s  e it  of  the  character  of  a surprise, 
it  was  thought  that  an  advance  might 
yet  be  attended  with  success.  Accord- 
ingly Egan’s  division  was  deployed  on 
the  right  of  the  Boydton  plank  road, 
facing  towards  the  bridge  over  Hatch- 
er’s Run,  Mott’s  division  on  the  left  of 
the  road,  De  Trobriand’s  brigade  con- 
necting with  Grregg  on  the  extreme  left ; 
while  McAllister’s  brigade  of  Mott’s 
division  was  placed  in  the  rear  to  watch 
the  enemy,  who  had  a battery  at  some 
distance  down  the  plank  road.  The 
bridge  was  then  seized  by  a skirmish 
line  in  the  advance  of  Egan’s  division 
and  the  stream  crossed.  The  next  thing 
to  be  done  was  to  carry  the  enemy’s 
works  beyond ; and  in  order  to  prepare 
for  this,  Egan’s  division  was,  about  one 
o’clock,  disposed  with  Price’s  brigade  in 
the  centre,  Rugg’s  on  the  left,  and 
Smyth’s  on  the  right.  Beck’s  battery 
co-operating  on  the  latter  flank.  McAl- 
lister’s brigade  was  withdrawn  from 
watching  the  enemy  in  the  rear  and  de- 
ployed in  support  of  Egan.  The  Fifth 
corps  being  now  heard  flring  rapidly  on 
the  right,  the  attack  on  the  works  was 
delayed  till  it  should  approach  and  co- 
operate. Owing  however,  to  the  difficult 
nature  of  the  thickly  wooded  country 
in  which  the  operations  were  being 
conducted,  and  the  intricacy  of  the 
roads,  the  Fifth  corps  failed  to  connect; 
and  after  waiting  until  four  o’clock, 
Hancock  prepared  to  make  the  assault. 
The  enemy,  in  the  mean  time,  having 
discovered  that  while  the  left  flank 
of  Hancock’s  force  was  covered  by 
Gregg’s  cavalry,  his  right  was  entirely 
unprotected,  took  the  offensive.  Ma- 


hone’s  strong  division  of  Hill’s  corps 
burst  suddenly  upon  Hancock’s  right 
and  partially  turned  it,  sweeping  off  at 
the  same  time  a section  of  Beck’s  bat 
tery ; then  getting  across  the  plank 
road,  it  bore  down  upon  Egan  in  the 
rear.  Egan  promptly  changed  front 
with  his  own  and  McAllister’s  bng- 
ades ; and  with  the  aid  of  three  bat- 
teries, after  a severe  and  prolonged 
fight,  he  succeeded  in  repulsing  Ma- 
hone.  Egan  was  now  in  turn  able  to 
attack  the  Confederates  in  flank,  com- 
pelling them  to  abandon  the  guns  they 
had  captured,  as  well  as  three  of  their 
own  flags,  besides  taking  nearly  1000 
prisoners  and  one  gun.  The  loss  of  the 
Second  corps  in  this  affair  was  esti- 
mated at  1000  in  killed,  wounded  and 
prisoners. 

After  this  attack  by  Mahone  had 
been  repulsed,  and  just  before  dark,  the 
enemy,  with  a force  of  five  brigades, 
made  a vigorous  demonstration  on  the 
left  against  Gregg’s  cavalry.  Gregg,  at 
first,  fell  back;  but,  soon  rallying,  he 
drove  back  the  enemy  and  re-established 
his  lines. 

Rain  had  fallen  in  the  afternoon, 
tending  to  make  manoeuvres  difficult ; 
the  ammunition  was  nearly  exhausted ; 
and  so  far  the  Confederates  had  shown 
themselves  not  only  vigilant  but  strong, 
and  had  inflicted  a loss  about  as  great 
as  they  had  sustained.  There  was  need 
for  great  caution  ; and  as  there  was 
reason  to  believe  that  the  enemy  would 
soon  gather  in  greater  force,  it  was 
deemed  imprudent  to  prosecute  the 
movement  by  the  left  flank.  Soon  after 
dusk,  therefore,  the  retrograde  march 


778 


PE  TERSBURG. 


was  commenced  by  the  route  taken  in 
the  morning.  It  occupied  the  entire 
night  and  part  of  the  next  day.  The 
old  camps  were  regained  by  the  Second 
corps  with  comparatively  little  loss. 
Many  of  the  wounded,  however,  had 
been  left  on  the  field,  the  column  not 
being  provided  with  the  means  of  trans- 
portation. 

The  task  of  the  Fifth  and  Ninth 
coi’ps  had  been  to  demonstrate  against 
the  enemy’s  works  at  Hatcher’s  Eun  in 
front,  so  as  to  cover  the  movement  of 
the  Second  corps  by  the  left  and  finally 
to  co-operate  with  it;  but  this  they 
had  only  partially  succeeded  in  accom- 
plishing. Having  only  a short  distance 
to  march,  they  had  indeed  soon  made 
their  appearance  in  front  of  the  works 
and  got  into  position,  the  Ninth  on  the 
right,  the  Fifth  on  the  left.  Skirmishing 
was  carried  on  during  the  greater  part 
of  the  day  by  the  infantry ; but  the  use 
of  artillery  was  made  extremely  .difficult 
in  that  region  by  the  almost  impenetra- 
ble woods,  which  rendered  military  ma- 
noeuvres almost  impossible.  The  enemy 
})eing  familiar  with  every  inch  of  the 
ground  had  in  this  respect  greatly  the 
advantage.  Although  the  commands 
of  Hancock  and  Warren  were  durino:  a 
great  part  of  the  day  not  very  far  apart, 
a junction  was  rendered  altogether  im- 
practicable by  the  natural  obstacles 
presented  in  the  shape  of  dark,  dense 
woods  and  swampy  ground.  The  ob- 
scurity of  the  few  miserable  roads  was 
such  that  troops  got  into  the  opposing 
lines,  and  staff  officers  lost  their  way  in 
the  forest  gloom.  The  two  corps  found 
the  enemy’s  defenses  in  front,  too  strong 


to  be  pierced,  and  had  to  content  them- 
selves with  maintaining  their  position, 
which  they  retained  all  day  and  through 
the  night  until  orders  arrived  from 
Grant  to  fall  back.  The  loss  thus  sus- 
tained in  manoeuvring  and  skirmishing 
was  about  500.  The  aggregate  losses 
attendii^g  the  entire  movement  by  the 
left  flank  were  not  much  short  of  1500 
men.  The  enemy  suffered  less  in  killed 
and  wounded,  but  lost  many  more  in 
prisoners.  Thus  ended  what  is  known 
as  the  battle  of  Boydton  Eoad. 

The  demonstrations  made  by  Butler 
and  his  Tenth  corps  were  comparatively 
barren  of  any  good  results.  On  the 
Williamsburg  road  he  was  attacked  and 
defeated.  On  the  York  Kiver  Eailroad 
he  captured  a fort  which  he  afterwards 
abandoned.  His  loss  was  about  1500 
men.  The  Confederates  lost  about  200. 

At  dusk  in  the  evening  of  the  27th, 
General  Miles,  who  had  been  left  in  the 
Petersburg  lines  with  the  first  division 
of  the  Second  corps,  under  cover  of  a 
terrific  cannonade,  sent  a small  stomiing 
party,  consisting  of  100  volunteers,  un- 
der Captain  Price,  against  a fort  which 
was  situated  near  the  spot  where  the 
mine  had  been  exploded  in  July.  This 
small  party,  having  moved  quickly,  and 
as  silently  as  possible  across  the  inter 
vening  space,  clambered  over  the  para 
pet ; and  although  Price  who  led  the 
assault  was  killed,  they  actually  drove 
the  enemy  out  of  the  works.  Had  the 
attack  been  made  by  a larger  force  it 
might  have  resulted  disastrously  for  the 
enemy ; but  as  it  was  impossible  for  so 
small  a body  of  men  to  hold  an  impor- 
tant fort  against  the  overwhelming 


ATTEMPTED  SUlirRISES. 


779 


force  which  was  immediately  thrown 
upon  them  from  right  and  left,  they 
promptly  retreated,  losing  10  of  their 
number,  but  carrying  off  30  prisoners, 
among  whom  were  several  officers. 

About  ten  o’clock  on  the  night  of 
the  30th,  the  Confederates  having  ob- 
tained information  as  to  the  strength 
and  position  of  a portion  of  the  Na- 
tional picket  lines  in  front  of  Fort 
Davis,  undertook,  and  successfully  car- 
ried out,  one  of  those  little  surprises 
which,  as  practised  against  themselves, 
they  had  had  frequent  and  painful 
Qct.  experience.  A body  of  Confed- 
erates  getting  in  the  rear  of  the 
National  pickets  called  to  them  to  ‘‘fall 
in.”  These  troops,  being  mostly  raw 
recruits,  and  believing  themselves  to  be 
among  friends,  promptly  obeyed  the 
call,  and  the  entire  line,  consisting  of 
380  men,  was  captured.  The  immedi- 
ate result  of  this  surprise  was  to  uncover 
the  National  intrenchments  at  the  point 
of  junction  of  the  corps  of  Warren  and 
Hancock.  On  this  unprotected  point, 
the  enemy  advanced.  Fortunately,  the 
National  officers  had  been  put  on  their 
guard  by  a sentinel  who  had  escaped 
his  captors ; and  when  the  Confederates 
came  within  range  they  found  them- 
selves under  a heavy  musketry  fire,  to 
which  was  soon  added  that  of  artillery. 
After  about  an  hour’s  fighting,  in  which 
the  loss  did  not  exceed  100  on  either 
side,  the  enemy  withdrew. 

On  the  4th  of  November  there  was 
sharp  skirmishing  in  the  neighborhood 
of  Fort  Sedgwick;  and,  on  the  night  of 
the  5th  the  enemy  succeeded,  by  a sud- 
den attack,  in  getting  possession  of  a 


considerable  portion  of  the  National 
picket  line  in  that  vicinity,  and  immedi- 
ately began  to  reverse  the  works  Nov. 
and  to  intrench.  At  the  same  time 
another  body  of  the  Confederates  car- 
ried the  picket  line  opposite  the  crater 
The  skirmishing  was  attended  with 
little  loss  on  either  side.  It  was  nec- 
essary, however,  that  the  enemy  should 
be  promptly  dislodged ; and  a furious 
cannonade  having  been  opened  upon 
them  from  the  forts  and  batteries  to 
the  right  and  left,  the  whole  line 
was  aroused.  At  daybreak,  after  some 
desperate  fighting,  the  captured  works 
were  recovered ; and  the  line  was  re- 
established from  Fort  Sedgwick  to  the 
crater.  On  the  6th,  a similar  attack 
was  made  by  the  enemy  on  the  left, 
but  was  quickly  repulsed.  This  desul- 
tory fighting,  with  little  result  beyond 
its  tendency  to  wear  out  both  the  com- 
batants, had  become  constant,  and  in 
fact,  almost  monotonous.  The  men 
about  this  time  began  to  build  log- 
huts,  the  weather  having  become  uncom- 
fortably cold. 

On  the  1st  of  December  a raid  was 
undertaken  by  Gregg’s  cavalry  against 
the  Weldon  Failroad,  at  Stony  Creek 
Station,  18  miles  south  of  Petersburg. 
At  half-past  three  in  the  morning  Dec, 
Gregg  broke  camp  and  set  out  in 
a southerly  direction,  his  second  brig- 
ade in  the  advance,  the  first  brigade 
next,  the  third  in  the  rear.  The  enemy’s 
pickets  were  met  before  daybreak ; but 
no  serious  opposition  was  encountered 
until  the  column  arrived  at  Eowanty 
Creek,  where  a cavalry  force  dis- 
puted the  advance,  but  was  quickly 


780 


PETERSBURG. 


dispersed.  The  third  brigade  was  then 
left  to  cover  the  rear;  and  the  column 
passed  on  to  Duvall’s  Station,  where 
the  first  brigade  also  was  dropped,  to 
destroy  certain  manufacturing  establish- 
ments and  to  protect  the  flanks.  The 
second  brigade  then  went  on  to  Stony 
Creek  Station,  two  miles  further  on. 
There  they  found  a well-built  fort, 
which  they  captured  and  destroyed, 
spiking  the  guns  and  carrying  off  the 
greater  portion  of  the  garrison  as  pris- 
oners. While  this  work  of  destruction 
was  going  on,  a brigade  of  Hampton’s 
cavalry  came  upon  the  scene.  Cregg 
deemed  it  convenient  to  retreat.  The 
Confederates  followed,  harassing  his 
rear  as  far  as  Rowanty  Creek.  At  that 
point  the  pursuit  was  discontinued. 
The  entire  loss  sustained  by  Gregg  was 
not  over  40,  all  of  whom  he  managed 
to  carry  off,  together  with  175  prisoners 
and  about  100  negroes. 

A few  days  afterwards  another  move- 
ment, on  a much  larger  scale,  was  made 
against  the  Weldon  Railroad,  which  it 
was  of  the  utmost  importance  that  the 
enemy  should  not  be  allowed  to  re- 
cover. On  the  6th  of  December  a 
heavy  column,  consisting  of  the  Fifth 
corps,  Mott’s  division  of  the  Second 
corps,  and  Gregg’s  division  of  cavalry, 
Dec.  in  all  about  20,000  men,  with  22 
pieces  of  artillery,  under  General 
Warren,  was  massed  on  both  sides  of 
the  W eldon  Railroad  between  the  Hali- 
fax and  Jerusalem  roads.  There  the 
troops  bivouacked  for  the  night.  Heavy 
rain  extinguished  the  camp-fires;  but 
before  daybreak  the  troops  were  on  the 
march,  the  cavalry  starting  at  four 


o’clock.  The  column  took  the  Jerusalem 
road,  and  struck  the  Not t away  at  the 
point  where  Freeman’s  Bridge  had  for- 
merly been,  about  18  miles  south-south- 
east of  Petersburg.  The  cavalry  crossed 
the  river,  which  was  about  three  feet 
deep,  by  fording ; the  infantry  crossed  ' 
by  a pontoon  bridge ; and  the  whole 
column  was  on  the  south  side  of  the 
stream  before  daylight  on  the  morning 
of  the  8th.  The  cavalry  bivouacked  at 
Sussex  Court  House ; the  infantry  be- 
tween that  place  and  the  river.  At 
three  o’clock  the  cavalry  set  off  in  a 
southwesterly  direction  towards  Jar- 
rett’s,  a station  on  the  railroad  about  30 
miles  south  of  Petersburg,  the  infantry 
following  rapidly.  About  twelve  o’clock 
the  cavalry  advance  reached  the  point 
where  the  railroad  crosses  the  Notta- 
way,  seized  and  burned  the  bridge,  and 
then  began  to  tear  up  the  track.  The 
infantry  arrived  soon  after  and  com- 
pleted the  work  of  destruction  by  burn- 
ing the  sleepers  and  twisting  the  rails. 
This  work  was  continued  for  5 miles, 
as  far  as  Jarre tt’s  Station,  where  the 
depot  and  water  tank  were  destroyed. 
The  following  day  the  column,  still 
moving  southward,  destroyed  the  track 
as  far  as  BellfieM,  on  the  Meher- 
rin,  37  miles  south  of  Petersburg.  At 
Three  Creek,  3 miles  north  of  Bellfield, 
the  enemy  burned  the  bridge  and  dis- 
puted the  passage  of  the  cavalry;  but 
Dennison’s  battery  having  opened  upon 
them,  and  the  Tenth  New  York  having 
foi-ded  the  stream  on  the  National  left, 
and  flanked  the  position,  the  Confeder^ 
ates  fell  back  to  Bellfield.  Hicksford, 
opposite  Bellfield,  was  found  protected 


RETURN  OF  WARREN. 


781 


on  botli  sides  of  tlie  river  by  strong 
intrencbments,  within  which  were  some 
of  Hampton’s  cavalry  and  a body  of 
militia  ; and  when  the  National  troops 
got  within  range,  a hot  fire  was  directed 
on  them.  Several  charges  were  made  on 
the  enemy’s  works;  but  Warren  finally 
drew  the  troops  off,  and  most  of  the  cav- 
alry bivouacked  that  night  north  of 
Three  Creek.  Up  to  this  time  during  the 
march  a cold  rain  had  poured  down,  mak- 
ing the  roads  almost  impassable  ; but 
now  the  increasing  cold  was  accompanied 
with  a storm  of  hail  and  snow,  and  the 
situation  of  the  troops  became  one  of 
extreme  discomfort.  It  was  determined, 
therefore,  not  to  prosecute  operations 
against  Hicksford,  the  strategic  value  of 
which  was  not  sufficiently  great  to 

At  this  period  in  the  History  of  the  War  the  rail- 
road had  become  not  only  a useful  but  a most  potent 
military  factor.  It  had  been,  as  we  have  seen,  of 
signal  service  at  Chattanooga.  It  had  rendered  possi- 
ble Sherman’s  movement  on  Atlanta,  and  had  greatly 
facilitated  his  March  to  the  Sea.  Without  the  railroad, 
Thomas  would  have  found  it  impossible  not  only  to 
resist  the  fierce  onsets  of  Hood,  but  even  to  maintain 
himself,  in  Tennessee  ; and  the  advantages  which  it 
secured  for  the  army  in  front  of  Petersburg  and  Rich-^ 
mond  were  many  and  invaluable.  To  the  end  of  the 
war  it  continued  to  be  an  agent  of  first  class  utility 
and  power  ; nor  is  it  any  disparagement  to  the  rank 
and  file  to  say  that  but  for  the  railroad  and  the  admir- 
able uses  to  which  it  was  put,  the  war  would  have 
assumed  a different  character  and  been  attended  prob- 
ably by  a different  result.  The  establishment  of  this 
branch  of  the  service  was  due  to  the  active  brain  and 
far-reaching  vision  of  Secretary  Stanton : its  suc- 
cessful management  is  to  be  credited  to  the  skill, 
experience,  activity  and  untiring  energy  of  General 
D.  C.  McCallum.  On  the  11th  of  February,  1862, 
McCallum  was  appointed  military  director  and 
superintendent  of  railroads,  in  the  United  States,  with 
authority  controllable  only  by  the  War  Department  ; 
and  commanding  officers  everywhere  were  directed, 
on  pain  of  dismissal  from  the  service,  not  to  in- 
terfere with  the  working  of  the  new  Department. 
The  responsibilities  of  the  head  of  the  Railroad 


warrant  any  heavy  sacrifice  of  life. 

On  the  morning  of  the  10th  AVarren 
commenced  his  march  back  towards  the 
National  lines,  the  enemy  following  arkd 
attempting  to  harass  his  rear.  His 
troops  got  back  to  camp  on  the  12th 
much  exhausted,  but  without  having 
sustained  any  great  loss. 

With  the  exception  of  two  reconnois- 
sauces  which  were  made  with  a view  to 
direct  attention  from  Warren,  this  was 
the  last  operation  of  importance  in  the 
year.  The  holiday  season  came  on. 
The  men  were  allowed  some  rest ; 
numbers  of  them  obtained  furloucrhs. 
The  festivities  proper  to  the  season  were 
not  overlooked;  and  the  Christmas  of 
1864  spent  in  the  lines  before  Peters- 
burg will  not  soon  be  forgotten. 

Department  were  scarcely  second  to  those  of  the 
General-in-chief.  One  of  the  greatest  feats  accom- 
plished by  McCallum  was  when  he  transferred  Hooker 
with  the  Eleventh  and  Twelfth  corps,  over  23,000 
strong,  with  artillery,  trains,  baggage  and  animals 
from  the  Rapidan  in  Virginia,  to  Stevenson,  Alabama, 
a distance  of  1192  miies,  within  the  brief  space  of 
seven  days.  But  for  the  railroad.  Hooker  could  not 
have  been  present  at  Chattanooga  ; and  few  will  deny 
that  the  success  on  Lookout  Mountain  contributed  to 
the  final  victory  at  Missionary  Ridge.  The  work  done 
between  Chattanooga  and  Atlanta  in  repairing  136 
miles  of  railroad,  was  scarcely  less  wonderful. 
In  his  report.  General  McCallum  gives  it  as  his 
opinion  that  but  for  the  railroad,  Sherman’s 
campaign,  in  place  of  being  a success,  “would  have 
resulted  in  disaster  and  defeat.”  An  idea  of  the  De- 
partment and  of  the  magnitude  of  its  work  may  be 
obtained  from  the  following  figures.  At  one  time, 
such  was  the  pressure  brought  to  bear  on  this  branch 
of  the  service,  McCallum  had  under  him  as  many  as 
24,964  men.  During  the  war  he  operated  in  all  2105 
miles,  and  made  use  of  419  engines  and  6330  cars.  Of 
bridges  he  built  over  26  miles,  and  of  track  he  laid 
or  relaid  641  miles.  The  expenses  of  the  Department 
amounted  to  $42,462,145.55.  The  property  when 
sold  realized  $12,636,965.83.  General  McCallum  bad 
several  able  assistants,  among  whom  were  General 
Anderson,  General  Devereux  and  Col.  W.  W.  Wright. 


782 


THE  SHENANDOxVH. 


CHAPTER  XXXVII. 

The  Valley  of  the  Shenandoah — Memory  of  Jackson — Banks  and  McDowell — Fremont  and  Shields— The  Co- 
operative Movement — Sigel  and  Hunter — Lynchburg — Meado^w  Bridge — Burbridge — Pound  Gap — The 
Effect  of  Morgan’s  Retreat — Washington  Exposed — The  Shenandoah  Valley  Unguarded — Early’s  Invasion 
— Sigel’s  Retreat — A Panic — Lincoln  calls  for  Militia — General  Lewis  Wallace  at  Baltimore — He  hastens 
to  the  Monocacy — At  Frederick — Wallace  joined  by  Ricketts — Preparations  to  relieve  Washington — 
Wright  and  Emory — Battle  of  the  Monocacy — A Fierce  and  Protracted  Struggle — The  Stone  Bridge— 
Ricketts  Outflanked — The  Confederate  Force — Wallace  orders  a Retreat — Wallace  by  his  heroic  resistance 
saves  the  Capital — Great  Excitement  in  Baltimore  and  Washington — Approach  of  Early  towards  Wash- 
ington— Near  Forts  Stevens  and  De  Russey — Augur’s  Reconnoisance — Early’s  Retreat — Wright  in  Pursuit 
— Snicker’s  Ferry — Island  Ford — Kernstown — Bunker  Hill  Road — Death  of  Colonel  Mulligan — McCaus- 
land  at  Cliambersburg — Burning  of  ( hambersburg — McCausland’s  Retreat — Pursued  by  Averill — Panic  in 
Maryland  and  Pennsylvania — Consolidation — The  Middle  Military  Division — Hunter  Relieved — Sheridan 
^ in  Command — Force  and  Composition  of  Sheridan’s  and  Early’s  Armies — Advance  of  Sheridan  up  the 
Shenandoah  Valley  to  Cedar  Creek — Mosby  attacks  Sheridan’s  Wagon  Train — Retreat  of  Sheridan  from 
Cedar  Creek — Destruction  of  Stock,  Grain,  etc. — Penrose’s  Brigade — Massacre  near  Snicker’s  Gap — Panic 
in  Maryland —Sheridan  at  Bolivar  Heights — Sheridan  at  Berryville — Offensive  Movements  resumc^i — 
Battle  of  Winchester — Advance  to  Cedar  Creek — Battle  of  Fisher’s  Hill — Advance  to  Staunton — Early  at 
Brown  s Gap — Murder  of  Lieutenant  Meigs — Retreat  of  Sheridan  towards  Cedar  Creek — Devastation  of  the 
Shenandoah  Valley — Rosser’s  Cavalry  Stampeded — Position  of  the  Army  at  Cedar  Creek — Early’s  Noctur- 
nal Flank  Movement — A Daring  and  Successful  Attack — A complete  Surprise — Wright  compelled  to  Retreat 
— At  Mr’dletown — Wright  again  Driven  Back — Order  Restored — Sheridan  still  Absent — Sheridan’s  Ride 
from  Winchester — The  Tide  of  Battle  Turned — A complete  Victory — End  of  the  Battle  at  Cedar  Creek- 
Honors  to  Sheridan. 


On  more  than  one  occasion  already, 
1864  been  our  duly  to  linger 

with  the  reader  in  the  valley  of 
the  Shenandoah.  Almost  from  the 
commencement  of  the  war,  the  tide  of 
battle  surged  in  or  around  this  now 
famous  valley.  It  was  already  memora- 
ble as  the  scene  of  Jackson’s  first  great 
campaign — -the  scene  of  the  humiliation, 
if  not  defeat,  of  Banks  and  McDowell, 
of  Fremont  and  Shields.  In  connection 
with  the  investment  of  Petersburg  and 
the  approach  to  Richmond,  it  has  again 
become  the  scene  of  impoifant  opera- 
tions. In  a previous  chapter,  and  in 
their  proper  place,  some  of  these  opera- 
tions have  been  described  in  detail. 


At  the  commencement  of  the  Wilder- 
ness campaign.  General  Grant  entrusted 
certain  co-operative  movements  which 
'were  to  be  conducted  in  the  Shenan- 
doah and  Kanawha  Valleys,  to  the  cai'e 
of  General  Sigel.  It  will  be  remem- 
bered that  Sigel  was  singularly  unfor- 
tunate in  a series  of  encounters  which 
he  had  w ith  Breckenridge ; and  about 
the  middle  of  May  he  was  superseded 
by  General  Hunter.  Hunter,  it  will 
also  be  remembered,  although  he  won 
a battle  and  inflicted  heavy  loss  on  the 
enemy,  found  it  necessary  to  fall  back 
from  Lynchburg,  which  he  was  invest- 
ing; and,  much  to  the  annoyance  and 
disappointment  of  General  Grant,  lie 


EARLY’S  INVASION. 


783 


made  an  unfortunate,  even  disastrous 
retreat  by  way  of  Meadow  Bridge  to- 
wards the  Kanawha. 

It  had  been  arranged  that  General 
Burbridge,  who  was  commanding  in 
Kentucky,  should  co-operate  with  Hun- 
ter in  the  movement  against  Lynch- 
burg. While  Hunter,  with  the  com- 
bined forces  of  Crook  and  Averill,  was 
to  move  direct  on  Lynchburg,  Bur- 
•bridge  was  to  enter  Virginia  on  the 
extreme  southwest,  with  the  view  of 
engaging  the  attention  of  the  enemy, 
and  preventing  any  movement  on 
Hunter’s  rear.  It  was  not  doubted  at 
the  time  that  this  two-fold  movement 
would  be  attended  with  complete  suc- 
cess ; for,  as  General  Breckenridge, 
with  his  command,  had  been  with- 
drawn to  the  assistance  of  General  Lee, 
there  was  no  Confederate  force  of  any 
importance  to  the  immediate  west  of 
the  Blue  Bidge.  We  have  already 
seen  that  Hunter  failed  in  carrying  out 
his  part  of  the  programme.  It  remains 
to  be  seen  that  Burbridge,  in  all  that 
regarded  the  general  plan,  was  equally 
unsuccessful.  The  object  of  Burbridge’s 
movement  was  discovered  by  the  Con- 
federates ; and  as  they  could  not  hope 
to  defeat  it  by  a direct  attack  in  front, 
they  resolved  to  thwart  it  by  detaining 
the  general  and  his  command  in  Ken- 
tucky. With  this  end  in  view,  the 
ever- vigilant  and  the  ever-ready  Morgan 
made  a dash  into  that  State.  Dividing 
his  troops,  he  sent  them  out  in  different 
directions.  Encountering  almost  no 
opposition,  they  moved  through  Pound 
Gap,  and  struck  successively  Paintville, 
Hazel  Green,  Owingsville,  Flemings- 


burg,  Maysville,  and  other  places,  seiz 
ing  property,  breaking  up  i-ailroads, 
burning  bridges,  and  capturing  a body 
of  National  troops  under  General  Hob- 
son, some  1600  strong.  On  the  12th 
of  June,  in  the  vicinity  of  Cynthiana, 
Burbridge,  who  had  xeturnedfrom  June 
south-western  Vbginia  and  also  12* 
had  been  working  his  way  back  with 
great  rapidity-,  fell  upon  Morgan  with 
his  whole  force,  routing  him  utterly, 
with  a loss  of  300  killed  and  wounded 
and  as  many  prisoners.  Of  Hobson’s 
command  1000  horses  and  100  men 
were  recaptured.  Burbridge’s  loss  was 
150.  Morgan’s  men,  utterly  demoral- 
alized  and  flinging  down  their  arms, 
fled  in  all  directions ; but  they  havl, 
nevertheless,  accomplished  their  pui' 
pose.  They  had  brought  Burbridge 
back  to  Kentucky,  where  his  wearied 
troops  remained  until  they  were  re 
quired  by  Sherman. 

The  failure  of  this  conjoint  move- 
ment, coupled  as  it  was  with  the  retreat 
of  Hunter  across  the  mountains,  left 
Washington  exposed  and  the  Shenan- 
doah Valley  practically  unguarded. 
Lee,  quick  to  seize  his  opportunity, 
resolved  to  make  a demonstration  in 
the  direction  of  Harper’s  Ferry.  His 
object  seems  to  have  been  three-fold — 
to  induce  Grant  to  withdraw  some  of 
the  troops  from  before  Petersburg, 
to  procure  supplies,  and  to  make 
an  attempt  on  the  National  Capital. 
Early,  who,  during  the  disability  of 
Ewell,  was  in  command  of  the  upj^er 
part  of  the  valley,  having  been  rein- 
forced by  a body  of  Brecken ridge’s 
troops,  was  quickly  in  motion  at  the 


784 


THE  SHENANDOAH. 


head  of  some  20,000  or  25,000  men. 
In  spite  of  the  hot  weather,  he  marched 
at  the  rate  of  about  20  miles  a day. 

As  soon  as  Grant  became  aware  of 
this  new  movement  of  the  enemy,  he 
ordered  Hunter,  who  was  then  on  the 
Kanawha  in  Western  Virginia,  to  trans- 
port his  troops,  with  all  possible  haste, 
by  river  and  rail,  to  Harper’s  Ferry. 
Insuperable  obstacles,  however,  lay  in 
Hunter’s  way.  The  river  was  low,  and 
the  railroad  was  broken  in  several 
places.  As  Hunter  was  not  able  to  be 
forward  in  time,  other  arrangements 
had  to  be  made  to  meet  the  emergency. 
The  Sixth  corps  was  taken  from  its 
lines  in  front  of  Petersburg,  and  sent 
to  cover  Washington.  The  Nineteenth 
corps,  under  General  W.  H.  Emory, 
A\diich  had  just  arrived  in  Hampton 
Eoads  from  the  Gulf  Department,  was, 
without  being  allowed  to  disembark, 
pushed  after  the  Sixth. 

Meanwhile,  Early  was  advancing. 
On  the  3d  of  July  he  was  at  Martins- 
burg,  where  Sigel  was  in  command. 
July  unafie  to  offer  any  effec- 

3*  tive  resistance,  retired  across  the 
river,  and  took  possession  of  Maryland 
Heights,  leaving  to  the  enemy  the  roll- 
ing stock,  heavy  trains  laden  with  sup- 
plies for  General  Hunter,  and  other 
valuable  stores.  A panic  seized  the 
entire  surrounding  country.  It  recalled 
the  memory  of  the  two  former  inva- 
sions, that  which  preceded  Antietam 
and  that  which  preceded  Gettysburg. 
Pj*eparations  were  everywhere  made  to 
leave  the  menaced  region.  At  Fred- 
erick, on  the  5th,  the  railroad  trains 
were  loaded  with  government  stores  ; 


and  arrangements  were  made  .for  the 
evacuation  of  the  city.  On  the  same  day, 
Hagerstown  was  occupied  by  the  cav- 
alry of  the  enemy ; the  stores  were  jy]y 
plundered,  and  a requisition  was  5. 
made  on  the  inhabitants  for  $20,000. 
The  money  was  paid,  and  the  raiders 
left.  President  Lincoln,  yielding  to  the 
excitement,  and  realizing  the  presence 
of  danger,  at  the  same  time  issued 
a call  for  militia — 12,000  from  New 
York,  12,000  from  Pennsylvania,  and 
5000  from  Massachusetts.  The  call 
was  promptly  responded  to  by  each  of 
the  different  States. 

General  Lewis  Wallace  was  at  that 
time  in  command  of  the  Middle  De- 
partment, having  his  head-quarters  at 
Baltimore.  Wallace  had  heard  some 
vague  rumors  regarding  the  disasters 
which  had  befallen  Sigel.  More  posi- 
tive information  soon  reached  him ; and 
he  became  aware  that  the  enemy  having 
crossed  the  Potomac  was  alreading  in 
Couch’s  Department.  Convinced  that 
a movement  was  intended  against  Balti- 
more and  Washington,  Wallace  with 
all  haste  possible,  adopted  measures  for 
checking  the  progress  of  the  invaders. 
On  the  5th  of  July,  with  the  few  avail- 
able troops  at  his  command,  he  took  a 
strong  position  on  the  Monocacy  Biver. 
There  he  concentrated  his  forces ; and 
the  ground  chosen  was  such  as  enabled 
him  to  cover  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio 
crossing,  and  the  principal  roads  leading 
to  the  cities  now  supposed  to  be  in 
danger.  On  the  6th  all  the  men,  who 
could  be  spared  from  watcliing  the 
railroads,  were  gathered  together  at  the 
appointed  rendezvous.  There  was  some 


THE  MONOCACY. 


785 


skirmishing  on  the  7th  with  varying 
success.  On  the  evening  of  that  day, 
however,  the  Confederates  who  had 
assembled  in  some  force  in  front  of 
Frederick  were  charged  by  Colonel 
Charles  Gilpin  at  the  head  of  his  regi- 
ment, and  driven  back  to  the  woods. 
The  situation  was  now  becoming  serious 
not  only  for  Wallace  but  for  Baltimore 
and  Washington.  Happily,  however, 
relief  was  at  hand.  Kicketts’  division, 
the  advance  of  the  Sixth  corps,  reached 
Washington  late  on  the  night  of  the 
6th  of  July.  Kicketts  with  his  division 
was  sent  to  Baltimore  the  same  night, 
with  orders  to  push  on  towards  the 
Monocacy  as  quickly  as  possible.  On 
the  8th  Wallace  was  joined  by  Kick- 
etts, and  made  aware  that  Wright  with 
the  remainder  of  the  corps,  and  Emory 
with  the  Nineteenth  corps,  were  on 
their  way  to  Washington.  Becoming 
more  and  more  satisfied  that  the  Con- 
federates were  bent  on  marching  to  the 
Capital,  he  withdrew  what  troops  he 
had  sent  for  the  defense  of  Frederick  to 
his  chosen  position  on  the  Monocacy. 
There  on  the  morning  of  the.  9th  he 
made  dispositions  for  battle.  His  right 
July  under  E.  B.  Tyler,  and  cov. 

9.  ered  the  railroad  at  the  Baltimore 
pike.  His  left  was  under  Kicketts  and 
held  the  Washington  pike.  On  the 
left  wing  the  main  attack  was  expected. 
Each  wing  had  3 guns — Colonel  Brown, 
with  his  own  command  and  a body  of 
mounted  infantry  guarded  a stone  bridge 
on  Tyler’s  extreme  right ; and  the  lower 
fords  were  protected  by  a body  of  cav- 
alry under  Clendennin.  Near  the  rail- 
road at  a block-house,  was  a rude  earth- 


work, mounted  with  a 24-pounder 
howitzer.  Of  Kicketts’  division,  three 
regiments  were  yet  behind.  It  was 
expected,  however,  that  they  would 
arrive  by  rail  at  one  o’clock.  Wallace’s 
entire  force  was  about  8000.  Early 
was  already  in  his  front  with  16 
Napoleon  guns,  a strong  body  of  cav- 
alry, and  some  16,000  infantry. 

It  was  near  nine  o’clock  when  Early 
opened  the  fight.  The  attack  was 
made  vdth  tremendous  fury.  The 
shock  was  felt  almost  instantaneously 
on  both  wings  of  the  National  army. 
Brown  soon  found  it  difficult  to  main- 
tain his  position  on  the  National  right. 
At  the  same  time,  a bold  and,  as  it 
proved,  successful  movement  was  exe- 
cuted against  the  National  left.  A 
large  body  of  Confederates  having 
moved  by  their  own  right,  succeeded 
in  crossing  the  Monocacy  out  of  range 
of  Kicketts’  guns.  Kicketts,  finding 
himself  outflanked,  wheeled  around  so 
as  to  face  the  foe ; but  in  his  new  posi- 
tion he  found  himself  exposed  to  an 
overwhelming  force  in  his  front,  as  well 
as  to  an  enfilading  fire  from  Early’s 
guns  across  the  stream.  The  battle 
lasted  for  many  weary  hours,  the  Na- 
tionals offering  a stout  and  stubborn 
resistance  to  the  repeated  onsets  of 
vastly  superior  numbers.  Tyler  while 
holding  his  own  position,  sent  all  the 
assistance  he  could  to  Kicketts.  It 
was  confidently  expected  that  Kicketts’ 
three  regiments  would  be  forward  by 
one  o’clock.  It  was  now,  however,  far 
in  the  afternoon ; and  as  yet  there  were 
no  signs  of  coming  relief.  Towards 
four  o’clock,  Wallace,  despairing  of  as- 


786 


THE  SHENANDOAH. 


sistance  and  seeing  the  Confederates 
issuing  from  the  woods  in  two  strong 
columns  to  deliver  a crushing  and  per- 
il aps  final  blow,  ordered  Kicketts  to 
retreat  by  the  Baltimore  road.  Brown 
still  held  the  stone  bridge.  Fighting 
desperately  he  continued  to  hold  it 
until  Bicketts’  column  was  safe.  At 
five  o’clock  Brown  was  compelled  to  give 
^vay.  He  fell  back  by  the  Baltimore 
])ike.  Tyler,  with  his  remaining  force, 
had  no  choice  but  follow.  It  was  only 
by  the  narrowest  chance  that  he  and 
his  staff,  cut  off  from  the  rest  of  the 
troops,  contrived  to  make  good  their 
escape.  At  New  Market,  the  fugitives 
were  joined  by  the  three  absent  regi- 
ments of  Eicketts’  division ; and  the 
retreat  towards  Ellicott’s  Mills  was 
covered.  The  wearied  troops  bi- 
vouacked some  12  miles  from  the  field 
of  strife.  The  battle  of  the  Monocacy 
'\v\as  a defeat  to  the  small  body  of  Na- 
tional troops  engaged  ; but  it  was  a 
gain  to  the  National  cause.  Wallace 
had  lost  nearly  2000  men,  of  whom 
over  1200  were  missing;  but  he  had 
given  Wright  and  Emory  time  to  reach 
Washington.  He  had,  in  truth,  saved 
the  Capital.  It  was  not  denied  that 
Early,  if  he  had  advanced  immediately 
after  the  battle,  might  have  captured 
Washington.  His  troops,  however,  had 
been  severely  tried  ; and  they  needed 
rest.  He  halted  for  a day.  That 
pause  made  the  Capital  secure.  Wright 
and  Emory  were  forward  in  force  ; and 
the  former  at  Grant’s  urgent  request 
was  placed  in  command  of  all  the  troops 
which  could  be  made  available  for  the 
defense  of  Washington. 


For  some  days  the  wildest  excitement 
prevailed  ; and  it  was  feared  that  both 
Baltimore  and  Washins^ton  were  in 
danger.  Johnson,  with  his  cavalry, 
moved  towards  Baltimore ; but  finding 
all  the  approaches  to  the  city  so  well 
guarded  that  success  was  not  to  be 
expected  from  any  attack  which  he 
could  hope  to  make,  he  contented  him- 
self with  a general  destruction  of  the 
railroads.  He  burned  the  bridges  and 
tore  up  the  tracks ; and  in  the  work  of 
vandalism  he  was  exceeded  by  his  lieu- 
tenant the  notorious  Gilmore,  who 
stopped  the  trains,  plundered  the  pas- 
sengers and  the  mails,  and  burned  the 
cars.  Early  moved  on  Washington, 
advancing  with  great  caution.  On  the 
12th  he  was  within  4 miles  of  the  July 
city,  on  the  north  side,  and  in  12. 
front  of  Forts  Stevens  and  de  Eussey 
His  skirmishers  and  sharpshooters  be- 
gan to  be  a source  of  some  annoyance  ; 
and  with  the  view  of  developing,  his 
strength  General  Augur  sent  out  from 
Fort  Stevens  a brigade  of  veterans. 
These  had  not  advanced  far  before  they 
felt  the.  foe  in  very  considerable  force. 
A severe  struggle  ensued,  each  party 
losing  about  300  men.  Made  aware 
of  the  concentration  of  - troops  in  Wash- 
ington, and  deeming  success  impossible, 
if  not  trembling  for  his  own  safety, 
Early  now  beat  a hasty  retreat.  On 
the  night  of  the  12  th  he  crossed  the 
Potomac  at  Edward’s  Ferry,  carr}dng 
with  him  a large  amount  of  booty,  in- 
cluding some  2000  head  of  cattle  and 
some  5000  horses. 

On  the  13th  Wright  commenced  the 
pursuit,  taking  with  him  the  two  divi- 


AVERILL  DEFEATS  EARLY. 


787 


sions  of  the  Sixth  corps,  and  the  Nine- 
teenth corps  under  Emory.  Moving 
northwestward  ^from  Washington  to 
Poolesville,  he  crossed  the  Potomac  just 
])elow  Edward’s  Ferry,  and  marched  to 
Leesburg,  where  he  was  joined  by 
Ricketts.  On  the  17th  Duffie’s  cavalry, 
of  Crook’s  command,  had  overtaken 
and  captured  a portion  of  the  enemy’s 
train  at  Snicker’s  Gap,  near  the  She- 
nandoah, and  Crook  himself  coming  up 
soon  afterwards,  the  Confederates  were 
dnven  through  the  gap  after  a sharp 
tight.  They  held  the  ferry,  however, 
on  the  west  side  of  the  river,  where 
they  planted  two  guns  and  put  a stop 
to  the  pursuit  for  a while.  On  the  18th 
the  whole  of  Wright’s  and  Crook’s 
forces  had  passed  through  Snicker’s 
Gap,  except  Duffie’s  cavalry,  sent  north- 
vard  to  Ashby’s  Gap  to  guard  against 
■m  attempt  of  the  enemy  to  flank  the 
National  right.  Shortly  after  mid-day 
the  infantry  crossed  at  Island  Ford, 
two  and  a half  miles  below  Snicker’s 
Ferry,  the  Thirty-Fourth  Massachusetts 
in  the  advance  and  driving  the  enemy. 
Crook’s  force  also  was  soon  over  the 
liver;  and  line  of  battle  was  formed. 
Colonel  Wells  with  the  Thirty-Fourth 
Massachusetts  being  on  the  left  and 
Colonel  Thorburn’s  brigade  on  the 
right.  A sharp  engagement  ensued. 
The  Sixth  corps  also  had  commenced 
crossing,  when  the  enemy,  under  Breck- 
eniidge,  finding  the  rear  attacked,  re- 
turned quickly,  and  charged  and  drove 
back  Colonel  Thorburn’s  brigade,  com- 
pelling it  to  recross  the  river.  Colonel 
Wells  then  mthdrew  his  force  in  good 
(U-der;  and  the  enemy  retained  posses- 


sion of  the  west  bank.  Duffie  had  no 
better  fortune  at  Ashby’s  Gap.  He 
had  driven  Imboden  through  the  gap 
and  across  the  river;  but  the  enemy 
having  returned  in  force,  he  was  him 
self  compelled  to  retreat.  A loss  of 
about  500  was  sustained  in  these  two 
fights ; and  some  of  the  wounded  were 
left  in  the  hands  of  the  enemy,  who  was 
then  allowed  to  pursue  his  way  leisurely 
towards  Winchester  and  Strasburg. 
The  column  under  Wright  crossed  the 
river.  It  soon,  however,  returned  and 
marched  back  to  Leesburg,  where  it 
was  divided.  Crook  with  his  portion  of 
the  force  going  to  Harper’s  Ferry,  and 
Wright  with  the  Sixth  corps  to  Wash- 
ington. 

On  the  19th,  Averill,  moving  up  the 
Shenandoah  Valley  from  Martinsburg, 
encountered  and  drove  back  a body  of 
cavalry  at  Darks ville.  Next  morning 
he  continued  his  march  in  the  same 
direction.  As  he  approached  Win- 
chester, General  Early  came  out  of  his 
old  intrenchments  to  meet  him.  The 
battle  which  ensued  lasted  three  hours, 
when  the  Confederates,  after  losing 
about  400  men  in  killed  and  wounded, 
retired  to  their  intrenchments,  leaving 
Averill  master  of  the  field,  with  4 can- 
non, several  hundred  small  arms,  and 
about  200  prisoners.  Averill’s  loss  was 
about  250. 

Soon  afterwards  General  Averill  was 
rejoined  by  General  Crook  with  his  in- 
fantry, just  returned  from  the  unfor- 
tunate affair  at  Island  Ford.  The  force 
under  Crook  was  now  about  10,000 
men,  consisting  of  Averill’s  and  Duffie’s 
cavalry  and  two  divisions  of  infantry. 


^88 


THE  SHENANDOAH. 


On  the  23d,  after  some  skirmishing  at 
Kernstown,  four  miles  south  of  Win- 
chester, the  National  cavalry  was  forced 
back,  by  the  enemy,  on  the  main  body ; 
and  on  the  following  day  they  were 
driven  through  Winchester  in  confu- 
sion towards  Bunker  Hill,  thus  com- 
pletely uncovering  the  flanks  of  the 
infantry.  General  Crook  had  draAvn 
up  his  force  in  line  of  battle  ; but  when 
his  cavalry  broke  he  was  compelled  to 
beat  a retreat.  The  Confederates, 
who  had  received  reinforcements,  and 
who  were  in  much  superior  force,  were 
able  completely  to  outflank  Crook’s 
line.  The  retreat  continued  on  the 
Bunker  Hill  road  till  night.  The  Na- 
tional loss  was  under  1200,  including 
prisoners.  Among  the  killed  was  Col- 
onel Mulligan,  whose  brigade  covered 
the  retreat. 

On  the  25th,  Crook  halted  at  Mar- 
tinsburg,  to  gain  time  for  getting  off 
his  trains;  but  after  a sharp  artillery 
engagement  he  again  fell  back,  and  on 
the  following  day  crossed  the  Potomac 
into  Maryland,  leaving  the  Confeder- 
ates in  possession  of  the  west  bank  of 
the  river  from  Williamsport  to  Shep- 
herdstown.  Another  panic  seized  the 
people  of  Maryland  and  Southern 
Pennsylvania.  On  the  28th,  General 
Kelley  crossed  the  Potomac  and  re- 
occupied Martinsburg,  which  the  Con- 
federates had  already  evacuated.  On 
the  morning  of  the  30th  a force  of  200 
or  300  cavalry,  under  McCausland, 
crossed  the  Potomac  and  marched  to- 
wards Chambersburg.  McCausland,  on 
his  arrival,  offered  to  spare  the  place 
for  the  sum  of  $500,000;  but  as  this 


was  not  forthcoming,  he  set  fire  to  the 
town  ; and  two-thirds  of  it  were  laid 
in  ashes.  McCausland  withdrew  about 
eleven  o’clock ; and  immediately  after- 
wards Averill,  who,  with  his  cavalry, 
had  just  arrived  at  Chambersburg,  set 
out  in  pursuit.  Averill  followed  Mc- 
Causland as  far  as  Hancock,  at  which 
place  the  raiders,  who  were  well 
mounted,  succeeded  in  crossing  the  Po- 
tomac. 

At  the  beginning  of  August,  great 
excitement  was  produced  in  the'  border 
regions  of  Maryland  and  Pennsylvania 
by  the  reported  reappearance  of  the 
Confederate  raiders.  Mosby  had  crossed 
the  Potomac  at  Cheat’s  Ferry,  wdth  a 
small  body  of  cavalry ; but  he  quickly 
retired,  carrying  with  him  considerable 
plunder.  Early,  it  was  rumored,  had 
entered  Pennsylvania,  at  the  head  of 
40,000  men  ; but  General  Wright,  with 
the  Sixth  and  a portion  of  the  Nine- 
teenth corps,  scoured  the  country  and 
failed  to  And  him  or  any  trace  of  his 
presence.  Pennsylvania,  however,  was 
now  thoroughly  aroused.  It  was  known 
that  the  Confederate  general,  Johnson, 
was  raiding  and  working  destruction 
in  Maryland.  On  the  7th  of  August, 
Averill  fell  upon  this  force  on 
the  Komney  road,  as  they  were  7. 
retiring  tow^ards  Moorefleld,  and  routed 
them,  capturing  all  their  artillery,  with 
many  wagons  and  small-arms,  and  500 
prisoners. 

These  successive  raids  had  convinced 
General  Grant  that  a powerful  force, 
under  a competent  leader,  was  now 
needed  in  the  valley  of  the  Shenan- 
doah. Without  delay  he  consolidated 


BEREYVILLE. 


789 


the  Washington,  Middle,  Susquehanna, 
and  Southwest  Virginia  Departments 
into  what  he  called  the  Middle  Military 
Division,  and  placed  it  under  the  com- 
mand of  General  Hunter.  Grant  visited 
Hunter,  who  was  concentrated  on  the 
Monocacy,  and  gave  him  his  instruc- 
tions. These  raids  must  be  ended ; 
and  to  prevent  their  repetition  every- 
thing which  can  not  be  consumed 
must  be  destroyed.  Hunter  expressed 
a willingness  to  be  relieved  ; and  on 
the  7th  of  August,  the  command  was 
given  to  Sheridan,  who  promptly  en- 
tered upon  his  duties. 

The  force  under  the  command  of 
Sheridan  consisted  of  the  Sixth  corps 
under  Wright,  and  the  Nineteenth  under 
Emory,  the  old  army  of  Western  Vir- 
ginia, comprising  the  Eighth  corps,  un- 
der Crook;  the  entire  first  division  of 
Potomac  cavalry ; Averill’s  division ; 
Lowell’s  brigade,  which  had  been  usu- 
ally kept  near  Washington,  and  Kel- 
ley’s command ; to  which  was  soon  after- 
wards added  Wilson’s  second  division 
— ^in  all  about  40,000  men,  of  which 
10,000  were  cavalry,  with  about  twenty 
6-gun  batteries.  The  force  under  Early, 
including  the  two  infantry  corps  of 
Rodes  and  Breckenridge,  consisted  of 
about  30,000  men,  of  which  10,000 
were  cavalry,  with  fourteen  6-gun  bat- 
teries, and  at  this  time  was  at  Winches- 
ter, 27  miles  west-southwest  of  Harper’s 
Ferry. 

At  sunrise  on  the  morning  of  the 
10th  of  August,  Sheridan  began  the 
movement  of  his  forces  from  Halltown, 
about  4 miles  west  of  Harper’s  Ferry. 
Marching  at  first  westward,  he  reached 


Charlestown  in  two  hours,  from  which 
point  the  Nineteenth  corps,  preceded 
by  the  cavalry  brigades  of  Custer  Aug. 
and  Gibbs,  struck  off  to  the  left  10- 
for  Berry ville,  15  miles  southwest. 
Further  to  the  left  marched  the  com- 
mand of  Crook,  while  on  the  right  the 
Sixth  corps,  preceded  by  the  brigades 
of  Devin  and  Lowell,  moved  along  the 
Winchester  road,  turning  off  a few 
miles  towards  Berry  ville  to  join  the 
Nineteenth.  The  weather  during  the 
march  was  oppressively  hot ; and  the 
roads,  in  rainy  seasons  almost  impassa- 
ble from  deep  mud,  were  now  covered 
with  a thick  layer  of  dust,  which  the 
rapid  tread  of  many  thousand  feet,  with 
horses,  artillery  and  wagon  trains  raised 
in  stifling  clouds.  About  noon  the 
several  cavalry  brigades  of  Custer,  De- 
vin, Gibbs,  and  Lov/ell  formed  a junc- 
tion at  Berry  ville.  Four  miles  west  of 
this  place,  on  the  road  to  Winchester, 
a body  of  the  enemy’s  skirmishers  was 
found  and  driven  off.  The  infantry 
bivouacked  in  the  neighborhood  of 
Berryville,  on  the  different  roads  by 
which  they  had  approached,  the  Sixtli 
corps  on  the  right,  the  Nineteenth  in 
the  centre,  the  Eighth  on  the  left. 
The  cavalry,  posted  in  the  advance, 
held  the  roads  leading  to  Winchester 
and  Millwood,  the  latter  place  being 
occupied  by  Colonel  Cesnola’s  regi- 
ment. On  the  11th  the  army  took  the 
road  leading  to  Winchester,  the  cavalry 
in  the  advance.  Custer’s  brigade,  on 
arriving  at  Sulphur  Springs  Biidge, 
about  4 miles  east  of  Winchester,  en- 
countered a body  of  the  enemy.  A 
sharp  skirmish  took  place,  lasting  two 


299 


790 


THE  SHENANDOAH. 


hours,  Custer  being  flanked  and  driven 
back.  Meanwhile  Devin’s  brigade,  fol- 
lowed by  Gibbs’,  had  moved  towards 
White  Post,  aiming  to  arrive  by  a cir- 
cuitous route  at  Ne^vtown,  with  the 
design  of  flanking  the  enemy,  who,  it 
was  now  ascertained,  had  begun  to 
withdraw  southward,  along  the  road 
leading  to  Strasburg.  This  object, 
however,  was  not  attained.  The  ad- 
vance under  Cesnola  encountered  the 
enemy’s  skirmishers  near  White  Post, 
and  drove  them  back  on  the  road  lead- 
ing to  Newtown.  On  amving  at  the 
road  leading  south  to  Front  Royal,  a 
brigade  of  Confederate  infantry  was 
discovered,  with  three  field  pieces,  in  a 
very  strong  position.  The  advance 
waited  till  the  remainder  of  Devin’s 
brigade  arrived,  when  a severe  fight 
ensued,  lasting  from  eleven  o’clock  till 
twelve,  but  without  any  decisive  result. 
At  four  o’clock  Crook  came  up  with 
his  infantry  and  relieved  Devin.  The 
latter  then  marched  on  to  the  assistance 
of  Gibbs,  who  had  got  nearly  to  New- 
town and  engaged  the  enemy,  and  was 
now  falling  back.  Devin  arrived  just 
in  time  to  check  the  Confederates,  who 
then  retreated  to  the  woods,  unpur- 
sued, the  National  troops  also  retiring 
about  a mile  and  bivouacking  with  a 
strong  picket  guard  in  front.  The  Con- 
federates by  hard  fighting  succeeded  in 
holding  Newtown,  and  in  covering  their 
trains,  which  passed  down  safely  towards 
Strasburg.  The  total  National  loss 
was  about  300,  chiefly  in  cavalry.  The 
infantry,  although  not  much  engaged, 
suffered  severely  in  marching,  and  lost 
many  men  from  sunstroke. 


On  the  morning  of  the  12th,  it  hav- 
ing been  ascertained  that  the  enemy 
had  retreated,  Sheridan’s  army  Aug. 
moved  forward  again.  The  cav-  12. 
airy  advanced,  skirmishing  most  of  the 
way,  to  Cedar  Creek.  About  noon 
they  found  a force  of  the  enemy  on  a 
hill  in  front  of  Strasburg.  The  Con- 
federates shelled  and  drove  back  the 
cavalry  skirmishers,  till  they  were  re- 
lieved by  the  Eighth  corps,  which  had 
now  arrived.  The  remainder  of  the 
army  in  passing  through  Newtowm  and 
Middletown  met  with  no  opposition, 
and  on  amving  at  Cedar  Creek  bivou- 
acked on  the  east  bank,  on  the  west 
side  of  which  the  enemy  held  a position 
in  some  old  breast-works.  There  was 
active  skirmishing  during  the  remainder 
of  the  day,  and  in  the  evening  some 
shelling  across  the  creek,  but  no  gen- 
eral engagement.  On  the  follomng 
day,  the  enemy  having  fallen  back  in 
the  night,  the  National  skirmishers  got 
into  Strasburg,  but  were  compelled  to 
retire  again.  On  the  evening  of  the 
14th  the  heights  in  front  of  the  town 
were  captured ; and  on  the  following 
morning  the  small  force  of  the  enemy 
which  had  held  Strasburg  for  two  days 
withdrew.  The  works  on  Fisher’s  Hill, 
however,  still  commanded  the  place. 

News,  however,  had  now  arrived 
which  caused  Sheridan  with  his  whole 
army  to  commence  a rapid  retreat  to- 
wards Harper’s  Ferry.  On  the  13th, 
while  the  National  army  was  lying  in 
front  of  Strasburg,  Mosby  with  a few 
light  troops  dashed  through  Snicker’s 
Gap,  crossed  the  Shenandoah,  and  fell 
suddenly  on  the  rear  of  Sheridan’s 


CROOKED  RUN. 


791 


supply  train  near  Berry ville  on  its  way 
to  Winchester,  about  4 miles  from  the 
gap.  The  guard,  consisting  of  Kenly’s 
brigade  of  hundred  days’  men,  became 
panic-stricken  when  Mosby  made  his 
charge.  A few  brave  men  fought  well 
for  a while,  but  the  rest  made  olf  as 
rapidly  as  possible.  Mosby  captured 
and  destroyed  75  wagons,  chiefly  laden 
with  cavalry  baggage,  besides  securing 
200  prisoners,  600  horses  and  mules, 
and  200  head  of  cattle.  He  then  re- 
tired, having  lost  only  two  men  killed 
and  3 wounded.  The  National  loss 
was  not  much  greater.  But  this  dis- 
aster in  the  rear,  though  not  fatal  in 
itself,  caused  it  to  be  reported  that 
Longstreet  with  his  entire  corps  was 
getting  into  a position  across  Sheridan’s 
line  of  communications,  and  was  cutting 
off  his  whole  army.  The  consequence 
was  that  on  the  15th  Sheridan  got  his 
Aug.  ^ corps  and  the  various  cavalry 
15.  brigades  in  readiness  to  retreat. 
The  movement  commenced  about 
eleven  at  night,  the  Nineteenth  corps 
taking  the  lead  towards  Winchester, 
followed  the  next  day  by  Crook’s  com- 
mand, the  Sixth  corps  bringing  up  the 
rear.  To  prevent  flanking  operations 
on  the  part  of  the  enemy  from  the 
gaps  in  the  Blue  Bidge,  and  to  cover 
the  retreat  in  that  direction,  Devin’s 
cavalry  brigade  had  been  sent  a few 
miles  to  the  southeast  towards  Front 
Royal.  In  the  meantime  a body  of  the 
enemy,  forming  a part  of  Kershaw’s 
division,  which  had  taken  part  in  the 
recent  actions  near  Malvern  Hills,  had 
come  by  railroad  to  Mitchell  Station; 
and  marched  thence  to  Front  Royal ; 


and  on  the  morning  of  the  16th  Cus- 
ter’s brigade,  followed  not  long  after- 
wards by  that  under  Gibbs,  was  sent 
to  the  support  of  Devin.  Custer 
arrived  soon  after  noon  and  took  posi- 
tion on  the  left  of  Devin.  The  line 
had  not  been  long  formed,  however, 
before  the  enemy  suddenly  appeared, 
marching  in  two  columns,  one  of  infan- 
try, the  other  of  cavalry,  along  the 
road  leading  northward  from  Front 
Royal  to  the  Shenandoah.  A brisk 
artillery  fight  then  took  place,  the  Con- 
federates using  8 pieces,  though  with- 
out much  effect.  Their  cavalry  having 
crossed  by  the  bridge  and  their  infantry 
by  the  ford,  they  advanced  to  carry 
the  National  batteries,  but  were  re- 
pulsed on  the  right  by  a charge  from 
two  regiments  of  Devin’s  brigade,  each 
of  which  captured  a flag.  The  Confed- 
erates were  thus  ao:ain  driven  over  the 
river.  Meanwhile,  having  secui-ed  a 
good  position  for  their  artillery,  they 
attempted  to  turn  the  National  left.  At 
this  time' a brigade  of  Kershaw’s  divi- 
sion crossed  the  river,  when  a series  of 
charges  and  counter-charges  took  place 
with  the  brigade  of  Custer.  The  fight- 
ing continued  till  after  dark ; and  when 
the  Confederates  fell  back  to  recross 
the  river  150  of  them  were  made  pris- 
oners at  the  ford.  The  killed  and 
wounded  did  not  exceed  100  on  either 
side.  This  affair  took  place  near 
Crooked  Run,  a small  tributary  of  the 
Shenandoah,  a little  below  the  conflu- 
ence of  the  north  and  south  forks. 
Early  the  next  morning  Custer’s  and 
Devin’s  brigades  fell  back  on  the  road 
leading  iiorthward  to  Winchester  to 


702 


THE  SHENANDOAH. 


follow  the  infantry  column,  carrying 
out  as  they  went  orders  which  had 
been  given  for  the  capture  or  destruc- 
tion of  all  the  stock,  grain,  hay, 
and  everything  else  which  could  con- 
Libute  to  the  sustenance  of  man  or 
beast.  Fields  and  gardens  were  rav- 
aged and  swept  clean. 

The  enemy  followed  closely  upon  the 
heels  of  Sheridan.  The  Sixth  corps, 
which  brought  up  the  rear  of  the  in- 
fantry column,  had  left  Winchester  on 
the  morning  of  the  17th,  Colonel  Pen- 
rose’s brigade,  consisting  of  only  about 
500  men,  having  been  left  behind  as  a 
support  to  Torbert’s  cavalry.  About 
Aug.  o’clock  the  advance  of  the 
17.  enemy,  approaching  by  the  New- 
town and  Winchester  turnpike,  attacked 
Penrose,  who  had  deployed  his  small 
brigade  in  skirmishing  order,  with  the 
cavalry  on  his  flank,  about  a mile  out 
of  the  town  on  the  road  leading  to 
Kernstown.  The  cavalry,  however, 
gave  way,  leaving  Penrose  to  make  the 
best  fight  he  could  behind  fences,  trees, 
and  walls.  Just  before  dark,  the 
enemy  having  received  large  acces- 
sions of  numbers,  was  able  to  flank 
Penrose’s  little  force ; and  it  was  soon 
broken,  losing  300  prisoners,  the  re- 
mainder, with  Penrose  and  a few  officers, 
making  their  way  through  Winchester, 
escaped  towards  Clifton  and  Martins- 
burg.  That  night  the  enemy  occupied 
Winchester.  The  National  cavalry 
bivouacked  at  Berry  ville,  next  day 
taking  up  the  line  of  retreat  towards 
Harper’s  Ferry,  being  much  harassed 
on  their  flanks  and  rear  by  the  Confed- 
erate cavalry. 


On  the  18th,  some  men  in  citizens, 
dress,  killed  a coi-poral  and  two  men 
belonging  to  an  advanced  post  of  the 
Fifth  Michigan  Cavalry,  picketing  at 
Snicker’s  Gap,  and  hastily  made  off. 
Several  other  similar  occurrences  took 
place;  and  on  the  19th,  General  Custer 
ordered  sqme  houses  of  disloyal  citizens 
to  be  destroyed  in  retaliation.  While 
a squad  of  men  from  the  Fifth  Michi- 
gan were  engaged  in  carrying  out  this 
order,  they  were  set  upon  by  Mosby’s 
men  and  compelled  to  fly  in  confusion : 
18  of  them  were  overtaken ; and  of 
these  15  were  killed.  This  affair  which 
took  place  near  Snicker’s  Gap  turnpike, 
was  followed  by  another  retaliatory 
order  for  the  destruction  of  more  houses 
of  disloyal  citizens. 

During  the  retreat  of  Sheridan’s 
army,  Averill,  who  commanded  at  Mar- 
tinsburg,  continued  to  hold  the  place ; 
but  the  alarm  had  become  so-  great 
on  the  18th,  that  he  abandoned  it  with 
his  main  force,  leaving  only  one  com- 
pany, which  was  driven  out  on  the  fol- 
lowing day.  Another  panic  then  arose 
in  that  neighborhood  and  spread  into 
Maryland.  In  Hagerstown,  merchants 
packed  their  goods  and  sent  them  north- 
ward ; the  quartermasters’  stores  were 
loaded  on  railroad  trains  in  readiness 
to  be  rapidly  transported  to  Frederick ; 
the  sick  and  wounded  were  sent  to 
Harrisburg.  In  the  mean  while  Averill 
took  possession  of  the  fords  of  the 
Potomac  from  Shepherdstown  to  Wil- 
liamspoii;.  Once  more  preparations 
were  made  to  resist  an  attempt  on  the 
part  of  the  enemy  to  cross  over  to  Maiy- 
land ; and  on  the  19th  Shendan’s  wagon 


BOLIVAR  HEIGHTS. 


793 


train  was  reported  to  be  safe  ” back 
at  Hagerstown.  The  panic  soon  died 
out;  and  the  enemy,  a few  of  whose 
advanced  cavalry  had  actually  got  near 
the  Potomac,  began  to  retire.  On  the 
20th  some  of  the  National  cavalry  again 
entered  Martinsburg. 

On  the  21st,  Sheridan  had  disposed 
his  army  advantageously  about  two 
miles  out  from  Charlestown  towards 
Summit  Point.  It  extended  in  a line 
from  the  Smithsfield  to  the  Berryville 
road,  the  Sixth  corps  on  the  right,  the 
Eighth  in  the  centre,  and  the  Nine- 
Aug,  leenth  on  the  left.  About  eight  in 
2 1 . the  morning  Early  came  up,  and 
A^dth  a part  of  his  force  attacked  the 
advanced  cavalry  skirmishers  on  the 
right  and  left,  easily  driving  them  in. 
The  main  body  of  his  army  moved  off 
iicross  the  National  right ; but  with  a 
small  force  he  drove  back  Wilson’s 
division  of  cavalry  from  a good  position 
on  Summit  Point  with  severe  loss.  He 
then  threw  a few  brigades  against  the 
Sixth  corps  and  the  right  of  the  Eighth ; 
and  fighting  ensued,  which  lasted  from 
ten  o’clock  till  the  close  of  the  day,  in 
the  course  of  which  the  Sixth  corps 
steadily  advanced  till  it  came  upon  the 
enemy’s  line  of  battle ; but  it  sustained 
heavy  losses  in  the  continuous  heavy 
skirmishing,  and  retired  to  its  original 
position  at  dark.  Cannonading  was 
kept  up  for  some  time ; but  the  result 
of  the  battle  was,  that  Sheridan’s  army 
again  fell  back  and  took  a position  on 
Bolivar  Heights,  his  right  resting  on 
the  Potomac,  his  left  on  the  Shenan- 
doah, his  head  quarters  at  Hall  town. 
The  position  of  the  army  here  was  ex- 


ceedingly strong,  far  outnumbering  the 
enemy  ; and  reinforcements  with  sup- 
plies were  being  sent  to  it  daily.  In  the 
mean  time  the  enemy’s  cavalry  ranged 
the  country  in  all  directions  at  will. 
On  the  24th,  a reconnoitring  force  of  3 
brigades  sent  out  towards  Charlestown 
discovered  that  Early  was  there  in  force, 
with,  his  pickets  out  towards  Bunker 
Hill.  On  the  25th,  Torbert’s  cavalry 
was  seid  to  reconnoitre  in  full  force  in 
the  direction  of  Leetown,  Wilson’s 
division  moving  out  from  Halltown 
and  uniting  with  Merritt’s  at  Kearneys- 
ville,  from  which  point  the  enemy’s 
skirmishers  retired.  The  National 
troops  had  the  advantage  for  a little 
while ; but  the  face  of  affairs  soon 
changed,  and  the  Confederates  drove 
back  the  divisions  of  Wilson  and  Mer- 
ritt, which  were  very  badly  handled, 
and  compelled  to  abandon  Kearneys- 
ville,  and  make  the  best  of  their  way 
towards  Harper’s  Ferry.  A running 
fight  ensued,  lasting  from  eleven  in  the 
forenoon  till  dark,  by  which  time  Mer- 
ritt’s division  was  safe  in  camp  at 
Bolivar  Heights  ; but  Custer’s  brigade, 
which  had  the  rear  in  the  retreat,  did 
not  fare  so  well.  At  Shepherdstown 
Custer  found  himself  cut  off  from  the 
Halltown  road,  by  which  he  intended 
to  march,  and  was  finally  compelled  to 
seek  safety  by  crossing  the  Potomac. 
The  enemy  did  not  venture  to  follow, 
but  held  the  river  from  Shepherdstown 
to  Williamsport,  and  on  the  following 
day  made  demonstrations  as  if  designing 
to  .cross  at  the  fords.  In  the  afternoon 
Thorburn’s  division  of  Crook’s  corps 
and  Lowell’s  cavalry  pushed  out  on  a 


794 


THE  SHENANDOAH. 


reconnoissance  towards  Halltown.  The 
infantry  soon  encountered  the  Con- 
federates, and  after  a contest,  which 
lasted  only  twenty  minutes,  drove  them 
to  the  cover  of  their  artillery.  Lowell 
with  his  cavalry  then  dashed  in  on  the 
flank  and  cut  off  69  prisoners,  including 
6 officers.  The  result  of  this  reconnois- 
sance was  that  the  enemy  was  found 
to  have  left  Sheridan’s  front ; and  about 
seven  o’clock  in  the  moi'nino:  of  the 
28th  he  was  again  on  the  march  in  the 
direction  of  Charlestown,  his  cavalry  in 
the  advance  carefully  reconnoitring  in 
various  directions.  By  ten  o’clock  the 
Nineteenth  corps  reached  Charlestown  ; 
and  the  entire  army  pushed  on  to  the 
old  line  of  battle  held  duriitg  the  en- 
gagement a week  before,  about  2 miles 
beyond  the  town,  the  Sixth  corps  hold- 
ing the  right,  the  Nineteenth  the  cen- 
tre, and  the  Eighth  the  left.  Then 
having  formed  line  of  battle,  the  army 
awaited  the  result  of  the  cavalry  ad- 
vance. On  the  morning  of  the  29th 
Aug.  Confederates  were  found  near 
29,  Smithsfield  ; and  General  Merritt 
making  a vigorous  attack  upon  their 
cavalry  drove  it  back  through  the  town 
and  over  Opequan  Creek.  A reconnois- 
sance was  then  made  beyond  the  creek 
by  General  Custer’s  cavalry  with  Ean- 
som’s  battery ; but  encountering  the 
Confederate  skirmishing  line  he  retired 
again  across  the  stream  in  the  direction 
of  Smithsfield,  followed  by  the  enemy’s 
infantry,  which,  however,  on  the  ad- 
vance of  General  Ricketts’  division  fell 
back  again  rapidly.  Sheridan’s  army 
then  again  retired  upon  Charlestown, 
and  remained  quiet  till  the  morning  of 


the  3d  of  September,  when  it  was  again 
put  in  motion  in  a southwesterly  di- 
rection, Crook’s  command  occupying 
the  left,  the  Nineteenth  corps  the  cen- 
tre, and  the  Sixth  the  right.  Between 
ten  and  eleven  the  second  cavaliy  gept. 
division  on  the  extreme  right  was  3. 
attacked, by  Lomax’s  cavalry  about  7 
miles  south  of  Martinsburg.  Lomax’s 
troops,  however,  were  driven  from  the 
field.  About  noon  Crook’s  command 
reached  the  vicinity  of  Berry ville, 
where  it  was  attacked  by  a large  Con- 
federate force,  approaching  from  the 
direction  of  Winchester.  Crook  hastily 
formed  his  men  ; and  a battle  ensued, 
which  lasted  till  dark,  when  the  enemy 
retired,  having  suffered  severely.  The 
remainder  of  the  army  then  coming  up, 
got  into  position  in  the  neighborhood  of 
Berryville,  and  threw  up  substantial 
breast- works.  Here  Sheridan  remained 
about  two  weeks,  content  to  hold  his 
own  in  the  valley,  without  attempting 
any  venturesome  expedition,  but  keep- 
ing his  force  well  in  hand,  so  as  to 
check  any  movement  on  the  part  of 
Early.  During  this  time  frequent  re- 
connoissances  were  made  both  by  the 
Confederate  and  the  National  cavalry. 

Sheridan  had  now  been  considerably 
over  a month  in  the  valley,  with  an 
army  decidedly  superior  to  that  of 
Early;  and  his  marches  and  counter- 
marches had  been  a source  of  much 
perplexity  and  some  dissatisfaction  with 
the  Northern  public.  His  campaign  so 
far  had  been  one  of  manceuvres,  in 
which  decisive  fighting  was  avoided. 
The  enemy,  however,  had  been  kept 
constantly  occupied  ; and  a force  which 


WINCHESTER. 


795 


Lee  could  ill  spare  had  been  kept  away 
from  Petersburg,  or  from  reinforcing 
Hood  at  Atlanta.  When  Atlanta  fell, 
it  ceased  to  be  a part  of  Grant’s  policy 
to  keep  Early  with  a large  force  idle  in 
the  valley;  and  about  the  middle  of 
September  he  paid  a hasty  visit  to  the 
upper  Potomac,  had  an  interview  with 
Sheridan,  and  gave  him  permission  to 
change  the  character  of  the  campaign 
by  commencing  a series  of  offensive 
operations. 

A reconnoissance  made  on  the  13th 
by  the  first  cavalry  division  supported 
by  Getty’s  division  of  the  Sixth  corps, 
to  Lock’s  Ford  on  the  Opequan,  showed 
that  the  Confederates  were  on  the  west 
bank  in  some  force.  Three  days  later 
it  was  discovered  that  they  had  disap- 
peared entirely  from  the  neighborhood 
of  the  left  wing  of  the  National  army 
on  the  Winchester  and  Berryville  turn- 
pike, and  that  they  had  but  a weak 
line  on  the  right.  On  the  18th  the 
Confederate  general,  Gordon,  with  his 
division  of  infantry,  occupied  Martins- 
burg,  but  was  speedily  driven  out  of  it 
again  by  Averill.  Sheridan  now  hav- 
ing become  satisfied  that  the  main  body 
of  the  Confederates  had  moved  to  the 
vicinity  of  Bunker  Hill  and  Stephen- 
son’s Depot,  resolved  by  a rapid  move- 
- ment  westward  towards  Winchester,  to 
get  into  their  rear.  On  the  afternoon 
of  the  18th,  therefore,  the  troops  were 
placed  under  arms  and  held  in  readi- 
ness to  march  at  a moment’s  notice. 
At  three  o’clock  on  the  morning  of  the 
Sept,  tile  Sixth  and  Nineteenth 
19.  corps  were  set  in  motion,  the 
Sixth  being  directed  to  march  in  par- 


allel columns  on  each  side  of  the  Win- 
chester and  Berryville  turnpike  with 
the  artillery,  ammunition,  and  supply 
trains  between  them  on  the  road,  the 
Nineteenth  corps  following  by  the 
same  road  in  similar  order.  Crook 
with  the  Eighth  corps  was  ordered  to 
move  at  five  o’clock  from  his  position 
in  the  vicinity  of  Summit  Point,  across 
the  country  in  a southw'esterly  direc- 
tion, and  form  a junction  with  the 
Sixth  and  Nineteenth  corps  at  the 
point  where  the  Winchester  and  Berry- 
ville turnpike  crosses  the  Opequan,  5 
miles  east  of  Winchester.  Torbert  and 
Averill,  with  their  large  cavalry  force, 
were  directed  to  occupy  the  enemy’s 
attention  by  demonstrating  on  his  left. 
Shortly  after  daylight  Wilson’s  division 
of  cavalry  crossed  the  Opequan  and 
skirmished  with  the  enemy,  who  were 
discovered  to  be  in  force  on  the  west 
bank.  The  march  of  the  Nineteentli 
corps  was  by  some  means  so  delayed 
that  it  did  not  cross  the  Opequan  till 
about  noon,  and  thus  Early  had  time 
to  draw  in  his  left  from  its  advanced 
position  near  Bunker  Hill.  Such  was 
the  resistance  offered  that  the  first  and 
second  lines  were  thrown  into  some 
confusion,  and  forced  to  retire  behind 
the  third ; but  as  soon  as  Sheridan  got 
his  batteries  into  a position  from  which 
they  were  able  to  silence  the  enemy’s 
guns,  order  was  restored,  and  they 
again  advanced,  retaking  the  position 
from  which  they  had  been  driven,  and 
holding  it  until  reinforced  by  Crook, 
whose  troops  had  been  kept  in  reserve 
on  the  east  side  of  the  creek.  Then 
followed  one  of  the  most  fiercely  con- 


796 


THE  SHENANDOAH. 


tested  battles  of  the  war,  the  opposing 
lines  being  at  some  points  not  more 
than  200  yards  apart.  About  three  in 
the  afternoon  Crook’s  first  division  got 
into  position  on  the  right  and  his 
second  in  the  rear,  supporting  a divi- 
sion of  the  Nineteenth  corps.  About 
this  time,  also,  Torbert,  with  Averill’s 
and  Merritt’s  cavalry  divisions,  arrived 
on  the  extreme  right.  Sheridan  then 
ordered  an  advance  along  the  entire 
line.  The  Confederates  stubbornly 
maintained  their  ground  against  the 
National  infantry,  but  gave  way  finally 
before  a most  brilliant  and  successful 
charge  of  the  cavalry,  made  at  a critical 
moment.  The  battle  lasted  till  five  in 
the  evening.  The  victory,  however, 
Avas  of  the  most  decisive  character. 
Early’s  troops  were  driven  from  the 
field  in  confusion ; and,  according  to  a 
despatch  of  Sheridan’s,  they  were  sent 
whirling  through  Winchester,”  whence 
they  retreated  rapidly  to  Fisher’s  Hill, 
3 miles  south  of  Strasburg.  Night 
prevented  Sheridan  from  continuing 
tlie  pursuit.  Such  was  the  battle  of 
Winchester.  Sheridan  captured  2500 
prisoners,  on  the  field  and  in  the  pur- 
suit. In  the  hospitals  at  Winchester 
he  found  nearly  3000  wounded.  The 
Confederates  left  behind  them,  also,  5 
guns  and  9 battle  fiags.  Early’s  entire 
loss  must  have  amounted  to  6000. 
Sheridan’s  entire  loss  could  hardly  have 
been  much  under  5000.  On  both  sides 
several  prominent  officers  were  killed, 
among  them  General  David  Russell 
and  the  Confederate  general,  Rodes. 

The  position  of  Early  at  Fisher’s 
Hill  was  one  of  extraordinary  natural 


strength.  His  line  extended  in  a west- 
erly direction  across  the  Strasburg  val- 
ley, the  right  resting  on  the  North 
Fork  of  the  Shenandoah,  the  left  on 
Little  North  Mountain.  From  this 
position  Sheridan  soon  made  prepara- 
tions to  drive  him ; and  after  a good 
deal  of  manceuvring,  his  army  about 
noon  on  the  2 2d  lay  as  follows:  gept. 
Crook’s  coi^s  on  the  right,  the 
Sixth  in  the  centre,  and  the  Nineteenth 
on  the  left.  While  Wright  and  Emory 
made  demonstrations  on  the  left  and 
centre,  and  Averill  drove  in  the  ene- 
my’s skirmishers.  Crook  moved  out  to 
the  extreme  right.  After  a long  and 
arduous  march,  he  got  round  and 
flanked  Early’s  left  between  four  and 
five  in  the  afternoon,  and  made  a furi- 
ous attack,  sweeping  down  behind  the 
enemy’s  breast-works,  and  driving  the 
Confederates  out  of  them  in  the  greatest 
confusion.  While  Crook  was  thus 
carrying  everything  before  him  on  the 
enemy’s  left,  Wright  attacked  the  Con- 
federate centre,  separating  the  two 
wings.  The  enemy  broke  and  fled 
towards  Woodstock,  leaving  behind 
him  16  guns  and  1100  prisoners.  The 
victory  at  Fisher’s  Hill  was  the  moi*e 
easily  won  from  the  fact  that  Early 
dreaded  an  attack  from  Torbert,  who, 
it  was  known,  was  coming  through  the 
Luray  Valley  with  his  cavalry.  Tor- 
bert, however,  had  been  effectively  held 
in  check  by  an  inferior  force  near  Mel- 
ford. 

Sheridan  marched,  the  night  after 
the  battle,  to  Woodstock,  but  halted 
there  in  the  morning  to  give  his  troops 
rest  and  to  await  the  arrival  of  rations. 


DEVASTATION  OF  THE  VALLEY. 


797 


Averill  pushed  on  in  advance,  drove  the 
Confederates  to  Mount  Jackson,  where 
they  made  a stand  and  resisted  his 
further  progress.  Sheridan  soon  after- 
wards advanced  to  Mount  Jackson  and 
thence  to  New  Market ; and  on  the 
25th  his  headquarters  were  at  Harri- 
sonburg, his  cavalry  moving  towards 
Staunton.  On  the  24th,  Torbert  had 
a sharp  engagement  near  Luray  with 
the  enemy’s  cavalry,  who  were  trying 
to  operate  in  Sheridan’s  rear;  but  he 
succeeded  in  driving  them  up  the 
valley;  and  on  the  26th  he  rejoined 
the  main  army.  Early  retreated  to 
Port  Kepublic,  and  thence  to  Brown’s 
Gap,  a depression  in  the  Blue  Bidge 
15  miles  southeast  of  Harrisonburg, 
which  he  held  in  force,  and  retained, 
in  spite  of  several  attempts  to  drive 
him  from  it.  Torbert,  with  Wilson’s 
division  of  cavalry  and  a brigade  of 
Merritt's,  entered  Staunton  on  the 
morning  of  the  26th  and  destroyed  a 
quantity  of  the  enemy’s  property  ; then 
marching  along  the  railroad  to  Waynes- 
boro, he  tore  up  the  track  for  the  entire 
distance,  as  well  as  the  bridges  over 
Christian’s  Creek  and  the  South  Biver, 
finally  retiring  to  Harrisonburg  by  way 
of  Staunton,  destroying  or  carrying  oft* 
lai-ge  supplies  of  forage  and  grain. 

Several  reconnoissances  made  to- 
wards Early’s  position  at  Brown’s  Gap 
showed  that  he  enjoyed  unusual  facili- 
ties for  defense.  He  had  thrown  up 
intrenchments  and  prepared  to  make  a 
determined  stand.  An  advance  on 
Lynchburg  on  the  part  of  Sheridan, 
with  Early  in  his  rear  now  receiving 
reinforcements,  would  have  been  ex- 


tremely hazardous.  His  communications 
would  have  been  at  once  interrupted. 
As  it  was,  numerous  guerrilla  bands, 
under  the  lead  of  Mosby,  White,  and 
other  partisan  chieftains,  kept  up  an 
annoying  warfare  between  Strasburg 
and  the  Potomac ; and  ever  since  the 
army  left  Harper’s  Ferry,  every  small 
party  and  every  straggler  had  been 
“ bushwhacked  ” by  the  people  of  the 
valley,  many  of  whom  had  obtained 
protection  passes  from  earlier  com- 
manders. Lieutenant  John  Meigs,  of 
the  engineer  corps,  was  overtaken  and 
murdered  in  a narrow  wooded  road 
between  Harrisonburg  and  Dayton ; 
but  in  retaliation  for  this,  all  the 
houses  within  five  miles  were  burned 
by  order  of  Sheridan.  Nothing  was  to 
be  gained  by  staying  any  longer  in  the 
neighborhood  of  Port  Bepublic  and 
Cross  Keys;  and  it  remained  only  to 
fall  back  down  the  valley  to  some 
point  which  could  be  easily  and  firmly 
held,  and  to  which  the  winter  supplies 
for  the  army  might  be  conducted  in 
safety.  On  the  6th  of  October, 
therefore,  Sheridan  withdrew  his 
forces  from  the  various  advance  points 
which  they  had  occupied,  and  marched 
northward,  destroying  on  his  way,  in 
accordance  with  orders  from  Govern- 
ment, all  the  hay,  grain,  and  forage  to 
be  found,  beyond  what  was  necessary 
for  the  use  of  his  own  army.  In  a des- 
patch dated  October  7th,  Sheridan  says: 

“ The  whole  country  from  the  Blue  Ridge 
to  the  North  Mountain  has  been  made  unten- 
able for  a rebel  army.  I have  destroyed  over 
2000  barns  filled  with  wheat,  hay,  and  farming 
implements,  over  70  mills  filled  with  wheat 
and  flour  Four  herds  of  cattle  have  been 


708 


THE  SHENANDOAH. 


driven  before  the  army,  and  not  less  than  3000 
sheep  have  been  killed  and  issued  to  the 
troops.  This  destruction  embraces  the  Luray 
and  Little  Fork  valleys  as  well  as  the  main 
valley.’’ 

As  Sheridan  returned  down  the 
valley  towards  Cedar  Creek,  he  was 
closely  followed  by  the  Confederate 
cavalry  under  Rosser,  supported  by  the 
main  body  of  Early’s  army.  On  the 
Oct.  head  of  Sheridan’s  in- 

fan  try  column  having  entered 
Strasburg  by  the  east  road,  while  the 
lear  was  still  some  miles  further  south, 
the  enemy  following  the  cavalry  on  the 
west  road  had  advanced  so  far  as  to 
get  on  the  left  flank  of  the  infantry 
column.  Custer  and  Merritt  then 
turned  and  attacked  with  their  cavalry, 
vvhen  a report  having  spread  among 
Rosser’s  men  that  the  National  infantry 
were  at  the  same  time  flanking  them, 
they  immediately  gave  way  and  broke 
into  a stampede.  The  pursuit  was 
continued  7 miles.  The  loss  of  the 
enemy  was  not  great,  being  only  about 
300  men,  including  prisoners ; but  he 
abandoned  11  guns,  4 caissons,  and  an 
ammunition  train.  Thino^s  remained 
quiet  for  several  days  after  this  affair ; 
but  on  the  12th  the  Confederates 
again  appeared  in  the  neighborhood 
of  Strasburg  and  opened  an  artillery 
fire  on  Emory’s  and  Crook’s  corps. 
These  troops  were  then  partially  with- 
drawn and  Crook  pushed  out  a recon- 
noissance,  which  brought  on  a smart 
enoraccement  of  three  hours’  duration. 
Night,  however,  closed  upon  the 
scene  without  any  advantage  and  with 
little  loss  to  either  side. 

On  the  15th,  Sheridan  went  to 


Washington  on  important  business, 
leaving  the  ai-my  under  the  command 
of  General  Wright,  whose  corps 
was,  in  the  meantime,  intrusted  to  15. 
General  Ricketts.  Fisher’s  Hill  had 
been  abandoned  as  not  affording  any 
good  defensible  line  on  its  southern 
slope,  on  which  side  Early  would  be 
likely  to  approach ; and  the  army  had 
now  lain  for  several  days  in  froiit  of 
Strasburg,  behind  breast-works  thrown 
up  on  rising  and  rolling  ground,  mostly 
along  the  east  side  of  Cedar  Creek — 
Crook  with  the  Eighth  corps  on  the  left, 
the  Nineteenth  corps  in  the  centre,  the 
Sixth  on  the  right.  On  the  right  of 
the  Sixth,  a little  in  the  rear  and  in 
reserve,  were  the  two  cavalry  divisions 
of  Custer  and  Merritt.  The  line  was 
4 or  5 miles  long,  and  following  the 
course  of  the  creek,  nearly  north  and 
south.  Crook’s  corps  rested  its  left 
flank  on  the  North  Fork  of  the  Shenan- 
doah and  its  right  on  the  Winchester 
and  Strasburg  turnpike,  the  principal 
highway  in  that  region.  Behind  Crook’s 
left  and  at  right  angles  to  it,  with  a 
view  to  guard  against  any  turning 
movement  on  that  flank,  lay  a force 
about  equivalent  to  a brigade,  known  as 
Kitching’s  provisional  division.  North 
of  the  turnpike  came  the  Nineteenth 
corps,  Grover’s  division  holding  its  left 
and  resting  on  the  turnpike,  where  it 
joined  Thorburn’s  division  of  Crook’s 
command.  The  Sixth  corps  on  the 
right,  and  the  second  cavalry  division, 
were  not  strongly  protected  with  works, 
as  was  all  the  rest  of  the  line,  but  were 
well  posted  on  high  ridges,  and  held 
firmly  the  Middle  road,  or  that  which 


EARLY’S  NOOTURN-AL  FLANK  MOVEMENT. 


700 


runs  next  north  of  the  turnpike.  A 
small  stream  called  Meadow  Kun  flows 
into  the  creek  between  the  two  roads 
mentioned.  In  front  the  National  po- 
sition was  considered  impregnable,  ex- 
cept by  surprise,  and  to  turn  it  would 
be,  it  was  believed,  an  undertaking  of 
extreme  temerity.  To  guard  against 
surprise  on  the  left,  the  North  Fork 
was  picketed  by  Powell’s  cavalry  divi- 
sion from  Cedar  Creek  all  the  way  to 
Front  Koyal.  Weir’s  battery  com- 
manded the  fords,  supported  by  cavalry, 
which  were  so  posted  as  to  prevent 
surprise  from  the  direction  of  the 
Luray  Valley.  Artillery  was  posted  in 
front  of  the  positions  of  Crook  and 
Emory,  so  as  to  command  the  ford  and 
the  bridge  over  Cedar  Creek,  as  well  as 
the  rising  ground  on  the  west  side. 
The  wagon  trains  and  reserve  artillery 
lay  in  the  rear  on  the  turnpike.  On 
the  17th  the  cavalry  on  the  right  under 
CMster  was  attacked  by  Confederate 
cavalry  and  infantry ; and  a severe 
skirmish  ensued,  resulting  in  the  re- 
pulse of  the  enemy.  Next  day  a care- 
ful reconnoissance  was  made  from  the 
left  towards  Strasburg  and  Fisher’s 
Hill ; but  no  sign  of  movement  on  the 
part  of  the  enemy  was  discovered. 
Despatches,  however,  were  captured ; 
and  it  was  thus  ascertained  that  re- 
inforcements had  been  sent  to  Early, 
for  the  purpose  of  enabling  him  to 
attack  and  defeat  Sheridan. 

Early,  in  fact,  had  just  received  a 
reinforcement  of  some  12,000  men.  His 
actual  strength  was  thus  increased  to 
27,000.  His  army  was  still  smaller 
than  that  of  Sheridan.  Encouraged, 


however,  by  so  large  an  accession  of 
strength.  Early  prepared  to  put  in  exe- 
cution one  of  the  most  audacious 
movements  of  the  war.  Before  break 
of  day  on  the  19th,  he  arranged  his 
troops  at  Fisher’s  Hill  and  began  to 
move  against  Sheridan’s  lines.  His  cav 
airy  and  light  artillery  were  directed,  to 
advance  against  the  National  right,  so 
as  to  occupy  the  attention  of  Torbert 
and  the  Sixth  corps.  His  infan  tiy 
marched  in  five  columns,  of  which  Gor- 
don’s, Kamseur’s,  and  Pegram’s  were 
ordered  to  place  themselves  by 
daybreak  on  the  left  rear  of  the  lA* 
whole  National  position,  while  Ker- 
shaw’s and  Wharton’s  Were  to  endeavor 
to  get,  about  the  same  time,  close 
under  the  intrenched  rising  ground  on 
which  lay  Crook’s  command.  To  turn 
the  National  left,  it  was  necessary  that 
Early’s  columns  should  descend  into 
the  gorge  at  the  base  of  the  Massanub 
ten  Mountain,  ford  the  North  Fork  of 
the  Shenandoah,  and  skirt  Crook’s  en- 
campment for  some  distance,  in  some 
places  within  400  yards  of  his  pickets. 
It  was  a hazardous  as  well  as  audacious 
experiment ; but  it  was  executed  with 
wonderful  skill  and,  as  the  result 
proved,  with  complete  success.  The 
movement  was  conducted  quietly,  and 
with  great  caution.  The  result  was 
that  before  daybreak  the  Confederate 
infantry,  formed  and  ready  for  battle, 
lay  within  600  yards  of  the  National 
camps.  Gordon’s  column  was  diagon- 
ally in  the  rear  of  the  Nineteenth 
corps;  on  the  left  of  Crook,  facing 
Kitching’s  provisional  division,  was 
Ramseur  supported  by  Pegram;  in 


soo 


TIIK  SIIEXANDOAII. 


front  of  Crook  was  Kershaw  supported 
by  Wharton.  Under  eover  of  the 
morning  mist,  Kershaw’s  column  moved 
rapidly  through  Crook’s  picket  line, 
and  with  tremendous  fury  rushed  upon 
the  intrenchments.  The  onslaught  was 
fearful.  The  surprise  was  complete. 

In  a quarter  of  an  hour  Crook’s 
gallant  army  of  Western  Virginia  be- 
came a disorganized  mass  of  fugitives 
in  rapid  rout  towards  the  position  of 
the  Nineteenth  corps.  Crook  lost  sev- 
eral batteries,  some  7 00  men  made 
prisoners,  and  about  100  in  killed  and 
^vounded.  The  Sixth  corps  was  at  the 
same  time  menaced ; and  its  attention 
(Kicupied  by  the  enemy’s  cavalry  and 
light  artillery.  It  fell  to  the  lot  of  the 
Nineteenth  corps  to  resist  unaided  the 
shock  of  Gordon’s  column,  now  advanc- 
ing solidly  massed  up  the  slope  of  a 
broad  bare  hill  which  commanded  Em- 
ory’s camp.  The  Confederate  force, 
including  the  divisions  of  Kamseur  and 
Pegram,  was  as  strong  as  Emory’s,  and 
was  supported  by  another  column  com- 
ing up  through  the  woods  on  the  left, 
and  along  the  turnpike  in  front.  The 
Nineteenth  corps  was  thus  not  only 
taken  in  the  rear,  but  outnumbered. 
Still  it  held  out  for  about  an  hour; 
and  then  its  left  gave  way,  leaving  a 
part  of  the  artillery  in  the  enemy’s 
hands.  The  left  and  centre  of  the 
National  army  had  now  fallen  into 
complete  confusion ; and  all  the  trains 
that  could  be  got  away  were  sent  off 
in  haste  along  the  turnpike  towards 
Winchester.  The  sun  was  now  high 
in  the  heavens;  and  the  extent  of  the 
disaster  was  rendered  visibla  The 


Confederates  had  succeeded  in  rolling 
up  the  left  of  the  line,  and  in  severing 
Powell’s  cavalry  division  on  the  ex 
treme  left  from  the  rest  of  the  army , 
and  they  were  now  forcing  back  the 
entire  centre,  and  occupying  the  in- 
trenchments of  the  Nineteenth  corps 
as  they  had  those  of  Crook’s  command. 
They  had  also  captured  18  pieces  of 
artillery,  thus  not  only  lessening  the 
National  power  for  defense,  but  in- 
creasing their  own  power  for  attack. 
The  captured  cannon  were  turned  with 
terrible  effect  on  their  late  possessors. 
The  Sixth  corps  was  now  ordered  over 
from  the  right ; and  these  troops,  exe- 
cuting quickly  a change  of  front  which 
brought  them  at  right  angles  to  their 
former  line,  were  soon  engaged  in  des- 
perate battle.  The  resistance  made  by 
the  Sixth  corps  in  covering  the  retreat 
afforded  opportunity  for  re-forming  the 
fugitives  to  some  extent;  but  the  Con- 
federates increased  their  artillery  and 
musketry  fire  to  the  utmost,  and  still 
pressed  the  National  left  flank,  with 
the  view,  apparently,  of  getting  full 
possession  of  the  turnpike,  that  they 
might  seize  the  trains  and  get  between 
the  National  army  and  Winchester. 
The  enemy  pressed  the  left  much  more 
vigorously  than  the  right.  Merritt’s  and 
Custer’s  cavalry  were  transferred  from 
the  right  to  the  left ; and  a severe  con- 
test took  place  in  the  thickly  wooded 
country  near  Middletown,  in  which  the 
left  had  been  placed  by  its  rapid  re- 
treat. About  nine  o’clock  Sheridan’s 
army  had  got  into  line  of  battle  again, 
and  made  desperate  efforts  to  check 
the  enemy.  Both  sides  used  artillery ; 


SHERIDAN’S  FAMOUS  RIDE. 


801 


bat  the  Confederates  had  greatly  the 
advantage  in  this  arm,  having  not  only 
their  own  batteries,  but  the  captured 
. guns  of  their  antagonists  besides.  The 
Sixth  corps  held  its  ground  well ; but 
Crook’s  corps  on  the*  left  was  forced 
back,  and  the  whole  line  gradually 
gave  way,  the  enemy  again  getting 
past  the  National  left  flank,  and  finally 
gaining  the  village  of  • Middletown, 
about  3 miles  northeast  of  the  posi- 
tion from  which  Sheridan’s  army  had 
been  driven.  The  principal  aim  of  the 
National  commanders  now  was  to  cover 
the  trains  and  draw  off  the  army  with 
as  little  loss  as  possible  to  Newton, 
where  they  hoped  to  be  able  to  re-form 
and  offer  an  effective  resistance.  The 
battle  had  been  completely  lost.  Camps, 
earth-works,  some  24  guns  and  1800 
prisoners — all  were  left  in  the  hands  of 
the  enemy.  The  routed  Nationals  were 
fl}dng  in  all  directions,  large  numbers 
of  them  making  their  way  to  Win- 
chester. 

The  National  army  fell  back,  as  we 
have  seen,  first  towards  Middletown, 
and  afterwards  in  the  direction  of 
Newton.  About  a mile  or  so  in  the 
rear  of  Middletown,  Wright  succeeded 
in  restoring  something  like  order. 
Sheridan  was  still  absent.  He  had 
been,  as  we  have  mentioned,  on  a visit 
to  Washington.  On  his  return,  he 
spent  the  night  at  Winchester.  It  was 
not  until  his  army  had  been  defeated 
that  he  was  made  aware  of  Early’s 
attack.  He  was  in  his  saddle  in  a 
minute.  He  had  scarcely  left  Win- 
chester when  he  beheld  sad  evidences 
of  the  disaster  which  had  befallen  his 


army.  The  road  was  covered  with 
wagon  trains  and  crowds  of  weary 
fugitives.  As  he  rode  along  on  his 
splendid  charger,  the  air  was  rent  with 
cheers.  The  fugitives  felt  abashed  and 
halted ; and  the  wounded  by  the  way- 
side  feebly  waved  a joyful  salute.  He 
did  not  slacken  his  pace  to  rebuke  or 
encourage.  Waving  his  hat  to  the 
cheering  crowds,  his  horse  still  at  full 
gallop,  he  shouted,  “Face  the  other 
way,  boys ! Face  the  other  way  ! We 
are  going  back  to  our  camps.  We  are 
going  to  lick  them  out  of  their  boots.” 
The  words  were  electric.  The  tide  of 
fugitives  began  to  turn.  As  he  neared 
the  main  body,  the  enthusiasm  became 
unbounded.  Officers  and  men  tossed 
their  hats  and  cheered  to  the  echo.  He 
repeated  his  fiery  words,  “ Boys,  if  I 
had  been  here  this  would  never  have 
happened.  We  are  going  back.  We’ll 
have  all  these  camps  and  cannon  back 
again.”  What  Sheridan  said,  he  meant ; 
and  the  men  believed  him.  He  was  in 
the  field  shortly  after  ten  o’clock. 

There  was  a lull  in  the  fight,  which 
lasted  several  hours.  Wright,  as  has 
been  mentioned,  had  already  restored 
order,  and  made  dispositions,  if  not  for 
attack,  at  least  for  effective  resistance. 
Sheridan  approved  of  the  arrange- 
ments ; and  amid  the  most  enthusiastic 
cheers,  he  rode  along  the  lines,  study- 
ing the  ground  and  encouraging  the 
men.  About  one  o’clock  Early  made 
a charge,  which  was  vigorously  repulsed 
by  Emory.  * About  three  o’clock  Shen- 
dan  gave  the  order,  “The  entire  line 
will  advance.  The  Nineteenth  corps 
will  move  in  connection  with  the  Sixth. 


802 


THE  SHENANDOAH. 


The  right  of  the  Nineteenth  will  swing 
to  the  left,  so  as  to  drive  the  enemy  upon 
the  pike.”  The  order  was  promptly 
obeyed.  The  entire  line  moved  forward 
— Getty’s  division  leading  the  charge. 
MeiTitt’s  cavalry  covered  the  left  flank; 
and  Custer’s  cavalry  was  thrown  out  on 
the  right.  As  the  Nationals  advanced 
tliey  were  checked  for  a moment  by  a 
tremendous  fire  of  artillery  and  mus- 
ketry. The  check,  however,  was  but 
momentary  ; for  Emory  swung  around 
upon  the  foe  and  by  two  gallant  charges 
greatly  disordered  his  lines.  Almost 
at  the  same  moment,  the  National  cav- 
alry fell  upon  Early’s  flank.  The  tide 
of  battle  had  already  turned.  The 
Confederates  fought  with  bravery  and 
determination  ; but  Sheridan’s  boys 
now  fighting  in  the  presence  of  their 
favorite  chief  were  not  to  be  resisted. 
The  battle,  in  fact,  was  already  won  ; 
and  what  was  so  recently  a retreat,  was 
now  changed  into  a pursuit.  It  was  a 
perfect  rout.  On  his  arrival,  Sheridan 
said  we’ll  have  all  those  camps  and 
cannon  back  again.”  His  word  was 
made  good.  That  night,  the  National 
infantry  halted  within  their  old  camps  ; 
but  the  cavalry  pursued,  hanging  upon 
the  flanks  and  rear  of  the  retreating  foe, 
until  he  was  beyond  Strasburg,  and 
night  fell  upon  the  scene.  Early  halted 
for  the  night  at  Fisher’s  Hill,  and  in  the 


morning  resumed  his  retreat  south  wai-d. 
In  the  pursuit,  all  the  captured  guns 
were  recovered.  The  Nationals  cap- 
tured not  only  their  own  guns,  but  23 
of  those  of  the  enemy,  together  with 
1500  prisoners,  -and  any  quantity  of 
horses,  mules,  ambulances,  wagons  and 
stores  of  various  kinds. 

Such  was  the  Battle  of  Cedar  Creek ; 
and  such  was  the  end  of  the  great 
campaign  in  the  Shenandoah  Valley. 
It  was  one  of  the  most  brilliant  cam- 
paigns of  the  war.  It  was  character- 
ized by  vigor  and  skill ; and  it  was 
crowned  with  success.  Sheridan  had 
captured  during  the  campaign  13,000 
prisoners  and  killed  and  wounded 

10.000  men.  His  own  loss,  however, 
was  great — reaching  the  high  figure  of 

16.000  men.  He  had  now  taken  his 
place  among  the  great  captains  of  the 
age.  His  praise  was  in  every  mouth. 
His  famous  ride  from  Winchester  has 
been  immortalized  by  the  combined 
influences  of  poetry  and  song.  It  was 
a proud  honor  which  was  conferred  upon 
him  when  some  three  weeks  afterwards 
on  the  occasion  of  the  resignation  of 
General  McClellan,  he  was  promoted  to 
the  rank  of  Major-General  in  tlie  regu- 
lar army  ; but  it  was  an  honor  to  which 
he  had  entitled  himself  by  daring,  by 
energy,  by  unwearied  activity  and  by 
success. 


THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA. 


803 


CHAPTER  XXXVIII. 


Sherman  at  Atlanta — ^How  the  Men  were  Occupied — ^Position  of  the  National  Forces — Hood  Rallies  ar 
Jonesboro — Speech  of  Jefferson  Davis  at  Macon — New  Confederate  Policy — Thomas  sent  to  Nashville — 
Movements  of  Hood — Allatoona  Pass — Arrival  of  General  Corse — General  French  demands  its  Surrender 
—Corse’s  Reply — Ready  for  the  “Useless  Effusion  of  Blood” — The  Assault — Corse  Wounded — Sherman 
at  Kenesaw  Mountain — The  Confederates  Retreat  towards  Dallas — Sherman  at  Kingston — Sherman  at 
Rome — Hood  Before  Resaca — Demands  its  Surrender — Colonel  Weaver's  Reply — The  National  Post  at 
Dalton  Captured — Sherman  at  Resaca — Communications  with  Rome  Re-opened — Affairs  at  Snake  Creek 
Gap  and  Ship’s  Gap — Rapid  Retreat  of  Hood  to  Gadsden — Beauregard  Assumes  Command — Sherman  at 
Gaylesville— New  Plan  of  Campaign — Sherman’s  Proposal  to  Grant — The  March  to  the  Sea  Suggested — 
Grant  Consents — Sherman  Prepares  for  the  March — He  Sends  some  of  his  Troops  to  Thomas — Sherman’s 
Army  Re-organized — Atlanta  in  Flames — The  Railroad  Routes  to  the  Sea — Order  of  March — Troops  to 
Live  on  the  Country — “ Uncle  Billy”  and  the  Troops — The  Men  in  Fine  Spirits — Feint  on  Macon — Battle 
of  Griswoldville — Occupation  of  Milledgeville — Flight  of  the  Legislators — Howard  Crosses  the  Oconee — 
Occupation  of  Sandersville — Sherman  at  Tennille  Station — Kilpatrick  Defeats  Wheeler — Crossing  the 
Ogeechee — Approach  to  Savannah — The  Savannah  and  Ogeechee  RiverS; — Captain  Duncan  and  two  Scouts 
Reach  the  Fleet — Rejoicing  in  the  North — Foster’s  Co-operative  Movement — Fort  McAllister — Preparing 
to  Assault — The  Port  Reduced — Arrival  of  Foster  and  Dahlgren — Sherman  on  board  the  Nemaha — The 
Surrender  of  Savannah  Demanded — Hardee  Refuses — Kilpatrick  Cuts  the  Gulf  Railroad — Savannah 
Invested — Union  Causeway — Corduroy  Road — Vigorous  Preparations  for  the  Assault — Hardee’s  Position 
Desperate — After  Destroying  all  the  Confederate  Property,  he  Retreats  during  the  Night — Sherman  Enters 
the  City — His  Christmas  Present  to  President  Lincoln — Halleck  and  Grant’s  Congratulations — A Compli- 
ment from  Grant — A Successful  Campaign — The  Inherent  Weakness  of  the  Confederacy  Demonstrated — 
Fearful  Destruction  of  Property — General  Geary  Appointed  Military  Governor  of  Savannah — Resolution 
of  Submission  to  the  Laws  of  the  United  States — Sherman  Perfecting  his  Plan  for  the  March  through  the 
Carolinas. 


After  the  fall  of  Atlanta,  there  was 
a lull  in  the  campaign.  The 
* wearied  armies  on  both  sides 
were  permitted  to  enjoy  a brief  period 
of  repose.  They  were  not,  however, 
allowed  to  be  wholly  idle.  Hood  col- 
lected and  recruited  his  forces  at  Love- 
joy’s  Station.  Sherman’s  head-quarters 
were  at  Atlanta.  Some  of  his  men 
obtained  leave  of  absence.  Those  who 
remained  were  employed  in  the  con- 
struction of  huts  and  barracks,  in 
strengthening  the  defenses  of  the  city, 
and  in  repairing  the  railroads.  Supplies 
and  recruits  were  hurried  forward  from 


Chattanooga.  It  seemed  as  if  Sherman 
intended  to  hold  Atlanta  with  a strong 
garrison,  and  to  make  it  the  base  for 
further  operations  towards  the  South. 
Before  the  end  of  September  the  place 
was  so  strengthened  and  filled  with 
supplies  that,  with  a small  garrison,  it 
would  have  been  able  to  resist  the 
attacks  of  vastly  superior  numbers. 

The  city  was  held  by  the  army  of 
the  Cumberland  under  Thomas.  The 
army  of  the  Tennessee,  under  Howard, 
was  grouped  about  East  Point,  and  the 
army  of  the  Ohio,  under  Schofield,  held 
Decatur.  The  cavalry  consisted  of  two 


B04 


THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA. 


divisions : one  stationed  at  Decatur, 
under  Garrard;  the  other,  under  Kil- 
patrick, was  posted  near  Sandtown, 
with  a pontoon  bridge  over  the  Chatta- 
hoochee, from  which  position  any 
movement  of  the  enemy  towards  the 
west  could  be  watched.  Numerous 
changes  occurred  in  the  composition  of 
the  armies.  The  term  of  service  of 
many  of  the  regiments  had  expired, 
and  the  temporary  suspension  of  active 
operations  afforded  an  opportunity  to 
consolidate  and  reorganize,  to  reclothe 
and  equip  the  men,  and  to  make  prep- 
arations for  another  campaign.  The 
garrisons  in  the  rear  also,  and  at  points 
along  the  railroad,  were  strengthened 
to  make  the  communications  more  se- 
cure. Wat^ner’s  division  of  the  Fourth 
corps  and  Morgan’s  division  of  the 
Fourteenth  corps  were  sent  back  to 
Chattanooga. 

General  Hood,  recovering  with  sur- 
pi’ising  elasticity  from  the  stunning 
blow  which  he  received  in  the  loss  of 
Atlanta,  rallied  and  reorganized  his 
forces  at  Jonesboro,  receiving  his  sup- 
plies by  the  Macon  Railroad.  His 
army  numbered  about  40,000  men,  ex- 
clusive of  the  Georgia  militia,  which, 
as  if  to  give  the  impression  that  no 
immediate  offensive  movement  was  con- 
templated, were  withdrawn  by  Gov- 
ernor Brown  soon  after  the  evacuation 
of  Atlanta.  The  governor  expressed  a 
hope,  however,  that  he  should  be  able 
to  return  the  militia  force  to  Hood’s 
command  in  greater  numbers  and  with 
equal  efficiency  when  the  interests  of 
the  public  service  should  require  it. 

It  was  not  the  intention  of  the  Con- 


federate authorities,  however,  to  allow 
their  principal  Southern  army  to  remain 
inactive.  Whatever  declarations  they 
might  make  to  the  public  in  the  hoj>e 
to  belittle  Sherman’s  successes,  they 
were  well  aware  that  the  capture  of 
Atlanta  was  a blow  at  the  heart  of  the 
Confederacy,  and  that  it  would  be  so 
considered  by  the  Southern  people.  It 
was  evident  that  if  Georgia  and  the 
Gulf  States  were  to  be  saved  to  the 
Confederacy,  something  must  be  done, 
and  that  without  delay,  to  arrest  the 
victorious  progress  of  the  National 
army.  While  affairs  were  in  this  posi- 
tion, Jefferson  Davis  set  out  on  a tour 
of  inspection  through  the  South ; and 
at  Macon,  on  the  23d  of  Septem-  gepl. 
ber,  he  delivered  an  address  on  23. 
the  crisis,  marked  by  so  many  indiscreet 
admissions  that  some  of  the  Confederate 
journals  refused  to  believe  the  reports 
to  be  genuine.  In  this  address  he 
spoke  with  undisguised  vexation  of  the 
depletion  of  Hood’s  ranks  by  desertion 
and  absenteeism ; and  he  promised  that 
if  all  the  men  away  without  leave  would 
return  to  their  duty,  Sherman’s  army 
should  meet  the  fate  that  befell  that  of 
the  French  empire  in  its  retreat  from 
Moscow. 

The  new  policy  to  be  inaugurated  in 
the  South  by  the  Confederates  was  in 
a measure  foreshadowed  by  the  speech 
of  Davis  at  Macon.  It  was  borrowed 
from  that  which  Sherman  had  himself 
so  successfully  earned  out  in  his  cap- 
ture of  Atlanta,  and  had  the  merit  of 
boldness  if  not  of  originality  and  far- 
sightedness. In  accordance  with  this 
new  plan  of  the  Confederates,  Hood’s 


HOOD  AT  DALLAS. 


805 


whole  army  was  to  move  rapidly  in  a 
compact  body  to  the  north  of  Atlanta, 
and  after  breaking  up  the  railroad 
between  the  Chattahoochee  and  Chat- 
tanooga, push  on  to  Bridgeport  and 
there  destroy  the  great  railroad  bridge 
over  the  Tennessee  Kiver.  Atlanta 
would  then  be  cut  off  from  Chat- 
tanooofa  and  the  latter  from  Nashville. 
Sherman  thus  separated  from  his  prim- 
ary and  secondary  bases,  would  find 
Atlanta  but  a barren  conquest.  It 
would,  indeed,  have  been  difficult  for 
him  to  hold  it ; for  he  would  soon  have 
found  himself  in  perplexity  from  the 
want  of  provisions  and  supplies,  which 
would  be  intercepted  in  all  directions 
by  the  Georgia  militia.  Forrest,  un- 
doubtedly the  best  of  the  Confederate 
(cavalry  officers,  was  already  operating 
in  southern  Tennessee,  where  the  Na- 
tional force  was  barely  adequate  to  the 
task  of  protecting  the  communications 
between  Nashville  and  Chattanooga. 
It  was  anticipated,  also,  that  the  re- 
sumption of  offensive  movements  on 
the  part  of  Hood  would  restore  the 
morale  of  his  army,  which  had  become 
dispirited  by  its  long  series  of  retreats 
and  reverses  ; and  that  the  opposite 
effect  would  be  produced  on  the  army 
of  Sherman  if  compelled  to  abandon 
conquests  effected  at  the  cost  of  so 
many  severe  battles  and  painful 
marches.  Such  was  the  plan  devised 
by  the  Confederate  authorities — a plan 
which  if  vigorously  carried  out,  and 
against  a less  able  general  than  Sher- 
man, might  have  been  productive  of 
the  most  disastrous  consequences  to  the 
National  arms.  It  will  be  seen  that 


Sherman  was  fully  equal  to  the  emer- 
gency, and  that  the  prophecies  of  the 
Southern  press,  that  the  “ great  flanker  ” 
was  about  to  be  ^^out  flanked,”  were 
not  to  be  fulfilled.  On  the  28th 
of  September,  as  soon  as  he  be-  -S. 
came  convinced  that  the  enemy  intend- 
ed to  assume  the  offensive,  Sherman 
sent  Thomas,  his  second  in  command, 
to  Nashville,  to  organize  the  new  troops 
expected  to  arrive  there,  to  make  pre- 
liminary preparations,  and  to  look  after 
Forrest. 

In  spite  of  strenuous  opposition, 
Hood  was  retained  at  the  head  of  the 
Confederate  army,  with  Cheatham, 
S.  D.  Lee,  and  Stewart,  commanding 
his  three  corps.  Wheeler  remained  in 
command  of  the  cavalry,  which  had 
been  largely  reinforced.  Hood  soon 
moved  westward  towards  the  Chatta- 
hoochee, taking  a position  facing  Sher- 
man and  covering  the  West  Point 
Eailroad  about  Palmetto  Station.  He 
also  threw  a pontoon  bridge  over  the 
Chattahoochee,  and  sent  cavalry  de- 
tachments beyond  it  in  the  direction  of 
Carrollton  and  Powder  Springs.  About 
the  2d  of  October  his  whole 
army  was  over  the  Chattahoochee,  2 • 
and  on  the  march  towards  Dallas, 
where  his  three  corps  were  directed  to 
concentrate.  At  this  point  he  was  able 
to  threaten  Kome  and  Kingston,  as  well 
as  the  fortified  places  on  the  railroad 
to  Chattanooga,  while  there  remained 
open  to  him  in  case  of  defeat,  a line 
of  retreat  southwestward  into  Alabama. 
Advancing  eastward  from  Dallas  to 
the  railroad,  he  captured  Big  Shanty 
and  Ackworth  Stations,  broke  the  tele- 


994 


806 


THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA. 


graph  wires,  and  destroyed  the  railroad 
between  those  places.  He  also  sent 
an  infantry  division  under  General 
French  against  the  National  post  at 
Allatoona  Pass  through  which  lay  the 
railroad  and  Sherman’s  line  of  commun- 
ications. Here  were  stored  more  than 
1,000,000  rations  for  the  National 
army,  the  capture  of  which  would 
prove  an  important  acquisition  to  Hood’s 
impoverished  commissariat.  The  natural 
strength  of  the  position  at  Allatoona 
Pass  was  such,  that  1000  men  could 
hold  it  against  ten  times  their  number  so 
long  as  supplies  held  out.  Its  redoubts 
were  at  this  time  garrisoned  by  only 
three  small  regiments  under  Colonel 
Tourtellotte.  In  the  possession  of  the 
Confederates  it  would  have  effectually 
interrupted  the  National  communica- 
tions between  Chattanooga  and  Atlanta, 
and  might  have  necessitated  the  evacua- 
tion of  the  latter  city.  It  will  be  seen, 
therefore,  that  Hood  had  excellent  rea- 
sons for  striking  suddenly  and  with  a 
large  force  at  this  point. 

Well  aware  that  his  seat  at  Atlanta 
was  insecure  while  his  long  line  of  com- 
munications lay  exposed  to  interrup- 
tion, Sherman,  on  hearing  that  Hood 
had  crossed  the  Chattahoochee,  des- 
patched General  Corse  with  a division 
of  the  Fifteenth  corps  to  Pome.  Slocum 
was  ordered  to  hold  Atlanta  and  the 
railroad  bridge  over  the  Chattahoochee 
with  the  Twentieth  corps.  A freshet  of 
the  river  having  carried  away  the 
bridges,  three  pontoons  were  laid  on 
the  4th  of  October,  and  the  Fifteenth, 
Seventeenth,  Fourth,  Fourteenth,  and 
Twenty-Third  corps  were  put  in  motion 


towards  Smyrna  camp-ground.  The 
following  day  they  .were  moved  to  the 
strong  position  about  Kenesaw  Moun- 
tain. Anticipating  the  enemy’s  move- 
ment against  Allatoona  Pass,  Sherman 
had  already  signalled  and  telegraphed 
to  Corse  to  reinforce  that  post  from 
Pome,  and  hold  it  until  the  main  body 
of  the  National  army  could  come  to  his 
assistance.  On  receiving  the  message, 
Corse  immediately  placed  a brigade  of 
900  men  on  the  cars  and  reached  Alla- 
toona  on  the  night  of  the  4th,  just  in 
time  to  be  ready  to  meet  the  attack  of 
French’s  division.  With  this  addition 
the  garrison  numbered  1600  men,  with 
6 guns. 

Early  on  the  morning  of  the  5th, 
French  with  6000  men,  and  sup- 
ported  by  two  other  divisions,  5. 
approached  Allatoona,  and  sent  a letter 
to  Corse  demanding  an  immediate  sur- 
render, in  order  to  avoid  “a  useless 
effusion  of  blood,”  giving  only  five 
minutes  for  an  answer.  Corse  was 
ready  ^vithin  the  time  specified.  His  re- 
ply was  that  he  and  his  command  were 
ready  for  the  “ useless  effusion  of  blood  ” 
as  soon  as  it  was  agreeable  to  French. 
This  was  immediately  followed  by  a 
Confederate  attack  which  commenced 
at  eight  o’clock  and  continued  till  two 
in  the  afternoon.  Driven  by  the  des- 
perate assaults  of  overwhelming  num- 
bers, Code’s  troops  contested  the  ground 
foot  by  foot,  from  their  intrenchments 
to  the  hill,  and  from  the  hill  to  the 
fort.  Corse,  although  bleeding  and  at 
times  insensible,  having  been  wounded 
early  in  the  action,  still  fought  on  with 
an  obstinacy  and  desperation  worthy  of 


SHERMAN  AT  ROME. 


S07 


tlie  great  stake  for  which  he  contended. 
During  the  heat  of  the  contest,  about 
ten  o’clock,  Sherman  reached  the  Kene- 
saw  Mountain,  18  miles  distant  from 
iVllatoona,  and  from  its  summit  saw 
the  smoke  of  battle  and  heard  faintly 
the  sounds  of  artillery.  The  distance 
being  too  great  to  send  troops  to  take 
part  in  the  battle,  Sherman  directed 
General  Cox  with  the  Twenty-Third 
corps  to  move  rapidly  westward  from 
the  base  of  Kenesaw,  strike  the  road 
from  Allatoona  to  Dallas,  and  threaten 
the  rear  of  the  attacking  force.  He 
also  succeeded  in  getting  a signal 
message  to  Corse  notifying  him  of  his 
presence.  Sherman  had  great  confi- 
dence in  that  general  and  in  the  result 
of  the  battle,  and  said  while  reviewing 
it  from  his  remote  stand-point : I know 
Corse ; so  long  as  he  lives,  the  Alla- 
toona Pass  is  safe.”  The  assaulting 
columns  of  the  enemy,  thrown  back 
again  and  again,  were  finally  compelled 
to  retire  towards  Dallas.  Their  retreat 
was  hastened  by  apprehensions  of  the 
co-operating  movement  of  Cox  towards 
the  only  road  by  which  they  could 
escape.  Unfortunate  delays,  arising 
from  rain  and  mud,  prevented  Cox 
from  intercepting  the  Confederates  on 
the  road  back  to  Dallas ; but  they  left 
800  killed,  wounded,  and  prisoners,  in 
the  hands  of  Corse.  The  garrison  lost 
nearly  half  its  number,  in  killed  and 
\vounded.  The  little  town  of  Alla- 
toona was  reduced  to  a mere  wreck  by 
the  severe  fire  of  the  Confederates.  All 
the  artillery  and  cavalry  horses  were 
killed.  The  valuable  stores,  however, 
•were  saved,  and  the  fort  and  pass  were 


held.  This  battle  was  the  decisive 
event  in  the  pursuit  of  Hood.  Corse, 
notwithstanding  his  severe  wounds, 
was  able  to  return  the  same  ni^ht  to 
Pome  with  the  remainder  of  his  com- 
mand. The  only  important  injury  done 
by  the  Confederates  in  this  vicinity 
was  the  destruction  of  6 or  7 miles  of 
railroad  between  Big  Shanty  and  Alla- 
toona, which  was  immediately  put  in 
course  of  restoration.  Sherman  re- 
mained several  days  in  the  vicinity  of 
Allatoona,  watching  the  movements  of 
Hood,  suspecting  he  would  march  for 
Pome,  and  thence  towards  Bridgeport, 
or  else  to  Kingston. 

On  the  6th  and  7th,  Sherman  pushed 
out  his  cavalry  towards  Burnt 
Hickory  and  Dallas,  and  disco v-  6. 

ered  that  the  enemy  had  moved  west- 
ward. Inferring  from  this  that  Hood 
would  attempt  to  break  the  i*ailroad 
again  in  the  neighborhood  of  Kingston, 
he  put  his  army  in  motion  on  the 
morning  of  the  8th  through  Allatoona 
Pass  and  arrived  at  Kingston  on  the 
10th.  There  he  learned  that  Hood 
had  threatened  but  passed  by  Pome, 
and  that  he  was  crossing  the  Coosa  by 
a pontoon  bridge  11  miles  below.  He 
therefore,  on  the  11th,  moved  his 
army  to  Pome,  and  sent  Gar-  11. 
rard’s  cavalry  and  the  Twenty-Third 
corps  under  Cox  across  the  Oostanaula 
to  threaten  the  flanks  of  the  enemy  as 
he  passed  northward.  Garrard  drove 
a Confederate  cavalry  brigade  beyond 
the  Narrows  leading  into  the  valley  of 
the  Chattooga,  and  captured  2 field- 
pieces. 

Hood,  however,  moved  with  great 


808 


THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA. 


rapidity  on  his  northward  march,  and 
on  the  12  th  appeared  with  Stewart’s 
Oct.  corps  in  front  of  Resaca,  and  de- 
12.  manded  its  immediate  and  un- 
conditional surrender.  He  promised 
that  all  the  white  officers  and  soldiers 
should  be  parolled  in  a few  days,  but 
he  threatened  that  if  the  place  should 
be  captured  by  assault,  no  prisoners 
would  be  taken.  To  this  demand 
Colonel  Weaver,  who  held  the  defenses 
of  the  place  with  600  men  and  3 pieces 
of  artillery,  replied : “ If  you  want  it, 
come  and  take  it.”  The  garrison 
manned  the  rifle-pits  surrounding  the 
works,  and  kept  the  enemy’s  skir- 
mishers at  bay.  During  the  day  masses 
of  Confederate  troops  continued  to 
pass  the  fort ; but  no  serious  attack 
was  made  on  them,  the  enemy  being 
more  intent  on  destroying  the  railroad 
towards  Dalton.  Sherman  had  at  first 
intended  to  move  his  army  into  the 
Chattooga  Valley,  to  interpose  between 
the  enemy  and  his  line  of  retreat  down 
the  Coosa,  but  fearing  that  Hood 
would  then  move  eastward  by  Spring 
Place  and  down  the  Federal  road,  he 
determined  to  move  against  him  at 
Resaca.  Although  repulsed  at  that 
place  by  Colonel  Weaver,  Hood  had 
succeeded  in  breaking  up  the  railroad 
from  Tilton  to  Dalton.  At  Tilton, 
during  the  night  of  the  12th,  he  cap- 
tured a blockhouse  garrisoned  by  a 
part  of  the  Seventeenth  Iowa,  after  a 
gallant  defense.  At  Dalton,  owing  to 
the  negligence  of  the  National  scouts, 
the  Confederates  were  able  to  surround 
the  fort  garrisoned  by  the  Forty-Fourth 
colored  regiment,  under  Colonel  John- 


ston, before  adequate  preparations  for 
defense  could  be  made.  A summons 
to  surrender,  signed  by  Hood,  similar 
to  that  sent  Colonel  Weaver  being  sent 
in.  Colonel  Johnston,  finding  that  Buz- 
zard Roost  and  other  important  points 
commanding  his  position  were  already 
in  the^  enemy’s  hands,  complied  with 
the  demand.  During  the  14th  and 
15th  the  enemy  was  occupied  in  com- 
pleting the  destruction  of  the  railroad 
as  far  as  Tunnel  Hill.  The  rolling 
stock  had  been  mostly  removed ; and  of 
this  kind  of  property  only  a few  box 
cars  were  destroyed. 

With  the  main  body  of  his  army, 
Sherman  arrived  at  Resaca  on  the  14th, 
where  he  encamped  for  the  night. 
Determining  to  strike  Hood  in  flank  or 
force  him  to  battle,  he  dmected  the 
army  of  the  Tennessee,  under  Howard, 
to  move  to  Snake  Creek  Gap,  where 
a portion  of  the  enemy’s  forces  held  the 
old  National  lines,  and  General  Stanley 
with  the  Fourth  and  Fourteenth  corps 
to  march  by  way  of  Tilton  across  the 
mountains  to  the  rear  of  the  gap  in  the 
neighborhood  of  Villanow.  Howard 
skirmished  with  the  Confederates  dur- 
ing the  forenoon  of  the  15th^ 
with  the  view  of  detaining  them  15. 
till  Stanley  should  have  time  to  get  in 
their  rear ; but  they  gave  way  about 
noon,  and  though  followed  through  the 
gap,  escaped  before  Stanley  had  been 
able  to  reach  the  fuidher  end  of  the 
pass. 

The  approach  of  the  National  columns 
now  warned  Hood  to  move  olf  west- 
ward; and  the  16th  of  October  found 
him  in  full  retreat  for  Lafayette. 


GAYLESVILLE. 


809 


Towards  that  place  also  Sherman 
moved  his  army,  with  the  view  of  cut- 
ting off  Hood’s  retreat.  At  Ship’s 
Gap,  Hood  left  some  tr9ops  intrenched, 
to  detain  his  pursuers;  but  Wood’s 
division  of  the  Fifteenth  corps  rapidly 
carried  the  advanced  posts  held  by  two 
companies  of  a South  Carolina  regi- 
ment, making  the  men  prisoners.  The 
remainder  of  the  regiment  escaped  to 
the  main  body  near  Lafayette.  Next 
morning  Sherman’s  force  passed  over 
into  the  valley  of  the  Chattooga,  the 
army  of  the  Tennessee  moving  in  pur- 
suit, by  way  of  Lafayette  and  Alpine, 
towards  Blue  Pond;  the  army  of  the 
Cumberland  by  Summerville  and  Mel- 
ville Post  Office  to  Gaylesville,  and  the 
army  of  the  Ohio  and  Garrard’s  cavalry 
from  Villanow,  Dirt-town,  and  Goover’s 
Gap  to  Gaylesville.  Hood,  however, 
was  little  encumbered  with  trains ; and 
as  he  marched  with  great  rapidity  in 
a southwesterly  direction,  through  a 
broken  and  mountainous  country,  he 
succeeded  in  getting  into  the  narrow 
gorge  formed  by  the  Lookout  range 
abutting  against  the  Coosa  River  in  the 
neighborhood  of  Gadsden. 

During  this  retreat  of  Hood  into 
northern  Alabama,  he  had  frequent 
opportunities  to  join  battle  with  his 
pursuers.  Of  these,  however,  he  de- 
clined to  take  advantage.  He  remained 
at  Gadsden  till  near  the  end  of  October, 
receiving  a few  reinforcements  brought 
Oct.  Beauregard,  who  on  the 

17.  17th  assumed  command  of  the 
(.-onfederate  Military  Division  of  the 
West,  Hood  still  retaining  his  special 
command;  though  subject  to  the  super- 


vision or  direction  of  Beauregard.  The 
latter  published  an  address  appealing 
to  his  countrymen  of  all  classes  and 
sections  for  their  support  and  confi- 
dence, and  urging  soldiers  absent  with- 
out leave  to  return  to  the  army.  The 
address  seems  to  have  had  little  effect. 

On  the  19th  the  National  armies  lay 
grouped  about  Gaylesville,  in  the 
rich  valley  of  the  Chattooga,  a 19. 
region  abounding  in  corn  and  cattle. 
Here  Sherman  resolved  to  let  his  men 
live  on  the  country  for  a while,  content 
for  the  present  to  watch  his  enemy 
without  wearing  out  his  troops  in  a use- 
less pursuit.  Hoping  that  Hood  would 
turn  towards  Huntersville  and  Bridge- 
port, he  posted  the  army  of  the  Ten- 
nessee near  Little  River,  with  orders  to 
keep  within  supporting  distance  of  the 
cavalry,  which  was  directed  to  watch 
Hood  in  the  neighborhood  of  Hill’s 
Valley,  and  give  the  earliest  notice  pos- 
sible of  his  turning  northward.  The 
army  of  the  Ohio  was  posted  at  Cedar 
Bluff,  with  orders  to  lay  a pontoon 
bridge  across  the  Coosa  and  reconnoitre 
towm’ds  Center  and  in  the  direction  of 
Blue  Mountain.  The  army  of  the 
Cumberland  w^as  kept  in  reserve  at 
Gaylesville.  In  the  mean  time  com- 
munications were  opened  to  Rome,  and 
a large  force  was  engaged  in  repairing 
the  railroads.  The  injuries  done  to 
these  were  confined  to  two  sections,  one 
7 miles  long  betw^een  Big  Shanty  and 
Allatoona,  and  the  other  21  miles  long, 
between  Resaca  and  Tunnel  Hill.  By 
the  20th  the  road  was  in  running  order 
again  from  Resaca  to  Atlanta.  On  the 
28th,  trains  left  Chattanooga  for  the 


810 


THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA. 


latter  place.  Atlanta  was  abundantly 
supplied  with  provisions ; but  forage  was 
scarce;  and  Slocum  was  instructed  to 
send  strong  detachments  in  the  direc- 
tion of  South  Eiver,  for  the  purpose  of 
collectinor  corn  and  fodder.  He  was 

O 

also  to  put  his  wagon  trains  in  good 
condition  for  further  service. 

Hood  had  not  succeeded  in  interrupt- 
ing the  National  communications  to 
such  a degree  as  would  compel  the 
evacuation  of  Atlanta.  Having  failed 
permanently  to  disable  the  railroad,  he 
had  been  driven  into  nothern  Alabama, 
where  he  was  now  separated  from  that 
admirable  railroad  system  by  means  of 
which  his  army  had  been  so  well  and  so 
long  supplied.  Georgia  and  the  whole 
southeast  was  left  exposed  to  the  inva- 
ders; but  on  the  other  hand  there 
seemed  open  to  Hood  the  opportunity 
of  caiTying  the  war  into  Middle  Ten- 
nessee and  Kentucky,  where  the  richly 
stored  cities  and  farms  afforded  tempting 
chances  for  plunder.  His  experience 
during  the  retreat  had  been  such  as  to 
satisfy  him  that  he  was  able,  with  the 
army  at  his  command,  to  endanger  at 
any  moment,  Sherman’s  communications. 
It  was  his  conviction  that  Sherman 
would  not  be  able  to  follow  him,  and 
that  even  then,  he  would  have  but 
little  chance  of  overtaking  his  army. 
Sherman,  however,  had  resolved  upon 
a bolder  course,  and  one  promising 
greater  and  more  important  results. 
He  had  previously  submitted  to  General 
Grant  the  outlines  of  a plan  for  the  de- 
struction of  Atlanta  and  the  railroad 
back  to  Chattanooga,  to  be  followed  by 
a march  through  the  heart  of  Georgia 


to  one  of  the  Atlantic  seaports.  This 
■proposition  he  now  renewed  from 
Gayles ville,  and  it  received  the  sanction 
of  the  commander-in-chief.  On  the  2d 
of  November,  Grant  wrote  to  Shennan  : 
“with  the  force  you  have  left  with 
General  Thomas  he  must  be  able  to  take 
care  o^  General  Hood,  and  destroy  him. 
I do  not  see  that  you  can  withdraw 
from  where  you  are  to  follow  Hood, 
without  giving  up  all  we  have  gained 
in  territory.  I say  then,  go  on  as  you 
propose.”  On  the  8th,  in  a letter  dated 
the  7th,  came  Grant’s  adieu.  “Great, 
good  fortune  attend  you.” 

The  original  plan  of  the  campaign  had 
been,  after  capturing  Atlanta,  to  hold 
it,  and,  using  that  city  as  a secondary 
base,  to  move  an  army  eastward  through 
Georgia,  leaving  garnsons  at  points 
along  the  railroads  across  the  State, 
and  thus  cut  the  Confederacy  in  two 
from  west  to  east,  as  had  been  done 
from  north  to  south  by  the  opening  of 
the  Mississippi.  The  execution  of  this 
plan  would  have  required  large  details 
of  troops,  and  it  was  willingly  aban- 
doned. Sherman’s  - plan,  which  was 
substituted  for  this,  effectually  secured 
the  same  advantages.  When  Hood 
crossed  the  Chattahoochee  on  his  flank- 
ing march  upon  the  National  communi- 
cations, he  was  moving  in  the  veiy 
direction  in  which  Sherman  wished  him 
to  go ; and  it  was  with  feelings  not 
unmixed  wdth  anxiety  that  the  National 
commander  watched  the  movements  of 
his  antagonist  until,  instead  of  returning 
to  Jonesboro,  he  moved  off  from  Gads- 
den to  the  neighborhood  of  Decatur. 
The  ill-advised  strategy  of  Hood  gave 


PKEPARATIONS  FOR  THE  MARCH. 


811 


Sherman  the  very  ojiportunity  he  de- 
sired ; and  he  prepared  at  once  to  avail 
himself  of  it. 

On  the  26th  of  October,  considering 
his  army  unnecessarily  large  for  his 
Oct.  pui’pose,  and  having  ascertained 
26.  that  Hood  had  moved  westward 
across  Sand  Mountain,  Sherman  de- 
tached the  Fourth  corps  under  General 
Stanley,  with  orders  to  proceed  to 
Chattanooga  and  report  to  General 
Thomas  at  Nashville.  On  the  30th, 
the  Twenty-Third  corps,  commanded 
by  Schofield,  was  also  sent  to  Thomas, 
to  whom  Sherman  delegated  full  power 
over  all  the  troops  subject  to  his  com- 
mand, except  the  four  corps  with  which 
he  designed  to  move  into  Georgia. 
This  gave  to  General  Thomas  the  Fourth 
and  Twenty-Third  corps,  the  two  divi- 
sions under  General  A.  J.  Smith — then 
en  route  for  Tennessee  from  Missouri — 
all  the  garrisons  in  Tennessee,  as  well 
as  all  the  cavalry  of  Sherman’s  Military 
Division,  except  one  division  under  Kil- 
patrick, which  was  ordered  to  rendez- 
vous at  Marietta.  General  Wilson,  who 
had  arrived  from  the  army  of  the  Poto- 
mac to  take  command  of  the  cavalry  of 
Sherman’s  army,  was  sent  * back  to 
Nashville,  with  all  dismounted  detach- 
ments, and  with  directions  to  collect  as 
rapidly  as  possible  the  -cavalry  serving 
in  Kentucky  and  Tennessee,  to  mount, 
organize,  and  equip  them,  and  report  to 
Thomas  for  duty.  These  forces  it  was 
hoped  would  enable  Thomas  to  defend 
the  railroad  from  Chattanooga  to  Nash- 
ville, and,  at  the  same  time,  leave  him 
an  army  which  would  be  a match  for 
that  of  Hood,  should  he  cross  the  Ten- 


nessee and  move  northward.  Thomas 
was  also  fully  informed  of  Sherman’s 
plans,  and  at  the  same  time  assured 
that  until  he  felt  fully  confident  of 
being  able  to  cope  with  Hood,  the  east- 
ward movement  on  the  part  of  Sherman 
would  not  be  commenced. 

By  the  1st  of  November  Hood  had 
moved  his  army  from  Gadsden  and 
appeared  in  the  neighborhood  of 
Decatur.  Sherman  then  began  1. 
preparations  for  his  march  through 
Georgia.  The  army  of  the  Tennessee 
returned  by  slow  and  easy  marches  to 
the  neighborhood  of  Smyrna  camp- 
ground. The  Fourteenth  corps  was 
moved  to  Kingston,  from  which  point 
all  surplus  artillery,  all  baggage  not 
needed  for  the  contemplated  movement, 
and  all  the  sick  and  wounded,  and  the 
refugees,  were  directed  to  be  sent  back 
to  Chattanooga.  The  troops  were  at 
the  same  time  put  in  the  most  efficient 
condition  for  a long  and  difficult  march. 
From  the  2d  to  the  11th  of  November 
every  locomotive  and  car  on  the  Chat- 
tanooga and  Atlanta  Railroad  was  put 
in  requisition.  The  vast  supplies  of 
provisions,  forage,  stores,  and  machinery, 
which  had  been  accumulated  at  Atlanta, 
Rome  and  other  points,  and  everything 
likely  to  impede  the  movements  of  the 
army,  were  sent  safely  to  Chattanooga. 
On  the  night  of  the  11th  the  last  train 
left  Atlanta  for  the  north.  Everything 
being  now  ready  Corse,  who  still  re- 
mained in  Rome,  was  ordered  to  destroy 
the  bridges  there,  as  well  as  all  the 
foundries,  mills,  shops,  warehouses,  or 
other  property  that  could  be  useful  to 
the  enemy,  and  move  on  Kingston.  At 


812 


THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA. 


the  same  time  the  railroad  near  Atlanta 
and  between  the  Etowah  and  the  Chat- 
tahoochee was  directed  to  be  effectually 
destroyed.  The  garrisons  north  of 
Kingston  were  ordered  to  withdraw  to 
Chattanooga,  taking  with  them  all  pub- 
lic property  and  railroad  stock,  and  to 
take  up  the  rails  north  of  Eesaca  and 
preserve  them  for  future  use.  The 
railroad  between  the  Etowah  and  the 
Oostanaula  was  left  untouched,  as  it 
might  be  necessary  to  reoccupy  the 
country  as  far  as  the  line  of  the  Etowah. 

On  the  12th  of  November  the  message 
“ All  is  well  ” was  telegraphed 
to  Thomas;  the  wire  was  then 
cut,  and  Sherman’s  army  stood  alone, 
^vithout  any  communication  in  the  rear. 
By  the  14th,  all  the  troops  had  arrived 
at  or  near  Atlanta,  and  by  orders  of 
Sherman  was  grouped  into  two  wings ; 
the  right  and  left,  commanded  respect- 
ively by  Generals  O.  O.  Howard  and 
H.  W.  Slocum.  The  right  wing  was 
composed  of  the  Fifteenth  corps,  Gen- 
P.  J.  Osterhaus,  and  the  Seventeenth 
corps.  General  Frank  P.  Blair  com- 
manding. The  left  wing  was  com- 
posed of  the  Fourteenth  corps.  General 
Jeff.  C.  Davis  and  the  Twentieth  corps, 
General  Slocum.  The  Fifteenth  corps 
had  four  divisions,  those  of  Woods, 
Hazen,  S^nith  and  Corse.  The  Seven- 
teenth had  three  divisions,  those  of 
Mower,  Leggett  and  Smith.  The 
Fourteenth  corps  had  three  divisions, 
those  of  Carlin,  Morgan  and  Baird. 
Tlie  Twentieth  corps  had  also  three 
divisions,  those  of  Jackson,  Geary  and 
Ward.  The  cavalry  division  was  held 
separate,  and  was  subject  to  orders  from 


Sherman  only.  It  was  commanded 
by  Judson  Kilpatiick,  and  was  com- 
posed of  two  brigades,  commanded  re- 
spectively by  Colonels  Eli  H.  Murray 
of  Kentucky,  and  Smith  D.  Atkins  of 
Illinois.  The  total  strength  of  the 
army  was  about  60,000  : — infantry 
about  54,000,  cavalry  nearly  5000, 
artillery  nearly  2000.  General  Barry, 
in  fitting  out  the  artiller}^,  which  was 
reduced  to  the  minimum,  withdrew 
every  doubtful  or  suspicious  horse. 
Each  artillery  carriage  had  eight  horses, 
and  each  battery  a reserve  of  twelve. 
Sherman  issued  orders  to  regulate  the 
conduct  of  the  troops  on  the  march. 
The  whole  force  moved  rapidly  south- 
ward, and  on  the  14th  of  November 
lay  agai)i  around  Atlanta. 

On  the  15th  all  the  buildings  in  the 
city,  except  the  dwelling-houses 
and  churches,  were  destroyed  15. 
under  the  direction  of  Captain  Poe,  the 
chief  of  engineers.  The  several  corps 
having  been  supplied  with  clothing 
and  such  equipments  as  were  necessary, 
from  the  depots,  and  everything  valu- 
able to  the  Government  removed,  the 
torch  was  applied  in  the  evening  to  the 
various  buildings,  the  most  substantial 
of  which  had  been  previously  mined. 
For  many  hours  the  heavens  were 
lighted  up  by  the  flames  of  this  vast 
conflagration,  which  was  rendered  moi’e 
awful  by  the  explosion  of  shells  and 
magazines.  By  the  dawn  of  the  16th 
all  that  was  valuable  of  the  city  lay  in 
ashes.  The  property  destroyed  in- 
cluded all  the  buildings  connected  with 
the  railroads,  the  passenger  de})ots, 
freight  houses,  a number  of  locomotives^ 


SHERMAN  LEAVES  ATLANTA. 


813 


cars,  and  every  description  of  rolling 
stock;  the  machine  shops,  mills,  arse- 
nals ; the  laboratory,  the  armory,  many 
business  houses,  the  institutions  of 
learning,  and  all  the  hotels  except  the 
Gate  City;  in  all  about  1800  buildings, 
exclusive  of  woodsheds  and  outhouses, 
the  whole  valued  at  about  $2,000,000. 
As  far  as  possible  private  property  was 
spared,  the  object  being  merely  to 
render  the  city  useless  to  the  enemy 
when  he  should  reoccupy  it. 

Connecting  Atlanta  with  the  sea- 
board are  two  great  lines  of  railroad, 
nearly  parallel  and  having  a general 
southeasterly  direction,  one  terminating 
at  Charleston,  308  miles  distant,  the 
other  at  Savannah,  293  miles  distant. 
The  former  line  is  composed  of  the 
Georgia  Railroad,  171  miles  long,  ex- 
tending from  Atlanta  to  Augusta,  and 
of  the  South  Carolina  Railroad,  137 
miles  long,  extending  from  Augusta  to 
Charleston;  the'  latter  consists  of  the 
Western  and  Macon  road,  103  miles 
long,  connecting  Atlanta  and  Macon, 
and  of  the  Georgia  Central  Railroad, 
190  miles  long,  connecting  Macon  with 
Savannah.  From  Augusta  there  runs 
a cross  railroad  due  south  to  Millen,  on 
the  Georgia  Central  Railroad,  53  miles 
long,  affording  a second  route  to  Savan- 
nah from  Atlanta,  10  miles  longer  than 
that  through  Macon.  The  belt  of 
country  between  the  two  main  lines  of 
railroad,  as  far  east  as  Augusta  and 
Millen,  is  of  an  average  breadth  of  40 
miles  ; east  of  these  points  the  country 
between  the  roads  gradually  expands 
to  a width  of  nearly  100  miles.  The 
Georgia  road,  after  the  capture  of 


Atlanta,  had  lost  much  of  its  import- 
ance. All  the  others,  however,  includ- 
ing that  between  Augusta  and  Millen, 
were  important  links  in  the  chain  of 
communications  between  the  northern 
and  southern  portions  of  the  Confeder- 
acy. The  feeling  was  prevalent,  there- 
fore, that*  the  destruction  of  these  links 
would  be  a severe  blow  to  the  enemy. 
The  region  included  within  these  rail- 
roads was  probably  the  richest  and 
most  populous  of  Georgia,  containing 
Milledgeville,  the  capital  of  the  State, 
and  other  important  towns.  It  was 
reported  to  be  rich  in  all  kinds  of  agri- 
cultural produce  and  abundantly  able 
to  supply  the  wants  of  a large  invading 
army. 

While  Atlanta  was  yet  in  flames, 
Sherman’s  army  began  its  march  east- 
ward in  four  columns.  The  two  consti- 
tuting the  left  wing  under  Slocum, 
followed  the  railroad  towards  Augusta, 
while  the  two  composing  the  right 
wing  under  Howard,  accompanied  by 
Kilpatrick’s  cavalry,  marched  in  the 
direction  of  J onesboro  and  McDonough, 
with  orders  to  make  a strong  feint  on 
Macon,  to  cross  the  Ocmulgee  about 
Planter’s  Mills,  and  rendezvous  in  the 
neighborhood  of  Gordon  in  seven  days. 
Slocum  moved  by  way  of  Decatur  and 
Stone  Mountain,  with  orders  to  tear  up 
the  railroad  from  Social  Circle  to  Mad- 
ison, to  burn  the  important  railroad 
bridge  across  the  Oconee,  east  of  Madi- 
son, and  then  to  turn  southward  and 
rendezvous  at  Milledgeville  on  the 
seventh  day.  Sherman  himself  left 
Atlanta  on  the  16th  in  company  with 
the  Fourteenth  corps,  which  marched 


814 


THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA. 


by  way  of  Litbonia,  Covington,  and 
Shady  Dale,  also  towards  Milledgeville. 
All  the  coi-ps  were  provided  with  good 
wagon  trains,  in  which  the  supplies  of 
ammunition  were  abundant,  but  with 
only  twenty  days’  bread,  forty  days’ 
sugar  and  coffee,  beef  cattle  equal  to 
forty  days’  supplies,  and  k double 
allowance  of  salt.  Three  days’  forage 
in  grain  was  also  taken.  The  instructions 
were  that  the  army  should  live,  during 
the  march,  chiefly  if  not  altogether  on 
the  country,  which  abounded  in  corn, 
sweet  potatoes,  and  cattle.  It  was  not 
at  first  known  to  the  men  whither  they 
were  marching.  The  opinion  prevailed 
that  they  were  off  for  Richmond. 
The  day  was  unusually  fine  ; and  a 
feeling  of  exhilaration  seemed  to  per- 
vade all  minds.  As  he  moved  about, 
Sherman  was  frequently  greeted  with 
the  words  Uncle  Billy,  I guess  Grant 
is  waiting  for  you  at  Richmond.” 

At  what  point,  on  the  seaboard,  Sher- 
man would  come  out  could  not  be 
definitely  fixed.  It  was  not  impossible, 
as  he  would  be  obliged  to  subsist  at 
least  partially  on  the  country,  that  a 
force  inferior  to  his  own  might  compel 
him  to  abandon  his  plans  and  seek  a 
point  different  from  that  intended. 
The  blindness  of  the  Confederate  au- 
thorities, however,  allowed  them  to  send 
Hood’s  army — the  only  considerable 
force  they  had  between  Richmond  and 
the  Mississippi — northward  on  an  offen- 
sive campaign,  thus  leaving  the  whole 
southeast  open,  with  little  opposition 
to  be  dreaded  by  the  National  forces 
on  any  route  they  might  take.  Sher- 
man’s first  object  was  to  place  his  army 


in  the  heart  of  Georgia,  interj^osing  it 
between  Macon  and  Augusta,  and  thus 
obliging  the  Confederates  to  scatter 
their  forces  in  order  to  defend  not  only 
those  points,  but  Millen,  Savannah, 
and  Charleston.  It  was  his  opinion 
that  by  means  of  pretended  demonstra- 
tions on^  places  widely  separated,  leav- 
ing it  doubtful  whether  the  immediate 
objective  was  Augusta  or  Macon,  or 
both,  he  would  be  able  to  perplex  the 
enemy  and  insure  a speedy  and  unin- 
terrupted march  to  the  coast. 

Howard’s  command,  of  which  the 
Fifteenth  corps  formed  the  right,  fol- 
lowing the  railroad  southward  as  far 
as  Jonesboro,  encountered  the  mounted 
troops  of  Iverson  ; but  these  were 
quickly  dispersed  by  Kilpatrick’s  cav- 
alry. The  column  then  moved  east- 
ward through  McDonough  and  Jackson 
to  the  Ocmulgee,  crossed  it  at  Planter’s 
Mills  and  passing  southward  through 
Monticell o and  Hillsboro,  and  between 
Milledgeville  and  Clinton,  struck  the 
Georgia  Central  Railroad  on  the  2 2d, 
the  left  at  Gordon,  20  miles  east 
of  Macon,  the  right  extending  22. 
westward  towards  Griswoldville.  In 
conjunction  with  the  operations  of 
Howard’s  column,  the  greater  part  of 
the  National  cavalry  under  Kilpatrick 
made  a circuit  by  the  right,  through 
Grifi&n  and  Forsyth,  towards  Macon. 
At  first  the  Confederates  supposed  this 
to  be  only  a raid  on  a grand  scale  ; but 
on  the  approach  of  Howard’s  column — 
and  still  remaining  ignorant  pf  Slocum’s 
movement  in  the  direction  of  Augusta 
— they  began  to  think  that  Sherman 
was  aiming  at  the  capture  of  Macon. 


GRISWOLDVILLB. 


815 


They,  therefore,  concentrated  at  that 
place  all  their  available  force,  consisting 
of  some  cavalry  under  Wheeler,  a small 
body  of  veterans,  and  several  brigades' 
of  militia.  On  the  20th,  800  of  Kil- 
patrick’s cavalry  with  4 cannon,  made 
a pretended  attack  on  East  Macon,  two 
miles  east  of  the  city,  and  drove  the 
enemy  within  his  intrenchments.  Lit- 
tle loss  was  sustained  on  either  side  ; 
but  the  movement  very  effectually  ac- 
complished its  purpose  of  confirming 
the  Confederates  in  the  belief  that 
Macon  was  Sherman’s  objective.  The 
National  cavalry  then,  after  destroying 
several  miles  of  railroad  east  of  Wal- 
nut Creek,  withdrew  to  Griswoldville. 
The  Fifteenth  and  Seventeenth  corps 
having  struck  the  Georgia  Central 
Railroad  on  the  2 2d,  as  already  stated, 
immediately  commenced  to  destroy  the 
track  and  the  road-bed  between  Gordon 
and  Griswoldville. 

While  this  work  was  going  on,  one 
of  the  severest  battles  of  the  campaign 
took  place.  Walcott’s  brigade  of  in- 
fantry, with  a section  of  artillery  and 
some  cavalry,  forming  the  extreme 
right  of  the  Fifteenth  corps,  had  been 
thrown  forward  to  Griswoldville  to 
cover  that  flank,  and  also  to  continue 
the  demonstration  on  Macon  commenc- 
ed by  Kilpatrick.  At  the  same  time 
Howard’s  trains  were  closing  up,  and 
his  men  were  destroying  the  railroads. 
Walcott,  after  burning  the  principal 
buildings  in  Griswoldville,  posted  his 
troops  in  a wood  protected  in  front  by 
an  open  morass,  and  threw  up  a rail 
breast- work.  About  two  in  the  after- 
noon a force  of  the  enemy,  about  5000 


strong,  moved  out  of  Macon  and  ap- 
proached the  National  position.  Fall- 
ing back  slowly,  the  National  cavaliy 
placed  themselves  in  connection  with 
the  infantry  so  as  to  protect  them  in 
flank  and  rear,  and  leave  the  enemy  no 
alternative  but  to  make  a direct  front 
attack.  The  Confederate  force,  con- 
sisting of  a part  of  Hardee’s  old  com- 
mand brought  up  from  Savannah  and 
several  brigades  of  militia,  advanced 
boldly ; and,  being  mostly  inexperienced 
troops,  and  ignorant  of  the  strength  of 
the  National  position,  they  attempted  to 
carry  it  by  storm.  They  made  six 
desperate  assaults,  which  Walcott’s  vet- 
erans, well  protected  by  their  breast- 
works, repelled  with  ease,  and  with 
little  loss,  while  the  Confederates  mov- 
ing with  difficulty  through  the  morass, 
were  exposed  to  a steady  fire  from  men 
conscious  of  security,  and  suffered  se- 
verely. When  they  retired,  they  left 
300  dead  upon  the  field.  The  Confeder- 
ate loss,  according  to  their  own  account, 
was  614,  including  General  Anderson 
severely  wounded.  It  was  probably 
'nearer  2000.  After  this  battle,  Macon 
might  easily  have  been  taken  by 
Howard,  but  now  that  the  railroad 
connections  were  destroyed,  its  posses- 
sion was  no  longer  an  important  object. 

In  the  mean  time,  the  left  wing  of 
Sherman’s  army  continued  its  march 
along  the  Augusta  and  Macon  Railroad 
in  two  parallel  columns,  the  Twentieth 
corps  on  the  left,  the  Fourteenth,  accom- 
panied, by  Sherman,  on  the  right.  The 
latter  corps  having  thoroughly  de- 
stroyed the  railroad  as  far  as  Covington, 
turned  south,  on  the  19th,  towards 


816 


THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA. 


Milledgeville  ; while  the  Twentieth 
corps,  which  had  previously  marched 
on  the  north  side  of  the  railroad,  con- 
tinued the  work  of  destroying  the  track 
and  the  bridges  as  far  as  Madison  30 
miles  north  of  Milledgeville  and  90 
miles  west  of  x\uo:usta.  To  strensrthen 
the  conviction  that  this 'movement  was 
intended  to  threaten  Augusta,  the  cav- 
alry, moving  on  the  left  wing,  was  sent 
as  far  east  as  Union  Point,  70  miles 
Avest  of  that  city.  From  Madison  the 
Twentieth  corps  turned  off  nearly  due 
south,  and  passing  through  Eatonton, 
its  advance  arrived  at  Milledge- 
21.  ville  on  the  21st,  followed,  next- 
day,  by  the  Fourteenth  corps,  which 
passed  through  Shady  Dale  and  Eaton- 
ton, neither  corps  having  encountered 
any  opposition  during  its  march. 

When  Sherman’s  army  set  out  from 
Atlanta,  the  Georgia  legislature  was  in 
session  at  Milledgeville,  but  the  ap- 
proach of  Kilpatrick’s  cavalry  caused 
no  alarm  there,  as  the  movement  was 
supposed  to  be  only  a raid,  and  that  its 
object  was  Macon.  When,  however,  on 
the  18th,  it  was  discovered  that  How- 
ard with  the  right  wing  was  moving 
through  McDonough  in  a southeasterly 
direction,  and  that  Slocum  was  also 
approaching  from  the  north,  a panic 
seized  the  whole  body  of  legislators, 
Avho  fled  with  all  possible  haste  to 
Augusta.  After  this  exodus,  several 
days  of  quiet  passed,  when  On  a bright 
sunshiny  morning  an  advanced  regi- 
ment of  the  Twentieth  corps  entered 
the  capital  of  Georgia,  wdth  the  band 
playing  the  national  airs. 

Only  a few  of  the  National  troops 


entered  Milledgeville.  Two  or  three 
regiments  were  detailed  under  the 
orders  of  engineers  to  destroy  govern- 
ment and  certain  other  property.  The 
magazines,  arsenals,  depot  buildings, 
factories  of  various  kinds,  with  store- 
houses containing  large  amounts  of 
government  property,  and  about  1700 
bales  of  cotton,  were  burned.  Private 
houses,  even  those  of  noted  Confeder- 
ates, were  left  uninjured,  as  well  as 
the  Capitol ; and  the  inhabitants  were 
protected  as  far  as  possible  from  pil- 
lage or  insult  from  the  soldiery.  The 
hospital  surgeons,  the  principal  of  the 
Insane  Asylum,  and  others,  expressed 
their  thankfulness  for  the  excellent 
order  preserved  during  the  National 
occupation.  _ Some  stores  and  about 
2500  small-arms  fell  into  the  possession 
of  the  National  troops ; and  a number 
of  Union  prisoners  were  liberated  from 
the  penitentiary. 

While  Sherman’s  left  wing  was  en- 
joying a temporally  rest  at  Milledge- 
ville, the  right,  under  Howard,  moved 
eastward  along  the  Georgia  Central 
Kailroad,  with  orders  to  destroy  it 
thoroughly  as  they  went,  as  far  as  Ten- 
nille  Station.  The  Confederates  now 
became  aware  that  Macon  was  not  to  be 
seriously  attacked ; and  Wheeler,  march- 
ing with  all  speed,  got  across  the 
Oconee  near  the  railroad  bridge,  and, 
aided  by  a body  of  militia  under  Gen- 
eral Wayne,  prepared  to  dispute  the 
passage.  When  Howard  arrived  on 
the  23d,  he  found  the  guard  there  so 
strong  that  a crossing  could  be  effected 
only  at  considerable  loss.  After  skir. 
mishing  near  the  river  a day  or  two  to 


WAYNESBORO. 


817 


occupy  the  enemy’s  attention,  the  Fif- 
teenth corps  was  moved  to  a ford  8 
miles  below,  and  a pontoon  bridge  was 
laid  without  much  difficulty.  The 
Confederates  then  retreated ; and  by 
the  26th  the  whole  right  wing  had 
crossed  the  river,  and  moving  eastward 
was  engaged  in  destroying  the  railroad. 
The  left  wing  crossed  the  Oconee  near 
Milledgeville  on  the  24th,  and  moved 
by  two  roads  in  a southeasterly  direc- 
tion towards  Sanders vill^  a small  town 
33  miles  from  Milledgeville,  and  a little 
north  of  the  railroad.  The  Fourteenth 
corps  now  took  position  on  the  left  of 
Slocum’s  column,  and  Sherman  accom- 
panied the  Twentieth  corps  towards 
Sandersville.  On  approaching  this 
Nov.  25th,  the  bridges 

2b.  across  Buffalo  Creek  were  found 
to  have  been  burned.  Next  day  the 
two  corps,  marching  by  parallel  roads, 
entered  the  town  almost  at  the  same 
moment,  skirmishing  with  and  driving 
out  Wheeler’s  cavalry,  which  had  at- 
tempted to  impede  their  progress.  On 
the  27th  and  28th  both  wings  lay 
encamped  between  Sandersville  and 
Irmn’s  Cross-Roads,  a few  miles  south 
of  the  railroad.  About  this  time  also 
Sherman  shifted  his  quarters  from  the 
left  wing  to  the  Seventeenth  corps, 
then  at  Tennille  Station,  opposite  San- 
dersville. 

Kilpatrick,  after  the  demonstration 
at  Macon  which  ended  with  the  action 
at  Gris  wold  ville,  shifted  his  cavalry 
force  to  the  left  wing,  and  remaining 
a day  at  Milledgeville  to  recruit,  was 
directed  to  move  rapidly  eastward  and 
break  the  railroad  between  Millen  and 


Augusta,  thus  threatening  Augusta 
and  covering  the  passage  of  the  main 
body  of  the  army  across  the  Ogeechee, 
the  next  great  river  on  Sherman’s  route 
east  of  the  Oconee.  After  breaking 
the  railroad,  Kilpatrick  was  ordered  to 
turn  southward  and  move  rapidly  upon 
Millen,  to  rescue  the  National  prisoners 
supposed  to  be  confined  there.  On  the 
27th,  a few  hundred  of  his  cav- 
airy,  under  Captains  Hays  and  27. 
Estes,  dashed  into  Waynesboro,  on  the 
railroad,  30  miles  south  of  Augusta, 
where  they  did  some  damage ; but  it 
having  been  ascertained  that  the  prison- 
ers had  for  several  weeks  previous  been 
in  the  course  of  removal  from  Millen  to 
some  less  exposed  point  in  southern 
Georgia,  no  demonstration  was  made  on 
that  town.  The  advanced  cavalry 
detachment  now  fell  back  to  its  main 
body,  which  lay  east  of  the  Ogeechee 
near  Louisville.  Kilpatrick  had  re- 
tired thence  to  meet  the  infantry,  with 
instructions  from  Sherman  not  to  risk 
a battle  unless  circumstances  should 
greatly  give  him  the  advantage.  But 
the  appearance  of  the  cavalry  on  the 
left  flank  of  the  National  army,  led 
the  Confederates  to  suppose  that  Au- 
gusta was  the  real  objective  of  the 
campaign.  Sherman,  therefore,  ordered 
Kilpatrick  to  leave  all  his  wagons  and 
other  incumbrances  with  the  left  wing 
and  to  move  towards  Wheeler’s  cav- 
alry, which  was  hovering  around  in  the 
direction  of  Augusta ; and  if  Wheeler 
desired  fighting  to  give  him  all  he 
wanted.  Accordingly,  Kilpatrick,  sup- 
ported by  Baird’s  division  of  infantry 
of  the  Fourteenth  corps,  again  mover] 


S18 


THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA. 


in  tlie  direction  of  Waynesboro.  En- 
countering Wheeler  in  the  neighbor- 
hood  of  Thomas’  Station,  on  the 
'E  8d  of  December,  Kilpatrick  at- 
tacked him  in  position,  driving  him 
from  three  successive  lines  of  barri- 
cades, through  Waynesboro  and  across 
Brier  Creek,  the  bridges  over  which 
he  burned.  Marching  rapidly  south- 
ward from  Waynesboro,  he  rejoined 
the  left  wing  at  Jacksonboro,  20  miles 
east  of  Millen,  on  the  5th. 

On  the  28th  of  November  the  Four- 
teenth corps  struck  the  Ogeechee  at 
Fenn’s  bridge,  15  miles  north  of  Sand- 
ersville.  The  river  was  crossed  by  pon- 
toons; and  marching  along  its  north 
bank,  the  corps  arrived  at  Louisville  on 
the  29th.  Upon  reaching  Buckhead 
Ci*eek,  it  then  turned  eastward  to  Lump- 
kin’s Station,  on  the  Augusta  and  Millen 
Bailroad,  10  miles  south  of  Waynes- 
boro. On  the  3d  and  4th  of  December 
it  destroyed  a considerable  portion  of 
the  track,  and  then  marched  in  a south- 
easterly direction  for  Jacksonboro.  At 
the  same  time  the  Twentieth  corps 
moved  along  the  railroad,  which  from 
Davisboro  Station  runs  parallel  with 
the  Ogeechee  for  about  20  miles.  The 
Fifteenth  and  Seventeenth  corps  moved 
along  the  south  side  of  the  railroad, 
the  Fifteenth,  with  which  was  General 
Howard  in  person,  keeping  on  the  right 
flank*  and  about  a day’s  march  ahead,  so 
as  to  be  ready  to  turn  against  the  flank 
of  any  force  of  the  enemy  that  should 
attempt  to  oppose  the  progress  of 
the  main  body.  The  Twentieth  and 
Seventeenth  corps  had  been  some  days 
engaged  in  destroying  the  railroad  be- 


tween Tennille  Station  and  the  Ogee- 
chee. This  river,  being  here  about 
sixty  yards  wide,  and  naturally  a strong 
defensive  line  to  the  enemy,  might 
have  been  rendered  a serious  obstacle. 
On  the  30th,  however,  a crossing  was 
effected  with  little  difficulty,  the 
Twentieth  at  the  railroad  bridge  30. 
and  the  Seventeenth  near  Barton  Sta- 
tion, a few  miles  further  east.  These 
two  corps  advanced  steadily  along  the 
railroad,  and^on  the  2d  of  December 
the  Seventeenth  reached  Millen;  the 
Twentieth,  passing  a little  north  of 
that  town  through  Birdsville,  moved  in 
a southeasterly  direction,  while  the 
Fifteenth  in  two  columns,  still  a day’s 
march  in  advance  of  the  main  body, 
kept  along  the  west  bank  of  the 
Ogeechee.  The  whole  army  then  turn 
ing  slowly  round  from  its  easterl] 
course,  moved  directly  southward  in 
parallel  columns,  all  except  the  Fif- 
teenth corps — which  was  directed  to 
cross  to  the  east  bank  on  arriving  at 
Eden  Station — between  the  Ogeechee 
and  Savannah  Eivers,  the  Seventeenth 
corps  following  the  railroad  and  tear- 
ing it  up  while  advancing,  the  Four- 
teenth keeping  along  the  Savannah 
Biver  road,  and  the  Twentieth  march- 
ing down  the  middle  road  by  way  of 
Springfield.  Kilpatrick  covered  the 
rear,  and  kept  at  bay  such  scattered 
bodies  of  the  enemy’s  cavalry  as 
attempted  to  harass  the  columns  while 
in  motion. 

The  advantage  of  the  feint  which 
had  been  made  towards  Augusta  now 
became  apparent.  A considerable 
number  of  Confederate  troops  had 


THE  GULF  RAILROAD  CUT. 


819 


been  concentrated  at  that  place.  Had 
Sherman’s  true  object  been  known, 
these  might  have  been  used  to  obstruct 
his  march  to  Savannah,  towards  which 
he  was  now  moving.  The  weather 
which  had  been  for  the  most  part 
favorable  during  the  first  half  of  the 
r-ampaign,  became  rainy  after  the  col- 
umns passed  Millen.  As  the  army 
approached  Savannah,  the  country  was 
foiiud  more  marshy  and  difficult.  Grreat 
obstructions  were  met  in  the  shape  of 
felled  trees  where  the  roads  crossed  the 
creek  swamps  or  narrow  causeways ; 
but  these  the  well-organized  pioneer 
companies  rapidly  removed.  No  im- 
portant opposition  was  encountered  till 
the  heads  of  the  columns  were  within 
about  15  miles  of  Savannah.  Here  all 
the  roads  leading  to  the  city  were  again 
found  obstructed  with  felled  timber ; 
but  the  imperfect  defenses  thus  formed 
were  easily  turned  and  the  enemy 
driven  away. 

By  the  lOtb  of  December  the  Con- 
federates  had  retired  within  their 
10.  lines  at  Savannah.  These  follow- 
ed a swampy  creek  which  falls  into  the 
Savannak  River  about  3 miles  above 
the  city  and  extended  thence  to  ,the 
head  of  a corresponding  creek  which 
falls  into  the  Little  Ogeechee.  These 
streams  formed  excellent  cover  for  the 
enemy,  flowing  through  marshes  and 
rice  fields,  which  could  be  flooded  either 
by  the  tide-water  or  from  inland  ponds, 
the  gates  of  which  were  covered  by 
heavy  artillery. 

To  prevent  an  attack  on  the  Gulf 
Railroad,  at  that  time  employed  to  its 
utmost  capacity  in  bringing  supplies 


and  reinforcements  to  the  city,  the  Con- 
federates sent  a force  across  the  Ogee- 
chee, which  they  supposed  would  be 
able  to  check  the  advance  of  the  Fif- 
teenth corps.  The  greater  part  of  this 
corps  had,  however,  passed  over  to  the 
east  bank  of  the  river  on  the  7th  near 
Eden  Station  ; and  the  next  day  Corse’s 
division  was  pushed  forward  between 
the  Little  and  Great  Ogeechee,  in  ad- 
vance of  the  main  column,  to  the  canal 
connecting  the  Ogeechee  with  the 

Savannah.  A position  was  taken  up 

on  the  south  side  of  the  canal  and  in- 
trenched ; the  Confederates  abandoning 
the  portion  of  their  advanced  line  there 
and  retiring  within  the  fortifications  of 
Savannah.  . Reinforcements  from  the 

Fifteenth  corps  were  sent  to  Corse; 

and  on  the  9th  a detachment  moved 
forward  to  the  Gulf  Railroad,  tore  up 
the  track  for  several  miles,  and  ca];- 
tured  a train  of  18  cars  with  many 
prisoners,  thus  cutting  off  communica- 
tions between  Savannah  and  the  south. 
No  supplies  could  reach  the  city  by 
the  accustomed  channels  ; while  the 
investing  forces  had  large  herds  of 
cattle,  brought  with  the  army  or 
gathered  from  the  country  on  the 
march ; and  although  still  without 
communication  with  the  fleet,  they 
had  yet  remaining  in  the  army  wagons 
a considerable  supply  of  breadstuffs 
and  other  necessaries.  The  fine  rice 
crops,  along  the  Savannah  and  Ogee- 
chee rivers,  afforded  abundance  of 
fodder  for  the  cattle,  as  well  as  food  for 
the  men.  The  country  south  of  the 
Ogeechee  was  also  open  as  foraging 
ground. 


820 


THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA. 


The  only  approaches  to  Savannah 
were  the  tAVO  railroads,  and  the  Au- 
gusta, Louisville,  and  Ogeechee  dirt 
roads,  all  narrow  causeways  and  com- 
manded by  heavy  ordnance,  against 
which  it  would  have  been  useless  to 
oppose  the  light  field  guns  with  which 
Sherman’s  army  Avas  provided.  The 
strength  of  the  enemy  at  that  time  was 
also  unknown  to  the  National  com- 
mander, and  he  determined  not  to  as- 
sault immediately,  trusting  that  the 
operation  of  time  would  bring  about 
the  desired  result.  Sherman,  therefore, 
instructed  his  army  commanders  to 
invest  the  city  as  closely  as  possible 
from  the  north  and  west,  and  to  re- 
connoitre the  ground  well  in  their  front. 
The  11th  and  12th  of  December  Avere 
passed  in  putting  the  troops  in  position, 
erecting  breast-Avorks,  and  establishing 
batteries.  The  army  lay  in  a semicir- 
Dec.  about  ten  miles  long — 

12.  the  left  resting  on  the  SaA^annah 
River  at  a point  3 miles  distant  from 
the  city,  the  right  on  the  Gulf  Railroad 
at  a distance  of  11  miles — every\A^here 
confronted  by  the  enemy’s  strong  line 
of  earth-AVorks,  which  constituted  the 
exterior  fortificatioiis  of  the  city. 

In  the  mean  time,  in  order  to  facili- 
tate communications  with  the  fleet. 
Captain  Duncan,  with  two  scouts,  Avas 
sent  down  the  Ogeechee  in  a small 
skiff,  on  the  night  of  the  9th.  Con- 
cealing themselves  in  the  rice  SAvamps 
during  the  following  day,  they  resumed 
the  perilous  voyage  at  night,  and  suc- 
ceeded in  getting  past  Fort  McAllister 
and  the  Confederate  picket-boats  dur- 
ing a rain-storm.  They  then  made  their 


way  into  Ossabaw  Sound,  where  on  the 
morning  of  the  11th  they  were  picked 
up  by  the  National  gun-boat  Flag,  and 
immediately  conveyed  to  Hilton  Head. 
General  Foster  was  at  that  time  operat- 
ing against  the  Charleston  and  Savan- 
nah Railroad  AAdth  the  vieAV  of  destroy- 
ing the  communications  of  Savannah 
with  the’  north.  He  was  immediately 
sent  for,  and  received  HoAvard’s  dis- 
patch of  the  9th : “We  have  had  per- 
fect success,  and  the  army  is  in  fine 
spirits.”  This  Avas  the  first  direct 
intellisrence  from  Sherman’s  armv  since 
its  departure  from  Atlanta,^  and  its 
reception  caused  universal  rejoicing  in 
the  North. 

The  co-operative  movement  of  Foster 
against  the  Charleston  and  Savannah 
Railroad,  the  object  of  which  Avas  to 
effect  a lodgment  at  Pocotaligo  or  at 
GrahamAulle,  had  only  partially  suc- 
ceeded. The  expedition  dispatched 
for  this  purpose,  consisting  of  5500 
men  under  General  Hatch,  together 
with  a naval  brigade  under  Commander 
Preble,  and  gun-boats  from  Admiral 
Dahlgren's  squadron,  arrived  soon  after 
daylight  at  Boyd’s  Point;  where  the 
troops  were  landed.  They  advanced 
skirmishing  some  miles  ; but  not  being 
acquainted  Avith  the  country  did  not 
succeed  in  reaching  the  railroad,  and  at 
night  were  compelled  to  withdraAV. 
Next  day,  hoAvever,  the  march  Avas 
resumed  ; and  the  troops  were  puslied 
on  toAvards  the  enemy’s  position  near 
Grahamville.  Strong  works,  consist- 
ing of  a fort  and  battery,  Avith  rifle-pits, 
Avere  found  at  Honey  Hill,  3 miles  from 
GrahamAulle.  The  garrison,  howe\^er 


MAP  SHOWING  THE  EOUTE  TAKEN  BY  SHERMAN  IN  HIS  MARCH  THROUGH  GEORGIA. 


I 


FORT  McAllister. 


821 


was  slim,  there  being  only  1500  men  un- 
der General  G.  W.  Smith,  with  7 pieces 
of  artillery.  The  position  was  imme- 
diately attacked.  An  engagement  en- 
sued, lasting  six  hours,  and  the  National 
troops  were  on  the  point  of  carrying 
the  works,  when  reinforcements  arrived 
for  the  enemy.  These  consisted  of  a 
regiment  of  infantry  and  some  cavalry, 
under  General  Robertson,  who  brought 
also  another  battery.  It  being  found 
impossible  now  to  contend  against  the 
increased  force  of  the  enemy,  protected 
as  they  were  by  their  defenses,  the 
National  force  was  withdrawn  to  a 
good  position  on  the  Savannah  road, 
having  sustained  a loss  of  740  men. 
The  operations  on  the  part  of  Foster,  in 
which  there  was  a good  deal  of  desul- 
tory fighting,  were  continued  for  several 
days;  and,  although  he  did  not  succeed 
in  getting  possession  of  the  railroad,  in 
guarding  which  the  Confederates  dis- 
played great  tenacity,  his  troops  under 
Hatch  secured  a position  on  the  penin- 
sula or  neck  between  the  Coosawatchie 
and  Tullafinney  Creek,  about  three- 
quarters  of  a mile  from  the  railroad. 
From  this  point,  the  intervening  woods 
having  been  cut  down  for  the  purpose, 
they  could  direct  the  fire  of  their  artil- 
lery on  the  passing  trains. 

As  the  greater  part  of  the  fleet  was 
already  in  or  at  the  entrance  of  the 
Savannah  River,  nothing  remained  to 
be  done  but  to  send  a few  vessels  to 
Warsaw  and  Ossabaw  Sounds  to  open 
communications  with  the  army.  The 
latter  sound,  the  estuary  of  the  Ogee- 
chee,  affording  the  most  practicable 
mode  of  accomplishing  this  object. 


Sherman  took  measures  to  reduce  Fort 
McAllister,  a strong  redoubt  on  the 
right  bank  of  the  river,  which  its  guns 
commanded.  This  fort,  situated  6 miles 
from  the  sound  and  about  18  miles 
southwest  of  Savannah,  was  highly  im- 
portant to  the  security  of  the  city  in 
the  rear.  It  was  one  of  the  strongest 
of  its  class  in  the  South ; and  it  had  suc- 
cessfully resisted  the  attacks  of  a small 
fleet  of  iron-clads  in  the  early  part  of 
the  year  1863.  It  mounted  23  guns 
en  harhette  and  one  mortar,  including 
several  8-inch  and  10-inch  pieces. 
Every  line  of  approach  to  the  fort  ^vas 
commanded  by  howitzers  and  field 
pieces  placed  on  the  bastions.  A deep 
ditch  40  feet  wide,  into  the  bottom  of 
which  were  driven  palisades,  extended 
along  its  front ; and  a formidable  line  of 
abatis  ran  along  the  outer  edge  of  the 
ditch,  beyond  which  the  approaches 
were  thickly  planted  with  torpedoes. 
Fortunately  the  garrison  was  not  strong, 
consisting  of  only  two  companies  of 
artillery  and  three  of  infantry,  in  all 
about  200  men,  in  command  of  Major 
Anderson.  It  would  doubtless  have 
been  reinforced  in  a few  days.  On  the 
evening  of  the  12th,  Hazen’s  division 
of  the  Fifteenth  corps  was  marched 
from  its  position  on  the  Gulf  Railroad 
to  the  Ogeechee,  just  below  the  mouth 
of  the  Canoochie,  where  the  bridge, 
known  as  King’s  Bridge,  having  been 
destroyed  was  rapidly  reconstructed  in 
a substantial  manner.  At  daybreak  of 
thi!  1 3th  Hazen  crossed  to  the  west  j)0c^ 
bank  and  pushed  on  towards  Fort  HR 
McAllister,  his  orders  being  to  carry 
it  by  assault.  Hazen  reached  the 


296 


S22 


THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA. 


vicinity  of  the  fort  about  one  o’clock, 
and  deployed  his  division  in  such  a 
iiianner  that  both  flanks  rested  on  the 
river.  His  skirmishers  were  posted 
behind  the  trunks  of  trees  whose 
branches  had  been  used  by  the  enemy 
in  constructing  the  ahatis.  About 
live  o’clock  the  assault  was  made,  with 
9 regiments,  at  three  points.  In  a very 
short  time,  the  intervening  space  of  600 
yards  was  crossed,  the  ahatis  sur- 
mounted, and  the  ditch  reached.  A 
few  minutes  sufficed  to  tear  down 
enough  of  the  palisades  to  permit  the 
passage  of  the  troops,  who  with  loud 
cheers  and  great  entbusiasm  rushed  in 
swarms  over  the  parapet  and  planted 
their  colors  on  the  rampart.  In  twenty 
minuted  from  the  time  the  assault  was 
commenced  the  fort  was  won.  Tiie 
struggle  was  brief.  The  losses  were 
not  great  on  either  side.  The  victory, 
however,  was  complete.  Sherman,  him- 
self, was  an  eye-witness  of  the  opera- 
tions from  a.  rice-mill  on  the  opposite 
bank  of  the  liver. 

No  communication  had  yet  been 
effected  with  the  fleet.  From  a signal 
station  at  the  rice-mill,  Sherman’s  offi- 
cers had  been  for  two  days  gazing 
anxiously  over  the  rice  fields  and  salt 
marsh,  in  the  direction  of  Ossabaw 
Sound,  but  no  vessel  came  in  sight. 
While  the  preparations  for  assaulting 
Fort  McAllister  had  been  going  on, 
the  smoke-stack  of  a small  steamer  evi- 
dently approaching  became  visible  on 
the  horizon.  Just  before  the  assault 
was  made,  the  steamer  was  signalled. 
Answer  was  given ; and,  as  soon  as 
he  saw  the  colors  fairly  planted  on  the 


fort,  Sherman,  in  company  with  How- 
ard, proceeded  in  a small  boat  to  meet 
Hazen;  but  finding  that  he  had  not 
yet  been  able  to  communicate  with 
the  steamer,  which  was  hid  from  him 
by  some  intervening  woods,  he  took 
another  small  boat  with  a crew,  and 
pulled  down  the  river  to  it.  It  proved 
to  be  ‘the  tug  Dandelion,  Captain  Wil- 
liamson, who  announced  that  Admiral 
Dahlgren  and  General  Foster  were  on 
their  way  and  might  be  hourly  expected 
in  the  sound.  Sherman,  after  writing 
a despatch  to  the  War  Department, 
his  first  since  leaving  Atlanta,  returned 
immediately  to  Fort  McAllister.  Be- 
fore daylight  on  the  14th  he  received 
intelligence  that  Foster  had  actu- 
ally  arrived  in  the  steamer  Ne-  14. 
maha  and  was  anxious  for  an  interview. 
Sherman  immediately  went  on  board 
the  Nemaha,  and  after  a consultation 
proceeded  in  that  steamer  to  meet 
Dahlgren,  whose  flag-ship,  the  Harvest 
Moon,  was  in  Warsaw  Sound.  Meas- 
ui'es  were  at  once  concerted  for  opening 
permanent  communication  between  the 
army  and  the  fleet ; and  Dahlgren, 
having  agreed  to  engage  the  attention 
of  the  forts  at  Wilmins^ton  and  Kose- 
dew,  Sherman  returned  to  Fort  Mc- 
Allister the  following  day,  confident  of 
being  able  to  carry  the  defenses  of 
Savannah  as  soon  as  his  heavy  ordnance 
from  Hilton  Head  should  arrive.  On 
the  17th  a number  of  32-pounder 
Parrott  guns  were  landed  from  17. 
transports,  at  King’s  bridge,  on  the 
Ogeechee,  where  the  new  base  was 
established,  the  obstructions  in  the 
river  below  having  been  removed ; and 


HARDEE  RETIRES  FROM  SAVANNAH. 


Slierman  despatched  from  Slocum’s 
headquarters,  by  flag  of  truce,  a formal 
demand  for  the  surrender  of  the  city. 
This  was  refused  by  General  Hardee, 
Avho  was  in  command  there  with  about 
15,000  men.  Hardee  expressed  a de- 
termination to  hold  the  city  to  the  last, 
saying  that  his  communications  were 
yet  open,  that  he  was  fully  supplied 
Avith  subsistence  stores,  and  was  able 
tu  withstand  a long  siege.  On  the 
same  day,  a large  body  of  cavalry  under 
Kilpatrick,  with  infantry  supports,  were 
sent  down  the  Gulf  Railroad  as  far  as 
the  Altamaha  River,  for  the  purpose  of 
destroying  the  track.  This  work  was 
thoroughly  accomplished  for  the  entire 
distance,  including  4 miles  of  trestle- 
^vork  immediately  adjoining  the  river. 

The  city  was  now  invested  on  every 
side  except  along  the  Savannah  River. 
That  river,  which  was  filled  with  ob- 
structions and  commanded  by  the  guns 
of  Forts  Jackson,  Lee,  and  Lawton,  was 
in  possession  of  the  enemy  nearly  as 
far  towards  the  sea  as  Fort  Pulaski. 
Opposite  the  city  is  Hutchinson’s 
Island,  several  miles  long,  the  west 
end  of  which  was  in  possession  of  Slo- 
cum’s troops;  but  the  lower  end  still 
remained  in  the  hands  of  the  enemy. 
A little  below  the  island,  on  the  South 
Carolina  side,  the  Union  Causeway 
^vhich  runs  north  through  the  swamps 
intervening  between  Savannah  and 
Charleston,  afforded  a way  of  escape  to 
Hardee. 

Reconnoissances  from  the  left  flank 
had  shown  that  it  was  impracticable  to 
push  a considerable  force  across  the 
Savannah  River  with  a view  to  occupy 


the  causeway,  as  the  enemy  holding 
the  river  opposite  the  city  with  iron- 
clad gun-boats,  would  be  able  to  destroy 
any  pontoons  laid  down  between  Hut- 
chinson’s Island  and  the  South  Carolina 
shore.  Sherman,  therefore,  ordered  Slo- 
cum to  get  his  siege  guns  into  position, 
and  prepare  for  an  assault;  while  he, 
himself,  proceeded  to  Port  Ro}^!  and 
made  arrangements  to  have  the  Union 
Causeway  occupied  from  the  north  by 
the  troops  of  Foster.  In  the  meantime 
a substantial  corduroy  road  had  been 
constructed  across  the  swamps  and  rice 
fields  from  the  Ogeechee,  at  King’s 
Bridge,  to  the  vicinity  of  the  city. 
Along  this  road  the  heavy  siege  guns 
were  transported  to  their  position,  as 
well  as  supplies  for  the  army. 

Hardee  seeing  this,  and  well  aware 
that  the  avenue  of  escape  northward 
would  not  be  allowed  long  to  remain 
open  to  him,  immediately  made  prepar- 
ations for  evacuating  the  city.  On  the 
afternoon  of  the  20th  he  caused 
his  troops  to  destroy  the  navy  ‘^0. 
yard  and  the  Confederate  Government 
property ; while  the  two  iron-clad s 
Georgia  and  Savannah  moved  up  the 
river,  and,  supported  by  several  bat- 
teries, opened  on  the  National  left 
a furious  fire,  which  was  continued  all 
night,  with  a view  to  cover  the  retreat. 
The  Confederate  troops  were  conveyed 
across  the  river,  during  the  night,  in 
steamboats  and  row-boats  and  on  rafts  ; 
and  on  the  morning  of  the  21st,  having 
blown  up  the  iron-clads  and  the  forts 
below  the  city,  they  were  well  on  their 
way  towards  Charleston. 

Hardee’s  retirement  was  discovered 


THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA. 


SM 

by  the  National  pickets  at  dawn  on  tbe 
21st;  and  several  regiments  were  sent 
forward  to  occupy  the  deserted  intrench- 
ments.  A few  hours  later  Sherman, 
who  had  just  returned  from  Hilton 

Head,  entered  the  city  at  the  head 
21.  of  his  body-guard  and  received 
the  formal  surrender  from  the  muni- 
cipal authorities.  On  the  same  day 
Foster  communicated  with  the  city  by 
steamers,  taking  up  what  torpedoes 
could  be  found  and  passing  safely  over 
others.  Measures  were  also  taken  for 
clearinsr  the  channel  of  all  obstructions. 

O 

The  captures  included  800  prisoners, 
150  guns,  13  locomotives  in  good  order, 
190  cars,  a large  supply  of  ammunition 
and  material  of  war,  4 steamboats,  be- 
sides the  iron-clads  and  transports  blown 
up  by  the  enemy,  and  33,000  bales  of 
cotton  safely  stored. 

Writing  to  President  Lincoln  on  the 
2 2d  of  December,  Sherman  said  : “ I beg 
to  present  you,  as  a Christmas  gift,  the 
city  of  Savannah,  with  150  heavy  guns 
and  plenty  of  ammunition,  and  also 
about  25,000  bales  of  cotton.”  Lincoln 
replied,  thanking  Sherman  for  his  gift. 
Halleck  and  Grant  both  wrote  letters 
of  congratulation  to  the  victorious  gen- 
eral. “ I never  ” wrote  Grant  “ had  a 
doubt  of  the  result.  When  appre- 
hensions for  your  safety  were  expressed 
by  the  President,  I assured  him  that 
with  the  army  you  had,  and  with  you 
in  command  of  it,  there  was  no  danger 
but  that  you  would  reach  salt  water  in 
some  place.  But  I should  not  have 
felt  the  same  security — in  fact  I would 
not  have  entrusted  the  expedition  to 
any  other  living  commander.” 


Thus  ended  the  great  march  to  the 
sea — a march  which,  while  it  command- 
ed the  attention  of  the  world,  and  estab 
lished  on  solid  foundations  the  military 
reputation  of  General  Sherman,  dem- 
onstrated, in  the  most  striking  man- 
ner, the  inherent  weakness  of  the 
Confederacy.  The  campaign  had  lasted 
over  five  weeks  ; and,  during  that 
time,  an  army  65,000  strong,  with 

10.000  horses,  over  a tract  varying  from 
20  to  60  miles  in  width,  traversed  a 
distance  of  300  miles.  Sherman  had 
lost  only  567  men,  of  whom  63  were 
killed,  245  wounded,  the  remainder 
missing.  A track  of  desolation  marked 
the  progress  of  the  army.  Over  20,000 
bales  of  cotton  had  been  destroyed, 
and  probably  over  25,000  bales  cap- 
tured. There  were  captured  besides 
some  10,000,000  pounds  of  corn,  and 
an  equal  amount  of  fodder  ; nearly 

1.500.000  rations  of  meat ; about  1,000,- 
000  rations  of  bread  ; 483,000  rations 
of  coffee,  581,000  of  sugar,  about  1,150,- 
000  of  soap,  and  137,000  of  salt.  This, 
however,  was  not  all.  Over  320  miles 
of  railroad  were  destroyed  ; and  so 
complete  was  the  work  of  destruction 
that  communications  between  the  Con- 
federate armies  in  Virginia  and  those 
in  the  west  were  finally  and  effectually 
severed.  Sherman  had,  during  his 
march,  forced  into  his  service  some  5000 
horses  and  4000  mules,  and  captured 
1328  prisoners,  with  167  guns.  His 
army  entered  Savannah,  accompanied 
by  more  than  10,000  negroes,  who 
everywhere  hailed  the  National  troops 
as  deliverers.  According  to  Sherman’s 
own  estimate,  damage  was  done  to  the 


SAVANNAH  SUBMISSIVE. 


825 


State  of  Georgia  to  the  extent  of 
$100,000,000,  of  which  $20,000,000 
at  least  inured  to  the  advantage  of  the 
National  government. 

General  Geary  was  appointed  mili- 
tary commander  of  Savannah,  immedi- 
ately after  the  surrender.  On  the  26th 
from  his  head-quarters  in  the  field. 
General  Sherman  issued  special  orders, 
giving  instructions  as  to  the  course  of 
conduct  to  be  pursued  by  the  military 
authorities  towards  the  inhabitants  of 
the  captured  city.  The  orders  were 
strict;  but  they  were  not  unjust,  nor 
could  they  even  be  called  severe.  The 
property  of  the  peaceful  citizens  was 
to  be  respected.  Industry  of  all  kinds 
was  to  be  encouraged.  Assistance  was  to 
be  tendered  to  all  deserving  families  or 
individuals  who,  from  whatever  cause 
were  in  necessitous  circumstances.  The 
Mayor  was  instructed  to  give  public 
notice  that  the  time  had  come  when  all 
must  choose  their  course,  and  decide 
^vhether  they  w^ere  willing  to  remain 
within  the  National  lines,  and  conduct 
themselves  as  good  citizens,  or  depart 
in  peace.  Those  who  preferred  to 
leave  were  to  report  their  names  to 
the  Chief-Quartermaster  ; and  measures 
would  be  taken  to  secure  them  safe 
transport  beyond  the  lines.  Sherman 
deemed  it  his  duty  to  lay  his  hand 
somewhat  heavily  on  the  press.  Only 
two  newspapers  were  to  be  published 
in  the  city ; and  their  editors  and  pro- 


prietors were  to  be  held  to  the  strictest 
accountability. 

In  the  grave  emergency  in  which 
they  now  found  themselves,  the  inhab- 
itants of  Savannah  conducted  them- 
selves with  the  utmost  propriety. 
Their  behavior,  indeed,  was  in  striking 
contrast  with  that  of  the  inhabitants  of 
other  Confederate  cities.  No  ill  feeling 
was  manifested  towards  their  captors 
by  word  or  deed.  On  the  contrary 
there  was  evidence  that  the  occupation 
of  the  city  by  the  Nationals,  was  felt 
to  be  a deliverance.  A latent  Union 
sentiment  soon  began  to  reveal  itself ; 
and  as  early  as  the  28th  of  December, 
a meeting  of  infiuential  citizens  was 
held  at  the  call  and  under  the  presi- 
dency of  Mayor  Arnold,  and  resolu- 
tions were  passed — acknowledging  the 
duty  of  submission  to  the  laws  of  the 
United  States,  and  asking  protection 
accordingly,  respectfully  requesting 
his  Excellency,  the  Governor  of  Georgia, 
to  call  a convention  of  the  people  of 
that  State,  and  thus  afford  an  oppor- 
tunity of  voting  upon  the  question 
whether  the  war  between  the  two  sec- 
tions of  the  country  should  continue, 
and  finally  tendering  thanks  to  the 
military  commander  for  his  “ urbanity  ” 
and  his  “ uniform  kindness.” 

The  year  1864  was  all  but  ended. 
Before  the  close,  however,  Sherman 
had  perfected  his  plans  for  the  projec- 
ted march  through  the  Carolinas. 


836 


HOOD  AND  THOMAS  IN  TENNESSEE. 


CHAPTER  XXXIX. 


Thomas  at  Nashville — Sherman’s  Instructions — Sherman  Divides  his  Army — Troops  sent  to  Thomas — What 
the  Confederates  thought  of  Sherman’s  Movements — Grant’s  Opinion  of  Hood’s  Conduct — Hood  playing 
into  the  hands  of  his  Antagonist — Appearance  of  Forrest  in  ‘Tennessee — At  Waterloo — Forrest  Attacks 
Athens — Campbell  Compelled  to  Surrender — Forrest  Advances  to  Pulaski — Held  in  Check  by  Rousseau — 
Forrest  Divides  his  Command — Buford  at  Huntsville — Pursued  by  Granger’s  Cavalry — Forrest  destroys 
the  Railroad  between  Carter’s  Creek  and  Spring  Hill — Buford  and  Forrest  Pursued  by  Rousseau,  Wash 
burne  and  Morgan — The  Confederates  Escape  to  the  South  Side  of  the  Tennessee— Thomas  Re-arranging 
and  Re-distributing  his  Troops — The  Confederates  Attack  the  Garrison  at  Decatur — Granger  makes  a 
Stubborn  Resistance — The  Confederates  Compelled  to  Retire — The  Confederates  at  Cypress  Creek — Held 
in  Check  by  General  Croxton — Hood’s  Purpose — Thomas  Divines  his  Plans — Rosecranz  in  Missouri — The 
Condition  in  which  he  Found  the  State — The  Confederates  Encouraged  by  the  Failure  of  the  Red  River 
Expedition— General  Sterling  Price — “Knights  of  the  Golden  Circle” — “Sons  of  Liberty” — Threatened 
Rising  in  Missouri — Rosecranz  Communicates  with  the  Government  at  Washington — Arrest  of  the  Belgian 
Consul — The  Government  Incredulous — Rosecranz  Resolute — Shelby  at  Batesville — Rosecranz  joined  by 
A.  J.  Smith — Shelby  at  Bloomfield — Pilot  Knob — General  Ewing  at  Rolla — Price  before  Jefferson  City — 
Compelled  to  Move  off  in  a Westerly  Direction— Price  already  a Disappointed  Man — Danville  and  High 
Hill — Price  Retreats  followed  by  Pleasonton- -Fagan  at  Independence — Routed  by  Pleasonton — At  the 
Big  Blue— Curtis  at  Westport — Severe  Engagement — The  Confederates  Routed — At  Marais  des  Cygnes — 
Price  Surprised — Falls  Back  to  Little  Osage  Crossing — Marmaduke  and  Cabell  Captured — The  Confederates 
Retreat  into  Arkansas— Pleasonton  Resting  his  Men  at  Fort  Scott— Price  at  Newtonia — Engagement  at 
Fayetteville — The  Confederates  driven  off  with  Heavy  Loss — Price’s  Invasion  a Failure — Grant  Displeased 
with  Rosecranz— Minor  Operations  in  Southwestern  Virginia  and  East  Tennessee — Morgan’s  Last  Raid — 
Death  of  the  GuerrOla  Chief — Generals  Gillem  and  Burbridge — Breckenridge  to  Command  ihEast  Tennessee 
— Stoneman’s  Raid — Strawberry  Plains— Saltville — Bean  Station — Burbridge  at  Bristol — At  Abingdon — 
Marion — Hood  and  Thomas  Confronting  each  other— Preparing  for  the  Conflict — Re-appearance  of  Forrest 
— Thomas  Waiting  for  Reinforcements— Schofield  at  Columbia — At  Franklin— Schofield  Forms  his  Line 
of  Battle — The  Battle  Ground — The  West  Bank  of  theHarpeth  River— Hood  Resolves  to  Attack  Schofield’s 
Centre — The  Battle  Begun — The  Confederates  Attack  with  Great  Fierceness — The  National  Line  Penetrated 
— Almost  a Confederate  Victory — Stanley  to  the  Rescue — Opdyke’s  brave  “First  Brigade” — The  Tide  of 
Battle  Turned — The  National  Line  Restored — Repeated  Onsets — Midnight — Sounds  of  Battle  Hushed — A 
National  Victory — Opdyke  Complimented — Losses  on  both  sides  Heavy — Position  of  Thomas’  Troops 
before  Nashville — Montgomery  Hill — Murfreesboro — Overall’s  Creek — Fort  Rosecranz — Thomas’  Delay 
Misunderstood  at  Washington — Grant  Dissatisfied — Hurries  from  City  Point — Explanations — Intense  Cold 
— The  Ground  Impassable — The  Weather  Moderates — Immense  Activity  in  Both  Camps — Thomas’  Plan  of 
Battle— Montgomery  Hill  Carried — The  Confederates  Forced  Back  at  all  Points — Nolensville  Turnpike — 
The  Night  of  the  15th  of  December — Preparing  to  Resume  the  Conflict — Second  Day  of  the  Battle — 
Overton’s  Hill— Tremendous  Firing— The  Confederates  Routed — Vigorous  Pursuit — Rutherford’s  Creek — 
Waiting  for  the  Pontoon  Train — Duck  River — Severe  Weather — Thomas  Resolves  to  Continue  the  Pur- 
suit— Wilson’s  Cavalry — Lamb’s  Ferry — The  Confederates  Across  the  Tennessee  River — Thomas  Orders 
the  Main  Army  to  Discontinue  the  Pursuit — Cavalry  Skirmishing — “ Thomas  has  Done  Magnificently” — 
Hood’s  Army  Ruined  beyond  Recovery — Estimate  of  Hood — Osband’s  Expedition — Davidson’s  Expedition — 
Grierson’s  Expedition — Great  Destruction  of  Property. 


In  the  chapter  immediately  preced- 
1864  have  seen  that  Genei’al 

‘Shei’man  about  the  end  of  Sep- 
tember, and  while  his  head-quarters 


were  still  at  Atlanta,  sent  General 
Thomas,  his  second  in  command,  to 
Nashville,  with  instructions  to  organize 
such  troops  as  might  be  placed  at  his 


SHERMAN  DIVIDES  HIS  ARMY. 


disposal,  and  to  keep  a watchful  eye 
on  the  movements  of  the  great  Confed- 
erate raider,  General  Forrest.  Later, 
towards  the  end  of  October,  and  while 
the  main  body  of  the  National  army 
was  halting  at  Gaylesville,  Sherman, 
who  had  now  obtained  Grant’s  consent 
to  advance  to  the  coast,  divided  his 
army  into  two  parts.  Under  his  own 
personal  command,  and  for  the  purpose 
of  pushing  his  way  through  Georgia, 
he  retained  four  corps.  The  other  two 
corps — the  Fourth,  under  General  Stan- 
ley, and  the  Twenty-Third,  under  Gen- 
eral Schofield — he  sent  to  Thomas. 
General  Wilson,  who  had  quite  recently 
arrived  from  the  army  of  the  Potomac 
and  taken  command  of  Sherman’s  cav- 
alry, was  also  sent  to  Nashville  to 
report  to  Thomas  for  duty.  He  took 
wdth  him  some  dismounted  detach- 
ments, and  had  instructions  to  collect, 
mount,  organize,  and  equip  all  the  cav- 
alry serving  in  Kentucky  and  Ten- 
nessee. It  was  Sherman’s  conviction 
that  thus  reinforced,  Thomas  would  be 
quite  able  to  cope  with  any  forces 
which  Hood  might  succeed  in  bringing 
against  him. 

It  is  now  generally  understood  that 
the  Confederate  authorities  were  com- 
pletely taken  by  surprise  at  Sherman’s 
audacious  movement.  His  lines  of 
defense  were  of  enormous  extent.  The 
distance  from  Atlanta  to  Louisville  is 
474  miles;  from  Atlanta  to  Nashville, 
289.  The  railroads  connecting  the 
army  with  these  lines,  it  was  necessary 
to  protect.  It  was  the  belief  of  Davis 
and  his  associates  that,  as  soon  as  the 
National  lines  were  seriously  threat- 


827 

ened,  Sherman  would  abandon  Georgia. 
They  had  no  conception  that  he  would 
of  his  own  accord  sunder  his  communi- 
cations and  boldly  march  to  the  sea. 
When  Sherman  did  march,  one  reads 
with  surprise  that  Hood  did  not  follow 
him.  Hood,”  says  General  Grant  in 
his  report,  instead  of  following  Sher- 
man, continued  his  move  northward, 
which  seemed  to  me  to  be  leading  to 
his  certain  doom.  At  all  events,  had  I 
the  power  to  command  both  armies,  I 
should  not  have  changed  the  orders, 
under  which  he  seemed  to  be  actino^.” 
Sherman,  before  his  departure,  made 
Thomas  fully  acquainted  with  his  plans, 
dele2:ated  to  him  the  command  of  all 
troops  and  garrisons,  not  absolutely  in 
the  presence  of  the  commander- in-  chief, 
and  instructed  him  to  pursue  Hood, 
if  he  should  attempt  to  follow  the 
main  army,  but,  by  all  means,  to  keep 
a firm  hold  on  Tennessee. 

Long  before  Sherman  divided  his 
army,  attempts  were  made  by  the  Con- 
federates, to  destroy  the  communica- 
tions of  Nashville  with  the  southeast. 
On  the  23d  of  September,  Forrest  Sept, 
at  the  head  of  7000  cavalry,  after  23. 
having  crossed  the  Tennessee,  near 
Waterloo,  made  his  appearance  before 
Athens,  a small  town  on  the  railroad 
from  Decatur,  and  about  90  miles  south 
of  Nashville.  The  place  was  held  by 
Colonel  Campbell,  mth  3 colored  regi- 
ments and  about  150  men  fi'om  the 
Third  Tennessee  cavalry.  Campbell, 
on  the  approach  of  Forrest,  retired  to 
the  fort.  On  the  morning  of  the  24th 
the  town  was  completely  invested ; and 
a vigorous  fire  was  opened  upon  the 


8^8 


HOOD  AND  THOMAS  IN  TENNESSEE. 


garrison  from  a 12-pounder  battery. 
The  guns  of  the  fort  replied.  Camp- 
bell, however,  was  unequally  matched ; 
and  after  an  artillery  contest  of  two 
hours’  duration,  he  yielded  to  the 
demands  of  his  antagonist  and  surrend- 
ered. Had  he  held  out  about  half  an 
hour  longer,  he  might  have  been  rein- 
forced by  the  Nineteenth  Michigan,  and 
the  One  Hundred  and  Second  Ohio 
I’egiments.  As  it  was,  these  regiments 
were  overpowered  and  captured.  For- 
rest then  advanced  to  Pulaski.  That 
place,  however,  had  been  well  cared 
for  by  General  Rousseau  ; and  the 
Confederate  general  moved  eastward, 
cutting  the  railroads  as  he  advanced. 
Meanwhile,  it  began  to  be  seen  that 
Forrest  was  bent  on  serious  work  ; and 
National  troops  were  pushed  forward 
from  all  directions  to  resist  his  pro- 
gress. Rousseau  at  the  head  of  a body 
of  troops  moved  by  rail  to  Tullahoma. 
Steedman  advanced  from  the  Etowah 
district  to  the  north  side  of  Tennessee. 
Newton’s  division  of  the  Fourth  corps 
arrived  from  Atlanta  on  the  28th  and 
replaced  Steedman’s  command  at  Chat- 
tanooga. Morgan’s  division  of  the 
Fourteenth  corps,  also  from  Atlanta, 
and  accompanied  by  General  Thomas, 
arrived  at  Nashville  on  the  3d  of 
October. 

Fori-est  had  by  this  time  divided 
his  forces.  One  column  consisting  of 
4000  men,  under  Buford,  he  sent  south^ 
towards  Huntsville.  The  other  col- 
umn, consisting  of  3000  men,  he  led, 
himself,  in  the  direction  of  Columbia. 
Buford,  as  early  as  the  30th  of  Sep- 
tember, appeared  before  Huntsville, 


and  in  vain  summoned  the  garrison  to 
surrender.  Moving  off,  he  appeared 
before  Athens  on  the  afternoon 
of  the  2d  of  October.  That  2. 
place  had,  in  the  meantime  been  re- 
garrisoned by  the  Seventy-Third  Indi- 
ana, Lieutenant-Colonel  Slade.  After 
a useless  attack  made  almost  immedi- 
ately after  his  arrival,  and  another 
equally  useless  attack  on  the  following 
morning,  Buford,  pursued  by  some  of 
Granger’s  cavalry,  was  compelled  to 
retreat  towards  the  Elk  River.  For- 
rest had  little  better  success  than  his 
lieutenant.  He  did  not  venture  to 
make  an  attack  on  Columbia ; but  on 
the  3d  he  destroyed  about  5 miles  of 
railroad  between  Carter’s  Creek  and 
Spring  Hill.  He  then  parolled  his 
prisoners  and  moved  off  in  the  direc- 
tion of  Mount  Pleasant  Hill.  It  now 
became  apparent  that  both  Buford  ani 
Forrest  Avere  aiming  to  make  good 
their  escape  to  the  south  side  of  the 
Tennessee  ; and  the  various  National 
commands,  particularly  those  under 
Rousseau,  Washburne  and  Morgan 
closed  in  upon  them,  with  a view  to 
prevent  their  crossing  the  river,  and  if 
possible  to  effect  their  capture.  The 
Confederates,  however,  kneAV  every  inch 
of  the  ground ; and  in  spite  of  a most 
vigorous  pursuit,  both  accomplished 
their  purpose,  Buford  crossing  the 
Tennessee  on  the  3d  and  Forrest  on 
the  6tli.  The  ferry-boats  and  other 
means  of  crossing  were  destroyed  ; but 
the  pursuit  was  not  continued. 

Thomas  now  spent  some  time  in 
re-arranging  and  re-distributing  his 
troops.  His  great  object  Avas  to  guard 


KOSECRANZ  IN  MISSOURI. 


82y 


well  all  the  avenues  of  approach,  and 
yet  to  have  his  troops  so  in  hand  that 
he  could  concentrate  with  ease  and 
mpidity  in  the  event  of  the  enemy 
attackins:  him  in  force.  It  was  not 
until  the  26th  that  Hood  made 
26.  any  further  demonstrations.  On 
that  day,  a large  force  of  Confederate 
infantry  appeared  before  Decatur,  and 
attacked  the  garrison,  but  without 
effect.  Granger  held  the  place  ; and 
on  the  27  th  reinforcements  were  sent 
him  with  instructions  to  hold  out  to 
the  bitter  end.  It  seemed  as  if  the 
enemy  was  bent  on  serious  business ; 
for  he  proceeded  at  once  to  establish  a 
line  of  rifle-pits  within  500  yards  of  the 
town.  On  the  29th,  however,  after 
having  had  on  the  previous  day  some 
bitter  experience  of  the  daring  and 
energy  of  Granger’s  men,  who  made 
two  separate  and  successful  sorties,  the 
Confederates  retired  in  the  direction  of 
Courtland.  On  the  same  day,  it  was 
i*eported  to  Thomas  that  a body  of  the 
enemy  was  crossing  the  river,  near  the 
mouth  of  Cypress  Creek,  about  2 miles 
below  Florence.  General  Croxton  was 
in  command  at  that  point ; and  on  re- 
ceipt of  the  intelligence,  Thomas  imme- 
diately sent  to  his  aid  a division  of 
cavalry  under  General  Hatch,  with  in- 
structions to  guard  the  passage  of  the 
liver  until  the  arrival  of  the  Fourth 
corps,  now  on  its  way  from  Georgia. 

It  now  became  evident  that  Hood 
intended  to  invade  Middle  Tennessee ; 
and  Thomas  hurried  forward  prepara- 
tions accordingly.  Before,  however, 
we  enter  upon  a detailed  account  of 
tho  events  which  led  to  the  great 


battles  of  Franklin  and  Nashville,  and 
the  subsequent  pursuit  and  destruction 
of  Hood’s  army,  it  is  fitting  to  refer  to 
certain  events  which  were  taking  place, 
or  were  about  to  take  place,  in  Mis- 
souri and  Eastern  Tennessee. 

After  the  battle  of  Chickamauga, 
Bosecranz,  who  was  superseded  by 
Thomas,  was  assigned  to  the  command 
of  the  Department  of  the  Missouri. 
He  reached  St.  Louis  in  the  beginning 
of  January,  when  he  found  the  State 
of  Missouri  in  a very  troubled  condi- 
tion. It  was  menaced  by  foes  without, 
and  by  hidden  but  not  less  dangerous 
foes  within.  The  failure  of  the  Red 
River  expedition,  and  the  expulsion  of 
Steele  from  the  country  below  the 
Arkansas  River,  had  a most  disastrous 
effect  upon  the  National  cause,  to  the 
west  of  the  Mississippi.  At  least  two- 
thirds  of  the  State  of  Arkansas  was 
left  in  undisturbed  possession  of  the 
Confederates.  It  was  well  known  that 
General  Sterling  Price,  the  great  guer- 
rilla chief  in  that  region,  was  making 
active  prepa^-ations  for  another  raid 
into  Missouri.  Missouri  was  still  under 
the  authority  of  the  National  Govern- 
ment ; but  the  inhabitants  of  the  State 
were  largely  in  sympathy  with  the 
Confederacy.  The  loyal  people  of  the 
State  were  over-awed  and  compelled  to 
conceal  their  sentiments.  Secret  asso- 
ciations— such  as  the  “ Knights  of  the 
Golden  Circle,”  the  Order  of  Ameri- 
can Knights,”  and  the  Sons  of  Lib- 
erty ” — abounded ; and  it  was  reported 
to  Rosecranz  that  when  Price  should  in- 
vade Missouri,  the  members  of  these 
societies  would  join  him  in  numbers  to 


830 


HOOD  AXD  THOMAS  IN  TENNESSEE. 


the  extent  of  at  least  23,000  men. 
Rosecranz  had  good  reason  to  believe 
that  the  reports  regarding  these  secret 
societies  and  their  purposes  were  not 
without  foundation.  He  accordingly 
communicated  his  information  to  the 
government,  and  asked  for  reinforce- 
ments. The  government  was  at  first 
incredulous,  believing  the  danger  to  be 
more  imaginary  than  real,  and  was 
encouraged  in  this  belief  by  the  report 
of  General  Hunt,  who  had  been  sent  to 
make  a tour  of  observation  throughout 
the  State.  On  being  informed  that 
arrangements  had  been  made  to  initiate 
the  revolution  in  St.  Louis  by  murder- 
ing the  Provost-Marshal,  and  seizing  the 
State  government,  Rosecranz  arrested 
the  Belgian  consul,  who  was  the  State 
commander,  with  his  deputy,  secretary, 
lecturer,  and  about  40  members.  The 
government,  still  incredulous,  ordered 
their  release ; but  Rosecranz  was  reso- 
lute ; and  the  government,  on  receiving 
fuller  information,  justified  his  course, 
and  countermanded  the  order.  There 
can  now  be  no  doubt  that  the  prompti- 
tude and  vigilance  of  Rosecranz  at  this 
crisis  did  much  to  prevent  the  threat- 
ened risinor.  The  arrest  of  the  State 

O 

commander  struck  terror  into  the 
hearts  of  the  conspirators. 

Pi  •ice  and  his  friends,  meanwhile, 
were  preparing  to  carry  out  their  part 
of  the  programme.  It  was  now  the  first 
week  in  September.  Rosecranz  received 
information  from  Washburne  who  kept 
a keen  eye  on  the  movements  of  the 
Confederates  in  Arkansas,  that  Shelby 
was  at  Batesville,  in  Northern  Ai^- 
kansas,  and  that,  as  soon  as  he  was 


joined  by  Price,  the  invasion  would  be 
commenced.  Rosecranz  communicated 
the  intelligence  to  Washington ; and 
Halleck  without  a moment’s  delay 
telegraj)hed  to  Cairo,  directing  A.  J. 
Smith,  who  was  then  on  his  way,  with 
6000  troops  to  join  Sherman  in  North- 
ern Georgia,  to  halt  and  proceed  to 
St.  Louis,  where  he  was  to  report  tn 
Rosecranz. 

On  the  23d  of  September,  the  ad- 
vance of  Price’s  force,  under  Shelby, 
occupied  Bloomfield,  in  Stoddard  Coun- 
ty, which  had  been  evacuated  by  the 
National  troops  on  the  night  of  the  21s-t. 
On  the  26th  the  Confederates 
moved  on  Pilot  Knob,  which  26. 
fortunately  had  been  occupied  the  day 
before  by  General  Hugh  S.  Ewing 
with  a brigade  of  A.  J.  Smith’s  com- 
mand. With  this  force,  and  the  garri- 
son of  Pilot  Knob  and  some  outlying 
posts,  Ewing  undertook  to  make  a 
stand  against  the  Confederates,  w^ho 
without  delay  made  preparations  to 
carry  the  place  by  assault.  The  fort 
occupied  by  the  National  forces  was  a 
strong  one,  mounting  four  24-pounders, 
four  32-pounders,  and  four  6-pounder 
Parrotts,  besides  two  6-pounder  Par- 
rotts mounted  outside.  The  enemy 
advanced  against  it  on  the  27th,  in  full 
confidence  of  being  able  to  carry  it  by 
assault ; but  he  was  driven  back  with 
a loss  of  about  1000  men,  by  a w'ell- 
directed  artillery  and  musketry  fii'e. 
The  fort,  however,  was  commanded  by 
a neighboring  height  called  Shepherd 
Mountain,  and  the  enemy  having  occu- 
pied this  position  Ewing  determined  to 
abandon  the  w'ork.  He  had  previously 


PILOT  KNOB. 


831 


sent  away  his  stores  to  St.  Louis. 
Blowing  up  his  magazine,  ho  fell  back, 
keeping  up  a running  fight  with  the 
enemy  as  far  as  Harrison  Station,  on 
the  Southwest  Branch  Railroad.  Here 
he  prepared  to  make  another  stand, 
behind  breast-works  left  by  a party  of 
militia  who  had  previously  occupied 
the  place.  Ewing  in  his  defense  of 
Pilot  Knob  rendered  important  service 
by  detaining  the  entire  force  of  Price, 
and  affording  time  to  put  St.  Louis  in 
a state  of  defense,  then  covered  only 
by  a portion'  of  A.  J.  Smith’s  infantry 
and  some  regiments  of  cavalry  thrown 
out  as  far  as  practicable  towards  the 
enemy.  The  Confederates  followed 
him  up  closely,  and  cut  the  railroad  on 
both  sides  of  him,  thus  severing  his 
communications  with  both  Rolla  and 
St.  Louis.  He  was  only  saved  from 
another  assault  by  the  opportune  arrival 
of  Colonel  Beveridge,  of  the  Seven- 
teenth Illinois  cavalry,  with  500  men. 
The  enemy  taking  these  to  be  only  the 
advance  of  large  reinforcements,  de- 
layed the  intended  attack  ; and  Bever- 
idge, in  the  night,  with  the  main  body 
of  the  troops,  succeeded  in  reaching 
Rolla. 

In  the  mean  time,  Springfield  being 
9onsidered  secure.  General  Sanborn 
moved  with  all  his  available  cavalry  to 
reinforce  Rolla,  where  General  McNeil 
was  in  command  and  preparing  to  pro- 
tect the  depots  and  great  supply  trains. 

A.  J.  Smith’s  infantry,  aided  by  the 
militia  and  the  citizens,  the  whole 
under  the  command  of  General  Pleason- 
ton,  made  St.  Louis  secure.  General 

B.  Gratz  Brown  was  placed  by  Rose- 


cranz  in  charge  of  the  militia.  Brown 
concentrated  at  Jefferson  City,  the 
troops  of  the  Central  District  ; and 
being  reinforced  by  General  Fisk  with 
all  the  available  troops  north  of  tlie 
Missouri,  as  well  as  aided  by  the 
enthusiastic  exertions  of  the  citizens, 
he  made  thorough  preparations  to  drive 
back  the  invaders  from  the  State  ca})i- 
tal.  Towards  this  point  Price,  who 
had  remained  a day  or  two  at  Rich- 
wood’s,  threatening  St.  Louis,  was  rap- 
idly marching.  On  the  7th  of  October 
he  had  crossed  the  Osage  not  far  from 
the  city.  But  McNeil  and  Sanborn, 
moving  with  all  their  available  cavalry 
succeeded  by  forced  marches  in  reach- 
ing the  city  first ; and  having  united 
their  commands  with  those  of  Fisk  and 
Brown,  they  so  increased  the  defensive 
force  within  the  city,  that  Price  deem- 
ing it  prudent  not  to  attack,  moved  off 
in  a westerly  direction.  Pleasonton 
arrived  at  Jefferson  City  on  the 
morning  of  the  8th,  and  assumed  8. 
chief  command.  Sanborn  with  all  his 
mounted  troops,  about  4000,  was  or- 
dered to  follow  and  harass  the  enemy, 
but  not  to  attack  until  the  remaining 
cavalry  and  infantry  supports  could 
come  up. 

On  the  afternoon  of  the  9th,  the  Con- 
federates entered  California,  25  miles 
west  of  Jefferson  City,  on  the  Pacific 
Railroad,  and  burnt  the  depots  and  a 
train  of  cars.  From  California,  after 
tearing  up  the  railroad  track  some 
distance  on  each  side  of  the  town,  they 
moved  on  to  Booneville,  in  Cooper 
County.  Price  was  already  a sorely 
disappointed  man.  He  had,  it  is  true, 


832 


HOOD  AND  THOMAS  IN  TENNESSEE. 


obtained  a few  recruits ; but  tbe  Sons 
of  Liberty,”  tbe  “ Knigbts  of  the  Gold- 
en Circle,”  had  sadly  failed  him  at  the 
critical  moment,  when  at  least  a tem- 
porary success  was  possible. 

On  the  13th  the  Confederate  chief 
withdrew  from  Boone ville,  and,  contin- 
uing his  march  westward,  occupied 
Lexington,  in  Lafayette  County,  on  the 
17th.  For  the  purpose  of  forag- 

17.  ino-  and  obtain  in  or  recruits  and 

O O 

conscripts,  detached  bodies  of  his  force 
were  sent  in  various  directions,  some 
as  far  as  the  borders  of  Kansas,  some 
as  far  east  as  Danville  and  High  Hill, 
Montgomery  County.  Wherever  they 
made  their  appearance  they  worked 
terrible  destruction.  The  militia  were 
driven  out  of  Sedalia,  in  Pettis  County, 
\vdth  severe  loss ; and  at  Glasgow,  in 
Howard  County,  6 companies  of  the 
Forty-Third  Missouri  were  compelled 
to  surrender. 

The  National  troops  did  not  pursue 
actively  until  Pleasonton  came  up,  when 
they  advanced  towards  Boone  ville  and 
harassed  Price’s  rear.  Most  of  the 
National  cavalry  were  concentrated  at 
the  Black  Water,  awaiting  the  arrival 
of  Colonel  Winslow  from  Washburne’s 
command.  He  came  up,  on  the  19th, 
bringing  with  him  1500  troopers,  with 
Avhom  he  had  followed  the  enemy  from 
Arkansas.  Pleasonton,  having  now  at 
least  6500  mounted  men,  exclusive  of 
escort  guards,  moved  from  Sedalia  in 
[)ursuit  of  Price.  At  Independence,  on 
the  22d,  he  came  up  with  and  routed 
the  Confederate  general,  Fagan,  cap- 
turing 2 guns. 

On  the  morning  of  the  23d,  Pleason- 


ton approached  the  Big  Blue.  At  West 
port  where  General  Curtis,  then  in 
charge  of  the  Department  of 
Kansas,  had  been  vigorously  but  23. 
unsuccessfully  attacked,  the  day  before, 
he  found  the  main  body  of  the  Confed- 
erates. Pleasonton  fell  upon  them  with 
tremendous  energy  at  the  early  hour  of 
seven,  'the  battle  raged  with  great 
fury,  until  about  one  in  the  afternoon, 
when  the  Confederates  gave  way  and 
fled  towards  Little  Santa  Fe.  Pleason- 
ton and  Curtis  who  had  now  united 
their  forces  followed  in  close  pursuit. 
At  Marais  des  Cygnes,  at  four  o’clock 
on  the  morning  of  the  25th,  the 
National  troops  came  up  with  the 
fugitives,  when  Pleasonton  surprised 
and  aroused  the  camp  by  a heavy  fire 
of  artillery.  Price  arose  and  fled 
leaving  behind  him  his  camp  equipage, 
one  cannon,  several  hundred  head  of 
cattle,  and  20  wagons  full  of  plunder. 
The  Confederates,  keeping  up  a running 
fight,  fell  back  to  Little  Osage  Cross- 
ing, where  two  advanced  brigades 
under  Benteen  and  Phillips  charged 
upon  and  broke  their  lines,  capturing 
Generals  Marmaduke  and  Cabell,  4 
field  officers,  about  1000  prisoners,  8 
pieces  of  artillery,  and  some  1500  stand 
of  arms.  The  pursuit  was  continued, 
Sanborn’s  brigade  again  leading  the 
way.  The  Confederates  were  over- 
taken ; and  after  a brief  but  stubborn 
resistance,  they  crossed  the  Marmiton, 
and  fled  under  cover  of  the  night,  into 
Arkansas.  In  six  days  204  miles  had 
been  traversed.  Price  was  falling  back 
at  panic  speed.  The  line  of  his  retreat 
was  strewn  with  the  'wi’ecks  of  wagons 


DISSATISFACTION  WITH  ROSECRANZ. 


833 


and  other  necessaries  and  accompani- 
ments of  the'  battle-field.  Pleasonton 
had  retired  to  Fort  Scott  to  rest  his 
jaded  men  and  horses.  Sanborn,  how- 
ever, was  still  in  close  pursuit.  At 
Newtonia,  Price  made  another  and  a 
final  stand  ; and  but  for  the  timely 
arrival  of  Sanborn,  he  would  have  won 
a decided  victory  over  the  National 
troops  under  Blunt.  As  it  was.  Price 
made  his  escape  into  Western  Arkansas 
follovred  by  Curtis.  The  last  struggle 
in  connection  with  this  Missouri  inva- 
sion was  at  Fayetteville.  The  place 
was  held  by  Colonel  La  Hue,  with  the 
First  Arkansas  cavalry — a body  of 
men  who,  amid  great  trial  and  hard- 
ship, remained  true  to  the  Union. 
Colonel  Brooks  had  surrounded  Fay- 
etteville with  some  2000  Confederates. 
He  had  been  joined  by  Fagan’s  division 
of  Price’s  flying  army.  La  Hue  might 
have  held  out  against  Brooks  ; but  it 
would  be  a hopeless  struggle  against 
the  combined  forces  of  Brooks  and 
Fagan.  At  the  critical  moment  Curtis 
came  up  ; the  Confederates  were  driven 
off  with  heavy  loss,  and  La  Rue  was 
saved.  Such  was  the  end  of  the  inva- 
sion ; and  no  further  attempt  was  made 
on  Missouri.  Sterling  Price’s  name  had 
long  been  a tower  of  strength  to  the 
Confederate  cause  in  the  West.  His 
prestige  was  gone  forever.  Missouri 
was  no  longer — and,  indeed,  had  no 
reason  to  be — in  sympathy  with  seces- 
sion. The  State,  which  had  suffered 
much,  now  began  to  enjoy  some  degree 
of  tranquility. 

Price  had  accomplished  little  by  his 
raid,  beyond  the  destruction  of  about 


$5,000,000  of  property,  and  laying 
waste  the  country  through  which  he 
passed.  He  obtained  5000  or  6000 
recruits  or  conscripts,  took  1500  stand 
of  arms,  one  cannon,  many  horses,  and 
large  herds  of  cattle,  with  a vast 
amount  of  plunder,  in  the  shape  of 
clothing,  forage,  and  provisions ; but 
of  this  he  lost  nearly  all  in  his  precipi- 
tate retreat,  besides  10  guns  and  1958 
prisoners.  In  his  flight  from  Newtonia, 
he  abandoned  or  destroyed  most  of  his 
w^agon- trains ; and  his  men  and  horses 
suffered  severely.  Large  numbers  of 
his  followers  left  him  ; and  when  he 
recrossed  the  Arkansas,  his  force  had 
been  reduced  by  desertion  and  losses 
to  less  than  5000  men,  only  partially 
armed  and  mounted.  His  artillery  had 
dwindled  down  to  3 Parrott  guns  and 
one  12-pounder  mountain  howitzer;  and 
of  his  train,  which  originally  consisted 
of  200  wagons,  but  53  remained.  The 
entire  National  loss,  according  to  the 
ofiicial  report  of  General  Rosecranz, 
was,  in  killed,  wounded  and  missing, 
only  346  officers  and  men. 

General  Grant  was  ill-satisfied  with 
the  whole  affair.  In  his  judgment,  the 
invasion  ought  to  have  been  nipped  in 
the  bud.  In  his  report  he  says  : “ the 
impunity  with  which  Price  was  enabled 
to  roam  over  the  State  of  Missouri  foi 
a long  time,  shows  to  how  little  pur 
pose  a superior  force  may  be  used. 
There  is  no  reason  why  General  Rose- 
cranz should  not  have  concentrated  his 
forces  and  beaten  and  di-iven  Price 
before  the  latter  reached  Pilot  Knob.” 
Rosecranz  could  hardly,  in  truth,  have 
made  a more  wretched  use  than  he  did 


834 


HOOD  AND  THOMAS  IN  TENNESSEE. 


of  a large  portion  of  liis  troops.  He 
was  slow  to  act ; and  when  he  did  act, 
he  did  not  act  with  wisdom.  During 
tlie  entire  pursuit,  the  troops  of  A.  J. 
Smith  were  practically  neutralized.  If 
instead  of  ordering  him  to  follow  Pleas- 
onton  in  the  direct  pursuit  of  Piice,  he 
had  ordered  him  to  continue  his  move- 
ment westward.  Price  ought  to  have 
been  captured.  As  it  was.  Price  ob- 
tained time,  and  when  pressed,  he  had 
to  deal  with  Pleasonton  and  the  cavalry 
alone.  It  was  the  23d  of  October  when 
Smith  arrived  at  Independence ; but  it 
was  too  late,  for  Pleasonton  was  already 
engaged  with  the  enemy  and  the  loud 
tliimders  of  artillery  were  heard  in  the 
direction  of  the  Big  Blue  River.  His 
troops  were  weary  and  footsore ; and 
])elievino:  that  his  services  were  no 
longer  needed,  he  marched  them  to  Har- 
rison ville,  where  they  enjoyed  a brief 
niterval  of  rest.  The  fame  of  Rosecranz 
was  clouded  at  Chickamauga.  It  was 
permanently  injured  by  his  conduct  of 
itfairs  in  Missouri. 

Loss  immmediately  connected  with 
ohe  Geoigia  and  Tennessee  campaigns, 
but  still  having  a most  important  bear- 
ing on  the  general  issue,  were  some 
minor  operations  which  took  place  in 
Southwestern  Virginia  and  East  Ten- 
nessee in  the  fall  of  the  year.  It  had 
been  a favorite  theory  with  some  experi- 
enced military  men  that  in  the  event 
of  Lee  sustaining  any  great  disaster  in 
the  East,  he  would  retire  with  his  army 
to  Southwestern  Virginia,  and  passing 
thence  into  East  and  Middle  Tennessee, 
there  concentrate  the  remaining  forces 
>f  the  Confederacy.  He  would  then 


be  in  a position  to  threaten  Nashville 
Chattanooga,  or  Louisville ; and  it  was 
predicted  that  the  decisive  battle  of  the 
war  would  be  fought  somewhere  in  the 
Southwest.  Eor  this  reason,  a consid- 
erable National  force  was  retained  in 
East  Tennessee.  Knoxville  was  well 
fortified^;  and  outlying  bodies  of  in- 
fantry and  cavalry  were  pushed  well 
up  the  railroad  and  the  Holston  River 
Valley  towards  the  Virginia  line.  But 
after  the  commencement  of  the  great 
Atlanta  and  Richmond  campaigns,  in 
May,  affairs  in  East  Tennessee  lost 
much  of  their  interest,  the  forces  on 
both  sides  being  concentrated,  as  much 
as  possible,  on  the  more  important 
scenes  of  operations.  The  presence  of 
scattered  bodies  of  irregular  Confeder- 
ate cavalry  in  Southwestern  Virginia 
proved  a source  of  constant  alarm  in 
Eastern  Kentucky.  These  rough  riders, 
dashing  through  the  gaps  of  the  Cum- 
berland Mountains,  would  fall  upon  iso- 
lated posts,  capture  their  garrisons,  and 
after  plundering  in  the  adjacent  country 
would  get  back  again  to  their  mountain 
retreats  before  they  could  be  overtaken. 
It  was  on  one  of  these  plundering  ex- 
peditions that  Morgan,  in  the  month  of 
June,  and  after  the  burning  of  Cynthi- 
ana,  as  has  already  been  mentioned, 
was  overtaken  and  badly  defeated  by 
General  Burbridge.  For  some  time 
afterwards,  Morgan  did  not  venture  to 
take  the  offensive.  He  was  of  too  rest- 
less a nature,  however,  to  remain  long 
inactive ; and  by  the  beginning  of  Sep- 
tember he  had  again  set  his  band  of 
guerrillas'  in  motion.  He  occupied 
Greenville,  East  Tennessee  on  the  3d ; 


GILLEM  DEFEATED. 


835 


but  his  command  was  surprised  the 
same  night  by  General  Gillem;  who 
had  made  a forced  march  from 
3.  Bull’s  Gap.  The  Confederate 
chief  with  a portion  of  his  staff' was  in 
the  house  of  a Mrs.  Williams.  The 
liouse  was  surrounded ; and  Morgan 
while  attempting  to  escape  was  shot 
dead.  The  death  of  Morgan  was  fol- 
lowed by  another  short  season  of  com- 
parative inaction,  both  parties  being 
content  to  remain  on  the  watch,  await- 
ing the  development  of  events  around 
Atlanta. 

About  the  beginning  of  October,  Gen- 
e;ral  Burbridge  with  2500  men  set  out 
on  an  expedition  from  Kentucky  against 
the  salt-works  in  Southwestern  Virginia, 
Avhich  were  of  great  importance  to  the 
(siemy.  After  heavy  skirmishing  he 
succeeded  in  driving  the  Confederates 
from  Clinch  Mountain  and  Laurel  Gap. 
Oct.  Coming  up  with  them  again  on 
2.  the  2d  of  October,  about  4 miles 
from  Saltville,  he  drove  them  back 
within  their  defenses  in  the  immediate 
neighborhood  of  the  salt-works.  Here, 
hoAvever,  they  bade  defiance  to  the 
National  troops;  and  Burbridge,  his 
ammunition  being  exhausted,  found  it 
necessary  to  retire.  He  had  sustained 
a loss  of  350  men. 

General  Gillem  having  fallen  back 
after  General  Bnrbridge’s  withdrawal 
into  Kentucky,  from  Greenville  to 
Bull’s  Gap,  and  thence  to  MorristoAvn, 
42  miles  from  Knoxville,  was  followed 
by  a Confederate  force,  under  Vaughan. 
On  the  26th  of  October,  Vaughan  ven- 
tured to  attack  Gillem  but  was  repulsed. 
Tav'o  days  afterwards  Vaughan  attacked 


again,  but,  receiving  a still  more  severe 
repulse,  retreated,  pursued  by  Gillem 
as  far  as  Limestone,  98  miles  east  of 
Knoxville.  After  remaining  in  that 
advanced  position  until  the  7th  of 
November,  Gillem,  whose  force  w^as 
only  1500  men,  consisting  of  3 regi- 
ments of  Tennessee  cavalry,  retired  to 
Bull’s  Gap,  where  Breckenridge,  now 
at  the  head  of  the  Confederate  forces  ir 
East  Tennessee,  some  3000  strong,  at 
tacked  him  on  the  11th.  He  too  was 
repulsed.  On  the  12th,  Gillem  with- 
drew his  forces  from  Bull’s  Gap,  and 
began  to  retreat  in  the  direction  of 
Knoxville.  In  the  evening  Brecken- 
ridge got  his  force  on  Gillem’s  flank 
and  rear  by  moving  through  Laurel 
Gap.  His  cavalry,  under  Vaughan  and 
Duke  were  in  front.  Soon  after  mid- 
night Breckenridge  attacked  Gil- 
lem’s  retreatino;  column  near  Mor-  13, 
ristown,  charging  upon  both  flanks  and 
at  the  same  time  breaking  his  centre. 
The  National  force  was  routed,  one 
regiment  after  another  giving  way  till 
men  and  horses  became  mixed  up 
together  in  inextricable  confusion.  A 
panic  ensued.  Owing  to  the  darkness 
feAV  casualties  occurred ; but  the  men 
threAV  away  their  arms  and  sought 
safety  in  flight.  All  the  artillery  and 
the  baggage  were  left  in  the  hands  of 
the  enemy.  The  Confederate  general 
claimed  to  have  captured  70  wagons, 
six  11-pounder  Parrott  guns  with  their 
horses  and  ammunition,  18  stand  of 
colors,  316  prisoners,  and  about  200 
horses  and  mules.  The  remainder  of 
Gillem’s  command,  about  1000  in  num- 
ber, escaped  to  Strawberry  Plains  and 


836 


HOOD  AND  THOMAS  IN  TENNESSEE. 


thence  to  Knoxville.  Breckenridge 
assumed  the  ^ir  of  a conqueror  in  East 
Tennessee,  and  issued  a proclamation 
promising  protection  to  all  who  should 
lay  down  their  arms  and  become  peace- 
able citizens.  He  continued  to  advance, 
by  way  of  Strawberry  Plains,  in  the 
direction  of  Knoxville.  On  the. 
18.  18th  he  withdrew  as  rapidly  as 
he  had  advanced;  and  on  that  day 
General  Ammen,  reinforced  by  1500 
troops  from  Chattanooga,  reoccupied 
Strawberry  Plains.  On  the  23d  of 
November  the  main  force  of  the  enemy 
was  reported  to  be  at  New'  Market,  8 
miles  to  the  north. 

About  this  time  General  Stoneman 
was  ordered  from  the  West  to  take 
general  direction  of  affairs  in  East 
Tennessee.  As  soon  as  he  arrived  he 
instructed  Burbridge  to  march,  with  all 
his  available  force  in  Kentucky,  by 
way  of  Cumberland  Gap,  to  the  relief 
of  Gillem.  Stoneman  w^as  dmected  by 
Thomas  to  concentrate  as  large  a force 
as  he  could,  and  move  against  Brecken- 
ridge, with  the  object  of  either  destroy- 
ing his  force  or  driving  it  into  Virginia. 
He  was  also  directed  to  destroy,  if 
possible,  the  salt-works  at  Saltville,  and 
the  East  Tennessee  and  Virginia  Eail- 
road  from  the  Tennessee  line  as  far 
into  Virginia  as  he  could  go  without 
endangering  his  command.  Learning 
on  the  6th  of  December  that  Brecken- 
ridge was  falling  back  towards  Vir- 
ginia, Stoneman  made  preparations  to 
follow  him;  and  having  concentrated 
Dec  commands  of  Burbridge  and 
12.  Gillem  at  Bean’s  Station,  he  set 
out  on  the  12th  for  Bristol.  The  ad- 


vance under  Gillem  reached  Jonesboro 
the  -same  day,  and  drove  the  rear-guard 
of  Vaughan’s  cavalry  through  the 
towu.  Gillem  then  turned  northward 
to  Kingsport,  on  the  North  Fork  of 
the  Holston,  crossed  the  river,  scaled 
the  bluff,  on  which  Duke  w’'as  posted, 
defeated  him,  and  killed,  captured,  or 
dispersed  the  whole  command.  The 
Confederates  left  in  his  possession 
8 wagons  and  the  entire  camp  equi- 
page. Burbridge  moved  upon  Bristol, 
where  he  struck  Vaughan,  and  skir 
mished  with  him  until  Gillem’s  column 
came  up.  Vaughan  was  also  com 
pletely  defeated,  with  the  loss  of  some 
300  prisoners  and  much  property. 
Burbridge  then  pushed  on  to  Abing- 
don, cut  the  railroad  between  SaltviUe 
and  Wytheville,  to  prevent  reinforce- 
ments coming  from  Lynchburg  to  the 
force  defending  the  salt-works.  Gillem 
also  reached  Abingdon  on  the  15th. 
The  enemy  under  Vaughan  had  in  the 
mean  time  reached  Marion,  having 
marched  by  a road  parallel  with  that 
by  which  Stoneman’s  force  had  ad- 
vanced, and  had  begun  to  intrench. 
But  Gillem  pushed  on  after  Vaughan; 
and  after  a hard  march  of  29  miles  he 
came  up  with  him,  early  on  the  16th. 
He  attacked  him  instantly,  and 
after  completely  routing  him,  16. 
drove  him  to  Wytheville,  30  miles 
further,  capturing  the  place,  with  200 
prisoners,  7 pieces  of  artillery,  and  a 
large  wagon  train.  All  the  enemy’s 
stores  and  supplies  were  destroyed,  as 
well  as  the  extensive  lead- works  near 
the  town,  and  the  railroad  bridges  over 
Eeedy  Creek.  Stoneman  now  turned 


FORREST  AT  JOHNSONVILLE. 


837 


his  attention  towards  Saltville.  His 
troops  entered  that  place  on  the  20th, 
Dec.  capturing  8 pieces  of  artillery  and 
-0.  a large  quantity  of  ammunition 
of  all  kinds.  They  also  destroyed  the 
buildings  belonging  to  the  Confederate 
government,  as  well  as  nearly  all  the 
machinery,  kettles,  vats,  engines,  and 
boilers  of  the  salt-works,  said  to  be 
among  the  most  extensive  in  the  world, 
and  an  immense  quantity  of  salt. 

In  this  great  raid,  besides  the  dam- 
age done  to  the  salt-works  and  lead- 
mines,  there  were  captured  20  pieces 
of  artillery,  900  prisoners,  200  negroes, 
8000  hogs,  many  cattle,  and  200  mules. 
Eleven  foundries,  90  flour  and  saw 
mills,  30  bridges,  and  the  depots  at 
Glade  Spring,  Marion,  and  Wytheville, 
were  destroyed,  as  well  as  13  locomo- 
tives, about  100  cars,  and  many  miles 
of  railroad  track.  It  was  estimated 
that  the  loss  to  the  Confederates  in 
stores  alone  amounted  to  $2,000,000. 
The  rapidity,  with  which  Stoneman 
moved,  enabled  him  to  take  the  entire 
region  he  traversed  by  surprise,  so  that 
the  citizens  had  not  time  to  run  off 
their  stock.  After  these  disasters, 
Breckenridge  made  no  further  attempts 
to  threaten  East  Tennessee.  Stoneman 
returned  to  Knoxville,  accompanied  by 
Gillem’s  command  ; Burbridge  marched 
back  to  Kentucky  by  way  of  Cumber- 
land Gap. 

W e now  return  to  Hood  and  Thomas. 
Hood,  we  have  already  said,  had  made 
such  movements  as  left  Thomas  in  no 
doubt  that  he  intended  to  invade  Mid- 
dle Tennessee.  He  had  been  for  some 
time  repairing  the  Mobile  and  Ohio 


Kailroad  for  the  purpose  of  supplying 
his  army;  and  trains  were  running  as 
far  north  as  Corinth  and  thence  east- 
ward to  Cherokee  Station,  transporting 
supplies  from  Selma  and  Montgomery. 
Wood’s  division  of  the  Fourth  corps 
reached  Athens  on  the  31st  of 
October,and  the  other  two  divis-  31. 
ions  rapidly  followed.  The  Twenty- 
Third  corps  under  Schofield,  awaiting 
at  Besaca  the  orders  of  Thomas,  as 
soon  as  it  was  known  that  Hood  had 
appeared  in  force  along  the  south  side 
of  the  Tennessee  Biver,  was  directed  to 
concentrate  at  Pulaski,  and  was  now 
also  on  its  way  in  the  rear  of  the 
Fourth  corps.  The  Confederates  hav- 
ing on  the  31st  effected  a lodgment  for 
their  infantry  on  the  north  side  of  the 
Tennessee  Biver  about  3 miles  above 
Florence,  and  driven  Croxton  above 
Shoal  Creek,  General  Stanley  was  di- 
rected also  to  concentrate  the  Fourth 
corps  at  Pulaski. 

In  the  mean  time  Forrest,  with  17 
regiments  of  cavalry  and  9 pieces  of 
artillery,  had  commenced  moving  north- 
ward from  Corinth,  and  from  Paris, 
Tennessee.  On  the  28th  of  October 
he  appeared  before  Fort  Heiman,  an 
earth- work  on  the  west  bank  of  the 
Tennessee  about  75  miles  from  Paducah, 
where  he  captured  a gun-boat  and  3 
transports,  having  previously  burned 
the  steamer  Express.  On  the  2d  of 
November  he  had  succeeded  in  planting 
batteries  both  above  and  below  John- 
son ville,  an  important  base  of  supplies, 
and  the  terminus  of  the  Northwestern 
Bailroad.  He  thus  completely  block- 
aded tiie  river  and  prevented  the 


998 


83S 


HOOD  AND  THOMAS  IN  TENNESSEE, 


escape  in  either  direction  of  3 gun-boats, 
8 transports,  and  about  a dozen  barges. 
The  garrison  consisted  of  about  1000 
men  under  the  command  of  Colonel 
Thompson.  The  naval  forces  under 
Lieutenant  King  attacked  the  enemy’s 
batteries  below  Johnsonville.  They 
were  repulsed,  however,  after  a severe 
contest,  but  not  until  they  had  recap- 
tured a transport,  with  two  20-pounder 
Parrotts  and  a quantity  of  ammunition 
and  stores  on  board,  and  compelled  the 
enemy  to  destroy  one  of  the  captured 
Nov.  gun-boats.  On  the  4th  the  Con- 
4.  federates  opened  fire  on  the  town, 
as  well  as  on  the  gun-boats  and  trans- 
ports, from  batteries  on  the  west  bank, 
[n  the  artillery  contest  which  ensued 
the  gun-boats  were  soon  disabled  ; and, 
to  prevent  their  falling  into  the  hands 
of  the  enemy  they  were  set  on  fire, 
with  the  transports.  Unfortunately 
the  flames  spread  to  the  buildings  of 
the  commissary  and  quartermaster’s  de- 
partments, which  together  with  a large 
amount  of  stores  on  the  levee,  were 
totally  destroyed,  involving  a loss  to 
the  Government  of  about  $1,500,000. 

On  the  5th,  after  directing  upon  the 
garrison  a furious  cannonade  of  an 
hour’s  duration,  the  enemy  withdrew, 
crossed  to  the  east  bank  above  the 
town,  and  marched  off  in  the  direction 
of  Clifton.  On  the  same  day  Schofield, 
with  the  advance  of  the  Twenty-Third 
corps,  arrived  at  Nashville ; and  being 
sent  immediately  b}^  railroad  to  John- 
sonville, he  arrived  there  at  night, 
only  to  find  that  the  enemy  had  disap- 
peared. Schofield  was  directed  to 
leave  a body  of  troops  at  Johnsonville 


sufficiently  numerous  for  its  defense. 
With  the  rest  of  his  force  he  was 
ordered  to  join  the  Fourth  corps  at 
Pulaski,  assume  command  of  all  the 
troops  in  that  vicinity,  and,  watching 
the  movements  of  Hood,  retard  his 
advance  into  Tennessee  as  much  as 
possible.  He  was  not,  however,  to  risk 
a general  engagement  till  A.  J.  Smith 
should  arrive  from  Missouri,  and  until 
Wilson  had  remounted  the  cavalry 
regiments  whose  horses  had  been  taken 
for  the  use  of  Kilpatrick’s  division  in 
Georgia. 

General  Thomas,  now  found  himself 
confronted  by  that  army  of  vet  era] 
troops  which,  under  General  Johnston 
had  made  such  persistent  opposition  to 
the  advance  of  Sherman’s  largely  super- 
ior force  from  Dalton  to  the  Chatta- 
hoochee, reinforced  by  12,000  well- 
equipped  cavalry  under  Forrest — per- 
haps the  boldest  and  ablest,  as  well  as 
the  most  unscrupulous  of  the  Confed- 
erate cavalry  officers.  Hood’s  army 
now  consisted  of  about  45,000  infantry 
and  from  1 2,000  to  1 5,000  cavalry.  The 
available  force  of  Thomas  at  this  time 
was  less  than  half . that  of  Hood,  com- 
prising only  about  12,000  men  under 
Stanley,  10,000  under  Schofield,  about 
4000  cavalry  under  Hatch,  Croxton’s 
brigade  of  2500  men,  and  Capron’s  of 
1200,  in  all  about  30,000  men.  The 
remainder  of  his  force  was  stationed 
along  the  railroad  to  keep  open  com- 
munications at  Chattanooga,  Decatur, 
Huntsville,  Bridgeport,  Stevenson,  Mur- 
freesboro, and  intermediate  posts.  It 
was  necessary  that  all  these  points 
should  be  well  guarded. 


HOOD’S  DEI.AY. 


839 


Hood  remained  inactive  in  the  neigli- 
})orhood  of  Florence  from  the  1st  to 
the  17th  of  November,  influenced 
doubtless  by  his  uncertainty  respecting 
the  movements  of  Sherman.  He  had 
laid  a pontoon  bridge  over  the  Tennes- 
see River  in  place  of  the  destroyed 
railroad  bridge,  and  had  sent  over  to 
the  north  side  S.  D.  Lee’s  infantry 
corps  and  two  cavalry  divisions,  which 
skirmished  continually  with  the  com- 
mands of  Hatch  and  Croxton  along  the 
line  of  Shoal  Creek.  His  other  two 
corps  remained  on  the  south  side  of  the 
Tennessee  till  the  l7th  of  Novein- 
1 7 . ber,  when  Cheatham’s  corps  also 
crossed  to  the  north  side,  and  Stewart’s 
[)  repared  to  follow.  On  the  same  day 
a portion  of  Lee’s  corps  moved  up  the 
Lawrenceburg  road  to  Bough’s  Mill  on 
Shoal  Creek,  skirmishing  a little  with 
Hatch’s  cavalry,  and  then  retiring  to 
some  neighboring  blufl^s,  went  into 
camp. 

This  delay,  on  the  part  of  Hood  was 
a great  gain  to  the  National  command- 
er. Thomas  was  anxiously  awaiting 
the  arrival  of  promised  reinforcements. 
In  a few  days  or  weeks  at  most,  the 
teim  of  service  of  a large  number  of 
his  troops  would  have  expired  ; but  20 
one  year  regiments  were  on  their  way 
to  take  their  place.  A.  J.  Smith,  with 
tw'o  veteran  divisions,  already  well 
advanced  on  his  journey,  was  approach- 
ing from  Missouri.  Wilson,  having  all 
Ijiit  completed  his  arrangements,  would 
soon  join  him  with  12,000  effective 
cavalry.  In  addition  to  these  which 
could  be  confidently  counted  upon, 
there  had  been  collected  at  Chattanooga, 


some  7000  convalescents  which,  if  not 
available  for  marching,  would  at  least 
be  serviceable  for  garrison  duty.  These 
forces,  when  all  concentrated,  would 
increase  Thomas’  available  force  to 
an  army  almost  as  large  as  that  of  the 
enemy.  Had  Hood  delayed  his  advance 
one  week  or  ten  days  longer,  Thomas 
would  have  been  able  to  meet  him  at 
some  point  south  of  the  Duck 
River.  Hood,  however,  began  19. 
his  advance  on  the  19th,  moving  by 
parallel  roads  from  Florence  toward? 
Waynesboro,  and  driving  Hatch’s  cav 
airy  out  of  Lawrenceburg,  on  the  2 2d. 
It  then  became  the  policy  of  Thomas 
to  retire  in  the  direction  in  which  his 
reinforcements  were  approaching,  and 
at  the  same  time  to  delay  the  enemy 
as  much  as  possible.  Schofield  began 
to  remove  the  public  property  from 
Pulaski  preparatory  to  falling  back 
towards  Columbia — two  divisions  of 
Stanley’s  corps  having  been  sent  to 
Lynnville,  15  miles  north,  to  protect 
Rie  railroad  and  secure  the  passage  of 
the  wagon  -trains.  Capron’s  brigade  of 
cavalry  was  stationed  at  Mount  Pleas- 
ant to  cover  the  approaches  from  the 
south ’west  to  Columbia,  where  was  held, 
in  position,  a brigade  of  Ruger’s  divi- 
sion of  the  Twenty-Third  corps.  Of 
the  other  two  divisions  of  that  corps, 
one  was  directed  to  move  to  Columbia, 
and  the  other  by  way  of  Waverly  to 
Centerville,  to  occupy  the  crossings  of 
the  Duck  River,  near  Columbia,  Wil- 
liamsport, and  Gordon’s  Ferry.  On 
the  23d  Granger  withdrew  by  rail, 
without  any  opposition,  on  the  part  of 
the  enemy,  the  garrisons  at  Athens, 


840 


HOOD  AND  THOMAS  IN  TENNESSEE. 


Decatur,  and  Huntsville  to  Stevenson, 
sending  5 new  regiments  from  that 
place  to  Murfreesboro,  and  retaining 
the  original  troops  of  his  command. 
On  the  same  night,  Schofield  evacu- 
ated Pulaski  and  retired  towards 
Columbia,  where  he  arrived  on  the 
24th.  The  officer,  commandino^  at 
Johnsonville,  was  ordered  to  remove  all 
public  property  and  retire  to  Fold 
Donelson  and  thence  to  Clarksville. 

On  the  24th  and  25th  some  dismount- 
ed cavalry  of  the  Confederates  skir- 
mished with  Schofield’s  troops  at  Col- 
umbia; and,  during  the  26th  and  27th, 
the  infantry  having  come  up,  they 
made  more  decided  demonstrations,  but 
did  not  assault.  Their  movements,  how- 
ever, indicated  an  intention  to  cross  the 
Duck  Piver,  above  or  below  the  town. 
Schofield,  therefore,  withdrew  to  the 
north  bank  on  the  night  of  the  27th, 
and  took  up  a new  position,  in  which 
he  remained  undisturbed  during  the 
28th.  In  front  of  the  town,  two  divi- 
sions of  the  Twenty-Third  corps  were 
placed  in  line,  holding  all  the  neigh- 
boring crossings,  while  Stanley’s  corps, 
posted  in  reserve  on  the  Franklin  turn- 
pike, was  held  in  readiness  to  repel 
any  attempt,  on  the  part  of  the  enemy, 
to  force  a passage.  General  Wilson, 
with  a body  of  cavalry,  held  the  cross- 
ings above  those  guarded  by  the  in- 
fantry  ; but,  about  two  o’clock 
29.  on  the  morning  of  the  29th,  the 
Confederates  drove  him  back  and 
pushed  over  the  river  at  the  Lewisburg 
turnpike,  and,  a little  later,  a body  of 
their  infantry  crossed  at  Huey’s  Mills, 
6 miles  above  Columbia.  Schofield 


now  finding  his  communication  with 
the  cavalry  internipted,  and  his  line  of 
retreat  towards  Franklin  threatened, 
prepared  again  to  fall  back.  Stanley, 
with  a division  of  infantry,  was  sent  to 
Spring  Hill  to  protect  the  passage  of 
the  trains,  and  keep  open  the  road  for 
the  retreat  of  the  main  force  in  that 
direction.  He  arrived  just  in  time  to 
drive  off  the  enemy’s  cavalry,  and  to 
save  the  trains.  Soon  afterwards,  he 
was  attacked  by  both  infantry  and 
cavalry,  and  had  considerable  difficulty 
in  maintaining  his  position  till  dark. 
Schofield,  though  not  attacked  at  Huey’s 
Mills,  was  actively  engaged  all  day, 
resisting  the  enemy  who  attempted  a 
crossing  at  Columbia.  Late  in  the 
afternoon,  and,  after  giving  directions 
for  the  retreat  of  all  the  troops  north- 
ward at  dark,  he  took  with  him  Kuger’s 
division  and  hastened  to  the  relief  of 
General  Stanley,  at  Spring  Hill.  Leav- 
ing a brigade  to  hold  the  turnpike,  at 
this  point,  he  pushed  on  to  the  cross- 
roads, near  Thompson’s  Station,  whence 
a body  of  the  enemy’s  cavalry  hastily 
made  off  at  his  approach,  leaving  their 
camp-fires  burning.  The  main  body  of 
Schofield’s  command  withdrew  safely 
from  Columbia  after  dark,  on  the  29th, 
passed  Spring  Hill  without  molestation, 
at  midnight,  the  cavalry  moving  on  the 
Lewisburg  turnpike,  on  the  right  of  the 
infantry  line  of  march.  The  whole 
command  got  into  position,  at 
Franklin,  18  miles  south  of  Nash-  30. 
ville,  early  on  the  morning  of  the  30th. 
Line  of  battle  was  formed  at  once  on 
the  south  side  of  the  town  in  expecta 
tion  of  the  enemy’s  immediate  approach 


FRANKLIN. 


841 


The  battle-ground  was  well  chosen. 
Franklin  is  situated  on  the  west  bank 
of  the  Harpeth  River,  a bend  of  which 
incloses  more  than  half  of  the  town  on 
the  east  and  north,  leaving  only  a part 
(»f  the  west  and  south  sides  exposed. 
The  National  troops  were  disposed  in 
a line  running  southeast,  b#th  flanks 
resting  on  the  river — the  Fourth  corps 
on  the  right,  the  Twenty-Third  on  the 
left.  The  cavalry  were  posted  on  both 
sides  of  the  town  on  the  north  bank, 
where  also  was  a fort  on  the  hill  com- 
manding the  town  and  the  railroad, 
besides  earth- works  and  some  artillery. 
From  the  outset  the  troops  worked 
energetically  in  the  erection  of  breast- 
^vorks  of  logs  and  earth,  while  the 
skirmishers  in  front  endeavored  to 
check  the  enemy’s  advance.  Between 
the  lines  of  the  two  armies  extended  a 
broad  plain,  broken  by  slight  undula- 
tions and  little  hills,  interspersed  by 
clumps  of  bushes  and  groves  of  trees. 

The  object  of  Schofleld  in  making  a 
stand  at  Franklin  was  to  detain  Hood 
until  the  trains  could  be  got  off  safely 
over  the  Harpeth  Bridge  and  well  on 
their  way  to  Nashville.  To  refuse 
battle  would  have  been  to  expose  his 
command  to  certain  attack  from  superior 
forces  while  on  the  march,  the  result  of 
which  would,  doubtless,  have  been  the 
destruction  of  the  wagon-trains  and 
the  greater  part  of  the  artillery.  Such 
ft  calamity  might  have  been  followed 
by  the  fall  of  Nashville,  and  the  aban- 
donment of  a large  part  of  Tennessee. 
Hood’s  object  was  to  overwhelm  Scho- 
field at  once,  or  at  least  compel  him  to 
sacrifice  his  artillery  and  stores.  He 


therefore  hurried  up  his  troops  and 
massed  them  behind  a screen  of  thick 
woods,  in  a line  parallel  with  that  of 
Schofield,  Stewart’s  corps  being  on  the 
right,  Cheatham’s  on  the  left,  and  Lee’s 
in  reserve  in  the  rear.  These  move 
ments  were  made  with  such  celerity 
that  Hood  very  nearly  took  Schofield 
by  surprise.  The  Confederate  chief 
rode  alons:  his  front,  telling  his  men 
that  the  National  lines  were  weak,  and 
that  when  these  were  once  broken, 
Thomas  would  be  compelled  to  leave 
Tennessee.  His  own  army  was  in 
excellent  condition.  With  bis  usual 
boldness  and  confidence  of  success. 
Hood  determined  to  attack  the  centre 
of  Schofield’s  line,  hoping  to  pierce  it, 
and  then  to  push  in  through  the  town 
to  the  bridges,  when  he  would  capture 
the  trains,  and  at  the  same  time  cut  the 
opposing  army  in  two.  At  four  o’clock 
in  the  afternoon  he  advanced  to  the 
attack.  The  National  skirmishers 
slowly  retreated  to  their  works,  ex- 
changing a sharp  fire  with  those  of  the 
enemy;  and  then  a tremendous  can- 
nonade was  opened  from  the  artillery 
along  Schofield’s  line.  The  cloud  of 
hostile  skirmishers  was  quickly  fol- 
lowed by  the  long  and  massive  lines, 
four  deep,  of  Cheatham  and  Stewart. 
As  the  Confederates  approached,  they 
were  received  by  a tremendous  mus- 
ketry, as  well  as,  artillery  fire.  On 
they  came,  however,  with  fierce  energy. 
A terrific  struggle  ensued.  At  length 
one  of  Cheatham’s  divisions  gained  the 
outworks  held  by  Wagner,  and  forced 
him  back  on  the  stronger  lines  held  by 
Cox  and  Ruger.  The  Confedei*ates 


842 


HOOD  AND  THOMAS  IN  TENNESSEE. 


then  re-forming  tlieir  lines,  again  rushed 
on,  and  after  a most  desperate  and 
bloody  contest,  penetrated  the  second 
line  of  defenses,  and  captured  two  guns. 
The  situation  had  already  become 
critical  in  the  last  degree.  It  seemed 
as  if  Hood  had  already  victory  in  his 
grasp.  At  this  supreme  moment,  Stan- 
ley rode  forward  to  the  head  of 
Opdyke’s  brigade,  of  Warren’s  division, 
which  was  posted  behind  the  works, 
and  ordered  it  forward  with  Conrad’s 
brigade  in  support.  Opdyke’s  voice 
was  immediately  heard  ringing  loud 
and  clear  above  the  tumult.  “ First 
brigade,  forward  to  the  works,”  he 
cried,  himself  leading  the  way.  His 
brave  men  promptly  responded  to  the 
call.  On  they  went  with  firm  and 
steady  step.  With  crushing  weight 
they  fell  upon  the  exultant  columns  of 
the  foe.  The  Confederates,  at  the  very 
moment  when  victory  seemed  secure, 
were  not  only  checked  in  their  trium- 
phant career;  they  were  driven  back 
with  fearful  slaughter.  The  gap  was 
closed — the  National  line  restored.  By 
this  gallant  charge  the  works  and  guns 
were  recovered  ; and  300  prisoners 
with  10  battle-flags  were  captured. 
Hood,  however,  was  unvdlling  to  give 
up  the  contest.  Again  and  again,  in 
four  successive  assaults,  he  flung  his 
men,  as  if  with  the  energy  of  despair, 
on  the  now  compact  National  lines ; but 
it  was  all  in  vain.  After  dark  the 
Confederates,  moving  to  their  own  left, 
made  a visrorous  attack  on  the  National 

O 

right ; but  this  too  was  repulsed  by 
Hanley’s  first  division,  under  Kimball. 
It  was  midnight  when  the  sounds  of 


musketry  and  artillery  ceased.  Hood, 
bitterly  mortified  at  the  result  of  the 
contest,  had  withdrawn  his  men.  Such 
was  the  battle  of  Franklin — a battle 
which  did  honor  to  the  genius  of  Scho- 
field, but  which,  according  to  the  con- 
current testimony  of  Wood,  Stanley 
and  Thprafts  himself,  was  won  by  Op- 
dyke  and  his  gallant  brigade.  It  was 
the  voluntary  testimony  of  each  of 
these  generals,  that  but  for  Opdyke 
and  his  men,  their  skill,  promptitude 
and  gallantry,  disaster  instead  of  vic- 
tory would  have  befallen  the  National 
arms  at  Franklin.”  Opdyke  had  al- 
ready figured  at  Shiloh,  where  he  was 
twice  wounded,  at  Chickamauga,  at 
Missionary  Kidge,  at  Bocky  Face,  and 
at  Peach  Tree  Creek.  He  was  spared 
at  Franklin  to  perform  equally  noble 
deeds  at  Nashville. 

On  both  sides  the  losses  were  severe. 
Hood’s  loss  was  about  6000,  some  of 
his  best  generals  had  perished ; and 
many  of  them  were  severely  wounded. 
Schofield’s  loss  was  not  so  heavy — 2326  • 
in  all,  of  whom  189  were  killed,  1033 
wounded,  and  1104  missing.  Among 
the  wounded  were  Generals  Stanley 
and  Bradley. 

It  would  be  difficult  to  over-estimate 
the  importance  of  the  victory  at  Frank- 
lin. It  checked  Hood’s  advance ; it 
gave  Schofield  time  to  remove  his 
troops  and  his  property  to  Nashville  ; 
and  what  was  of  equal  value,  from  a 
National  point  of  view,  it  greatly  dis- 
couraged and  bowed  down  the  spirits 
of  the  Confederate  rank  and  file. 

After  the  battle,  Schofield  in  com- 
pliance with  orders  from  Thomas,  fell 


OVERALL’^)  CREEK. 


back  to  Nashville,  in  front  of  which, 
by  noon  on  the  1st  of  December,  a 
line  of  battle  was  formed.  The 
1.  army  of  Thomas  was  now  about 
56,000  strong.  Steedman  had  come  up 
from  Chattanooga  with  5000  men. 
A.  J.  Smith  with  his  command  had 
arrived  from  Missouri  on  the  30th. 
Other  reinforcements  were  rapidly  ar- 
riving. Thomas  had  taken  every  care 
to  strengthen  his  position.  Forts 
Negley,  Morton,  Confiscation,  Houston 
and  Gillem,  situated  on  commanding 
heights,  guarded  the  approaches  from 
the  south.  Behind  these,  and  in  front 
of  Nashville,  lay  Thomas’  army ; A.  J. 
Smith  on  the  right,  resting  on  the 
river ; the  Fourth  corps  commanded  by 
Wood  in  the  absence  of  the  wounded 
Stanley,  in  the  centre  ; and  the  Twenty- 
Third  corps,  under  Schofield  on  the 
left.  Wilson  with  the  cavalry,  was 
stationed,  to  secure ' the  interval  be- 
tween Schofield  and  the  Cumberland 
above  the  city.  Steedman  arrived  in 
the  evening,  and  took  up  a position 
about  a*  mile  in  advance  of  the  left 
centre  of  the  main  line  and  on  the  left 
of  the  Nolensville  turnpike.  This 
position,  however,  was  considered  to  be 
too  much  exposed,  and  the  cavalry 
were  directed  to  take  post  on  the  north 
side  of  the  river  at  Edgefield,  Steed- 
man’s  troops  taking  their  place  in  the 
line  between  Schofield  and  the  river. 
On  the  afternoon  of  the  2d  of  Decem- 
.ber  small  parties  of  the  enemy’s  cavalry 
engaged  the  National  skirmishers ; but 
their  infantry  did  not  appear  in  force 
till  the  latter  part  of  the  following  day, 
when  Hood  began  to  establish  his  main 


84[i 

line.  Early  on  the  4th  he  occupied 
the  high  ground  on  the  southeast  sid^* 
of  Brown’s  Creek,  extending 
from  the  Nolensville  turnpike  4. 
— ^his  extreme  right  in  a westerly  direc- 
tion across  the  Franklin  and  Granny 
White  turnpikes  to  the  hills  south  and 
southwest  of  Bichland  Creek,  and  along 
that  stream  to  the  Hillsboro  turnpike. 
Both  fianks  were  covered  by  the  cav- 
alry. The  enemy’s  salient  was  on 
Montgomery  Hill,  within  600  yards  of 
the  National  centre.  An  artillery  fire 
was  opened  on  his  lines  from  several 
points,  but  brought  no  reply.  In  this 
position  Hood’s  army  remained  till  the 
15th  of  December. 

During  this  interval,  there  occurred 
some  operations  of  a minor  character. 
Murfreesboro  was  then  held  by  General 
Eousseau.  The  garrison  at  Murfrees- 
boro had  been  considerably  strength- 
ened by  the  arrival  of  a body  of  troops 
under  General  Milroy,  who  had  been 
ordered  up  from  Tullahoma.  Thomas 
was  particularly  anxious  that  nothing 
should  be  allowed  to  disturb  his 
communication  with  Chattanooga.  He 
kept,  therefore,  a watchful  eye  on  the 
railroad.  Hood  was  not  ignorant  of 
the  importance  of  this  line  of  commu- 
nication ; and  on  the  same  day  on 
which  the  latter  took  position  in  front 
of  Thomas,  Bates’  division  of  Cheat- 
ham’s corps  appeared  at  Overall’s 
Creek,  and  made  an  attack  on  the 
block-house  at  the  railroad  crossing. 
The  little  garrison  made  a stout  re- 
sistance ; and  on  the  arrival  of  Milroy, 
who  was  sent  with  3 regiments  from 
Fort  Rosecranz,  Bates  was  compelled 


su 


HOOD  AND  THOMAS  IN  TENNESSEE. 


to  retire.  During  the  three  following 
(lays,  Bates  was  largely  reinforced  with 
both  cavalry  and  infantry ; and  it 
seemed  as  if  he  were  bent  on  making  an 
assault  on  the  fort.  On  the  8th,  Buford 
Dec.  head  of  a body  of  cavalry 

dashed  into  Murfreesboro.  At- 
tacked by  a regiment  of  National  in- 
fantry, Buford  found  it  necessary  to 
retire  from  the  town.  Determined  that 
his  day’s  labor  should  not  be  altogether 
fruitless,  he  swept  around  by  way  of 
Lebanon,  and  along  the  Cumberland, 
with  the  evident  intention  of  cutting 
Thomas’  communication  with  Louis- 
vWle ; but  the  gun-boats  on  the  river 
made  it  impossible  for  him  to  carry  out 
his  designs.  On  the  same  day,  Milroy 
encountered  the  Confederates  in  some 
force  on  the  Wilkeson  turnpike,  and 
after  a severe  struggle,  routed  them, 
inflicting  a loss  of  30  killed,  and  175 
wounded,  and  capturing  over  200  pris- 
oners and  2 guns.  Milroy’s  loss  was 
about  205  men  killed  and  wounded. 

Thomas’  protracted  delay  was  misun- 
derstood and  misinterpreted  at  Wash- 
ington. Grant,  himself,  who  had  great 
faith  in  Thomas,  was  dissatisfied.  Hood, 
it  was  thought,  was  having  matters  too 
much  his  own  way.  Grant,  resolved  to 
have  the  mystery  of  the  delay  ex- 
plained, hurried  from  City  Point  for 
Nashville.  He  had  only  proceeded  as 
far  as  Washington,  when  he  received 
from  the  West,  telegraphic  messages 
fully  explaining  the  situation,  and  con- 
vimnng  him  that  he  had  not  mistrusted 
liis  man,  and  that  all  was  well  in  Ten- 
nessee. Grant  did  not  pursue  his 
journey.  Thomas  was  really  making 


the  best  possible  use  of  his  time.  His 
numbers  were  superior  to  those  of 
Hood,  but  he  was  deficient  in  cavalry. 
Time  was  of  the  utmost  importance  to 
Wilson,  who  was  organizing  with  all 
the  rapidity  possible  in  the  circum- 
stances. The  weather,  besides,  had 
been  unfavorable.  On  the  morning  of 
the  9th, ‘there  was  a heavy  sleet-storm, 
which  covered  the  ground  with  ice. 
For  a week  the  ground  was  such,  that' 
it  was  impossible  to  move  ; and  the 
cold  was  most  intense. 

On  the  14th,  the  weather  moderated 
considerably.  In  both  camps  the  ut- 
most activity  prevailed.  It  was  evident 
that  both  armies  were  fully  prepared 
for  a great  test  struggle.  Thomas  con- 
vened his  corps-commanders ; and  a 
plan  of  battle  was  discussed  and  agreed 
upon.  The  left  flank  of  the  enemy 
was  his  weak  point.  It  was  the  gei- 
eral  conviction  that  the  point  was  vul- 
nerable— that  it  could  be  turned.  It 
was  resolved,  therefore,  to  make  a 
feigned  attack  against  Hood’s  right, 
and  to  follow  it  by  an  effective  blow 
against  the  left.  The  morning  of  the 
15th  was  gloomy.  A dense  fog 
overhung  the  entire  country  15. 
around.  It  was  not  until  the  morning 
was  far  advanced,  that  it  was  possible 
to  move  the  troops  to  their  assigned 
positions.  Steedman  had  received  in- 
structions, the  night  before,  to  advance 
against  the  enemy’s  right,  east  of  the 
Nolensville  turnpike.  As  soon  as  the 
light  permitted,  he  proceeded  to  carry 
out  his  instructions. 

Immediately  after  the  completion 
of  Steedman’s  movement.  Smith  and 


MAP  SHOWING  THE  COUNTRY  FROM  NASHVILLE,  TENNESSEE,  TO  DECATUR, 

ALABAMA. 


1 


NASHVILLE. 


845 


Wilson  pushed  out  along  the  Harding 
turnpike,  and,  wheeling  to  the  left,  ad- 
vanced against  Hood’s  position,  across 
the  Harding  and  Hillsboro  turnpikes. 
At  the  same  time,  Johnson’s  division  of 
cavalry  was  sent  to  operate  against  a 
battery  of  the  enemy  at  Ball’s  Landing, 
on  the  Cumberland,  8 miles  below 
Nashville ; and,  late  in  the  afternoon,  in 
conjunction  with  some  gun-boats,  he  en- 
gaged it,  continuing  the  firing  till  dark, 
and  with  such  effect  that  the  Confed- 
ei-ates  disappeared  from  that  vicinity 
diirins:  the  nicrht.  The  remainder  of 
Wilson’s  cavalry,  moving  on  the  right 
flank  of  A.  J.  Smith’s  troops,  Hatch’s 
division  leading  and  Knipe’s  in  reserve, 
struck  the  enemy  at  Richland  Creek, 
near  Harding’s  House,  di*ove  him  back 
rapidly,  capturing  a number  of  prison- 
ers and  wagons.  Continuing  to  ad- 
vance, and  still  swinging  a little  towards 
the  left,  they  came  upon  a redoubt 
containing  4 guns.  The  redoubt  was 
carried  by  assault ; and  the  captured 
guns  were  turned  upon  the  enemy. 
The  same  troops  then  advanced  against 
another  and  stronger  4-gun  redoubt, 
(\npturing  it  with  300  prisoners.  At 
this  stage  it  was  discovered  that  Smith 
liad  not  advanced  sufficiently  to  the 
nght.  Schofield,  therefore,  with  the 
Twenty-Third  corps,  was  directed  to 
leave  his  position  in  reserve,  and  ad- 
vance to  Smith’s  right.  This  move- 
ment Schofield  rapidly  accomplished  ; 
and  the  cavalry  were  thus  enabled  to 
operate  more  freely  on  the  enemy’s 
rear.  The  Fourth  corps,  under  Wood, 
formed  on  the  left  of  Smith’s  command, 
and  as  soon  as  the  latter  had  struck 


the  enemy’s  fiank,  assaulted  Mont- 
gomery Hill.  This  position,  the  most 
advanced  in  Hood’s  line,  was  carried, 
at  one  o’clock,  by  a brigade  of  the 
second  division.  The  Fourth  corps, 
still  connecting  with  Smith’s  left,  con- 
tinued to  advance,  carrying  by  assault 
all  that  portion  of  Hood’s  line  in  its 
immediate  front,  and  capturing  several 
pieces  of  artillery,  with  500  prisoners, 
and  some  colors.  The  Confederates 
were  driven  out  of  their  original  line 
of  works,  and  forced  back  to  a position 
along  the  base  of  the  Harpeth  Hills, 
still  holding  their  line  of  retreat  by  the 
Franklin  and  Granny  White  turnpikes. 

The  National  line  was  readjusted  at 
nightfall  so  as  to  run  along  the  east 
side  of  the  Hillsboro  turnpike — Scho- 
field on  the  right.  Smith  in  the  centre, 
and  Wood  on  the  left,  with  the  cavalry 
on  the  right  of  Schofield.  Steed  man 
continued  to  hold  the  position  he  had 
gained  in  the  morning,  east  of  the 
Nolensville  turnpike.  The  day’s  oper- 
ations resulted  in  the  forcing  back  of 
the  enemy  at  all  points,  with  a loss  of 
16  pieces  of  artillery,  1200  prisoners, 
several  hundred  stand  of  arms,  and  40 
wagons.  The  National  loss  was  slight. 
The  original  plan  of  battle  had  been 
strictly  adhered  to,  and,  with  but  few 
alterations,  fully  carried  out.  The 
entire  army  bivouacked  in  the  line  of 
battle  formed  at  dark  ; and  prepara- 
tions were  made  to  renew  the  contest 
on  the  following  day  at  an  early  hour. 

On  the  16th,  at  six  in  the  morn- 
ing,  the  struggle  was  resumed.  16. 
Wood  pressed  back  the  Confederate 
skirmishers  across  the  Franklin  turn- 


846 


HOOD  AND  THOMAS  IN  TENNESSEE. 


pike ; and  then  swinging  a little  to  the 
right  he  advanced  in  a southerly  dii*ec- 
tion,  driving  the  Confederates  before 
him  until  he  came  upon  their  new  main 
line  of  works,  at  Overton’s  Hill,  about 
5 miles  south  of  the  city,  and  on  the 
east  side  of  the  Franklin  turnpike. 
Steedman  moved  out  from  Nashville  by 
the  Nolens ville  turnpike,  and  formed 
his  command  on  the  left  of  Wood, 
whose  left  flank  he  thus  effectually 
secured.  Smith  moved  on  the  right  of 
Wood’s  corps  and  established  con- 
nection with  it,  thus  completing  a new 
line  of  battle.  Schofield’s  corps  re- 
mained in  the  position  taken  up  at 
dark  on  the  15th,  in  which  his  troops 
faced  eastward  and  towards  the  enemy’s 
left  flank,  while  those  of  Smith  and 
Wood  faced  towards  the  south.  Wil- 
son’s cavalry  was  dismounted  and 
formed  on  the  right  of  Schofield. 
These  dispositions  having  been  com- 
pleted, it  was  determined  to  continue 
the  movement  against  the  enemy’s  left 
flank  ; and  the  entire  National  line 
moved  to  within  600  yards  of  that  of 
the  enemy  at  all  points.  About  three 
in  the  afternoon  an  assault  on  Overton’s 
Hill  was  ordered  to  be  made  by  two 
brigades  of  Wood’s  corps,  aided  by  a 
colored  brigade  from  Steedman’s  com- 
mand. But  as  the  ground  on  which 
the  assaulting  columns  were  formed 
was  open  and  exposed  to  the  view  of 
the  Confederates,  they  anticipated  the 
movement,  and  drew  reinforcements 
from  their  left  and  centre  to  strengthen 
the  menaced  position  ; and,  when  the 
assault  was  made,  they  directed  a tre- 
mendous fire  of  grape,  canister,  and 


musketry  upon  the  National  troops. 
Wood’s  men,  however,  moved  steadily 
onward  up  the  hill  until  near  its  crest, 
when  the  reserves  of  the  enemy  rose 
suddenly  and  opened  upon  their  assail- 
ants a most  destructive  fire,  wFicli 
caused  them  to  waver  and  ultimately 
to  fall  back,  leaving  their  dead  and 
wounded  lying  among  the  felled  trees. 
The  troops  were  immediately  re-formed 
in  their  old  position  by  Wood,  in  readi- 
ness for  a renewal  of  the  assault. 

Smith  and  Schofield  then  moved 
against  the  works  in  their  respective 
fronts,  and  carried  all  before  them, 
breaking  the  enemy’s  lines  in  a dozen 
places,  capturing  all  his  artillery  with 
thousands  of  prisoners,  including  four 
general  officers.  Wilson’s  cavalry  dis- 
mounted, attacked  the  enemy  at  the 
same  moment,  gained  firm  possession 
of  the  Granny  White  turnpike,  and 
thus  closed  one  of  the  routes  which 
had  remained  open  to  the  Confederate^ 
for  retreat  in  the  direction  of  Franklin. 
Wood’s  and  Steedman’s  troops,  now 
hearing  the  shouts  of  their  victorious 
comrades  on  the  right,  again  rushed 
impetuously  forward  to  renew  the  as- 
sault on  Overton’s  Hill.  Although 
received  with  a very  heavy  fire,  their 
onset  proved  irresistible.  The  Confe^l- 
erates  broke,  and,  leaving  their  artillery 
and  a large  number  of  prisoners,  fled  in 
confusion  to  the  Brentwood  pass, 
through  which  runs  the  Franklin  turn- 
pike, closely  followed  till  dark  by  the 
Fourth  corps.  Wilson,  at  the  same 
time,  hastily  mounted  Knipe’s  and 
Hatch’s  divisions  of  his  command,  ami 
sent  them  in  pursuit  along  the  Granny 


THE  PURSTJIT. 


847 


White  turnpike,  with  directions  to 
reach  Franklin,  if  possible,  in  advance 
of  the  enemy.  After  proceeding  about 
a mile  they  came  upon  a body  of  Con- 
federate cavalry  under  Chalmers,  behind 
barricades  constructed  across  the  road. 
The  position  was  charged,  at  once,  by 
the  Twelfth  Tennessee  cavalry,  under 
Colonel  Spalding,  wlien  the  Confeder- 
ates broke  and  scattered  in  all  direc- 
tions, leaving  a number  of  prisoners, 
among  whom  was  General  Rucker. 
Such  was  the  battle  of  Nashville. 

During  the  two  day’s  operations 
4462  prisoners  were  taken,  including 
287  officers,  from  the  grade  of  major- 
general  downward,  besides  53  pieces 
of  artillery  and  thousands  of  small-ai*ms. 
The  Confederates  left  3000  of  their 
dead  and  wounded  on  the  field  of  bat- 
tle. The  total  National  loss  did  not 
exceed  3000,  and  of  this  number  very 
few  were  killed. 

Next  morning,  the  pursuit  was  con- 
tinued,  the  Fourth  corps  pushing 
17.  towards  Franklin  by  the  direct 
turnpike,  and  the  cavalry  by  the  Granny 
White  turnpike  to  its  intersection  with 
that  road,  beyond  which  point  they 
moved  in  advance  of  the  infantry. 
Johnson’s  cavalry  division  was  sent  by 
Wilson  direct  to  the  Harpeth  River  by 
the  Hillsboro  turnpike,  with  instruc- 
tions to  cross  and  move  rapidly  towards 
Franklin.  The  main  cavaliy  column, 
Knipe’s  division  in  the  advance,  over- 
took the  enemy’s  rear-guard  4 miles 
north  of  Franklin,  at  Hollow  Tree  Gap, 
and  carried  the  position  by  simultane- 
ous charges  in  both  front  and  flank, 
capturing  413  prisoners  and  3 stand  of 


colors.  The  Confederates  then  fell 
back  rapidly  to  Franklin,  and  endeav- 
ored to  defend  the  crossins^s  of  the 
Harpeth;  but,  Johnson’s  division  com 
ing  up  from  below  on  the  south  side 
of  the  stream,  they  were  compelled  to 
retii’e.  The  National  forces  took  pos- 
session of  the  town,  in  which  were  the 
enemy’s  hospitals,  containing  over  200(> 
wounded,  of  whom  about  200  were 
Union  soldiers.  Wilson  continued  the 
pursuit  towards  Columbia,  the  Confe<]- 
erate  rear-guard  slowly  retiring  before 
him  to  about  5 miles  south  of  Franklin, 
where  it  halted  in  some  open  fields  on 
the  north  side  of  the  West  Harpeth 
River,  apparently  disposed  to  make  a 
stand.  Wilson  at  once  deployed  Knipe’s 
division  as  skirmishers,  with  Hatch’s 
division  in  support,  and  ordered  his  body- 
guard, the  Fourth  United  States  caval- 
ry commanded  by  Lieutenant  Hedges, 
to  attack  the  Confederates.  Form- 
ing on  the  turnpike  in  column  of  fours, 
the  gallant  little  band  charged  with 
drawn  sabres,  and  succeeded  in  break 
ing  their  centre,  while  Knipe’s  and 
Hatch’s  men  drove  back  their  flanks, 
scattering  the  entire  command  and  cap- 
turing their  artillery.  Night  came  on ; 
and  the  fugitives  escaped.  The  Fourth 
corps  had  followed,  in  the  rear  of  the 
cavalry,  as  far  as  the  Harpeth  River. 
There,  however,  their  progress  was 
stayed.  The  bridges  were  destroyed, 
and  there  was  too  much  water  in  the 
sti-eam  to  permit  the  crossing  of  infan tiy. 
The  construction  of  a trestle  bridge  was 
commenced ; but  it  was  not  completed 
before  night-fall.  Steedman’s  command 
followed  the  Fourth  corps  and  encamped 


848 


HOOD  AND  THOMAS  IN  TENNESSEE. 


near  it  on  the  banks  of  the  Harpeth. 
Smith  and  Schofield,  with  their  corps, 
also  joined  in  the  pursuit,  marching 
along  the  Granny  White  turnpike  to 
its  intersection  with  the  direct  road  to 
Franklin.  At  that  point  they  encamped 
for  the  night. 

The  pursuit  was  resumed  by  the 
ctivalry,  and  pushed  the  next  day  as  far 

as  Rutherford’s  Creek,  3 miles 

18.  from  Columbia.  The  Fourth 
corps  crossed  to  the  south  side  of  the 
Harpeth  and  closed  up  with  the  cavalry, 
the  enemy  offering  no  opposition  during 
the  day.  Heavy  rains  having  succeeded 
to  the  cold  which  had  delayed  Thomas’ 
operations  at  Nashville,  not  only  made 
the  roads  almost  impassable,  but  swelled 
the  streams  and  rivers  to  such  an  extent 
that  the  pursuit  became  extremely  diffi- 
cult. Rutherford’s  Creek  had  swollen  so 
rapidly,  that  it  was  found  to  be  unford- 
able  soon  after  the  enemy  had  crossed. 
The  splendid  pontoon  train  with  its 
experienced  pontoniers,  belonging  to 
the  army  of  Thomas,  had  been  taken 
by  Sherman  for  his  Georgia  campaign. 
A pontoon  bridge,  hastily  constructed 
at  Nashville,  was  on  its  way;  but  the 
vTetched  state  of  the  roads  retarded 

its  arrival.  During  the  19th, 

19.  efforts  were  made  by  the  ad- 
vanced troops  to  get  across  Rutherford’s 
Creek.  They  were  only  partially  suc- 
cessful, only  a few  skirmishers  effecting 
a lodgment  on  the  south  bank.  Smith’s 
and  Schofield’s  commands  crossed  to 
the  south  side  of  the  Harpeth,  the  form- 
er advancing  to  Spring  Hill,  the  latter 
to  Franklin.  On  the  morning  of  the 
20th,  Hatch  having  succeeded  in  throw- 


ing a fioating  bridge  over  Rutherford’s 
Creek,  got  his  entire  division  over,  and 
pushed  on  for  Columbia;  but  on  reach- 
ing Duck  River  he  found  that  the  Con- 
federates had  got  everything  across  the 
night  before  by  a pontoon  bridge,  which 
they  had  caiHed  off,  and  that  the  river 
was  impassable.  In  the  course  of  the 
day  Wood  constructed  a foot  bridge 
over  Rutherford’s  Creek;  and  by  night- 
fall having  crossed  all  his  infantry,  as 
well  as  one  or  two  of  his  batteries,  he 
pushed  on  to  Duck  River. 

The  pontoon  train  came  up  about 
noon,  on  the  21st;  and,  in  spite  of  the 
severe  cold  which  had  now  set  in,  the 
bridge  was  completed  before  night  fall, 
and  Smith’s  command  pushed  across. 
Materials  for  the  construction  of  another 
bridge  were  hurried  forward  to  Duck 
River.  This  bridge  was  finished  in 
time  to  permit  Wood’s  command  to 
cross  to  the  south  side,  late  in  the 
afternoon  of  the  2 2d,  and  to  get  into 
position  on  the  Pulaski  road,  about 
two  miles  south  of  Columbia. 

Notwithstanding  the  severity  of  the 
weather  and  the  vexatious  delays  which 
he  had  experienced,  Thomas  resolved 
to  continue  the  pursuit.  This  duty  he 
assigned  to  Wilson’s  cavalry  and  the 
Fourth  corps.  The  infantry  was  to  move 
along  the  turnpike — the  cavalry  was 
to  march  on  its  flanks,  across  the  fields. 
Smith’s  and  Schofield’s  corps  were  to 
follow  more  leisurely,  and  to  be  used 
as  occasion  demanded.  Hood  had  now 
formed  a powerful  rear-guard,  composed 
of  Forrest’s  cavalry  and  about  4000 
infantry  under  General  Walthall,  made 
up  of  detachments  from  all  his  organized 


DEFEAT  OF  HOOD. 


849 


force.  This  rear- guard,  undaunted 
and  firm,  did  its  duty  to  the  last.  All 
the  rest  of-  Hood’s  once  noble  army 
became  a disheartened  rabble  of  ragged, 
barefooted,  and  half-armed  men,  whose 
privations  and  discouragement  led  them 
to  take  every  opportunity  of  escape 
from  the  Confederate  service. 

Wilson  crossed  the  Duck  Kiver  on 
the  23d ; and  on  the  following  day, 
supported  by  Wood,  he  came  up  with 
the  enemy  at  Lynnville  and  at  Buford’s 
Station.  A stand  was  made  at  both 
these  places ; but  the  Confederates  were 
quickly  dislodged  with  considerable 
loss,  and  followed  up  so  rapidly  that 
they  had  not  time  to  destroy  the  bridges 
over  Bichland  Creek.  On  the  morning 
of  the  25th  they  evacuated  Pulaski, 
and  were  pursued  in  the  direction 
25.  of  Lamb’s  Ferry,  over  an  almost 
impracticable  road  and  through  a coun- 
try devoid  of  sustenance  for  men  or 
horses.  During  the  afternoon  Colonel 
Harrison’s  brigade  found  them  strongly 
intrenched,  at  the  head  of  a deep  and 
heavily  wooded  ravine,  through  which 
the  road  ran.  Their  skirmishers  were 
driven  in  ; but  the  attack  was  delayed 
until  the  remainder  of  the  cavalry 
should  come  up.  The  enemy  then, 
recovering  some  of  its  old  audacity, 
took  the  opportunity  to  sally  from  his 
breast-works,  driving  back  Harrison’s 
skirmishers,  and  capturing  one  gun. 
The  Confederates  were  ultimately 
driven  back,  with  a loss  of  some  50 
prisoners ; but  the  gun  was  not  recov- 
ered. The  cavalry,  in  pursuit,  moved 
so  rapidly  that  their  supply  trains  were 
left  far  in  the  rear;  and  both  men  and 


animals  suffered  much  in  consequence. 
Wood’s  corps  following  the  cavalry  on 
the  night  of  the  26th  encamped  6 miles 
out  from  Pulaski,  on  the  Lamb’s  Ferry 
road,  and  reached  Lexington,  Alabama, 
30  miles  from  Pulaski,  on  the  28th. 
The  Confederates,  by  this  time,  j)ec. 
had  made  good  their  escape  28, 
across  the  Tennessee  Biver  at  Bain- 
bridge  ; and  Thomas  ordered  the  pur- 
suit to  cease.  At  Pulaski  200  of  the 
enemy’s  wounded  and  sick  were  found 
in  the  hospital ; and  4 guns  were  taken 
out  of  Richland  Creek.  The  road,  all 
the  way  from  Nashville  to  Bainbridge, 
Avas  strewn  with  wagons,  limbers, 
small-arms,  and  blankets,  affording  con- 
clusive evidence  that  the  retreat  of 
Hood’s  troops  had  been  of  the  most 
disorderly  character. 

Although  the  pursuit  of  Hood,  by 
the  main  army,  had  been  discontinued, 
a force  of  600  cavalry  under  Colonel 
Palmer,  made  up  from  various  regiments, 
set  out  from  Decatur,  in  the  direction 
of  Hood’s  line  of  retreat.  Palmer  as- 
certained at  Leighton  that  Hood  had 
passed  through  that  place  on  the  28th, 
and  marched  in  the  direction  of  Colum- 
bus, Mississippi.  Avoiding  the  cavalry 
of  the  Confederates,  and  moving  rapidly 
by  way  of  LaGrange,  Russellville  and  the 
Cotton-Gin  road.  Palmer  overtook  their 
pontoon  train,  consisting  of  200  wagons 
and  78  pontoon  boats,  about  10  miles 
from  Russellville,  the  whole  of  whicli 
he  destroyed.  Then,  having  ascertained 
that  a large  supply  train  was  on  its 
way  to  Tuscaloosa,  he  set  out  on  the 
1st  of  January  towards  Aberdeen,  Mis- 
sissippi, and  succeeded  in  surprising  it 


m 


HOOD  AND  THOMAS  IN  TENNESSEE. 


about  ten  o’clock  the  same  night,  just 
beyond  the  Mississippi  boundary  line. 
This  train,  consisted  of  over  100  wagons 
and  500  mules.  The  wagons  he  burned ; 
tlie  mules  he  sabred  or  shot.  After 
encountering  and  pressing  back  Eoddy’s 
ciivalry,  near  Leighton,  Alabama,  and 
(tapturing  and  destroying  Hood’s  pon- 
toon train,  about  10  miles  from  Eussell- 
ville  he  pushed  on  for  Moulton.  ’ Meet- 
ing a body  of  Confederates  at  Thorn 
Hill,  he  attacked  and  routed  them.  He 
ai’rived  safe  at  Decatur  on  the  6th  of 
January. 

While  Hood  was  before  Nashville, 
he  sent  into  Kentucky  a force  of  about 
800  cavalry  with  2 guns,  under  General 
Lyon,  with  instructions  to  operate 
against  the  railroad  communications 
'with  Louisville.  To  protect  these, 
McCook’s  division  of  cavalry  was  on 
the  14th  of  December  sent  to  Bowling 
Green  and  Franklin.  Lyon  captured 
IJopkinsville,  but  was  soon  afterwards 
met  and  routed  by  Lagrange’s  brigade 
near  Greenburg.  Then,  making  a wide 
detour  by  way  of  Elizabethtown  and 
Glasgow,  he  succeeded  in  getting  to 
the  Cumberland  Eiver,  at  Burkville, 
where  he  crossed.  Proceeding  thence, 
byway  of  McMinnville  and  Winchester, 
to  Larkinsville,  Alabama,  on  the  Mem- 
phis and  Charleston  Eailroad,  he  at- 
tacked the  little  garrison,  at  Scottsboro 
on  the  10th  of  January,  but  was  again 
repulsed.  This  time,  however,  his  com- 
mand scattered  and  was  pursued  to  the 
Tennessee  Biver,  beyond  which  he 
managed  to  escape  with  about  200 
men,  the  rest  of  his  force  dispersing  in 
squads  among  the  mountains.  Palmer 


with  150  men  crossed  the  Tennessee 
Biver  and  went  in  pursuit  of  Lyon; 
and  on  the  14th  of  January,  he  surprised 
him  in  camp  at  Bed  Hill,  on  the  road 
from  Warrentown  to  Tuscaloosa,  cap- 
turing Lyon  with  100  of  his  men,  and 
his  one  remaining  piece  of  artillery. 
Lyon,  however,  shooting  a sentinel, 
effected  ‘his  escape. 

The  total  National  losses  in  the  vari- 
ous operations  of  the  campaign  in  Ten- 
nessee, including  killed,  wounded,  and 
missing,  did  not  exceed  10,000  men; 
while  that  of  the  enemy  in  prisoners 
alone  was  13,189,  including  nearly  1000 
officers  of  all  ranks,  72  serviceable  pieces 
of  artillery,  and  a large  number  of 
battle-flags.  More  than  2000  deserters 
also  came  within  the  National  lines  and 
took  the  oath  of  allegiance. 

The  success  which  attended  General 
Thomas,  in  this  campaign,  was  in  some 
respects  without  parallel  in  tlie  entire 
history  of  the  war.  In  many  of  the 
campaigns  larger  numbers  were  en- 
gaged, and  the  fighting  was  more  severe ; 
but  in  none  of  the  campaigns  was  an 
opposing  army  so  thoroughly  demol- 
ished. It  was  the  first  time  that  a 
Confederate  army  had  been  annihilated. 
Thomas  had  reason  to  be  proud  of  his 
victory.  With  an  army  hastily  made 
up  of  fragments  of  three  se^^arate  com- 
mands, numerically  eaker,  and  greatly 
inferior  in  dicipline  to  that  to  which  he 
was  opposed,  he  not  only  held  his  o^vn, 
not  only  repelled  successive  attacks, 
but  won  a signal,  even  a cro\'vning 
victory.  It  has  already  been  mentioned 
that  Grant  was  impatient  of  what  he 
called  Thomas’  ^‘unnecessary  delay’ 


CO-OPERATIVE  MOVEMENTS. 


851 


before  the  battle  of  Nashville.  Al- 
though not  abandoning  the  opinion 
that  the  delay  was  perilous  and  to  a 
eertain  extent  unnecessary,  the  Lieu- 
tenant-General afterwards  declared  that 
Thomas’  success  would  be  accepted  as 
;i  vindication  of  that  distinguished 
(officer’s  judgment.  In  his  letter  to 
Sherman  on  the  18th  of  December, 
Grant  says  “Thomas  has  done  magnifi- 
cently.” Thomas  was  slow  but  he  was 
sure.  He  was  already  renowned  as  the 
“ Rock  of  Chickamauga.”  As  the  con- 
queror of  Hood,  the  hero  of  the  great 
Tennessee  campaign,  he  was  henceforth 
to  take  a foremost  place,  with  Grant 
and  Sherman  and  Meade  and  Sheridan. 
The  government  evinced  its  appreciation 
(xf  his  great  services  by  appointing  him 
major-general  in  the  regular  army,  his 
rank  to  date  from  the  15th  of  Decem- 
ber— the  day  on  which  he  won  his 
crowning  victory  at  Nashville. 

On  the  30th  of  December,  Thomas 
proclaimed  the  campaign  at  an  end, 
and  gave  orders  for  the  distribution  of 
his  troops  in  winter-quarters,  at  East- 
port,  in  Northern  Mississippi,  at  Athens 
and  Huntsville,  in  Alabama,  and  at 
Dalton,  in  Georgia.  This  arrangement, 
liowever,  was  not  satisfactory  to  Gen- 
eral Grant  and  the  War  Department. 
The  Secession  cause  must  now  be 
crushed — such  was  the  determination 
(d‘  General  Grant;  and  in  this  deter- 
mination he  was  fully  supported  by  the 
government.  Until  this  result  should 
be  achieved,  there  was  to  be  no  rest  for 
the  National  armies.  Thomas  was, 
therefore,  instructed  to  countermand 
tlie  orders  given,  and  to  make  a new 


disposition  of  his  troops.  Wood  with 
the  Fourth  coiq)s  was  to  go  to  Hunts- 
ville. ■ Smith,  Schofield  and  Wilson 
were  to  concentrate  at  Eastport,  and  to 
hold  themselves  in  readiness  for  further 
orders. 

Hood  with  a shattered  frasrment  of 

O 

his  army  had  made  his  way  to  Tupelo, 
Mississippi.  There,  on  the  28d  of  Janu- 
ary, he  was  relieved  of  his  command,  at 
his  own  request ; but  it  would  be  use- 
less to  deny  that  his  resignation  had 
become  a necessity.  A capable  and 
dashins:  officer,  he  was  Lonsrstreet’s 
tower  of  strength  at  Gettysburg,  where 
he  lost  an  arm.  He  fought  ^vith  equal 
energy  and  daring,  at  Chickamauga, 
where  he  lost  a leg.  He  held  him- 
self responsible  for  the  conception  of 
the  Tennessee  campaign  ; and  he  strove 
hard,  he  tells  us,  to  do  his  duty  in 
its  execution  ; but  his  plan  and  mode 
of  battle  would  have  been  more  per- 
fect, if  he  had  awaited,  not  made,  the 
assaults.  As  it  was,  he  acted  precisely 
as  his  antagonist  wished  him  to  act. 
Hood  added  another  name  to  that  list 
of  capable  men,  who  had  figured  on 
both  sides — men  who  as  corps  or  divis- 
ion commanders  were  equal  to  any 
emergency;  but  who,  being  unequal  to 
the  responsibilities  of  uncontrolled 
authority,  were  found  wanting,  when 
entrusted  with  supreme  command. 

Simultaneous  with  these  operations 
in  Tennessee,  and  having  for  their 
object  the  occupation  of  the  Confeder- 
ate forces  to  the  west  of  both  Sherman 
and  Thomas,  there  were  some  minor 
and  co-operative  movements  of  which  it 
is  necessary  to  give  a brief  account. 


853 


HOOD  AND  THOMAS  IN  TENNESSEE. 


One  of  these  was  sent  out  from  Vicks- 
burg, in  the  latter  part  of  November, 
against  Hood’s  communications  with 
Mobile.  The  force  employed,  consisting 
of  about  2000  cavalry,  with  8 pieces  of 
artillery,  under  Colonel  Osband,  after 
a well  executed  flank  movement  on 
Jackson  on  the  24th,  started  northward 
for  the  Mississippi  Central  Eailroad 
Bridge  over  the  Big  Black.  The  bridge 
Nov.  reached  on  the  27th,  captured 
27.  after  a sharp  flght  and  destroyed. 
The  wagon-road  bridge  and  30  miles  of 
railroad  track  were  also  destroyed,  with 
all  the  intermediate  depots  and  build- 
ings, besides  2600  bales  of  cotton,  sev- 
eral locomotives  and  cars,  and  a large 
amount  of  stores  at  Vaughan  Station. 
Hood’s  army  was  thus  cut  oft*  from 
the  supplies  accumulated  for  its  use 
at  Jackson;  and  the  railroad  was 
rendered  unavailable  for  months. 
The  expedition,  although  considerably 
harassed  on  its  return  by  bodies  of  the 
enemy,  got  back  to  Vicksburg  on  the  4th 
of  December,  without  having  suffered 
any  material  losses. 

Another  expedition,  under  General 
Davidson,  set  out  from  Baton  Bouge, 
with  a similar  object,  on  the  27th  of 
November,  comprising  a force  of  4200 
men  in  two  divisions,  commanded  by 
General  Baily  and  Colonel  Davis,  with 
96  wagons  and  8 guns,  and  reached 
Tangipaha,  on  the  Jackson  Eailroad,  on 
the  1st  of  December.  Five  miles  of 
the  track  were  torn  up  and  the  railroad 
buildings  and  bridges  burned.  Unfor- 
tunately, some  dwelling  houses  caught 
fire ; and  a part  of  the  town  was  con- 
sumed. The  column  then  proceeded  to 


Franklin ville;  and  there,  also,  the  track 
was  torn  up.  Columbia  and  Augusta 
were  also  visited.  The  enemy’s  cavalry, 
under  Scott,  now  made  its  appearance ; 
and  a sharp  skirmish  occurred,  on  the 
Yazoo  City  and  Vicksburg  road  on  the 
2d.  After  a weary  march,  over 
roads  rendered  almost  impassable  2. 
by  heavy  rains,  the  command  arrived 
at  West  Pascagoula,  on  the  12th.  On 
the  16th,  the  Mobile  and  Great  North- 
ern Eailroad  was  cut  at  Pollard’s,  72 
miles  northeast  of  Mobile,  by  a column 
of  infantry  and  cavalry,  under  Colonel 
Eobinson.  A few  miles  of  the  track 
were  torn  up,  and  the  depot,  8 cars,  and 
a large  amount  of  stores,  including  2000 
stand  of  arms,  were  destroyed. 

Another  co-operative  movement,  from 
Memphis,  had  greater  success.  On  the 
21st  of  December,  General  Dana 
sent  General  Grierson,  with  some  2 1 . 
3000  cavalry,  to  cut  the  Mobile  and 
Ohio  Eailroad.  The  column  moved 
directly  eastward,  threatening  Corinth. 
Detachments,  sent  for  the  purpose,  cut 
the  telegraph  wire  between  Grand 
Junction  and  Corinth,  as  well  as  that 
between  Booneville  and  Gumtown,  on 
the  Mobile  and  Ohio  road.  On  the 
latter  road  they  also  destroyed  4 bridges 
between  the  same  points.  The  main 
column,  moving  rapidly  on  Tupelo, 
surprised  and  captured  or  dispersed 
Forrest’s  camp  of  dismounted  men  at 
Verona.  At  this  place,  were  destroyed 
32  cars,  loaded  wdth  new  wagons,  pon- 
toons, and  supplies,  300  army  ^vagons, 
most  of  which  had  been  captui*ed  from 
General  Sturgis  at  Gumtown,  4000  new 
English-made  carbines  intended  for  the 


GRIERSON’S  EXPEDITION. 


853 


use  of  Forrest’s  troops,  also  large 
amounts  of  ordnance  stores,  quarter- 
masters’ and  commissary  stores  for 
Hood’s  army.  On  leaving  Verona  the 
column  moved  southward  along  the 
line  of  railroad,  which  was  thoroughly 
destroyed,  to  a point  between  Egypt 
and  Prairie  Stations.  Telegrams  were 
taken  from  the  wires  at  Okalona  from 
Generals  Taylor  and  Gardner,  ordering 
Egypt  to  be  held  at  all  hazards,  and 
promising  reinforcements  from  Mobile 
and  elsewhere.  Eygpt  was  held  by  a 
garrison  of  about  1200  infantry  and 
cavalry,  with  4 guns  on  platform  cars. 

Grierson  attacked  the  place  on 
28.  the  28.th.  While  the  attack  was 
going  on,  two  trains  loaded  with 
infantry,  under  Gardner,  came  in  sight. 
Grierson  sent  a force  to  meet  them 
and  to  hinder  their  approach.  The 
expected  aid  not  coming  up,  the  garri- 
son, after  a fight  of  about  two  hours, 
was  dispersed  with  a loss  of  500  pris- 
oners and  General  Gholson  killed.  At 
Egypt  the  Nationals  destroyed  a train 
of  14  cars  and  1000  stand  of  arms. 
The  further  prosecution  of  the  raid  was 


now  given  up,  the  hostile  force  in  front 
and  the  great  number  of  prisoners  and 
captured  animals  making  rapid  move- 
ment impossible.  The  column,  accord- 
ingly, turned  to  the  southwest,  and 
marching  through  Houston  and  Belle- 
fontaine,  struck  the  Mississippi  Central 
Eailroad  at  Winona.  A detachment, 
sent  to  Bankston,  destroyed  the  large 
and  valuable  factories  which  supplied 
the  Confederate  army  with  clothing  and 
shoes,  as  well  as  large  quantities  of 
wool,  cloth,  and  leather.  Another  de- 
tachment destroyed  the  new  machine- 
shops  and  all  the  Confederate  govern- 
ment property  at  Granada.  A brigade, 
sent  southward  from  this  place,  tore  up 
the  railroad  track  and  pulled  down  the 
telegraph  wire  for  35  miles,  and  meet- 
ing a brigade  of  Confederate  troops 
under  Wirt  Adams  at  Franklin,  charged 
and  drove  it  from  the  field  with  a loss 
of  25  killed.  The  column,  after  destroy- 
ing an  immense  amount  of  property, 
arrived  safely  at  Vicksburg,  on  the 
5th  of  Januaiy,  •bringing  in  550  pris- 
oners, 1000  negroes  and  800  horses  and 
mules. 


300 


<54 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  PRIVATEERS. 


CHAPTER  XL. 

no  Necessity  of  the  Blockade — The  Blockade  Banners — The  Temptation — The  EjBforts  of  the  Government — 
Growing  Strength  of  the  Naval  Service — Gillmore’s  Expedition  to  Florida — Seymour  Placed  in  Immediate 
Command — On  St.  John’s  River — At  Jacksonville — At  Baldwin — Gillmore  Returns  to  Hilton  Head — 
Seymour’s  Blunder — Suwannee  River — Barber’s  Station — Olustee  Station — Battle  of  Olustee — Bravery  of 
the  Negroes— Seymour  Falls  Back  on  Jacksonville — Destruction  of  Property — The  Expedition  a Failure^ — 
North  Carolina — New  Berne — Plymouth — Washington — Pickett’s  Unsuccessful  Attempt  on  New  Berne — 
Confederate  Attack  on  Plymouth — Forts  Warren,  W’'essels  and  Comfort — The  Albemarle — Capture  of 
Plymouth — Hoke  Demands  the  Surrender  of  New  Berne— Melancthon’s  Blockading  Squadron — The 
Sassacus  Buts  the  Albemarle — The  Albemarle  Retires — Hoke  Abandons  the  Siege  of  New  Berne — Quiet 
in  Albemarle  Sound  and  along  the  Coast  of  North  Carolina — Burnside’s  Conquests  in  1862  for  the  most 
part  recovered  by  the  Confederates — Cushing  and  the  Albemarle — Cushing’s  Bravery — Destruction  of  the 
Albemarle — Plymouth  Recaptured— Wilmington  the  one  Open  Port — Its  Defenses — Arrangements  Made 
to  Reduce  it — A Joint  Expedition — Porter  and  Butler — Grant’s  Instructions  to  Butler — The  Troops  on 
board  Transports — A Formidable  Fleet — A Storm  at  Sea — Cape  Fear — The  Transports  Seek  Shelter  at 
Beaufort — Fort  Fisher — The  Powder  Ship — The  Experiment  a Failure — The  First  Attack  on  Fort  Fisher 
— A Magnificent  Bombardment — The  Second  Day — The  Troops  Landed — “Yankee  Doodle” — Bravery  of 
Curtis — Difference  of  Opinion — The  Troops  Re-embarked — The  Assault  a Failure — A National  Disap- 
pointment— Grant  Offended — Preparations  for  Another  Assault — Grant  Sends  an  Increased  Land  Force — 
Terry  in  Command — The  Combined  Forces  at  New  Inlet — The  Strength  of  Fort  Fisher — The  Armament 
of  the  Fleet — A Terrific  Bombardment — Terry  Resolves  to  Assault — Porter  Concurs — The  Signal  Given — 
The  Marines  Driven  Back — The  Palisades — Curtis’  Brigade — A Terrible  Struggle — Curtis  Joined  by 
Pennybacker  and  Bell— Hand-to-hand  Fighting — Fighting  over  the  Traverses — Arrival  of  Blackman  and 
Abbott— Fort  Fisher  Captured — Hoke’s  Attack  on  the  National  Line — His  Retreat-^The  Struggle  at  Fort 
Fisher  one  of  the  most  gallant  in  the  War — A Brave  Assault — A Heroic  Defense — A Fearful  Explosion — 
The  Confederates  Blow  Up  Fort  Caswell — All  the  other  Works  Deserted — The  Blockade  of  Wilmington 
Secured— A Pause — General  Schofield  Ordered  to  the  Coast  of  North  Carolina — His  Arrival  at  Fort  Fisher 
— The  Department  of  Noith  Carolina— Schofield  in  Command — Ordered  to  Co-operate  with  Sherman — 
Capture  of  Fort  Anderson — Wilmington  Abandoned  by  the  Confederates— Occupied  by  the  Nationals — 
A Severe  Blow  to  the  Confederates— Mobile — A Co-operative  Movement — Canby,  Wilson  and  Thatcher — 
Mobile  a place  of  Great  Strength— Canby  and  Thatcher  Move  Against  It — On  the  East  Side — Spanish  Fort 
—The  Siege— The  Assault — The  Work  Abandoned— Occupied  by  the  Nationals— vFort  Blakely — A place 
of  Great  Strength — Canby  Resolves  to  Assault — A Rush  into  the  Jaws  of  Death — A Desperate  Struggle — 
“Remember  Fort  Pillow” — A National  Victory — Surrender  of  Mobile — Wilson’s  Co-operative  Movement 
— At  Ely  ton — At  Monte  vallo — Ebenezer  Church — Selma  Captured — Great  Destruction  of  Property — At 
Montgomery — The  Place  Surrrendered — At  Macon — A Most  Successful  and  Most  Destructive  Raid — The 
Privateers — The  Savannah— The  Petrel— The  Juda — The  Nashville' — The  Sumter — The  Later  Privateers — 
The  Florida — Her  Depredations — Captured  at  Bahia — Sunk  in  Hampton  Roads — The  Tallahassee  and 
Chickamauga — Destroyed  at  Wilmington — The  Georgia — Captured  near  Lisbon — The  Olustee — The 
Shenandoah — Surrendered  to  the  British  Government — The  Stonewall — Surrendered  to  the  Spaniards  at 
Havana — The  Alabama — Her  Mission  of  Destruction — Captain  Semmes — At  Cherbourg — The  Kearsarge 
and  the  Alabama — The  Great  Battle — Captain  Winslow — The  Deerhound — The  Courronne — Winslow’s 
Skilful  Fighting— The  Kearsarge  Victorious — The  Alabama  Sunk — Her  Record. 


Naval  and  coast  operations  have 
1864  already,  at  different  times,  occu- 
pied our  attention,  in  the  course 
of  this  work.  These  operations  had  for 


their  primaiy  object,  the  establishment 
and  maintenance  of  an  effective  block- 
ade of  all  the  ports  on  the  coast, 
through  which  the  Confederacy  might 


EXPEDITION  TO  FLORIDA. 


855 


obtain  succor,  or  supplies.  It  can  well 
be  understood  that  tbe  maintenance  of 
such  a blockade  was  a severe  strain  on 
the  energies  of  the  North.  It  implied 
the  presence  of  armed  vessels,  all  along 
the  extended  seaboard,  gun-boats  in  the 
rivers  and  bayous,  and  large  bodies  of 
armed  men  at  suitable  points,  and  at 
convenient  distances  all  along  the  coast. 
Blockade-running,  which  offered  pecu- 
liar temptations  to  the  foreign  trader, 
^\"as  at  first  beset  with  little  difficulty. 
The  reward  was  great;  and  the  risk 
was  small.  Time,  however,  and  the 
progress  of  the  war  worked  a great 
change.  The  Navy  grew  in  strength  ; 
and  the  perils  and  risks  of  the  blockade- 
runner  multiplied.  At  the  close  of 
1863,  there  were  of  iron-clad  steamers 
75  ; of  side-wheels  203 ; of  screws  198; 
of  sailing  vessels  112 — in  all  588.  The 
number  of  guns  was  4443,  and  the 
aggregate  tonnage  467,967.  On  the 
1st  of  July  in  that  year,  there  were 
34,000  seamen;  and  during  the  year 
enlistments  for  the  naval  service  aver- 
aged over  2000  per  month.  In  1864 
the  number  of  vessels  had  increased  to 
671 ; the  number  of  guns  to  4610  ; and 
the  tonnage  to  510,396.  At  the  begin- 
ning of  the  war,  there  were  in  the  ser- 
vice 7600  men;  at  its  close  the  figures 
were  51,500. 

In  the  spring  of  1864,  the  naval 
forces  were  divided  into  four  separate 
R([uadrons,  of  which  one  was  stationed 
ill  the  James  River,  one  in  the  Sounds 
of  North  Carolina,  the  other  two  lying 
off  Cape  Fear  and  the  adjacent  inlets. 
Each  of  these  squadrons  was  placed 
under  a competent  officer ; and  the 


head-quarters  were  established  at  Beau- 
fort, North  Carolina.  Port  after  port 
had  gradually  been  wrested  from  the 
Confederacy,  until  in  almost  every  har- 
bor and  along  the  banks  of  the  Missis- 
sippi, the  National  flag  floated  supreme. 
After  the  destruction  of  the  forts  in 
Charleston  Harbor,  and  in  Mobile  Bay, 
Wilmington  was  the  only  port  of  first- 
class  importance,  which  continued  to 
invite  the  enterprise  and  to  tempt  the 
the  cupidity  of  the  blockade-runners. 
As  we  have  already  brought  down  the 
story  of  the  naval  and  coast  engage- 
ments to  the  year  1864,  and  as  separate 
chapters  have  been  devoted  to  Charles- 
ton Harbor  and  to  Mobile  Bay,  we  pro- 
pose to  make  this  chapter  exhaustive 
of  all  the  remaining  naval  and  coast 
operations,  for  whatever  purpose,  cov- 
ering, of  course,  those  connected  with 
the  blockade  and  the  privateering  inter- 
ests of  the  South. 

Although  not  in  any  direct  way  con- 
nected with  the  blockade,  yet  having 
all  the  essential  characteristics  of  a 
coast  operation,  place  must  be  found  at 
the  outset  here  for  a brief  record  of  the 
ill-starred  expedition  which  was  sent  to 
Florida,  in  the  early  months  of  1864. 
Towards  the  close  of  1863,  reports 
were  freely  circulated,  to  the  effect,  that 
Florida,  tired  of  the  war,  was  sighing 
for  amnesty  and  restoration  to  the 
Union.  Gillmore,  since  the  demolition 
of  Fort  Sumter,  his  troops  compara- 
tively unemployed,  had  remained  ar, 
Hilton  Head.  It  was  the  opinion,  of 
that  officer,  that  such  being  the  state  ol 
feeling  in  Florida,  his  men  might  be 
used  to  some  advantage  in  an  expeditiou 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  PRIVATEERS. 


85^) 

to  that  State.  In  January,  Lincoln 
gave  his  consent  to  the  proposed  exped- 
ition— at  the  same  time  commissionins: 
as  major,  Mr.  John  Hay,  one  of  his 
private  secretaries,  and  sending  him  to 
Hilton  Head,  to  join  Gillmore  and  pro- 
ceed Avith  him  as  the  representative  of 
the  Executive.  Gillmore  hurried  for- 
ward the  necessary  preparations  ; and 
the  expedition,  under  the  immediate 
command  of  General  Trumau  Seymour, 
consisting  of  4500  infantry  and  400 
cavalry,  on  board  20  steamers  and  8 
Feb.  schooners,  left  Hilton  Head,  on 
6.  the  6th  of  February.  On  the 
following  day,  they  entered  the  St. 
John’s  Kiver,  and  proceeding  upwards, 
landed  at  and  occupied  Jacksonville,  in 
the  afternoon.  Jacksonville  was  found 
to  be  ill  ruins,  and,  Avith  the  exception 
of  a few  women  and  children,  aban- 
doned by  the  inhabitants.  On  the  8th, 
the  army  in  three  columns — commanded 
respectively  by  C.  C.  Barton,  Forty- 
Eighth  'New  York,  J.  B.  Hawley, 
Seventh  Connecticut,  and  Guy  V. 
Henry,  Fortieth  Massachusetts,  set  out 
from  Jacksonville  in  the  direction  of 
Baldwin.  Henry,  who  commanded  the 
cavalry,  led  the  advance.  On  the  way, 
Henry  found  the  Confederates  in  some 
force,  at  Camp  Vinegar.  Passing  the 
camp,  he  surprised  and  captured,  some- 
what in  the  rear  of  the  Confederates,  4 
guns,  and  a large  amount  of  commis- 
sary stores.  Baldwin  was  reached 
about  sunrise,  on  the  morning  of  the 
9th,  Avhen  another  gun  was  captured, 
together  with  3 cars,  a large  quantity 
of  cotton,  and  stores  of  all  kinds,  to  the 
value  of  about  $500,000.  Henry 


pushed  forward  in  the  ^ direction  of 
l4ake  City ; but  discovering  tliat  the 
Confederate  general,  Finnegan,  was  in 
the  neighborhood,  and  not  knoAving  the 
exact  strength  of  his  command,  he  fell 
back  about  4 miles,  and  telegraphed  to 
Seymour  for  orders  and  supplies. 

Gillmore  had  accompanied  the  ex- 
pedition as  far  as  Bakhvin.  It  was  not 
his  intention  to  penetrate  further  into 
the  interior.  GiAung  Seymour  instruc- 
tions to  that  effect,  he  returned  to  Hil- 
ton Head,  which  he  reached,  on  the 
15th.  Seymour,  hoAvever,  having  been 
informed  that  Finnegan  had  fallen  back 
from  Lake  City,  gave  way  to  his  own 
strong  impulses  and  assumed  the  respon- 
sibility of  pushing  forward  his  troops, 
bare  almost  of  supplies,  in  the  direc- 
tion of  the  Suwannee  Biver.  Thence 
he  telegraphed  to  Gillmore,  notifying 
him  of  the  fact  and  asking  him  to  make 
a demonstration  against  Savannah,  Avith 
one  of  the  iron-clads,  so  as  to  prevent 
reinforcements  being  sent  to  Finnegan. 
Gillmore  Avas  astounded.  He  saw,  at  a 
glance,  the  peril  to  which  Seymour  was 
exposing  himself  and  his  6000  troops. 
There  was  no  reason  why  Finnegan 
should  not  receive  reinforcements  from 
both  Georgia  and  Alabama.  In  such 
a case,  Seymour’s  force  Avould  be  over- 
whelmed and  probably  destroyed.  Gill 
more,  without  a moment’s  delay,  sent 
a message  to  his  lieutenant  remonstra 
ting  against  the  folly  of  such  conduct. 

It  was  too  late,  Seymour  was  already 
caught  in  a trap.  On  the  morn- 
ing  of  the  20th,  he  had  pressed  20. 
foi-Avard,  from  Barber’s  Station,  along  the 
road  which  runs  parallel  with  the  rail- 


OLUSTEE. 


857 


road.  He  was  within  three  miles  of 
Olustee  Station.  At  this  point  there 
was  a ftwamp  and  a heavy  pine  forest. 
Under  cover  of  these,  Finnegan  had 
disposed  his  men.  It  was  now  near  two 
o’clock  in  the  afternoon.  The  head 
of  Seymour’s  column  had  no  sooner 
come  up,  than  the  woods  blazed  with 
the  fire  of  musketry  and  artillery. 
Henry’s  cavalry  with  Stevens’  battalion 
and  Hawley’s  Seventh  Connecticut  were 
the  first  to  suffer.  Hawley  hurried 
forward  the  Seventh  New  Hampshire, 
Colonel  Abbott,  with  the  batteries  of 
Hamilton,  Elder,  and  Langdon.  The 
National  artillery  suffered  terribly. 
In  the  brief  space  of  twenty  minutes  40 
out  of  50  horses  were  killed,  and  45 
out  of  82  men.  What  remained  of  the 
artillery  force  fell  back,  leaving  behind 
t^vo  guns. 

The  battle,  however,  continued  to 
rage  with  great  fury.  Seymour  almost 
atoned  for  the  blunder  he  had  commit- 
ted, by  his  activity  and  daring.  He 
was  everywhere  present,  and  the  bullets 
of  the  enemy  whistled  around  him  in 
vain.  Hawley’s  brigade  having  suffered 
terribly,  the  Eighth  United  States,  a 
negro  regiment  from  Montgomery’s  bri- 
gade, was  sent  to  its  support.  This 
regiment,  which  had  never  before  been 
under  fire,  behaved  with  the  utmost 
gallantry.  For  two  hours  it  held  an 
exposed  position  in  front ; and  its  losses 
— including  its  brave  commander  and 
amounting  in  all  to  350  men — attested 
the  severity  of  the  fighting.  Barton’s 
brigade,  composed  of  the  Forty-Eighth, 
Forty-Ninth,  and  One  Hundred  and  Fif- 
teenth New  York,  was  brought  up  in 


turn.  On  the  part  of  this  brigade 
nothing  was  wanting  in  the  matter  of 
bravery ; but  it  proved  of  no  avail.  It 
advanced  only  to  repeat  the  experience 
and  to  share  the  fate  of  that  which  had 
gone  before.  For  a while  the  struggle 
was  prolonged.  Barton’s  men,  already 
severely  punished,  were  showing  signs 
of  weakness.  The  Confederates  seemed 
to  think  that  their  opportunity  had 
come  for  a final  and  crushing  charge. 
Gathering  up  their  strength,  and  as  if 
resolved  to  make  short,  sharp  work  with 
their  antagonists,  they  came  rolling  for- 
ward in  overwhelming  numbers  and 
with  resistless  energy.  It  was  a critica.. 
moment.  Montgomery,  with  his  twG 
remaining  negro  regiments,  the  Fifty- 
Fourth  Massachusetts  and  the  First 
North  Carolina,  rushed  forward  to  the 
rescue,  and  received  the  full  weight  of 
the  Confederate  onset.  This  was  the 
turning  point  in  the  fight.  The  negroes 
fought  with  the  energy  of  despair,  and 
although  their  comrades  were  falling  on 
every  side,  they  firmly  held  their  ground. 
Although  ultimately  overpowered  and 
driven  back,  it  was  not  until  Seymour 
had  found  time  to  rally  and  re-adjust  his 
lines  and  get  his  guns  in  position.  Four 
vollies  of  grapeshot  from  the  National 
batteries  compelled  the  Confederates  to 
halt.  It  was  now  about  four  o’clock. 
Seymour  ordered  a retreat.  The  Con- 
federates attempted  to  pursue ; but  the 
National  guns,  handled  with  skill  and 
fired  with  great  rapidity,  made  such 
havoc  in  their  lines  that  they  were  com- 
pelled to  desist.  Seymour  fell  back 
with  the  wreck  of  his  command  to 
Jacksonville;  and  finally  the  whole 


858 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  PRIVATEERS. 


command  returned  to  Hilton  Head. 
The  estimated  loss  of  the  Nationals  in 
this  campaign  was  nearly  2,000  men. 
At  Jacksonville,  Seymour  destroyed 
stores  valued  at  $1,000,000.  The  Con- 
federate loss  was  under  1000  men. 
Such  was  the  battle  of  Olustee,  and 
such  was  the  result  of  the  test  applied 
to  the  loyal  sentiment  of  Florida. 

From  the  date  of  Seymour’s  unsuc- 
cessful experiment,  Florida  no  longer 
commanded  attention  until  the  close  of 
the  war.  Early  in  the  year  1864,  how- 
ever, the  east  coast  of  North  Carolina 
became  the  theatre  of  some  important 
operations.  Since  1862,  when  they 
were  captured  by  General  Burnside, 
New  Berne,  Plymouth,  and  Washing- 
ton had  been  held  by  National  garri- 
sons. In  February  1864,  an  unsuccess- 
ful attempt  was  made  by  a body  of 
Confederates,  under  General  Pickett,  to 
recapture  New  Berne.  After  setting 
on  fire  the  gun-boat  Underwriter, 
Pickett  claimed  a victory  and  retired. 
It  was,  however,  a barren  victory  ; for 
he  had  left  the  defenses  of  New  Berne 
untouched. 

About  the  middle  of  April,  a more 
daring  as  well  as  more  successful  effort 
was  made  against  Plymouth,  at  the 
head  of  Albemarle  Sound,  and  at  the 
mouth  of  the  Boanoke  Kiver.  The 
place  was  well  fortified,  and  was  held 
by  General  Wessels,  with  a force  of 
some  2400  men,  consisting  of  the  Eighty- 
Fifth  New  York,  One  Hundred  and 
First  and  One  Hundred  and  Third 
Pennsylvania,  Sixteenth  Connecticut, 
and  6 companies  from  other  regiments. 
In  the  river,  in  front  of  the  town,  were 


the  gun-boats  Southfield,  Miami,  and 
Bombshell.  In  the  immediate  nemh- 

O 

borhood,  and  guarding  the  approaches 
to  the  town  were  four  forts — Fort  War- 
ren, Fort  Williams,  Fold  Wessels,  and 
Fort  Comfort.  On  the  17th  of  ^p^ii 
April,  General  Hoke,  \\dth  about  17. 
7000  Confederates,  appeared  in  the 
vicinity  of  Plymouth  ; and,  on  the  same 
day,  he  made  an  attack  on  Fold  War- 
ren, which  was  about  a mile  above  the 
town.  On  the  morning  of  the  18th,  the 
attack  was  resumed  with  greater  energy ; 
and  powerful  assistance  was  rendered 
by  the  Confederate  ram  Albemarle 
which  came  down  the  Boanoke  Biver. 
The  National  gun-boat  Bombshell  came 
to  the  aid  of  the  garrison,  but  was  soon 
disabled  and  captured.  Hoke  then  fell 
upon  Fort  Wessels,  a mile  nearer  the 
town ; and,  although  a vigorous  resist- 
ance was  offered,  the  fort  was  at  length 
captured.  Plymouth  was  now  closely 
invested.  Hoke  pressed  the  siege  with 
great  energy  ; he  brought  his  batteries 
closer  upon  the  town;  and  the  Albe- 
marle, having  run  past  Fold  Warren, 
fell  upon  the  unarmed  gun-boats.  The 
Southfield  was  first  struck.  The  blow 
was  fatal ; for  she  speedily  went  down. 
The  Miami  was  next  attacked;  and 
although  she  managed  to  escape  down 
the  river,  it  was  not  until  her  command- 
er was  killed,  and  many  of  her  guns 
were  disabled.  The  Albemarle  then 
turned  her  guns  upon  the  town,  pour- 
ing upon  it  a perfect  storm  of  shot  and 
shell.  On  the  follomng  day,  Hoke, 
having  pushed  his  batteries  within 
1100  yards  of  the  town,  opened  upon 
it  a tremendous  fire.  He  tlien  made  a 


DESTEUCTIOX  OF  THE  ALBEMARLE. 


859 


general  assault.  Wessels  made  an  ob- 
stinate defense  ; but  he  was  ultimately 
compelled  to  surrender  the  place  with 
1600  prisoners,  25  guns,  and  2000 
small  arms.  The  fall  of  Plymouth 
rendered  necessary  the  evacuation  of 
Washington,  a little  town  at  the  mouth 
of  the  Tar  Kiver,  some  32  miles  north 
of  New  Berne. 

Pursuing  his  victorious  career,  Hoke 
then  pushed  towards  New  Berne.  Ar- 
rived in  front  of  the  place  he  demanded 
its  surrender,  which  was  refused.  He 
then  commenced  a siege.  Captain 
Cooke  of  the  Albemarle  somewhat 
over-elated  by  his  success  at  Plymouth, 
and  feeling  confident  that  a similar 
success  would  attend  him  in  the  broader 
waters  further  down,  pushed  on  again 
to  the  assistance  of  Hoke.  He  was 
ignorant  of  the  fate  which  awaited  him. 
Captain  Melancthon,  with  his  blockad- 
ing squadron,  was  then  guarding  the 
waters  of  Albemarle  Sound.  His  prin- 
cipal vessels  were  the  Mattahesset,  the 
Miami,  the  Wyalusing,  the  Whitehead, 
]jlay  and  the  Sassacus.  It  was  now 
5.  the  5th  of  May.  The  Albemarle 
was  accompanied  by  the  captured  boat 
Bombshell.  The  Sassacus  gave  the 
Bombshell  a broadside  which  compelled 
her  to  strike  her  flag.  She  then  butted 
the  Albemarle,  forcing  her  hull  under 
the  water.  The  Sassacus,  however, 
was  severely  punished  for  her  temerity, 
a 100-pound  Brooks  bolt  passing 
through  one  of  her  boilers,  killing  3 
men,  and  wounding  6,  and  filling  the 
vessel  with  scalding  steam.  When  the 
cloud  of  steam  passed  away,  the  Albe- 
marle was  seen  moving  o£E  in  the  direc- 


tion of  Plymouth,  firing  as  she  fled. 
The  Bombshell  was  left  behind.  Hoke 
was  compelled  to  abandon  the  siege  of 
New  Berne.  It  was  a National  victory. 

For  some  months  there  was  quiet  in 
Albemarle  Sound,  and  all  along  the 
coast  of  North  Carolina.  The  conquests 
made  by  Burnside,  in  1862,  had  for  the 
most  part  been  recovered  by  the  Con- 
federates ; but  Boanoke  Island  and  New 
Berne  remained  in  the  hands  of  the 
Nationals.  The  Albemarle  continued 
to  be  a source  of  annoyance  and  even 
terror  to  the  blockading  vessels.  To- 
wards the  end  of  October,  Lieutenant 
W.  B.  Cushing,  one  of  the  bravest  of 
the  young  officers  in  the  naval  service, 
undertook  to  destroy  the  monster.  It 
was  lying  at  the  time  in  the  harbor  of 
Plymouth,  behind  a raft  of  logs,  some 
30  feet  in  width.  A small  steam  launch, 
fitted  up  as  a toi-pedo  boat,  was  placed 
in  Cushing’s  charge.  On  the  night  of 
the  27th  of  October,  with  a crew  Q^t. 
of  13  officers  and  men,  he  moved  27. 
up  the  Roanoke,  and  an^ived,  before  he 
was  perceived  by  the  enemy,  within 
twenty  yards  of  the  Albemarle.  The 
torpedo  was  under  the  ram  and  explod- 
ed before  the  enemy  had  time  to  fire  a 
shot.  Cushing’s  own  account  best  tells 
the  story:  “The  torpedo,”  he  says 
“was  exploded  at  the  same  time  that 
the  Albemarle’s  gun  was  fired.  A shot 
seemed  to  go  crashing  through  my  boat 
and  a dense  mass  of  water  rushed  in 
from  the  torpedo,  filling  and  completely 
disabling  her.  The  enemy  then  con- 
tinued to  fire  at  fifteen  feet  range,  and 
demanded  our  surrender,  which  I twice 
refused.”  Cushing  escaped  into  the 


8o0 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  PRIVATEERS. 


water,  and,  in  spite  of  the  bullets  of  the 
enemy,  managed  to  reach  the  shore. 
Most  of  his  crew  were  captured  or 
drowned.  In  the  morning,  he  learned 
that  his  work  had  been  effectually  ac- 
complished. The  Confederate  ram  was 
completely  destroyed.  A few  days 
later,  Plymouth  was  recaptured  by 
Commodore  Macomb,  and  the  National 
flag  was  unfurled  over  the  sunken 
Albemarle. 

It  has  already  been  stated  in  this 
chapter  that  Wilmington,  North  Caro- 
lina, was  the  one  seaport  remaining  to 
the  Confederacy  through  which  foreign 
supplies  could  be  obtained.  Charleston 
had  not  yet  fallen;  and  Mobile  was 
still  a stronghold  of  the  Confederates ; 
but  the  blockade  of  both  harbors  was 
complete,  and  there  were  few  who 
deemed  it  possible  to  run  the  gauntlet 
of  either  the  one  or  the  other.  Of  all 
the  Confederate  ports  Wilmington  was 
the  most  difficult  to  close  against  the 
blockade-runners.  It  was  peculiarly 
and  favorably  situated,  some  thirty 
miles  up  Cape  Fear  River.  It  could  not 
be  approached  without  passing  certain 
formidable  works  which,  at  the  mouth 
of  the  river  and  on  the  borders  of  the 
sea,  the  Confederates  had  erected  for 
purposes  of  defense.  There  are  two 
channels  admitting  to  Cape  Fear  River. 
The  southwest  or  main  channel  is  about 
miles  wide,  with  a depth  of  from  10 
to  14  feet  of  water  on  the  bar.  It  was 
protected  by  Fort  Caswell  on  Oak 
Island,  and  by  the  Light-house  battery 
on  Smith’s  Island.  The  northwest 
channel,  called  New  Inlet,  less  than  2 
miles  wide  and  the  water  less  deep  than 


in  the  other,  was  protected  by  Fort 
Fisher — a first-class  casemated  earth- 
work, on  the  mainland,  near  Federal 
Point.  The  interior  of  the  peninsula 
which  lies  between  Cape  Fear  River 
and  the  Atlantic  Ocean  is  for  the  most 
part  sandy  and  low,  in  few  places  rising 
higher  than  15  feet  above  high  tide. 
To  reach  Wilmington  it  was  necessary 
to  pass  through  one  or  other  of  these 
inlets.  So  long  as  the  Confederates 
held  the  works,  ingress  was  easy  to  a 
friend,  perilous  to  a foe. 

As  early  as  the  beginning  of  1864, 
the  government  at  Washington,  had 
made  arrangements  for  the  capture  of 
Wilmington.  General  Burnside,  who 
was  intrusted  with  the  expedition,  was 
collecting  troops  for  the  purpose,  at 
Annapolis,  when  he  was  summoned  by 
General  Grant  to  join  the  army  of  the 
Potomac.  Later,  in  the  summer  of  the 
same  year  and  simultaneously  with  the 
preparations  for  the  attacks  on  the 
forts  in  Mobile  Bay,  arrangements  were 
made  for  reducino*  the  works  at  the 

O 

mouth  of  Cape  Fear  River.  With  this 
end  in  view,  gun-boats  armored  and 
unarmored  were  assembled  in  Hampton 
Roads ; and  in  October,  Admiral  Por- 
ter, charged  with  the  execution  of  the 
naval  portion  of  the  task,  found  him- 
self at  the  head  of  a fleet  of  50  war 
vessels,  including  the  New  Ironsides 
and  several  monitors.  The  plan  which 
had  been  first  suggested  to  Burnside  by 
Mr.  Kidder,  a Boston  gentleman,  and 
which  had  been  approved  of  by  the 
government  was  again  accepted  ; and 
Grant  agreed  to  send  the  bulk  of  Sher 
idan’s  force  to  co-operate  with  Portei 


FORT  FISHER. 


861 


in  tlie  intended  movement.  Sheridan’s 
men,  however,  it  was  soon  found,  could 
not  be  spared  from  the  Shenandoah 
Valley ; and  the  expedition  against 
Wilmington  once  more  fell  through. 

It  was  now  resolved  to  make  a direct 
attack  on  Fort  Fisher  and  its  depend- 
encies. Preparations  were  hurried  for- 
ward; and  a reconnoissance  of  Fort 
Fisher  was  made,  with  the  help  of  the 
blockading  squadron,  by  Generals  God- 
frey Weitzel  and  Charles  K.  Graham. 
Rumors  of  the  projected  movement 
against  Wilmington  reached  the  ears  of 
the  Confederates.  General  W.  H.  C. 
Whiting,  an  accomplished  and  skilful 
engineer  was  then  in  charge  of  that 
region.  Under  his  direction,  new  works 
were  thrown  up  to  strengthen  Fort 
Fisher ; and  the  garrison  was  increased. 
Another  delay  took  place  ; and  it  was 
not  until  December  that  the  expedition 
actually  set  out.  Grant  having  de- 
tached 6500  troops  from  the  forces 
under  Butler,  placed  them  under  the 
immediate  command  of  Weitzel.  The 
object  of  the  expedition,  as  stated  in 
Grant’s  instructions  to  Butler,  was, 
first,  the  closing  of  the  port  of  Wil- 
mington, and,  second,  the  capture  'of 
that  city.  It  was  not  intended  that 
Butler  should  accompany  the  expedi- 
tion. 

On  the  8th  of  December,  the  troops 
destined  to  take  part  in  the  pro- 
8.  posed  movement — Ames’  division 

of  the  Twenty-Fourth  corps,  and 
Paine’s  division  of  the  Twenty-Fifth 
(colored)  corps — left  Bermuda  Hun- 
dred in  transports.  On  the  following 
day  they  were  at  Fortress  Monroe ; and 


Butler  notified  Porter  that  his  troops 
were  ready  to  proceed.  On  the  14th, 
at  noon,  when  off  Cape  Henry,  Butler 
joined  the  transports  in  his  flag-ship, 
the  Ben  Deford.  The  transport  fleet 
then  put  to  sea.  Porter’s  formidable 
fleet  had  preceded  it  by  36  hours.  On 
the  evening  of  the  15th  the  transports, 
with  the  troops  on  board,  arrived  at 
the  appointed  rendezvous,  about  25 
miles  east  of  Fort  Fisher.  The  weather 
had  been  beautiful,  since  the  13th. 
For  three  days  more,  while  the  army 
waited  for  the  navy,  the  ocean  was 
perfectly  calm.  It  was  not  until  the 
evening  of  Sunday,  that  the  fleet  made 
its  . appearance.  Then,  however,  the 
weather  which  had  been  so  propitious, 
had  become  gloomy  and  threatening. 
A strong  wind  was  coming  up  from 
the  southeast ; and  the  sea  was  covered 
with  white-caps.  The  wind  increased 
in  violence  until,  on  the  20th,  it  blew 
a perfect  hurricane.  It  was  one  of 
those  storms  which  are  common  on  that  ' 
coast,  and  which  have  given  its  name 
to  Cape  Fear.  By  advice  of  Porter,  the 
transports  returned  to  Beaufort,  some 
7 0 miles  up  the  coast.  There  they 
found  shelter  and  took  in  coal  and 
water.  The  storm  lasted  for  3 days, 
and  was  one  of  the  severest  experi- 
enced in  30  years.  Porter’s  fleet,  while 
it  lasted,  rode  at  anchor.  On 
Friday  the  23d,  Butler,  who  had  23, 
accompanied  the  expedition,  and,  con- 
trary to  Grant’s  expectation,  had  taken 
personal  command,  sent  Captain  Clarke, 
one  of  his  aids,  in  the  armed  tug  Cham- 
berlain to  inform  Porter  that  the  fleet 
would  be  at  the  rendezvous  by  sunset, 


862 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  PRIVATEERS. 


next  day.  Clarke  returned  to  Butler 
on  Saturday  at  suniise,  with  tlie  report 
that  Porter  could  not  wait  the  arrival 
of  the  troops,  and  that  his  purpose  was 
to  fire  the  powder-ship  at  one  o’clock 
that  morning.  Butler  was  indignant, 
because  he  considered  the  presence  of 
the  troops  essential  to  the  success  of 
the  experiment.  The  powder-ship  was 
exploded  as  Porter  declared  it  would 
be  ; but  the  experiment  was  fruitless. 

What  was  the  experiment  ? It  ap- 
pears that  on  the  first  of  October  1864, 
an  accideiftal  explosion  of  150,000 
pounds  of  gunpowder  took  place  at 
Erith,  in  England ; and  such  was  the 
force  of  the  concussion  that  100  yards 
of  embankment  was  blown  away,  and 
a large  number  of  houses  destroyed. 
Butler  taking  a hint  from  this  fact, 
conceived  the  idea  that  a similar  ex- 
plosion in  the  near  neighborhood  of 
Fort  Fisher  would  have  a similar  result. 
It  was  his  expectation  that  it  would 
shake  down,  at  least,  a portion  of  the 
walls  and  demoralize  the  garrison.  He 
had  grievously  miscalculated.  The 
experiment  was  fairly  made.  Two  hun- 
dred and  fifteen  tons  of  gunpowder 
were  exploded,  without  any  apprecia- 
ble result. 

Porter,  not  discouraged  by  the  failure 
of  the  gunpowder  experiment,  resolved 
to  proceed  ^vithout  delay  to  the  attack. 
The  squadron  selected  for  that  purpose 
consisted  of  33  vessels,  carrying  over 
400  guns,  with  a reserve  of  17  small 
gun-boats,  carrying  about  100  guns. 
The  first  line  was  composed  of  the  New 
Ironsides,  the  Monadnock,  Canonicus 
and  Mahopac — all  iron- clads.  The  sec- 


ond line  was  com j)osed  of  the  heavy  fn- 
gates  Minnesota,  Colorado,  Wabash  and 
other  vessels  of  similar  weight  and  con- 
struction. There  was  yet  another  line 
in  rear  of  the  second  ; and  two  divisions 
took  side  positions,  to  the  north  and 
east,  and  to  the  south  and  southeast,  so 
as  to  be  able  to  direct  an  enfiladins:  fii^e 
on  the ' works.  The  bombard-  j)^  ^ 
ment  was  “magnificent  for  its  *^4, 
power  and  accuracy.”  Clouds  of  dust 
arose  from  the  fort,  and  conceal6^'l 
eveiything  from  view.  It  was  impossi- 
ble for  the  garrison  to  make  any  show 
of  resistance.  The  gunners  retired 
behind  their  bomb-proofs ; and  in  less 
than  an  hour  and  a quarter  the  fort 
was  silenced.  For  five  hours,  the 
bombardment  continued  ; and  at  sun- 
set when  Butler  arrived  in  his  fiag-ship 
with  some  of  the  transports.  Porter  sig- 
nalled his  fleet  to  retire  for  the  night. 

Arrangements  were  made,  early  on 
the  morning  of  the  25th,  for  a joint 
attack  by  the  troops  and  the  fleet.  It 
was  agreed  between  Porter  and  Weitzel 
that,  as  soon  as  the  transports  arrived, 
the  troops  should  attempt  to  effect  a 
landing  under  cover  of  the  fire  fi*om 
the  ships,  and  proceed  to  take  the  place 
by  storm.  It  was  an  hour  past 
noon  before  the  transports  were 
fully  forward.  Tiie  fleet  had  already 
for  some  hours  been  firing  upon  the 
works.  Without  delay,  and  by  the 
help  of  launches,  a landing  was  effected 
about  3 miles  above  Fort  Fisher.  Gen- 
eral Curtis  with  about  550  men,  was 
the  first  to  reach  the  shore.  The  Na- 
tional flag  was  quickly  planted  on  a 
deserted  battery.  As  soon  as  it  was 


FAILURE  OF  THE  FIRST  ATTACK. 


803 


seen,  tlie  air  was  rent  by  cheers  from 
the  men  still  on  board  the  transports ; 
and  the  bands  struck  up  Yankee 
Doodle.”  Curtis  pushed  along  the 
shore,  until  his  skirmish  line  was  within 
50  yards  of  Fort  Fisher.  It  was  Por- 
ter’s belief  that  there  was  “ not  a rebel 
within  five  miles  of  the  fort.”  Weitzel 
had  a very  dift'erent  opinion.  He  had 
landed  with  Curtis,  and  advanced  to 
within  800  yards  of  the  work.  It 
would  be  butchery  ” he  thought,  to 
make  an  assault  under  the  circumstances ; 
and  returning  to  Butler  on  board  tlie 
gun-boat  Chamberlain,  he  so  reported. 
Butler  after  some  consideration  came 
to  the  same  conclusion ; and  about  five 
o’clock  in  the  afternoon,  when  about 
one-half  of  his  troops  were  landed,  he 
ordered  them  to  re-embark.  In  the 
meantime  Curtis,  still  pressing  forward, 
had  captured  the  half-moon  battery 
with  220  men.  He  had  notified  Gen- 
eral Ames  of  the  fact,  calling  for  assist- 
ance, and  declaring  his  belief  that  he 
could  take  the  fort.  Ames,  ignorant 
of  the  order  which  had  been  given  to 
re-embark,  sent  Colonel  Bell’s  brigade 
to  the  support  of  Curtis.  It  was  now 
after  sunset ; and  before  Cuidis  could 
make  a further  advance,  the  firing  of 
tbe  fleet  ceased,  and  night  closed  in 
upon  the  scene.  As  soon  as  Ames 
became  aware  of  the  order  to  withdraw 
his  troops,  he  put  them  on  board  the 
launches  and  returned  to  the  transports. 
The  attack  on  Fort  Fisher  from  which 
so  much  was  expected,  thus  resulted  in 
total  failure.  On  the  following  day, 
the  transports,  with  the  troops  on  board, 
left  for  Hampton  Roads. 


The  result  of  the  experiment  on  Foi  t 
Fisher  was  a source  of  deep  and  gen- 
eral disappointment.  Ho  one  was 
more  disappointed  than  General  Grant 
himself.  He  was  greatly  displeased. 
It  was  his  opinion,  as  it  was  that  of 
Admiral  Porter,  that  the  place  might 
have  been  taken,  if  the  land  forces  had 
acted  with  sufficient  determination,  and 
if  the  advance  had  been  adequately 
sustained.  Several  of  the  officers  vol- 
untarily reported  to  Grant  that,  when 
recalled,  they  had  nearly  reached  tlie 
fort,  and  that,  in  their  judgment,  it 
could  have  been  taken  without  much 
loss.  Which  was  right  in  this  instance. 
General  Weitzel,  who  landed  and  in- 
spected the  works,  or  Admiral  Porter, 
who  saw  them  only  from  his  flag-ship, 
will  possibly  always  be  a divided  ques- 
tion. It  does  not  seem  fair,  however, 
to  blame  Qeneral  Butler  for  acting  on 
the  advice  of  Weitzel  who,  according  to 
Porter’s  own  confession,  was  a thorough 
soldier  and  an  able  engineer,  whose  busi- 
ness it  was  to  know  more  about  assault- 
ing than  he  did.  Whatever  may  have 
been  the  fact,  in  the  circumstances,  it 
was  Grant’s  determination  that  the  fort 
should  be  taken  and  the  blockade  of 
Wilmington  reduced.  While  therefore 
the  South  was  rejoicing  over  what  they 
claimed  to  be  a victory,  the  Lieutenant- 
General  was  making  arrangements  for 
dealing  a more  effective,  and,  as  it 
proved  to  be,  a decisive  blow. 

For  some  days  after  the  departure  of 
the  transports.  Porter,  with  his 
fleet,  was  still  off  New  Inlet,  in 
the  neighborhood  of  Fort  Fisher.  Here 
he  received  instructions  from  Grant. 


804 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  PRIVATEERS. 


ordering  him  to  remain,  and  promising 
to  send  him  an  effective  land  force, 
with  a proper  leader.  It  was  still  his 
belief  that  the  fort  could  be  taken.  In 
addition  to  the  troops  which  had  gone 
back  in  the  transports  to  Hampton 
Hoads,  he  sent  a brigade  of  1500  men, 
and  a small  siege  train.  General  Terry 
was  to  command.  The  new  expedition 
Jan.  Hampton  Koads  on  the  6th 

6.  of  January,  and  on  the  8th  ren- 
dezvoused off  Beaufort,  where  Porter 
was  taking  in  coal,  ammunition  and 
other  needed  supplies.  The  weather 
^vas  boisterous ; and  it  was  not  until 
late  on  the  night  of  the  12th  that  the 
combined  forces  arrived  off  New  Inlet. 

It  had  been  arranged  that  the  troops 
should  be  landed  some  distance  above 
the  fort,  and  that  they  should  then  in- 
trench across  the  point  to  Cape  Fear 
Biver,  so  as  to  prevent  reinforcements 
being  sent  from  Wilmington.  The  land- 
ing effected,  and  the  position  secured, 
the  assault  was  to  be  made  simultane- 
ously by  the  troops  and  by  the  fleet. 
Fort  Fisher,  as  we  have  seen  already, 
was  a place  of  wonderful  strength. 
Admiral  Porter,  who  was  at  Sebastopol 
during  the  siege,  pronounced  it  much 
stronger  than  the  famous  Malakoff. 
With  the  immediately  connected  works, 
it  mounted  75  guns.  The  armament 
of  the  whole  works  guarding  the  ap- 
proaches to  Wilmington  was  about  160 
guns,  among  which  were  some  150- 
pounder  Armstrongs.  The  attacking 
squadron  carried  500  guns,  some  of 
them  the  largest  in  the  world.  It  was 
a concentration  of  destructive  machin- 
ery unparalleled  in  the  world’s  history. 


On  the  morning  of  the  13th,  at  an 
early  hour,  the  landing  of  the  troops 
commenced.  Some  200  boats 
and  a large  number  of  steam-tugs  13. 
were  employed  in  the  operation.  The 
fleet,  divided  into  3 columns,  covered 
and  protected  the  boats  and  the  land- 
ing ; and  as  early  as  three  o’clock  in  the 
afternooh  8000  troops  were  on  shoi^ 
Each  man  carried  with  him  3 days’ 
rations  and  40  rounds  of  ammunition. 
There  was  put  on  shore  also  an  abun- 
dant supply  of  intrenching  tools.  Dur- 
ing the  entire  process  of  landing,  the 
fleet  was  pouring  shot  and  shell  into 
the  fort.  The  bombardment  had  been 
terrific.  It  was  calculated  that,  while 
it  lasted,  four  shots  were  fired  from  the 
fleet  every  second,  and  that  during  the 
course  of  the  day,  the  iron-clads  alone — 
the  New  Ironsides,  Saugus,  Mahopac 
and  Canonicus — fired  upwards  of  2000 
shells.  It  is  not  wonderful  that  under 
such  a fire,  the  Confederates  should 
have  been  compelled  to  take  shelter 
under  their  bomb-proofs.  At  dark, 
about  an  hour  after  the  landing  of  the 
troops  had  been  effected,  the  wooden 
vessels  were  drawn  off  for  the  night. 
The  iron-clads  remained  at  their  an- 
chorage, firing  slowly  at  intervals,  dui*- 
ing  the  darkness. 

As  soon  as  the  troops  were  landed, 
they  were  set  to  work,  throwing  up 
intrenchments ; and  as  early  as  eight 
o’clock  on  the  morning  of  the  14th, 
they  had  constructed  a good  j^n. 
breast-work  stretching  from  the  14. 
river  to  the  sea,  and  partially  covered 
by  ahatis.  During  the  course  of  the 
day,  a reconnoissance  was  made  to 


SECOND  ATTACK  ON  FORT  FISHER. 


8Gc 


wathin  500  yards  of  tlie  fort.  The 
principal  result  of  this  reconnoissance 
was  that  General  Terry,  in  view  of  the 
difficulty  of  conducting  a regular  siege 
on  the  narrow  and  exposed  peninsula, 
came  to  the  conclusion  that  the  wiser 
course  would  be  to  make  an  immediate 
assault.  In  this  Admiral  Porter  con- 
curred ; and  it  was  decided  that  the 
assault  should  be  made  at  three  o’clock, 
on  the  afternoon  of  the  1 5th.  Arrange- 
ments were  made  for  the  army  to  as- 
sault the  western  half  of  the  land  face, 
while  a co-operating  force  of  sailors  and 
marines  should  attack  the  northeast 
bastion.  The  troops  were  kept  busy 
strengthening  the  line  of  breast-works, 
and  getting  the  guns  into  position  as 
soon  as  they  were  landed ; and,  all  day 
long  and  all  night  through,  a slow  and 
deliberate  fire  was  maintained  by  the 
fleet.  Fort  Fisher,  before  the  sun  went 
down  on  the  14th,  was  badly  pounded. 
Most  of  the  guns  were  injured ; not  a 
few  of  them  were  silenced ; and  what 
with  the  slow  but  continuous  fire  of 
shot  and  shell  during  the  night,  suffi- 
cient openings  were  made  to  warrant 
an  assault,  in  the  morning. 

On  the  morning  of  the  15th,  every- 
Jan.  ready  for  the  attack. 

15.  The  ships  were  in  position  ; and 
the  soldiers  and  marines  were  prepared 
to  move  at  the  word  of  command.  At 
eleven  o’clock,  the  fleet  opened  a fire 
which  was  unparalleled  in  the  history 
of  naval  warfare.  Under  its  cover 
1000  sailors  and  400  marines,  com- 
manded by  Fleet-Captain  K.  R.  Breese, 
were  landed  on  the  beach ; and  by 
digging  rifle-trenches,  they  worked  their 


way  to  a point  within  200  yards  of  the 
sea-front  of  the  fort,  where  they  lay 
awaiting  the  final  signal  for.  attack. 
The  troops  selected  for  the  attack  wei^ 
the  brigades  of  Curtis,  Pennybacker, 
and  Bell,  of  Ames’  Division.  Paine’s 
division  of  colored  troops  and  Abbott’s 
brigade  were  left  in  charge  of  the  in- 
trenchments  facing  Wilmington.  It 
was  now  three  o’clock.  All  this  time 
the  fleet  continued  to  thunder  against 
the  fort,  working  terrible  destruction. 
At  half-past  three  o’clock  the  signal 
Avas  given.  All  the  steam  whistles 
screamed  and  roared.  The  ships  di- 
rected their  fire  to  the  upper  bat- 
teries. The  sailors,  led  by  Captain 
Breese,  eager  to  win  the  laurels  of  the 
day,  rushed  forward,  with  reckless 
energy,  towards  the  parapet  of  the  fort, 
already  swarming  with  Confederate 
soldiers  and  blazing  with  the  fire  of 
musketry.  It  was  intended  that  the 
marines  should  cover  the  assaulting  par- 
ty ; but  for  some  unknown  reason  they 
failed  to  fire  upon  the  Confederates 
who  exposed  themselves  on  the  parapet. 
It  was  Porter’s  opinion  that  if  the 
marines  had  made  a proper  use  of  their 
guns,  the  first  assault  would  have  been 
a complete  success.  I saw  ” he  says 
“how  recklessly  the  rebels  exposed 
themselves,  and  what  an  advantage 
they  gave  our  sharpshooters  whose  guns 
were  scarcely  fired,  or  fired  with  no 
precision.”  In  spite,  however,  of  the 
murderous  fire  to  which  they  were  ex- 
posed, the  sailors  pressed  forward,  some 
of  them  actually  reaching  the  parapet 
The  advance  was  swept  away  like  chafl 
before  a mighty  rushing  wind.  The 


866 


THE  BLOCKADE  AKD  THE  PRIVATEERS. 


men  in  tlie  rear  seeing  the  slaughter  in 
front,  were  seized  with  a panic  and  fell 
back  in.  some  confusion.  The  attack  on 
this  part  of  the  fort  was  a failure, 
except  in  so  far  as  it  diverted  attention 
from  the  action  of  the  troops. 

Before  the  sisrnal  for  assault  was 

O 

given,  the  soldiers  had,  under  cover  of 
hastily  constructed  breast-works,  ap- 
])roached  within  a few  hundred  yards 
of  the  fort.  At  the  word  of  command, 
they  sprang  forward  and  went  bounding 
toAvards  the  palisades.  These,  already 
much  damaged  by  the  fire  from  the 
fleet,  soon  yielded  to  the  vigorous 
blows  of  the  axemen.  Curtis’  brigade, 
which  led  the  attacking  force,  pushed 
on  in  the  face  of  a severe  enfilading 
fire.  A lodgment  was  quickly  effected 
on  the  west  end  of  the  land  front. 
Here  a terrible  hand-to-hand  struggle 
commenced.  The  cannoniers  rushed 
to  their  guns ; and  the  parapet  bristled 
with  bayonets.  Curtis,  one  of  the 
bravest  of  the  brave,  was  sore  beset. 
He  was  soon,  however,  joined  by  Penny- 
backer,  who  took  position  on  his 
right,  and  by  Bell,  who  occupied  the 
space  between  the  fort  and  the  river. 

Hand-to-hand  fighting  ” says  General 
Terry,  “ of  the  most  desperate  charac- 
ter ensued,  the  huge  traverses  of  the 
land  face  being  used  successively  by  the 
enemy  as  breast- works,  over  the  tops  of 
which  the  contending  parties  fired  in 
each  other’s  faces.”  Nine  of  these 
traverses  were  carried  one  after  the 
other  by  the  National  troops.  It  was 
now  about  five  o’clock.  The  battle  had 
lasted  a full  hour  and  a half.  It  be- 
came apparent  that  more  troops  were 


needed  to  suppoH  the  assaulting  col- 
umn. Terry,  therefore,  ordered  up 
Abbott’s  brigade  from  the  line  of  in- 
trenchments  facing  Wilmington.  Breese 
being,  at  the  same  time,  ordered  to  oc- 
cupy that  2)osition  with  his  sailors  and 
marines.  Paine,  also,  being  ordered  to 
send  down  one  of  his  best  regiments, 
forwarded  the  Twenty-Seventh,  a negro 
regiment,  under  Brigadier- General  A. 
M.  Blackman.  Meanwhile,  the  combat 
waxed  fiercer  and  fiercer.  There  was 
no  lull — no  interruption.  Amid  the 
ruins  of  barracks  and  storehouses,  in 
the  deep  sand-hollows,  and  over  the 
bodies  of  dead  and  dying  comrades,  the 
terrible  struggle  was  prolonged.  While 
this  desperate  fight  was  going  on,  inside 
the  work,  the  fleet  was  not  idle  ; and 
by  means  of  signals,  which  were  ex- 
changed with  great  accuracy,  such  of 
the  ships  as  were  in  position  wei’e 
enabled  to  pour  upon  the  fort  a well- 
directed  and  most  destructive  fire,  mth- 
out  in  any  way  interfering  with  the 
action  of  the  troops.  Some  of  the 
ships,  from  the  moment  the  action  com- 
menced, continued  to  sweep  the  ground 
more  to  the  south,  so  as  to  make  it 
impossible  for  any  reinforcements  to 
reach  the  fort  fi*om  that  direction. 

The  battle  commenced  at  half  past 
three  o’clock.  It  was  now  dusk.  Nine 
of  the  traverses  which  had  been  used 
as  breast-works,  one  after  the  other, 
had  been  carried.  It  was  about  this 
time  that  Blackman  reported  to  Ames, 
and  that  Abbott,  with  his  little  band, 
entered  the  work.  The  arrival  of  these 
reinforcements  gave  intensity  to  the 
struggle.  Blackman’s  troops,  after 


FORT  CASWELL  BLOWN  UP. 


867 


having  been  under  the  heavy  fire  for  a 
Jittle  while,  were  mthdrawn.  It  was 
now  near  nine  o’clock.  The  fighting 
still  continued  for  the  possession  of  the 
traverses.  At  length  two  more  of  them 
were  carried ; and  the  Confederates  fell 
back,  Abbott  pressing  them  with  great 
vigor,  and  finally  driving  them  from 
their  last  stronghold.  The  entire  work 
was  now  in  the  hands  of  the  Nationals. 
Some  of  the  garrison  had  fied  down  the 
Point  to  Battery  Buchanan.  Thither 
tiiey  were  hotly  pursued  by  Abbott 
and  by  Blackman ; and  about  midnight, 
Colonel  Lamb,  the  commandant  of  the 
fort,  and  Major-General  Whiting,  and 
such  of  the  garrison  as  were  not  in  the 
hands  of  General  Terry,  were  made 
prisoners.  Hemmed  in  between  the 
water  and  their  antagonists,  they  had 
no  choice  but  to  surrender. 

About  four  o’clock  in  the  afternoon. 
General  Hoke  approached  the  line  of 
intrenchments  which  had  been  thrown 
up  across  the  peninsula,  so  as  to  guard 
iigainst  any  surprise  from  the  north  ; 
and  it  seemed  for  a time  as  if  he  meant 
to  make  a vigorous  attack.  Paine  was 
in  readiness  to  receive  him.  Hoke, 
however,  after  a slight  skirmish  with 
the  National  pickets,  retired.  His  de- 
parture was  a relief  to  General  Terry. 
A vigorous  and  well-sustained  attack 
in  that  direction,  might  have  changed 
the  fortunes  of  the  day. 

Such,  then,  was  the  great  struggle 
for  the  possession  of  Fort  Fisher ; and 
such  was  the  result.  No  more  gallant 
assault  was  ever  made.  No  more  glori- 
ous resistance  was  ever  offered.  To 
I With  North  and  South,  Fort  Fisher 


will  ever  be  a source  of  common  pride. 
On  both  sides  were  revealed  the  intelli- 
gent purpose  and  indomitable  spirit  of 
the  American  soldier. 

The  garrison  originally  numbered 
over  2300  men,  of  whom  1971  with 
112  officers  were  captured.  General 
Whitney  and  Colonel  Lamb  were  both 
severely  wounded.  The  National  loss 
in  killed,  wounded  and  missing  was 
about  690.  Ames’  brigade  command- 
ers, Curtis,  Pennybacker  and  Bell,  were 
each  of  them  wounded,  the  two  former 
severely.  Bell  mortally.  On  the  part 
of  the  fieet,  there  was  a loss  of  about 
250  or  300  men ; and  two  15-inch  guns 
were  exploded  on  board  the  monitors. 
On  the  morning  of  the  16th  a fearful 
accident  occurred.  From  some  un- 
known cause,  the  principal  maga- 
zine  of  the  fort  exploded,  scatter-  16. 
ing  death  and  ruin  all  around.  Sonie 
200  men  were  killed ; and  about  100 
were  wounded. 

On  the  16th  and  17th  the  Confeder- 
ates blew  up  Fort  Caswell  on  the  right 
bank  of  the  river.  They  abandoned 
also  Battery  Holmes,  on  Smith’s  Island, 
together  with  all  the  works  at  Smith s- 
ville  and  Beeve’s  Point.  The  Nationals 
were  thus  left  in  entire  and  absolute 
control  of  all  the  works  which  com- 
manded the  mouth  of  Cape  FearKiver. 
In  the  different  works  were  found  169 
pieces  of  artillery,  most  of  them  of 
heavy  calibre  and  some  of  them  of  the 
best  English  make ; over  2000  stand  of 
small  arms,  with  stores  and  ammunition 
in  large  (Quantities.  The  blockade  of 
Wilmington  was  thus  effectually  se- 
cured ; and  Wilmington  itself  was  now 


868 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  PRIVATEERS. 


to  command  tlie  attention  of  General 
Terry  and  Admiral  Porter. 

Some  weeks  were  allowed  to  elapse 
before  active  operations  were  resumed, 
in  the  direction  of  Wilmington.  It 
was  not  deemed  advisable  to  make  an 
advance,  until  the  land  troops  were 
considerably  reinforced.  It  w’as  known 
that  Hoke,  with  a strong  force  of  Con- 
federates, was  occupying  an  intrenched 
line  which  extended  across  the  penin- 
sula, from  the  sea,  at  Masonboro  Inlet 
to  Sugar  Loaf  Battery,  on  the  east 
bank  of  Cape  Fear  River,  and  almost 
to  Fort  Anderson,  a strong  work  which 
stood  on  the  west  bank  of  ‘the  river. 
General  Terry  having  supplied  the 
requisite  number  of  men  to  guard  the 
different  works,  strengthened  his  line 
of  intrenchments,  which,  as  we  have 
seen,  extended  across  the  peninsula, 
some  two  or  three  miles  to  the  north  of 
Fort  Fisher.  Meanwhile,  Admiral  Por- 
ter had  pushed  some  of  his  lighter 
vessels  through  Hew  Inlet  into  Cape 
Fear  River  ; and  Cushing,  in  obedience 
to  the  orders  of  the  Admiral,  had 
raised  the  National  flag  over  Fort  Cas- 
well, and  the  works  at  Smithsville. 

General  Grant  had  not  been  unmind- 
ful of  the  difficulties,  as  well  as  oppor- 
tunities, which  might  follow  upon  the 
capture  of  Fort  Fisher.  Occupied  as 
he  was,  with  the  work  immediately 
before  Petersburg  and  Richmond,  his 
mental  eye  continued  to  survey  the 
whole  vast  field  of  war  operations. 
Sherman  was  already,  with  the  consent 
of  the  Lieutenant-General,  .making  pre- 
parations for  his  return  march  through 
the  Carolinas.  Thomas'  success  had 


been  such  that  he  was  left  almost 
without  a rival  in  Tennessee.  He  had 
about  him  more  men  than  he  could  use ; 
and  he  had  already  ordered  Schofield 
with  the  Twenty-Third  corps,  to  go 
into  winter-quarters  at  Eastport,  Missis- 
sippi. Grant,  however,  had  work  for 
Schofield  and  his  men.  It  was  his 
determination  to  hasten  matters  to  a 
close ; and  with  this  end  in  view,  he 
had  resolved  to  concentrate  the  armies 
of  the  republic.  When  about  to  carry 
out  the  orders  of  Thomas  and  retire  to 
Eastport,  Schofield  received  instruc- 
tions, from  Grant,  to  proceed  to  the  coast 
of  North  Carolina.  The  instructions  of 
the  Lieutenant-General  were  promptly 
obeyed.  Proceeding  by  steamers  down 
the  Tennessee  and  up  the  Ohio  to  Cin- 
cinnati, and  thence  by  rail,  he  reached 
Washington  and  Alexandria  on  the 
23d  of  January.  His  troops  were  again 
embarked;  and  on  the  9th  of 
February,  Schofield,  with  Cox’s  9. 

division  arrived  at  Fort  Fisher.  The 
remainder  of  the  troops  followed,  some 
of  them  goiug  to  New  Berne.  After 
the  capture  of  Fort  Fisher,  Butler  had 
been  superseded  by  Ord,  in  the  com- 
mand of  fte  Department  of  Virginia 
and  North  Carolina.  A separate  De- 
partment was  now  made  of  North 
Carolina,  and  intrusted  to  Schofield. 
Schofield,  however,  was  to  act  under 
orders  from  General  Sherman  and  to 
co-operate  with  him.  Sherman  was 
expected  to  be  in  the  neighborhood  of 
Goldsboro,  between  the  2 2d  and  the 
28th  of  Febiniary ; and  Schofield,  march- 
ing from  Wilmington  or  New  Berne 
was  to  join  him  at  that  place.  There 


MAP  SHOWING  THE  ENTRANCES  TO  CAPE  FEAR  RIVER  AND  THE  APPROACHES 
TO  WILMINGTON,  N.  C. 


MOVEMENT  AGAINST  MOBILE. 


869 


were  now  in  tlie  immediate  neighbor- 
hood of  Fort  Fisher  some  20,000  men. 

No  time  was  now  lost  in  moving 
towards  Wilmington.  Two  days  after 
the  arrival  of  Schofield,  Terry  advanced 
against  Hoke.  Driving  in  the  pickets, 
he  threw  up  a fresh  line  of  intrench- 
ments  close  to  those  of  his  antagonist. 
An  unsuccessful  attempt  was  made  to 
turn  Hoke’s  left.  The  attempt  to  turn 
his  right  was  more  successful  ; and 
Fort  Anderson  was  speedily  enveloped 
by  the  divisions  of  Ames  and  Cox.  It 
Feb.  February.  On 

l^.  the  same  evening,' the  garrison, 
convinced  of  their  danger,  abandoned 
the  fort,  taking  with  them  6 guns  and 
some  valuable  property,  but  leaving 
behind  them  10  heavy  guns  and  a large 
quantity  of  ammunition.  The  work 
was  occupied  next  morning ; and  over 
it  waved  the  National  flag.  After  the 
capture  of  Fort  Anderson,  Ames  crossed 
to  the  east  side  of  Cape  Fear  River  to 
assist  Terry.  Hoke  abandoned  his  in- 
trenchments  and  fell  back  towards 
Wilmington.  The  National  troops 
pressed  forward  on  both  sides  of  the 
river.  Fort  Strong  and  Fort  St.  Philip 
were  successively  deserted  by  the  Con- 
federates. On  the  21st,  Cox  was  on 
Eagle  Island  and  flinging  shells  into 
Wilmington.  Feeling  his  situation  to 
be  desperate,  Hoke  ordered  a general 
destruction  of  property.  Several  steam- 
ships, including  the  Chickamauga  and 
Tallahassee  were  destroyed  by  fire, 
Feb.  together  with  large  quantities  of 
22.  military  and  naval  stores.  On 
the  morning  of  the  22d,  it  was  discovered 
that  the  Confederates  had  abandoned 


the  town  ; and  Schofield  and  his  vic- 
torious troops  entered  unopposed.  The 
fall  of  Wilmington  was  a serious  blow 
to  the  Confederate  cause.  It  had  long 
been  a fruitful  source  of  supplies  ; and 
it  could  ill  be  dispensed  with.  Lee,  it 
was  known,  had  manifested  much 
anxiety  regarding  Wilmington  ; and 
after  the  capture  of  Fort  Fisher,  there 
was  found  in  the  work  a letter,  in 
which  he  informed  the  officer  command- 
ing that  if  Wilmington  should  be  taken, 
Richmond  could  not  much  longer  hold 
out.  Grant’s  plans  were  working  ad- 
mirably ; and  the  end,  day  after  day, 
was  more  visibly  drawing  nigh. 

Tn  a separate  chapter,  we  have 
already  given  a detailed  account  of  the 
operations  in  Mobile  Bay — operations 
which,  in  August,  1864,  resulted  in  the 
capture  of  the  forts  which  commanded 
the  entrance.  In  the  upper  portions 
of  the  bay,  the  waters  are  shallow.  It 
was  found  impossible,  in  consequence, 
to  move  the  fleet  sufficiently  near  the 
town  to  make  bombardment  possible  ; 
and  as  the  land  force  was  too  small  to 
attack  without  the  aid  of  the  fleet, 
operations  were  suspended  until  the 
spring  of  1865. 

Mobile,  however,  still  commanded 
Grant’s  attention  ; and  when  Sherman 
had  completed  his  triumphal  march 
through  Georgia  to  the  sea,  and  Thomas 
had  cut  to  pieces  Hood’s  army  in  Mid- 
dle Tennessee,  fresh  arrangements  were 
made  for  the  reduction  of  this  Confed- 
erate stronghold.  The  conduct  of  the 
movement  against  Mobile  was  intrusted 
to  General  Canby,  then  commanding 
the  West  Mississippi  army  with  head- 


309 


370 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  PRIVATEERS. 


quarters  at  New  Orleans.  A co-opera- 
tive movement  was  placed  in  charge  of 
the  famous  cavaliy  leader,  General  J.  H. 
Wilson,  who  was  to  act  under  or- 
ders from  General  Thomas.  Admiral 
Thatcher,  then  in  command  of  the  West 
Gulf  Squadron,  was  also  ordered  to 
proceed  to  New  Orleans  and  confer 
wdth  General  Canby.  It  was  believed 
that  by  using  vessels  of  light  draught, 
the  fleet  would  be  able  to  co-operate 
with  the  army.  Canby  .proceeded  at 
once  to  collect  his  forces ; and  he  soon 
had  around  him,  or  acting  under  his 
orders,  and  towards  a common  end,  an 
army  of  about  45,000  men.  It  consisted 
of  Granger’s  newly  organized  corps,  the 
Thirteenth,  13,200  strong;  A.  J.  Smith’s 
corps,  the  Sixteenth,  16,000  strong; 
Steele’s  column,  which  came  up  from 
Pensacola,  13,200  strong ; with  artillery, 
cavalry  and  engineers  to  the  number  of 
3000.  The  Confederate  forces  in  the 
Department,  were  under  the  command 
of  General  Richard  Taylor,  who  was  at 
Meridian.  General  D.  H.  Maury,  with 
9000  men  was  immediately  in  charge 
of  Mobile,  and  its  defenses. 

About  the  middle  of  March,  every- 
thing was  in  readiness  for  the  forward 
movement.  Wilson,  who  as  Ave  have 
seen,  was  to  co-operate  with  his  cavalry, 
was  also  ready  to  swoop  from  the  north, 
down  through  Alabama.  During  the 
course  of  the  three  years  of  the  war. 
Mobile  had  been  made  a place  of  great 
strength.  On  the  Avestern  side  particu- 
larly, it  was  considered  impregnable. 
A direct  attack  on  that  side  Avas  deemed 
too  hazardous.  It  was,  therefore,  de- 
termined to  make  a flank  movement. 


up  the  eastern  shore,  and,  in  concert 
with  the  fleet,  which  Thatcher  had  con- 
trived to  bring  up,  to  seize  the  fortifica- 
tions on  the  islands  and  the  mainland 
at  the  head  of  the  bay.  On  the 
24th  of  March,  the  Thirteenth  24. 
corps,  having  marched  along  the  penin- 
sula from  Fort  Morgan,  reached  Dan- 
ley’s,  oh  Fish  River.  The  Sixteenth 
corps  which  had  crossed  the  bay  in 
transports,  and  had  landed  under  coA^er 
of  the  fleet,  was  already  at  the  appoint- 
ed rendezA^ous.  On  the  25th,  the  Thir- 
teenth and  Sixteenth  corps  advanced 
from  Fish  River,  up  the  east  side  of  the 
bay,  along  the  Belle  Rose  and  Blakely 
Roads.  The  roads  were  strewn  with 
torpedoes,  some  of  Avhich  exploded, 
killing  men  and  horses.  On  the  26th, 
having  encountered  only  a feAV  skir 
mishers  by  the  way,  the  National  ad- 
vance Avas  in  the  neighborhood  of  Span- 
ish Fort,  some  7 miles  east  from  Mobile. 
The  reduction  of  this  fort  Avas  deemed 
a preliminary  necessity;  and,  on  the 
following  day,  it  was  completely  in 
vested  on  the  land  side.  Smith  being  on 
the  right,  and  Granger  on  the  left. 
This  fort  Avas  of  great  strength,  the 
Avorks  extending  about  two  miles.  Tt 
was  garrisoned  by  nearly  3000  men, 
under  General  R.  Gibson. 

The  siege  of  Spanish  Fort  lasted  for 
tAvo  Aveeks  On  the  27th,  as  the  day 
advanced,  and  all  duiing  the  night,  the 
firing  Avas  on  a scale  of  unusual  mag- 
nificence. Besiegers  and  besieged  vied 
with  each  other,  the  bombardment  and 
the  response  being  equally  terrific ; and  a 
spectacle  unique  in  its  character,  as 
grand  and  imposing  as  it  was  fitted  to 


BLAKELY. 


871 


alarm,  was  furnished  to  the  citizens  of 
Mobile.  Canby,  day  after  day,  drew 
his  lines  closer  and  closer,  the  lire  tell- 
ing more  and  more  effectually  on  the 
^vorks.  Excellent  work  was  done 
by  the  vessels  of  the  fleet.  They 
not  only  neutralized  the  vessels  of  the 
enemy,  but  succeeded,  from  time  to 
time,  in  throwing  100-pound  shells  into 

April  April 

8.  an  assault  was  made  by  Colonel 
Bell’s  Eighth  Iowa  regiment,  of  Gedde’s 
brigade  of  Carr’s  division.  The  garri- 
son was  composed  mainly  of  Texans, 
^vho  fought  with  tremendous  energy. 
The  Texans  received  the  advancing 
(‘olumn  with  a tremendous  musketry 
Are.  Bell,  however,  pushed  his  men 
forward  in  greater  force,  cheering  them 
by  his  words  and  sustaining  them  by 
his  example.  The  Iowa  men  charged 
over  the  works  in  the  most  gallant 
manner ; and  after  a desperate  hand- to- 
ll and  struggle,  they  found  themselves 
in  possession  of  about  300  yards  of  the 
intrenchments,  with  several  colors,  and 
a bout  3 5 0 prisoners.  Gibson,  con  vinced 
that  the  position  was  no  longer  tenable, 
})roceeded  to  withdraw  his  troops. 
About  midnight,  the  firing  from  the 
fort  ceased ; and,  shortly  after  two 
o’clock  on  the  morning  of  the  9th,  Ber- 
tram’s brigade  entered  and  took  posses- 
sion of  the  place,  without  encountering 
any  opposition.  The  immediate  fruits 
of  victory  were  600  prisoners,  the  en- 
tire works,  with  30  heavy  guns,  and 
military  stores  in  abundance. 

On  the  night  of  the  11th,  Forts  Hu- 
ger and  Tracy,  which  commanded  the 
mouth  of  the  Blakely  Biver,  were  also 


abandoned  ; and  the  key  to  Mobile  was 
now  in  the  hands  of  the  Nationals 
The  fleet  moved  up  the  Tensas  April 
Biver  towards  Mobile,  picking  11. 
up,  as  it  advanced,  some  35  tor- 
pedoes, and  coming  to  anchor  within 
shelling  distance  of  the  city.  In  cross- 
ing Blakely  Bar,  two  of  the  vessels 
were  sunk.  The  army  moved  along  the 
east  bank  of  the  river  towards  Blakely, 
where  the  Confederates  had  constructed 
a strong  line  of  works,  about  three 
miles  in  length,  both  extremities  resting 
on  high  ground,  and  extending  to  the 
river.  These  works  comprised  nine 
redoubts,  or  lunettes,  and  were  armed 
with  forty  guns.  The  garrison,  which 
was  under  the  command  of  General  St. 
John  Lidell,  was  <jomposed  of  veterans 
from  Hood’s  army,  and  was  about  3500 
strong.  Lidell  had  for  his  immediate 
subordinates.  Generals  Thomas  and 
Cockerell. 

Blakely  had  been  closely  invested  by 
Hawkins’  negroes  since  their  arrival  from 
Pensacola.  On  the  afternoon  of  Sunday, 
the  9th  of  April,  Canby  arrived  at  April 
Blakely  with  the  troops,  which  had  9. 
been  engaged  in  the  capture  of  Spanish 
Fort.  Immediately  after  his  arrival,  he 
decided  upon  an  assault.  It  was,  he 
knew,  a perilous  undertaking ; but  much 
precious  time  would  necessarily  be 
wasted  in  a siege.  He  resolved  to  run 
the  risk.  The  ground  to  be  traversed 
was  covered  with  cTievaux-de-frise^  abatis 
and  torpedoes ; in  the  immediate  front 
of  the  works  was  a broad,  deep  ditch  ; 
and  forty  guns,  with  their  angry  mouths, 
threatened  every  avenue  of  approach. 
Canby  drew  up  his  divisions  in  line  ol 


872 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  PKIVATEEKS.  • 


battle.  Hawkins,  with  his  negroes,  was 
on  the  rio^ht;  Veatch  and  Andrews  of 
the  Thirteenth  corps,  were  in  the  centre ; 
aiid  Garrard’s  division  of  the  Sixteenth 
corps  was  on  the  left.  The  remainder 
of  the  Sixteenth  corps  was  held  in 
reserve.  Half  past  five  o’clock  was  the 
hour  fixed  for  the  assault.  The  ap- 
pointed moment  had  all  but  arrived ; 
and  the  men  were  waiting  impatiently 
for  the  signal.  The  sky  was  overspread 
with  gloom  ; and  low  growling  sounds 
of  distant  thunder  came  rolling  from 
the  west.  These  sounds  were  soon 
rendered  inaudible  by  the  nearer  and 
more  alarming  thunders  of  rival  artil- 
lery. While  the  National  guns  thun- 
dered over  the  intervening  space,  the 
advance  was  m^e  almost  simultaneous- 
ly, along  the  whole  line.  Never  did 
troops  behave  more  nobly.  Never  was 
attack  made  in  circumstances  of  greater 
dififtculty.  It  was  a rush  into  the  very 
jaws  of  death.  Torpedoes  were  ex- 
ploding, at  every  step ; the  abatis  and 
other  obstructions  made  progress  next 
to  impossible ; while  the  terrific  fire 
from  the  enemy’s  guns,  swift  and  uner- 
ring, ploughed  long  lanes  in  the  advanc- 
ing columns.  Nothing  daunted,  how- 
ever, the  brave  fellows  pressed  forward. 
Here,  as  at  Port  Hudson,  the  negro 
troops  were  on  the  right ; and  here,  as 
there,  they  rivalled  their  white  compan- 
ions-in-arms,  by  feats  of  valor.  They 
were  the  first  to  advance — the  first  en- 
gaged in  deadly  conflict  with  the  enemy. 
Garrard,  on  the  left,  when  the  signal 
was  given  pushed  forward  only  a por- 
tion of  his  men,  his  object  being  to 
discover  a suitable  avenue  to  advance  in 


force.  No  such  avenue  being  discovered 
he  gave  the  word  “ Forward ; ” and  his 
brave  fellows,  heedless  of  the  withering 
fire  from  the  Confederate  breastworks, 
went  bounding  forward.  The  centre 
also  was  quickly  at  work.  From  the 
extreme  right  to  the  extreme  left,  the 
whole  line,  extending  about  three  miles, 
was  engaged  in  the  assault.  At  all 
points  the  experience  was  very  much 
the  same.  The  great  difi&culty  was 
to  reach  the  works.  For  more  than 
half  an  hour,  the  entire  line,  struggling 
with  the  obstacles  which  lay  in  the  way, 
and  thrown  into  disorder  from  time  to 
time  by  exploding  torpedoes,  was  ex- 
posed to  the  guns  of  the  enemy.  At 
length,  as  the  day  was  waning,  victory 
dawned  on  the  National  left.  Garrard’s 
men,  cheered  by  the  example  of  their 
chief,  had  worked  their  way  through  the 
obstructions.  Harris’  brigade  swept 
over  the  ditch,  and  clambered  up  the 
face  of  the  works ; while  those  of  Gil- 
bert and  Rinaker,  having  turned  the 
right  of  the  fort,  rushed  in,  and  cap- 
tured General  Thomas,  with  1000  of  his 
men.  The  struggle  was  more  protract- 
ed, in  the  centre  and  on  the  left.  Veatch 
and  Andrews  met  with  a most  stubborn 
resistance,  and  suffered  terribly  from  the 
enemy’s  fire,  as  well  as  from  the  ex- 
ploding torpedoes.  The  presence  of 
the  negroes  seemed  to  rouse  the  wrath 
of  the  Confederates ; and  the  struggle 
on  the  left  raged,  for  a time,  with 
tremendous  fury.  At  length  the  cry 
was  raised  “Remember  Fort  Pillow.” 
“Remember  Fort  Pillow”  rang  along 
the  line.  The  words  were  electric ; 
and  Hawkins’  dusky  brigades,  as  if 


WILSON’S  GREAT  RAID. 


873 


yielding  to  a new  and  overwhelming 
impulse,  and  filled  with  superhuman 
energy,  with  wild  cries,  went  rushing 
over  the  embankments,  and  swept  the 
enemy  before  them,  like  chaff  before 
the  wind.  The  battle  of  Blakely  was 
ende4.  It  was  only  one  hour  and  a half 
since  the  Nationals  advanced  to  the 
assault;  and  already  they  were  in  pos- 
session of  all  the  works,  with  40  pieces 
of  artillery,  4000  small  arms,  16  battle 
flags,  and  a large  quantity  of  ammuni- 
tion. They  had  captured  over  8000 
men^  with  several  ofiicers  of  high  rank, 
including  Generals  Lidell,  Cockerell 
and  Thomas.  The  Confederate  loss  was 
estimated  at  500  in  killed  and  wound- 
ed. The  National  loss  was  much 
more  severe — probably  not  much  under 
1000. 

With  the  fall  of  Fort  Blakely  per- 
ished the  last  hopes  of  the  Confederates 
in  Mobile.  On  the  11th,  Maury  retired 
from  the  place,  and,  with  9000  men  in 
gun-boats  and  transports  made  his  way 
up  the  Alabama  Kiver.  Before  his 
departure,  he  caused  to  be  sunk  the  two 
powerful  rams,  Huntsville  and  Tusca- 
April  loosa.  On  the  evening  of  the 
12.  12th  the  place  was  surrendered. 
On  the  following  day,  Veatch’s  division 
entered  the  town;  and'  the  National 
banner  was  hoisted  on  the  public  build- 
ings. Thus  ended  another  successful 
campaign. 

The  story  of  the  capture  of  Mobile 
Avould  be  incomplete  without  a brief 
reference  to  the  co-operative  movement 
'which  was  conducted  under  the  imme- 
diate direction  of  General  Wilson. 
After  the  expulsion  of  Hood  from  East 


Tennessee,  Thomas,  as  has  been  stated 
already,  had  a large  unemployed  force 
on  hand.  We  have  already  seen  what 
use  was  made  of  Schofield  and  his  com- 
mand. It  remains  for  us  to  follow 
Wilson  on  his  famous  cavalry  raid, 
through  Alabama.  Wilson  had  been, 
for  a brief  space,  with  the  cavalry  of 
the  Military  Division  of  the  Mississippi, 
on  the  north  side  of  the  Tennessee 
Kiver,  in  Lauderdale  County,  Alabama. 
On  the  28d  of.  February,  he  was  visited 
by  General  Thomas  who  gave  him  in- 
structions regarding  the  intended  move- 
ment. It  was  designed  to  be  co-opera- 
tive with  that  of  Canby;  and  it  was 
expected  that  Avhile  he  would  be  giving 
the  Confederates  sufficient  occupation, 
and  so  preventing  them  from  sending 
reinforcements  against  Canby,  he 
would  be  able  to  destroy  Selma,  Tusca- 
loosa, and  the  other  great  iron  centres  of 
the  State.  The  cavalry  were  in  excel- 
lent condition ; and  the  necessary  ar- 
rangements being  quickly  completed, 
they  set  out  on  the  2 2d  of  March, 

The  entire  force  under  Wilson,  22. 
numbered  about  13,000,  all  mounted 
except  some  1500  who  were  detached 
to  guard  the  numerous  supply  and 
baggage  trains.  The  troops  were  ar- 
ranged in  three  divisions,  and  were 
commanded  respectively  by  Long,  Up- 
ton, and  McCook.  They  were  accom- 
panied by  6 batteries.  There  were  250 
wagon  trains,  together  with  a light  pon- 
toon train  of  30  boats,  borne  by  some 
56  mule  wagons.  Each  trooper  carried 
with  him  five  days’  rations,  24  pounds 
of  grain,  an  extra  pair  of  horse-shoes, 
and  100  rounds  of  ammunition.  The 


874 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  PRIVATEERS. 


^^xpedition,  it  was  expected,  would  not 
last  over  60  days.  As  but  little  opposi- 
tion was  encountered,  it  is  unnecessary 
to  dwell  minutely  on  tbe  details  of  this 
raid.  Wilson  was  at  Elyton  on  the 
30th.  Thence  he  despatched  Croxton’s 
brigade,  of  McCook’s  division,  to  Tusca- 
loosa, with  instructions  to  destroy  the 
foundries  and  factories,  and  other 
public  property.  Wilson,  himself  push- 
ed forward  to  Montevallo,  which  he 
reached  on  the  afternoon  of  the  31st. 
There,  he  destroyed  a large  number  of 
iron-works,  rolling-mills  and  collieries. 
There,  too,  he  encountered  and  defeated 
a body  of  Confederate  cavalry,  captur- 
ing 3 guns  and  several  hundred  prison- 
ers. At  Ebenezer  Church,  near  Boyle’s 
Creek,  he  was  confronted  by  Forrest, 
with  5000  men.  Forrest  was  routed 
and  driven  in  confusion  towards  Selma, 
leaving  behind  him  2 guns  and  200 
April  pi*isoners.  At  four  o’clock,  in  the 
2.  afternoon  of  April  2d,  Wilson’s 
troopers  were  in  sight  of  Selma.  Prep- 
arations were  made  for  an  immediate 
assault.  The  place  was  well  fortified  ; 
and  Forrest  was  there  at  the  head  of 
7000  men.  Forrest  had  manifested  an 
unwillingness  to  attempt  a defense 
with  so  small  a force ; but  Taylor,  who 
made  good  his  own  escape,  ordered  him 
to  hold  it  at  all  hazards.  The  attack 
was  made  without  any  delay.  It  was 
made  at  two  separate  points,  and  with 
tremendous  energy.  Long  and  Upton 
both  distinguishing  themselves  by  their 
bi’avery.  It  was  not  yet  dark  when 
the  Confederates  were  fleeing  from  the 
place  in  wild  confusion.  Forrest, 
Poddy  and  Armstrong  contrived  to 


escape  by  the  Burnsville  road.  Selma, 
with  32  guns,  2700  prisoners,  of  whom 
150  were  officers,  was  now  in  the  hands 
of  the  Nationals.  Twenty-five  thous- 
and bales  of  cotton  were  found  blazing. 
Wilson  fired  10,000  more,  together  with 
the  foundries,  arsenals,  machine.-^hops 
and  other  public  property. 

On  the  12th  of  April,  Wilson  was  at 
Montgomery,  the  original  seat  April 
of  the  Confederate  government.  12. 
The  place  had  been  in  charge  of  Wii-t 
Adams.  Adams,  however,  had  already 
fled,  having  set’  on  fire  before  he  left, 
some  90,000  bales  of  cotton.  Mont- 
gomery was  formally  surrendered  by 
the  city  authorities.  Wilson  remained 
in  the  place  two  days,  during  which  he 
destroyed  5 steamboats,  several  locomo- 
tives, one  armory,  and  several  foundiies, 
and  then  entered  Georgia.  On  the  16th, 
he  captured  Columbus,  taking  52  guns 
and  1200  prisoners.  He  caused  to  be 
destroyed  a large  quantity  of  property — 
about  115,000  bales  of  cotton,  200  cars, 
15  locomotives,  with  the  navy  yard, 
arsenal,  and  factories  of  various  kinds, 
and  a vast  quantity  of  stores.  Among 
the  property  destroyed  was  the  Con- 
federate ram  Jackson,  which  mounted 
six  7-inch  guns.  On  the  21st,  Wilson, 
pushing  on,  had  reached  Macon,  which 
was  surrendered  under  protest.  Here 
he  heard  for  the  first  time  of  the  arm- 
istice between  Sherman  and  Johnston. 
Here  also  he  was  joined  by  Croxton, 
who,  it  will  be  remembered  was  sent 
to  Tuscaloosa.  He  captured  that  place 
on  the  3d  of  Apiil,  and  proceeded 
thence  through  Jasper,  Talladega  and 
Newman,  thus  completing  a march  of 


THE  SUMTER. 


875 


650  miles  in  30  days.  During  this  raid, 
which  was  in  the  last  degree  disastrous 
to  the  Confederate  cause,  Wilson  cap- 
tured 5 fortified  cities,  288  pieces  of 
artillery,  23  stand  of  colors  and  6820 
prisoners.  The  property  he  destroyed 
was  enormous.  His  own  loss  did  not 
much  exceed  700,  of  whom  90  were 
killed. 

From  an  early  period,  in  the  history 
of  the  war,  the  North  suffered  severely, 
while  the  South  equally  benefitted,  by 
the  blockade-runners,  and  also  by  priv- 
ateers on  the  high  seas.  By  closing  the 
ports  of  Charleston,  Wilmington  and 
Mobile,  the  business  of  the  blockade- 
runners  was  effectually  ended.  To- 
wards the  end  of  1864,  the  privateers 
had  been  for  the  most  part  swej)t  from 
the  seas  ; but  it  was  not  until  after  the 
fall  of  the  Confederacy,  that  the  depre- 
dations of  these  vessels  wholly  ceased. 
A brief  account  of  the  origin,  doings, 
and  fate  of  what  were  called  the  Con- 
federate cruisers,  will,  it  is  thought, 
form  a not  inapt  conclusion  to  the 
present  chapter. 

Scarcely  had  the  war  broken  out, 
when  certain  vessels  specially  built  or 
reconstructed  for  the  purpose,  heavily 
armed  and  floating  the  Confederate 
flag,  began  to  prey  on  the  commerce  of 
the  North.  One  of  the  first  of  these 
vessels  was  the  Savannah,  a schooner 
of  50  tons,  and  carrying  an  18-pound 
swivel.  Early  in  June,  1861,  she  suc- 
ceeded in  eluding  the  blockading- 
squadron  off  Charleston,  and  captured 
a Maine  brig,  laden  with  sugar  and 
bound  for  Philadelphia.  Soon  after- 
wards, however,  she  came  in  the  wav 


of  the  United  States  brig-of-war  Perry, 
and  was  obliged  to  surrender.  Another 
of  these  vessels  was  the  Petrel.  She, 
too,  successfully  ran  through  the  block- 
ade of  Charleston,  and*  was  about  to 
commence  her  work  of  destruction, 
when  she  was  pursued,  and  blown  to 
pieces  by  the  United  States  frigate, 
St.  Lawrence.  The  Juda,  another 
privateer,  w^as  burned  on  the  14th  of 
September,  1861,  in  the  harbor  of  Pen- 
sacola. The  Nashville  was  another  of 
the  vessels  of  the  privateer  class.  She 
destroyed  a valuable  merchant  ship 
called  the  Harvev  Birch,  near  the 
English  coast.  She  then  proceeded  to 
Southampton  ; but  the  Tuscarora  being 
there,  she  returned,  and  escaping  from 
the  National  ship,  made  her  way  back 
safely  to  Southern  waters.  The  Nasi] 
ville,  as  has  been  narrated  elsewhere, 
was  finally  destroyed  on  the  22d  of 
February,  1863,  on  the  Ogeechee  Biver, 
near  Fort  McAllister.  Of  all  the  orig- 
inal privateers,  the  most  destructive 
was  the  Sumter.  During  her  brief 
career,  under  the  guidance  of  Captain 
Semmes,  she  played  terrible  havoc 
among  American  merchant  ships.  She 
was  finally  forced  to  take  refuge  in  the 
waters  of  Gibraltar,  where  she  was 
blockaded  by  the  Tuscarora.  Finding 
that  he  was  not  likely  ever  to  be  able 
to  take  his  vessel  out,  Semmes  sold  the 
Sumter,  and,  afterwards,  with  his 
officers,  proceeded  to  Liverpool,  where 
he  awaited  the  completion  of  the 
Alabama. 

The  privateers  of  a later  date  were 
of  a more  formidable  character.  They 
were  constructed,  for  the  most  part,  in 


876 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  PRIVATEERS. 


Britisli  ship-yards.  The  first  of  these 
vessels  was  the  Oreto,  built  at  Birken- 
head. She  was  finished  in  the  fall  of 
1862,  and  immediately  left  England, 
fiying  the  British  colors,  for  Nassau, 
New  Providence.  Thence,  her  colors 
unchanged,  she  sailed  for  Mobile, 
which  in  spite  of  the  blockade,  she 
reached  on  the  4th  of  September. 
About  the  end  of  December,  she  moved- 
out  from  Mobile,  ran  the  blockade,  and 
commenced  her  work  of  destruction. 
She  was  now  named  the  Florida,  and 
was  fully  armed.  In  the  space  of  three 
months,  during  which  she  remained 
mostly  in  American  waters,  now  cruis- 
ing among  the  West  India  Islands,  and 
now  sweeping  along  the  coasts  of  the 
United  States,  she  captured  15  vessels, 
2 of  which  were  afterwards  converted 
into  cruisers,  the  rest  destroyed.  In 
August  1863,  she  crossed  the  Atlantic, 
reaching  Brest  on  the  4th  of  September. 
At  Brest  she  was  for  a brief  period 
forcibly  detained.  Set  at  liberty,  she 
again  crossed  the  Atlantic ; and,  run- 
ning along  the  coast  of  Brazil,  she  de- 
sti'oyed  the  bark  Mandamon,  off  the 
port  of  Bahia,  and  tlien  ran  into  that 
harbor.  There,  contrary  to  law,  she 
was  captured  by  the  U.  S.  steamer, 
Wachusett,  and  conveyed  to  Hampton 
Hoads,  where  not  long  afterwards,  she 
was  sunk.  The  Florida  was  first  com- 
manded by  Maffit,  later  by  Morris. 

Besides  the  Florida  and  the  Alabama, 
of  which  latter  we  shall  have  something 
to  say  presently,  there  were  other  ves- 
sels, most  of  them  British-built,  all  of 
them  powerful,  and  every  one  of  them 
destructive,  according  to  opportunity. 


The  Tallahassee,  in  a cruise  of  ten  days, 
destroyed  33  vessels.  The  Chicka- 
mauga,  during  her  career,  destroyed 
property  at  sea,  to  the  amount  of 
$500,000.  Those  vessels  were  ulti- 
mately compelled  to  take  shelter  in  the 
inland  waters  at  Wilmington,  where, 
as  has  been  mentioned  in  a previous 
chapter,  f;hey  were  both  destroyed  by 
the  Confederates.  The  Georgia,  orig- 
inally called  the  Japan,  and  built  at 
Glasgow,  was,  after  she  had  accom- 
plished a vast  amount  of  destruction, 
captured  by  the  National  frigate,  Niag- 
ara, about  20  miles  off  Lisbon.  The 
Olustee,  a powerful  vessel  of  1100  tons, 
schooner-rigged,  with  two  propellers, 
appeared  in  1864,  and,  in  November  of 
that  year,  captured  many  vessels  bound 
for  New  York.  The  Shenandoah,  built 
at  Glasgow,  under  the  name  of  the  Sea 
King,  in  1863,  was  purchased  by  the 
Confederates  in  1864,  and  taken  to 
Madeira,  where  she  took  in  her  arms, 
stores  and  crew.  Thence  she  sailed  for 
Australia,  and  the  North  Pacific.  Dur- 
ing her  marauding  career,  which  lasted 
for  some  time  after  the  war  was  over, 
she  destroyed  some  25  ships.  She  was 
eventually  taken  back  to  Europe,  and 
surrendered  to  the  British  government. 
Another  of  those  vessels,  named  the 
Stonewall,  was  built  in  France  for  the 
Danish  government.  She  became  Con- 
federate property  by  right  of  purchase. 
At  the  close  of  the  ^var,  she  was  sur- 
rendei*ed  to  the  Spanish  ofiicials  at 
Havana,  and  given  up  by  them  to  the 
United  States. 

The  great  naval  event  on  the  high 
seas,  during  the  course  of  the  war,  was 


THE  ALABAMA  AND  THE  KEARSARGE. 


877 


the  fight  between  the  Alabama  and  the 
Kearsarge.  The  Alabama  was  built 
at  Birkenhead,  by  Laird,  and  was  first 
named  the  “ 290.”  When  completed 
in  July,  1862,  she  was  taken  to  Ter- 
ceira,  one  of  the  Western  Islands,  under 
the  command  of  a British  captain. 
There  she  was  joined  by  another  Brit- 
ish vessel  from  which  she  received  her 
armament.  On  the  day  following,  the 
British  screw  steamer  Bahama  arrived, 
bringing  with  her  Captain  Semmes  and 
the  other  officers,  formerly  of  the  Sum- 
ter, and  20  more  of  her  crew.  On 
Sunday,  August  26th,  she  steamed  out 
of  port.  When  out  in  the  open  sea, 
Captain  Semmes  appeared  on  deck,  in 
full  uniform,  mustered  the  crew,  read 
his  commission,  as  post-captain,  in  the 
Confederate  navy,  and  announced  that 
the  290  ” was  henceforth  to  be  known 
as  the  Confederate  sloop-of-war,  Ala- 
bama. The  British  flag  was  hauled 
down  ; and  the  Confederate  ensign  and 
pennant  were  hoisted  and  saluted.  On 
the  29th  of  August,  she  went  forth  on 
her  mission,  which  was  to  “sink,  burn, 
and  destroy  everything  which  flew  the 
ensign  of  the  so-called  United  States  of 
America.”  For  well  nigh  two  years, 
she  continued  faithful  in  the  perform- 
ance of  this  terrible  work.  By  the  end 
of  October,  she  had  made  27  prizes. 
Most  of  the  vessels  attacked,  being 
unarmed,  fell  an  easy  prey.  In  Janu- 
aiy,  1863,  she  encountered  the  Hat- 
teras,  one  of  the  blockading  ships  off 
Galveston.  The  Hatteras  was  lightly 
ai’ined  ; and  in  one-quarter  of  an  hour, 
she  went  down  under  the  heavy  fire  of 
her  antagonist.  * After  cruising  for  a 


time  in  the  West  Indies,  and  then  alonir 
the  coast  of  Brazil,  Semmes  crossed  the 
Atlantic  to  Cape  Town,  where  he  re- 
mained for  some  time.  Thence  he  pro 
ceeded  to  the  Malay  Archipelago,  which 
he  reached  in  November ; and  after  an 
unproductive  cruise  of  three  months, 
he  returned  homewards.  On  the  11th 
of  June,  1864,  he  went  into  the  French 
harbor  of  Cherbourg.  In  her  pro- 
tracted wanderings,  the  Alabama  had 
captured  47  vessels,  of  which  45  were 
destroyed. 

At  that  time  the  U.  S.  steamer, 
Kearsarge,  Captain  John  A.  Winslow, 
was  lying  in  the  Dutch  port  of  Flush- 
ing. Of  the  presence  of  the 
Alabama  at  Cherbourg,  Winslow 
was  immediately  made  aAvare,  through 
the  American  Consul  at  that  port.  On 
the  14th,  the  Kearsarge  appeared  off 
Cherbourg.  On  the  day  following, 
Winslow  received  a note  from  Semmes, 
in  which  the  latter  requested 
him  not  to  depart,  as  it  was  his  15. 
intention  to  take  the  opportunity  offer- 
ed for  testing  the  merits  of  the  two 
ships.  Winslow,  perfectly  willing  to 
oblige,  remained.  In  proportion  and 
armaments,  the  vessels  were  about 
equal.  The  Alabama  was  about  220 
feet,  and  1150  tons;  she  carried  one 
7-inch  Blakely  rifle,  one  8-inch  smooth 
bore  68-pounder,  and  six  32-pounders. 
The  Kearsarge  was  2144  feet  long,  and 
1030  tons;  and  carried  two  11-inch 
Dahlgren  guns,  one  30-pounder  rifle, 
and  four  32-pounders.  The  Alabama 
had  about  140  officers  and  men.  The 
Kearsarge  had  22  officers  and  140  men. 
Winslow,  for  the  sake  of  protection. 


878 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  PRIVATEERS. 


hung  his  anchor  cable  over  the  midship 
section  of  his  vessel  on  either  side ; 
and  in  order  to  make  the  addition  less 
unsightly,  he  caused  the  chains  to  be 
boxed  over  with  inch  deal  boards. 
The  same  experiment  had  been  made  by 
Farragut,  when  moving  up  the  Missis- 
sippi, in  1862. 

On  Sunday  morning,  the  19th  of 
June  about  twenty  minutes  past 

19.  ten,  the  Alabama  was  seen  steam- 
ing out  of  Cherbourg,  accompanied  by 
the  French  iron-clad  Courronne,  and  fol- 
lowed by  the  steam  yacht  Deerhound, 
owned  by  an  Englishman,  of  the  name 
of  Lancaster.  Winslow,  on  seeing  the 
Alabama  approach,  steamed  out  to 
sea,  in  order  that  no  questions  should 
be  raised  as  to  the  line  of  jurisdiction. 
When  about  7 miles  out  from  the 
breakwater  at  Cherbourg,  the  Alabama 
being  about  a mile  behind,  Winslow 
wheeled  round  and  made  direct  for  his 
antagonist.  The  Alabama  opened  fire 
at  once ; and  loading  with  wonderful 
rapidity,  she  fired  a second  and  a third 
broadside,  without  receiving  any  re- 
sponse. The  Kearsarge  had  received 
no  harm  as  yet,  except  in  the  rigging ; 
but  Winslow,  being  now  within  900 
yards  of  his  antagonist,  and  fearing  the 
effects  of  another  broadside,  sheered 
his  vessel  and  opened  fire.  The  two 
vships  were  soon  broadside  to  broadside. 
Semmes,  however,  fought  shy.  It  was 
evident  that  he  did  not  seek  close 
action  ; and  Winslow,  fearing  that  in 
the  event  of  his  antagonist  being  sorely 
pressed  he  might  make  for  the  French 
shore,  attempted  to  run  under  the  stern 
of  the  Alabama.  The  effect  of  this 


movement,  on  the  part  of  the  Kear- 
sarge, was  to  force  the  Alabama,  with 
a full  head  of  steam,  into  a circular 
track.  The  Kearsarge  followed.  For 
an  hour  the  two  vessels  kept  moving 
in  a series  of  circles,  starboard  bearing 
upon  starboard,  both  firing  heavily  and 
drifting  with  the  tide  further  from  the 
shore.  i It  was  now  about  noon.  Tlie 
combat  had  lasted  an  hour.  The  ves- 
sels had  desciibed  seven  circles.  They 
were  thus  about  4 miles  further  from 
the  French  coast,  than  they  were  at 
the  commencement  of  the  action.  Tlie 
Alabama  was  already  at  the  mercy  of 
her  adversary.  The  firing  from  the 
Confederate  from  the  first  had  been 
rapid  and  wild.  The  firing  from  the 
Kearsarge  was  slow,  steady  and  deliber- 
ate. The  result  was  that  while  the  Keai* 
sarge  was  comparatively  uninjured,  tl^e 
Alabama  was  sorely  damaged,  ^he 
had  received  several  11-inch  shells. 
Of  these,  one  had  disabled  a gun,  kill- 
ing or  wounding  some  18  men ; and 
another  had  penetrated  the  coal  bunkei*, 
where  it  exploded,  and  blocked  up  the 
engine  room.  Her  sides  were  shattered, 
and  pierced  with  holes.  On  her  seventh 
rotation  in  the  circular  track,  the  Ala- 
bama winded,  setting  fore  try-sail  and 
two  jibs,  with  head  in  shore.  Her  port 
broadside  with  only  two  guns,  was  now 
presented  to  the  Kearsarge ; and  sl>e 
was  moving  slowly.  Winslow  was  now 
in  a position  to  use  grapeshot  witli 
effect.  A few  more  guns  were  fired  ; 
and  the  flag  of  the  Alabama  disap- 
peared. A white  flag  was  then  dis- 
played over  her  stern  ; and  Win- 
slow, respecting  the  signal  of  disti^ss, 


THE  ALABAMA  SUNK. 


879 


discontinued  filing.  Within  two  min- 
utes, the  Alabama  again  opened  fire  from 
her  two  guns  on  the  port  side.  The 
Kearsarge  quickly  responded  ; and  then 
steaming  ahead,  Winslow  placed  his 
vessel  risrht  across  the  bow  of  the  Ala- 

o 

bama,  and  was  about  to  open  a raking 
fire.  .The  white  flag,  however,  was 
still  floating ; and  Winslow  again  re- 
served his  fire.  Almost  immediately 
afterwards,  the  boats  of  the  Alabama 
were  lowered ; and  in  one  of  them 
came  an  officer  who  informed  Winslow 
that  the  Confederate  vessel  had  sur- 
rendered, and  that  she  was  fast  sinking. 

Twenty  minutes  after  the  surrender, 
the  Alabama  went  down  in  the  deep 
waters  of  The  English  Channel.  She 
went  down  stern  foremost,  her  bow 
rising  high  in  the  air,  and  her  main- 
mast breaking  off,  as  she  disappeared. 
Semmes  flung  his  sword  into  the  sea. 
He  and  his  officers,  and  some  of  the 
crew,  were  picked  up  by  the  Deerhound, 


and  carried  to  England.  Some  65  or 
70  men,  a number  of  them  wounded, 
were  rescued  by  the  boats  of  the  Kear 
sarge.  Several  others  were  got  on 
board  by  two  French  pilot  boats,  and 
taken  to  France.  Althouo-h  the  Ala- 

o 

bama  had  fired  some  370  shot  and 
shell,  the  Kearsarge  was  but  little 
injured  ; and  the  casualties  on  board 
amounted  to  only  3 wounded.  This 
great  naval  duel,  the  greatest  perhaps 
in  the  century,  was  witnessed  by  thous- 
ands of  people  on  the  French  shu]*e. 
Such  was  the  end  of  the  Alabama — a 
privateer  which,  during  her  career,  had 
captured  and  for  the  most  part  burned 
65  vessels,  which  had  destroyed  pro- 
perty estimated  at  $10,000,000,  and 
which,  more  than  any  ship  of  her  class, 
had  driven  American  commerce  from 
the  sea.  On  sea,  as  well  as  on  land, 
the  National  cause  was  now  gaining 
the  ascendency.  Time  was  working 
steadily  in  favor  of  the  right. 


880 


THE  MARCH  THROUGH  THE  CAROLINAS. 


CHAPTER  XLI. 


Sherman  still  at  Savannah — Ordered  to  Transport  his  Troops  to  the  James — Sherman  Presses  the  Marcn 
Overland — Correspondence  with  Grant — Earnest  Entreaties — Grant  Consents  to  the  Overland  March — 
Preparations — Foster  left  in  Command  of  Savannah — Howard’s  Troops  Embarked  for  Beaufort — Slocum 
Ordered  to  the  Coosawhatchie— Sherman  at  Hilton  Head — The  Floods — The  Troops  Detained — Slocum  at 
the  Salkahatchie — Blair  at  Orangeburg  Bridge — Sherman  Sets  Out  for  Columbia — Little  Congaree  Bridge 
— Shells  Flung  into  Columbia — The  Army  before  Columbia — Surrender  of  Columbia — The  City  in  Flames — 
Wade  Hampton’s  Orders — Charleston — The  City  Threatened — General  Hardee  in  Command — The  Place 
Evacuated- -Formal  Surrender  of  Charleston  and  all  the  Harbor  Defenses — Gillmore  Takes  Possession — 
A Grand  Demonstration — A Distinguished  Assemblage— General  Anderson  Restores  the  Old  Flag  to 
Fort  Sumter — Address  by  Henry  Ward  Beecher — Great  Rejoicing — Slocum  at  Rocky  Mount — Kilpatrick 
at  Lancaster — The  Catawba  Greatly  Swollen — On  to  Cheraw — Kilpatrick  Surprised — Almost  a Defeat — 
The  Confederates  Concentrating — Sherman  Sets  Out  from  Fayetteville — Pushing  on  to  Goldsboro — Hardee 
Attempts  to  Hinder  the  Advance — Pretence  of  Moving  on  Raleigh --Sherman  Resolves  to  Dislodge  Hardee 
— A Strong  Position — Severe  Fighting — A Dismal  Night — A Confederate  Retreat — The  Battle  of 
Averysboro — A National  Victory — The  Goldsboro  Road — Howard  at  Lee’s  Store — Sherman  Starts  for 
Goldsboro — Overtaken  by  the  Way — Bad  News — Compelled  to  Return — Slocum  in  Danger — The  Con- 
federates in  Force  under  Johnston — In  a Strong  Position — The  Confederate  Attack — The^  Battle  of 
Benton ville — Fearing’s  Brave  Brigade — The  Confederates  Surprised — Terrible  Fighting — The  Confederates 
Driven  Back — The  Day  Saved — Morgan’s  Division  Covered  with  Glory — A National  Victory — Arrival  of 
Howard  and  the  Right  Wing — Result  of  the  Three  Day’s  Fighting — A Great  National  Gain — Sherman’s 
Purpose — In  Communication  with  Schofield  and  Terry — Schofield’s  Advance  on  Goldsboro — The  Country 
Flooded — The  Confederates  in  Force  under  Bragg — The  March  to  Kinston — The  Importance  of  the  Rail- 
road— Jackson’s  Mills — Severe  Encounter  on  the  Trent  and  Upper  Trent  Roads — Bragg  Compelled  to  Retire 
across  the  Neuse— ^Schofield  at  Kinston — The  Three  Armies  United — The  Object  of  the  Campaign  Practi- 
cally Accomplished — The  Railroads  Repaired — Sherman  at  City  Point — He  Meets  Lincoln,  Grant  and  Porter 
— Lincoln’s  Conversation — “ Stop  this  Blood-shed  ” — The  Grand  Result  of  the  Campaign — Stoneman’s  Raid 
— His  Instructions — Collecting  his  Troops — A Demonstration  in  the  direction  of  Bristol — Movement  Across 
Stone  Mountain — Stoneman  at  Boone — At  Wilkesboro — Crossing  the  Yadkin  River — On  Cranberry  Plain 
— At  Jacksonville — General  Destruction  of  the  Railroads — No  Rest  for  the  Troopers — Stoneman  on  the  North 
Carolina  Railroad,  between  Danville  and  Greensboro— Burning  the  Factories  at  Salem — On  the  Road  to 
Salisbury — Encounter  with  Pemberton — The  Confederates  Defeated — Fearful  destruction  of  Property — 
Motherwell  on  the  Catawba  River — Burning  of  the  Railroad  Bridge  — The  End  of  a most  Destructive  Raid, 


From  the  moment  that  General  Sher- 
man  had  demonstrated  the  hol- 
* lowness  of  the  Confederacy,  by 
his  almost  unopposed  march  to  the 
sea,  General  Grant,  impatient  of 
delay  and  determined  to  force  matters 
to  a final  issue,  was  anxious  that  his 
lieutenant  should  return  northward, 
and  bring  his  army  into  conjunction 
with  the  army  of  the  Potomac  and  the 
army  of  the  James,  then  confronting 


General  Lee  at  Petersburg  and  Rich- 
mond. 

The  question  was,  how  was  this 
transfer  of  so  large  an  army  to  be  ac- 
complished ? There  were  two  modes 
which  at  once  suggested  themselves. 
The  army  could  be  transferred  by  sea 
It  could  also  be  transferi*ed  by  a land 
march  through  the  Carolinas.  Both 
modes  of  transfer  would  be  attended 
with  difficulty!  It  was  mid- winter. 


THE  MARCH  COMMENCED. 


8<S1 


There  were  many  and  serious  objections* 
to  conveying  so  many  thousands  of 
men,  with  all  the  appurtenances  of  war, 
on  board  transports,  along  such  a coast, 
at  such  a season  There  were  also 
many  and  serious  objections  to  the 
march  overland.  Of  the  two  modes, 
Sherman  very  wisely  concluded  in  favor 
of  the  transfer  by  land.  Grant,  how- 
ever, had  ordered  that  the  army  should 
be  carried  to  Virginia  by  sea.  Sher- 
man prepared  to  obey.  It  was  with 
the  utmost  reluctance,  however,  that 
he  was  taking  such  a course.  I have 
now  completed  my  first  step  ” he  writes 
to  Grant.  “ I should  like  to  go  to  you 
by  way  of  Columbia  and  Raleigh,  but 
will  prepare  to  embark  as  soon  as  ves- 
sels come.  You  know  well  how  much 
better  troops  arrive  by  a land  march 
than  when  carried  by  transports.”  Still 
later,  when  the  movement  had  actually 
commenced,  and  when  he  was  about  to 
embark  his  troops,  he  wrote  from  Poc- 
otaligo  to  Grant.  know,”  he  says, 
J^that  this  march  is  necessary  to  the 
war.  It  must  be  made  sooner  or  later, 
and  I am  in  the  proper  position  for  it. 
I ask  no  reinforcements,  but  simply 
wish  the  utmost  activity  at  all  other 
points,  so  that  the  enemy  may  not 
concentrate  too  powerfully  against  me. 
I expect  Davis  will  move  heaven  and 
earth  to  resist  me,  for  the  success  of  my 
army  is  fatal  to  his  dream  of  empire. 
Richmond  is  not  more  vital  to  his 
cause  than  is  Columbia.  ” Grant 
yielded.  I am  gratified,”  writes 
Sherman  in  reply,  that  you  have 
modified  your  former  ^ orders,  as  I 
feared  the  transportation  by  sea  would 


very  much  disturb  the  unity  and  mor- 
ale of  my  army,  now  so  perfect.” 

In  refitting  the  army,  which  was 
about  60,000  strong,  in  regulating  the 
local  government,  and  in  making  the 
proper  disposition  of  the  captured  cot- 
ton and  other  property,  Sherman  con- 
sumed nearly  a month.  During  that 
time  he  had  a visit  from  Secretary 
Stanton.  Grant  sent  Grover’s  division 
of  the  Nineteenth  corps  to  garrison  the 
forts;  and  on  the  18th  of  Janu- 
ary  Sherman  transferred  these  18. 
and  the  city  itself  to  General  Foster. 
Foster  was,  at  the  same  time,  instructed 
to  follow  the  movements  of  the  army 
inland  by  occupying,  in  succession,  the 
city  of  Charleston  and  such  other 
points  northward  along  the  coast  as 
were  of  any  strategic  value.  Sherman 
had  already  made  up  his  mind  to  make 
Goldsboro  the  point  from  which  he 
would  re-open  communications  with 
the  seaboard ; and  he  had  given  orders 
to  Colonel  Wright,  superintendent  of 
military  railroads,  to  proceed  in  ad- 
vance to  New  Berne,  and  extend  the 
railroad  from  that  point  to  Goldsboro — 
a distance  of  about  45  miles — by  the 
15th  of  March.  Schofield,  as  has  been 
mentioned  in  a previous  chapter,  was 
directed  to  move  with  the  Twenty- 
Third  corps,  from  New  Berne  and 
Wilmington  upon  Goldsboro,  so  as  to 
be  there  if  possible  on  the  arrival  of 
Sherman. 

Before  commencing  the  march.  How- 
ard  was  directed  to  embark  his  com- 
mand and  proceed  by  sea  to  Beaufort, 
South  Carolina^  and  from  that  point 
to  send  a force  to  make  a lodgment  on 


882 


THE  MAKCH  THROUGH  THE  OAROLINAS. 


the  Charleston  Eailroad  at  or  near 
Pocotaligo.  This  was  effected  on  the 
15th  of  January  by  the  Seventeenth 
corps  under  Blair;  and  a depot  of  sup- 
j)lies  was  established  near  the  mouth 
of  Pocotaligo  Creek,  having  easy  water 
communication  with  Plilton  Head. 
Slocum  with  the  left  wing  of  the 
army,  and  Kilpatrick  with  the  cavalry, 
Avere  ordered  to  rendezvous  about  the 
same  time  near  Roberts ville  and  Coos- 
awhatchie,  in  South  Carolina,  with  a 
depot  of  supplies  at  Pureysburg  or 
State’s  Ferry  on  the  Savannah  River. 
Slocum,  accordingly,  had  a pontoon 
bridge  laid  over  the  river  opposite 
Savannah.  He  also  repaired  and  cor- 
duroyed the  Union  Causeway,  which 
traverses  the  rice-fields  northward  from 
tlie  city.  Heavy  rains,  however, 
swelled  the  river  and  overflowed  all 
the  adjacent  low  grounds,  covering  the 
causeway  with  water  4 feet  deep  and 
breaking  the  pontoon  bridge.  Com- 
l^elled  to  seek  a crossing  higher  up 
the  river,  he  moved  to  Sister’s  Ferry; 
but  as  the  bottom-lands  were  over- 
flowed there  also,  he  was  again  de- 
tained. 

On  the  2 2d  of  January,  Sherman 
went  to  Hilton  Head,  where  he  had  a 
conference  with  Admiral  Dahlgren 
and  General  Foster.  He  then  pro- 
ceeded to  Beaufort,  and  on  the  24th  to 
to  Pocotaligo,  where  the  Seventeenth 
corps,  under  Blair,  was  encamped. 
The  Fifteenth  corps  had  not  yet  con- 
centrated, Wood’s  and  Hazen’s  divis- 
ions only  being  at  Beaufort.  J.  E. 
Smith’s  division  was  marchino^  from 
Savannah  to  join  them  by  the  coast 


•road;  and  that  of  Corse  was  detained 
by  storms  and  the  floods.  On  the 
following  day,  and  in  order  to 
strengthen  the  conviction  on  the  25. 
part  of  the  enemy  that  Charleston  was 
to  be  the  objective  of  Sherman’s  move- 
ments, a demonstration  w^as  made 
against  the  Combahee  Ferry  and  the 
railroad  bridge  across  the  Salkahatchie. 
Feigned  movements  were  made,  as  if 
it  was  intended  to  cross.  No  real 
movement,  however,  was  made  until 
the  waters  abated. 

By  the  29th,  the  floods  had  retired 
from  the  roads  west  of  Savannah  suflS- 
ciently  to  permit  Slocum  ’ to  put  the 
left  wing  in  motion,  at  Sister’s  Ferry. 
A gun-boat,  sent  thither  by  Dahlgren, 
covered  the  troops  while  crossing. 
Three  divisions  of  the  Fifteenth  corps 
also  had  closed  up  at  Pocotaligo ; and 
the  right  wing  being  ready  to  start, 
Howard  was  directed  to  move  the 
Seventeenth  corps  along  the  Salkahat- 
chie as  far  as  River’s  Bridge,  and  the 
Fifteenth  by  Hickory  Hill,  Loper’^ 
Cross-Roads,  Anglesey  Post  OiSce,  and 
Beaufort’s  Bridge.  Hatch’s  division 
was  directed  to  continue  the  feints  at 
the  railroad  bridge  and  the  ferry,  till 
Sherman’s  movement  should  turn  the 
enemy’s  position  and  compel  him  to 
fall  back  behind  the  Edisto.  The 
march  of  the  Seventeenth  and  Fifteenth 
corps  began  on  the  1st  of  Febru- 
ary ; and  though  all  the  roads  1 • 
leading  north  were  obstructed  by  felled 
trees,  the  pioneer  battalions  cleared  the 
path  of  the  army  so  rapidly,  that,  on 
tlie  2d,  the  Fifteenth  corps  reached 
Loper’s  Cross-Roads,  and  the  Seven 


ORANGEBURG, 


883 


teenth,  River’s  Bridge.  Slocum  was 
still  hindered  by  the  floods  at  Sister’s 
Ferry ; but  he  had  managed  to  push  to 
the  east  bank  two  divisions  of  the 
Twentieth  corps  under  Williams,  with 
Kilpatrick’s  cavalry.  Kilpatrick  was 
ordered  to  Blackville  by  way  of  Barn- 
^vell.  Williams  was  ordered  to  Beau- 
fort’s Bridsfe.  Slocum  was  directed  to 
get  the  remainder  of  his  command  over 
a.s  rapidly  as  possible,  and  join  the 
right  wing,  on  the  South  Carolina 
Railroad.  The  right  wing  was  ordered 
to  cross  the  Salkahatchie — which  was 
still  held  by  the  enemy  in  force,  with 
infantry  and  artillery  intrenched  at 
River’s  and  Beaufort’s  Bridges — and  to 
push  on  to  the  South  Carolina  Rail- 
road  at  or  near  Midway.  River’s 
Bridge  was  carried,  on  the  3d  of 
February,  by  two  divisions  of  the 
Seventeenth  corps,  those  of  Mower  and 
G.  A.  Smith.  Mower  and  Smith  led 
their  troops  in  person,  wading  the 
swamp,  which  was  nearly  3 miles  wide. 
A lodgment  was  effected  below  the 
bridge  ; and  the  brigade  which  guarded 
it  was  driven  towards  Branchville. 

The  line  across  the  Salkahatchie  was 
thus  broken  ; the  enemy  retreated  at 
once  beyond  the  Edisto  at  Branchville. 
Sherman’s  army  moved  rapidly  to  the 
South  Carolina  Railroad,  at  Midway, 
Bamberg,  and  Graham’s  Station.  The 
track  of  the  railroad  was  then  torn  up 
all  the  way  from  the  Edisto  as  far 
west  as  Blackville.  To  this  point 
Kilpatrick  had,  in  the  mean  time, 
brought  up  his  cavalry.  Ordered  to 
proceed  towards  Aiken  and  threaten 
Augusta,  he  skirmished  heavily  with 


Wheeler’s  cavalr}"  at  Blackville,  Willis- 
ton,  and  Aiken.  The  destruction  of 
the  railroad  was  continued  as  far  as 
Windsor,  20  miles  east  of  Augusta. 
By  the  11th,  the  entire  army  was  on 
the  railroad  from  Midway  to  Johnson’s 
Station,  thus  dividing  the  enemy’s 
forces,  which  lay  westward  at  Aiken 
and  Augusta  and  eastward,  at  Branch- 
ville and  Charleston.  A movement  on 
Orangeburg  was  commenced,  the  Seven- 
teenth corps  crossing  the  South  Fork 
of  the  Edisto  at  Binnaker’s  Bridge,  and 
moving  straight  on  that  place,  the 
Fifteenth  crossing  at  Holman’s  Bridge 
and  moving  to  Poplar  Springs,  in  sup- 
port. On  the  12th,  the  Seventeenth 
corps  finding  the  Confederates  in- 
trenched in  front  of  the  Orangeburg 
Bridge,  carried  their  position  at  a dash, 
compelling  them  to  retire,  beyond  the 
bridge,  to  the  protection  of  a battery 
which  was  covered  by  a rampart  of 
cotton  and  earth.  Blair  keeping  G.  A. 
Smith’s  division  near  the  bridge,  sent 
the  other  two  divisions  to  a point,  two 
miles  below,  where  Force’s  division, 
crossing  by  a pontoon  bridge,  and  mov- 
ing rapidly  up  to  the  position  held  by 
the  Confederates,  compelled  them  to 
retreat.  Smith  immediately  pushed 
over  the  bridge  and  took  possession  of 
the  enemy’s  abandoned  battery.  The 
bridge,  which  had  been  partially  burned, 
was  then  repaired ; and  the  whole 
corps  was  in  Orangeburg  by  four  ^ 
o’clock  in  the  afternoon,  and,  at 
work,  tearing  up  the  railroad.  By  the 
14th,  Blair  had  destroyed  the  track,  as 
far  northward  as  Lewisville,  and  driven 
the  Confederates  across  the  Congaree 


884 


THE  MARCH  THROUGH  THE  CAROLINAS. 


As  they  retired,  they  burned  the  bridges 
in  their  rear. 

Sherman,  without  making  demon- 
strations on  Branchville  or  Charleston, 
which  his  movements  had  already  made 
untenable,  set  all  his  columns  in  march 
for  Columbia,  the  Seventeenth  corps 
following  the  State  road  ; the  Fifteenth 
crossing  the  North  Edisto  from  Pop- 
lar Springs,  at  Schilling’s  Bridge,  and 
taking  a country  road  which  enters 
the  State  road  at  Zeigler’s.  On  the 
15th,  this  corps  found  the  enemy 
strongly  posted  at  the  Little  Congaree 
Bridge,  having  a tke-de-pont  on  the 
south  side,  and  on  the  north  side  a well- 
constructed  fort,  the  artillery  of  which 
commanded  the  bridge.  The  ground 
in  front  was  level  and  open.  It  was 
covered  with  a fresh  deposit  of  mud, 
from  which  the  water  of  a freshet  had 
only  just  retired.  General  Wood,  how- 
ever, by  sending  a brigade  through  a 
cypress  swamp  to  the  left,  succeeded  in 
turning  the  flank  of  the  tete-de-pont ; and, 
promptly  following  up  his  advantage, 
he  got  possession  also  of  the  bridge  and 
fort.  Some  delay  was  occasioned  in 
repairing  the  bridge,  which  had  been 
partially  burnt,  so  that  the  column  did 
not  arrive  at  the  Congaree,  opposite 
Columbia,  till  the  following  morning. 
By  that  time  the  enemy  had  burnt  the 
fine  bridge  at  that  point. 

The  inhabitants  could  now  be  easily 
seen  running  about  the  streets ; and 
small  bodies  of  cavalry  occasionally 
showed  themselves.^  Against  these  was 
directed,  for  some  time,  the  fire  of  one 
gun;  but,  subsequently,  it  was  turned 
by  order  of  Sherman  against  the  walls 


of  the  unfinished  State  House.  A few 
shells  were  also  thrown  at  the  railroad 
depot  to  scatter  the  crowds  who  were 
carrying  off  sacks  of  corn  and  meal. 
Of  course  no  white  flag  was  visible,  or 
any  sign  of  a disposition  to  surrender. 
Slocum  came  up  with  the  left  wing 
within  an  hour  after  the  arrival  of 
Howardjs  column;  and  the  latter  was 
directed  to  cross  the  Saluda  Biver 
about  3 miles  above  the  city,  to  pro- 
ceed thence  across  the  Broad  Biver, 
and  to  approach  the  city  from  the 
north.  Slocum  was  directed  to  cross 
the  Saluda  at  Zion  Church,  to  proceed 
thence  northward  towards  Winnsboro 
and  to  break  up  the  railroad  and 
bridges  in  the  vicinity  of  Alston.  On 
the  night  of  the  16th,  Howard  had 
thrown  a flying  bridge  across  the  Broad 
Biver  about  3 miles  above  the  city.  By 
this  means  he  got  one  brigade  over. 
In  the  morning  a pontoon  bridge 
was  laid,  and  preparations  were  made 
for  an  advance  upon  the  city. 

Meanwhile  the  mayor  had  appeared 
and  made  a formal  surrender  to  Yeh. 
Colonel  Stone,  of  the  Twenty-  17. 
Fifth  Iowa,  at  the  Saluda  Bridge.  A 
small  party,  from  the  Seventeenth  corps, 
had  also  crossed  the  Congaree,  in  a 
skiff,  and  entered  the  city,  from  the 
west.  Stone’s  brigade  was  then  posted 
in  the  streets  of  the  city ; and,  for  some 
time,  good  order  prevailed.  Subse- 
quently, however,  half  drunken  sol- 
diers and  released  prisoners,  enter- 
ed stores  and  private  dwellings,  and 
helped  themselves  to  any  valuables 
they  could  find,  robbing  ladies  and 
gentlemen  of  their  watches  and  jewelry, 


MAP  SHOWlNa  THE  ROUTE  OF  SHERMAN’S  ARMY  THROUGH  SOUTH  CAROUNA. 


I 


$ 


FALL  OF  CHARLESTON. 


8S5 


in^  the  streets,  and  committing  vari- 
ous other  crimes  when  not  immedi- 
ately under  the  eyes  of  their  officers. 
Orders  were  given  for  the  destruction 
of  all  arsenals  and  such  other  public 
property  as  could  not  be  made  use  of 
by  the  army,  as  well  as  all  railroads, 
depots,  and  machinery  that  might  be 
subsequent! 3^  made  available  to  the 
enemy.  They  were  to  spare  private 
dwellings,  as  well  as  schools,  colleges, 
and  such  institutions.  The  Fifteenth 
corps  passed  through  the  city  in  the 
course  of  the  day,  marching  out  by 
the  Camden  road.  The  Seventeenth 
cor];)s  did  not  enter  the  city  at  all ; and 
the  left  wins:  halted  about  2 miles 
distant. 

General  Wade  Hampton,  who  was 
in  command  of  the  Confederate  rear- 
guard of  cavalry,  had,  before  leaving 
the  city,  ordered  that  all  cotton, 
whether  belon2:inD:  to  the  Confederate 
government  or  to  individuals,  should 
be  collected  in  the  streets  and  burned. 
The  bales  were  cut  open ; and  the  loose 
cotton,  scattered  and  blown  about  by 
a high  wind,  which  prevailed  at  the 
time,  lodged  in  trees,  on  the  roofs  of 
houses,  and  on  piazzas  and  verandahs, 
thus  offering  great  temptation  to  the 
floatino^  fire  which  filled  the  air.  Some 
of  the  great  heaps  of  cotton  were  still 
burning  when  the  National  troops  took 
possession.  The  flames,  however,  were 
soon  extinguished  by  the  exertions  of 
the  soldiers.  Sherman’s  instructions 
had  not  yet  been  put  in  execution, 
when  the  smouldering  heaps  of  cotton, 
fanned  by  the  wind,  broke  out  again 
into  flames,  which  were  communicated 


to  some  of  the  adjacent  buildings. 
About  dark,  the  conflagration  spread  to 
such  an  extent,  as  to  be  altogether  be- 
yond the  control  of  the  single  brigade 
stationed  in  the  city;  and  Wood’s 
whole  division  was  ordered  in,  to 
check  the  progress  of  the  flames.  B}' 
midnight,  the  fire  became  quite  unman- 
ao^eable.  Drunken  soldiers  had  cut  the 
hose  ; and,  in  some  instances,  they  went 
round  with  torches,  deliberately  setting 
fire  to  building’s  which  would  otherwise 

o 

have  escaped.  In  spite  of  the  exertions 
of  Sherman,  who  was  up  nearl}^  all 
night,  and  of  Generals  Howard,  Logan, 
and  Wood,  the  fire  was  not  got  under 
control  until  about  four  o’clock  in  tlie 
morning,  b}"  which  time  the  whole  of 
the  business  portion  of  the  city  was  in 
ruins.  The  arsenals,  railroad  depots, 
machine  shops,  and  other  public  prop- 
erty, were  destroyed  on  the  18th  and 
19th,  as  well  as  the  railroad  track  as 
far  as  Kingsville  and  the  Wateree 
Bridge,  and  also  towards  Winnsboro. 

Columbia,  the  political  capital  of 
South  Carolina,  fell  on  the  17th  of 
February.  On  the  following  day  fell 
Charleston,  the  commercial  capital.  The 
destruction  of  the  inland  routes  of 
travel  and  supply,  by  the  army  of  Gen- 
eral Sherman  on  its  march  through  the 
Carolinas,  made  the  whole  sea-coast 
northward,  from  Savannah  to  New 
Berne  absolutely  worthless  and  even 
untenable.  The  National  fleet  occu- 
pied the  entrance  to  Charleston  harbor. 
Morris  Island  was  also  held ; an  ar- 
tillery fire  was,  at  intervals,  directed 
against  Fort  Sumter  and  the  city  itself ; 
but  the  capture  of  either  had  proved 


304 


886 


THE  MARCH  THROUGH  THE  CAROLIHAS. 


to  be  a task  of  extreme  difficulty,  and 
in  fact  impossible  by  tbe  navy,  without 
the  aid  of  a large  co-operating  land 
force.  The  strategic  value  of  Charles- 
ton was  not,  however,  so  great  as  to 
warrant  the  sending  against  it  an  expe- 
dition of  the  ma2!:nitude  which  would 
have  been  necessary  for  its  reduction. 
Tlie  closing  of  the  harbor,  by  a block- 
ading fleet,  effected  nearly  all  that 
would  have  been  accomplished  by  the 
actual  occupation  of  the  city.  This 
had  been  secured  by  the  presence  of 
Admiral  Dahlgren’s  fleet  of  iron-clads. 

Some  thought  was  entertained,  early 
ill  the  summer  of  1864,  of  attacking 
Fort  Sumter  and  attempting  the  pas- 
sage with  monitors ; but  the  idea  was 
finally  abandoned.  It  was  not  until 
the  8th  of  February,  1865,  when 
8.  Gillmore  succeeded  Foster  in 
command  of  the  Department  of  the 
South,  that  active  measures  were  taken 
to  reduce  the  city. 

General  Hardee  was  at  that  time  in 
command,  in  Charleston,  with  a force 
of  about  15,000  men,  comprising  the 
regular  garrison  and  troops  with  which 
he  had  reti^eated  from  Savannah.  On 
the  10th,  operations  were  commenced 
by  the  construction  of  a bridge  across 
the  creek  separating  Folly  and  Cole’s 
islands  from  James  Island  ; and  a force 
under  General  Schimmelpfenig,  3000 
strong,  effected  a lodgment  on  the 
latter  about  3 miles  southwest  of 
Charleston.  Skirmishers,  who  were 
thrown  forward,  encountered  the  en- 
emy at  Grimball’s,  on  Stono  River.  A 
mortar  schooner  and  two  tin-clads  also 
moved  up  the  Stono  River  and  shelled 


the  enemy,  and  at  the  same  time  cov- 
ered the  flank  of  the  National  troops. 
About  half-past  four.  General  Hartwell 
moved  his  whole  brigade  forward  in 
columns,  doubled  on  the  centre,  and 
carried  the  enemy’s  rifle-pits  at  the 
double-quick.  The  contest  was  brief, 
as  the  Confederates  retreated  rapidly  U- 
their  main  works,  abandoning  their 
dead  and  wounded,  and  losing  about 
20  prisonei-s.  The  National  loss  was 
about  80.  As  this  movement  was  only 
a feint,  the  troops  of  General  Schim- 
melpfenig were  soon  afterwards  with- 
drawn. On  the  12th  and  13th,  demon- 
strations were  made-,  by  a force  under 
General  Potter,  along  the  approaches 
from  Bull’s  Bay  towards  Mount  Pleas- 
ant, with  the  view  of  threatening 
Charleston  from  the  north.  General 
Hatch’s  column,  moving  northward 
from  Pocotaligo,  threatened  Charleston 
from  the  south.  Hardee  soon  became 
aware  that  his  hold  on  the  city  was  very 
precarious.  His  railroad  communica- 
tion with  Branchville,  as  well  as  with 
Savannah,  was  destroyed.  The  rail- 
road running  northward  to  Florence, 
the  only  remaining  one,  was  in  danger. 
A prolonged  defense  of  the  city  could 
only  end  in  his  being  encircled  by 
National  forces,  and  compelled  to  sur- 
render his  whole  army.  If  he  could 
effect  a Junction  with  Johnston,  he 
might  yet  render  important  service  to 
the  Confederacy.  About  midnight  of 
the  17th,  therefore,  as  the  last  of 
the  Confederate  troops  were  leav-  1 7 . 
ing,  they  fired  the  upper  part  of  the 
city,  where  were  the  railroad  buildings 
containing  several  thousand  bales  of 


THE  OLD  FLAG  ON  FORT  SUMTER. 


887 


c.otton.  In  these  buildings  were  stored, 
in  addition  to  the  cotton,  a large  quan- 
tity of  rice,  and  200  kegs  of  gunpowder. 
About  half-past  three  in  the  morning 
a terrific  explosion  took  place,  killing 
about  150  people,  and  mutilating  about 
200,  among  whom  were  women  and 
children,  who  were  carrying  off  the  rice. 
At  daylight,  several  rams  in  the  inner 
liarbor,  near  the  city,  were  blown  up. 
The  mayor,  soon  afterward,  sent  a note 
to  Gillmore,  stating  that  the  Confeder- 
ate military  authorities  had  withdrawn  ; 
and  at  nine  o’clock  on  the  morning  of 
the  18th,  the  city  of  Charleston, 
with  Forts  Sumter  and  Moultrie, 
Castle  Pinckney,  and  all  the  defensive 
^vorks,  were  formally  surrendered, 
f jillmore’s  troops  were  promptly  moved 
up  to  the  city ; and  the  National  flag 
was  restored  to  the  parapet  of  Fort 
Sumter  amid  the  deafening  cheers  of 
the  troops. 

The  soldiers  were,  immediately,  set 
to  work  to  check  the  progress  of  the 
flames,  in  the  upper  part  of  the  city. 
The  fire,  however,  had  already  got  such 
headway  that  the  cotton  warehouses, 
arsenals,  quarter  - masters’  stores,  the 
railroad  bridges,  some  vessels  in  the 
ship -yards,  and-  a large  number  of 
dwellings  were  destroyed  before  this 
could  be  effected.  The  lower  part  of 
the  city,  within  range  of  the  fire  of  the 
fieet,  had  suffered  much  from  shot  and 
sliell,  in  the  course  of  the  protracted 
siege,  and  had  long  been  in  a ruinous 
condition.  The  wealthy  residents  had 
deserted  the  city;  and  the  population, 
now  reduced  to  about  10,000,  mostly 
negroes  and  poor  whites,  had  no  means 


of  escape.  “ Any  one,”  said  Sherman, 
^^who  is  not  satisfied  with  war  should 
go  and  see  Charleston,  and  he  will 
pray,  louder  and  deeper  than  ever, 
that  the  countiy  may  in  the  long 
future  be  spared  any  more  wai*.”  Sev- 
eral hundred  deserters  from  Hardee’s 
army,  who  had  concealed  tliemselves  in 
houses,  while  th^  evacuation  was  going 
on,  surrendered  when  Gillmore’s  troops 
entered  the  city.  Among  the  captures 
were  450  cannon,  found  in  the  forts 
and  other  defenses,  8 locomotives,  and 
a large  number  of  passenger  and  plat- 
form cars,  all  in  good  condition. 

The  memorable  siege  of  Chai*leston 
commenced  actually,  on  the  10th  of  July, 
1863,  when  Gillmore  landed  on  Morris 
Island.  The  city  had . been  under  fire 
542  days  ; and  the  surrender  took  place 
on  the  fourth  anniversary  of  the  inaug- 
uration of  Jefferson  Davis,  as  president 
of  the  Southern  Confederacy.  The 
moral  effect  of  the  fall  of  Cliarleston 
was  very  great,  not  only  in  the  North 
and  in  the  South,  but  in  Europe  also. 

The  circumstances  of  the  surrender 
of  Fort  Sumter,  by  General  Anderson, 
had  produced  an  impression  on  the 
public  mind  too  deep  to  be  readily 
erased ; and  President  Lincoln,  desirous 
to  commemorate  its  restoration,  made 
arrangements  for  a celebration  wortliy 
of  the  occasion.  The  ^ old  flag  was 
restored,  with  great  pomp  and  solem- 
nity, on  the  14th  of  April.  A large 
number  of  citizens,  on  board  the 
steamer  Oceanicus,  arrived  from  New 
York  to  take  part  in  the  ceremonies. 
Colonel  S.  L.  Woodford  took  gen- 
eral charge  of  the  day’s  proceedings 


888 


THE  MARCH  THROUGH  THE  CAROLINAS. 


Gathered  around  the  flag-staff,  the  entire 
company,  led  by  W.  B.  Bradbury,  sang 
his  song,  Victory  at  Last.”  This  was 
followed  by  Bally  round  the  Flag.” 
Prayer  was  offered  by  the  Bev.  Mat- 
thew Harris,  chaplain  of  the  United 
States  Army.  Selections  from  the 
Boole  of  Psalms  were  read  by  Dr.  B. 
S.  Storrs,  of  Brooklyn.  General  Town- 
send, Assistant  Adjutant-General,  read 
Major  Anderson’s  despatch  of  April 
18th,  1861.  This  done,  Anderson’s 
faithful  servant.  Sergeant  Hart,  ap- 
peared with  a new  mail-bag  containing 
the  identical  flao;  which  had  been  taken 
down  on  the  day  of  surrender,  four 
years  before.  The  precious  relic,  now 
a memorial  of  victory  as  well  as  of 
defeat,  was  attached  to  the  halyards. 
Anderson  then  delivered  a brief  but 
touching  address,  after  which,  he 
hoisted  the  old  banner  to  the  peak  of 
the  flag -staff,  amid  heaven -rending 
cheers,  the  whole  multitude  then 
breaking  forth  into  singing  “The  Star- 
Spangled  Banner.”  As  soon  as  the 
singing  was  over,  deafening  peals  were 
thundered  forth  from  four  guns  on  the 
fort.  These  were  responded  to  by  all 
the  batteries  which  had  taken  part  in 
the  bombardment,  in  1861.  The  pro- 
ceedings were  concluded  by  an  address 
from  the  Bev.  Henry  Ward  Beecher, 
an  address  which,  for  power,  pathos, 
grandeur  of  thought  and  all  the  other 
elements  of  first-class  oratory,  has  sel- 
dom been  equalled,  rarely  surpassed. 
Feb.  On  the  23d  of  February, 
Georgetown,  on  the  South  Caro- 
lina coast,  about  50  miles  northeast 
of  Charleston,  was  evacuated  by  the 


Confederate  forces.  On  the  25  th. 
Admiral  Dahlgren  entered  and  took 
possession. 

In  the  mean  time.  General  Slocum, 
with  the  left  wing  and  the  cavalry,  had 
crossed  the  Saluda  and  Broad  rivers, 
breaking  up  the  railroad  near  Alston, 
and  as  far  as  the  bridge  over  the  Broad 
Biver,  ou  the  Spartanburg  road.  The 
main  body  moved  towards  Winnsboro, 
where  it  arrived  on  the  21st  of  Feb- 
ruary. Destroying  the  railroad,  as  far 
as  Blackstakes  Depot,  Slocum  then 
turned  towards  Bocky  Mount,  on  the 
Catawba.  He  arrived  there,  with  the 
Twentieth  corps,  on  the  22d,and  having 
laid  a pontoon  bridge,  crossed  the  next 
day.  Kilpatrick’s  cavalry  crossed  over, 
the  same  night,  during  a heavy  rain,  and 
pushed  on  to  Lancaster,  whither  Beaure- 
gard had  retired  with  the  Confederate 
cavalry.  Heavy  rains  prevailed  from 
the  20th  to  the  26th,  making  the  roads 
almost  impassable  and  swelling  the 
rivers.  The  Catawba  became  so  swollen 
that  the  pontoon  bridge  gave  way  be- 
fore the  Fourteenth  coiq)s  had  effected 
a crossing  ; and  much  difficulty  was  ex- 
perienced in  the  work  of  reconstruc- 
tion. When  General  Davis  got  his 
command  over,  the  whole  left  winej  was 
put  in  motion  for  Cheraw. 

The  right  wing  had  crossed  the 
Catawba  before  the  heavy  rains  set  in, 
and  pushed  on  for  Cheraw.  Detach- 
ments were  sent,  from  the  Fifteenth 
corps  to  Camden,  to  burn  the  bridge 
over  the  Wateree,  as  well  as  the  railroad 
depot  and  public  stores.  At  Lynch’s 
Creek  the  right  wing  was  delayed  by 
the  badness  of  the  roads,  just  as  the 


FAYETTEVILLE. 


889 


left  wing:  had  been  at  the  Catawba. 

o 

The  leadiner  division  of  the  Twentieth 

o 

corps  entered  Chestei’field  on  the  2d  of 
March,  skirmishing  with  Butler’s  cav- 
airy  ; and  about  noon,  on  the  3d, 
3.  the  Seventeenth  corps  entered 
Cheraw,  the  Confederates  falling  back 
iicross  the  Pedee  and  burning  the  bridge 
after  them.  A large  amount  of  ammu- 
nition and  nunaerous  pieces  of  artillery 
were  destroyed  at  Cheraw,  as  were  also 
the  railroad  bridges  and  trestles,  as  far 
as  Darlington.  Without  delay,  the  col- 
umns were  put  in  motion  in  the  direction 
of  Fayetteville,  North  Carolina,  the 
1‘ight  wing  crossing  the  Pedee  at 
Cheraw,  the  left  wing  and  the  cavalry 
at  Sneedsboro,  Kilpatrick’s  cavalry, 
keeping  well  on  the  left  flank.  In 
spite  of  the  unfavorable  weather  and 
the  wretched  roads,  the  Fourteenth  and 
Seventeenth  corps,  on  the  11th  of 
March,  reached  Fayetteville,  on  the 
Cape  Fear  Biver.  There  they  had  a 
sharp  skirmish  with  Wade  Hampton’s 
cavalry,  the  rear-guard  of  Hardee’s  re- 
treating army,  which,  after  crossing  the 
river,  burnt  the  bridge.  On  the  morn- 
Mar.  ^ March,  at  day- 

10,  light,  Kilpatrick,  who  was  on  the 
left,  and  exposed,  was  suddenly  at- 
tacked by  Hampton  and  his  cavalry. 
Hampton  gained  possession  of  the 
camp  of  Spencer’s  brigade,  and  the 
house  in  which  Kilpatrick  and  Spencer 
had  their  quarters.  Kilpatrick,  who 
Av^as  asleep  at  the  time,  escaped,  with 
oidy  pantaloons  and  slippers;  but  suc- 
ceeding in  rallying  his  men,  on  foot,  in 
a neighboring  swamp,  he  attacked  the 
enemy  so  vigorously,  that  he  res:ained 


his  camp,  horses,  and  artillery.  The 
Confederates  rapidly  made  off,  taking 
with  them  a few  prisoners,  but  aban- 
doning their  dead.  The  army  remained 
during  the  12th,  13th,  and  14th  at 
Fayetteville.  The  buildings  of  what 
was  called  the  Arsenal  of  Construction, 
which  covered  50  acres  of  ground, 
and  which  contained  a vast  amount  of 
machinery,  brought  from  Harper’s 
Ferry,  were  destroyed.  All  the  build- 
ings were  burnt,  and  the  machinery 
destroyed,  under  the  supervision  of 
Colonel  Poe,  the  chief  engineer  of  the 
army. 

Up  to  this  time,  Sherman  had  suc- 
ceeded in  keeping  his  army  between 
the  divided  and  scattered  portions  of 
the  enemy’s  forces.  The  latter,  how- 
ever, were  now  concentrating  on  Sher- 
man’s left  flank.  The  troops,  with 
which  Beauregard  left  Columbia,  had 
been  reinforced  by  Cheatham’s  corps 
from  Hood’s  broken  army,  and  by  the 
garrison  of  Augusta.  Hardee  also  had 
got  across  the  Cape  Fear  Kiver;  and 
he  would  soon  be  able  to  join  the 
other  armies.  These  various  bodies  of 
the  enemy,  when  united,  would  consti- 
tute a formidable  force,  superior,  in 
fact,  to  Sherman’s  in  cavalry,  and  but 
little  inferior  in  infantry  and  artillery. 
Commanded  as  they  were,  by  the  skilful 
and  experienced  Johnston,  Sherman 
had  need  to  move  with  caution.  Before 
arriving  at  Fayetteville,  he  had  sent  two 
trusty  scouts  to  Wilmington,  with  intel- 
ligence respecting  his  position.  The 
scouts  made  their  way  safely  ; and  on 
the  morning  of  the  12th  of  March,  a 
small  steamer  arrived  at  Fayetteville 


890 


THE  MARCH  THROUGH  THE  CAROLINAS. 


from  Wilmington.  It  returned,  the 
same  day,  with  despatches  for  General 
Terry,  and  for  General  Schofield,  at 
New  Berne,  informing  them  that  the 
army  would  move  on  the  15th,  for 
Goldsboro,  and  directing  them  to  move 
their  forces  on  the  same  point. 

As  delay  would  be  highly  dangerous, 
in  face  of  the  probable  combination  of 
the  enemy’s  forces,  Sherman  moved  out 
of  Fayetteville,  on.  the  15th.  The 
weather  was  still  unfavorable  ; and  the 
roads  had  to  be  corduroyed  to  allow 
the  passage  of  wagons  and  artillery. 
Kilpatrick  was  directed  to  move  by  the 
plank  road,  as  far  as  Averysboro  and 
beyond.  He  was  to  be  followed  by 
four  divisions  of  the  left  wing,  with  as 
few  wagons  as  possible.  The  remainder 
of  the  train,  under  the  escort  of  the 
other  two  divisions  of  the  left  wing, 
were  ordered  to  take  a shorter  and 
more  direct  road  to  Goldsboro.  How- 
ard, with  the  right  wing,  was  ordered 
to  send  his  trains  well  to  the  right, 
towards  Faison’s  Depot  and  Goldsboro, 
holding  four  divisions  in  readiness  to 
aid  the  left  wing,  if  it  should  be  at- 
tacked while  in  motion. 

General  Sherman  accompanied  the 
left  wing,  with  Kilpatrick’s  cavalry  in 
advance,  as  far  as  Kyle’s  Landing.  At 
Taylor’s  Hole  Creek,  Kilpatrick  en- 
countered the  rear-guard  of  the  enemy’s 
cavalry  ; and  a brigade  of  infantry  was 
sent  at  his  request  to  hold  a line  of 
barricades.  On  the  morning  of 
15.  the  15th,  the  column,  advancing 
in  the  same  order,  found  a large  force 
of  the  enemy  under  Hardee,  in  an 
intrenched  position,  in  the  vicinity  of 


Averysboro,  where  the  road  branches 
off  towards  Goldsboro.  Hardee’s 
intention  was,  evidently,  to  detain 
Sherman,  so  as  to  give  Johnston  time 
to  concentrate  his  forces.  It  was  neces- 
sary, therefore,  to  get  possession  of  the 
Goldsboro  road  without  delay ; and 
at  the  same  time  desirable  to  keep  up, 
as  long  ^s  possible,  a pretence  of  mov- 
ing on  Baleigh. 

Sherman,  immediately,  made  prepara- 
tions to  dislodge  Hardee’s  force.  Slo- 
cum was  ordered  to  push  forward  and 
carry  the  position.  The  Twentieth 
corps,  under  Williams,  led  the  attack  ; 
and  Ward’s  division,  which  was  in  the 
advance,  found  a brigade  of  heavy 
artillery,  armed  as  infantry,  posted 
across  the  road  behind  a light  parapet, 
with  a battery  which  commanded  the 
open  ground  in  front.  A brigade,  sent 
round  by  the  left,  turned  this  line,  and 
then  made  a quick  charge.  The  Con- 
federate brigade  broke,  and  fell  rapidly 
to  a second  and  stronger  line.  In  doing 
so,  it  suffered  severely,  from  the  fire  of 
a well-posted  battery  under  Major  Key- 
nolds.  Ward’s  division  advanced  over 
this  ground,  capturing  217  men  and  3 
guns.  On  approaching  the  enemy’s 
second  line,  Jackson’s  ai vision  was  de- 
ployed on  the  right  of  Ward’s  ; and 
two  divisions  of  the  Fouideenth  corps 
were  deployed  on  the  left,  well  towards 
the  Cape  Fear  Kiver.  Kilpatrick,  who 
was  acting  in  concert  with  Williams, 
got  a brigade  on  the  road  ; but  it  was 
furiously  attacked  by  a Confederate 
division  under  McLaws,  and  compelled 
to  fall  back  to  the  flank  of  the  infantry. 
Late,  in  the  afternoon,  the  whole  line 


BENTONVILLE. 


891 


advanced,  and  drove  the  Confederates 
within  their  intrenchments.  During  the 
dismal  and  stormy  night  which  followed, 
they  retreated  over  a wretched  road  in 
the  direction  of  Smithheld.  Such  was 
the  battle  of  Averysboro.  The  ISTa- 
tional  loss  was  77  killed  and  477 
wounded.  The  enemy  left  108  of  their 
dead  on  the  field. 

Ward’s  division  kept  up  a show  of 
pursuit  for  some  distance.  The  re- 
mainder of  Slocum’s  command,  turning 
to  the  right,  crossed  the  South  River 
and  took  the  Goldsboro  road.  Kil- 
patrick crossed  more  to  the  north,  with 
orders  to  move  eastward  and  guard  the 
flank  in  that  direction.  The  wagon- 
trains,  with  their  escorts,  and  Howard’s 
column,  were,  in  the  mean  time,  slowly 
toiling  along  the  miry  roads  towards 
Bentonville  and  Goldsboro. 

Sherman  remained  with  Slocum  and 
the  left  wing,  on  the  night  of  the  18th, 
on  the  Goldsboro  road,  about  5 miles 
from  Bentonville.  Howard  was  at 
Lee’s  Store,  some  2 miles  to  the  south. 
The  pickets  of  both  columns  were  well 
thrust  forward.  There  was  no  sign  to 
indicate  that  the  enemy  intended  to 
oflPer  further  opposition  to  the  march. 
Mar.  Sherman,  therefore,  on  the  morn- 
19.  ing  of  the  19th,  ordered  Howard 
to  move,  with  the  right  wing,  by  the 
Goldsboro  road.  A little  later,  he  rode 
on  himself  in  the  same  direction.  His 
object  was  to  advance  with  the  column, 
and  open  communications  with  Scho- 
field and  Terry,  who  were  known  to  be 
moving  up  from  New  Berne  and  Wil- 
mington. He  was  only  about  6 miles 
on  his  journey,  when  he  heard  cannon- 


ading on  the  northwest,  and  when  he 
was  overtaken  by  some  staff  officers, 
who  informed  him  that  Slocum  had 
encountered  the  entire  Confederate 
army  under  General  Johnston.  Slocum 
was  ordered  to  call  up  the  two  divis- 
ions which  were  guarding  the  wagon- 
trains,  as  also,  Hazen’s  division  of  the 
Fifteenth  corps,  which  was  near  Lee's 
Store.  Sherman  promised  do  hurry  up 
with  Blair’s  corps,  and  the  three  re- 
maining divisions  of  the  Fifteenth,  and 
fall  upon  Johnston’s  left  rear.  Slocum 
felt  the  foe,  at  a very  early  hour  on  the 
19th,  and  just  when  he  had  advanced 
from  his  camp.  By  ten  o’clock,  the 
Confederates,  cavalry  and  artillery,  were 
present  in  great  force.  At  noon,  the 
fighting  had  become  stubborn  and  se- 
vere. It  was  now  discovered  that  the 
whole  of  Johnston’s  army,  augmented 
by  the  commands  of  Hoke  and  Hardee, 
was  in  a fortified  position,  in  front  of 
the  left  wing  of  the  National  arm}', 
prepared  to  attack,  and  already  hopeful 
of  victory.  It  was,  indeed,  a surprise. 
Preparations  were  made  in  all  haste  to 
resist  the  threatened  attack.  Barri- 
cades were  hurriedly  thrown  up  orders 
were  sent  for  the  two  divisions  of  the 
Twentieth  corps,  who  were  guarding 
the  wagon-trains,  also  for  Hazen’s  di- 
vision of  the  Fifteenth.  Morgan  and 
Carlin,  with  their  respective  divisions 
were  on  the  extreme  National  left, 
Carlin  to  the  left  of  Morgan.  It  was 
now  half-past  two  o’clock.  With  tre- 
mendous fury,  the  Confederates  came 
rushing  out  of  the  woods,  and  sent 
Carlin’s  division  into  the  air.  Morgan’s 
division  stood  firm.  The  brigades 


892 


THE  MARCH  THROUGH  THE  CAROLINAS. 


of  Mitchell  and  Vandevere  were  in 
line ; and  Feariug’s  brigade  was  in 
reserve.  General  Davis,  then  in  com- 
mand of  the  Fourteenth  corps,  which 
was  thus  savagely  attacked,  realizing 
the  danger,  with  which  the  whole  army 
was  threatened,  rode  to  the  front,  faced 
hearing’s  brigade  to  the  left,  and  hurled 
it  upon  the  Confederate’s  flank.  Push 
j’ight  in  the  direction  of  that  heaviest 
firing,”  shouted  Davis  to  Fearing,  we’ll 
whip  them  yet.”  We’ll  whip  them 
yet,”  echoed  the  boys ; and  on  they 
went,  over  the  swampy  ground,  and 
fell  like  a thunderbolt  on  the  unsiis- 
pecting  foe.  The  Confederates  reeled 
and  staggered  and  fell  back ; and  such 
was  the  confusion  into  which  they 
were  thrown,  that  it  was  an  hour, 
before  they  were  able  to  resume  the 
attack.  The  day  was  saved  ; for  Sher- 
man was  thus  afforded  time  to  re-form 
Davis’  left  and  centre.  In  that  gal- 
lant charge,  young  Fearing  was  dis- 
abled by  a bullet,  and  hundreds  of  his 
bi'ave  men  were  either  killed  or  wound- 
ed. Davis’  line  was  drawn  back  and 
formed,  in  open  fields,  half  a mile  to  rear 
of  the  old  line ; and  the  artillery  were 
massed  on  a commanding  knoll,  so  as 
to  sweep  the  whole  space  between  the 
new  line  and  the  enemy.  Morgan’s 
troops,  on  that  day,  won  for  themselves 
imperishable  renown.  Again  and  again, 
(lid  the  Confederates  come  up  to  the 
attack.  Again  and  again  were  they 
I'epulsed,  with  heavy  loss.  If  Mor- 
gan’s troops  can  stand  this,”  said  Davis, 
all  is  right.  If  not,  the  day  is 
lost.”  In  the  midst  of  the  hottest  of 
the  fight,  Coggswell’s  brigade,  of  the 


Twentieth  corps,  came  up  and  moved 
into  the  gap  between  Custer  and  Mor- 
gan. This  position  it  gallantly  held, 
until  the  end  of  the  struggle.  The 
National  forces,  said  Sherman,  received 
six  distinct  assaults,  by  the  combined 
forces  of  Iloke,  Hardee,  and  Cheatham, 
under  the  immediate  command  of  Gen- 
eral Johnston  himself,  without  giving 
an  inch  of  ground,  and  doing  good  exe- 
cution on  the  enemy’s  ranks.”  The 
Confederates  suffered  terribly  from  the 
National  artillery,  they  themselves  be- 
ing weak  in  that  arm.  During  the 
night  of  the  19th,  Slocum’s  wagon- 
train,  with  its  guard  of  two  divisions, 
and  Ilazen’s  division,  came  up,  as 
ordered,  and,  taking  position,  rendered 
the  left  wing  almost  impregnable. 

The  riorht  wim^,  niovim^  to  the  relief 
of  the  left,  experienced  at  first  but  lit- 
tle opposition.  It  soon,  however,  en- 
countered a body  of  cavalry,  posted 
behind  a barricade,  at  the  fork  of  tlie 
road,  near  Benton ville.  The  cavalry 
were  quickly  dislodged,  and  the  forks 
of  the  roads  secured.  It  was  now  dis- 
covered that  the  left  flank  of  the  enemy 
was  thrown  back,  and  that  he  had  con- 
structed, in  his  front,  a line  of  parapet, 
in  the  form  of  a bastion.  The  salient 
of  this  line  was  on  the  main  road  to 
Goldsboro,  between  Slocum  on  the 
west,  and  Howard  on  the  east.  The 
flanks  rested  on  Mill  Creek,  and  cov- 
ered the  road  back  to  Smithfield.  By 
four  o’clock,  on  the  afternoon  of  the 
20th,  Ho^vard  had  established  a strong 
connection  on  his  left  with  Slocum. 
Line  of  battle  was  formed,  in  front  of 
the  enemy’s  intrenched  position,  and 


MAP  SHOWING  THE  LAST  CAMPAIGN  OF  SHERMAN’S  AND  JOHNSTON’S  ARMIES. 


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AT  KINSTON. 


«93 


Jolinston  was  put  on  the  defensive, 
with  Mill  Creek,  and  only  a single 
bridge  in  his  rear.  Sherman,  however, 
having  little  to  gain  by  a battle,  was 
in  no  haste  to  strike.  Skirmishing  was 
kept  up  all  day ; and  there  was  some 
heavy  artillery  filing. 

On  the  21st,  skirmishing  and  artillery 
firing  were  kept  up..  Some  bold  and 
Mar.  dasliing  efforts  were  made  to  dis- 
21.  cover  a weak  point  in  the  ene- 
my’s lines.  On  one  occasion,  General 
Mower,  with  his  division  of  the  Seven- 
teenth corps,  pushed  his  way  around 
the  Confederate  fiank,  almost  to  the 
bridge  at  Mill  Creek.  He  was  glad, 
however,  to  return  to  the  defenses  of 
his  own  lines.  During  the  night,  John- 
ston retreated  on  Smithfield,  leaving 
his  pickets  behind  him,  his  dead  un- 
buried, and  his  wounded  in  field  hos- 
pitals. He  was  pursued  some  2 miles 
beyond  Mill  Creek. 

Such  was  the  battle  of  Benton ville. 
It  cannot  be  called  one  of  the  greatest ; 
but  it  was  certainly  one  of  the  most 
important  battles  of  the  war.  If  Sher- 
man’s army  had  been  defeated  at  Ben- 
ton ville,  and  Johnston  thus  set  free  to 
join  Lee  at  Petersburg  and  Bichmond, 
the  result  mic>:ht  have  been  disastrous 
in  the  extreme.  As  it  was,  the  country 
was  brought  one  stage  nearer  the  de- 
sired end.  In  the  three  days’  fighting, 
tlie  Nationals  lost  1646.  The  Confed- 
erate loss  was  probably  not  under  3000. 

Sherman  had  now  accomplished  his 
purpose.  He  had  already,  to  all  in- 
tents and  purposes,  effected  a junction 
with  Schofield  and  Terry.  Schofield 
had  entered  Goldsboro  on  the  21st. 


Terry  was  in  possession  of  the  Neuse 
Biver  at  Cox’s  Bridge. 

As  soon  as  Wilmington  fell  into  his 
hands,  Schofield  took  measures  to 
carry  out  Grant’s  orders,  with  regard  to 
the  movement  on  Goldsboro.  General 
Palmer,  then  commanding  the  New 
Berne  district,  was  sent  from  Wilming- 
ton, with  instructions  to  march  from 
New  Berne,  with  bOOO  men,  to  occupy 
Kinston — a small  town  on  the  Neuse 
Biver  and  on  the  railroad  to  Golds- 
boro, about  22  miles  from  that  place 
and  32  from  New  Berne.  Buger’s  divi- 
sion, of  the  Twenty-Third  corps,  was 
sent  from  Fort  Fishei*  to  reinforce  him. 
The  immediate  object  of  this  move- 
ment Avas  to  get  possession  of  and 
hold  the  railroad,  in  order  to  establish 
a depot  of  supplies  at  Kinston,  and  so 
facilitate  the  subsequent  movement 
upon  Goldsboro,  when  Sherman  should 
arrive.  Palmer  was  not  able  to  com- 
plete his  preparations  for  an  adA^ance  so 
soon  as  was  expected ; and,  on  the  6th 
of  March,  General  Cox  arrived  at  ]jfar. 
NeAv  Berne,  assumed  command,  fi* 
and  commenced  the  forAvard  move- 
ment The  Confederates,  after  being 
driven  out  of  Wilmington,  had  re- 
treated northward  to  Goldsboro ; and 
having  determined  to  defend  that 
place,  they  decided  to  make  their  first 
stand  at  Kinston,  at  Avhich  point  about 
1200  troops  were  concentrated  under 
General  Bragg.  The’ march  to  Kington 
was  one  of  extreme  difficulty.  The 
morasses  were  impassable ; and  the 
Neuse  Biver  Avas  too  shalloAV  to  admit 
the  heavy  gun-boats.  It  became,  there- 
fore, a matter  of  the  last  importance,  that 


894 


THE  MARCH  THROUGH  THE  CAROLINAS. 


the  line  of  railroad  to  Kinston  should 
come  under  the  control  of  the  National 
army. 

Tlie  6th,  was  spent  in  clearing  the 
roads  and  in  building  bridges.  On  the 
morning  of  the  Vth,  the  enemy  was 
found  in  some  force,  at  the  point  where 
the  Dover  and  Jackson  roads  meet  the 
Trent  road.  Classon  drove  him  back 
to  Jackson’s  Mills,  4i  miles  from  Kins- 
ton. On  the  8th,  there  was  some  sharp 
fighting,  the  Confederates,  in  course  of 
the  day,  rushing  from  their  works  at 
Jackson’s  Mills,  falling  upon  Curtis’ 
division  with  great  force,  and  over- 
whelming the  Twenty -Seventh  Massa- 
chusetts and  the  Fifteenth  Connecticut. 
The  Nationals  were  compelled  to  fall 
back,  and  form  a new  line  of  battle. 

During  the  whole  of  the  9th,  there 
was  lively  skirmishing,  but  without  any 
Mar.  decisive  result.  On  the  10th,  how- 
10.  ever,  the  enemy,  who  had  received 
large  reinforcements,  attacked  in  a bold 
and  determined  manner,  hoping  to 
defeat  Schofield,  before  Couch,  who  was 
now  on  his  way  from  Wilmington, 
could  come  up.  The  National  forces 
were  well  intrenched  at  the  junction  of 
the  Trent  and  Upper  Trent  roads. 
Schofield  and  Cox  were  both  on  the  field, 
as  were  also  Bragg,  Hill,  and  Hoke  on 
the  side  of  the  Confederates.  The 
enemy  made  two  fierce  attacks — one 
falling  on  Carter’s  division  on  the  left, 
the  other  on  Buger’s  division  in  the 
centre.  Both  assaults  were  decisively 
repulsed,  with  heavy  loss  to  the  enemy. 
Bragg  withdrew  his  troops,  leaving 
behind  him  his  dead  and  wounded  with 
several  hundred  prisoners.  His  total 


loss  was  about  1500  in  killed,  wounded, 
and  missing.  Couch  came  up  from 
Wilmington,  on  the  morning  of  the 
11th;  and  Bragg  fell  back  across  the 
Neuse  to  Kinston,  where  he  burnt  the 
bridge  and,  for  a short  time,  held  the 
noi-th  bank  of  the  river. 

Schofield,  having  no  pontoon  train, 
could  i;iot  cross  the  Neuse  until  the 
14th.  On  that  day,  Bragg  abandone<l 
Kinston,  and  set  out  to  join  Johnston, 
who  was  then  concentrating  for  the 
purpose  of  attacking  Sherman’s  left  at 
Bentonville.  Immediately  after  getting 
possession  of  Kinston,  Schofield  set  a 
large  force  at  work  in  the  reconstruction 
of  the  railroad,  under  the  direction  of 
Colonel  Wright.  He,  also,  re-built  the 
wagon-bridge  over  the  Neuse,  brought 
forward  supplies,  and  prepared  for  a 
further  advance.  On  the  morning  of 
the  20  th,  he  left  Kinston;  and  on 
the  evening  of  the  21st,  he  took  ^1- 
possession  of  Goldsboro  with  little  o|)- 
position.  Terry  left  Wilmington  on  the 
15th,  and  moving  steadily  northward 
reached  Faison’s  Depot  on  the  20th  ; 
and,  in  obedience  to  Sherman’s  ordei-s, 
he  advanced  thence  to  Cox’s  Bridge,  10 
miles  above  Goldsboro,  and  secured  a 
crossing  of  the  Neuse,  on  the  2 2d. 
The  three  armies  were  united ; and  the 
object  of  the  campaign  was  accom- 
plished. The  railroads  from  Goldsboro 
to  Wilmington  and  New  Berne  wei^e 
quickly  repaired ; and  supplies  in  abun- 
dance were  moved  forward  to  Kinston. 

On  the  23d,  the  different  commands 
had  camps  assigned  to  them,  in  the 
vicinity  of  Goldsboro.  On  the  25th, 
the  railroad  from  New  Berne  was  again 


THE  RESULT  OF  THE  MARCH. 


805 


in  working  order ; and  the  first  train 
of  cars  came  in.  The  troops  were  soon 
supplied  with  abundance  of  food  and 
clothing.  In  harmony  with  an  arrange- 
ment already  made,  Sherman,  leaving 
the  army  in  charge  of  Schofield,  pro- 
ceeded by  rail  to  Morehead  City,  and 
thence  by  steamer  to  City  Point.  There, 
in  the  upper  saloon  .of  the  Hiver  Queen, 
on  the  evening  of  the  27th  of 
27 . March,  he  met  President  Lincoln, 
General  Grant,  and  Admiral  Porter ; 
and  then  occurred  that  famous  con- 
sultation, which  is  one  of  the  memor- 
able incidents  of  the  war.  Lincoln 
looked  care-worn  and  anxious.  Grant 
sat  silent  and  imperturbable,  smoking 
his  cigar.  Pleased  with  the  promising 
aspect  of  things,  and  convinced  that 
the  hour  of  victory  was  at  hand,  Lin- 
coln was  yet  most  desirous  to  put  an 
end  to  further  bloodshed.  “As  long 
as  the  rebels  lay  down  their  arms,  I 
don’t  care  how  it  is  done.”  “ Stop  this 
bloodshed  ; ” he  added,  “ stop  this  hor- 
rible war;  I know  I can  manage  all 
the  rest.  What  signify  the  terms, 
so  long  as  we  get  peace  I ” On  hearing 
Sherman’s  account  of  his  own  position, 
he  expressed  the  fear  that  Johnston 
might  escape  southward  by  the  rail- 
road, and  thus  render  necessary  further 
pursuit.  “ He  cannot  move  southward,” 
said  Sherman,  “without  breaking  up 
his  army,  which,  once  disbanded,  can 
never  again  be  re-united ; and  I have 
destroyed  the  railroads,  so  that  they 
(cannot  be  used  for  a long  time.” 
At  this  point.  Grant,  who  had  not 
taken  any  part  in  the  conversation, 
interjected  the  question,  “ What  is  to 


prevent  them  laying  the  rails  again  ? ” 
“ Why”  answered  Sherman,  “my  bum- 
mers hav’nt  done  things  by  halves. 
All  the  rails  have  been  twisted ; and 
they  are  as  crooked  as  rams’  horns. 
They  can  never  be  used  again.”  The 
conversation  turning  upon  the  terms 
of  surrender  which  should  be  allowed 
Joho^ton,  Sherman  said : “ I can  com- 
mand my  own  terms ; Johnston  will 
have  to  yield.”  Lincoln  said : “ Get 
his  surrender  on  any  terms.”  Sherman 
never  saw  Lincoln  again.  It  was  the 
opinion  of  Grant  and  Sherman  that  one 
or  the  other  would  have  to  fight  one 
more  bloody  battle,  but  that  it  would 
be  the  last.  Sherman  returned  to  New 
Berne  by  the  steamer  Bat. 

In  the  march  across  the  Carolinas,  as 
in  that  from  Atlanta  to  Savannah,  the 
army  of  Sherman  wasted  a wide  belt 
of  country,  of  an  average  breadth  of 
not  less  than  40  miles,  consuming  all 
the  forage,  cattle,  hogs,  sheep,  poultry, 
and  corn  meal.  Hundreds  of  miles  of 
railroad  were  destroyed  and  thousands 
of  bales  of  cotton  burned.  There  were 
captured  85  cannon,  4000  prisoners  and 
25,000  animals.  Many  thousand  negroes 
also  were  set  free. 

These  results  were  no  doubt  import- 
ant ; but  the  grand  result  which  Sher- 
man had  achieved,  and  one  of  the 
grandest  results  of  the  war,  was  that  no 
Confederate  force  could  now  hinder  the 
junction,  if  necessary,  of  his  own  forces 
with  those  of  Grant. 

Simultaneously  with  these  converg- 
ing movements  of  the  several  armies, 
Stoneman  made  his  last  great  raid.  It 
was  part  of  General  Grant’s  plan,  that 


896 


THE  MARCH  THROUGH  THE  CAROLINAS. 


Stonemaa  should  aid  Sherman’s  move- 
ments by  a cavalry  raid  into  South 
Carolina.  Before  Stoneman  was  ready 
to  move,  Sherman  had  advanced  so  far 
on  his  march  backward  from  the  sea, 
that  the  co-operative  movement  of  the 
cavalry  was  not  necessary.  Stoneman 
w^as,  tlierefore,  ordered  to  march  east- 
ward, and  destroy  the  Virginia  and 
Tennessee  Bail  road,  in  the  direction  of 
Lynchburg.  On  tlie  20th  of  March,  he 
collected  the  cavalry  brigades  of  Palm- 
er, Miller  and  Brown,  • of  Gillem’s 
division,  at  Mossy  Creek.  His  whole 
force  was  about  6000  strong.  Having 
moved  eastward,  to  Bull’s  Gap,  he 
divided  his  troops,  sending  Miller  to 
make  a demonstration  in  the  direction 
of  Bristol,  himself  proceeding  with  the 
rest  to  Jonesboro,  where  he  crossed 
over  Stone  Mountain  to  Boone,  in  North 
31  ar.  Carolina.  At  Boone,  on  the  28  th, 
28.  he  skirmished  with  the  enemy, 
and  captured  200  Home  Guards.  The 
day  after,  he  was  at  Wilkesboro,  where 
he  captured  stores  and  some  prisoners. 
Continuing  his  march,  he  crossed  the 
Yadkin  Biver,  at  Jones ville;  and  then, 
facing  to  the  north,  he  advanced  to 
Cranberry  Plain,  Carroll  County,  Vir- 
ginia. Thence,  having  sent  Miller  to 
Wytheville  to  destroy  the  railroad,  he 
himself,  with  the  main  body,  moved  on 
Jacksonville.  From  Jacksonville  he 
sent  out  raiding  parties  in  all  directions. 
One  of  these,  under  Major  Wagner, 
liaving  advanced  on  Salem,  swept  along 
the  railroad  to  the  east,  destroying  it 
from  New  Biver  Bridge  to  within  4 
miles  of  Lynchburg.  Another,  and  a 
larger  party,  under  Stoneman  himself. 


advanced  on  Christiansburg,  and  de- 
stroyed about  90  miles  of  rail.  Stone- 
man’s  prescribed  task  being  thus  accom- 
plished, he  collected  his  forces,  and 
returned  to  Jacksonville. 

There  was  still,  however,  work  to  be 
done ; and  Stoneman  was  not  disposed 
to  rest  his  troopers  until  that  work  was 
accomplished.  On  the  9th  of  April 
Api*il,  his  face  now  turned  to  the  9. 
south,  we  find  him  on  the  North  Caro- 
lina railroad,  between  Danville  and 
Greensboro,  his  whole  command  at 
work  tearing  up  rails  and  demolishing 
bridges.  Palmer  destroyed  the  railroad 
between  Greensboro  and  Salisbuiy, 
burned  the  factories  at  Salem,  and 
captured  some  400  men.  Stoneman, 
with  the  main  body,  moved  on  Salis- 
bury, which  was  a provision  depot,  and 
known  to  be  guarded  by  a Confederate 
force,  some  3000  strong,  under  General 
W.  M.  Gardiner.  The  Confederates 
were  found  at  Grant’s  Creek,  10  miles  to 
the  east  of  Salisbury,  well  posted,  with 
18  guns.  The  entire  force  was  under 
the  command  of  Pemberton,  Grant’s 
old  opponent,  still  faithfully  serv- 
ing the  Confederates,  although  reduced 
to  the  rank  of  Colonel.  The  Nationals 
charged  the  Confederate  position.  The 
struggle  was  brief.  The  Confederates 
broke  and  fled,  leaving  behind  them 
some  1200  men,  who  were  made  pris- 
oners, all  their  guns,  3000  small  arms, 
and  a vast  quantity  of  stores.  Salisbury 
was  occupied  without  further  resistance. 
The  work  of  destruction  was  repeated. 
Ammunition,  provisions,  clothing,  medi- 
cine, 10,000  small  arms,  4 cotton  fac- 
tories, 7000  bales  of  cotton,  all  were 


BRIDGE  OVER  THE  CATAWBA  BURNED. 


897 


delivered  up  to  the  flames.  The  prison 
pens,  from  which  the  Union  prisoners 
had  already  been  moved,  were  flred ; and 
the  rails  for  miles  on  both  sides  of  the 
town  were  torn  up  and  destroyed. 
Stoneman  now  set  out  for  East  Tennes- 
see, taking  with  him  the  prisoners  and 
the  captured  clothing,  and  followed  by 
thousands  of  negroes. 

On  the  18th,  General  Palmer,  whose 
command  was  at  Lincolntown,  sent 
Major  E.  C.  Motherwell,  with  a body 
of  some  250  mounted  men,  belonging 
to  the  Twelfth  Ohio  cavalry,  towards 
the  point  where  the  Charlotte  and 
South  Carolina  Railroad  crosses  the 
Catawba  River.  His  instructions  were 
to  destroy  the  railroad  bridge.  By 
this  time,  Richmond  had  fallen;  and 
Davis,  the  Confederate  president,  was 
at  Charlotte  with  a considerable  force. 
Vaughan  and  Duke,  who  had  come 
down  from  the  borders  of  Virginia,  it 
was  ascertained  were  also  in  the  neigh- 
borhood. Motherwell,  in  consequence, 
found  it  necessary  to  move  with  great 
caution.  At  Dallas  he  encountered  the 
cavalry  leaders.  He  cunningly,  how- 
ever, evaded  battle.  On  the  following 


morning,  the  19th,  at  day -break,  the 
National  troops  were  well  formed.  Ad- 
vancing to  the  bridge,  they  captured  the 
picket  and  surprised  the  guard, 

The  torch  was  soon  applied;  and  i9. 
in  about  thirty  minutes  the  splendid 
structure,  some  1150  feet  in  length,  and 
about  50  feet  above  the  water  was  com- 
pletely destroyed.  After  skirmishing 
with  some  Confederate  cavalry,  under 
Ferguson,  Motherwell’s  men  began  to 
move  backwards  in  the  direction  of  Dal- 
las. Early  on  the  20th,  having  marched 
all  night,  they  rejoined  the  main  body  of 
the  brigade,  with  325  prisoners,  200 
horses,  and  two  pieces  of  artillery. 

This  last  raid  of  Stoneman  was  one 
of  the  most  destructive  during  the  war. 
He  captured  from  first  to  last  some  6000 
men,  about  56  pieces  of  artillery,  small 
arms  in  great  abundance,  with  other 
property  of  untold  value.  If  the  fate 
of  the  Confederacy  had  not  been  al- 
ready sealed,  it  must  have  hastened  the 
end.  As  it  was,  it  helped  to  complete 
the  punishment  of  the  South,  and,  by 
throwing  some  darker  lines  upon  the 
canvas,  made  more  horrible  the  pictui’e 
of  civil  war. 


898 


THE  FALL  OF  PETERSBURG  AND  RICHMOND. 


CHAPTER  XLII. 

Grant  holding  on  to  the  Weldon  Railroad — Sheridan  master  of  the  Shenandoah  Valley — Dutch  Gap  CanaJ — 
The  Explosion — James  River  Flooded — Confederate  Fleet  in  the  James — Fort  Brady — Battery  Parsons — 
Preparing  for  Attack  along  the  Whole  Line — Rowanty  Creek — Hatcher’s  Run — Smyth  at  Armstrong’s  Mill — 
The  Boydton  Plank-Road — Dabney’s  Mills — The  Second  Battle  of  Hatcher’s  Run — Movement  from  the 
Shenandoah — Hancock  in  Command  of  the  Middle  Military  Division — Sheridan  at  Kernstown— At  Stras- 
burg — At  Woodstock — At  Staunton — Custer  at  Waynesboro— Sheridan’s  Troops  at  Scottsville  and  New 
Market — Hardwicksville — Amherst  Court  House — Sheridan  at  Ashland  Station — Terrible  Destruction  of 
Property — Richmond  in  Consternation — Lee  Preparing  to  Penetrate  the  National  Lines — Grant  on  his 
Guard — Lee’s  Attack  on  the  Ninth  Corps  at  Fort  Steadman — Fort  Steadman  Captured  by  the  Confed- 
erates— A Terrific  Struggle — Fort  Steadman  Re-captured  by  the  Nationals — General  Advance  of  the 
National  Left — Wright  and  the  Sixth  Corps  Heavily  Engaged — The  Advanced  Position  held  by  the 
Nationals — Grant’s  Plan  of  Attack — His  Old  Tactics — White  Oak  Road  and  Five  Forks — The  National 
Line — Its  Vast  Extent — Disposition  of  the  Troops — General  Directions — The  Night  of  the  29th  of  March — 
The  National  Troops  in  Motion — Warren  and  Humphreys  on  the  White  Oak  Road — In  Front  of  the 
Enemy’s  Right  Flank — Sheridan  at  Dinwiddie  Court  House —Grant’s  Instructions  to  Sheridan — The 
Position  of  Lee’s  Anny — Lee’s  Extended  Line — His  Difficulty — His  Plan  of  Battle  - -Longstreet  left  in  front 
of  the  National  Right — The  Morning  of  the  30th — Bad  Road — Grant  in  no  Haste  to  Strike— The  Delay  a 
Gain  to  Lee — The  Confederate  General  Preparing  to  Acton  the  Offensive — Warren  on  the  Boydton  Plauk- 
Rcad — Ayres,  Crawford  and  Griffin — Warren’s  Disposition  of  his  Troops — His  Advance — The  Batth 
Begun — Fierce  Sortie  by  Lee — Ayres  and  Crawford  Driven  Back — Griffin  Stands  Firm — Chamberlain’s 
Brigade — The  Confederates  Driven  Back — Warren  Attacks  the  Works  at  Hatcncrs  Run — Lee’s  Sortie  a 
Failure — He  Attacks  Sheridan  at  Five  Forks — The  National  Cavalry  Driven  in  Confusion — Dinwiddie 
Court  House — Devin  and  Davies  Isolated  from  the  Main  Body — Sheridan  in  Great  Straits,  but  Equal  to 
the  Situation — The  National  Cavalry  Recruited— Severe  Fighting— Sheridan  Dismounts  his  Men — The 
Confederates  Pressed — Night  and  Relief — Sheridan  Praised  by  Grant — An  Anxious  Night — Alarming 
Rumors — Warren  Ordered  to  Sheridan’s  Relief — Gravelly  Run — Lee  Falls  Back  from  Dinwiddie — He 
Takes  Position  at  Five  Forks — A Junction  Effected  by  the  National  Infantry  and  Cavalry — Sheridan 
Assumes  Command  of  the  Entire  Force — Saturday,  April  1st — The  Key  Point  of  the  Position — A Morning 
Struggle — Sheridan  Preparing  to  Attack — His  Plan  of  Battle— He  Blames  Warren  for  Delay — Four 
o’clock — Assault  on  the  Confederate  Position  at  Five  Forks — Warren’s  Advance — A Warm  Reception — 
Ayres  and  Crawford  Badly  Punished— Griffin  Again  to  the  Rescue  —The  Rally — The  Battle  Raging— Advance 
of  the  Cavalry — The  Confederates  Routed — A Brave  Remnant — A Complete  Victory — Difference  Between 
Sheridan  and  Warren— Sheridan’s  Charges  not  Sustained  by  Facts — The  Disaster  at  Five  Forks  a Sad 
Blow  to  Lee— His  Right  Flank  was  Turned — Grant  and  Meade  Quick  to  Act- -The  Thunder  of  the 
National  Guns — A Hideous  Night — The  General  Assault — Parke  and  Wright  Carry  all  Before  Them — 
Ord  at  Hatcher’s  Run — He  Unites  with  Wright — The  Clayborue  Road — Sutherland’s  Station — The  South 
Side  Railroad  Lost  to  the  Confederates— Forts  Gregg  and  Alexander — Gib'oon’s  Heroic  Attack — (’apture  of 
the  Forts — The  Investing  Line  Drawn  Close— Lee’s  Inner  Line — Bold  and  Aggressive  to  the  Last — An 
Offensive  Sally — Heath’s  Division  of  A.  P.  Hill — Death  of  Hill — The  End  at  Hand — “ Richmond  Must  Be 
Evacuated  ” — Scene  in  St.  Paul’s  Church — A Sad  Sunday — A Night  of  Horrors — Richmond  and  Peters- 
burg Evacuated — Entrance  of  the  National  Troops — The  Old  Flag  Restored — Joy  and  Gratitude. 


AVe  return  now  to  the  neighborhood 
of  Petersburg  and  Richmond, 
^ * where  after  the  battle  of  Ilatch- 
e^r’s  Run  and  at  the  conclusion  of 


AYarren’s  expedition,  as  before  de- 
scribed, the  army  of  the  Potomac  and 
the  army  of  the  James  went  into  win- 
ter quarteiu  AVith  the  left  of  the 


DESTRUCTIOX  OF  THE  DREWRY. 


899 


army  of  the  Potomac,  Grant  maintained 
a firm  hold  on  the  Weldon  Hailroad. 
llis  right,  which  consisted  of  the  army 
(kf  the  James  and  which  was  stationed 
on  the  north  side  of  the  river  of  that 
name,  extended  to  within  a few  miles 
(rf  Richmond.  Sheridan,  now  ‘undis- 
puted master  of  the  Shenandoah  Valley 
from  Harper’s  Ferry  to  Staunton,  had 
his  headquarters  at  Kernstown,  near 
Winchester. 

It  Avas  not  until  near  the  end  of 
March,  that  Grant  Avas  ready  for  a 
general  movement  upon  the  Confeder- 
ate lines.  The  opening  months  of  the 
} ear,  however,  Avere  not  spent  wholly 
in  idleness.  Several  eA^ents  of  minor 
importance  served  to  disturb  the  mo- 
notony of  winter  quarters.  On  New 
Jan.  Year’s  day,  the  bulkhead  of  the 
!•  Dutch  Gap  Canal  was  partially 
bloAvn  out  by  the  explosion  of  mines. 
The  earth  Avas  thrown  up  to  a consid- 
erable height;  but,  instead  of  being  cast 
forward,  as  was  desired,  it  fell  back 
into  its  former  position.  Connection 
with  the  river  was  not  established ; and 
of  coui'se  the  canal  remained  useless 
for  the  purposes  for  Avhich  it  was  in- 
tended. 

Heavv  rains,  about  the  middle  of 

k/  f 

January,  swelled  the  James  River  to 
several  feet  above  its  ordinary  leA^el, 
flooding  the  low  grounds  along  its 
banks,  and  tearing  away  the  pontoon 
bridges  at  Aiken’s  Landing  and  Dutch 
Bottom  ; and  the  enemy,  taking  advan- 
tage of  the  high  water,  during  the 
absence  of  Porter’s  fleet,  prepared  his 
iron-clads  in  the  James  for  a descent  on 
City  Point.  A fleet  composed  of  3 


iron-clads,  the  Virginia,  Richmond  and 
Fredericksburg,  each  carrying  4 guns; 
the  wooden  vessels  Drewry,  Nanse- 
mond  and  Hampton,  each  of  2 guns; 
the  Bedford,  one  gun ; the  steamer 
Torpedo,  and  3 torpedo  boats,  at  a A^ery 
early  hour  on  the  morning  of  the  24th, 
dropped  doAvn  from  their  anchor- 
ao-e  above  the  Hewlett  batteries.  24, 

o 

Moving  silently  under  cover  of  the 
darkness,  they  had  all  but  passed  Fort 
Brady,  Avhen  the  guns  of  the  fort 
opened  upon  them  a tremendous  fire. 
The  vessels  made  a vigorous  response, 
and  moAung  onward  Avere  soon  beyond 
the  range  of  the  guns.  In  the  brief 
struggle  one  of  the  guns  of  the  fort,  a 
100-pounder  Parrott,  was  dismounted. 
On  reaching  the  obstructions  at  Dutch 
Gap,  the  Fredericksburg  pushed 
through  under  a full  head  of  steam. 
The  Richmond,  the  Virginia  and  the 
DreAvry  grounded  in  attempting  to 
follow;  and  the  Fredericksburg  AA’as 
compelled  to  return  to  their  assistance. 
The  Drewry  could  not  be  got  off ; and 
as  daylight  was  approaching,  and  the 
fleet  Avas  now  within  range  of  Battery 
Parsons,  she  was  abandoned.  A.  shell 
from  the  battery  subsequently  falling 
into  her  magazine,  she  bleAV  up  and 
was  totally  demolished.  The  remain- 
der of  the  fleet  retired  up  the  river. 
The  loss  in  killed  and  wounded  did 
not  exceed  20  on  either  side. 

About  this  time  some  futile  attempts 
were  made  to  reneAv  negotiations  for 
peace.  After  the  entire  breaking  up 
of  Hood’s  army  by  Thomas,  and  the 
march  of  Sherman,  almost  unopposed, 
from  Atlanta  to  Savannah,  a conviction 


yoo  THE  FALL  OF  PETERSBURG  AND  RICHMOND. 


began  to  prevail  very  generally  in  the 
South  as  well  as  in  the  North,  that  the 
strength  of  the  rebellion  was  broken. 
Without  Sherman’s  command,  the  Na- 
tional forces  in  the  field  were  suffi- 
ciently numerous  to  ensure  final  success. 
The  North  had,  therefore,  one  great 
arm}^  to  spare,  while  the  Confederacy, 
in  men,  in  resources  of  every  kind,  and 
in  the  spirit  with  which  the  contest  was 
carried  on,  was  known  to  be  failing 
rapidly.  A belief  came  to  be  generally 
entertained  in  the  North,  that  a large 
portion  of  the  Southern  leaders  were 
not  indisposed  to  accept  peace,  even  on 
condition  of  entire  submission  to  the 
National  authority.  Some  of  the  best 
and  more  sagacious  of  the  Confederate 
leaders  had  long  seen  that  success  was 
hopeless ; and  they  were  only  solicitous 
of  bringing  the  war  to  a close  in  some 
way  which  should  not  wound  too 
keenly  the  pride  and  self-respect  of  the 
Southern  people.  A large  class  in  the 
North  were  also  desirous-  that  efforts 
should  be  made  to  put  a stop  to  the 
war  as  soon  as  it  could  be  done  without 
materially  sacrificing  the  national  inter- 
ests. Into  the  details  of  these  peace 
efforts  we  shall  not  enter.  They  were 
all  failures,  and  they  had  no  appreci- 
able effect  on  the  war. 

It  was  now  the  31st  of  January. 
There  were  signs  of  unusual  activity 
all  along  the  National  lines.  Grant, 
resolved  to  put  in  execution  a long 
projected  movement  towards  the  ene- 
my’s right,  had  issued  marching  orders 
to  the  entire  army  in  front  of  Peters- 
burg— the  Second,  Fifth,  Sixth  and 
Ninth  corps.  The  hospitals  were 


cleared,  and  the  sick  sent  back  to  City 
Point ; the  quartermasters’  and  com- 
missary stores  also  were  sent  out  of 
harm’s  way.  The  cars  were  kept  run- 
ning constantly  to  City  Point  until  the 
afternoon  of  Saturday  the  4th  of  Feb- 
ruary, when  Gregg’s  division  of  cavalry 
received  orders  to  march  at  three  on 
the  following  morning.  The  Fifth 
coi’ps  was  to  follow  at  five,  and  the 
Second  at  six.  The  object  of  the  move- 
ment was  to  get  possession  of  the 
South  Side  Railroad,  which,  it  was 
hoped,  would  cause  the  evacuation  of 
Petersburg.  Gregg’s  division  started 
at  the  hour  appointed ; and,  mov-  pgi), 
ing  along  the  Jerusalem  plank-  &• 
road,  the  advance  reached  Reams’  Sta- 
tion soon  after  daybreak.  The  Fifth 
corps  moved  along  the  Halifax  road — 
Ayres’  division  in  the  advance,  Griffin’s 
next,  and  Crawford’s  in  the  rear.  These 
troops  formed  the  expeditionary  or 
flanking  column.  Along  the  Vaughan 
road  marched  Smyth’s  and  Mott’s  di- 
visions of  the  Second  corps.  These 
troops  had  the  duty  assigned  them  of 
moving  directly  on  the  enemy’s  works 
at  Hatcher’s  Run,  while  the  Fifth  corps 
and  Gregg’s  cavalry  marched  around 
their  right.  The  weather  and  the  roads 
were  good ; and  the  troops,  carrying 
four  days’  rations,  were  in  excellent 
spirits.  Gregg’s  cavalry  column,  ad 
vancing  from  Reams’  Station  towards 
Dinwiddie  Court  House,  encountered, 
at  Rowanty  Creek,  a body  of  Wade 
Hampton’s  cavalry,  dismounted  and  in- 
trenched. After  a sharp  skirmish,  the 
bridge  across  the  creek,  and  the  works 
were  carried;  and  22  of  the  garrison 


HATCHER’S  RUN. 


901 


were  made  prisoners.  The  Nationals 
lost  20  men.  The  stream  was,  at  this 
time,  about  20  feet  wide.  As  it  was 
too  deep  for  fording,  it  was  necessary 
to  construct  bridges  to  enable  the 
Fifth  corps  to  get  over  with  its  ord- 
nance, supply  trains,  and  ambulances. 
This  caused  a delay  of  several  hour^ 
The  cavalry,  however,  moved  on  rap- 
idly to  Dinwiddie  Court  House,  where 
they  captured  an  empty  wagon  train, 
and  sent  out  scouting  parties  in  vari- 
ous directions.  At  nightfall  Gregg 
returned  to  Rowanty  Creek,  and  en- 
camped. 

General  Humphreys,  with  the  second 
and  third  divisions  of  his  corps,  moved 
down  the  Vaughan  road  to  Hatcher’s 
Run — Mott  with  the  third  division  in 
the  advance,  De  Trobriand’s  brigade 
leading.  De  Trobriand  deployed  his 
brigade  in  line  of  battle ; and,  sending 
the  Ninety-Ninth  Pennsylvania  over  in 
skirmishing  order,  he  carried  the  works 
and  secured  the  ford.  The  Confeder- 
ates were  compelled  to  take  refuge  in 
the  woods.  The  brigade  then  taking 
position  on  a hill  beyond  the  ford, 
threw  up  intrenchments.  But  the  cav- 
alry battalion,  which  had  crossed  a 
little  to  the  south  of  the  Vaughan 
road,  while  pursuing  the  enemy  and 
reconnoitring  on  the  left,  met  a small 
force  in  ambush,  from  which  it  received 
a sharp  volley,  and  lost  a number  of 
men  and  horses. 

General  Smyth,  in  the  mean  time, 
before  the  run  was  crossed  and  while 
his  division  was  yet  half  a mile  from 
the  stream,  turned  off  to  the  right, 
along  a by-path,  leading  northeastward 


towards  Armstrong’s  Mill  and  Ford. 
After  an  advance  of  about  a mile,  a 
heavy  force  of  the  enemy,  under  Gordon, 
was  found  in  a strong  position,  with 
pickets  thrown  out  in  front.  The  Con- 
federates having  retired  within  their 
breastworks,  Smyth  formed  his  men  in 
line  of  battle,  his  left  connecting  with 
Mott’s  right.  Earth-works  were  also 
thrown  up  and  other  preparations  made 
to  resist  an  attack.  Skirmishing  went 
on  till  about  two  o’clock,  when  a furi- 
ous artillery  fire  was  begun  by  the 
enemy.  About  half-past  four,  the  ene- 
my fell  with  great  weight  on  Smyth’s 
right  flank,  striking  principally  McAl- 
lister’s and  Murphy’s  brigades.  With 
their  accustomed  yell,  the  Confederates 
pressed  through  a difficult  swamp  upon 
which  Smyth’s  right  partly  rested  , 
but  the  troops,  standing  firm  behind 
their  breast- works,  received  them  with 
such  a musketry  fire  that  they  fell  back 
again  to  the  woods.  This  attempt  to 
carry  the  works  on  the  right  flank,  and 
thus  turn  the  National  position,  was 
repeated  a second  and  a third  time,  but 
with  the  same  result.  It  was  not  until 
darkness  fell  that  the  fighting  was  dis- 
continued. Smyth’s  lines  remained 
intact.  When  morning  dawned,  it  was 
found  that  the  Confederates  had  aban- 
doned their  ground  in  front  of  the 
Second  corps.  During  the  night  the 
lines  were  re-formed  so  that  the 
Fifth  and  Second  corps  were  6. 
brought  into  connection,  the  Second 
on  the  right,  the  Fifth  on  the  left, 
the  latter  covered  by  Gregg’s  cavalry. 
The  Sixth  and  Ninth  corps  were  also 
so  disposed  as  to  be  able  to  render 


306 


902 


THE  FALL  OF  PETERSBURG  AND  RICHMOND. 


assistance  to  the  Fifth  and  Second,  if 
necessary.  The  lines,  as  usual  in  the 
presence  of  the  enemy,  were  covered 
with  rude  breast- works.  Early  in  the 
forenoon,  De  Trobriand  and  McAllister 
moved  out  their  bris^ades  and  recon- 
noitred  in  the  direction  of  Petersburg. 
About  noon,  Crawford’s  division  of  the 
Fifth  corps  was  sent  towards  Dabney’s 
Mills  with  the  view  of  getting  to  the 
Boydton  plank-road.  The  entire  region, 
to  be  traversed  in  this  direction,  was  ill 
adapted  for  marching  or  manoeuvring. 
It  was  covered  with  thick  woods,  and 
broken  up  in  all  directions  with  swamps 
and  ravines.  There  was  but  one  road; 
and  it  was  so  narrow  that  two  wagons 
could  not  pass  each  other.  The  troops, 
advancing  in  skirmishing  order  on  the 
right  and  left  of  the  road,  were  more 
unfortunate  than  those  moving  along 
it,  as  the  ground  was  softer,  covered 
with  thick  underbrush,  and  swarming 
with  Confederate  sharp-shooters.  The 
men  lost  their  shoes  in  the  mud  ; and 
their  muskets  and  ammunition  were 
made  useless  by  water.  About  two 
miles  above  the  Vaughan  road,  Craw- 
ford’s skirmishers  met  those  of  the 
enemy  under  Pegram,  and  drove  them 
back.  Pegram  sent  for  assistance,  and 
\vas  quickly  reinforced  by  Evans’  di- 
vision. The  persevering  advance  of 
Crawford  was  at  length  checked,  but 
not  before  the  enemy  had  been  driven 
beyond  Dabney’s  Mills. 

Gregg  with  the  cavalry,  on  the  left 
;)f  the  Vaughan  road,  had  been  fighting 
for  some  time,  the  enemy’s  cavalry 
having  commenced  the  day  by  pressing 
his  rear,  so  that  Davies’  brigade,  and 


subsequently  the  entire  division,  became 
engaged.  During  a lull  in  the  fighting, 
the  cavalry  threw  up  breast-works, 
which  proved  of  immense  advantage. 
Towards  evening  the  enemy  attacked 
again  in  force,  driving  in  the  pickets 
and  forcing  the  troops  to  take  refuge 
behind  their  intrenchments.  Heavy 
firing  Ijollowed,  the  Nationals,  some  of 
whom  were  armed  with  the  Spencer 
rifie,  inflicting  considerable  loss  upon 
the  enemy.  The  battle  became  very 
severe;  and  Gregg,  who  was  finally 
driven  out  of  his  breast-works,  was 
forced  back  to  Hatcher’s  Kun. 

While  the  cavalry  had  thus  been 
desperately  engaged  on  the  left,  the 
infantry  on  the  right  of  the  Vaughan 
road  had  to  withstand  repeated  shocks. 
Soon  after  five  o’clock,  the  enemy  came 
down  upon  the  Fifth  corps.  As  it  was 
apprehended  that  Crawford’s  division, 
entangled  in  the  woods,  might  be  cut 
off,  Ayres’  division  was  sent  to  its  sup- 
port ; but  while  moving  in  column  it 
was  attacked  and  driven  back.  Wheat- 
on’s division  of  the  Sixth  coiq)s,  which 
arrived  about  five  o’clock,  was  also 
ordered  up  to  the  support  of  Crawford, 
and  part  of  it  was,  for  a time,  hotly 
engaged.  This  division,  however,  shared 
in  the  general  reverse,  and  soon  joined 
the  Fifth  corps  and  Gregg’s  cavalry, 
both  of  which  were  falling  back  in 
confusion.  The  force  of  the  enemy 
consisted  of  Pegram’s  and  Evans’  divis- 
ions of  Gordon’s  corps,  and  Mahone’s 
division  of  A.  P.  Hill’s  corps.  In  the 
presence  of  these  veteran  troops,  and 
in  a broken  and  swampy  country,  in 
which  the  enemy  had  greatly  the 


SHERIDAN’S  GREAT  RAID. 


903 


advantage,  in  being  well  acquainted  with 
the  ground,  a retreat  could  not  be  con- 
ducted with  anything  like  a regular 
formation.  The  scattered  troops  fought 
as  they  fell  back,  every  man  for  him- 
self, firino:  from  behind  trees  and  such 
slielter  as  they  could  find ; nor  was  it 
until  the  Vaughan  road  and  Hatcher’s 
Kun  were  reached  and  the  intrench- 
ments  regained,  that  the  routed  col- 
umns could  be  rallied.  Flushed  with 
success,  the  Confederates  dashed  out  of 
tlie  woods  into  the  open  space  in  front 
of  the  works.  Keceived  with  a sharp 
fire  they  fell  back  quickly  to  their 
cover,  without  attempting  to  carry  the 
defenses.  Thus  ended  the  second  bat- 
tle of  Hatcher’s  Kun.  The  Confeder- 
ate loss  was  about  1000  in  killed  and 
# 

^vounded.  Among  the  former  was 
General  Pegram.  The  Nationals  sus- 
tained a loss  of  nearly  2000  men. 
General  Crawford’s  division  suffered 
severely. 

The  National  troops  busied  them- 
selves all  night,  and  during  the  morning 
Feb.  strengthening  their 

7 . defenses,  believing  that  the  Con- 
federates would  attack  again  ; but,  as 
they  showed  no  disposition  to  do  so, 
Crawford’s  division  was  sent  out  to 
I’econnoitre.  The  enemy  was  found  in 
a strong  position  higher  up  the  stream, 
between  Armstrong’s  and  Burgess’ 
Mills.  A sharp  musketry  fire  was  kept 
up  for  some  time  ; but  as  Crawford  was 
not  strong  enough  to  force  the  enemy’s 
lines,  he  fell  back  again  towards  the 
intrenchments.  There  was  also  con- 
siderable artillery  firing  during  the  day. 
On  the  8th  there  was  no  fighting.  The 


troops,  however,  were  kept  busy  during 
the  entire  day  throwing  up  intrench- 
ments and  defensive  works.  The  result 
of  the  entire  movement  was  the  pro- 
longation of  the  National  line  in  the 
direction  of  the  South  Side  Kailroad,  as 
far  as  Hatcher’s  Bun,  to  which  the 
City  Point  Kailroad  was  continued. 

Before  commencing  a general  move- 
ment of  the  armies  operating  against 
Kichmond  and  Petersburg,  it  was  of 
the  utmost  importance  that  all  the 
enemy’s  communications,  north  of  the 
James,  should  be  cut  off.  To  accom- 
plish this  object,  and  with  a view  also, 
if  possible,  to  reinforce  Sherman,  who 
was  inferior  to  his  opponents  in  cavalry. 
Grant  determined  to  set  in  motion  an 
expedition  from  the  Shenandoah  Val- 
ley. Placing  General  Hancock  tempo- 
rai’ily  in  charge  of  the  Middle  Military 
Division,  with  his  headquarters  at  Win- 
chester, Grant  directed  Sheridan  to  pro- 
ceed with  an  adequate  cavalry  force  to 
Lynchburg,  and  after  thoroughly  break- 
ing up  the  railroad  and  canal,  to  push 
southward  and  join  Sherman.  Accord- 
ingly, Sheridan,  on  tlie  27th  of  Febru- 
ary, left  his  camp  at  Winchester  with 
about  10,000  cavalry,  comprising  Mer- 
ritt’s first  division,  Custer’s  third  divis- 
ion, and  a brigade \under  Colonel  Cape- 
hart,  with  4 guns.  For  some  days 
before  the  march  commenced,  heavy 
rains  had  prevailed.  The  roads  there- 
fore, were  very  bad  ; and  the  streams 
and  rivers  were  greatly  swollen.  The 
troops,  however,  marched  along  tlie 
turnpike,  which,  being  macadamized, 
was  in  comparatively  good  condition, 
and  passed  successively  through  Kerns« 


904 


THE  FALL  OF  PETERSBURG  AND  RICHMOND. 


f 


town,  Middletown,  and  Strasburg,  reach- 
ing Woodstock,  without  encountering 
opposition.  At  Woodstock  the  column 
bivouacked,  ha\dng  marched  30  miles 
on  the  first  day.  Thence  the  march 
was  continued,  on  the  28th,  through 
Edenburg  and  Hawkinsburg  to  the 
North  Fork  of  the  Shenandoah,  which 
was  crossed  by  a pontoon  bridge  be- 
tween Mount  Jackson  and  New  Market. 
After  a march  of  27  miles,  the  troops 
bivouacked  at  Lincoln’s  Mills,  between 
Harrisonburg  and  New  Market.  On 
the  1st  of  March,  the  column  moved 
26  miles,  passing  through  Harrisonburg, 
Mount  Cra^vford,  and  Mount  Sydney, 
and,  crossing  Middle  Kiver,  encamped 
about  4 miles  from  Staunton.  At  this 
place,  it  was  known.  Early  had  his 
head-quarters.  The  Confederate  chief, 
however,  had  anticipated  Sheridan’s 
approach,  and  warned  the  inhabitants, 
who  removed  from  the  town  much  of 
their  money  and  valuables. 

The  only  skirmishing,  so  far,  had 
been  at  the  North  River,  near  Mount 
Crawford,  where  Capehart’s  brigade 
had  a sharp  contest  with  some  cavalry 
of  Rosser’s  division,  who  were  trying  to 
burn  the  bridge.  The  bridge,  however, 
Avas  saved ; and  87  prisoners  and  21 
wagons  were  captured,  with  a loss  of  only 
6 men.  The  weather  had  been  good, 
permitting  83  miles  of  the  march  to  be 
easily  accomplished.  During  the  night 
of  the  1st  of  March,  the  rain  began  to 
fall.  About  nine  o’clock,  while  the  troops 
were  encamped  outside  of  Staunton, 
Devin’s  brigade  moved  up  to  the  town, 
drove  out  the  pickets,  and  occupied 
it  without  opposition.  Turning  then 


towards  the  left,  the  brigade  marched  7 
miles  along  the  road  leading  to'  Rock- 
fish  Gap,  and  destroyed  the  trestle 
bi’idge  of  the  Virginia  Central  Railroad 
at  Christian’s  Creek. 

On  the  2d  of  March,  Sheridan’s 
column,  heedless  of  the  rain, 
which  still  continued  to  fall  in  2. 
torrent^  moved  through  Staunton  ; and 
the  march  was  continued  towards 
Waynesboro,  on  the  South  Ri^^er,  1-3 
miles  southeast,  whither  Early  had 
retreated  Avith  the  forces  under  his 
command.  At  Fisherville,  Custer’s 
division,  in  the  advance,  encountered 
the  enemy’s  videttes  and  drove  them 
back  towards  Waynesboro.  On  arriv- 
ing near  the  latter  place,  the  Confed- 
erates were  found  in  an  intrenched 
position,  with  5 guns.  Custer  then, 
placing  Colonel  Pennington’s  brigade 
on  the  right,  and  Colonel  Welles’  on 
the  left,  AAuth  Capehart’s  in  reserve,  de- 
ployed two  regiments  of  the  advanced 
brigades  as  skirmishers,  Avho  moved  to 
the  attack  firing  briskly.  Much  to  the 
surprise  of  their  assailants,  the  Confed- 
erates, after  firing  a single  volley,  broke 
and  attempted  to  retreat ; but  Custer’s 
troops,  rushing  in  and  surrounding 
them,  captured  some  1600  men,  about 
two-thirds  of  Early’s  Avhole  command. 
Among  the  captures  Avere  11  guns,  17 
battle-flags,  over  100  horses  and  mules, 
and  about  200  wagons  loaded  Avith  sub- 
sistence stores.  Early’s  personal  bag 
gage  Avas  taken,  but  he  himself  escaped 
to  Charlottesville.  This  AA^as  the  end 
of  Early  as  a military  leader. 

Custer’s  division  and  Capehart’s 
brio^ade  crossed  the  South  River  and 


SHERIDAN  MOVING  TO  WHITE  HOUSE. 


905 


moved  on  rapidly  in  pursuit  as  far  as 
Greenwood  Station,  destroying  the  de- 
pot  and  a train,  in  which  were  6 pieces 
of  artillery  with  commissary  and  ord- 
nance supiDlies,  which  Early  had  in- 
tended to  send  away.  The  prisoners 
were  sent  to  Winchester  under  an 
escort  of  1500  men.  On  the  6th,  the 
escort  was  attacked,  while  crossing  the 
North  Fork  of  the  Shenandoah,  by  a 
small  force  under  Rosser..  Rosser, 
however,  was  beaten  off,  and  the  num- 
ber of  prisoners  Avas  increased.  The 
detachment  arrived  at  Winchester,  with 
its  charge,  safe.  Sheridan’s  entire  col- 
umn having  come  up  to  Waynesboro, 
the  march  was  resumed,  on  the  morning 
of  the  3d,  in  the  direction  of  Char- 
lottesville, 18  miles  to  the  east.  The 
rain  was  still  falling ; and  the  roads  were 
wretched.  The  troops,  destroying  the 
]*ailroad  and  bridges,  as  they  moved 
along,  arrived  at  Charlottesville  on  the 
day  of  starting ; but  they  were  de- 
tained there  two  days,  awaiting  the 
arrival  of  the  wagon  trains,  which  were 
delayed  by  the  wretched  condition  of 
the  roads.  In  the  mean  time  bodies  of 
troops  sent  out,  destroyed  the  railroad 
in  the  direction  of  both  Lynchburg  and 
Richmond,  as  well  as  the  large  iron 
bridges  over  the  North  and  South  forks 
of  the  Rivanna  River. 

The  delay,  occasioned  by  the  detention 
of  his  trains,  finally  caused  Sheridan  to 
abandon  the  idea  of  capturing  Lynch- 
Mar.  burg;  and,  on  the  morning  of  the 
6.  6th,  dividing  his  force  into  two 
cn  I limns,  he  sent  one  southward  to 
Scottsville,  whence  it  marched  up  the 
James  River  Canal  to  New  Market, 


destroying  every  lock  between  those 
towns,  and  working  destruction  gener- 
ally. From  New  Market  a detachment 
was  sent  on  to  Duguidsville,  to  secure 
the  bridge  at  that  point.  It  Avas  found, 
when  the  front  was  reached,  that  the 
bridge  was  already  destroyed,  as  was 
that  also  over  the  James  at  HardAvicks- 
ville.  The  other  column,  Avhich  moved 
in  a southAvesterly  direction,  succeeded 
in  destroying  the  railroad  as  far  as  Am- 
herst Coui*t  House,  16  miles  north  of 
Lynchburg.  Thence  it  moved  across 
the  country  to  New  Market,  where  the 
two  columns  effected  a junction.  The 
James  River  was  now  so  much  swollen, 
that  the  pontoons  Avere  found  to  be 
useless.  The  Confederates  had  also 
destroyed  the  bridges  by  which  Sheridan 
had  hoped  to  get  to  the  South  Side 
Railroad.  He  had,  therefore,  only  two 
alternatives,  either  to  return  to  Winches- 
ter or  to  march  as  rapidly  as  possible  to 
White  House.  Choosing  the  latter 
course,  he  followed  the  James  River 
Canal  towards  Richmond,  and  destroyed 
every  lock,  besides  cutting  through  the 
banks  whereA^^er  that  was  practicable,  as 
far  east  as  Goochland.  On  the  10th,  at 
Columbia,  at  the  confluence  of  the  Riv- 
anna with  the  James,  he  concentrated  his 
whole  force.  Remaining  there  one  day, 
he  sent  scouts  to  Grant,  with  information 
as  to  his  position  and  intentions,  with 
a request  that  supplies  be  sent  to  meet 
him  at  White  House.  His  scouts 
arrived  at  head-quarters,  on  the 
night  of  the  12th;  and  an  infantry  force 
was  immediately  sent  by  Grant  to  take 
possession  of  White  House,  whither 
abundant  supplies  were  forwarded. 


906 


THE  FALL  OF  PETERSBURG  AND  RICHMOND. 


Sheridan,  then  moving  as  if  he  intended 
to  threaten  Richmond,  arrived  at  the 
Central  Railroad,  near  Ashland  station. 
He  then  crossed  the  South  Anna  and 
the  North  Anna;  and  having  destroyed 
all  the  bridges  and  many  miles  of  rail- 
road, he  proceeded  down  the  north 
bank  of  the  Pamunkey  to  White  House, 
where  he  arrived  on  the  19th,  his  men 
and  horses  in  great  need  of  rest  and 
supplies. 

The  amount  of  property  destroyed,  in 
this  great  raid,  was  enormous.  It  was 
estimated  that  the  pro^^erty  destroyed 
by  Custer  alone  amounted  to  $2,000,- 
000.  Not  a bridge  was  left  standing 
over  the  James  between  Richmond  and 
Lynchburg.  Every  railroad  bridge  was 
destroyed  between  Staunton  and  Char- 
lottesville, as  well  as  between  the  lat- 
ter place  and  Buffalo.  The  aqueduct 
at  Columbia  was  badly  damaged.  No 
kind  of  property  was  spared.  It  was 
a general  and  complete  destruction. 
Richmond  was  filled  with  consterna- 
tion. The  Confederate  government 
was  paralyzed.  On  the  24th,  Sheridan 
moved  from  White  House,  crossed  the 
James  River  at  Jones’  Landing,  and  on 
the  27th,  formed  a junction  with  the 
army  of  the  Potomac,  in  front  of  Pet- 
ersburg, taking  position  in  Gregg’s  old 
camp  on  the  left  and  rear  of  the  army. 

The  course  of  events  in  North  Caro- 
lina had  now  made  it  the  most  prudent 
policy  for  Lee  and  Johnston  to  unite 
their  forces  ; and  Grant’s  great  source  of 
anxiety  at  this  time  was  the  probability 
that  the  Confederates  would  leave  their 
strong  lines  about  Petersburg  and  Rich- 
mond for  the  purpose  of  accomplishing 


this  union  of  the  two  great  Confederate 
armies.  “ I had  spent  days  of  anxiety,” 
says  General  Grant  in  his  repoid,  lest 
each  morning  should  bring  the  report 
that  the  enemy  had  retreated  the  night 
before.  I was  firmly  convinced  that 
Sherman’s  crossing  the  Roanoke  would 
be  the  signal  for  Lee  to  leave.  With 
Johnston  and  him  combined,  a long, 
tedious,  and  expensive  campaign,  con- 
suming most  of  the  summer,  might  be- 
come necessary.”  From  the  reports  of 
deserters  and  from  other  sources.  Grant 
had  become  fully  convinced  that  some 
such  movement  was  intended,  and  that 
Petersburg  was  about  to  be  abandoned. 
Lee,  in  truth,  had  already  resolved  to 
penetrate  the  National  lines,  and,  what- 
ever the  risk,  to  attempt  to  force  his 
way  from  the  Appomattox  to  the 
Roanoke. 

To  prevent  such  a movement,  and 
with  a view  to  force  a final  issue.  Grant 
had  made  arrangements,  as  early  as  the 
24th  of  March,  for  a general  attack  on 
the  29th.  Lee,  however,  was  also  bent 
on  carrying  out  his  perilous  purpose ; 
and,  on  the  morning  of  the  25th, 
he  fell  with  crushins:  weis^ht  on  25. 
the  lines  of  the  Ninth  corps  in  front  of 
Fort  Steadman — a square  work  on 
Hare’s  Hill,  about  a mile  from  the 
Appomattox.  It  was  the  second  regu- 
lar fort  in  the  rio^ht  of  the  National 
lines.  The  first  was  Fort  McGilvery, 
close  by  the  river.  The  third,  to  the 
south,  was  Fort  Haskell.  Fort  St-ead- 
man  mounted  9 guns,  and  was  sup- 
23orted  by  moidar  batteries  on  the  right 
and  left.  The  National  line,  at  this 
point,  was  guarded  by  McLaughlin’s 


ADVANCE  OF  THE  NATIONAL  LEFT. 


907 


brigade  of  Willcox’s  division,  tbe  Four- 
teenth New  York  Heavy  Artillery  being 
inside  the  fort.  Gordon’s  corps  con- 
sisting of  three  divisions,  was  massed 
against  it  at  daylight.  The  rest  of 
Lee’s  army  was,  at  the  same  time,  held 
in  readiness,  should  the  proposed  at- 
tempt prove  successful,  to  make  an 
attack  on  the  National  left.  The  dis- 
tance between  the  opposing  lines,  at 
Fort  Steadman,  was  only  150  yards. 
At  daybreak,  Gordon’s  troops,  having 
got  through  the  obstructions  in  their 
own  immediate  front,  rushed  over  the 
interval,  charged  up  the  acclivity  to  the 
fort,  and  w^orked  their  way  rapidly 
through  the  abatis.  The  assault  was 
executed  in  so  bold  and  skilful  a man- 
ner that  the  National  officers  were  sur- 
prised. Gordon’s  troops  carried  the  fort 
almost  without  any  opposition.  Turn- 
ing the  guns  of  the  fort  towards  the 
right  and  left,  they  compelled  the  aban- 
donment of  the  mortar  batteries,  which 
they  immediately  occupied.  Over  500 
men  were  made  prisoners,  including  18 
commissioned  officers. 

Resolved  to  extend  their  conquest, 
the  victors  moved  upon  Fort  Haskell, 
then  commanded  by  Major  Woermer. 
The  situation  had  become  extremely 
critical ; and,  if  Gordon  had  been  well 
supported,  a serious  disaster  might  have 
befallen  the  National  army.  From 
some  cause  or  other,  Lee  lost  his  oppor- 
tunity. It  was  his  last.  Willcox’s 
men  were  rallied ; Hartranft,  with  his 
division,  came  to  the  rescue;  and  all 
the  neighboring  batteries  concentrated 
their  fire  on  Fort  Steadman,  and  the 
C ^nf ederate  advance.  The  enemy  made 


good  and  effective  use  of  the  captured 
guns.  It  soon  became  manifest,  how- 
ever, that  he  was  engaged  in  a hopeless 
struggle.  The  concentrated  fire  of  the 
different  batteries  was  working  terrible 
destruction  Hartranft’s  men  pressed 
towards  the  captured  fort,  with  an 
energy  and  a determination  seldom 
equalled  in  war.  For  a time  the  battle 
raged  fiercely.  Finally,  however,  the 
Confederates,  recently  so  elated  with 
victory,  were  forced  back  into,  and  out 
of  Fort  Steadman.  Some  of  them 
made  the  rash  attempt  to  regain  theii 
own  lines  ; but  such  was  the  enfilading 
fire  from  the  National  artillery,  which 
swept  the  intervening  ground,  that 
they  were  literally  cut  to  pieces.  About 
1900  surrendered,  rather  than  make 
the  perilous  attempt.  Fort  Steadman 
and  the  other  works  were  of  course 
recovered.  The  entire  Confederate  los  » 
was  about  2500.  The  National  loss 
was  estimated  at  68  killed,  337  wound 
ed,  and  506  missing.  The  contest  was 
over  by  ten  o’clock.  At  Gordon’s 
request,  a brief  truce  was  agreed  upon  ; 
and  the  dead  were  buried. 

A general  advance  of  the  National 
left  was  ordered  a little  later  in  the 
forenoon.  The  Sixth  corps  which  lay 
on  the  left  of  the  Ninth,  and  the  Second 
which  was  on  the  left  of  the  Sixth, 
moved  out  against  the  Confederate 
picket  line,  which  was  far  in  advance  of 
the  main  line  of  works.  The  picket  line 
was  captured,  without  much  difficulty ; 
and  many  prisoners  were  taken.  It  was 
not  to  be  supposed,  however,  that  the 
Confederates  would  allow  the  advauced 
position  to  remain  in  the  possession 


908 


THE  FALL  OF  PETERSBURG  AND  RICHMOND. 


of  their  antagonists,  without  making 
a bold  effort  to  reclaim  it.  Accord- 
ingly, about  half -past  two  in  the  after- 
noon, a vigorous  assault  was  made  upon 
the  Sixth  corps.  A little  later,  about 
half-past  four,  a similar  assault  was  made 
on  the  Second  corps.  The  fighting 
was  protracted  and  severe ; but  the 
('Onfed orates  were  ultimately  driven 
back,  and,  at  night,  the  advanced  posi- 
tion was  held  by  the  Nationals. 

Grant’s  original  purpose,  which  was 
to  open  the  campaign  by  a general 
movement  by  the  left  flank,  on  the 
29th,  was  not  in  any  way  affected  by 
the  events  of  the  25th.  Adhering  to 
his  plan,  he  pushed  forward  prepara- 
tions for  the  grand  movement.  It  will 
be  obseiwed  that  the  movement,  con- 
templated by  Grant,  was,  in  its  main 
features,  a repetition  of  those  tactics, 
with  which  we  were  made  familiar, 
during  the  Wilderness  campaign.  It 
was  his  purpose  to  mass  on  his  own 
left,  and,  using  his  right  as  a pivot,  to 
fall  with  overwhelming  force  on  Lee’s 
right  and  vulnerable  flank.  With  the 
exception  of  the  Ninth  corps,  which 
\vas  to  form  the  National  right  and  to 
i)e  the  pivot  of  the  movement,  the  turn- 
ing column  was  to  embrace  the  entire 
army  of  the  Potomac,  Sheridan’s  cav- 
alry force,  and  neai'ly  the  whole  army 
of  the  James.  The  right  of  Lee’s 
intrenched  line,  running  south  westward 
from  Petersburg,  crossed  Hatcher’s  Pun 
at  the  Boydton  plank  road.  Thence 
it  extended  some  distance  westward, 
[)arallel  with  Hatcher’s  Pun  and  along 
the  .White  Oak  road.  This  line  cov- 
ered Lee’s  main  communication  by  the 


South  Side  Pailroad.  About  4 miles 
further  to  the  west  of  the  termination 
of  this  intrenched  front,  there  was  a 
detached  line,  running  also  along  the 
White  Oak  road,  and  covering  an  im- 
portant strategic  point,  known  as  Five 
Forks.  Such  was  the  position  which 
Grant  proposed  to  turn. 

On  the  27th,  General  Ord,  then  in 
command  of  the  army  of  the  James, 
moved  over  with  the  greater  portion  of 
his  troops,  from  the  Pichmond  front  to 
the  lines  before  Petersburg.  The  force, 
thus  (ransf erred,  consisted  of  two  di- 
visions of  the  Twenty-Fourth  corps, 
under  General  Gibbon  ; one  division  of 
the  Twenty-Fifth  corps,  under  General 
Birney  ; and  a small  division  of  cavaliy, 
under  General  McKenzie.  They  took 
position  on  the  extreme  left  of  the 
National  line,  on  the  ground  occupier)^ 
on  the  25th,  by  the  Second  and  Fiftn 
corps.  The  Ninth  corps,  under  General 
Parke,  and  the  remainder  of  Ord’s  com- 
mand, under  General  Weitzel,  were 
left  to  guard  the  extended  line  of 
intrenchments. 

On  the  29th,  at  an  early  hour,  the 
Fifth  and  Second  corps,  commanded 
respectively  by  Warren  and  Hum-  Mar. 
phreys,  led  the  general  advance. 

The  distance  to  be  traversed  was  not 
great ; but  the  roads  were  in  a wretched 
condition,  and  progress  was  necessarily 
slow.  Warren,  marching  well  to  the 
left,  crossed  Powanty  Creek,  and  then, 
turning  to  the  right,  moved  northward 
along  the  Quaker  road.  Humphreys 
advancing  by  the  Vaughan  road,  cross- 
ed to  Hatcher’s  Pun,  some  4 miles 
above  Powanty  Creek,  and  then,  like 


LEE’S  CRITICAL  POSITION'. 


909 


Warren,  turned  his  face  to  the  north. 
The  two  corps,  on  roads  nearly  parallel, 
were  thus  marching  towards  the  flank 
of  the  Confederate  intrenchments.  War- 
ren had  advanced  to  within  2 miles  of 
the  Confederate  works,  before  he  en- 
countered anything  like  serious  opposi- 
tion. The  enemy  was  then  felt  in 
some  strength.  A sharp  contest  en- 
sued, the  weight  of  the  resistance  being 
chiefly  borne  by  Chamberlain’s  advance 
brigade,  of  Grifiin’s  division.  Griffin 
not  only  held  his  own — he  repulsed  the 
Confederates,  who  left  behind  them 
100  men  as  prisoners,  with  a consider- 
able number  of  dead  and  wounded. 
The  National  loss,  in  the  encounter,  did 
not  exceed  370  men.  Warren  pressed 
on,  and  drew  fire  from  the  Confederate 
works  on  the  White  Oak  road.  Hum- 
phreys, whose  pathway  was  more  diffi- 
cult than  that  of  Warren,  had  neared, 
but  not  reached  the  Confederate  works, 
when  night  compelled  him  to  discon- 
tinue his  advance.  Sheridan,  mean- 
while, having  moved  by  a more  cir- 
cuitous and  more  adventurous-  route, 
had  reached  Hinwiddie  Court  House, 
about  6 miles  southwest  of  the  position 
occupied  by  the  right  of  the  National 
advance. 

Such  was  the  situation  on  the  night 
of  the  29th.  The  National  line  was 
practically  unbroken  from  Dinwiddle 
Court  House,  to  the  Appomattox,  and 
\vas  in  the  following  order : Parke, 
Wright,  Ord,  Humphreys,  Warren, 
Sheridan.  It  had  been  Grant’s  inten- 
tion— and  instructions  had  been  given 
accordingly — that  Sheridan  should  cut 
loose  from  the  rest  of  the  army,  and 


set  out  on  an  expedition  against  the 
South  Side  and  Danville  Railroads. 
The  Lieutenant-General,  in  the  brief 
interval,  had  changed  his  mind  with 
regard  to  the  disposition  of  the  cavalry ; 
and  on  the  29th,  he  so  informed  Sheri- 
dan. I now  feel  ” wrote  Grant,  “ like 
ending  the  matter,  if  it  is  possible  to 
do  so,  before  going  back.  I do  not 
want  you,  therefore,  to  cut  loose,  and 
go  after  the  enemy’s  roads  at  present. 
In  the  morning,  push  around  the  ene- 
my, and  get  on  his  right  rear.  We 
will  act  all  together  as  one  army  here, 
until  it  is  seen  what  can  be  done  with 
the  enemy.” 

The  position  of  Lee  had  now  become 
extremely  critical.  To  a man  of  weaker 
nerve,  and  le^s  fruitful  of  resource,  it 
would  certainly  have  seemed  desperate. 
He  knew  that  Grant  was  massing  his 
troops  on  his  own  left,  and  that  a vig- 
orous attack  was  contemplated  in  the 
direction  of  the  Confedei’ate  right.  As 
yet,  however,  he  was  ignorant  of  the 
actual  condition  of  the  National  right. 
He  did  not  know  that  Grant  had  so 
concentrated  on  his  own  left, . that  he 
was  incapable  of  making  any  offensive 
movement  with  his  right.  It  was  all-im- 
portant  that  effective  resistance  should 
be  offered  to  the  threatened  movement, 
on  his  light ; for  if  success  should  at- 
tend his  antagonist  in  that  direction, 
his  only  remaining  lines  of  communica- 
tion with  the  rest  of  the  Confederacy 
would  be  effectually  severed.  It  was 
also  of  the  utmost  importance,  as  he 
conceived,  that  his  long  intrenched 
line — some  35  miles  in  length — which 
covered  Petersburg  and  Richmond 


910 


THE  FALL  OF  PETERSBURG  AND  RICHMOND. 


should  be  preserved  intact ; for  if  the 
line  should  be  penetrated,  at  any  one 
point,  the  struggle  would  be  rendered 
hopeless.  To  oppose  the  threatened 
movement,  and  to  protect  his  intended 
line,  he  had  only  37,000  muskets,  and 
a small  body  of  broken-down  horse. 
In  the  emergency,  the  Confederate  com- 
mander was  not  found  wanting.  Of 
the  two  evils  which  stared  him  in  the 
face,  and  from  one  or  other  of  which 
escape  was  impossible,  he  chose  the 
less.  He  stripped  his  intrenched  lines, 
as  far  as  was  possible,  and  concentrated 
his  strength  on  his  threatened  right 
flank.  It  was  unfortunate  for  Lee  that 
he  was  ignorant  of  the  strength  of  the 
Nationals,  in  front  of  his  own  left. 
Two  divisions  of  Longs treet’s  corps, 
some  8000  strong,  guarded  the  lines  of 
Hichmond ; and  Mahone’s  division  of 
Hill’s  corps  protected  those  in  front  of 
Bermuda  Hundred.  On  the  Petersburg 
side  were  the  divisions  of  Wilcox, 
Pickett,  Bushrod  Johnson,  and  the  rem- 
nant of  Ewell’s  corps,  now  under  Gor- 
don. Longstreet  was  ordered  to  remain 
where  he  was  for  the  present ; he  Avas 
to  move  to  the  Petersburg  side,  as  soon 
as  he  discovered  any  weakening  of  the 
lines  in  his  front.  From  the  troops  on 
the  Petersburg  side  he  drew  two  divis- 
ions and  three  brigades — a force  of 
about  15,000  men;  and  to  these  he 
added  what  remained  of  Fitz-Lee’s  cav- 
alry. LeaAung  only  some  6000  or  7000 
men  in  the  Petersburg  intrenchments, 
he  hastened,  during  the  stormy  night  of 
the  29th  and  30th,  and  placed  the  troops 
thus  collected  in  front  of  the  position 
in  which  Warren  and  Humphreys  were 


arrested  by  the  darkness. 

On  the  morning  of  the  30th,  the  Na- 
tional troops  were  in  position  and  ready 
to  strike.  The  storm  had  ceased ; 
but  the  ground  was  soaked  with  30. 
rain,  and  the  roads  were  wretched.  It 
was  found  next  to  impossible  to  move 
the  heavy  trains.  Such  in  fact,  Avas  the 
condition  of  the  entire  surrounding 
countiy,  that  Grant  was  in  no  haste  t?) 
force  a decisive  issue.  Humphreys  and 
Warren  Avere  pushed  forward,  and 
placed  close  in  front  of  the  Confederate 
line  on  the  White  Oak  road  and  Hat- 
cher’s Bun.  Sheridan  despatched  a 
body  of  cavalry  under  DeAun,  support- 
ed by  Davies’  brigade  of  Crook’s  divK- 
ion,  in  the  direction  of  Five  Forks. 
The  Confederates,  however,  Avere  found 
there  in  great  force;  and  the  cavaliy 
returned  to  Diinviddie  Court  House. 
During  the  coui-se  of  the  day.  Grant 
became  convinced,  from  reconnoissances 
made  by  his  subordinates,  that  the  Con- 
federate lines  Avere  weak,  and  that  they 
might  be  penetrated  without  great 
difficulty.  He  resolved,  therefore,  to 
reinforce  Sheridan  rather  than  extend 
his  line,  and  while  leaving  it  to  that 
officer  to  execute  the  flanking  moA;e- 
ments,  to  assault  the  enemy’s  lines  Avith 
the  other  corps. 

It  was  now  Fridav,  the  31st.  Tlie 
ground  was  still  unfavorable  for  moving 
large  masses  of  men  with  all  the 
impedimenta  <di  war.  Grant,  be-  31. 
lieving  his  position  secure,  and  influ- 
enced by  the  Aveather  and  the  impass<i- 
ble  character  of  the  ground,  Avas  still 
unwilling  to  make  too  much  haste. 
Lee,  however,  had  decided  differently. 


# 


A DASHING  CONFEDERATE  CHARGE. 


911 


Grant’s  delay  in  striking  wkat  was 
meant  to  be  a decisive  blow,  had  been 
a o^reat  ^ain  to  Lee.  He  was,  indeed, 
but  ill  prepared  to  resist  an  attack  on 
the  morning  of  the  30th.  His  troops, 
however,  were  now  well  forward ; and 
he  had  got  them  into  position.  The 
weather  had  given  him  time.  His  pos- 
ition, however,  was  pregnant  with  peril. 
Further  delay  would  be  no  gain  to  him ; 
it  might  be  his  ruin.  Brave  and  full 
of  resource  to  the  last,  he  resolved  to 
re2:)eat  the  experiment  which  had  been 
so  successful  in  the  past,  and  by  reason 
of  which  he  had  foiled  so  many  turning 
movements.  Warren  held  position,  on 
the  Boydton  plank-road,  with  the  divis- 
ions of  Griffin  and  Crawford.  The 
division  of  Ayres  was  thrown  forward 
to  the  west  of  that  road.  Early  on  the 
morning  of  the  31st,  Griffin  was  relieved 
by  Miles’  division  of  the  Second  corps, 
and  was  thus  enabled  to  develop  more 
fully  towards  the  left.  Warren,  in  fact, 
moved  his  entire  corps  to  the  westward 
of  the  Boydton  road,  and  pressed  for- 
ward, in  the  direction  of  the  extreme 
right  of  the  Confederate  line.  Ayres’ 
division  was  in  advance ; Crawford’s  was 
in  the  rear,  and  somewhat  to  the  right 
of  Ayres’ ; Griffin’s  was  in  the  rear  and 
to  the  right  of  Crawford’s.  Sheiidan 
was  so  far  to  the  left  that  several  miles 
intervened  between  the  National  caval- 
ry and  Wan-en’s  left  flank.  Warren 
has  been  found  fault  with  for  this  dis- 
position of  his  troops ; but,  in  the  cir- 
cumstances, it  is  difficult  to  see  how  he 
could  have  arranged  them  differently, 
without  acting  in  opposition  to  the 
first  principles  of  military  science.  He 


could  not  know  at  what  point  tlie 
enemy  would  strike;  and  so,  in  place 
of  extending  a thin  weak  line  from 
Humphreys’  left,  he  disposed  his  troo]  )s 
in  masses  en  echelon,  so  as  to  be  ready 
to  resist  attack  from  whatever  direct- 
ion it  might  come,  with  reinforcements 
close  at  hand.  Warren  was  desirous 
to  obtain  possession  of  the  White  Oak 
road,  beyond  the  extreme  left  of  the 
Confederate  line  of  intrenchments ; and 
after  he  had  received  instructions  to 
suspend  operations  for  the  day,  he  ob- 
tained permission  from  General  Meade 
to  reconnoitre  and  take  possession  of 
the  position,  if  he  found  it  possible 
to  do  so. 

It  was  this  movement  which  precipi- 
tated the  conflict.  It  was  now  half- 
past ten  o’clock.  Ayres’  division,  with 
Winthrop’s  brigade  in  advance,  had 
been  pushed  forward  in  the  direction 
indicated.  The  reconnoissance  was 
scarcely  begun,  when  the  enemy  was 
felt;  and  Lee,  with  the  swiftness  of 
lightning  and  with  the  weight  of  an 
avalanche,  fell  upon  Warren’s  advance. 
Ayres  was  stunned  by  the  blow,  and 
forced  back  upon  Crawford.  Crawford 
in  his  turn,  pressed  by  the  foe,  and  dis- 
organized by  the  fugitives,  broke  and 
fell  back  upon  Griffin.  The  wisdom  of 
the  echelon  arrangement  was  now  made 
visible.  Griffin  stood  firm  and  immov- 
able ; and,  in  the  more  open  ground  in 
which  his  division  was  posted,  the  othei 
two  divisions  were  quickly  rallied. 
The  Confederates,  elated  with  what 
promised  to  be  a complete  victory, 
were  effectually  held  in  check;  and 
Warren,  as  soon  as  his  lines  were  re- 


912 


THE  FALL  OF  PETERSBURG  AND  RICHMOND. 


stored,  made  a vigorous  counter-cliarge. 
Humplireys  pushed  Miles’  division  for- 
^vard  to  Warren’s  right;  and,  while  the 
Fifth  corps  attacked  the  Confederates 
in  front.  Miles  fell  heavily  on  their  left 
flank.  For  a time  the  fighting  was 
lively  and  spirited  in  the  extreme, 
Chamberlain’s  brigade  of  the  Fifth 
coi'ps,  particularly,  covering  itself  with 
glory.  The  Confederates  were  soon 
compelled  to  fall  back  behind  their  in- 
trenchments.  Humphreys  pressed  for- 
ward with  great  energy,  and  made 
bold  attacks  on  the  works  at  the  inter- 
section of  the  Boydton  and  White  Oak 
I'oads,  and  on  the  west  side  of  Hatcher’s 
Hun.  The  works,  however,  were  too 
strong  and  too  well  guarded  to  be 
assailed  with  success. 

Lee  had  failed  in  his  attack  on  War- 
ren. In  regaining  his  intrenchments, 
however,  he  had  sustained  but  little 
loss.  He  was  quickly  ready  for  another 
bold  and  determined  effort,  which  he 
confidently  hoped  would  be  attended 
with  better,  perhaps  enduring  success. 
Sheridan,  as  we  have  seen,  had  failed 
in  the  attempt  which  he  made  on  Five 
Forks,  on  the  30th.  Impressed,  how- 
ever, with  the  strategic  value  of  the 
position,  and  undismayed  by  the  exper- 
ience of  the  day  before,  Sheridan  made 
another  attempt  on  the  morning  of  the 
31st.  Devin’s  division,  supported  by 
Davies’  brigade  of  Crook’s  division,  was 
])ushed  forward  again  in  the  direction 
of  Five  Forks.  Crook,  with  his  other 
two  brigades,  those  of  Smith  and 
Gregg,  encountered  and  held  in  check 
a hostile  cavalry  force  at  Chamberlain’s 
Creek,  While  the  Confederate  cavalry 


were  thus  occupied  with  Crook,  and 
the  Confederate  infantry  were  engaged 
with  Warren,  Five  Forks  was  left  com- 
paratively unprotected ; and  the  place 
was  seized  without  difficulty  by  De\dn 
and  Davies.  His  infantry  safe  behind 
their  works  and  Warren’s  progress 
effectually  checked,  Lee  resolved  that 
Five  Foiiks  should  not  be  left  in  the 
hands  of  his  antagonist.  Detaching 
portions  of  the  two  divisions  of  infantry 
under  Pickett  and  Bushrod  Johnson, 
he  sent  them  to  regain  the  lost  position. 
Advancing  by  the  White  Oak  road, 
they  soon  reached  Five  Forks.  The 
National  cavalry  were  driven  from  the 
place  and  forced  back  in  confusion  on 
Dinwiddie  Court  House.  Pursuing 
vigorously,  with  cavalry  and  infantry, 
the  Confederates  reached  Chamberlain’s 
Creek,  which  they  attempted  to  cross ; 
but,  being  stoutly  resisted  by  Smith’s 
brigade,  they  were  compelled  to  seek  a 
crossing  further  up  the  creek.  Falling 
upon  Davies’  brigade,  with  great  weight, 
they  forced  it  back  against  the  left 
flank  of  Devin’s  division.  Both  com- 
mands were  thus  isolated  from  the 
main  body,  which  was  at  Dinwiddie 
Court  House.  Devin  and  Davies  were 
thus  compelled  to  make  a long  detour, 
by  the  Boydton  plank-road,  in  order 
to  rejoin  their  chief  and  the  main  body. 
Deceived  by  this  movement,  and  be- 
lieving it  to  be  a forced  retreat,  the 
Confederates  made  a left  wheel,  and 
were  about  to  make  a vigorous  pursuit. 
Sheridan,  quick  and  ready,  always,  in 
truth,  equal  to  the  situation,  realized  at 
once  his  new  difficulty,  and  the  oppor- 
tunity which  was  so  promptly  and 


GRAVELLY  RUN^. 


913 


unexpectedly  presented.  With  the  bri- 
gades of  Gregg  and  Gibbs  he  charged 
upon  the  now  exposed  flank  and  rear 
of  the  Confederates,  and  compelled 
them  to  face  about  and  so  give  up  the 
pursuit.  Devin  and  Davies  soon  re- 
joined the  main  body,  upon  which  the 
Confederates  now  fell  with  tremendous 
fury,  and  with  the  combined  strength 
of  the  cavalry  and  infantiy  then  at 
hand.  The  numbers  were  not  unequal ; 
but  the  flre-arms  of  their  infantry  gave 
the  Confederates  an  advantage.  Plucky 
as  he  had  always  shown  himself,  on 
every  battle-field  on  wKich  he  had  been 
actively  engaged,  and  determined  to 
bear  his  own  burden  and  do  his  own 
work,  Sheridan  dismounted  his  troopers, 
and,  placing  them  behind  light  breast- 
works, he  opened  upon  the  Confeder- 
ates, a musketry  fire,  so  swift  and  so 
deadly,  that  they  were  compelled  to 
fall  back.  The  National  cavalry,  al- 
though successful  in  repelling  the  attack 
of  the  enemy,  had  been  somewhat  se- 
verely handled  ; and  a renewed  assault 
might  have  been  attended  with  some 
danger.  Happily,  darkness  intervened, 
and,  for  the  night,  made  a fresh  assault 
impossible. 

Grant  was  greatly  pleased  with  Sheri- 
dan’s conduct.  He  displayed,  he  said, 
great  generalship.  He  did  not  retreat 
on  the  main  army,  “ to  tell  the  story  of 
superior  forces  encountered.”  On  the 
contrary,  he  deployed  his  cavalry  on 
foot,”  and,  by  compelling  the  enemy  to 
do  the  same,  “ made  his  progress  slow.” 
This  was  high  praise  from  the  Lieu- 
tenant-General ; but  it  was  justified  by 
the  fact.  Sheridan  had,  undoubtedly. 


done  well — all  indeed  he  could  do  ; but 
no  one  knew  better  than  himself. that 
the  shades  of  evening  had  fallen  like  a 
blessing. 

The  night  of  the  31st  of  March,  was 
an  anxious  night,  at  the  head-quarters 
of  the  National  army.  It  was  known 
that  the  cavalry  had  been  attacked  and 
driven  from  Five  Forks,  and  that  they 
had  been  attacked  again,  in  force,  at 
Dinwiddie  Court  House.  It  was  the 
general  conviction,  that  Sheridan  could 
not  hold  his  own,  unless  strongly  rein- 
forced. Warren,  accordingly,  was  or- 
dered to  his  relief  with  the  Fifth  corps. 
Warren  promptly  obeyed,  and  hurried 
olf  Ayres,  with  his  division.  Unfor- 
tunately, however,  the  bridge  at  Gravel- 
ly Run,  over  which  it  was  intended 
that  Ayres’  troops  should  pass,  was 
found  to  be  destroyed.  The  construc- 
tion of  a bridge,  sufficient  to  pass  in- 
fantry, necessarily  occasioned  some  de 
lay.  It  was  near  two  o’clock  on  the 
morning  of  April  1st,  when  the  division 
was  crossed  and  on  its  way  to  Dinwid- 
die. When  made  aware  of  the  condi- 
tion of  the  crossing  at  Gravelly  Run, 
Meade  suggested  to  Warren  the  pro- 
priety of  sending  troops  both  by  the 
Boydton  road,  and  by  the  Quaker  road, 
considerably  further  to  the  east.  It 
was  a distance  of  about  10  miles  to 
Dinwiddie  by  ^ the  Quaker  road  ; and 
Warren  not  unjustly  judged  that  the 
wiser  course  was  to  abide  the  issue  of 
the  movements  already  commenced, 
retaining  the  divisions  of  Griffin  and 
Crawford  where  they  were,  until  he 
should  hear  that  Ayres  had  reached 
Dinwiddie.  The  result  proved  that  he 


9U 


THE  FALL  OF  PETERSBURG  AND  RICHMOND. 


acted  not  unwisely.  While  this  anxiety 
[)revailed  at  head-quarters,  Sheridan, 
himself,  had  ceased  to  have  any  fear 
regarding  his  position.  Before  mid- 
night, indeed,  he  became  aware  that 
Lee  had  withdrawn  the  greater  part  of 
his  troops  from  his  immediate  front, 
blearing  for  the  welfare  of  the  isolated 
force  in  the  immediate  front  of  Warren, 
Lee,  as  early  as  ten  o’clock,  on  the  night 
of  the  81st,  had  recalled  his  troops  from 
Dinwiddie,  and  taken  position  at  Five 
Forks.  In  such  a position,  in  the  event 
of  any  attack  being  made  by  Warren, 
he  would  be  better  able  to  render  the 
needed  assistance.  At  earliest  dawn 
April  morning  of  April  1st,  and 

i . shortly  after  he  had  been  joined 
by  Ayres,  Sheridan  put  his  whole  force 
in  motion,  in  the  direction  of  Five 
F(uks.  W arren , meanwhile,  had  marcli- 
e<l  across  the  country,  with  his  two 
otlier  divisions  ; and,  by  seven  o’clock, 
he  formed  a junction  with  the  cavalry, 
midway  between  Dinwiddie  and  Five 
Forks.  Sheridan,  who  ranked  Warren, 
assumed  command  of  the  entire  force. 
He  had  now  under  his  immediate  con- 
trol, four  .divisions  of  cavalry,  and  three 
of  infantry — an  aggregate  force,  at  least 
25,000  strong.  It  would  be  difficult, 
if  not  impossible,  for  Lee  to  oppose 
him  at  .Five  Forks  with  more  than  half 
of  that  number. 

Such  was  the  condition  of  affairs  on 
Saturday,  April  1st.  Lee’s  line,  as  we 
have  seen,  all  the  way  between  Hatch- 
er’s Eun  and  the  Appomattox,  was 
thinly  guarded.  There  was  hardly 
more  than  one  man  to  five  yards  of 
fiont.  Confronting  this  line,  as  has 


also  been  mentioned,  were  the  corps  of 
Parke,  Wright,  Ord  and  Humphreys. 
At  any  one  point  that  line  might  have 
been  easily  penetrated.  The  original 
plan  of  battle,  however,  was  strictly 
adhered  to.  Grant  remained  resolute 
in  his  determination  to  turn  the  Con- 
federate rio^ht  flank  ; and  to  this  end 
he  was  bendin<2:  all  his  eneimes.  The 
key-point  of  the  entire  situation  was 
Five  Forks.  For  the  defense  of  this 
position,  Lee  had  accumulated  all  his 
available  force.  Towards  this  point 
Sheridan  was  now  marching  wdth  both 
cavalry  and  infantry.  As  early  as  four 
o’clock,  on  the  morning  of  the  1st,  an 
attack  was  made  by  the  Confederates, 
on  Foster’s  division  of  the  Twenty- 
Fourth  corps.  The  blow,  which  was 
unexpected,  was  swiftly  and  skilfully 
delivered,  and  was  attended  with  mo- 
mentary success.  Foster’s  men  yielded 
to  the  pressure ; and  the  Confederate 
flag  w^as  raised  on  the  deserted  parapet. 
The  Nationals  quickly  rallied  ; and  the 
enemy,  glad  to  escape  to  his  lines,  left 
behind  him  some  50  prisoners.  For  a 
time  the  artillery  thundered ; and  there 
were  demonstrations  made  by  the  Na- 
tionals along  the  whole  line.  This 
morning  affair,  however,  was  only  an 
episode  ; it  was  not  the  great  feature  of 
the  day.  During  the  morning  and 
forenoon,  Sheridan  kept  pressing  for- 
ward, in  the  direction  of  Five  Forks. 
By  two  o’clock,  he  had  forced  the  Con- 
federates inside  their  works.  Merritt 
with  his  cavalry,  while  he  was  to  hold 
the  enemy  firmly  in  his  front,  was  in- 
structed to  make  a vigorous  demonstra- 
tion, as  if  his  real  object  was  to  turn 


FIVE  FORKS. 


915 


his  opponent’s  right  flank.  Warren, 
with  the  Fifth  corps,  was  ordered  to 
move,  so  that,  at  the  proper  time,  his 
^^dlole  weight  would  fall  on  the  Con- 
federate left.  In  order  the  more  c om- 
j)letely  to  enclose  his  antagonist,  in  his 
toils,  Sheridan  directed  McKenzie,  with 
liis  brigade,  to  move  along  the  White 
Oak  road,  and  take  place  on  Warren’s 
light,  thus  guarding  against  any  hostile 
movement,  which  might  be  made  from 
the  direction  of  Petersburg.  It  was  a 
well  arranged  plan  ; and  there  was 
every  reason  to  believe  that,  if  prompt- 
ly executed,  it  would  be  attended  with 
complete  success.  McKenzie,  when  ad- 
vancing to  take  the  position  assigned 
liim,  encountered  and  routed  a body  of 
the  enemy’s  cavalry,  driving  them  to- 
\vards  Petersburg.  He  had  returned 
and  joined  the  main  body,  on  the 
White  Oak  road,  just  as  Warren  ad- 
vanced to  the  attack. 

It  was  now  four  o’clock.  Sheridan 
had  expected  to  make  the  attack,  at  an 
earlier  hour.  He  had,  himself,  as  we 
have  seen,  reached  the  ground  about 
two  o’clock.  He  blamed  Warren  for 
the  delay.  That  general,  before  I’esum- 
ing  his  march  to  the  point  assigned 
him,  deemed  it  wise  to  form  his  whole 
corps  in  battle  order.  This,  of  course, 
consumed  a certain  amount  of  time; 
and  Warren  informed  his  chief  that  he 
could  not  be  ready  for  an  assault  before 
four.  At  the  hour  named,  he  was 
roady.  Ayres  was  on  the  left ; Craw- 
ford was  on  the  right ; and  Griffin  was 
behind  Crawford  in  reserve.  Each  of 
the  two  advanced  divisions  had  two  bri- 
gades in  front ; and  each  brigade  was 


in  two  lines  of  battle.  The  third  bri- 
gade of  each  was  also  arranged  in  two 
lines  of  battle,  behind  the  centre  of  the 
two  former  lines.  Griffin’s  division 
which,  as  we  have  said,  was  in  the  rear 
of  the  right,  was  arranged  in  column  of 
battalions  in  mass.  The  lines,  as  they 
advanced,  were  to  keep  closed  to  the 
left;  and  they  were  to  preserve  their 
direction,  in.  the  woods,  by  keeping  the 
sun  over  their  left  shoulders.  The  point, 
immediately  aimed  at,  was  on  the 
White  Oak  road,  and  a little  beyond 
the  enemy’s  left  flank.  That  point 
reached,  they  were  to  swing  around 
pivoting  on  the  left ; and  then,  having 
formed  perpendicular  to  the  White 
Oak  road,  they  were  to  advance  and 
fall  on  the  Confederate  left. 

The  entire  distance,  between  Warren 
and  the  White  Oak  ]’oad,  was  only 
about  1000  yards.  A few  minutes  was 
sufficient  to  enable  the  Fifth  corps  to 
accomplish  the  intended  movement. 
The  enemy  had,  in  the  meantime,  re- 
fused his  left  in  a crotchet,  about  100 
yards  in  length,  and  turned  northward 
to  the  main  line.  This  refused  line  was 
covered  by  a strong  breastwork,  and 
by  a dense  undergrowth  of  pines. 
Ayres’  division  which,  as  we  have  said, 
was  to  be  the  pivot  on  which  the  other 
two  divisions  were  to  wheel,  as  soon  as 
it  effected  its  change  of  front,  encoun- 
tered the  enemy’s  skii*mishers  in  front 
of  the  crotchet.  Crawford’s  division,  in 
taking  position,  was  exposed  to  a heavy 
fire  on  its  left — a fire  which  was,  at  the 
same  time,  working  some  mischief  on 
Ayres’  right.  Crawford,  in  order  to 
obtain  the  shelter  of  woods  and  a ridge. 


916 


THE  FALL  OF  PETERSBURG  AND  RICHMOND. 


obliqued  somewhat  to  the  right,  and 
thus  produced  a gap  between  his  own 
division  and  that  of  Ayres.  Ayres’ 
right,  in  fact,  was  for  a time,  so  to 
speak,  in  air ; ” and  so  terrific  was  the 
fire  on  that  exposed  flank,  that  the 
troops  became  unsteady,  large  numbers 
of  them  breaking  and  falling  back  to 
the  rear.  This,  however,  was  but  a 
short-lived  difiiculty ; for  Griffin  flung 
his  division  into  the  gap,  and  Ayres, 
his  men  quickly  rallying,  rushed  upon 
the  intrenched  crotchet,  and  by  an  im- 
petuous charge,  carried  it,  capturing 
about  1000  men,  with  several  battle 
flags,  Griffin  fell  upon  the  works,  in 
his  front,  and  captured  them,  taking 
1500  prisoners.  Crawford,  moving  more 
to  the  right,  reached  the  Ford  road ; 
and  then,  wheeling  round,  his  face  now 
to  the  south,  he  fell  upon  the  enemy’s 
rear,  and  captured  4 guns.  The  sound 
of  the  guns  on  the  right,  was  the  signal 
for  the  cavalry  to  attack.  Merritt  led 
his  troopers  forward  with  great  gallan- 
try, Devin  and  Custer,  his  immediate 
subordinates,  rivalling  each  other  in 
deeds  of  daring  and  of  skill.  The  cav- 
alry, however,  were  warmly  received  ; 
and,  in  a few  seconds,  numbers  of  rider- 
less horses  were  seen  galloping  over  the 
j)lain,  wildly  screaming  and  sniffing  the 
air  with  terror — sad  evidences  of  the 
deadly  precision  of  the  musketry  fire  of 
the  enemy.  The  Confederates,  pressed 
in  front  flank  and  rear,  in  great  num- 
l)ers,  threw  down  their  arms.  A small 
])ut  determined  body,  however,  contin- 
ued to  parry  the  thrusts  of  the  cavalry 
in  the  front,  and  the  hostile  movements 
of  Warren,  who  had  again  concentrated 


his  forces  at  right  angles  with  the 
White  Oak  road.  Warren  expeiienced 
a most  stubborn  resistance.  At  this 
stage,  the  personal  courage  of  that  gen- 
eral was  conspicuously  revealed.  His 
troops,  somewhat  disorganized,  halted, 
without  orders,  in  their  forward  move- 
ment. Warren  sprang  to  the  front,  and 
called  on  his  men  to  follow  him.  The 
action  was  electric.  The  call  ^\^as  irre- 
sistible. There  was  one  wild  rush  ; 
the  works  were  carried ; and  all  that 
remained  of  the  enemy  was  captured. 
In  this  final  effort,  Warren  had  his 
horse  shot  under  him ; and,  but  for  the 
timely  interference  of  Colonel  Rich- 
ardson, who  was  severely  wounded  in 
shielding  his  loved  commander,  he 
himself  might  have  perished.  Pickett 
and  Johnson  had  done  their  best ; but 
their  best  had  failed.  Those  of  the 
Confederates,  who  were  not  captured, 
were  now  retreating  in  ^vild  confusion, 
in  a western  direction,  hotly  pursued 
by  the  mounted  divisions  of  Men-itt 
and  McKenzie.  The  trophies  of  the 
day  were  several  guns  and  colors,  with 
more  than  5000  prisoners.  Of  these 
last,  3244  were  taken  by  the  Fifth 
corps.  The  National  loss  was  compar- 
atively trifling,  not  exceeding  1000  in 
all,  of  which  634  belonged  to  the  in- 
fantry. 

Such  was  the  battle  of  Five  Forks. 
Of  all  the  battles  of  the  war,  few  were 
more  brilliant  or  more  decisive.  .It 
redounded  to  the  honor  and  increased 
the  already  great  reputation  of  General 
Sheridan.  It  was  equally  a credit  to 
General  Wan*en.  It  was  his  Fifth 
corps  which,  under  his  direction,  fought 


. 80.  SOOEliniBAW. 


© E H L . IP, 


I 


A TERRIFIC  CANNONADE. 


917 


and  won  the  battle.  The  plan  was 
Sheridan’s.  The  execution  of  the  plan, 
which  was  perfect,  was  mainly  done  by 
Warren.  For  some  cause,  not  satisfac- 
torily explained,  although  both  generals 
have  written  and  published  on  the  sub- 
ject, Sheridan,  after  the  battle,  relieved 
Warren  from  duty ; and  General  Griffin 
was  assigned  to  the  command  of  the 
Fifth  corps.  An  unpleasantness  seems 
to  have  existed  from  the  moment  that 
the  Fifth  corps  was  ordered  to  co-oper- 
ate with,  and  act  under  instructions, 
from  Sheridan.  It  is  not  so  clear  on 
whom  the  blame  for  the  existence  of 
such  a feeling  should  rest.  Sheridan 
was  dissatisfied  with  Warren  at  Din- 
widdie  Court  House.  His  conduct,  he 
thought,  was  dilatory.  The  cause  of 
the  delay  has  already  been  explained. 
The  bridge  at  Gravelly  Run,  by  the 
Boydton  plank-road,  had  been  destroy- 
ed ; and  before  the  run  could  be  crossed, 
a new  bridge  had  to  be  constructed. 
Successful,  though  he  was,  General 
Warren  failed  to  please  Sheridan,  at 
Five  Forks.  In  preparing  for  battle, 
he  thought,  he  was  slow.  He  seemed 
to  be  lukewarm,  or,  as  Sheridan  him- 
self put  it,  “ his  manner  gave  me  the 
impression  that  he  wished  the  sun  to 
go  down  before  dispositions  for  the 
attack  could  be  completed.”  This, 
however,  was  not  all.  He  blamed  him 
because  some  of  his  troops  gave  way, 
at  the  commencement  of  the  contest ; 
and  he  charged  him,  with  not  exerting 
himself  sufficiently  to  inspire  them 
with  confidence.  Such  charges,  the 
reader  will  perceive,  are  not  sustained 
by  our  narrative.  They  are  not  justi- 


fied by  the  actual  facts  of  the  battle. 
It  is  difficult,  indeed,  to  acquit  Sheri- 
dan of  something  like  rashness  or  in- 
considerate  haste  in  his  treatment  of 
Warren.  The  Lieutenant-General,  of 
course,  was  made  aware  of  the  diffi- 
culty between  the  two  commanders; 
and  it  is  only  just  to  General  Grant  to 
say,  that  his  sturdy  common  sense  was 
never  more  strikingly  displayed,  than 
when,  refusing  to  take  any  part  in  the 
quarrel,  he  appointed  Warren  to  the 
chief  command  in  the  Department  yf 
the  Mississippi,  then  in  need  of  a first 
class  man.* 

The  news  of  the  disaster,  at  Five 
Forks,  was  soon  known  to  General  Lee. 
It  was  a terrible  blow.  He  knew  its 
full  meaning.  His  right  flank  was 
turned.  The  enemy  was  in  his  rear. 
A general  assault  was  certain ; and  all 
he  could  do  now  was  to  hold  on,  and 
provide  for  a retreat.  The  news,  of 
course,  was  as  quickly  known  to  Meade 
and  Grant.  Nor  were  they  slow  to 
act.  Instantaneously,  from  their  multi- 
tudinous throats,  the  National  guns,  all 
along  the  line  before  Petersburg,  opened 
their  murderous  Are;  and  night  was 
made  hideous  by  the  roar  of  artillery 
and  the  hissing  and  bursting  of  shells. 
The  cannonade  continued  the  entire 
night.  Wright,  Parke  and  Ord  were 
ordered  to  attack  in  the  early  morning ; 
and  Miles’  division  of  Humphreys’ 
corps  was  ordered  to  the  support  of 
Sheridan. 


* Coppee’s  Grant  and  His  Campaigns,  p.  439.  S win- 
ton’s  Campaigns  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  p.  601. 
Rebellion  Record,  vol.  XI,  pp.  645,  646.  Lessing's 
Civil  War,  vol.  Ill,  {note)  p.  542 


308 


918 


THE  FALL  OF  PETERSBURG  AND  RICHMOND. 


The  2d  was  Sunday.  At  earliest 
daAvn,  the  assault  was  opened  from 
April  Appomattox  to  Hatcher’s 
2.  Run.  Parke,  with  the  Ninth 
corps,  was  on  the  right.  Wright,  with 
the  Sixth  corps,  Avas  on  the  left  of  Parke. 
Ord  was  on  the  left  of  Wright.  Parke 
<piickly  carried  the  outer  line  of  in- 
trenchments;  but  he  Avas  compelled^to 
halt  before  an  inner  cordon  of  works, 
on  Avhich  he  could  make  no  impression. 
Wright,  carrying  everything  before 
1dm,  and  attaining  the  Boydton  plank- 
road,  swept  to  the  left,  down  the  Con- 
federate intrenchments,  and  captured 
many  guns  and  several  thousands  of 
prisoners.  Ord  forced  the  lines  at 
Hatcher’s  Run,  and  formed  a connec- 
tion with  Wright.  Their  combined 
forces  then  swung  to  the  right,  and 
advanced  by  the  Boydton  road,  in  the 
direction  of  Petersburg.  Humphreys, 
Avho  was  still  more  to  the  left,  when 
he  heard  of  these  successes,  advanced 
with  two  diAusions  of  the  Second 
corps  — the  divisions  of  Mott  and 
Hays — storming  and  carrying  a re- 
doubt in  his  front,  and  making  a con- 
nection with  the  Sixth  corps.  Miles, 
Avith  the  remaining  division  of  Hum- 
phreys’ corps,  had,  in  the  meantime, 
joined  Sheridan,  and,  under  his  orders, 
attacked  the  remains  of  the  Confeder- 
ates who  had  gathered  together,  west 
of  Hatcher’s  Run,  at  the  intersection  of 
the  Clayborne  road,  and  driven  them 
to  Sutherland’s  Station,  on  the  South 
Side  Railroad.  Sheridan,  at  the  same 
time,  was  hotly  pursuing  the  enemy 
with  the  divisions  of  Bartlett  and 
CraAvford  of  the  Fifth  corps.  At 


Sutherland’s  Station,  Humphreys  re- 
claimed Miles’  division ; and  Sheridan, 
returning  to  the  Five  Forks,  moved 
across  the  South  Side  Railroad,  at 
Ford’s  and  Wilson’s  stations,  with  the 
view  of  striking  the  Confederates  at 
Sutherland’s,  in  the  rear.  Miles,  mean- 
while, had  attacked  and  routed  the  foe, 
at  that  point,  capturing  2 guns  and  600 
men.  The  South  Side  Railroad,  their 
most  important  line  of  communication, 
AA^as  thus  lost  to  the  Confederates. 
While  these  eA^ents  were  taking  place. 
Gibbon’s  division  of  Ord’s  command, 
had  pushed  its  Avay  to  Forts  Gregg 
and  Alexander,  tAvo  strong,  enclosed 
redoubts,  the  most  salient  and  com- 
manding to  the  south  of  Petersburg. 
Fort  Gregg  Avas  strongly  manned  by 
Harris’  Mississippi  brigade ; and,  for  a 
time.  Gibbon’s  men  dashed  themselves 
against  it,  in  vain.  Ultimately,  hoAv- 
ever,  and  at  the  early  hour  of  seven, 
the  fort  was  carried.  It  had  been  a 
terrific  and  most  determined  struo^ofle. 
Gibbon  had  lost  500  men;  and  of  the 
250  defenders  of  the  work,  only  30 
remained.  Fort  Alexander,  which  Avas 
but  imperfectly  protected,  was  more 
easily  taken.  The  investing,  line  Avas 
noAV  drawn  tight  and  close  around  Pe- 
tersburg. 

In  this  inner  line,  Avhich  Avas  Avell 
protected,  and  Avhich  admitted  of 
greater  concentration,  Lee  Avas  still 
strong.  It  was  noAV  about  ten  o’clock. 
Longstreet,  haAung  at  length  discoA^ered 
that  the  force  which  confronted  him, 
on  the  north  of  the  James,  Avas  a mere 
mask,  and  haAung  AvithdraAvn  several  of 
his  brigades,  had  just  joined  Lee  at 


DEATH  OF  A.  P.  HILL. 


919 


Petersburg,  with  Banning’s  brigade  of 
Field’s  division.  Thus  strengthened, 
Lee,  having  made  the  best  arrange- 
ments possible  for  the  defense  of  the 
city,  resolved  to  make  an  offensive 
sally,  in  the  direction  of  the  National 
right,  and  with  the  view  of  regaining 
some  works  which  had  been  captured 
by  the  Ninth  corps.  Heth’s  division 
of  A.  P.  Hill’s  corps  was  pushed  for- 
ward to  the  attack ; and  such  was  the 
vigor  of  the  onset  that  the  Ninth  corps 
\vas  able  with  difficulty  to  maintain  its 
ground.  The  National  troops,  then 
Iiolding  City  Point,  were  ordered  to  its 
support;  and  Heth,  after  a bold  and 
most  determined  effort,  was  repulsed. 
In  this  final  struggle.  A.  P.  Hill,  one  of 
Lee’s  best  generals,  and  one  who  during 
the  four  years  of  strife,  had  taken  a con- 
spicuous part  in  the  defense  of  Bich- 
mond,  was  killed.  He  had  been  convers- 
ins:  with  Lee  and  Mahone.  The  sounds 
of  battle  were  coming  nearer  and  nearer. 

How  is  this.  General  ? ” said  Lee  to 
Hill,  “ your  men  are  giving  way.”  Fling- 
ing over  his  uniform  a rough  coat.  Hill, 
accompanied  by  a single  orderly,  rode 
forward  to  reconnoitre.  In  a wooded 
ravine,  he  came  upon  half-a-dozen  sol- 
(iiers,  in  blue.  They  raised  their  rifles 
and  fired.  Hill  fell  dead  on  the  spot.* 

* Ambrose  Powell  Hill,  who  came  to  his  untimely 
end  during  the  final  assault  on  the  lines  before  Peters- 
burg. was  born  in  Culpepper  County,  Virginia,  in 
1824.  He  was  thus  at  the  time  of  his  death,  only  41 
years  of  age.  In  the  county,  which  gave  him  birth 
his  father  was  a leading  merchant,  and  a prominent 
politician.  Young  Hill  entered  the  military  academy 
in  1843,  and  graduated  in  1847,  in  the  same  class  with 
Ueneral  Burnside.  He  became  lieutenant  in  Septem- 
oer,  1851 ; and  in  1855  he  was  promoted  to  the  rank  of 
captain.  Later,  in  the  same  year,  he  was  appointed  an 
assistant  in  the  Coast  Survey.  This  position  he  held 


Tbe  end  was  now  close  at  band. 
The  grand  drama,  so  full  of  strange 
scenes,  and  tragic  incident,  and  so 
fraught  with  the  destiny  of  a great 
nation  and  people,  had  reached  its  last 
act.  Lee  was  now  fullv  convinced  that 
he  could  no  longer  maintain  his  posi- 
tion. He  decided  to  hold  on  until  night, 
and  then  to  retreat  by  the  Danville 
road,  in  the  hope  of  effecting  a junction 
with  Johnston.  About  half  past  ten 
o’clock,  and  immediately  after  tlie  re- 
pulse of  Heth,  he  telegraphed  to  Jef- 
ferson Davis,  saying,  ^‘My  lines  are 
broken  in  three  places ; Bichmond 
must  be  evacuated  this  evening.  ” 
When  the  message  was  handed  him  by 
Colonel  Taylorwood,  Davis  was  in  his 

until  March,  1861.  When  Virginia  seceded,  he  joined 
the  volunteers  of  that  State,  becoming  colonel  of  the 
Thirteenth  regiment.  He  took  part  in  the  battle  of 
Bull  Run.  He  fought  at  Williamsburg,  where  he 
held  the  rank  of  brigadier-general.  For  his  bravery 
in  that  fight,  he  was  made  major  general;  and  on  the 
25th  of  June,  1832,  he  formed  one  of  the  council  of 
war,  held  at  Richmond.  He  was  present  at  Mechan- 
icsville,  and  took  part  in  all  the  subsequent  battles  of 
the  “ Seven  Days.”  He  fought  against  Pope,  through- 
out the  Virginia  campaign.  He  was  present  at  An- 
tietam,  at  Fredericksburg,  at  Chancellorsville.  When 
“ Stonewall”  Jackson  received  his  death  wound,  the 
command  devolved  upon  Hill,  who  was  himself  se- 
verely wounded,  almost  immediately  afterwards.  For 
his  gallant  conduct  at  Chancellorsville  he  was  made  a 
lieutenant-general,  and  put  in  command  of  one  of 
three  great  corps  into  which  the  army  of  V' irginia  was 
divided.  He  took  part  in  the  three  days’  fighting  at 
Gettysburg,  He  was  more  fortunate  on  the  first  day, 
than  he  was  on  the  second  and  third.  From  that  date 
onto  the  end,  including  the  manoeuvring  in  the  neigh- 
borhood of  Mine  Run,  the  battles  in  the  W ilderness, 
at  Spottsylvania,  at  Cold  Harbor,  before  Petersburg 
and  Richmond,  he  was  a prominent  actor  in  the  army 
of  Virginia.  He  lived  to  see  almost  the  bitter  end; 
but  he  was  spared  the  humiliation  which  rested  so 
heavily  on  some  of  his  associates.  Whatever  may  be 
the  opinion  entertained  regarding  the  cause,  in  which 
and  for  which  he  fought,  to  Ambrose  Powell  Hill 
must  be  accorded  a high  place  among  the  great  sol 
diers  begotten.,  on  either  side,  by  the  Civil  War 


920 


THE  FALL  OF  PETERSBURG  AND  RICHMOND. 


seat,  in  his  customary  place  of  worship, 
the  Episcopal  Church  of  St.  Paul.  A 
livid  pallor  passed  over  the  face  of  the 
ruined  president;  and  he  quietly  left 
the  church.  It  was  evident  to  the 
assembled  congregation  that  something 
dreadful  had  happened.  The  deepest 
silence  prevailed,  and  the  religious  ser- 
vices were  closed.  In  dismissing  the 
congregation,  the  rector.  Dr.  Minne- 
gerode,  gave  notice  that  General  Ewell, 
the  commander  in  Richmond,  desired 
the  local  forces  to  assemble  at  three 
o’clock,  in  the  afternoon.  The  news 
passed  from  lip  to  lip,  and  from  church 
to  church ; and  the  sorrowful  utterance 
came  from  many  a pulpit  that  the 
same  congregation  might  never  meet 
again. 

It  was,  indeed,  a sad  Sunday  in 
Richmond.  The  government  would 
give  the  citizens  no  positive  informa- 
tion. As  the  afternoon  advanced,  how- 
ever, there  was  no  longer  any  doubt 
that  the  city  was  about  to  be  aban- 
doned. At  all  the  Departments,  the 
utmost  activity  prevailed ; and  wagons 
laden  with  trunks  and  boxes  were  be- 
ing hurried  thence  to  the  station  of  the 
Danville  Railroad.  Davis  left  the  city, 
about  eight  o’clock.  The  members  of 
the  Confederate  Congress  and  of  the 
Virginia  Legislature  had  all  departed, 
by  nine  o’clock.  At  midnight,  all  that 
remained  of  the  Confederate  govern- 
ment was  the  War  Department;  and 
it  was  represented  by  Major  Melton, 
alone. 

The  tumult  had  already  become  great 
during  the  afternoon.  It  became  more 
violent,  when  darkness  set.  in.  The 


City  Council,  dreading  the  consequences 
which  might  result  from  a drunken  sol- 
diery and  an  intoxicated  rabble,  ordered 
the  destruction  of  all  liquors.  By  mid- 
night, wine,  spirits,  beer,  and  other  in- 
toxicating liquids  ran  down  the  streets 
in  streams;  and  the  authorities  soon 
became  aware,  from  the  number  of 
drunken  and  disorderly  stragglers,  that 
they  had  committed  a grave  blunder, 
and  unwittingly  created  the  very  evil, 
they  wished  to  prevent.  As  no  one 
could  leave  the  city  without  a pass 
from  the  Secretary  of  War,  and  as  no 
one  could  find  that  functionaiy,  Rich- 
mond, during  the  weary  night  hours, 
became  a very  Pandemonium.  Noth- 
ing was  sacred.  Nothing  was  safe. 
The  horrors  of  the  situation  were  ag- 
gravated when,  at  three  o’clock  in  the 
morning,  Ewell,  in  obedience  to  orders 
from  Major  Melton,  set  fire  to  the 
warehouses.  The  conflagration  was 
soon  beyond  control.  One  thousand 
houses,  covering  thirty  squares — one- 
third  of  the  city — ^were  on  fire.  The 
War  Department,  the  Treasury,  many 
churches  and  public  buildings,  were 
consumed.  In  the  midst  of  the  confu- 
sion, the  howling  mob  liberated  the 
prisoners  from  the  State  Penitentiaiy, 
and  then  fired  the  place.  Towards 
morning,  when  the  tumult  was  at  its 
height,  a magazine  near  the  alms-house 
exploded,  with  a concussion  which 
shook  the  city  to  its  foundations 
Another  explosion  soon  followed.  Il 
was  the  blowing  up  of  the  Confederate 
ram  Virginia.  A little  later,  the  Fred 
ericksburg  and  Richmond,  also  iron 
clads,  were  blown  up ; and  the  receiv 


JOY  AND  GRATITUDE. 


921 


ing  ship  Patrick  Henry  was  scuttled 
and  sunk.  In  the  early  morning, 
Ewell,  wrapt  in  a faded  cloak  and  a 
slouched  hat,  rode  away  on  an  iron- 
gray  horse. 

As  «oon  as  it  was  light  on  Monday 
April  morning.  General  Weitzel,  who 

3.  was  holding  the  National  lines 
north  of  the  James,  crossed  the  aban- 
doned defenses;  and,  at  six  o’clock,  he 
and  his  staff,  with  the  second  brigade 
of  the  third  division  of  the  Twenty- 
Fourth  corps,  commanded  by  General 
Ripley,  were  in  the  suburbs ' of  the 
city.  At  that  time  the  fire  was  raging 
fiercely ; and  shells,  exploding  in  the 
burning  arsenal,  were  screaming  over 
the  doomed  city.  At  eight  o’clock, 
Weitzel  and  his  staff  entered  Rich- 
mond ; and  Lieutenant  De  Peyster,  hav- 
ing ascended  to  the  roof  of  the  Virginia 
State  House,  hoisted  over  it  the  old 
flag  of  the  Republic.  The  city  was 
placed  under  military  rule.  General 
Shepley,  the  same  who  was  put  in 
command  of  New  Orleans,  when  it 
was  captured,  was  put  in  command 
of  Richmond.  Lieutenant  • Colonel 


Manning  was  made  pro vost  - marshal 
The  flames  were  soon  got  under;  and 
order  was  restored.  With  Richmond 
were  captured  1000  prisoners,  5000  sick 
and  wounded  in  the  hospitals,  500 
cannon,  30  locomotives  and  300  cars. 
Petersburg  was  taken  possession  of 
simultaneously  with  Richmond. 

The  fall  of  Petersburg  and  Rich- 
mond naturally  enough  fllled  the  North 
with  joy  and  satisfaction.  With  the 
speed  of  lightning,  the  glad  intelligence 
was  carried  broad  and  wide  over  the 
land ; and  before  nightfall,  on  that 
memorable  day,  the  sentiments  of  the 
people  had  found  expression  in  the 
most  enthusiastic  demonstrations  of 
delight.  In  the  larger  centres  of  pop- 
ulation, business  was  suspended ; the 
public  places  were  crowded ; patriot- 
ic speeches  were  delivered ; cannon 
boomed  and  church  bells  chimed ; 
while,  in  most  cases,  the  assembled 
multitudes,  controlled  by  a common 
sentiment,  recognized  the  hand  of  the 
God  of  Battles  who  had  given  them 
the  victory,  by  spontaneous  outbursts 
of  grateful  song. 


022 


THE  LAST  DAYS  OF  THE  WAH. 


CHAPTER  XLIII. 


The  End  at  Hand — The  Confederate  Retreat — Chesterfield  Court  House — Amelia  Court  House— The  Pursuit 

Sheridan  at  Jettersville— Paine’s  Cross  Roads— A Severe  Encounter — Lee  pushes  on  towards  Deatonsville 
— Conduct  of  the  Pursuit — Collision  at  Farmville— Death  of  General  Read— Sailor’s  Creek — Capture  of 
Ewell — Lee  crosses  the  Appomattox — The  Horrors  of  the  Retreat — Lee  in  a Strong  Position — Attacked  by 
Humphreys — Death  of  General  Smith — Prince  Edward  Court  House — Correspondence  between  Grant  and 
Lee — Appomattox  Station — Sheridan  Strikes  and  Drives  Back  Lee’s  Vanguard — Lee’s  Retreat  Cut  Off — 
Gordon’s  Vain  Attempt  to  Cut  Through  Sheridan’s  Lines — Lee  goes  to  meet  Grant — The  Interview — The 
Surrender  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia— The  Terms  of  Surrender — The  Magnanimity  of  the 
Conqueror — Lee’s  Farewell  to  his  Troops — A Touching  Scene — The  Keystone  of  the  Confederacy  Gone — 
National  Rejoicing — Clouded  Joy— Grant  in  Washington— The  Cabinet,  Meeting — Ford’s  Theatre — 
Assassination  of  Lincoln — John  Wilkes  Booth — A Real  Tragedy — The  Nation  in  Grief — Attempt  on  the 
Life  of  Secretary  Seward — A Foul  Conspiracy — Lincoln’s  Funeral— The  Fate  of  the  Conspirators — 
Sherman  at  Goldsboro — Reconstruction  of  his  Army — Johnston  Retreats — The  Pursuit— A Letter  from 
Johnston — Sherman’s  Reply — Durham’s  Station — Meeting  of  the  two  Generals — The  Second  Meeting — 
The  Memorandum — Sherman’s  Mistake — The  Memorandum  disapproved  o.f — Grant  at  Sherman’s  Head- 
quarters— The  Surrender  of  Jobnston — Wade  Hampton  Unfaithful — Surrender  of  Taylor — Surrender  of 
Farrand — The  Confederate  Cabinet — Flight  of  Davis — Faithful  Reagan — Mrs.  Davis  in  danger — Davis  at 
Irwinsville — C'apture  of  Davis — Capture  of  Stephens — Surrender  of  JefE.  Thompson — Kirby  Smith  still 
holds  out— Hopes  of  Foreign  Help — Collision  of  the  Rival  Forces  on  the  Rio  Grande — Brazos  Santiago — 
Barrett  and  Slaughter — Palmetto  Ranche — Colored  Troops — The  brave  Sixty-Second — The  Thirty-Fourth 
Indiana — The  Last  Battle  of  the  War — Kirby  Smith  Asking  Terms  from  General  Canby — Deserting  his 
Post — General  Buckner — The  War  Ended — The  Cost — A Fearful  Sacrifice — The  Sacrifice  Not  in  Vain — 
The  End  Foreseen  and  Provided  For — The  Grand  Review  at  Washington — One  Conspicuous  Figure 
Missed — The  Disbandment  of  the  Troops — A Difficult  Problem  Satisfactorily  Solved — Sherman’s  Farewell 
to  his  Command — Grant’s  Last  Order — A kindly  “ Adieu” — Our  Task  Completed. 


The  bloody  and  protracted  tragedy 
whicb  was  commenced  on  the 
12th  of  April,  1861,  when  the 
first  Confederate  shot  was  fired  against 
Fort  Sumter,  was  now  drawing  rapidly 
to  a close.  The  fall  of  Richmond  and 
Petersburg  was  the  true  beginning  of 
the  end.  The  backbone  of  the  Confed- 
eracy was  broken.  At  an  earlier  stage 
of  the  contest,  these  places  might  have 
been  abandoned  without  radically  in- 
juring the  Secession  cause.  Lee,  how- 
ever, had  been  pleased  to  stake  his  all 
on  the  defense  of  those  famous  lines ; 
and  now  that  they  were  broken,  it  was 


all  but  impossible  for  him  again  to 
rally  his  forces  in  any  position,  in 
which  he  could  hope  to  offer  an  effect- 
ive or  protracted  resistance. 

Richmond  and  Petersburg  were,  as 
we  have  seen,  occupied  by  the  National 
troops  on  Monday  the  3d  of  April.  April 
The  Confederate  chief,  mean-  3. 
while,  had  concentrated  his  forces  at 
Chesterfield  Court  House,  a point  mid- 
way between  Richmond  and  Petersburg, 
and  then  pushed  out  in  a westerly  direc- 
tion. The  evacuation  and  retreat  were 
conducted  with  wonderful  skill.  It  was 
Lee’s  intention  to  push  on  as  quickly 


SHERIDAX  AT  JETTERSVILLE. 


923 


as  possible  to  Burkes ville,  a station 
about  52  miles  west  of  Petersburg,  and 
where  the  South  Side  and  Danville 
Railroads  cross  each  other.  If  he  could 
reach  that  point  and  destroy  the  bridges, 
hi  his  rear,  he  might  succeed,  by 
pushing  his  way  towards  Danville,  not 
only  in  putting  distance  between  him- 
self and  his  pursuers,  but  in  effecting  a 
junction  with  Johnston.  In  that  case, 
as  he  not  unreasonably  concluded,  he 
might,  at  least,  be  able  to  exact  more 
favorable  terms  from  the  conqueror. 
His  past  experience  encouraged  him  to 
hope  for  the  best.  He  had  already 
successfully  conducted  two  famous 
retreats — one  after  Antietam  and 
another  after  Gettysbui*g.  On  the 
morning  of  the  3d,  he  had  already 
succeeded  in  putting  16  miles  between 
his  army  and  Petersburg.  Lee  was  in 
excellent  spirits.  On  Tuesday  the  4th, 
April  reached  Amelia  Court  House, 
4.  and  struck  the  Danville  Railroad. 
He  had  made  arrangements  to  receive 
here  250,000  rations  which  were  to 
be  sent  from  Danville.  His  stores  were 
already  exhausted;  for  he  had  started 
on  the  march,  Avith  provisions  only  for 
a single  day.  At  Amelia  Court  House, 
however,  there  were  no  supplies.  They 
had,  it  appeared,  been  promptly  sent. 
The  loaded  trains  had  reached  their 
destination  on  the  afternoon  of  Sunday. 
Immediately  on  his  arrival,  however, 
the  officer  in  charge  received  an  order 
from  the  Richmond  authorities  to  brins: 
on  the  train  to  Richmond,  and  take  on 
board  the  personnel  and  effects  of  the 
Confederate  government.  The  officer 
obeyed,  and  proceeded  to  Richmond 


Avithout  unloading  the  cars.  The 
surprise,  sorrow  and  indignation  of  the 
Confederate  commander,  when  the  sad 
fact  was  disclosed  to  him,  may  well  be 
imagined.  His  men  were  already  fam- 
ishing. It  was  impossible  to  proceed 
until  they  collected  what  supplies  could 
be  obtained  from  the  surrounding 
country.  The  delay,  thus  occasioned, 
not  only  robbed  Lee  of  all  the  advan- 
tages of  the  start ; it  proved  the  ruin  of 
all  his  plans  and  prospects. 

The  National  army,  meanwhile,  Avas 
not  permitted  to  remain  idle.  Grant 
had  taken  possession  of  both  Richmond 
and  Petersburg.  With  the  exception 
of  the  troops  under  Weitzel,  all  the 
rest  of  his  forces  Avere  south  or  south- 
Avest  of  Petersburg.  We  have  already 
said  that  Lee’s  objective  was  Burkes  ville. 
ToAA^ards  the  same  point,  and  advancing 
in  two  lines,  the  Nationals  were  now 
converging.  It  was  Grant’s  great  object 
to  reach  BurkesAulle,  before  Lee  should 
be  able  to  attain  that  point.  The  troops 
of  the  army  of  the  James,  under  Ord, 
Avere  moving  by  the  South  Side  or 
Lynchburg  Railroad.  Sheridan,  Avitli 
the  caAmlry  and  the  Fifth  corps,  follow- 
ed by  the  Second  and  Sixth  corps,  was 
moving  in  a line,  more  to  the  north,  and 
nearer  the  Appomattox.  On  the  after 
noon  of  the  4th,  at  the  head  of  the 
cavalry,  he  struck  the  Danville  Railroad, 
at  Jetters ville,  some  7 miles  southAvest 
of  Amelia  Court  House.  The  Fifth 
corps  was  following  close  in  the  rear  of 
the  cavalry.  Lee,  who,  as  Ave  have  seen, 
had  reached  Amelia  Court  House,  on 
the  morning  of  the  same  day,  A\ms  com- 
pelled to  halt  at  that  place,  in  order  to 


THE  LAST  HAYS  OF  THE  WAR. 


BU 

obtain  provisions,  his  supplies  having 
been  carried  on  to  Richmond.  On 
reaching  Jettersville,  Sheridan  soon 
learned  of  the  whereabouts  of  Lee,  and 
Avas  naturally  overjoyed  at  the  thought 
that  he  had  been  able  to  fling  himself 
across  his  antagonist’s  line  of  retreat. 
To  Meade,  who  was  some  16  miles  in  the 
]*ear,  sick  and  encamped  for  the  night, 
Sheridan  sent  a message  urging  him  to 
push  forward  the  Second  and  Sixth 
corps,  with  all  possible  haste.  ^‘Do  I 
understand”  said  Meade  ‘Hhat  General 
Sheridan  believes  that  Lee’s  army  will 
be  destroyed  or  captured,  if  my  troops 
reach  the  Danville  Railroad  by  morn- 
ning?”  “Yes  sir”  was  the  prompt  reply. 
Without  a moment’s  delay,  the  worn-out 
men  were  again  in  motion.  To  Grant, 
Sheridan  at  the  same  time  wrote,  saying 
“ I Avish  you  were  here,  yourself.  I feel 
confident  of  capturing  the  army  of 
Northern  Virginia.  I see  no  escape  for 
General  Lee.”  On  the  afternoon  of  the 
April  Meade  had  come  up  AAuth 
5.  the  Second  and  Sixth  corps,  and 
joined  Sheridan  at  Jettersville.  Grant, 
meanwhile,  was  pressing  forward,  Avith 
Ord  and  the  army  of  the  James.  On 
the  evening  of  the  4th,  he  had  encamped 
Avith  the  main  body  of  that  army  at 
Wilson’s  Station.  At  half  past  six  on 
the  following  day,  close  by  NottoAvay, 
about  9 miles  southeast  of  Burkesville, 
and  some  12  miles  soutli  of  JettersAulle, 
and  when  about  to  encamp  for  the 
night.  Grant  received  Sheridan’s  letter. 
With  all  possible  speed,  he  hurried 
forward  tAVO  divisions  of  the  Twenty- 
Foui*th  corps  to  Burkesville,  leaving 
Birney  with  the  remainder  of  the  col- 


umn at  Blacks  and  Whites.  At  eleven 
o’clock,  the  advance  had  reached  Burkes- 
ville J unction ; and  about  the  same  hour, 
Grant  joined  Sheridan  at  Jettersville. 
When  the  Lieutenant-General  arrived  at 
the  unpretentious  little  building,  Avhich 
Sheridan  had  made  his  head-quarters, 
the  latter  Avas  in  bed  and  asleep.  In  a 
few  seconds,  hoAvever,  he  was  in  the  pres- 
ence of  his  chief  and  sketchins:  on  the 
back  of  a letter,  the  relative  positions  of 
his  OAvn  troops  and  the  columns  of  Gen- 
eral Lee.  Grant  took  in  the  situation  at 
a glance.  “ Lee  is  caught  ” he  said.  “ It 
will  be  hard  Avork  for  him  to  get  aAvay.” 

Lee’s  position  had  already  become 
sufiiciently  desperate.  He  Avas  not  only 
cut  off  from  his  main  line  of  retreat ; 
he  was  overtaken  by  the  vastly  superior 
numbers  of  the  enemy.  The  two  days’ 
delay  had  indeed  been  fatal.  On  the 
night  of  the  4th,  and  during  the  earlier 
portion  of  the  5th,  he  had  a choice  of 
two  possible  courses.  He  might  have 
fallen  upon  Sheridan’s  isolated  com- 
mand, and  attempted  to  cut  his  Avay 
through,  and  so  make  himself  master 
of  the  Danville  route  ; or,  by  doubling 
on  his  track,  and  striking  out  in  a Avest- 
erly  direction,  he  might  have  endea\"- 
ored  to  push  his  way  to  Lynchburg 
and  the  mountains  be3^ond.  The  former 
of  these  courses  Avas  no  longer  open  to 
him,  on  the  evening  of  the  5th  ; for 
Meade,  as  AA^e  have  seen,  had  already 
arrived  Avith  the  Second  and  Sixth 
corps  of  the  army  of  the  Potomac. 
Sheridan  has  since  given  it  as  his  opin- 
ion, that  Lee  might,  during  the  earlier 
poftion  of  the  5th,  ha\"e  attacked  him 
with  success,  and  pursued  his  Avay  to 


MAP  SHOWING  THE  MOVEMENTS  OF  GRANT’S  AND  LEE’S  ARMIES  FROM  RICHMOND  TO  APPOMATTOX  COURT-HOUSE. 


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FARMVILLE. 


925 


Biirkesville  Junction.  In  this  opinion 
we  do  not  concur.  Sheridan  had  with 
him  an  excellent  force,  about  18,000 
strong,  including  infantry  and  cavalry  ; 
and  he  had  already  found  time  to  throw 
up  in  his  front  a powerful  line  of  bi-east- 
Avorks.  Lee’s  entire  force,  weary,  dis- 
pirited and  hungry,  did  not  exceed 
20,000 ; and  on  the  5th,  as  on  the  4th, 
it  Avas  broken  up  into  foraging  parties. 
At  all  events,  no  such  experiment  Avas 
made ; and  noAV  it  AA^as  questionable 
Avhether  the  other  alternative  could 
be  adopted  Avith  any  prospect  of  suc- 
cess. On  the  afternoon  of  the  5th, 
Brigadier-General  Davies,  whom  Sheri- 
dan had  sent  out  early  in  the  day,  Avith 
a mounted  foi*ce,  to  operate  to  the  left 
aud  in  front  of  Jettersville,  struck  a 
train  of  180  wagons,  escorted  by  a body 
of  Confederate  cavalry  at  Paine’s  Cross- 
Roads.  Davies  fell  heavily  upon  the 
cavalry  and  routed  them,  capturing  5 
pieces  of  artillery  and  a number  of 
prisoners.  The  Avagons,  he  destroyed. 
Almost  immediately  afterAvards,  Davies 
w-as  beset  with  a considerable  body  of 
Confederate  infantry ; and  it  might 
liaA^e  gone  hard  with  him  and  his  men, 
had  he  not,  at  the  opportune  moment, 
)>een  reinforced  by  the  brigades  of 
Gregg  and  Smith,  of  the  Second  cavalry 
division.  As  it  was,  the  fighting  was 
severe  ; but  the  National  troops  found 
their  way  back  to  Jettersville. 

On  the  morning  of  the  6th,  the  entire 
m^my  of  the  Potomac,  which,  the  night 
previous,  had  concentrated  at  Jetters- 
ville, moved  noi’thward,  in  the  direc- 
tion of  Amelia  Court  House.  Meade 
had  resumed  control  of  the  Fifth  corps  ; 


and  Sheridan  thenceforward  operated 
Avith  the  cavalry  alone.  It  Avas  soon 
discovered  that  Lee,  who  had,  at  night- 
fall, on  the  previous  day,  moved  out 
from  Amelia  Court  House,  had  slipped 
past  the  left  flank  of  the  National  army, 
and  that,  AAuth  all  his  forces,  he  aa  as  uoav 
moving  rapidly  westAvard,  in  the  direc- 
tion of  Deaton sville.  The  order  of 
march  was  immediately  changed.  The 
Sixth  corps  Avas  moved  from  the  right 
to  the  left.  The  Second  corps  Avas  then 
ordered  to  push  forAvard  by  the  Dea- 
tonsville  route;  the  Fifth  corps  Avas  tc 
move  by  a parallel  route  on  the  right 
and  the  Sixth  corps  was  to  move  by 
another  parallel  route  to  the  left 
There  Avere  thus  three  pursuing  col 
umns — one  close  on  the  enemy’s  rear, 
one  on  a parallel  line  to  the  north,  and 
another  on  a parallel  line  to  the  south. 
Sheridan,  Avith  the  cavalry,  led  the  van 
of  the  left  or  southern  column. 

While  the  army  of  the  Potomac  was 
thus  pressing  hai*d  upon  the  retreating 
foe,  the  army  of  the  James,  under  the 
skilful  direction  of  General  Ord,  Avas 
pushing  its  way  rapidly  from  Burkes- 
ville  Junction,  in  the  direction  of  Farm 
ville.  Ord,  as  we  have  seen,  had  reach- 
ed Burkesville,  with  the  advance  of  the 
ai*my  of  the  James,  on  the  night  of  the 
5th.  On  the  morning  of  the  6th,  his 
troops  being  well  forward,  he  set  out, 
at  an  early  hour  for  Farm  ville,  as  above 
mentioned,  his  object  being  to  antici- 
pate the  arrival  of  the  van  of  the 
Confederate  army,  and  to  destroy  the 
bridges  which  at  that  place  cross  the 
Appomattox.  Eager  to  accomplish  his 
purpose,  Ord  pushed  forward  A light 


926 


THE  LAST  DAYS  OF  THE  WAR. 


column,  consisting  of  two  regiments  of 
infantry,  and  a squadron  of  cavalry, 
under  the  command  of  Brigadier-General 
Thomas  Bead.  On  the  way,  and  when 
just  approaching  Farmville,  Bead  en- 
countered the  van  of  Lee’s  army.  There 
was  an  immediate  collision.  The  Con- 
federates, who  were  greatly  superior  in 
numbers,  fought  with  the  energy  of 
men  who  knew  that  their  last  hopes, 
if  not  gone,  wei*e  at  least  trembling  in 
the  balance.  Bead,  however,  presented 
a bold  and  determined  front.  Fighting 
at  the  head  of  his  men,  he  held  the 
Confederates  at  bay,  until  Ord  had 
time  to  come  up  with  the  main  body. 
It  was  a noble  service,  nobly  done. 
In  the  struggle  Bead'^  was  shot  and 
killed,  in  a hand-to-hand  contest  with 
General  Fearing  ; and  his  command 
was  overwhelmed.  The  Confederates 
had  saved  the  bridges ; and  when  Ord 
arrived  they  intrenched  themselves. 

Meanwhile  the  three  columns  of  the 
army  of  the  Potomac  were  pressing 
forward  with  all  possible  haste.  Sher- 
idan with  his  cavalry,  as  we  have  seen, 
moved  at  the  head,  and  in  advance  of 
the  left  column.  He  was  already  close 
upon  Deatonsville,  when  he  espied  the 
whole  Confederate  army  struggling  to- 
wards the  west.  It  was  evident,  at  a 
glance,  that  Lee’s  men  were  greatly 

*Brigadie» -General  S.  T.  Read,  was  a native 
of  Massachusetts  He  entered  the  Service  in  January, 
1862,  as  captain  of  unattached  cavalry  from  his  native 
State,  At  Gettysburg,  where  he  distinguished  him- 
self, and  was  severely  wounded,  he  held  a staff  ap- 
pointment. He  held  command  under  Grant  from  the 
Rapidan  to  the  James,  and  before  Richmond  and 
Petersburg.  When  Ord  was  appointed  to  the  com- 
mand of  the  army  of  the  James,  he  made  Read  his 
staff  officer. 


exhausted.  In  this  terrible  march  the 
splendid  training  and  high  morale  of 
the  army  of  Northern  Virginia  were 
conspicuously  revealed.  Never  was 
army  in  so  severe  a plight.  It  was 
marvellous,  indeed,  that,  in  the  circum- 
stances, the  troops  could  be  held,  to- 
gether. They  knew  that  the  entire 
army  of  the  Potomac  was  pressing  close 
upon  their  heels ; and  it  was  scarcely  a 
surprise  when  the  van  was  struck  by 
the  army  of  the  James.  Escape  was 
hardly  to  be  hoped  for  ; but  strong 
nerve  and  high  purpose  amply  supply 
the  place  of  hope.  Sheridan  was  not 
slow  to  see  his  opportunity;  nor  was 
he  dilatory  in  turning  it  to  account. 
He  made  his  arrangements  with  admir- 
able .skill.  Bight  in  front  of  him  was 
a Confederate  wagon-train  escorted  by 
a powerful  force  of  infantry  and  cav- 
alry. Crook  was  ordered  to  attack  the 
train.  Custer  was  ordered  at  the  same 
time  to  press  forward  and  attack  a 
point  further  in  advance.  If  Crook 
should  not  succeed  in  his  attack,  he 
was  to  move  on  again,  ahead  of  Cus- 
ter ; and  this  mode  of  action  was  to  be 
kept  up,  until  finally  a weak  point 
should  be  discovered.  The  experiment 
was  attended  with  almost  immediate 
success.  Crook,  unable  to  make  any 
impression  in  his  front,  was  compelled 
to  fall  back.  Custer,  however,  was 
more  successful.  Gaining  the  road  at 
Sailor’s  Creek,  a small  tributary  of  the 
Appomattox,  he  immediately  engaged 
the  enemy.  Crook  and  Devin  with 
their  respective  divisions,  having  hur- 
ried to  his  aid,  the  Confederate  line 
was  pierced ; and  there  were  >aptiired, 


SAILOirS  CREEK. 


927 


400  wagons,  16  pieces  of  artillery,  with 
a large  number  of  prisoners. 

One  of  the  most  immediate  as  well 
as  most  important  effects,  produced  by 
this  onslaught,  was  the  cutting  off  from 
the  main  body  of  Lee’s  army,  the  entire 
corps  of  General  Ewell,  with  a portion 
of  Pickett’s  division.  It  was  all-im- 
portant that  this  force  should  not  be 
allowed  to  escape.  With  the  view  of 
detaining  them,  until  Wright,  with  the 
Sixth  corps,  should  have  time  to  come 
up,  Sheridan  ordered  a mounted  charge, 
which  was  made  in  a most  spirited 
manner  by  Colonel  Stagg,  and  his  brave 
brigade.  It  was  not  long  until  the 
advance  division  of  the  Sixth  corps, 
under  General  Seymour,  made  its  ap- 
pearance. Seymour  was  ordered  to 
carry  the  road  on  which  the  Confeder- 
ates were  posted.  Pushing  his  men 
forward  with  great  energy,  Seymour 
compelled  the  Confederates  to  fall  back. 
This,  however,  they  did  slowly,  con- 
testing every  inch  of  the  ground,  and 
turning  and  striking  heavily  at  almost 
every  step.  So  vigorous,  in  truth,  be- 
came the  resistance,  that  Seymour  found 
it  necessary  to  Balt  his  men  and  await 
the  arrival  of  Wheaton’s  division,  also 
of  the  Sixth  corps.  Wheaton  was 
speedily  on  the  ground,  and  in  position 
on  Seymour’s  left.  The  advance  was 
then  renewed.  The  Confederates,  no 
longer  able  to  resist  the  tremendous 
pressure  on  their  front,  fell  back,  until 
the  lines  of  the  Sixth  corps  had  reached 
Sailor’s  Creek.  Sheridan’s  cavalry  could 
now  be  seen  on  the  high  ground  to  the 
south  of  the  creek ; and  the  long  lines 
of  smoke,  arising  from  the  burning 


wagons,  gave  sad  evidence  of  the  de- 
structive work  which  had  been  going 
on.  It  would  be  difficult  to  imagine  a 
situation  more  critical  than  that  in 
which  Ewell  and  his  brave  followers 
now  found  themselves.  Encompassed  on 
every  side,  and  barred  from  every  pos- 
sibility of  escape,  they  still  gave  blow 
for  blow;  and,  almost  at  the  last  mo- 
ment, they  poured  so  deadly  a volley 
into  the  ranks  of  their  assailants,  that 
a portion  of  Wright’s  veteran  line  bent 
and  gave  way.  It  was  impossible, 
however,  to  maintain  the  struggle 
against  the  vastly  superior  numbers  of 
the  Nationals.  Pressed  in  front  by  the 
Sixth  corps,  and  charged  in  flank  and 
rear  by  Sheridan’s  cavalry,  Ewell’s  vet- 
erans threw  down  their  arms  in  token  of 
surrender.  Over  6000  men  were  made 
prisoners  ; and  among  the  captured  were 
General  Ewell  himself,  and  four  other 
general  officers.  The  National  loss  in 
this  encounter  at  Sailor’s  Creek,  was 
about  1000,  in  killed  and  wounded. 

The  National  victory  at  Sailor’s 
Creek,  might  have  been  less  easily 
won — it  would  certainly  have  been  less 
decisive  — if  the  movements  of  the 
Second  corps  had  been  conducted  with 
less  energy.  Following,  as  we  have  seen, 
right  in  the  rear  of  the  retreating  Con- 
federates, Humphreys  never  gave  them 
a moment’s  rest,  until,  at  evening,  he 
crowded  them  together,  at  Sailor’s  Creek. 
In  the  confusion  which  prevailed,  when 
the  Confederates  thus  found  them- 
selves pressed  on  all  sides,  Humphreys’ 
men  captured  a large  train,  and  many 
hundreds  of  prisoners,  together  with 
13  flags  and  several  pieces  of  artillery. 


THE  LAST  DAYS  OF  THE  WAR. 


^28 

During  the  night  of  the  6th,  and  the 
morning  of  the  7th,  Lee  with  the  shat- 
tered remains  of  his  once  magnificent 
April  crossed  the  Appomattox, 

7 . by  the  bridges,  a few  miles  east  of 
Farmville.  Resolved,  if  possible,  to 
make  the  Appomattox  an  impassable 
barrier  between  himself  and  his  pur- 
suers, he  ordered  the  bridges  to  be 
destroyed.  Humphreys,  however,  with 
the  Second  corps,  was  close  upon  his 
lieels.  The  second  span  of  the  railroad 
bridge  was  already  burning  ; it  was  left 
to  the  mercy  of  the  fiames.  The  wagon- 
road  bridge  was  just  fired ; it  was  saved. 
Humphreys’  troops  were  pushed  across 
^vithout  much  difficulty.  Barton’s  divis- 
ion leading.  The  Confederates,  who 
seemed  to  be  posted  in  considerable 
force,  on  the  heights  on  the  opposite 
side,  disappeared  as  the  Nationals  ap- 
proached, leaving  behind  them  several 
pieces  of  artilleiy.  Ten  guns  had  also 
been  left  on  the  south  of  the  river. 
Signs  were  already  abundant  that  Lee, 
and  his  whole  army,  brave  and  indomit- 
able as  they  all  were,  could  not  much 
longer  hold  out.  Men  and  horses  were 
sinking  by  the  wayside  from  pure  ex- 
haustion ; and  thousands  had  let  fall 
their  muskets  from  sheer  inability  to 
carry  them.  Without  food  and  sleep, 
more  could  not  be  expected  from  man 
or  beast;  but  neither  food  nor  sleep 
^vas  to  be  granted  them  until  the  bitter 
end.  The  horrors  of  that  march  have 
not,  perhaps,  been  equalled  since  the 
famous  Moscow  retreat. 

The  impossibility  of  continuing  the 
march  westward  began  to  be  .apparent 
to  all.  On  the  night  of  the  6th,  when 


the  army  of  Northern  Virginia  was 
well  across  the  Appomattox,  several  of 
the  chief  ofiScers  of  that  army  met 
around  the  bivouac  fire,  and  consulted 
as  to  what  it  was  best  to  do,  in  the  cir- 
cumstances. General  Lee  was  not 
present.  Three  lines  of  conduct  were 
suggested  : — to  disband,  allowing  the 
troops  to  make  their  way,  as  best  they 
might,  to  some  fixed  rallying  point ; to 
abandon  the  trains  and  cut  their  way 
through  the  opposing  lines ; or  to  sur- 
render. After  a short  consultation,  it 
was  agreed  that  two  of  the  suggested 
lines  of  conduct  were  impracticable  ; 
and  the  voice  of  the  council  was  in 
favor  of  surrender.  General  Pendleton 
was  commissioned  to  communicate  the 
result  of  their  deliberations  to  General 
Lee.  The  probability  is  that  Lee’s 
private  opinion  did  not  differ  from  that 
of  his  officers  ; but,  refusing  to  regard 
the  situation  as  so  des23erate,  he  lent 
an  apparently  unwilling  ear  to  their 
advice.  It  would  be  time  enough,  he 
thought,  to  surrender  when  he  had  abso- 
lutely no  other  choice.  He  was  not  yet 
reduced  to  that  extremity.  Pendleton 
was  still  with  his  chief,  when  the  con- 
versation was  broken  short  by  the  loud 
thunders  of  artillery — sounds  which  too 
plainly  told  that  the  relentless  and  un- 
tiring pursuer  was  again  upon  the 
track.  In  his  determination  not  to 
surrender,  Lee  was,  no  doubt,  encour- 
aged by  the  fact  that  Davis  and  his 
colleagues  were  at  Danville,  and  mak- 
ing strenuous  efforts  to  reorganize  the 
government.  Lee  was  still  aware  that 
the  Confederate  authorities — if  such 
authorities  could  be  said  now  to  exist — 


PRINCE  EDWARD  COURT  HOUSE. 


9:i9 


had  no  intention  as  yet  of  giving  up 
the  contest ; and  he  was  hardly  to  be 
blamed — especially  when  we  remember 
that  he  was  the  most  trusted  and  hon- 
ored man  in  the  Confederacy — if  he  was 
unwilling  to  incur  the  odium  of  aban- 
doning the  sinking  vessel,  while  a sin- 
gle ray  of  hope  remained. 

The  army  of  Northern  Virginia,  or 
rather  what  remained  of  that  once  mag- 
nificent organization,  was  now  concen- 
trated, in  a strong  position,  some  four 
or  five  miles  north  of  Farmville,  and 
covering  both  the  stage  and  plank 
roads.  The  ground  in  front,  which  was 
open,  and  gently  sloping  downwards  in 
the  direction  of  Appomattox,  was  cov- 
ered with  intrenchments  and  batteries. 
Humphreys,  as  soon  as  he  had  crossed 
the  river  with  the  Second  corps,  re- 
newed the^  pursuit.  Barlow,  with  the 
first  division,  moved  in  the  direction 
of  Farmville,  which  the  Confederates, 
on  his  approach,  abandoned,  after  firing 
the  bridges,  and  destroying  130  wagons. 
Humphreys,  himself,  with  the  divisions 
of  Miles  and  De  Trobriand,  making  a 
more  direct  pursuit,  soon  found  himself 
confronted  by  Lee’s  army  in  its  in- 
trenched position.  He  saw  at  a glance 
how  vain  it  would  be  to  make  any  at- 
tempt in  front.  Having  sent  instruc- 
tions to  Barlow  to  come  up  without 
delay,  he  proceeded  to  execute  a flank 
movement,  in  the  hope  of  dislodging  his 
antagonist.  He  soon  discovered  that 
his  own  lines  were  outflanked  by  those 
of  the  Confederates,  both  on  the  right 
and  on  the  left ; nor  was  he  any  longer 
in  doubt  that  he  had  in  front  of  him 
all  that  remained  of  the  army  of  North- 


ern Virginia.  Extending  his  right  the 
length  of  one  division,  Humphreys 
ordered  Miles  to  make  an  attack  with 
three  regiments.  Miles  made  a bold 
and  vigorous  attempt ; but  he  was  com- 
jDelled  to  fall  back,  with  a loss  of  over 
600  men  in  killed  and  wounded.  Among 
the  former  were  General  Smyth*  and 
Major  Mills.  Among  the  latter  were 
Generals  Mott,  Madill  and  McDougall, 
as  also  Colonel  Starbird,  of  the  Nine- 
teenth Maine.  It  was  night  before  Bar- 
low  came  up ; and  it  was  agreed  not  to 
repeat  the  assault  until  the  morning. 

On  the  morning  of  the  7th,  Sheridan 
had  despatched  two  mounted  divisions 
under  Merritt,  to  Prince  Edward  Court 
House.  The  remaining  division  of  his 
cavalry,  commanded  by  Crook,  he  sent 
to  Farmville.  The  bridges  having  been 
destroyed  at  Farmville,  Crook’s  troop- 
ers were  compelled  to  wade  the  stream 
— a task  which  was  not  accomplished 
without  considerable  difiiculty.  On 
the  north  side  of  the  Appomattox,  they 
fell  upon  a body  of  Confederate  infan- 
try who  were  guarding  a wagon-train. 
A sharp  skirmish  ensued.  The  Con- 
federates, however,  were  greatly  in  the 

* Brigadier-General  Thomas  A.  Smyth  was 
born  in  Ireland.  At  an  early  age  he  came  to  the 
United  States,  and  settled  at  Wilmington,  Del.,  be- 
coming engaged  in  course  of  time  in  the  coach-build- 
ing business.  When  the  war  broke  out,  he  recruited 
a company  in  Wilmington.  Proceeding  thence  ro 
Philadelphia,  he  joined  a three  months’  regiment, 
then  leaving  for  the  Shenandoah  Valley.  On  his 
return  home,  a Delaware  regiment  was  just  about  to 
proceed  to  the  seat  of  war.  Smyth  accepted  the  post 
of  major.  He  rose  gradually,  becoming  successively 
lieutenant  colonel,  and  colonel,  until  finally  he  was 
promoted  to  the  rank  of  brigadier  general,  for  his 
bravery  at  Cold  Harbor.  In  the  engagement  near 
Farmville,  where  he  received  his  death  wound,  he  com- 
manded  the  second  division  of  the  Second  army  corps 


930 


THE  LAST  DAYS  OF  THE  WAD. 


majority ; and  Crook,  after  an  effectual 
effort  to  dislodge  the  enemy,  found  it 
necessary  to  fall  back.  In  tliis  strug- 
gle, General  Gregg,  one  of  his  brigade 
commanders,  was  surrounded  and  cap- 
tured. On  his  arrival  at  Prince  Edward 
Court  House,  Sheridan,  who  marched 
with  the  command  of  Merritt,  found 
General  McKenzie,  with  his  division  of 
cavalry  from  the  army  of  the  James, 
and  ordered  him  to  cross  the  bridge  on 
the  Buffalo  Biver,  and  make  a recon- 
noissance  in  the  direction  of  Prospect 
Station,  on  the  Lynchburg  Railroad. 
Information  had,  in  the  meantime,  been 
received  from  Crook,  that  the  Confed- 
erate army  had  crossed  to  the  north 
bank  of  the  Appomattox.  Resolved 
to  outrun  Lee,  and  to  interpose  between 
his  army  and  Lynchburg,  Sheridan 
ordered  Merritt  to  push  forward  and 
encamp  at  Buffalo  River,  and,  at  the 
same  time,  sent  instructions  to  Crook 
to  ]-ecross  the  Appomattox  and  encamp 
at  Prospect  Station. 

Such  was  the  general  situation,  at 
nightfall  on  the  7th.  On  that  same 
evening,  and  immediately  after  the  re- 
pulse of  Miles,  as  before  described,  Lee 
received  the  following  letter : — 

April  7fh,  1865. 

“General:  The  result  of  the  last  week 
must  convince  you  of  the  hopelessness  of  fur- 
ther resistance  on  the  part  of  the  Army  of 
[N  orthern  Virginia  in  this  struggle.  I feel  that 
it  is  so,  and  regard  it  as  my  duty  to  shift  from 
myself  the  responsibility  of  any  further  effusion 
of  blood,  by  asking  of  you  the  surrender  of 
that  portion  of  the  Confederate  States  army 
known  as  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia. 

“ U.  S.  Grant,  Lieut-General. 

“ General  R.  E.  Lee.” 


To  this  letter  Lee  wrote  an  immedi- 
ate answer;  but  it  was  not  until 
the  following  morning  that  it  8. 
reached  Grant  at  Farmville.  It  was 
couched  in  these  words  : — 

“ April  7th,  1865. 

“General:  I have  received  your  note  of 
Tliis  date.  Though  n >t  entertaining  the  opin- 
ion you  express  of  the  hopelessness  of  furtlier 
resistance  on  the  part  of  the  Army  of  Northern 
Virgin iii,  I reciprocate  your  desire  to  avoid 
useless  effusion  of  blood,  and,  therefore,  before 
considering  your  proposition,  ask  the  terms 
you  will  offer,  on  condition  of  its  surrender. 

. “ R.  E.  Lee,  General. 

“ Lieut.-General  U.  S.  Grant.” 

On  the  instant  Grant  replied  as 
follows : — 

“ April  8lh,  1865. 

“General:  Your  note  of  last  evening,  in 
reply  to  mine  of  same  date,  asking  the  condi- 
tion on  which  I will  accept  the  surrender  of 
the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  is  just  re- 
ceived. In  reply,  I would  say  that  peace  being 
my  first  desire,  there  is  but  one  condition  that 
I insist  upon,  viz,  : That  the  men  surrendered 
shall  be  disqualified  for  taking  up  arms  against 
the  government  of  the  United  States  until 
properly  exchanged.  I will  meet  you,  or  des- 
ignate officers  to  meet  any  officers  you  may 
name  for  the  same  purpose,  at  any  point  agree- 
able to  you,  for  the  purpose  of  arranging  defi- 
nitely, the  terms  upon  which  the  surrender  of 
tlie  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  will  be  received. 

“ U.  S.  Grant,  Lieut.-General. 

“ General  R.  E.  Lee.” 

VVe  left  Lee  in  a strongly  intrenched 
position,  a few  miles  to  the  north  of 
the  Appomattox.  As  soon  as  he  in- 
dited his  reply  to  Grant’s  first  message, 
he  resumed  his  retreat  under  cover  of 
the  darkness  ; and  so  quietly  was  it  con- 
ducted that  Humphreys  was  ignorant 
of  the  fact,  until  morning,  when  he  was 
prepared  to  renew  the  attack.  Lee’s 


GRANT  SUGGESTS  TERMS  OF  SURRENDER. 


931 


skilful  generalship  was  again  conspicu- 
ously revealed.  Ever  vigilant,  ever  fer- 
tile in  resource,  and  ever  active,  he  had 
again  put  miles  between  himself  and 
liis  pursuers.  The  fact  that  Lee  had 
i-etreated  during  the  night  was  at  once 
^made  known  to  Grant,  who  immediate- 
ly gave  orders  for  the  renewal  of  the 
pursuit.  The  Second  and  Sixth  corps, 
under  the  immediate  direction  of  Meade, 
who  was  accompanied  by  the  General- 
in-chief,  were  pushed  forward  with  all 
possible  haste  along  the  north  bank  of 
the  Appomattox.  Sheridan,  mean- 
while, had  made  excellent  use  both  of 
his  troopers  and  of  his  time.  Lee  was 
pressing  along  that  gradually  narrow- 
ins:  neck  of  land  which  lies  between  the 
head  waters  of  the  Appomattox  and  the 
affluents  of  the  James.  It  was  of  the 
utmost  importance  that  Sheridan  should 
be  able  to  interpose  his  troops  between 
Lee’s  army  and  Lynchburg.  If  he 
could  close  the  outlet  in  the  direction 
of  that  city,  it  would  be  all  over  with 
Lee,  pursued  closely  as  he  was  by  the 
Second  and  Sixth  corps,  under  the  direc- 
tion of  Meade  and  the  General-in-chief. 
This  was  precisely  what  Sheridan  was 
aiming  at,  anvd  what,  within  a few 
hours,  he  actually  did  accomplish.  Hav- 
ing learned  from  one  of  his  scouts, 
early  on  the  morning  of  the  8th,  that 
four  trains  of  cars,  with  supplies  for 
Lee’s  army,  were  at  Appomattox  Sta- 
tion, he  at  once  notified  Merritt  and 
Crook,  and  briskly  pushed  the  whole 
(command  towards  that  point.  Lee  was 
not  ignorant  of  the  extreme  peril  of  his 
situation  ; but  he  kept  pressing  eagerly 
forward,  still  clinging  to  the  skirts  of 


hope,  and,  in  spite  of  almost  irresistible 
evidence  to  the  contrary,  indulging  the 
thought  that  he  might  yet  find  refuge 
among  the  ranges  of  the  Blue  Bidge, 
beyond  Lynchburg.  In  these  circum 
stances  he  received  Grant’s  second  let 
ter,  and  replied  as  follows : 

April  8th,  1865. 

‘‘Gen'ERAL:  I received  at  a late  liour  yoii7 
note  of  to-day.  In  mine  of  yesterday,  I did 
not  intend  to  propose  the  surrender  of  the 
Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  but  to  ask  the 
terms  of  your  proposition.  To  be  frank,  I do 
not  think  the  emergency  has  arisen  to  call  for 
the  surrender  of  this  army;  but  as  the  restora* 
tion  of  peace  should  be  the  sole  object  of  all,  I 
desire  to  know  whether  your  proposals  would 
tend  to  that  end.  I cannot,  therefore,  meet  you 
with  a view  to  surrender  the  Army  of  Northern 
Virginia;  but  so  far  as  your  proposition  may 
affect  the  (Jonfedei’ate  States  forces  under  my 
command,  and  tend  to  the  restoration  of  peace, 
I should  be  pleased  to  meet  you  at  ten,  a.m., 
to-morrow,  on  the  old  stage-road  to  Richmond, 
between  the  picket-lines  of  the  two  armies. 

“ R.  E.  Lee,  General. 

“ Lieut. -General  U.  S.  Gran^” 

This  note  was  received  by  Grant  about 
midnight ; and  he  replied  next  morn- 
ing in  the  following  terms  : 

“ April  9th,  1865. 

“General:  Your  note  of  yesterday  is  re- 
ceived. As  I have  no  authority  to  treat  on  the 
subject  of  peace,  the  meeting  proposed  for  ten 
A.M„  to-day,  could  lead  to  no  good.  I will 
state,  however.  General,  that  I am  equally 
anxious  for  peace  with  yourself;  and  the  whole 
North  entertain  the  same  feeling.  The  terms  up- 
on which  peace  can  be  had  are  well  understood. 
By  the  South  laying  down  their  arms  they  will 
hasten  that  most  desirable  event,  save  thousands 
of  human  lives,  and  hundreds  of  millions  of 
property  not  yet  destroyed.  Sincerely  hoping 
that  all  our  difficulties  may  be  settled  without 
the  loss  of  another  life,  I subscribe  myself, 

“U.  S.  Grant,  Lieutenant-General. 

“ General  R.  E.  Lee.” 


932 


THE  LAST  DAYS  OF  THE  WAR. 


As  soon  as  lie  had  finished  this  let- 
ter, Grant  left  Meade  in  charge  of  the 
Second  and  Sixth  corps  and  hurried  on 
to  join  Sheridan  and  Grifiin.  While 
the  letter  was  on  its  way,  and  before 
the  General-in-chief  had  joined  the  one 
or  the  other,  further  parley  had  become 
unnecessary.  Sheridan  had  already 
settled  the  question.  On  the  morning 
of  the  8th,  after  a forced  march  of 
about  30  miles,  his  advance,  under 
Custer,  had  reached  Appomattox  Sta- 
tion, about  four  miles  to  the  south  of 
Appomattox  Court  House.  Lee’s  van- 
guard had  just  arrived  with  four  trains 
of  cars,  laden  with  supplies.  Custer, 
with  lightning-like  rapidity  dashed  up- 
on the  rear  of  the  trains,  and  captured 
them.  Supported  by  Devin,  who  had 
come  up,  he  then  rushed  with  fierce 
energy  on  the  vanguard,  and  drove  it 
back  to  Appomattox  Court  House,  near 
which  was  the  main  body  of  Lee’s 
army.  Twenty-five  guns,  a hospital 
train,  a large  number  of  additional 
wagons,  with  many  prisoners,  were 
captured  by  the  National  cavalry. 
Sheridan,  hurrying  forward  with  the 
remainder  of  his  command,  flung  him- 
self across  the  line  of  Lee’s  retreat, 
with  the  determination  of  holding  his 
ground  at  any  and  every  risk  until  the 
morning,  when,  he  knew,  he  would  be 
joined  by  Ord,  and  the  army  of  the 
James,  and  by  Griffin  with  the  Fifth 
corps.  He  knew  also  that  by  that  time, 
Meade,  with  the  Second  and  Sixth  corps, 
would  be  well  forward  and  able  to  fall 
with  effect  on  the  Confederate  rear. 
Such  was  the  situation  of  affairs  on  the 
night  of  the  8th.  Lee  was  completely 


cut  off  from  his  own  line  of  retreat. 
Brave  and  resolute  to  the  last,  and  be- 
lieving that  he  had  nothing  but  cavalry 
in  front  of  him,  he  decided  to  make  an 
attempt,  at  least,  to  cut  through  Sheri- 
dan’s lines. 

Early  on  the  morning  of  the  9th, 
Lee  was  ready  to  carry  out  his  purpose. 
His  h^art,  however,  must  have  April 
bled  within  him,  when  he  looked  9 . 
around  him,  and  beheld  the  wretched 
remnant  of  what  was  once  the  proud 
and  invincible  army  of  Northern  Vir- 
ginia. It  consisted  of  two  thin  lines — 
the  one  composed  of  what  was  left  of 
Plill’s,  now  Gordon’s  command,  the 
other  of  the  wreck  of  Longstreet’s 
corps.  Between  these  lines  were  the 
debris  of  the  wagon-train,  and  some 
thousands  of  miserable  creatures  who 
were  too  weak  to  carry  arms.  Lee 
gave  orders  to  Gordon  to  cut  his  way 
through,  at  all  hazards.  The  charge 
was  made  with  tremendous  energy. 
Such,  in  truth,  was  the  violence  of  the 
shock,  and  so  persistent  was  the  pres- 
sure, that  Sheridan’s  men  who  had  dis- 
mounted to  resist  the  attack,  wei*e 
forced  back.  At  this  critical  moment, 
Sheridan,  who  had  been  to  Appomattox 
Station  for  the  purpose  of  hurrying  for- 
ward Ord,  arrived  on  the  scene  of  action. 
Knowing  well  the  purpose  of  the  en- 
emy, and  keenly  alive  to  the  value  of 
time,  he  directed  his  troopers  to  fall 
back  gradually,  but  to  continue  to  offer 
a firm  and  steady  resistance,  so  as  to 
allow  Ord,  with  his  infantry,  to  come 
up  and  form  his  lines.  This  done,  they 
were  to  move  to  the  right  and  mount. 
Sheridan’s  orders  wei*e  admirably 


GRANT  AND  LEE  AT  McLEAN^S  HOUSE. 


933 


executed.  As  soon  as  the  cavalry  moved 
towards  their  own  right,  the  Confed- 
erates beheld  to  their  amazement,  the 
glittering  arms  and  serried  ranks  of  the 
infantry.  The  unlooked  for  vision  had 
all  the  effect  of  a stunning  and  unex- 
pected blow.  The  Confederates  imme- . 
diately  discontinued  their  pressure,  and 
began  to  give  way.  The  National  in- 
fantry were  now  pressing  upon  the 
confused  and  bewildered  multitude. 
Sheridan  had  ridden  round  to  the  Con- 
federate left  flank ; his  bugles  had 
sounded  the  order  to  remount ; and  he 
was  just  about  to  fall  with  all  his  weight 
on  the  already  disordered  mass,  when 
a flag  of  truce  was  presented  to  Custer 
who  led  the  advance.  Sheridan  rode 
to  Appomattox  Court  House,  where 
lie  was  met  by  General  Gordon  and 
General  Wilcox.  Gordon  asked  for  a 
suspension  of  hostilities,  and  informed 
Sheridan  that  Grant  and  Lee  were, 
even  now,  making  arrangements  for  the 
surrender  of  the  army  of  Northern  Vir- 
ginia. There  was  no  more  fighting 
between  the  two  great  rival  armies — 
the  army  of  the  Potomac  and  the  army 
of  Northern  Virginia. 

On  the  morning  of  the  9th,  a heavy 
fog  enveloped  the  entire  country  around 
Appomattox  Court  House.  Long  be- 
fore that  fog  dispersed,  Lee,  clad  in  a 
new  gray  uniform,  might  have  been 
seen  at  a camp-fire  with  Mahone  and 
Longstreet.  Care  and  anxiety  were 
written  on  each  of  their  countenances. 
Longstreet,  his.  arm  in  a sling,  and  a 
cigar  in  his  mouth,  sat  on  the  trunk  of 
a felled  tree.  Gordon  had  been  sent 
on  his  mission.  It  was  agreed  that  if 


success  were  denied  him  there  was  no 
longer  any  chance  of  escape.  Of  Gor- 
don’s failure  to  penetrate  the  National 
lines,  they  were  soon  made  aware.  Lee 
mounted  his  horse.  General  Long- 
street,” he  said,  “ I leave  you  in  charge  ; 
I am  going  to  hold  a conference  with 
General  Grant.”  He  then  rode  off.  On 
his  way  he  received  Grant’s  letter,  be- 
fore quoted.  He  replied  immediatelj"  : 

April  9,  1865. 

‘•General:  I received  your  note  of  tiiis 
morning,  on  the  picket-line,  whither  I had  come 
to  meet  you,  and  ascertain  definitely  what 
terms  were  embraced  in  your  proposition  of 
yesterday,  with  reference  to  the  surrender  of 
this  army.  I now  ask  an  interview,  in  accord- 
ance with  the  offer  contained  in  your  letter  of 
yesterday  for  that  purpose. 

“ R.  E.  Lee,  General. 

“ Lieut-General  U.  S.  Grant.”  . 

To  this  Grant  replied  as  follows : 

“ April  9th,  1865. 

‘‘General:  Your  note  of  this  date  is  but 
this  moment  (11.50  a.m.)  received.  In  conse- 
quence of  my  having  passed  from  the  Rich- 
mond and  Lynchburg  road  to  the  Farmville 
and  Lynchburg  road,  I am  at  this  writing, 
about  four  miles  west  of  Walter’s  Church,  and 
will  push  forward  to  the  front  for  the  purpose 
of  meeting  you.  Notice  sent  to  me  on  this 
road,  where  you  wish  the  interview  to  take 
place,  will  meet  me. 

“ U.  S.  Grant,  Lieutenant-General. 

“ General  R.  E.  Lee.” 

The  scene  and  the  main  features  of  the 
interview  have  been  preserved  for  us  by 
an  eye-witness.  It  took  place  at  the 
house  of  Mr.  Wilmer  McLean — a square 
brick  building  surrounded  with  roses, 
violets,  and  daffodils.  Grant — with  his 
slouched  hat,  dark  blue  frock-coat  un- 
buttoned and  covered  with  mud,  gray 


810 


934. 


THE  LAST  DAYS  OF  THE  WAR. 


pantaloons  tucked  in  his  soiled  boots, 
and  a dark  waistcoat,  and  with  nothing 
to  indicate  his  rank,  except  the  double 
row  of  brass  buttons  and  the  three  silver 
stars — walked  up  to  the  house,  accom- 
panied by  Ord,  Sheridan,  and  their  re- 
s2Jective  staffs.  Lee  had  already  ar- 
rived; and  his  blooded  iron-gray  horse, 
in  charge *of  an  orderly,  was  nibbling  at 
the  grass.  Grant  and  two  aids  entered 
the  house ; the  others  who  accompanied 
him,  sat  down  on  the  porch.  Lee  was 
standing  beside  a table,  wearing  a bright 
bluish-gray  uniform,  a military  hat,  with 
a gold  cord,  buckskin  gauntlets,  high 
riding-boots,  and  the  splendid  dress- 
sword  which  had  been  presented  to 
him  by  the  State  of  Virginia.  Tall 
and  erect,  he  had  a fine  soldierly  bear- 
inof.  It  was  noticed  that  his  hair  was 

O 

long  and  gray.  He  was  attended  only 
by  Colonel  Marshall,  his  chief  of  staff. 
On  Grant’s  entrance  the  two  shook 
hands,  sat  down  and  proceeded  to  busi- 
ness. As  Lee  made  no  special  request. 
Grant  at  once  wrote  out  his  terms : 

Appomattox  Court  House,  ) 
April  9,  1865.  j 

“General:  In  accordance  with  the  sub- 
stance of  my  letter  to  you  of  the  8th  instant,  I 
propose  to  receive  the  surrender  of  the  Army 
of  Northern  Virginia  on  the  following  terms, 
to  wit:  Rolls  of  all  the  officers  and  men  to  be 
made  in  duplicate,  one  copy  to  be  given  to  an 
officer  designated  by  me,  the  other  to  be  re- 
tained by  such  officers  as  you  may  designate. 
Idle  officers  to  give  their  individual  puroles,  not 
to  take  up  arms  against  the  government  of  the 
United  States  until  properly  exchanged,  and 
each  company  or  regimental  commander  to  sign 
a like  parole  for  the  men  of  his  command.  The 
arms,  artillery,  and  public  property  to  be  parked 
and  stacked,  and  turned  over  to  the  officers  ap- 
pointed by  me  to  receive  them.  This  will  not 


embrace  the  side-arms  of  the  officers,  nor  their 
private  horses  or  baggage.  This  done,  each 
officer  and  man  will  be  allowed  to  return  to  his 
home,  not  to  be  disturbed  by  United  States 
authority  so  long  as  they  observe  their  paroles 
and  the  laws  in  force  where  they  may  reside. 

“ U.  S.  Grant,  Lieutenant-General. 
“ General  R.  E.  Lee.” 

The  following  is  Lee’s  letter  of  ac- 
ceptance : 

“Headquarters  Army  of  Northern  ) 
Virginia,  April  9,  1865.  \ 

‘^General:  I have  received  your  letter  of 
this  date,  containing  the  terms  of  the  surrender 
of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  as  proposed 
by  you.  As  they  are  substantially  the  same  as 
those  expressed  in  your  letter  of  the  8th  inst., 
they  are  accepted.  I will  proceed  to  designate 
the  proper  officers  to  carry  the  stipulations 
into  effect. 

“ R.  E.  Lee,  General. 
“ Lieut.-General  U.  S.  Grant.” 

The  signatures  had  just  been  at- 
tached, when  Lee,  after  a moment’s 
reflection,  said  that  he  had  forgotten 
one  thing.  Many  of  the  cavalry  and 
artillery  horses  belonged  to  the  men 
who  had  chars^e  of  them.  It  was  too 
late,  however,  to  speak  of  that  now. 
Grant  replied,  “ I will  instruct  my  pa- 
rolling  officers  that  all  the  enlisted  men 
of  your  cavalry  and  artillery,  who  own 
horses  are  to  retain  them,  just  as  the 
officers  do  theirs.  They  will  need  them 
for  their  spring  ploughing,  and  other 
farm  work.”  Lee  seemed  greatly 
pleased  with  Grant’s  prompt  com- 
pliance with  his  only  half-expressed 
wish.  General,”  he  said  earnestly, 
there  is  nothing  which  you  could 
have  accomplished  more  for  the  good 
of  the  people  or  of  the  government.” 

Grant’s  terms  were  in  the  last  de- 
gree magnanimous  and  liberal.  They 


THE  UNION  SAVED. 


935 


revealed  nobility  of  soul  and  delicacy  of 
sentiment  on  tbe  part  of  the  conqueror 
who  granted  them,  on  the  part  of  the 
government  which  sanctioned  them, 
and  on  the  part  of  the  people  who 
gave  them  their  approval.  The  agree- 
ment was  such  as  sufficiently  sustained 
the  dignity  of  those  who  had  triumphed 
^vithout  unnecessarily  wounding  the 
feelings  of  those  who  had  been  van- 
quished. It  was  one  of  the  grandest 
examples  yet  given  to  the  world  of  the 
refining  and  softening  influences  of 
modern  civilization — an  example  which 
contrasted  strangely  and  strikingly  with 
the  barbarous  habits  of  the  past.  Gen- 
eral Grant  will  live  in  history  as  a great 
soldier ; he  will  be  remembered  also  as 
a hiofh-souled  hero  in  the  hour  of  vie- 
tory.  If  battles  must  still  be  fought, 
blood  be  shed,  and  valuable  lives  sacri- 
ficed, it  is  gratifying  to  think  that 
cruelty,  under  the  guise  of  justice,  is  no 
longer  to  be  a necessary  adjunct  of 
party,  sectional,  or  national  triumph. 

After  the  surrender,  Lee  rode  back 
to  his  troops  to  bid  them  farewell.  His 
reception  was  a something  unparalleled, 
in  such  circumstances  “ Whole  lines  of 
battle,”  says  an  eye-witness,  “ rushed  up 
to  their  beloved  old  chief,  and  choking 
with  emotion,  struggled  with  each  other, 
to  wring  him  once  more  by  the  hand. 
Men  who  had  fought  throughout  the 
war,  and  knew  what  the  agony  and  hu- 
miliation of  the  moment  must  be  to 
him,  strove  with  a refinement  of  un- 
selfishness and  tenderness,  which  he 
alone  could  fully  appreciate,  to  lighten 
his  burden  and  mitigate  his  pain.  With 
tears  pouring  down  both  cheeks,  Gen- 


eral Lee,  at  length,  commanded  voice 
enough  to  say : ^ Men,  we  have  fought 
through  the  war  together.  I have  done 
the  best  that  I could  for  you.’  Not  an 
eye  that  looked  on  that  scene  was  dry.” 
On  the  12th  of  April,  three  days  after 
the  surrender,  the  Confederates  march- 
ed by  divisions  to  an  appointed  place  in 
the  neighborhood  of  Appomattox  Court 
House,  and  stacked  their  arms  and  de- 
posited their  accoutrements.  Of  nearly 
28,000  men,  only  about  8000  had  mus- 
kets in  their  hands.  Among  the  sur- 
rendered property  there  were  30  cannon 
and  350  wagons.  Paroles  were  distri- 
buted to  the  men  ; and  the  army  of 
Northern  Virginia  passed  out  of  exist- 
ence. The  war  was  now  practically 
ended.  It  was  impossible  for  the  other 
armies  for  any  length  of  time  to  jDrolong 
the  struggle.  The  army  of  Northern 
Virginia — as  Swinton,  at  the  close  of  his 
masterly  history  of  the  army  of  the 
Potomac,  puts  it — was  the  “ keystone  ” 
of  the  Confederate  structure.  The  key- 
stone removed,  the  structure  fell  with 
‘^a  resounding  crash.” 

A year,  all  but  three  weeks,  had 
elapsed  since  Grant  crossed  the  Papidan. 
It  had  been  one  of  the  severest  and 
most  protracted  campaigns  on  record. 
When  it  commenced,  Lee  had  under 
him  65,000  men.  We  have  seen  what 
a miserable  remnant  was  left.  Between 
the  Rapid  an  and  Appomattox  Court 
House,  Grant  lost,  as  nearly  as  possible, 
in  killed,  wounded  and  missing  100,000 
men — an  enormous  sacrifice ; but  it 
saved  the  Union,  and  perpetuated  the 
Republic. 

It  was  natural,  that,  in  the  circum- 


936 


THE  LAST  DAYS  OF  THE  WAR. 


stances,  there  should  be  great  joy  all 
over  the  North.  The  secretary  of  war 
issued  the  following  order : 

“ That  a salute  of  two  hundred  guns  be  fired, 
at  the  head-quarters  of  every  army,  and  at 
erery  post  and  arsenal  in  the  United  States, 
and  at  the  Military  Academy  at  West  Point, 
on  the  day  of  the  receipt  of  this  order,  in  com- 
memoration of  the  surrender  of  General  R.  E. 
Lee  and  the  army  of  Northern  Virginia,  to 
Lieutenant-General  Grant  and  the  army  under 
his  command — report  of  the  receipt  and  exe- 
cution of  this  order  to  be  made  to  the  Adju- 
tant-General at  Washington/’ 

These  orders  were  gladly  obeyed ; 
and  in  addition  to  the  demonstrations 
thus  brought  about,  there  were  public 
and  voluntary  rejoicings  in  every  town- 
ship and  every  city  thi’oughout  the 
Northern  States. 

On  the  day  of  the  surrender  of  Gen- 
e^  al  Lee,  President  Lincoln  returned  to 
Washino:ton.  He  had  been  for  some 
days  at  City^  Point,  where,  as  -has  been 
mentioned  in  a previous  chapter,  he 
had  a conference  with  Generals  Grant 
and  Sherman,  and  Admiral  Porter. 
After  the  occupation  of  Richmond,  by 
the  National  troops,  Lincoln,  on  board 
the  Malvern,  Porter’s  flag-ship,  moved 
up  the  James.  Leaving  the  Malvern 
near  Rocketts,  the  president  and  the 
admiral  proceeded  to  Richmond  in  the 
commander’s  gig.  Lincoln’s  reception 
was  most  cordial,  the  emancipated  slaves 
crowding  around  him  to  such  an  ex- 
tent, that  a file  of  soldiers  had  to  be 
called  in,  to  clear  the  way.  Halting 
for  a time,  and  resting  at  Weitzel’s 
quarters,  he  entered  an  open  carriage 
and  rode  rapidly  through  the  principal 
streets,  and  was  soon  again  on  board. 


and  on  his  way  back  to  City  Point.  He 
visited  Richmond  again  on  the  6th  of 
April,  two  days  later,  and  granted  per- 
mission to  the  Virginia  Legislature  to 
assemble,  on  the  understand  ini?  that 
the  members  would  adopt  measures  for 
the  withdrawal  of  the  Virginia  troops 
and  all  other  obstructions,  which  might 
tend  to  l^inder  the  action  of  the  general 
government.  In  a few  days,  however, 
it  was  discovered  that  the  gentlemen  of 
the  State  Legislature  of  Virginia  were 
abusing  their  privilege ; and  almost  im- 
mediately after  his  return  to  Washing- 
ton, Lincoln  directed  W eitzel  to  revoke 
the  safeguard  which  he  had  granted 
them,  and  to  allow  said  gentlemen  to 
return  to  private  life.  The  return  of 
the  president  to  the  National  capital, 
associated  as  that  return  was,  with  a 
crowning  National  victory,  was  made 
the  occasion  of  great  rejoicing  and  fes- 
tivity. Each  successive  day  had  its 
special  excitement.  On  the  11th,  Lin- 
coln issued  two  proclamations — one 
declaring  that  certain  ports  in  the 
Southern  States  would  be  closed  until 
further  notice,  and  another,  demanding 
for  vessels  of  the  United  States,  in 
foreign  ports,  those  privileges  and  im- 
munities which,  during  the  war,  had 
been  denied,  on  the  plea  that  equal 
rights  had  to  be  accorded  to  each  belli- 
gerent. In  the  evening  the  city  was 
illuminated.  At  the  Executive  Man- 
sion, which  was  especially  brilliant  with 
light,  the  president  addressed  a large 
assemblage  of  citizens.  He  spoke  hope- 
fully and  encouragingly  regarding  the 
future,  and  set  forth  his  views  regard- 
ing the  reconstruction  of  the  South.  It 


ASSASSINATION  OF  LINCOLN. 


937 


was  noticed  there  was  nothing  like  bit- 
terness or  ill-feeling  towards  the,  now 
all  but  subjugated,  foe.  There  were 

110  suggestions  of  vengeance,  retaliation, 
or  punishment  of  any  kind.  It  was  a 
speech  ^vhich  revealed  a heart  full  of 
joy  and  satisfaction,  because  a great 
and  destructive  war  was  all  but  ended, 
and  because  the  sunshine  of  peace  was 
about  to  rest  upon  the  entire  country 
and  people.  All  this  joy,  however,  was 
soon  to  be  clouded.  The  last  sad  act 
of  the  protracted  drama  had  yet  to  be 
^vitnessed. 

The  14th  day  of  April,  1865,  is  des- 
tined to  immortal  memory  in  the  history 
of  the  United  States.  On  that  day, 
with  imposing  solemnities.  General 
Anderson  hoisted  over  Fort  Sumter  the 
same  old  flag  which,  four  years  before, 
he  had  taken  down  and  stowed  away  in 
hope  of  its  future  usefulness.  This 
story,  however,  has  already  been  told 
in  its  proper  place.  It  was  a gladsome 
day  throughout  the  republic ; and  pre- 
parations were  being  made  over  the 
length  and  breadth  of  the  land  for  a day 
of  National  thanksgiving.  On  the 
morning  of  the  14th,  General  Grant 
arrived  in  Washington.  He  was  ac- 
companied by  Captain  Kobert  Lincoln, 
the  president’s  son,  one  of  his  staff 
officers.  A Cabinet  council  was  held 
at  eleven  o’clock.  General  Grant  was 
present.  Lincoln,  it  was  observed,  was 

111  excellent  spirits.  Although  not  ig- 
uormt  of  the  reports  which  were  in 
circulation  as  to  the  existence  of  a con- 
spiracy, which  threatened  not  only  his 
own  life,  but  the  lives  of  all  the  princi- 
pal members  of  the  government,  as  well 


as  those  of  Grant  and  Sherman,  he 
seemed  to  have  no  forebodings  of  evil. 
Delighted  at  the  course  events  had 
taken,  and  pleased  with  the  prospect  of 
peace,  his  conversation  turned  chiefly 
on  the  policy  of  conciliation  to  be  pur- 
sued towards  the  South.  At  the  close 
of  the  Cabinet  meeting,  he  made  an  ar- 
rangement with  General  Grant  to  visit 
Ford’s  Theatre  in  the  evening ; and  a 
box  was  immediately  engaged.  The 
news  spread  like  wild-flre  ; and  when 
the  doors  were  opened,  the  theatre  was 
speedily  crowded  in  every  part.  The 
play  for  the  night  was  “ Our  American 
Cousin.”  Between  eight  and  nine 
o’clock  the  presidential  party  arrived. 
It  consisted  of  Lincoln  himself,  Mrs. 
Lincoln,  Miss  Clara  Harris,  daughter 
of  Senator  Ira  Harris,  and  Major  H.  E. 
Eathbone.  General  Grant,  it  was  ob- 
served, was  not  with  them.  He  had,  it 
was  afterwards  learned,  been  summoned 
to  New  York  on  important  and  press- 
ing business.  The  box,  prepared  for 
and  occupied  by  the  party,  was  in  the 
second  tier.  Along  its  spacious  front 
was  draped  the  American  flag. 

It  was  now  a few  minutes  after  ten 
o’clock.  The  performance  was  drawing 
to  a close.  The  attention  of  the 
audience  was  completely  absorbed.  All 
of  a sudden,  there  was  heard  the  sharp 
crack  of  a pistol.  The  sound  came 
from  the  president’s  box.  At  the  same 
instant,  there  appeared,  in  front  of  that 
box,  a man,  who,  brandishing  a gleam- 
ing dagger,  exclaimed  “ Sic  semper 
tyrannis^^ — so  may  it  be  always  with 
tyrants — the  motto  engraven  on  the 
seal  of  the  State  of  Virginia.  Placing 


938 


THE  LAST  DAYS  OF  THE  WAR, 


his  hand  on  the  rail,  he  sprang  from 
the  box  towards  the  stage.  In  his 
descent,  one  of  his  spurs — for  he  was 
booted  and  spurred  on  the  occasion — 
becomino:  entansfled  in  the  folds  of  the 
National  flag,  his  leap  was  broken ; and 
he  fell  heavily  on  the  floor.  Quickly 
spiinging  to  his  feet,  but  showing  that 
he  was  severely  injured,  especially  in 
one  of  his  legs,  he  again  brandished  his 
weapon  in  the  face  of  the  excited  and 
bewildered  audience,  and  shouted  “ The 
South  is  avenged.”  Rushing  to  the 
rear  of  the  stage  he  disappeared,  before 
either  actors  or  audience  could  recover 
themselves  or  realize  what  had  hap- 
pened. So  sudden  was  tlie  whole  affair, 
that  it  almost  seemed  as  if  it  formed  an 
incident  in  the  play.  It  was  far  other- 
wise. The  play  had  become  a real 
tragedy.  A foul  murder  had  been  com- 
mitted. The  murdered  man  was  Pres- 
ident Lincoln.  The  assassin  was  John 
AVilkes  Booth. 

Booth  was  an  actor  by  profession, 
and  well  acquainted  with  the  building. 
He  was  well  known,  also,  to  all  the  em- 
ployes, and  had  no  difliculty  in  gaining 
admission  to  any  part  of  the  house.  It 
appeared  that  immediately  before  the 
tragedy  occurred,  he  passed  near  the 
box  in  which  were  seated  the  president 
and  his  fiiends.  Presenting  a card  to 
Mr.  Lincoln’s  messenger  he  looked,  for 
a minute,  upon  the  orchestra  and  the 
audience.  Then,  enterins;  the  vestibule 
of  the  box,  he  fastened  the  door  with  a 
piece  of  plank,  which  had  evidently 
been  pi-ovided  previously  for  the  pur- 
pose, the  object  being  to  make  it 
impossible  to  open  the  door  from  with- 


out. Pulling  a Derringer  pistol  from 
one  pocket  with  his  right  hand,  and  a 
dagger  from  another  pocket  with  his 
left,  he  moved,  into  the  box,  quietly 
and  unobserved.  The  entire  party 
were  absorbed  in  the  performance. 
The  president  was  leaning  forward, 
holding  aside  the  curtain  with  his  left 
hand,  his  head  being  turned  slightly 
towards  the  audience.  Holding  his 
pistol  over  the  back  of  the  president’s 
chair.  Booth  fired.  The  ball  entered 
behind  Mr.  Lincoln’s  left  ear,  passed 
throuD;h  the  brain  and  lodged  behind 
the  right  eye.  The  head  fell  forward  ; 
and  the  eyes  closed.  He  lived  for  nine 
hours  afterwards ; but  he  was  never 
again  conscious.  Major  Rathbone, 
startled  by  the  sound  of  the  pistol^ 
and  seeing  what  had  happened,  sprang 
upon  the  assassin ; but  Booth,  dropping 
his  pistol,  swung  his  dagger,  inflicting 
a severe  wound  on  the  major’s  left  arm, 
and  then  leaped  over  the  rail.  Such 
was  the  end  of  Abraham  Lincoln — the 
beloved  of  the  people,  the  emancipator 
of  the  slave,  the  man  who,  of  all  othei*s, 
was  best  fitted  for  the  high  but  delicate 
and  difficult  position  which  he  held 
during  the  stormiest  period  of  his 
country’s  history.  His  four  years  of 
unceasing  toil  and  agony  saved  the 
Union.  His  life-blood,  thus  ruthlessly 
shed,  sealed  it  and  made  it  perpetual. 
His  name  will  ever  remain  one  of  the 
greatest  in  American  history ; and 
while  A\^ashington,  to  latest  ages,  will 
be  spoken  of  as  the  Father,  Lincoln 
will  be  remembered  as  the  Saviour  of 
his  country. 

The  death  of  Lincoln  filled  the  nation 


ATTEMPT  ON  THE  LIFE  OF  SEWARD. 


939 


with  woe,  and  covered  it  with  sack- 
cloth. Every  one  felt  as  if  he  had  lost 
a personal  friend.  No  one  felt  the 
blow  more  than  Stanton,  the  stern  and 
unbending  secretary-of-war.  Leaning 
over  the  body  of  the  dead  president, 
and  overwlielmed  with  grief,  he  mouin- 
fully  said,  “No  one  will  ever  know  the 
anxious  hours  that  you  and  I have 
spent  together.  You  were  my  only 
witness.  Now,  you  are  gone,  and  I am 
left  alone.”  Lincoln’s  funeral  in  many 
particulars  was,  perhaps,  unprecedented 
in  modern  times.  The  body  having  been 
embalmed  lay,  in  state,  in  the  East 
Room  of  the  White  House.  On  the 
19th  of  April,  after  the  funeral  services, 
the  remains  were  removed  thence  by 
way  .of  Baltimore,  Philadelphia,  New 
York,  and  Albany,  to  Springfield,  Illi- 
nois, where  they  were  interred.  In  each 
of  those  cities  multitudes  crowded  to 
look  on  the  face  of  the  dead  president; 
and  it  is  but  truth  to  say,  that  the 
entire  people  of  the  North  were  mourn- 
ei*s  on  the  occasion.  No  chief-ruler  of 
any  people — no  monarch  in  all  the  past 
— was  ever  more  loved  in  life,  or  more 
lionored  in  death.  Ilis  grave  is  now, 
and  ever  will  be,  a point  of  attraction, 
not  onl}^  to  the  American  people,  in 
whose  service  he  lost  his  life,  but  to 
liberty-loving  pilgrims  from  all  lands. 
He  died  a martyr  to  liberty.  His  mur- 
der made  his  name  immortal. 

On  the  same  evening  on  which 
Lincoln  was  shot,  a murderous  assault 
was  made  on  Mr.  Seward,  the  secretary, 
of-state.  Although  the  assassin,  in 
this  case,  was  less  successful  in  the 
accomplishment  of  his  purpose,  the 


enterprise  was  quite  as  daring,  and 
revealed,  equally  with  the  other,  the 
foul  character  of  the  conspiracy,  and 
the  villainous  methods,  as  well  as  des- 
perate energy,  of  its  agents.  Mr. 
Seward,  a few  days  before,  had  been 
thrown  from  his  carilage,  and  was, 
in  consequence,  confined  to  his  bed-_ 
room.  About  the  same  time  that  the 
tragedy  occurred  in  the  theatre,  a man 
called  at  Mr.  Seward’s  house.  On 
being  refused  admittance,  he  rushed 
past  the  porter  and  flew  up  two  flights 
of  stairs  straio:ht  to  Mr.  Seward’s  room. 
At  the  door  of  that  room,  he  was  met 
and  resisted  by  the  secretary’s  son,  Mr. 
Frederick  William  Seward.  With  the 
butt-end  of  his  pistol,  he  struck  the 
younger  Se^vard  to  the  floor,  fracturing 
his  skull.  Then,  pushing  aside  Miss 
Seward,  who  had  been  attracted  by  the 
noise,  he  rushed  into  the  sick-room, 
sprang  upon  the  bed,  and  inflicted  some 
fearful  wounds  on  Mr.  Seward’s  face 
and  neck.  An  invalid  soldier  named 
Robinson,  who  was  in  attendance  on 
Mr.  Seward,  seized  the  assassin  from 
behind,  and  struggled  with  him ; while 
Mr.  Seward  himself,  his  arm  in  a sling, 
and  the  blood  streaming  from  his  gaping 
wounds,  resisted  with  what  energy  he 
could  command.  Meanwhile  the  cry 
of  “ Murder  ! ” rang  through  the  house ; 
and  the  assassin  becoming  alaiuied,  and 
shaking  himself  free  of  Robinson,  made 
his  way  down  stairs  and  into  the  open 
street.  Mounting  a horse  which  was 
there  waiting  for  him,  he  was  soon  out 
of  sight.  The  assassin,  in  this  case,  was 
Lewis  Payne  Powell.  He  was  the  son 
of  a Florida  clergyman  ; and  he  had 


THE  LAST  DAYS  OF  THE  WAR. 


1^40 


served  in  tlie  war.  He  belonged  to 
the  same  gang  witb  Booth. 

The  principal  agents  of  the  conspiracy 
were  afterwards  captured  and  brought 
to  trial.  Summary  justice  was  dealt 
out  to  Booth.  He  was  shot  and  killed 
by  his  pursuers  in  a tobacco-barn,  at 
Garrett’s  Farm,  some  20  miles  below 
Fredericksburg.  Harold,  who  was 
^vith  Booth  when  he  was  shot ; Mrs. 
Surratt,  who  had  harbored  the  con- 
spirators ; Atzerott,  who  had  been 
appointed  to  kill  Vice-President  John- 
son ; and  Payne  who  made  the  attack 
on  Mr.  Seward — all  these  were  found 
guilty  and  executed  on  the  6th  of  July. 
Several  other  conspirators — among 
them  Dr.  Mudd,  who  set  Booth’s  broken 
limb — were  sentenced  to  imprisonment 
for  longer  or  shorter  terms.  It  was 
suspected,  at  the  time,  that  the  conspir- 
acy had  the  encouragement  of  some  of 
the  Confederate  leaders.  This  suspi- 
cion has  not  been  justified  by  any  facts, 
hitherto  made  public. 

The  assassination  of  the  president, 
painful  as  the  blow  was  felt  to  be  by 
the  whole  people,  did  not,  in  any  seri- 
ous way,  disorganize  the  government 
machine  or  impede  its  working. 
Within  six  hours  after  Lincoln’s  death, 
Andrew  Johnson,  the  vice-president, 
^vas  sworn  into  office  as  president.  Mr. 
Jolinson  on  taking  the  chair  of 
Washington,  and  assuming  tlie  reins  of 
government,  requested  tlie  members  of 
the  cabinet  to  retain  their  offices.  The 
tide  of  affairs  thus  rolled  on,  neither 
cdiecked  nor  diverted  by  what  had 
happened. 

The  reader  must  now  return  with  us 


to  Goldsboro,  where  we  left  the  army 
of  General  Sherman,  resting,  and  pre- 
paring for  anotlier  march  which,  it 
was  hoped,  would  result  in  the  destruc- 
tion or  capture  of  the  Confederate  army 
under  General  J ohnston.  In  a pi*evious 
chapter,  we  have  given  an  account  of 
the  visit  made  to  City  Point  by  Gen- 
eral Sherman,  and  of  the  interview 
which  he  there  had  with  President 
Lincoln  and  with  General  Grant. 
While  at  City  Point,  Sherman  obtained 
permission  from  Grant  to  make  some 
radical  changes  in  the  organization  of 
his  forces.  On  his  return  to  Goldsboro, 
he  proceeded  at  once  to  the  work  of 
reconstruction.  His  left  wing  he  con- 
stituted a distinct  army,  under  the 
title  of  “the  Army  of  Georgia,” 
and  entrusted  it  to  the  command  of 
General  Slocum.  This  army  consisted 
of  two  corps,  which  were  commanded 
respectively  by  Jeff.  C.  Davis  and  Jos. 
A.  Mower.  The  Tenth  and  Twenty- 
Third  corps  he  named  “ the  Army  of 
the  Ohio,”  and  placed  it  under  the  com- 
mand of  General  Schofield.  The  corps 
commanders  of  General  Schofield’s 
army  were  J.  D.  Cox  and  A.  H.  Terry. 
These  changes  were  considered  neces- 
saiy  for  various  reasons,  but  mainly  for 
the  purpose  of  discipline  and  efficiency 
in  the  entire  command  ; and  they  were 
made,  as  we  have  seen,  with  the  con- 
sent and  approval  of  General  Gi*ant. 
Sherman  had  thus,  under  his  direct 
command,  three  separate  armies — the 
army  of  the  Tennessee,  under  Howard ; 
the  army  of  Georgia,  under  Slocum ; 
and  the  army  of  the  Ohio,  under  Scho- 
field. Howard  was  on  the  right ; Slocnm 


SHERMAN  AND  JOHNSTON— CORRESPONDENCE. 


941 


was  on  the  left ; Schofield  was  in  the 
centre.  The  cavalry  force  was  under 
the  immediate  direction  of  Kilpatrick. 
The  efi'ective  strength  of  the  entire 
command  was  88,948.  Of  this  force 
2443  belonged  to  the  artillery,  and 
5537  to  the  cavalry. 

Sherman’s  preparations  were  not 
completed  when,  on  the  6th  of  April, 
he  learned  of  the  victory  which  had 
been  won  at  Five  Forks,  and  of  the 
subsequent  evacuation  of  Richmond 
and  Petersburg.  Wisely  judging  that 
Lee  would  attempt  to  effect  a junction 
with  Johnston,  he  countermanded  the 
orders  which  had  already  been  given, 
and  made  arrangements  to  march  di- 
rectly on  Johnston’s  army,  which  was 
at  Smithfield,  some  35,000  strong.  On 
the  10th,  Sherman’s  entire  army  was 
in  motion,  towards  the  point  indicat- 
ed. The  left  wing,  supported  by  the 
centre,  moved  on  the  two  direct  roads, 
leading  to  Smithfield  and  Raleigh. 
Howard  moved  more  to  the  right, 
feigning  the  Weldon  road.  Terry  and 
Ealpatrick  pushed  along  the  west  bank 
of  the  Nense  River,  in  the  same  general 
direction.  Smithfield  was  reached  on 
the  11th,  when  it  was  found  that  John- 
ston had  retreated  with  his  whole  army 
towards  Raleigh,  and  that  he  had 
burned  the  bridges  in  his  rear.  The 
bridges,  of  course,  had  to  be  rebuilt — 
a task  which  consumed  the  remainder 
of  that  day.  During  the  night,  Sherman 
received  a message  from  Grant,  inform- 
iug  him  of  the  surrender  of  Lee  and  the 
army  of  Northern  Virginia,  at  Appo- 
mattox Court  House.  On  the  morning 
of  the  12th,  the  joyful  intelligence 


was  communicated  to  the  army,  amid 
the  wildest  demonstrations  of  delight. 
It  was  felt  by  all,  that  the  war  was  April 
all  but  over.  Glory  to  God,”  12. 
said  Sherman,  “and  our  country,  and 
all  honor  to  our  comrades  in  arms, 
towards  whom  we  are  marching.  A 
little  more  labor,  a little  more  toil  on 
our  part,  the  great  race  is  won,  and  om 
government  stands  regenerated  afte’ 
four  long  years  of  war.” 

The  pursuit  was  resumed  on  thf 
12th.  On  the  evening  of  that  day. 
Sherman  was  at  Gulley’s,  with  the  head 
of  Slocum’s  column.  On  the  13th,  he 
entered  Raleigh,  and  ordered  the  sever- 
al heads  of  column  towards  Ashville, 
in  the  direction  of  Salisbury  or  Char- 
lotte. It  was  feared  by  Sherman  and, 
indeed,  by  all  the  ofiicers,  that  Johnston 
would  retreat  into  the  hill  country  of 
South  Carolina  and  Georgia,  break  up 
his  army  into  small  bands,  and  thus 
indefinitely  23rol()ng  the  war.  They 
were  all  desirous  that  the  surrender  of 
that  army  should  be  secured  on  any 
reasonable  terms.  It  was  not,  there- 
foi’e,  without  a feeling  of  grateful  relief 
that  Sherman,  on  the  morning  of  the 
14th,  and  while  still  at  Raleigh,  April 
received  from  Johnston  a note,  14. 
inquiiing  whether  “ in  order  to  stop 
the  further  effusion  of  blood  and 
devastation  of  property,”  he  was  Avilling 
to  make  a temporaiy  suspension  of 
active  operations,  and  to  communicate 
to  General  Grant  the  request  that  he 
would  take  like  action  in  regard  to 
other  armies,  the  object  being  to  per- 
Init  the  civil  authorities  to  enter  into 
the  needful  arrangements  to  terminate 


042 


THE  LAST  DAYS  OF  THE  WAR. 


tlie  existing  war.  To  this  note,  Sher- 
man replied  as  follows : 

April  14th,  1865. 

“General:  I have  this  moment  received 
your  communication  of  this  date.  I am  fully 
empowered  to  arrange  with  you  any  terms  for 
the  suspension  of  further  hostilities  between 
the  armies  commanded  by  you  and  those  com- 
manded by  myself,  and  will  be  willing  to  con- 
fer with  you  to  that  end.  I will  limit  the 
advance  of  my  main  column,  to-morrow,  to 
Morrisville,  and  the  cavalry  to  the  University, 
and  expect  that  you  will  also  maintain  tlie 
present  position  of  your  forces  until  each  has 
notice  of  a failure  to  agree.  That  a basis  of 
action  may  be  had,  I undertake  to  abide  by  the 
same  terms  and  conditions  as  were  made  by 
Generals  Grant  and  Lee,  at  Appomattox  Court 
House,  on  the  9th  inst.,  relative  to  our 
two  armies  ; and  furthermore,  to  obtain  from 
General  Grant  an  order  to  suspend  the  move- 
ments of  any  troops  from  the  direction  of 
Virginia.  General  Stoueman  is  under  my 
command,  and  my  order  will  suspend  any 
devastation  or  destruction  contemplated  by 
him.  I will  add  that  I really  desire  to  save 
the  people  of  North  Carolina  the  damage  they 
would  sustain  by  the  march  of  this  army 
through  the  central  or  western  parts  of  the 
State. 

“ W.  T.  Sherman,  Major-General.” 

On  the  16th,  an  answer  was  received 
from  Johiivston,  agreeing  to  a meeting 
to  be  held,  on  the  following  day,  at  a 
point  midway  between  the  National 
advance  at  Durham’s,  and  the  Confed- 
erate rear  at  II  illsboro.  At  eight  o’clock 
on  the  morning  of  the  17th,  a car  and  a 
April  locomotive  were  waiting  to  con- 

17.  vey  Sherman  and  his  attendants 
to  Durham’s  Station.  The  general  was 
just  entering  the  car  when  the  tele- 
graph operator  approached  him  in  great 
haste,  and  informed  him  that  he  was 
just  now  receiving  in  cipher  from 


Morehead  City,  a most  important  des- 
patch, ^vhich,  he  thought,  it  might  be 
well  for  him  to  see.  Sherman  delayed 
the  train,  until  the  message  was  ti'ans- 
lated  and  written  out.  It  was  from 
the  secretary-of-war ; and  it  conveyed 
the  sad  intelligence  of  the  fate  which 
had  befallen  President  Lincoln,  of  the 
attack  which  had  been  made  on  Mr. 
Seward  and  his  son,  and  of  the  suspi- 
cions that  were  entertained,  that  the 
conspirators  had  intended  to  assassin- 
ate General  Grant  and  all  the  princi- 
pal officers  of  the  government.  The 
operator  alone,  hitherto,  had  seen  the 
message.  Assured  of  this,  Sherman 
enjoined  him  to  preserve  the  utmost 
secrecy,  until  he  should  return.  The 
train  was  then  permitted  to  stall. 
About  ten  o’clock,  the  party  reach  e<l 
Durham’s  Station,  where  General  Kil- 
patrick, with  a squadron  of  cavalry, 
was  waiting  to  receive  his  chief.  Led 
horses  had  been  provided  for  Sherman 
and  his  staff.  Mounted  on  these,  and 
preceded  by  a small  platoon  and  tlie 
bearer  of  a white  flag,  they  were  soon 
on  their  way  to  the  appointed  place  of 
meeting.  The  morning,  we  are  told, 
was  exceptionally  beautiful.  Nature 
was  clad  in  her  robes  of  richest  green. 
The  air  was  vocal  with  the  songsters  of 
the  grove,  and  laden  with  the  fragrance 
of  the  fruit  trees,  just  bursting  into 
bloom.  Everywhere  there  was  that 
which  appealed  to  and  pleased  the 
senses ; and  there  was,  besides,  an  in- 
vigorating freshness  in  the  surrounding 
atmosphere.  It  was  not  wonderful 
that  in  such  circumstances,  and  on  such 
a mission,  a feeling  of  elation,  a sense 


THE  CONFERENCE  AT  BENNETT’S  HOUSE. 


943 


of  gladness,  should  have  been  experi- 
enced by  the  entire  party — by  Sherman 
(piite  as  much  as  by  the  others,  soul- 
burdened  though  he  was  by  the  sad  in- 
telligence which  he  had  just  received, 
and  which  he  could  not  as  yet  reveal. 

About  five  miles  from  Durham’s  the 
flag-bearers  met ; and  the  announce- 
ment was  made  that  General  John- 
ston was  near  at  hand.  He  was  soon 
in  sight.  By  his  side  rode  General 
Wade  Hampton;  and  close  by,  and 
forming  part  of  his  personal  staff,  were 
Major  Johnston  and  Captain  Hampton. 
General  Sherman  had  a larger  retinue, 
which  included,  among  others.  General 
Kilpatrick,  General  Barry,  and  Colonel 
Poe.  Sherman  and  Johnston  who, 
although  thirteen  years  in  the  regular 
army,  had  never  met  before,  saluted 
and  shook  hands,  and  then  introduced 
their  respective  attendants.  This  done, 
and  still  on  horseback,  they  repaired  to 
a small  farm  house,  on  the  Chapel  Hill 
road — a wooden  structure  situated  on 
the  brow  of  a hill,  and  owned  and 
occupied  by  a Mr.  Bennett  and  his 
family.  At  the  request  of  the  two 
generals,  the  inmates  vacated  the 
premises  and  retired  to  one  of  the 
adjoining  buildings.  Pen,  ink  and 
paper  were  brought  into  one  of  the 
rooms  by  an  orderly.  The  orderly 
having  retired,  the  two  generals  were 
left  alone.  I have  just  received,”  said 
Sherman,  bad  news — the  worst  news, 
general,  in  my  judgment,  that  we  have 
had  for  a long  time.  It  is  especially 
damaging  to  your  cause.”  He  then 
handed  Johnston  the  despatch,  and 
watched  him  closely  while  he  read. 


Johnston’s  exclamations  showed  how  ut- 
terly he  was  shocked;  and  the  persjiir- 
ation,  which  came  out  in  large  bead-like 
drops  on  his  high  forehead,  revealed  the 
inner  agony  of  the  man.  He  denounced 
the  act  as  a disgrace  to  the  age,  and 
expressed  the  hope  that  Sherman  did 
not  charge  it  to  the  Confederate  gov- 
ernment. Sherman  was  willing  to  ex 
onerate  Johnston  himself  and  Lee,  and 
indeed,  all  the  higher  officers  of  the 
Confederate  aiTny;  but,  he  confessed, 
he  had  his  doubts  regarding  such  men 
as  Davis,  Sanders,  and  others  of  that 
stripe.  He  told  Johnston  that  his  own 
army  was  as  yet  ignorant  of  what  had 
hap]3ened,  and  that  he  had  not  revealed 
the  painful  intelligence  even  to  his  own 
staff.  He  dreaded  the  result  which 
might  follow  from  the  communication 
of  the  news  to  the  soldiers ; for  with 
his  army,  as  indeed,  with  all  the  armies 
of  the  Union,  Lincoln  was  a great 
favorite.  If  the  spirit  of  retaliation 
seized  them,  and  was  by  any  provoca- 
tion forced  into  open  expression,  it 
might  be  difficult,  if  not  impossible,  to 
hold  them  in  restraint ; and  the  fate  of 
Baleigh  might  be  more  fearful  than  the 
fate  of  Columbia.  He  expressed  the 
belief  that  Johnston,  himself,  must  be 
convinced  of  the  folly  and  even  cruelty 
of  prolonging  the  contest,  and  offered 
to  accept  his  surrender  and  that  of  all 
the  troops  subject  to  his  orders,  on  the 
identical  terms  which  had  been  granted 
to  General  Lee. 

Johnston  admitted  that  the  cause 
with  which  he  was  identified,  was  lost. 
Any  further  fighting,  he  said,  would  be 
“ murder.”  For  himseK  he  askexl 


944 


THE  LAST  DAYS  OF  THE  WAR. 


nothing.  He  was  anxious  only  for  his 
men.  The  terms  granted  to  Lee  were, 
he  thought,  in  the  last  degree  magnan- 
imous. He  wished,  however,  to  obtain 
some  general  concessions  which,  he  con- 
sidered, were  necessary  to  secure  the 
safety  of  his  followers  ; and  he  insisted 
upon  certain  guarantees  which  Sherman 
liad  no  authority  to  concede.  “ Why,” 
lie  asked,  ^‘can  we  not  make  this  sur- 
render universal  ? ” “I  know,”  he  said, 
I can  get  an  order  from  Mr.  Davis 
that  all  the  Confederate  armies  shall 
disband.”  It  was  Johnston’s  earnest, 
anxious  desire  that  the  surrender  should 
cover  not  only  his  own  army,  but  all 
the  Confederate  forces  east  and  west  of 
the  Mississippi.  The  two  generals 
could  not  come  to  an  agreement ; and 
Johnston  asked  that  the  conference  be 
])Ostponed  for  some  days.  Sherman 
would  grant  one  day  only.  It  was  ar- 
ranged that  they  should  meet  at  the 
same  place  tlie  following  day  at  noon ; 
and  the  interview,  which  had  lasted 
tliree  hours,  was  brought  to  a close. 

On  his  return  to  Haleigh,  Sherman 
issued  an  order  to  the  army,  making 
])ublic  the  contents  of  the  telegraphic 
message.  The  impression  produced 
was,  as  he  had  expected,  painful  in 
t’le  extreme.  Every  countenance  gave 
evidence  of  deep  and  genuine  sorrow. 
Sherman  watched  the  effect  closely. 
He  saw  and  felt  that  the  slightest  cir- 
cumstance might  provoke  a terrible 
revenge.  Happily,  however,  in  no 
single  instance  was  there  any  attempt 
at  retaliation.  Summoning  together 
his  general  officers,  he  confeiTed  with 
them  as  to  the  course  to  be  followed 


with  Johnston  and  his  army.  It  was 
felt  by  all  that,  if  the  enemy  could  only 
be  brought  to  bay,  he  could  be  easily 
destroyed.  That,  however,  was  the 
difficulty.  The  country  was  peculiarly 
in  Johnston’s  favor.  If  the  worst 
should  happen,  it  would  be  possible  for 
the  Confederate  leader  to  break  up  his 
army  into  separate  bands  and  scatter 
them  in  different  directions.  Such  an 
event  was  dreaded,  as  it  would  lead  to 
an  indefinite  prolongation  of  the  war. 
The  general  voice  was,  therefore,  in 
favor  of  leniency.  It  was,  in  the  last 
degree,  desirable  that  the  war  should  be 
ended  at  once.  On  the  following  day 
the  two  generals-in-chief  met,  as  April 
agreed  upon,  at  Bennett’s  house.  18. 
Sherman  arrived  at  noon.  Johnston 
did  not  come  up  until  it  was  about  two 
o’clock.  He  was  accompanied,  as  on 
the  day  before,  by  General  Wade 
Hampton.  Johnston  had  not  changed 
his  mind  since  the  meeting  on  the  pre- 
vious day.  He  had  authority,  he  said, 
over  all  the  Confederate  armies.  He 
wished  the  surrender  to  be  universal. 
He  insisted,  however,  upon  obtaining 
some  guarantee  which  would  secure  the 
political  rights  of  his  officers  and  men. 
Sherman  argued  that  all  such  rights 
were  covered  by  the  example  which  had 
been  set  at  Appomattox  Court  House. 
Lincoln’s  proclamation  of  December 
8th,  1863,  was  still  in  force  ; and  that 
instrument  enabled  every  Confederate 
soldier  and  officer,  below  the  rank  of 
colonel,  to  obtain  an  absolute  pardon 
by  laying  down  his  arms  and  taking 
the  common  oath  of  alleo:iance.  Gen- 
eral  Grant  had  extended  the  principle 


INTERVIEW  BETWEEN  GENERALS  SHERMAN  AND  JOHNSTON. 


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THE  MEMORANDUM. 


945 


so  as  to  include  all  the  officers,  General 
Lee,  himself,  not  excepted.  At  tliis 
stage  Johnston  informed  Sherman  that 
Mr.  Breckenridge  was  near  at  hand,  and 
asked  whether  he  might  not  be  per- 
mitted to  take  part  in  the  conference. 
Sherman,  at  first,  objected,  on  the 
irround  that  ne2:otiations  should  be 
confined  strictly  to  belligerents.  It 
was  finally  agreed,  however,  that  Breck- 
enridge might  be  allowed  to  be  present 
in  the  capacity  of  a major-general,  but 
not  as  the  Confederate  secretary-of-wai\ 
Breckenridoce  confirmed  all  that  Jolin- 
ston  had  said  regarding  the  state  of 
feeling  which  j^i’^^ailed  among  officers 
and  men  concerning  their  political 
rights,  in  case  of  surrender.  After  the 
lapse  of  some  hours,  Sherman,  recalling 
the  conversation  he  had  with  Mr.  Lin- 
C )ln,  at  City  Point,  and  anxious  to  em- 
body the  views  there  presented  to  him, 
as  well  as  to  conform  somewhat  to  the 
wishes  of  his  opponents,  sat  down  and 
drew  up  a “ memorandum  ” or  basis  of 
agreement.  This  document,  which  will 
be  found  below,*  was  signed  by  both 

Memorandum  or  Basis  of  agreement,  made  this  18^^ 
day  of  April,  A.  D.  1865,  near  Durham's  Station, 
in  the  State  of  North  Carolina,  by  and  between  Oen- 
Joseph  E.  Johnston,  commanding  the  Confed- 
erate army,  and  Major-General  William  T.  Sher- 
man, commanding  the  army  of  the  United  States  in 
North  Carolina,  both  present : 

1.  The  contending  armies  now  in  the  field  to  main- 
tain the  statu  quo,  until  notice  is  given  hj  the  Com- 
manding general  of  either  one  to  its  opponent,  and 
reasonable  time — say  forty-eight  hours — allowed. 

2.  The  Confederate  armies  now  in  existence  to  be 
disbanded  and  conducted  to  their  several  State  capitals, 
there  to  deposit  their  arms  and  public  property  in  the 
State  arsenals  ; and  each  oflScer  and  man  to  execute 
and  file  an  agreement  to  cease  from  acts  of  war,  and 
abide  the  action  of  both  State  and  Federal  authority. 
The  number  of  arms  and  munitions  of  war  to  be  reported 


parties,  and  sent  to  Washington  for  the 
approval  of  President  Johnson.  Mean- 
while, it  was  agreed  that  both  armies 
should  remain  in  statu  quo,  until  an 
answer  should  be  received  from  Wash- 
ington. 

Major  Henry  Hitchcock  reached 
Washington,  with  the  memorandum,  on 
the  21st  of  April.  The  public  April 
mind  was  still  intensely  excited  21. 
over  the  assassination  of  Lincoln,  and 
over  the  brutal,  although  less  successful, 
attack  which  had  been  made  upon  the 
life  of  Secretary  Seward.  The  terms 
which  Sherman  proposed  to  grant  to 
the  South  accorded  ill  with  the  tone  of 
public  feeling.  The  blood  of  Lincoln 
was  calling  loudly  for  vengeance ; yet, 
one  of  the  most  trusted  and  honored 
generals  of  the  Union  was  proposing  to 
grant,  to  the  now  conquered  South, 
terms  which  implied  an  utter  forgetful- 
ness of  all  the  events  of  the  war.  The 
memorandum,  in  fact,  was  universally 
condemned.  It  was  disapproved  by 
the  president,  by  the  secretary-of-war,  by 
the  Lieutenant-general,  and,  indeed,  by 

to  the  Chief  of  Ordnance  at  Washington  City,  subject 
to  the  future  action  of  the  Congress  of  the  United 
States,  and  in  the  mean  time,  to  be  used  solely  to 
maintain  peace  and  order  within  the  borders  of  the 
States  respectively 

3.  The  recognition,  by  the  Executive  of  the  United 
States,  of  the  several  State  governments,  on  their 
officers  and  Legislatures  taking  the  oaths  prescribed 
by  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States,  and  where 
conflicting  State  governments  have  resulted  from  the 
war,  the  legitimacy  of  all  shall  be  submitted  to  the 
Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States. 

4.  The  re-establishment  of  all  the  Federal  Courts 
in  the  several  States,  with  powers  as  defined  by  the 
Constitution  of  the  United  States  and  of  the  States  re- 
spectively. 

5.  The  people  and  inhabitants  of  all  the  States  to 
be  guaranteed,  so  far  as  the  Executive  can,  theii 


946 


THE  LAST  DAYS  OF  THE  WAR. 


every  member  of  tbe  cabinet ; and,  later, 
when  it  found  its  way  into  the  news- 
papers, it  called  forth  against  Sherman 
a perfect  howl  of  indignation.  Time, 
however,  has  set  this  whole  matter  forth 
in  its  true  light ; and  General  Sherman’s 
patriotism  shines  not  the  less  brightly 
that  it,  temporarily  and  most  unjustly, 
suffered  an  eclipse. 

General  Grant  set  out  immediately 
for  Ealeigh,  with  instructions  from  the 
secretary-of-war  to  declare  the  rejection 
of  the  memorandum,  and  to  assume 
direction  of  military  affairs.  From 
Morehead  City,  he  telegraphed  to  Sher- 
man the  decision  of  the  government ; 
April  morning  of  the  24th, 

24.  he  reached  the  head-quarters  of 
the  army  at  Ealeigh.  Grant  directed 
Sherman  to  communicate  the  decision 
of  the  government  to  Johnston,  to 
notify  him  that  the  truce  would  expire 

political  rights  and  franchises,  as  well  as  their  rights 
of  person  and  property,  as  defined  by  the  Constitution 
of  the  United  States  and  of  the  States  respectively. 

6.  The  Executive  authority  of  the  Government  of 
the  United  States  not  to  disturb  any  of  the  people  by 
reason  of  the  late  war,  so  long  as  they  live  in  peace 
and  quiet,  abstain  from  acts  of  armed  hostility,  and 
obey  the  laws  in  existence  at  the  place  of  their  resi- 
dence. 

7.  In  general  terms — the  war  to  cease  ; a general 
amnesty,  so  far  as  the  Executive  of  the  United  States 
can  command,  on  condition  of  the  disbandment  of  the 
Confederate  armies,  the  distribution  of  arms  and  the 
resumption  of  peaceful  pursuits  by  the  officers  and  the 
men  hitherto  composing  said  armies. 

Not  being  fully  empowered  by  our  respective  prin- 
dpals  to  fulfill  these  terms,  we  individually  and 
officially  pledge  ourselves  to  promptly  obtain  the 
necessary  authority,  and  to  carry  out  the  above  pro- 
gramme. 

W.  T.  Sherman,  Major-General, 

Commanding  Army  of  the  United  States  in  North 
Carolina. 

J.  E.  Johnston,  General, 

Commanding  Confederate  States  Army  in  North 
Carolina.  ’ 


within  forty-eight  hours  after  the 
receipt  of  the  message,  and  to  demand, 
at  the  same  time,  the  immediate  sur- 
render of  his  army.  This  was  the  full 
extent  of  Grant’s  interference.  Sher 
man  was  permitted  to  carry  on  and 
conclude  the  negotiations  with  Jolmston. 
On  receiving  Sherman’s  message  announ 
cing  the  decision  of  the  government  at 
Washington,  Johnston  requested  an- 
other interview.  It  was  promptly 
granted;  and  on  the  following  day,  the 
26th  of  April,  the  two  commanders  met 
again,  at  the  same  place,  when  articles 
of  agreement  were  signed.  The  follow- 
ing is  the  document  as  approved  and 
signed  by  General  Grant. 

I 

“ Termsi  of  a Military  Convention^  entered  into 
this  2Qth  day  of  April,  1865,  at  Bennett’s 
House^  near  Durham's  Station,  North  Caro- 
lina, between  General  Joseph  E.  Johnston, 
Commanding  the  Confederate  Army,  and 
Major-General  W.  T.  Sherman,  Command- 
ing the  United  States  Army,  in  North 
Carolina. 

1.  All  acts  of  war  on  the  part  of  the  troops 
under  General  Johnston’s  command  to  cease 
from  this  date.  2.  All  arms  and  public  prop- 
erty to  be  deposited  at  Greensboro,  and  de- 
livered to  an  ordnance-officer  of  the  United 
States  Army.  3.  Rolls  of  all  the  officers  and 
men  to  be  made  in  duplicate;  one  copy  to  be 
retained  by  the  commander  of  the  troops,  and 
the  other  to  be  given  to  an  officer  to  be  desig- 
nated by  General  Sherman.  Each  officer  and 
man  to  give  his  individual  obligation, in  w’riting, 
not  to  take  up  arms  against  the  Government  of 
the  United  States,  until  properly  released  from 
his  obligation.  4.  The  side-arms  of  officers, 
and  their  private  horses  and  baggage  to  be 
retained  by  them.  5.  This  being  done,  all  the 
officers  and  men  will  be  permitted  to  return 
to  their  homes,  not  to  be  disturbed  by  the 
United  States  authorities,  so  long  as  they 


DAVIS  AT  IRWINSVILLE. 


947 


observe  their  obligation,  and  the  laws  in  force 
where  they  may  reside.” 

W.  T.  Sherman,  Major-General, 
Commanding  United  States  Forces  in  North  Carolina. 

J.  E.  Johnston,  General, 

Commanding  Confederate  States  Forces  in  North 

Carolina. 

Approved:  U.  S.  Grant,  Lient.-General.” 

Wade  Hampton,  who  refused  to 
abide  by  the  terms  of  the  capitulation, 
dashed  off  with  a body  of  cavalry  in 
the  direction  of  Charlotte,  where  were 
-Davis  and  the  other  members  of  the 
Confederate  government.  The  remain- 
der of  Johnston’s  army,  some  30,000 
strong,  after  having  formally  surren- 
dered arms,  were  permitted  to  retui*n  to 
their  homes.  So  passed  out  of  exist- 
ence the  second  great  army  of  the 
Confederacy. 

Surrenders  and  captures  now  fol- 
lowed in  rapid  succession.  On  the  4th 
of  May,  at  Citronella,  Ala.,  General 
Richard  Taylor,  who  commanded  the 
Confederate  forces  on  the  east  of  the 
Mississippi,  surrendered  with  his  entire 
command.  At  the  same  time  and  place 
Commander  Farrand  surrendered  to 
Rear-Admiral  Thatcher,  that  portion  of 
the  Confederate  navy  which  was  in  the 
Tombigbee. 

On  the  10th  of  May,  the  head  and 
front  of  the  offending  cause  was  cap- 
tured in  the  person  of  Jefferson  Davis. 
After  the  fall  of  Richmond,  Davis  had 
attempted  to  maintain  the  semblance  of 
a government  at  Danville.  On  the 
10th  of  April,  on  hearing  of  the  surren- 
der of  Lee,  he  proceeded  to  Greensboro, 
accompanied  by  the  different  members 
of  his  cabinet.  At  Greensboro,  where 
he  met  Johnston  and  Beauregard,  and 


vainly  endeavored  to  induce  them  to 
attack  Sherman,  Davis  was  coldly  re- 
ceived. For  three  days  he  and  his 
party  were  compelled  to  content  them 
selves  with  what  accommodations  could 
be  obtained  in  a railroad  car.  From 
Greensboro  they  proceeded  to  Charlotte, 
where  they  remained  until  they  were 
informed  of  the  surrender  of  Johnston. 
Davis  was  anxious,  if  possible,  to  reach 
Taylor,  who  was  beyond  the  Chatta- 
hoochee ; and  it  was  his  hope  that  a 
vigorous  resistance  might  yet  be  made, 
if  the  forces  of  that  general  could  be 
united  with  those  of  Kirby  Smith,  west 
of  the  Mississippi.  All  such  hopes 
were  soon  blasted.  At  Washington, 
Ga.,  there  was  a scramble  among  Davis’ 
ministers  for  what  gold  they  had  been 
able  to  carry  with  them.  Well  aware 
that  they  were  being  pursued,  and 
alarmed  by  the  rumors  which  were 
reaching  them  of  the  near  presence  of 
the  National  troopers,  they  now  scatter- 
ed— Postmaster-general  Reagan  alone, 
of  all  the  members  of  the  cabinet,  re- 
maining with  Davis.  At  this  stage, 
Mrs.  Davis,  her  children,  and  her  sister, 
Mrs.  Howell,  were  pushing  towards  the 
Gulf  in  wagons,  on  a nearly  parallel 
route,  about  18  miles  distant.  Learning 
that  they  were  in  danger  of  being 
attacked  and  robbed  by  a band  of  Con- 
federate soldiers,  who  imagined  that 
Mrs.  Davis  and  her  party  were  carrying 
off  a large  amount  of  specie,  Davis 
hastened  to  their  assistance.  He  joined 
them  as  they  were  approaching  Irwins- 
ville,  the  capital  of  Irwin  County,  Ga., 
nearly  due  south  of  Macon.  There  the 
weary  fugitives  encamped  for  the  nigl)4. 


THE  LAST  DAYS  OF  THE  WAR. 


Meanwhile  two  detachments  of  General 
•Wilson’s  cavalry — one  under  Colonel 
Pritchard,  the  other  under  Colonel 
Hamden — who  for  some  days  had  been 
in  hot  pursuit,  were  rapidly  closing  in 
upon  them.  A prize  of  $100,000,  which 
was  to  reward  the  successful  captor, 
was,  no  doubt,  lending  some  intensity 
to  the  purpose  of  the  pursuers.  At 
day-break,  on  the  10th  of  May,  the 
camp  was  surrounded,  and  the  entire 
party  were  made  prisoners.  Pritchard’s 
men  had  the  honor  of  the  capture. 
Conveyed  first  to  Wilson’s  headquarters 
at  Macon,  the  prisoners  were  sent 
thence  by  way  of  Savannah  to  Fortress 
Monroe.  Alexander  H.  Stephens,  who 
was  captured  about  the  same  time, 
was  sent  to  the  same  prison.  He  and 
Reagan  were  afterwards  transferred  to 
Fort  Warren,  in  Boston  harbor. 

On  the  11th  of  May,  General  Jeff. 
Thompson,  who  commanded  in  Arkan- 
sas, surrendered  at  Chalk  Bluff,  with 
about  7500  men.  One  Confederate 
army  still  continued  to  hold  out.  It 
.vas  that  of  General  Kirby  Smith. 
Long  after  the  surrender  of  Lee,  Smith 
professed,  at  least,  to  be  sanguine  and 
hopeful.  Towards  the  very  last  days 
of  April  he  addressed  his  soldiers  as 
the  hope  of  the  nation,”  and  exhorted 
them  to  fight  on  for  their  liberties  and 
their  homes.  You  possess,”  he  said, 
the  means  of  long  resistance ; you 
liave  hopes  of  succor  from  abroad. 
Protract  the  struggle,  and  you  will 
surely  receive  the  aid  of  nations  who 
already  deeply  sympathize  with  you.” 
Smith  was  encouraged  in  his  attitude 
of  resistance  by  the  sentiments  which 


prevailed  among  the  people  of  the 
South-west.  In  Louisiana  and  in  Texas, 
in  several  of  their  more  populous  cen- 
tres, public  meetings  were  held  and 
resolutions  adopted  in  favor  of  continu- 
ing the  contest.  Of  the  existence-  of 
this  feeling  in  those  ‘States,  and  of  the 
stubborn  energy  of  Kirby  Smith,  the 
authorities  at  Washini^ton  were  not 
ignorant.  Preparations  were  made  for 
a vigorous  campaign  in  Texas  ; measures 
were  adopted  for  the  collection  of  a 
large  force  at  New  Orleans ; and  Gen- 
eral Sheridan  received  instructions  to 
hold  himself  in  readiness  to  assume  the 
command.  These  arrans^ements,  be- 
coming  unnecessary,  were  never  fully  car- 
ried out.  The  end,  for  which  all  were 
impatiently  longing,  was  rapidly  ap- 
proaching. It  was  not  to  be  deferred 
by  the  stubbornness  of  any  general,  or 
by  the  wishes  of  any  section  of  the 
people. 

Meanwhile,  collisions  were  • taking 
place  between  po]*tions  of  the  rival 
forces  on  the  borders  of  the  Rio  Grande. 
One  of  these,  which  happened  near 
Brazos  Santiago,  and  which  resulted 
somewhat  unfavorably  for  the  Nationals, 
proved  to  be  the  last  battle  of  the  war. 
Colonel  Theodore  H.  Barrett,  who  was 
in  command  of  the  National  troops  at 
Brazos  Santiago,  was  short  of  horses  for 
his  men.  In  order  to  supply  this  want, 
he  sent  Colonel  Bronson,  on  the  evening 
of  the  11th  of  May,  with  some  300  men, 
to  surprise  and  capture  a Confederate 
camp  on  the  Rio  Grande.  The  surprise 
was  complete.  Bronson  drove  the  foe 
before  him,  captured  a number  of  hoi’ses 
and  made  some  prisoners.  Having 


FRONT  VIEW  OF  THE  CAPITOL  AT  WASHINGTON. 


PORTKAITS  OF  SOME  OF  THE  GENEEALS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 


PORTRAITS  OF  PROMINENT  UNION  GENERALS. 


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PORTRAITS  OF  UNION  CAVALRY  COMMANDERS. 


POKTRAITS  OF  PROMINENT  UNION  GENERALS. 


PORTRAITS  OF  PROMINENT  UNION  GENERALS. 


PORTE  AITS  OF  THE  PRINCIPAL  NAVAL  COMMANDERS  DURING  THE  WAR. 


PORTRAITS  OF  PROMINENT  UNION  GENERALS. 


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POETRAITS  OF  UNION  CAVALRY  COMMANDERS. 


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PORTRAITS  OF  SOME  OF  THE  LEADERS  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  CONFEDERACY. 


THE  COST  OF  THE  WAR. 


949 


fallen  back,  lie  was  joined  on  the  morn- 
ing of  the  13t]r  by  Colonel  Morrison, 
at  the  head  of  some  200  men.  Barrett 
now  assumed  command  in  person.  The 
Confederates,  it  was  discovered,  were 
collected  in  considerable  force  in  the 
vicinity  of  what  was  known  as  Palmetto 
Hay  Banche.  Kesolved  to  disperse 
13.  them,  Barrett  ordered  another 
attack.  After  some  skirmishing  which 
lasted  during  the  greater  part  of  the 
forenoon,  the  Confederates  were  driven 
back  some  miles,  when  the  Nationals 
halted  on  a piece  of  rising  ground  about 
a.  mile  from  the  ranche.  The  National 
left  rested  on  the  Bio  Grande.  In  this 
position,  about  four  o’clock  in  the  after- 
noon, Barrett  was  fiercely  attacked  by 
a strong  Confederate  force,  under  the 
command  of  General  Slaughter.  Bar- 
rett was  without  guns.  Slaughter  was 
well  supplied  with  both  cavalry  and 
artillery.  Barrett  was  compelled  to 
fall  back.  This,  however,  he  did  with 
great  skill  and  with  very  considerable 
success.  For  three  hours  the  running 
fight  was  kept  up.  The  Confederates 
made  repeated  and  savage  onsets  on 
Barrett’s  front  and  right  fiank.  The 
recoiling  force,  however,  was  admirably 
covered  by  a body  of  colored  troops 
belonging  to  the  Sixty-Second  regiment, 
who  boldly  and  firmly  maintained  their 
line  and  successfully  repelled  every 
attack  of  the  enemy.  In  the  struggle 
some  48  men  of  the  Thirty-Fourth 
Indiana,  who  had  been  thrown  out  as 
skirmishers  to  protect  the  flank  of  their 
regiment,  were  cut  off  and  captured  by 
Slaughter’s  cavalry.  About  sunset, 
the  pressure  ceased,  and  the  fighting 


was  discontinued.  Such  was  the  battle 
of  Palmetto  Banche,  famous  as  being 
the  last  in  the  Civil  W ar. 

A few  days  later  came  the  last  sur- 
render. Kirby  Smith  had,  at  length, 
discovered  the  hopelessness  of  his  cause. 
He  had  heard  of  the  surrenders  of  John- 
ston and  Taylor  and  Thompson.  He 
had  heard  also  of  the  arrival  of  Sheridan 
at  New  Orleans.  The  expected  foreign 
aid  had  not  yet  arrived.  Further  resist- 
ance, he  saw,  was  useless.  He  sent  mes- 
sengers to  General  Canby,  who  was  at 
Baton  Bouge,  to  ascertain  the  terms  of 
surrender ; but,  before  the  negotiations 
were  completed,  Smitja  had  abandoned 
his  post  and  made  his  escape  into 
Texas.  General  Buckner,  who  it  will 
be  remembered,  was  left  in  a similar 
plight  at  Fort  Donelson,  assumed  com- 
mand ; and  on  the  26th  of  May,  jjay 
all  that  remained  of  the  Confed-  26. 
erate  army  in  the  Trans-Mississippi  De- 
partment, was  surrendered  to  Canby,  at 
New  Orleans.  The  Civil  War  was  ended. 

The  struggle  which  extended  over 
four  weary  years,  was  as  severe  as  it  was 
protracted.  To  the  entire  people,  north 
and  south,  it  was  a long-continued  bap- 
tism of  fire.  The  whole  nation,  so  to 
speak,  passed  through  the  burning  fiery 
furnace.  On  both  sides  the  war  had 
been  conducted  at  a fearful  cost  of 
blood  and  treasure.  The  total  number 
of  troops  called  for  by  the  National 
government,  was  2,942,748.  The  total 
number  obtained  was  2,690,401.  Mak- 
ing allowance  for  the  terms  of  service, 
which  varied  from  six  months  to  four 
years,  it  is  safe  to  conclude  that  there 
were  in  actual  service  about  1,500,000 


950 


THE  LAST  DAYS  OF  THE  WAR. 


men.  Of  these  some  60,000  were  killed 
m battle,  35,000  were  mortally  wound- 
ed, and  184,000  died  in  the  hospitals  of 
diseasa  It  is  scarcely  an  exaggeration 
to  say,  that,  on  the  part  of  the  Nation- 
als alone,  300,000  men  died  on  the 
battle-field  or  in  the  hospitals,  and  that 
as  many  more  were  crippled  or  other- 
wise disabled  for  life.  The  Confeder- 
ate armies  in  point  of  actual  numbers, 
were  not  equal  to  the  National  armies ; 
but  their  losses  could  hardly  be  less. 
It  would  certainly  not  be  an  over-esti- 
mate to  say  that,  through  the  war, 
the  entire  country  sustained  an  actual 
loss  of  l,000,000able-bodied  men.  An 
idea  of  the  pecuniary  cost  of  the  war 
may  be  obtained  from  the  fact  that  the 
National  debt,  which  in  June,  1861, 
was  only  $90,867,828,  had,  at  the  be- 
ginning of  Januar}^,  1866,  reached  the 
high  figure  of  $2,749,491,745.  On  a 
fair  calculation,  it  is  estimated  that  the 
expenditures  of  the  government,  during 
the  last  year  of  the  war,  exceeded  the 
whole  expenditures  of  the  government 
from  the  inauguration  of  Wasliino^ton 
to  the  inauguration  of  Buchanan. 
Th^se  figures  do  not  cover  the  enor- 
mous sums  paid  out  by  individual 
States,  and  by  local  bodies,  in  fitting 
out  their  several  contingents ; they  do 
not  include  the  millions  voluntarily 
contributed  by  the  people  to  the  Sani- 
tary and  Christian  Commissions;  nor 
do  they  make  any  account  of  the  fact 
that  the  once  blooming  and  wealthy 
South  was  literally  exhausted,  prostrat- 
ed, and  laid  waste.  It  was  a fearful 
sacrifice — one  of  the  greatest  ever  made 
by  any  people.  Whether  it  was  a 


necessary  sacrifice  will  probably  for- 
ever remain  a debatable  question.  One 
thing,  however,  is  certain : it  was  not 
made  in  vain.  Out  of  the  fiery  ordeal 
came  forth  a regenerated  America — a 
grander  and  more  glorious  Union. 
Great  questions,  involving  ever-recur- 
ring, never-ending  trouble,  were  finally 
settled.  The  Southern  Confederacy  was 
crushed,  and,  with  it,  the  spirit  of  rebel- 
lion. Slavery  was  abolished  ; and  free- 
dom was  proclaimed  to  be  the  birthright 
of  man,  irrespective  of  race  or  color. 
And,  what  will  be  found  to  be  of  equal 
importance  to  the  future  of  America, 
and,  indeed,  to  the  future  of  mankind, 
the  original  National  Union  was  saved. 

The  end  which  had,  at  last,  come 
had  been  foreseen  ; and,  even  before 
the  assassination  of  President  lancoln, 
arrangements  had  been  made  to  discon- 
tinue all  draftino-  and  recruitins:,  to 
curtail  purchases  of  army  supplies,  to 
reduce  the  number  of  general  and  staff 
officers,  and  to  remove  whatever  mil- 
itary restrictions  had  been  laid  on 
ti*ade  and  commerce.  Preparations 
were  made,  at  Washington,  for  the  re- 
ception of  the  victorious  legions  which 
had  followed  the  leadership  of  Grant 
and  Sherman.  On  the  22d  and  23d  of 
May,  the  grand  review  took  place.  In 
the  presence  of  multitudes  of  their  re- 
joicing fellow  - citizens,  over  200,000 
veterans,  victors  in  many  a hard-won 
fight,  marched  before  the  president  and 
his  cabinet.  On  those  two  days,  in 
Washington,  an  element  of  sadness 
mingled  wdth  the  general  joy.  One 
prominent  figure  was  missed.  Lincoln, 
the  beloved  of  all,  was  in  every  man's 


DISBANDMENT  OF  THE  ARMIES. 


951 


tliouglits  ; but  lie  was  not  tliere.  His 
work,  however,,  bad  been  nobly  done  ; 
and  amid  the  imposing  grandeur  and 
magnificence  of  the  spectacle,  men’s 
minds  were  impressed  with  the  old 
truths,  that  the  good  which  men  do 
lives  after  them,”  and  that  when  the 
blessed  rest  from  their  labors  their 
‘works  do  follow  them.” 

A difficult  task  had  yet  to  be  per- 
formed by  the  government,  before  it 
could  be  said  that  the  nation  had  fairly 
entered  upon  the  enjoyment  of  peace. 
In  crushing  out  the  rebellious  elements 
of  the  States  recently  in  revolt,  and  in 
bringing  back  those  States  to  their 
allegiance  and  restoring  them  to  the 
Union,  it  had  been  necessary,  as  we 
have  seen,  to  call  into  existence  and  to 
sustain  large  military  and  naval  organ- 
izations. For  the  purpose  for  which 
they  were  created,  these  war  forces  were 
no  longer  necessary.  What  was  to  be 
done  with  them?  They  must  be  re- 
tained or  disbanded ; and  each  alter- 
native was  beset  with  difficulty.  If 
retained,  how  were  they  to  be  em- 
ployed ? If  disbanded,  might  they  not 
be  provoked  into  open  resistance  ? The 
problem'  to  be  solved  was  not  entirely 
new;  but  there  was  somewhat  of  nov- 
elty in  the  circumstances ; and  the 
entire  civilized  world  was  interested  in 
the  mode  and  character  of  its  solu- 
tion. It  was  not  the  first  time  that 
huge  armies,  after  having  saved,  had 
proved  the  ruin  of  the  commonwealth. 
Thoughtful  men  remembered  the  ex- 
perience and  fate  of  Eome,  and,  later, 
the  experience  and  fate  of  France. 
Once  more  the  crucial  test  was  about 


to  be  applied.  What  was  to  be  the 
result?  The  test  was  applied;  and 
the  result  was  in  the  last  degree  satis- 
factory. The  problem  was  solved  in  a 
manner  which  did  honor  to  the  Ameri 
can  soldier,  to  American  institutions^ 
and,  indeed,  to  the  general  intelligence 
of  the  nineteenth  century. 

It  had  never,  in  truth,  been  a seiious 
question  with  the  government  or  Avith 
the  people,  what  should  be  done  Avith 
the  soldier,  when  the  Avar  Avas  over. 
It  was  taken  for  granted  by  all,  the 
soldier  himself  included,  that  he  should 
return  to  his  home,  and  resume  the 
duties  of  peaceful  citizenship.  Accord- 
ingly, before  the  end  of  May,  arrange 
ments  Avere  made  for  disbanding  the 
armies.  Sherman,  in  a touching  ad 
dress,  bade  fareAvell  to  his  command, 
on  tlie  30th  of  May ; and,  on  tlie  June 
2d  of  June,  General  Grant  issued, 
to  all  the  armies,  the  following  order 

“Soldiers  of  the  Araiies  of  the  Exited 
States  : — By  your  patriotic  (le\'otioii  to  youi 
country,  in  the  hour  of  danger  and  alarm, 
your  magnificent  fighting,  bravery,  and  eodur- 
ance,  you  have  maintained  the  supremacy  of 
the  Union  and  the  Constitution,  overthrown 
all  armed  opposition  to  the  enforcement  of  the 
laws  and  of  the  proclamation  forever  abolish- 
ing slavery — the  cause  and  pretext  of  the 
rebellion — and  opened  the  way  to  the  rightful 
authorities  to  restore  order  and  inaugurate 
peace,  on  a permanent  and  enduring  basis,  on 
every  foot  of  American  soil.  Your  mai’ches, 
sieges,  and  battles,  in  distance,  duration, 
resolution,  and  brilliancy  of  results,  dim  the 
lustre  of  the  world’s  past  military  achieve- 
ments, and  will  be  the  patriots’  precedent,  in 
defense  of  liberty  and  right,  in  all  time  to 
come.  In  obedience  to  your  country’s  call, 
you  left  your  homes  and  families,  and  volun- 
teered in  her  defense.  Victory  has  crowned. 


952 


THE  LAST  DAYS  OF  THE  WAR. 


your  valor,  and  secured  the  purpose  of  your 
patriotic  hearts ; and  with  the  gratitude  of  your 
countrymen,  and  the  highest  honors  a great  and 
free  nation  can  accord,  you  will  soon  be  per- 
mitted to  return  to  your  homes  and  families, 
conscious  of  having  discharged  the  highest 
duty  of  American  citizens.  To  achieve  these 
glorious  triumphs,  and  secure  to  yourselves, 
your  fellow-countrymen,  and  posterity,  the 
blessings  of  free  institutions,  tens  of  thousands 
of  your  gallant  comrades  have  fallen,  and 
sealed  the  priceless  legacy  with  their  blood. 
The  graves  of  these  a grateful  nation  bedews 
with  tears,  honors  their  memories,  and  will  ever 
cherish  and  support  their  stricken  families.” 

The  ^vork  of  disbandment,  which 
had  been  already  commenced,  was  car- 
ried on  steadily,  the  government  giv- 
ing to  it  a large  share  of  its  atten- 
tion; and,  as  early  as  the  15th  of 
November,  over  800,000  troops  had 
been  transported,  mustered  out  and 
paid.  'At  the  beginning  of  November, 
1866,  when  the  mustering  process  was 
completed,  as  many  as  1,023,021  sol- 
diers had  been  restored  to  their  homes, 
and  to  the  avocations  of  peaceful  life. 
There  was  no  jarring,  no  resistance. 
It  was  a grand  experiment;  and  it 
resulted  in  a splendid  success.  Such 
an  experiment,  attended  by  such  a 
result,  had  never  before  been  wit- 
nessed. The  disbandment,  without 
any  serious  disturbance  to  the  com- 
munity, of  so  many  thousands  of  men, 
most  of  them  inured  to  all  the  habits, 
as  well  as  hardships  of  the  soldier’s 
life,  was,  at  the  time  and  not  unjustly, 
regarded  as  another  great  victory — a 
victory,  in  some  respects,  even  greater 
than  that  which  had  just  been  won 
by  the  sword.  It  was  a real  triumph 
of  popular  government — another  gen- 


uine proof  of  the  inherent  strength  of 
the  republic. 

We  have  now  completed  the  task  we 
assigned  ourselves  at  the  commencement 
of  this  volume.  We  have  traced  the 
History  of  the  Great  Civil  War  from 
its  commencement  at  Fort  Sumter,  in 
1861,  to  its  triumphant  close  in  the  dis- 
bandment of  the  Armies  of  the  Union, 
in  1865.  We  have  shown  the  causes 
which  brought  about  the  struggle,  and 
have  traced  our  troubles  to  their  true 
source.  We  have  swept  the  whole 
horizon  of  the  war,  pointing  out  to  the 
reader  the  various  complex  movements 
of  the  contending  forces,  and  seeking 
to  separate  each,  yet  so  blend  all  as  to 
enable  him  to  understand  not  only  each 
separate  operation,  but  its^eneral  bearing 
upon  the  whole  great  drama.  We  have 
seen  the  tide  of  victory  roll  backward 
and  forward,  at  times  seeming  to  en- 
gulf the  hopes  of  those  whose  prayers 
were  for  the  triumph  of  the  Union,  yet 
after  all  sweeping  onward  in  one  grand 
irresistible  swell  to  victory  and  peace. 
We  have  seen  the  Union  preserved,  the 
contending  armies  quietly  returning  to 
their  homes,  and  a new  reign  of  peace 
and  good  will  inaugurated. 

Such  a story,  the  most  sublime  and 
thrilling  that  human  pen  can  relate,  can 
point  but  one  moral — that  the  institu- 
tions which  were  worth  fighting  for  so 
nobly  are  worth  preserving ; that  the 
Union  which  has  cost  us  so  much  blood 
and  treasure,  which  has  brought  us  free- 
dom and  prosperity,  must  be  cherished 
as  the  most  precious  possession  we  can 
transmit  to  future  generations. 


INDEX. 


953 


INDEX. 


The  Gee  at  Civil  War. 


A, 

A.BBOTT,  Gen.,  brigade  of,  at  tbe  capture  of  Fort 
Fisber,  866, 

A.bercrombie,  Gen.,  at  tlie  battle  of  Fair  Oaks,  238. 

Ackwortb  Station,  Ga.,  captured  by  Gen.  Hood,  805. 

Acquia  creek,  McClellan’s  army  moves  towards.  279  ; 
arrival  of  McClellan  at,  280  ; deserted  by  tbe  Na- 
tionals, 301. 

Adairs ville,  Ga.,  Gen.  Newton  skirmishes  witb  Gen. 
Johnston’s  rear-guard  at,  711. 

Adams,  Gen.  severely  wounded  at  Cbickamauga,  554. 

Aiken,  skirmish  of  Kilpatrick  with  Wheeler  at,  883. 

Alabama,  Confederate  cruiser,  depredations  of,  877  ; 
sunk  by  the  Kearsarge  off  Cherbourg,  879. 

Albemarle,  Confederate  ram,  at  the  siege  of  Ply- 
mouth, 858  ; her  fight  with  the  Sassacus — sunk  in 
the  Roanoke  river  by  Lieut.  Cushing,  859. 

Alexander,  Gen.,  brigade  of,  at  Chattanooga,  569. 

Alexandria,  Va.,  occupation  of,  by  National  troops,  35. 

Alexandria,  La.,  taken  possession  of  by  Admiral  Por- 
ter, 438  ; occupied  by  the  Confederates.  597  ; Na- 
tional troops  occupy,  624  ; evacuation  of,  638. 

Alice  Dean  and  McCombs,  steamers,  seized  by  Gen. 
Morgan  at  Bradenburg,  Ky.,  595. 

Allatoona  Pass,  Ga.,  operations  of  Gen.  Sherman’s 
army  at,  713  ; heroic  defense  of,  by  Gen.  Corse,  806  ; 
battle  of,  807. 

Allyn,  Lieut  S.,  bravery  of,  at  Port  Hudson,  443. 

Alsop’s  Farm,  surprise  of  the  National  troops  at,  673  ; 
battle  of,  674. 

Ames.  Gen,,  at  the  capture  of  Fort  Fisher,  866  ; at 
Fort  Anderson,  869. 

Ammen,  Gen.,  re-occupies  Strawberry  plains,  836. 

Anderson,  Col.,  surrender  of  Fort  Gaines  by,  to  the 
Nationals,  648. 

Anderson,  Gen.  G.  T.,  at  Santa  Rosa,  07  ; at  the  bat- 
tle of  Shiloh,  109  ; at  the  battle  of  Fredericksburg, 
457  ; at  the  battle  of  Gettysburg,  514  ; at  the  battle 
of  the  Wilderness.  666  ; severely  wounded  at  the 
battle  of  Griswoldville,  815. 

Anderson,  Major-Gen.,  mortally  wounded  at  the  bat- 
tle of  Jonesboro,  731. 


Anderson,  Major  R.,  in  command  of  Charleston  har- 
bor— headquarters  at  Fort  Moultrie — letter  of,  re- 
lating to  Fort  Moultrie,  12  ; moves  into  Fort  Sumter, 
16  ; his  refusal  to  surrender  Fort  Sumter,  23  ; sur- 
render of  Fort  Sumter  by,  31  ; (Gen.)  hoists  the 
National  flag  on  Fort  Sumter,  888. 

Andrews,  Gen.,  at  the  battle  of  Chancellorsville,*457. 

Anthony,  Col.  D.  C.,  in  the  affair  at  Colliersville,  562. 

Antietam,  description  of  the  battle-ground  of,  317  ; 
battle  of,  319-327  ; Capt.  Noyes’  description  of, 
after  the  battle,  330  ; President  Lincoln’s  story  of 
the  effect  of  the  battle  of  {note),  332. 

Antietam  creek,  bridges  on,  319. 

Appomattox  court  house,  Gen.  Lee’s  surrender  at,  934. 

Archer,  Gen.,  at  the  battle  of  Chancellorsville,  460  ; 
captured  at  the  battle  of  Gettysburg,  503. 

Arkadelphia,  occupied  by  the  Nationals,  606. 

Arkansas,  joins  the  Confederacy.  33  ; compulsory 
retreat  of  Gen.  Price  into — the  flag  of  the  Union 
floating  in,  97  ; operations  of  Gen.  Curtis  in,  97, 
98  ; march  of  Gen.  Curtis  through,  355-357  ; opera- 
tions against  guerrillas  in,  359-366  ; operations  of 
Gens.  Steele  and  Davidson  in,  605,  606. 

Arkansas,  Confederate  ram,  description  of,  429  ; action 
of,  with  Caron delet,  Tyler,  and  Ellet’s  ram  Queen 
of  the  West,  430  ; destruction  of  {note),  431. 

Arkansas  Post,  battle  of,  387. 

Arlington  heights,  occupied  by  the  Nationals,  35. 

Armistead,  Gen.,  brigade  of,  at  the  battle  of  Malvern 
hills,  268  ; at  the  battle  of  Gettysburg,  525  ; taken 
prisoner  at  Gettysburg,  529. 

Armitage,  Gen.,  fatally  wounded  at  Gettysburg,  528. 

Armstrong,  Gen.,  raids  made  by,  159. 

Army  of  the  Potomac,  effective  strength  of,  under 
Gen.  McClellan,  191  ; address  of  Gen.  McClellan 
to,  270  ; Gen.  McClellan  takes  leave  of,  336  : ad- 
dress of  Gen  Burnside  to,  337  ; reorganization  of. 
338  ; distrust  occasioned  in,  by  Gen.  Burnside’s 
failure  at  Fredericksburg,  354  ; address  of  Gen. 
Hooker  to — demoralization  in,  451  ; addresses  of 
Gen.  Hooker  to,  484,  495  ; addresses  of  Gen.  Meade 
to,  496,  50J  ; consolidation  of,  by  Gen.  Meade, 


954 


I X D E X . 


G5S-GG0  ; corps  commanders  of,  658  ; movements 
of  from  the  Rapidan  to  Spottsylvania  court  house, 
CGO-678  ; address  of  Gen.  Meade  to,  683  ; move- 
ments of,  from  Spottsylvania  court  house  to  the 
Chickahominy,  683-704;  operations  of,  against 
Petersburg,  735-780. 

Army  of  the  United  States,  condition  of,  in  1861,  25. 

Army  of  Virginia,  under  Gen.  Pope,  how  constituted, 
277  ; address  of  Pope  to,  278  ; Pope  asks  to  be 
relieved  of  command  of.  279  ; orders  issued  by  Pope 
to,  281,  282  ; retreat  of,  to  the  north  fork  of  the 
Rappahannock,  287,  288  ; great  exhaustion  of,  298  ; 
effective  force  of,  after  retreating  to  Centreville, 
301  ; losses  of,  304. 

Aimold,  Gen.  Rich.,  at  the  siege  of  Fort  Morgan,  648. 

Arnold,  Major,  at  the  battle  of  Santa  Rosa,  68. 

Asboth,  Gen.,  at  the  battle  of  Pea  Ridge.  97. 

Asiiby,  Gen.  T.,  killed  at  the  battle  of  Cross  Keys,  251. 

Ashby’s  Gap,  Va,,  skirmishes  at,  493  ; battle  at,  787. 

Ashland  Station,  captured  by  Gen.  Sheridan,  685. 

Assassination  of  President  Lincoln,  937-940. 

Atchafalaya,  Gen.  A.  J.  Smith’s  operations  on  the,  623. 

Athens,  Tenn.,  surrender  of,  to  Gen  Forrest,  828. 

Atlanta,  Ga.,  description  of,  707  ; account  of  Sher- 
man’s march  to,  from  Chattanooga,  708  ; occupation 
of,  by  Sherman’s  forces,  732 ; civilians  removed 
from,  733  ; depopulation  of,  734  ; disposition  of 
Sherman’s  forces  in  and  around,  803  ; extensive  de- 
struction of  buildings  in,  by  order  of  Sherman,  812. 

Atlanta,  iron-clad,  captured  by  Capt.  Rodgers,  588. 

Augur,  Gen.,  operations  of,  between  Port  Hudson  and 
Clinton,  438  ; at  Port  Hudson,  441  ; sends  a brigade 
to  check  Early’s  advance  on  Washington,  786. 

Augusta,  Ga.,  Sherman’s  feint  in  the  direction  of,  817. 

Averill,  Gen.,  expedition  of,  on  the  Rappahannock — 
displaced  by  Gen  Hooker,  482  ; defeat  of,  by  Gen. 
Morgan,  691  ; defeats  Gen.  Early  near  Winchester, 
787  ; defeats  Johnson,  on  the  Romney  road,  788. 

Averysboro,  N.  C.,  battle  of,  891. 

Ayres,  Gen.,  at  the  battle  of  Gettysburg,  515. 

B. 

Bache,  Lieut.,  services  of,  at  Pleasant  Hill  landing. 
Red  river,  in  the  gunboat  Lexington,  633. 

Bailey,  Capt.  T.,  commands  a division  of  the  fleet  at 
the  capture  of  Xew  Orleans,  150. 

Bailey,  Col.,  batteries  of,  at  the  battle  of  Fair  Oaks,  235. 

Bailey,  Lieut. -Col.,  dam  constructed  by,  on  the  Red 
river,  near  Alexandria,  636. 

Baird,  Gen.,  operations  of,  538  ; at  the  battle  of 
Chickamauga,  550  ; at  the  battle  of  Chattanooga.  572. 

Baker,  Col.  E.  D.,  killed  at  Ball’s  Bluff,  Va.,  54. 

Baldwin,  Col.,  operations  of,  at  Liberty  gap,  543. 

Baldwin,  Fla.,  destruction  of  property  at,  856. 

Ball’s  Bluff  Va.,  battle  of,  54. 

Baltic,  steamer,  sent  from  New  York  with  reinforce- 
ments to  Fort  Sumter,  26. 


Baltimore,  preparations  made  at,  to  resist  the  threat- 
ened invasion  of  the  Confederates,  493. 

Banks,  Gen.  N.  P.,  in  command  on  the  Maryland 
side  of  the  Potomac,  52  ; commands  a corps  of  the 
army  of  the  Potomac,  193  ; in  command  at  Har 
per’s  ferry,  242  ; retreat  of,  247  ; at  the  battle  of 
Cedar  mountain.  285  ; in  command  at  Washington, 
310  ; expedition  of,  arrives  at  New  Orleans.  431  ; 
sends  an  expedition  to  Galveston.  432  ; operations 
of,  in  Lousiana,  434  ; sends  an  expedition  to  Bayou 
Teche,  435  ; operations  of,  against  Port  Hudson, 
436  : second  expedition  of,  to  Bayou  Teche,  437  ; 
attacks  Port  Hudson,  441,  443  ; failure  of  his  attacks 
on  Port  Hudson,  444  ; lays  siege  to  Port  Hudson, 
445  ; Port  Hudson  surrenders  to,  446,  447  ; ordered 
to  the  conquest  of  Texas,  597  ; sends  an  expedition 
to  Sabine  city,  598  ; expedition  of,  to  Texas,  600  ; 
expedition  of,  to  Shreveport,  621  ; at  the  battle  of 
Sabine  cross  roads,  628  ; ordered  to  close  the  cam- 
paign, 635. 

Barksdale,  Gen.,  at  the  battle  of  Chancellorsville, 
457  ; in  charge  of  Marye’s  hill,  473  ; killed  at  the 
battle  of  Gettysburg.  518. 

Barlow,  Gen.,  brigade  of,  at  the  battle  of  Chancel 
lorsville,  459  ; at  the  battle  of  Gettysburg,  504  ; 
wounded  and  taken  prisoner,  505. 

Barnes,  Gen.,  at  the  battle  of  Gettysburg,  512  ; 
Bartlett,  Gen.,  at  the  battle*  of  the  Wilderness,  672  , 
brigade  of,  at  the  battle  of  Jericho  ford,  694. 
Bari^n,  Commodore,  surrender  of  at  Fort  Hatteras,  65. 
Bassett,  Major,  killed  at  capture  of  Marye’s  hill.  475. 
Baton  Rouge,  occupied  by  Gen.  Williams,  430  ; fleet 
of  Admiral  Farragut  at,  437. 

Battery  Harrison,  capture  of,  769  ; unsuccessful  at- 
tempt of  the  Confederates  to  regain,  771. 

Battery  Holmes,  abandoned  by  the  Confederates,  867. 
Battle  of — 

Allatoona  Pass.  807. 

Alsop’s  Farm,  674. 

Antietam.  319-327. 

Arkansas  Post,  387. 

Ashby’s  Gap,  787. 

Atlanta,720,  723-727 
Averysboro,  891. 

Ball’s  BluS,  54. 

Baylor’s  Farm,  737. 

Bean  Station,  596. 

Belmont,  61. 

Bentonville,  893. 

Bermuda  Hundred,  687. 

Big  Bethel,  62. 

Big  Black,  413. 

Blackburn’s  Ford,  37. 

Blakely,  873. 

Boston  Mountains,  362. 

Boydton  Road,  778. 

Bristow  Station.  291 


INDEX. 


95? 


Battle  of — 

Battle  of — 

Bull  Bun,  40  ; 2d  battle,  301. 

Malvern  Hills,  267-269. 

Cane  Hill.  362. 

Manassas,  299. 

Cane  River,  635. 

Marais  des  Cygnes,  832. 

Carnifex  Ferry,  52. 

Mechanicsville,  258,  259. 

Carrack’s  Ford,  50. 

Middletown,  800. 

Cedar  Creek.  802 

Mill  Spring,  81. 

Champion  Hills,  111. 

Miss'onary  Ridge,  568. 

Chancellorsville,  461-470. 

Monocacy.  786. 

Chantilly,  302. 

Morristown,  Tenn,,  835. 

Chapin’s  Farm,  769. 

Murfreesboro,  180-186. 

Chattanooga,  568-573. 

Nashville,  847. 

Chicamacomico,  66. 

New  Hope  Church,  712. 

Chickamauga,  550-556. 

New  Market,  691. 

Chickasaw  Bayou,  379. 

Ny  River,  684. 

Cold  Harbor,  698-702. 

Olustee,  858. 

Corinth.  163-167. 

Pea  Ridge,  97,  98. 

Crooked  Run,  791 

Peach  Tree  Creek,  720. 

Cross  Keys,  251. 

Perryville,  177. 

Dalton,  708. 

Pittsburg  Landing,  105. 

Davis’  Farm,  742. 

Pleasant  Hill,  630. 

Deep  Run,  760. 

Port  Gibson,  405. 

Dug  Springs,  55. 

Prairie  Grove,  363, 

Elk  Horn,  97. 

Raymond,  407. 

Fair  Oaks,  230-241. 

Reams’  Station,  766. 

Fisher’s  Hill,  796. 

Resaca,  710. 

Five  Forks,  916. 

Rich  Mountain,  49. 

Fort  Darling,  689. 

Sabine  Cross  Roads,  629. 

Franklin,  842. 

Sabine  Pass,  598. 

Fredericksburg,  343-351. 

Sailors’  Creek,  927. 

Gaines’  Mill,  259-261. 

Salem  Heights,  478. 

Gettysburg,  502-533. 

Salisbury,  896. 

Glendale,  265. 

Santa  Rosa,  67. 

Grand  Coteau,  599. 

Savage  Station,  263. 

Gravelly  Run,  913. 

Secession ville,  580,  581. 

Griswoldville,  815. 

Seven  Pines,  230-241. 

Groveton,  295. 

Shiloh,  105-111. 

Gumto^vn,  620. 

South  Mountain,  315. 

Hampton  Roads,  207-211. 

Spottsylvania  Court  House,  675-682. 

Hanover  Court  House,  231. 

Springfield,  602. 

Hatcher’s  Run,  777  ; 2d  battle,  903. 

Trevillian,  703. 

Hatchie,  167. 

Warrenton  Turnpike,  293. 

Huntsville,  602. 

Wauhatchie,  561. 

Island  Ford,  787. 

Waynesboro,  904. 

lulia,  161. 

Weidon  Railroad,  742,  762-766. 

Jenkins’  Ferry.  640. 

West  Point,  613. 

Jericho  Ford,  604. 

Westport.  832. 

Jonesboro,  731. 

White  Oak  Swamp  264. 

Kenesaw  Mountain,  715. 

Wilderness.  662-671. 

Kinston,  894. 

Williamsburg,  214-225. 

Kernstown,  243. 

Wilson’s  Creek,  56. 

Kirksville,  358. 

Winchester,  796. 

Knoxville,  575. 

Baxter,  Col  , at  Gettysburg,  527. 

Kulp  House,  715. 

Baylor’s  Farm,  battle  of,  737. 

Lavergne,  180. 

Bayou  Sara,  forces  of  Gen.  Banks  at,  440. 

Little  Osage  Crossing,  832. 

Bayou  Teche,  operations  of  Banks  on  the,  435,  437 

Lookout  Mountain,  566,  567. 

Bean  Station,  Tenn.,  battle  of,  596. 

056 


INDEX. 


Beaufort,  S.  C.,  condition  of,  75  ; naval  force  at,  76. 

Beauregard,  Gen.  P.  G.  T.,  in  command  at  Charles- 
ton, 26  ; at  Manassas  junction,  35  ; in  command  at 
Shiloh,  108;  retreats  to  Corinth,  114;  flight  of, 
from  Corinth,  119  ; at  Tupelo,  120 ; relieved  by 
Gen.  Bragg.  121  ; proclamation  of,  584  ; at  Bermuda 
Hundred,  687  ; placed  in  command  of  the  Confed- 
erate military  division  of  the  west,  809. 

Bee,  Gen.,  at  the  battle  of  Bull  Run,  41. 

Beenher,  Rev.  H.  W.,  powerful  address  given  by,  at 
Fort  Sumter,  888. 

Bell,  Capt.,  commands  a division* of  the  fleet  at  the 
capture  of  New  Orleans,  150. 

Bell,  Gen. , at  the  capture  of  Fort  Fisher  866  ; mortally 
wounded  at  Fort  Fisher,  867. 

Belgian  Consul,  arrest  of  the,  at  St.  Louis,  830. 

Belmont,  Mo.,  battle  of,  61. 

Beltzhoover,  Col.,  at  the  battle  of  Belmont,  60, 

Benedict,  Col,,  at  the  battle  of  Pleasant  hill,  630. 

Benham,  Gen.,  at  the  battle  of  Secessionville,  580. 

Benjamin,  Judah  P.,  circular  of,  584. 

Bentonville,  battle  of,  893. 

Bermuda  Hundred,  battle  of  687. 

Berry,  Gen.,  at  the  battle  of  Williamsburg.  217. 

Berry,  Gen.,  at  the  battle  of  Chancellorsville,  458, 
462  ; death  of,  470. 

Berry ville,  Gen.  Sheridan’s  forces  at,  789,  794. 

Best,  Capt.,  battery  of,  at  Chancellorsville,  462. 

Bethesda  Church,  attack  of  Gen.  Rodes  at,  697. 

Big  Bethel.  Gen.  Pierce’s  attempt  on,  62. 

Big  Black,  battle  of,  413. 

Big  Shanty  Station,  Ga.,  captured  by  Gen.  Hood,  805. 

Big  Tybee  Island,  seized  by  the  Nationals,  75  ; descrip- 
tion of,  139. 

Birge,  Gen.,  operations  of,  635. 

Birney,  Gen.,  at  the  battle  of  Williamsburg,  218  ; at 
the  battle  of  Fair  Oaks,  236  ; at  the  battle  of  Chan- 
tilly, 303  ; at  the  battle  of  Fredericksburg,  346  ; at 
the  battle  of  Chancellorsville,  459  ; at  the  battle  of 
Gettysburg,  511  ; raid  of,  in  Virginia,  656  ; division 
of,  at  Taylor's  bridge,  695. 

ITackburn’s  Ford,  battle  at,  37. 

Blackman,  Gen.,  at  the  capture  of  Fort  Fisher,  866. 

B aisdell.  Col.,  at  the  battle  of  Williamsburg,  216. 

Blair,  Gen.  Frank  P , at  the  battle  of  Chickasaw 
bayou,  378 ; in  contact  with  Gen.  S.  D.  Lee  at 
Tuscumbia,  562  ; in  command  of  the  seventeenth 
corps  under  Sherman,  713. 

Blakely,  battle  of,  873. 

Blockade  of  the  Southern  ports  by  the  Nationals.  61, 62. 

Blockade  of  Charleston,  declared  raised  by  Beaure- 
gard and  Ingraham,  584. 

Blooming  Gap,  Gen.  Jackson  surprised  at,  242. 

Blue  Wing,  steamer  captured  by  the  Confederates,  385. 

Blunt,  Gen.  J.  G.,  defeat  of  Cooper  at  Fort  Wayne, 
Mo. , by,  361  ; defeat  of  Marmaduke  by,  362  ; at  the 
battle  of  Prairie  grove,  365  ; takes  possession  of 


Van  Buren,  Ark.  366  ; defeat  of  Gen.  Cooper  by. 
604  ; relieved  of  his  command,  606. 

Boggs,  Capt.  C.  S..  his  report  of  the  exploits  of  the 
gun-boat  Varuna,  152. 

Bolivar  Heights,  affair  at,  314  ; Shericlan  at,  793. 

Boomer,  Col. , at  the  battle  of  luka,  161. 

Bombshell,  gun-boat,  capture  of,  by  the  Confederates, 
858  ; deserted  by  the  Confederates,  859. 

Booth,  Major  L F..  killed  at  Fort  Pillow,  617. 

Booth,  J.  Wilkes,  assassinates  President  Lincoln, 
938  ; death  of,  940. 

Border  States,  condition  of  the,  47. 

Boswell,  Capt. , killed  at  the  battle  of  Chancellorsville, 
464.  I 

Boston  Mountains,  Mo.,  battle  of,  362. 

Bowling  Green,  Ky  , headquarters  of  A.  S.  Johnston’s 
army,  83  ; evacuation  of,  94. 

Bowen,  Gen.  J.,  at  the  battle  of  ( 'hampion  Hills,  410 

Boyd’s  Creek,  batteries  erected  at,  76. 

Boydton  Road,  battle  of,  778. 

Bradford,  Major  W.  F.,  at  Fort  Pillow,  617  ; murder 
of.  by  the  Confederates,  619. 

Bradley,  Gen.,  brigade  of,  at  the  battle  of  Chicka- 
mauga,  551  ; wounded  at  the  battle  of  Franldin.  842. 

Bragg,  Gen.  B.,  forts  at  Pensacola  held  by.  68  ; at 
Shiloh,  106  ; succeeds  Beauregard  in  the  command 
of  the  army  of  the  Mississippi,  120  ; at  Chattanooga. 
171  ; proclamation  of,  to  the  Kentuckians,  172  ; 
inaugurates  a provisional  governor  of  Kentucky, 
173  ; battle  of  Perryville  or  Chaplin’s  hills  fough 
by.  177  ; retreat  of,  to  Chattanooga.  178  ; cavalry 
raids  of,  into  West  Tennessee  and  Kentucky.  180  ; 
battle  of  Murfreesboro  fought  by,  180  ; retreat  of. 
187  ; at  Shelbyville.  542  ; retreat  of,  544  ; retires 
from  Chattanooga  547  ; at  the  battle  of  Chicka- 
mauga,  549  ; report  of,  552  ; victory  of,  at  Chicka- 
mauga,  555  ; at  the  battle  of  Chattanooga,  568  ; 
defeat  of,  by  Gen.  Grant  573  ; retreat  of,  to  Dalton. 
574  ; relieved  of  his  command.  578  ; driven  over  tlie 
Neuse  to  Kinston  by  Schofield,  894. 

Bramhall,  Gen.,  at  the  battle  of  Williamsburg,  215. 

Branch,  Gen.,  killed  at  the  battle  of  Antietam,  327. 

Brannan.  Gen.,  at  the  battle  of  Chickamauga,  550; 
operations  of,  at  Pocotaligo,  581. 

Brashear  City,  Weitzel’s  expedition  to,  435  ; Gen. 
Banks  at,  437  ; capture  of.  by  the  Confederates.  445. 

Breckenridge,  Gen.  J.  C.,  at  the  battle  of  Shiloh,  107  ; 
at  the  battle  of  Murfreesboro.  180  ; at  the  battle  of 
Chickamauga.  551  ; at  the  battle  of  Chattanooga, 
568;  defeats  Gen.  Sigel  near  New  Market,  69.2: 
defeats  Gen.  Gillem  near  Morristown,  Tenn.,  836. 

Breese,  Capt.  K R.,  in  command  of  the  sailors  and 
marines  at  the  capture  of  Fort  Fisher,  865. 

Bristow  Station,  battle  of,  291  ; Gen.  Banks  destroys 
property  at,  301. 

Brooke,  Gen  , at  the  battle  of  Savage  station,  263  ; 
at  the  battle  of  Gettvsburg,  515. 


INDEX 


957 


Brooks,  Gen.,  operations  of,  from  Bermuda  hun- 
dred, 687. 

Brown,  Col. , at  Chicamacomico,  66. 

Brown,  Col.  Harvey,  at  Fort  Pickens,  68. 

Brown,  Col. , at  the  battle  of  Chancellorsville,  459. 
Brown,  Col.,  at  the  battle  of  Jericho  ford,  694. 
Brown,  Col. , at  the  battle  of  Monocacy,  785. 

Brown,  Gen.,  severely  wounded  at  the  battle  of 
Springfield,  Mo.,  602. 

Brown,  Gen.,  in  charge  of  militia  at  St.  Louis,  831. 
Brown,  Gen.  E.  B.,  his  encounter  with  guerrillas  and 
Indians,  606 

Brown,  Gov.,  sends  the  Georgia  militia  to  Gen.  Jos. 
E Johnston’s  army,  714. 

Brown’s  Gap,  strength  of  Early’s  position  at,  797. 
Bruinsburg,  Miss.,  expedition  of  Gen.  Grant  at,  403. 
Brunswick,  Ga.,  taken  possession  of,  by  Nationals,  141, 
Buchanan,  Commodore  McKean,  death  of,  in  the 
Calhoun,  at  Carney’s  bridge,  435. 

Buchanan,  Franklin,  in  command  of  the  Confederate 
iron  clad  Merrimac,  202  ; (Admiral;  in  command  of 
iron- clad  Tennessee,  642  ; severely  wounded  in  ac- 
tion in  Mobile  bay,  647. 

Buchanan,  President  James,  reply  of,  to  the  South 
Carolina  commissioners,  19. 

Buckner,  Gen.  S.  B , at  Fort  Donelson,  85  ; surrender 
of  94  ; retreats  from  Knoxville,  Tenn.,  544. 

Buell,  Gen.  D.  C.,  in  charge  of  the  department  of  the 
Ohio,  80  ; in  command  of  the  army  of  the  Cumber- 
land, 83  ; ordered  to  join  Grant  at  Shiloh,  103  ; his 
interview  with  Grant,  105  ; his  arrival  at  Shiloh, 
110  ; at  Corinth,  117  ; army  of,  sent  to  Chattanooga, 
120  ; approaching  Chattanooga,  171  ; moves  from 
Louisville,  174 ; at  Perryville,  175-177  ; supplanted 
by  Gen.  Rosecrans,  178. 

Buford,  Col.,  at  the  battle  of  Belmont,  60. 

Buford,  Gen.,  operations  Of,  616  ; at  Columbus,  619  ; 

cavalry  attack  of,  against  Murfreesboro,  844 
Ball  Run,  battle  of,  40  ; second  battle  of,  301. 

Bur  bridge,  Gen.,  at  tlie  battle  of  Chickasaw  bayou, 
378  ; National  standard  planted  by,  on  Fort  Hind- 
man, Ark.,  388  ; at  the  battle  of  Grand  Coteau, 
599  ; his  pursuit  of  Morgan  to  Cynthiana,  783  ; his 
expedition  against  the  Virginia  salt  works,  835. 
Burns,  Gen  , at  the  battle  of  Fair  Oaks,  238  ; at  the 
battle  of  Savage  station,  263. 

Burnside,  Gen.,  A E. , at  the  battle  of  Bull  Run,  40, 
4i,  43  ; biographical  sketch  of — commands  the  ex 
pedition  to  Pamlico  Sound,  123  ; proclamation  by. 
and  Goldsboro  ugh.  to  the  people  of  North  Carolina, 
lol  ; at  New  Berne,  132,  135  ; at  Fort  Macon.  136  ; 
capture  of  Fort  Macon  by — summoned  to  Fortress 
Monroe,  137  ; at  the  battle  of  Antietam,  325  ; or- 
dered to  take  command  of  the  army  of  the  Potomac, 
836  ; order  of,  on  assuming  command,  337  ; plan 
of,  to  attack  Fredericksburg,  338  ; mortification  of, 
and  his  division  commanders,  340  ; losses  of,  at  the 


battle  of  Fredericksburg,  351  ; entire  army  of, 
withdraws  to  Falmouth,  352  ; letter  of,  assuming 
the  entire  responsibility  for  the  disaster  at  Fred- 
ericksburg, 354  ; relieved  of  his  command  at  liis 
own  request.  354  ; appointed  to  the  command  of 
the  department  of  the  Ohio  {note),  449  ; ordered  to 
join  Rosecrans,  542  ; enters  Knoxville,  545  ; Cum- 
be.land  gap  surrenders  to,  545,  540  ; encounter  of, 
with  Longstreet,  575  ; his  defense  of  Knoxville, 
576  ; in  command  of  the  ninth  army  corps  at  Cul- 
pepper, 660,  repulse  of,  at  the  North  Anna,  695. 

Burton’s  Georgia  brigade,  at  Bull  Run,  41. 

Butler,  Gen.  B.  F.,  at  Fortress  Monroe,  35  ; declares 
slaves  contraband  of  war.  47  ; ordered  to  take 
command  at  Fortress  Monroe,  62  ; relieved  of  his 
command  at  Fortress  Monroe,  63  ; success  of,  at 
Hatteras,  65  ; departure  of,  from  Hampton  Roads 
with  troops  for  New  Orleans.  157  ; moves  up  the 
James  river  from  Fortress  Monroe,  686  ; despatch 
of,  to  Stanton,  687  ; operations  of,  against  Peters- 
burg 736  ; additional  corps  placed  under,  by  Gen. 
Grant,  751  ; joins  the  expedition  against  Fort 
Fisher,  861-863  ; superseded  by  Ord,  868. 

Butterfield’s  brigade  at  the  battle  of  Gaines’Mill,  260. 

C. 

CaBELL,  Gen.  W.  L.,  defeat  of,  at  Fayetteville,  603  ; 
operations  of,  639. 

Caldwell,  Commander,  C.  H.  B.,  at  the  attack  on  Port 
Hudson,  441. 

Caldwell,  Gen,,  at  the  battle  of  Antietam,  324  ; at  the 
battle  of  Gettysburg,  514. 

Calhoun,  J.  M.,  letter  of,  to  Gen.  Sherman  in  relation 
to  the  removal  of  civilians  from  Atlanta,  734. 

Cameron,  Brig-Gen. , at  the  battle  of  Grand  Coteau, 
600  ; at  the  battle  of  Sabine  cross  roads,  628. 

Cameron,  Col,,  lulled  at  the  battle  of  Bull  Run,  44. 

Cameron,  Secretary,  resigns  the  war  department,  79. 

Campbell,  Col.,  surrender  of  Athens,  Tenn.  by,  to 
Gen.  Forrest,  828. 

Canby,  Gen.,  commands  the  Shreveport  expedition, 
638  , in  command  of  the  western  military  division, 
641;  operations  of,  against  Mobile,  869-873. 

Cane  Hill,  battle  of,  362. 

Cane  River,  battle  of,  635. 

Carlin's  brigade  at  the  battle  of  Perryville,  177. 

Carnifex  Ferry,  battle  of,  52. 

Curolinas,  Gen.  Sherman’s  march  through  the,  880- 
807 ; waste  and  destruction  effected  in  the,  by 
Sherman’s  troops,  895. 

Carr,  Gen.,  at  Pea  Ridge,  97  ; at  the  battle  of  Big 
Black,  413  ; at  Little  Rock,  638. 

Carrack’s  Ford,  Va. , battle  of,  50. 

Carroll.  Gen  , brigade  of,  at  the  battle  of  Gettysburg, 
520  ; splendid  charge  of,  at  the  battle  of  the  Wilder- 
ness, 671  ; wounded.  672. 

Carter,  Gen  S.  P.,  at  Knoxville,  545. 


958 


INDEX. 


Casey,  Gen.,  division  of,  at  the  battle  of  Williamsburgh, 
230  ; at  the  battle  of  Fair  Oaks,  334. 

C’ass,  Gen.  Lewis,  conduct  of,  prior  to  hostilities,  15. 

Catlett’s  Station,  Pope’s  army-train  surprised  at,  288. 

Cedar  Creek,  Gen.  Sheridan’s  army  at,  790  ; Early’s 
temporary  victory  at,  799  ; battle  of,  8 '3. 

Cedar  Mountain,  or  Cedar  Run,  Va.,  battle  of,  386. 

Cemetery  Ridge,  near  Petersburg,  unsuccessful  as- 
saults upon,  from  the  “crater,”  755,  756. 

Centreville,  Va.,  Union  army  under  Gen.  Pope  at,  301. 

(’esnola,  Col.,  drives  the  Confederates  back  from 
their  position  at  White  Post,  790. 

Chalmette,  Confederate  regiment,  unconditional  sur- 
render of,  to  Capt.  Bailey,  154. 

Chalmers,  Gen  , at  Shiloh,  109  ; at  Colliersville,  562. 

Chamberlain,  Col.,  at  the  battle  of  Gettysburg,  513. 

Chambers,  Col.,  at  the  battle  of  luka,  161. 

Chambersburg,  Pa  , capture  of,  by  Gen.  Stuart,  333  ; 
burnt  by  Gen.  McCausland,  788. 

Champion  Hills,  Miss.,  described,  410  ; battle  of,  411. 

Chancellorsville  House,  Va.,  headquarters  of  Gen. 
Hooker,  454  ; takes  fire  and  is  abandoned,  470. 

Chancellorsville,  Va.,  first  battle  of,  461  ; second  bat- 
tle of,  467  ; captured  by  the  Confederates,  470,  471. 

Chantilly,  Va.^  battle  of,  302. 

Chapin’s  Farm,  Va.,  battle  of,  769. 

Chaplin’s  Hills,  Ky.,  battle  of,  177. 

Charleston,  excitement  in,  16  ; attempt  of  Beaure- 
gard and  Ingraham  to  raise  the  blockade  of,  583, 
584  ; circular-of  J.  P.  Benjamin  in  relation  to  the 
blockade  of,  581  ; Dupont’s  attack  on  the  fortifica- 
tions of,  584-587  ; operations  of  Gen.  Gillmore  against 
the  defenses  of,  588-593  ; evacuation  of,  by  Gen. 
Hardee,  886  ; surrender  of,  to  Gen.  Gillmore,  by  the 
mayor,  887  ; explosion  with  loss  of  life  and  great 
fire  in,  886  ; remarks  of  Gen.  Sherman  on  the  ruin- 
ous condition  of — Gen.  Anderson  sent  thither  to 
raise  the  Stars  and  Stripes  again  on  Fort  Sumter,  887. 

Charleston  and  Savannah  Railroad,  movements  of 
Gen.  Foster  against,  830. 

Charleston  Forts,  paper  respecting,  addressed  to 
President  Buchanan  by  South  Carolina  representa- 
tives, 19. 

Charleston  Harbor,  condition  of,  prior  to  the  war,  11  ; 
description  of  the  forts  in,  585. 

Chase,  Secretary,  visit  of,  to  Fortress  Monroe,  238. 

Chattahoochee  River,  Ga.,  Gen  Johnston  driven  across 
the,  by  Gen.  Sherman,  717, 

Chattanooga,  Tenn.,  strategic  importance  of,  171  ; its 
position  and  surroundings,  541  ; battle  of,  568-573. 

Cheatham,  Gen.,  at  Belmont,  60;  at  the  battle  of 
Shiloh,  109  ; at  the  battle  of  Perry ville,  176  ; at 
the  battle  of  Murfreesboro,  180  ; at  the  battle  of 
Chickamauga,  551. 

Cheraw,  destruction  of  property  at,  by  Sherman,  889. 

Cliesapeake  and  Albemarle  Canal,  operations  of  Lieut. 
Jeffers  on  the,  130. 


Chicamacomico,  battle  of,  66. 

Chickahominy,  crossed  by  Gen.  Grant's  army,  703. 
Chickamauga,  position  of,  549  ; battle  of,  550-556.' 
Chickamauga,  steamship,  destroyed  by  the  Confeder- 
ates,  869  ; depredation^  of,  876. 

Chickasaw  Bayou  or  Haines’  Bluff,  battle  of,  379  . 

sad  scenes  after  the  battle  of,  381. 

Churchhill,  Gen.  T.  J.,  in  command  of  Fort  Hind- 
man, Ark.,  386  ; surrenders  the  fort  to  the  military 
authorities,  388. 

City  Belle,  steamer,  captured  by  the  Confederates,  038. 
City  of  New  York,  steamer,  lost  at  Hatteras,  124. 
City  Point,  terrific  explosion  with  loss  of  life  at,  758  ; 
meeting^  of  Gens.  Grant  and  Sherman,  Admiral 
Porter,  and  President  Lincoln  at,  895. 

Clark,  Gov.  H.  T.,  counter-proclamation  of,  to  the 
people  of  North  Carolina,  131. 

Classen,  Capt.,  operations  of,  at  Fort  Gaines,  648. 
Clayton,  Col.  P.,  repulses  the  attack  of  Marmaduke, 
at  Pine  Bluff,  Ark. , 607. 

Cleburne,  Gen  , at  the  battle  of  Murfreesboro,  180  : 

at  the  battle  of  Chickamauga,  551. 

Clendennin,  Gen. , at  the  battle  of  Monocacy,  785. 
Clifton  and  Arizona,  gun-boats,  captured  by  the  Con- 
federates, 598. 

Coates,  Col.  J.  H , operations  of,  at  Yazoo  city,  615. 
Cobb.  Gen.,  at  the  battle  of  Gaines’  mill,  260  ; at  the 
battle  of  Fredericksburg,  344. 

Cobb,  guerrilla  leader,  defeated  by  Col.  Merrill,  3.58. 
Cockerell,  Gen.,  captured  at  Fort  Blakely,  893. 
Cockerell’s  brigade  at  Missionary  Ridge,  569. 
Coggswell,  Col.,  at  the  battle  of  Ball’s  Bluff,  54. 
Colburn.  Gen.,  defeated  by  Van  Dorn  and  Forrest,  538. 
Cold  Harbor,  Va.,  battle  of,  699-702. 

Colquitt,  Gen.,  at  the  battle  of  Chancellorsville,  460. 
Colston,  Gen.,  at  the  battle  of  Chancellorsville,  460. 
Columbia,  Tenn.,  retreat  of  Gen.  Schofield  from,  840. 
Columbia,  S.  C.,  surrender  of,  by  the  mayor  to  Col. 
Stone,  884  ; disorderly  conduct  of  drunken  soldiers 
in,  884  ; great  fire  in,  885. 

Columbus,  Ga.,  captured  by  Gen.  Wilson,  874. 
Columbus,  Ky.,  seized  by  Gen.  Polk,  58  ; Confederate 
post  at,  80  ; evacuation  of,  94. 

Commissioners,  South  Carolina,  correspondence  of 
with  President  Buchanan,  19 
Congress,  destroyed  by  the  iron-clad  Merrimac,  204. 
Congress,  Southern,  assembled  at  Montgomery.  23. 
Cook,  Major,  isolated  with  Col.  U.  Dahlgren,  from 
their  command,  in  the  Virginia  raid,  657. 

Cooke,  Capt.,  his  operations  with  the  ram  Albe 
marie  at  the  siege  of  Plymouth,  859. 

Cooke,  Gen.  St.  G.,  at  the  battle  of  Gaines’  mill,  261. 
Cool  Arbor,  Va.,  headquarters  of  Gen.  McClellan,  230 
Cooper,  Adjt.-Gen  , iniquity  of,  13. 

Cooper,  Gen.,  defeat  of,  by  Gen.  Blunt,  604. 

Coosaw  River,  obstructions  placed  on,  76. 
Coosawhatchie  River,  Gen.  Slocum  at  the,  883. 


INDEX. 


950 


Corintli,  description  of,  114  ; evacuation  of,  by  Beau- 
regard, 119  ; battle  of.  1G3-167. 

Cornyn,  Dr.,  at  the  battle  of  Shiloh,  109. 

Corse,  Gen.,  at  the  battle  of  Chattanooga,  569  ; wound- 
ed at  Chattanooga,  570  ; his  defense  of  Allatoona 
pass,  806  ; services  of,  near  Savannah,  Ga.,  819. 

Coste,  N.  L . surrenders  the  cutter  William  Aiken,  18. 

Cotton,  J.  A.,  Confederate  steamer,  destruction  of,  435. 

Couch,  Gen.  D.  N , at  the  battle  of  Williamsburg, 
214  ; at  the  battle  of  Fair  Oaks,  235  ; at  the  battle 
of  Malvern  hills,  268  ; at  the  battle  of  Fredericks- 
burg, 348  ; at  the  battle  of  Chancellors ville,  454. 

Courronne,  French  iron  clad,  at  the  fight  between  the 
Kearsarge  and  the  Alabama,  878. 

Covington,  steamer,  set  on  fire  and  abandoned,  637. 

Cox,  Gen.,  at  Kanawha  valley,  51  ; at  the  battle  of 
South  mountain,  315  ; his  capture  of  Fort  Ander- 
son, 869. 

Craft,  Col.,  in  the  attack  on  Fort  Donelson,  91. 

Craig,  Col.,  killed  at  Deep  bottom,  761. 

Crampton’s  Gap,  skirmish  at,  316. 

Crater  of  Petersburg  mine,  scene  inside  the,  755. 

Craven,  Capt.,  in  the  attack  on  Fort  St.  Philip,  152. 

Craven,  Capt.  T.  A.  M.,  lost  in  the  Tecumseh  in 
Mobile  bay — biographical  sketch  of  {aote),  644. 

Crawford,  Gen. , wounded  at  the  battle  of  Antietam, 
322  ; at  the  battle  of  Gettysburg,  513  ; at  the  bat- 
tle of  the  Wilderness,  663  ; repulse  of  the  Confed- 
erates by,  at  Shady  grove  road,  697. 

Cricket,  steamer.  Confederate  attack  on  the,  633. 

Crist,  Col.,  at  Port  Royal  ferry,  76. 

Crittenden,  U.  S.  Senator,  devotion  of,  to  the  Union,  57. 

Crittenden,  Gen.  T.,  at  Shiloh,  110  ; at  the  battle  of 
Perryville,  174  ; at  the  battle  of  Murfreesboro,  180  ; 
takes  possession  of  Lafayette,  Tenn.,  547  ; at  the 
battle  of  Chickamauga,  550. 

Crocker,  Lieut.  F.,  failure  of  the  naval  expedition  in 
charge  of,  to  Sabine  city,  598. 

Croker,  Gen.,  at  the  battle  of  Champion  hills,  411. 

Crook,  Gen.,  defeats  Gen.  McCausland  at  Dublin  sta- 
tion, 691  ; drives  the  Confederates  through  Snick- 
er’s gap — at  Island  ford,  787. 

Crooked  Run,  Va.,  battle  of,  791. 

Cross,  Col.,  at  the  battle  of  Antietam,  324. 

Cross,  Gen.,  killed  at  the  battle  of  Gettysburg,  515. 

Cross  Keys,  Va.,  battle  of,  251. 

Crowen  and  Wheeler,  batteries  of,  at  the  battle  of 
Williamsburg,  218. 

Croxton,  Gen.,  in  command  at  Cypress  creek,  829. 

Crufts,  Gen.,  division  of,  at  Wauhatchie,  566  ; at  the 
battle  of  Chattanooga,  568. 

Crutchfield,  Col.,  wounded  at  Chancellorsville,  462. 

Culpepper  Court  House,  arrival  of  Gen.  Pope  at,  285  ; 
Gen.  Grant’s  headquarters  at,  658. 

Cumberland,  suuk  by  the  iron-clad  Merrimac,  203. 

Curtin.  Gov.,  of  Pennsylvania,  orders  all  able  bodied 
men  to  organize  for  the  defense  of  the  State.  309. 


Curtis,  Gen  , brigade  of,  in  the  attack  on  Fort  Fisher. 
866  ; severely  wounded  at  Fort  Fisher,  867. 

Curtis,  Gen.  S.  R.,  operations  of,  against  Gen.  Price. 
97  ; victory  of,  at  the  battle  of  Pea  ridge,  98  ; at 
Batesville,  Ark.,  355  ; arrives  at  Helena,  357  ; defeat 
of  the  Confederates  at  Fayetteville,  Mo.,  by,  833. 

Cushing,  Lieut.  W.  B.,  destroys  the  Confederate  ram 
Albemarle,  in  Plymouth  harbor,  N.  C.,  860. 

Custer,  Capt  , death  of,  at  Columbia,  Ky. , 595. 

(Juster,  Gen.  G.  A.,  raid  of,  in  Virginia,  656  ; repulse 
of,  by  the  Confederates  at  Sulphur  springs  bridge, 
789  ; at  Crooked  run,  791. 

Cutler,  Gen.,  at  the  battle  of  Gettysburg,  503  ; at  the 
battle  of  Jericho  ford,  694. 

Cynthiana,  Ky.,  Morgan  routed  by  Gen.  Burbridge 
near,  783. 

p. 

Dabney’s  Mills,  battle  of,  777  ; second  battle  of,  003. 

Dahlgren,  Admiral,  his  bombardment  of  Fort  Sumter 
and  Fort  Wagner,  589,  590. 

Dahlgren,  Col.,  raid  of,  in  Virginia,  656  ; death  of,  657. 

Dallas,  Ga.,  Sherman’s  movement  upon,  712. 

Dalton,  Ga.,  battle  of,  708  ; Gen.  Johnston  evacuates, 
709  ; surrender  of  the  garrison  at,  to  Gen 
Hood,  808. 

Dam  constructed  on  the  Red  river  by  Col.  Bailey  to 
facilitate  the  escape  of  Porter’s  vessels,  636. 

Dana,  Gen  , at  York  river,  227  ; wounded  at  the  bat- 
tle of  Antietam,  322. 

Dana,  Gen.  N.  J.  T.,  in  command  of  expedition  to  the 
Rio  Grande,  Tex.,  601. 

Danville  Railroad,  destruction  effected  on,  by  Gens. 
Wilson  and  Kautz,  746. 

Davidson,  Gen.,  surrender  of  Little  Rock,  Ark.,  to, 
606  ; expedition  of,  from  Baton  Rouge  against 
Hood’s  communications,  852 

Davis,  Gen.  A. , killed  at  the  battle  of  Fair  Oaks,  238. 

Davis,  Cajit.  C.  H.,  his  naval  engagement  near  Mem- 
phis, 144  ; Memphis  surrenders  to,  146. 

Davis,  Col. , cavalry  exploits  of,  483. 

Davis,  Gen.,  at  Pea  ridge,  97  ; at  Corinth,  163  , at 
Murfreesboro,  180. 

Davis,  Gen.  Jeff.  C.,  operations  of,  537  ; at  the  battle 
of  Chickamauga,  551  ; capture  of  Rome,  Ga.  by, 
712  ; appointed  to  succeed  Gen.  Palmer  in  command 
of  the  fourteenth  corps,  728. 

Davis,  Jefferson,  cunning  of,  12  ; inaugurated  Presi- 
dent of  the  Confederacy,  23  ; his  despatch  from 
Bull  Run,  45  ; justifies  the  seizure  of  Hickman  and 
Columbus,  58  ; note  to  Gen.  Polk  by,  61  ; telegraph 
message  of,  to  Gen.  Bragg,  120  ; visit  of.  to  Gen. 
Bragg,  at  Murfreesboro,  179  ; visit  of,  to  the  army, 
at  the  battle  of  White  Oak  Swamp,  265  ; address 
of,  to  the  army  in  Eastern  Virginia,  271  ; speech  of, 
at  Macon,  on  desertion  and  absenteeism,  804  ; cap 
ture  of,  near  Irwinsville,  Ga.,  947  ; imprisoned  in 
Fortress  Monroe,  948. 


900 


INDEX 


I hi  vis’  two  Mississippi  regiments  captured  at  Gettys- 
burg, 503. 

Davis’  Farm,  battle  of,  742. 

D^i'catar,  Mo.,  seized  by  Gen.  Mitchell,  115. 

Decatur,  Tenn.,  Gen.  Hood’s  demonstration  against 
the  garrison  of,  829. 

De  Courcy’s,  Gen.,  brigade  at  Chickasaw  bayou,  379. 

Deep  Bottom,  Va.,  severe  fighting  near,  758-761. 

Deep  Run,  Va. , battle  of,  760. 

Deerhound,  steam  yacht  picks  up  the  men  and  officers 
of  the  Alabama,  ofi;  Cherbourg,  879. 

De  nnis,  Gen  , at  the  battle  of  Raymond,  407. 

Denver,  Gen.,  at  Corinth,  118. 

De  Trobriaiid,  Gen  , at  the  battle  of  Gettysburg,  511  ; 
Confederate  position  carried  by,  at  Petersburg,  768. 

Desher,  Gen.  H. , killed  at  Chickamauga.  554. 

Deve  s,  Col.  Chas.,  at  the  battle  of  Ball’s  bluff,  53  ; 
(Gen.)  at  the  battle  of  Williamsburg,  220  ; wounded 
at  the  battle  of  Chancellors ville,  461. 

Devereux,  Col  , at  Gettysburg,  527. 

Devin,  Gen.,  occupies  Staunton,  904;  cavalry  under, 
at  Five  forks,  910,  912  ; at  Sailor’s  creek,  926. 

Dickey,  Capt.,  killed  at  Sabine  cross  roads,  629. 

Dix,  Gen. , in  command  at  Fortress  Monroe,  594. 

Dodge,  Gr'ii.,  operations  of,  539  ; in  command  of  the 
sixteenth  corps  under  Sherman,  706. 

Doherty,  private,  bravery  and  death  of,  at  the  battle 
of  Williamsburg,  216. 

Doles,  Gen  , at  the  battle  of  Chancellorsville,  460. 

Donaldson  ville,  occupied  by  the  National  troops, 
named  Fort  Butler,  430  ; attempt  by  the  Confeder- 
ates to  recapture,  445. 

Doubleday,  Gen.,  brigade  of,  at  the  battle  of  Warren- 
ton  turnpike,  293  ; at  the  battle  of  Antietam,  319  ; 
at  the  battle  of  Fredericksburg,  345  ; at  the  battle 
of  Gettysburg,  503. 

Douglass,  Col.,  killed  at  the  battle  of  Antietam,  320. 

Dowdall’s  Tavern,  rout  of  the  National  right  at,  462. 

Draft  proclamation  for  300,000  militia,  283. 

Draper’s  Dr.,  opinion  of  the  Emancipation  proclama- 
tion, 391,  392  ; his  opinion  of  the  losses  in  the  Over- 
land campaign.  704. 

Drayton,  Gen.  T.  F.,  in  command  of  Fort  Walker,  73. 

Drayton,  Commander,  operations  of,  at  Fort  McAllis- 
ter, 583  ; at  Mobile  bay,  644. 

Drewry,  steamer,  destroyed  on  the  James  river,  899. 

Duff,  guerrilla  chief,  brutal  action  of,  towards  Ger- 
man Unionists,  367. 

Duifie,  Gen.,  captures  a portion  of  Gen.  Early’s  train 
at  Snicker’s  gap,  Va.,  787. 

Dug  Springs,  battle  of,-  55. 

Duncan,  Gen.  J.'K.,  in  command  of  the  Confederate 
defenses  below  New  Orleans,  148. 

Dunker  Church,  focus  of  the  battle  of  Antietam,  319. 

Dunnington.  Col. , surrenders  Fort  Hindman,  Ark.,  388. 

Dunovant,  Col.  R.  G.  M , at  Bay  point,  73. 

Dupont,  Commodore,  in  command  of  fleet  at  Hampton 


roads,  70  ; fleet  of,  enters  Port  Royal,  73  ; unsuc- 
cessful attempt  of,  to  reach  the  Savannah  river,  76  ; 
expedition  of,  along  the  coast  of  Florida,  141  ; order 
of,  to  Worden,  to  attack  Fort  McAllister,  582  ; 
ordered  to  attack  Charleston,  584 ; his  order  of 
battle  for  an  attack  on  the  Charleston  forts,  585  ; 
superseded  by  Admiral  Dahlgren,  588. 

Dutch  Gap  Canal,  construction  of,  commenced  by 
Gen.  Butler,  757  ; Major  Ludlow’s  movement  from, 
761  ; failure  of,  899. 

Dwight  Col  , at  the  battle  of  Williamsburg,  216. 

Dwight,  Gen.  W.,  enters  Alexandria,  La.,  438;  at 
the  attack  on  Port  Hudson,  443,  444 ; at  the  battle 
of  Pleasant  hill,  630. 

E. 

Early,  Gen.  Jubal  A.,  at  the  battle  of  Bull  Run.  43  ; 
at  the  battle  of  Williamsburg,  219  ; at  the  battle  of 
Fredericksburg,  347  ; at  Marye’shill,  473  ; at  Salem 
church,  479  ; at  the  battle  of  Gettysburg,  504  ; at 
the  salient,  681  ; his  invasion  of  Maryland,  784  ; 
defeats  Gen.  Lewis  Wallace  at  the  battle  of  Mono- 
cacy,  785,  786 ; defeat  of,  by  Gen.  Averill,  787  ; 
attacks  Sheridan’s  force  at  Summit  point,  793  ; de- 
feated by  Sheridan  at  Winchester  and  Fisher’s  hill, 
796  ; retreats  to  Woodstock  and  Brown’s  gap,  797  ; 
his  victory  over  Sheridan’s  troops  at  Cedar  creek, 
801  ; Sheridan  turns  his  victory  into  defeat,  802  ; 
routed  by  Sheridan  at  Waynesboro,  904. 

Eastport,  steamer,  blown  up  by  the  Nationals,  633. 

Eddy,  Col.,  mortally  wounded  at  luka,  161. 

Edentown,  N.  C.,  taken  possession  of  by  Lieut.  A. 
Maury.  130. 

Egan,  Col.,  at  the  battle  of  Chantilly,  303. 

Egypt,  Miss  , capture  of  by  Gen.  Grierson,  853. 

Elizabeth  City,  N.  C.,  description  of — expedition  of 
Commander  Rowan  against,  129. 

Elk  Horn,  Confederate  name  for  battle  of  Pea  ridge,  97. 

Ellet,  Jr.,  Col.  C.,  ram  squadron  of,  joins  flotilla  of 
Davis,  144  ; operations  of,  before  Memphis,  145. 

Ellet,  Gen.  A.,  in  command  of  marine  brigade,  in  th€ 
Red  river  expedition,  623. 

Elliott,  Capt.  S.,  in  command  of  Fort  Beauregard,  73. 

Emancipation  proclamation  issued  by  President  Lin- 
coln, 391  ; diversity  of  opinion  regarding,  392. 

Emory,  Gen,,  division  of,  at  Berwick,  La.,  437  ; at  the 
battle  of  Sabine  cross  roads,  629  ; at  the  battle  of 
Pleasant  hill,  630  ; at  Washington,  786. 

Ericsson,  Capt  John,  biographical  sketch  of,  205. 

Evans,  Col.,  holds  the  Stone  bridge  at  Bull  Run,  40  ; 
Confederate  force  under,  on  Goose  creek,  53. 

Ewell,  Gen.  R.  S.,  at  Bull  Run,  43;  pursues  Gen. 
Banks  to  Strasburg,  246  ; at  the  battle  of  (Toss 
keys,  251  ; defeated  by  Gen.  Hooker  near  Bristow 
station,  291  ; at  the  battle  of  Warrenton  turnpike, 
293  ; at  the  battle  of  Fredericksburg,  347  ; at  the 
battle  of  Gettysburg,  504  ; at  the  battle  of  the  W il 


INDEX 


9G1 


derness,  664  ; captured  at  the  battle  of  Sailor’s 
creek,  927. 

Ewing,  Gen.  II.  S.,  liis  defense  of  Pilot  Knob,  830. 

Explosion,  of  the  Petersburg  mine,  754  ; of  ordnance 
stores  at  City  point,  756  ; of  the  principal  magazine 
at  Fort  Fislier,  867  ; at  Charleston,  887. 

F. 

Fagan,  Gen.,  defeat  of,  at  Independence,  Mo..  833. 

Fair  Oaks,  Va.  battle  of,  230-341 

Falmouth,  Va.,  station  and  bridges  at,  destroyed  by 
fire,  801  ; description  of,  339  ; pontoons  at,  340. 

Fanny,  steam-tug,  captured  by  Confederates,  66. 

Farnsworth,  Col.,  killed  at  Gettysburg,  528. 

Farragut,  Admiral  D.  G.,  biographical  sketch  of,  146  ; 
in  command  of  the  western  gulf  squadron,  147  ; 
fleet  of,  attacks  the  Mississippi  forts.  151  ; oMicial 
report  of,  of  his  operations  at  New  Orleans,  155  ; 
operations  of,  against  Vicksburg,  371  ; attack  of, 
on  the  Arkansas  ram — bombardment  of  Donaldson- 
Tille  by,  430  ; sends  a naval  force  to  Sabine  pass. 
593  ; fleet  of,  at  Mobile,  614  ; reconnoissance  of 
Forts  Morgan  and  Gaines  made  by,  641  ; operations 
of,  against  the  Mobile  bay  forts,  644. 

Farrand,  Commander,  surrenders  the  Confederate 
navy  to  Admiral  Thatcher,  947. 

Faulkner,  Col.,  surrender  of  Union  city  to,  616. 

Faxon,  Major,  killed  at  the  capture  of  Marye’s  hill,  475. 

Fayetteville,  Mo.,  Confederates  driven  from  833. 

Fayetteville,  N.  C.,  destruction  effected  at,  by  Sher- 
man’s forces,  889. 

Fernandina,  Fla.,  surrender  of,  to  Dupont,  141. 

Ferrero,  Gen.,  his  defense  of  Knoxville,  576;  at  the 
battle  of  Bean  station,  597. 

Fessenden,  Col  , wounded  at  Cane  river,  635. 

Fessenden,  Senator,  action  of.  prior  to  the  war,  13. 

Finnegan,  Gen.,  defeats  Seymour  at  Olustee,  856,  857. 

Fishers  Hill,  Va.,  battle  of,  796. 

Fitch,  Lieut.,  operations  of,  on  the  Cumberland,  537. 

Five  Forks,  Va.,  battle  of,  916. 

Flag,  of  the  Union,  floating  in  Arkansas,  97  ; United 
States,  hoisted  at  Memphis,  146  ; hoisted  at  New 
Orleans,  156  ; the  old,  restored  to  Fort  Sumter,  887. 

Florida,  Confederate  cruiser,  operations  of  the,  876. 

Floyd,  J.  B.,  strange  conduct  of,  while  secretary  of 
war,  12 ; implication  of,  in  the  Indian  trust  fund 
defalcation,  19  ; (Gen.)  assumes  command  of  the 
Confederate  forces,  51  ; outnumbered  at  Carnifex 
ferry,  52  ; at  Fort  Donelson,  85  ; flight  of,  93. 

Foote,  Admiral  A.  H.,  leaves  Cairo,  83  ; capture  of 
Fort  Henry  by,  84  ; moves  up  the  Cumberland,  86  ; 
at  Fort  Donelson.  88  ; fleet  of,  returns  to  Cairo,  89  ; 
expedition  of,  to  Fort  Pillow,  143  ; retires  from 
Fort  Pillow,  144. 

Ford,  CM.  T.  H.,  in  command  of  forces  on  Maryland 
heights,  313  ; retires  to  Harper’s  ferry— dismissed 
from  the  service,  314 


Forrest,  Gen.  N.  B.,  cava'ry  of,  at  Fort  Donelson,  90  ; 
raids  by,  in  Kentucky  and  Tennessee.  170  ; plunder- 
ing expeditions  of,  188  ; raid  by,  on  Davis’  mills, 
374  ; operations  of,  538  ; exploit  of,  540 ; at  the 
battle  of  Chick amauga,  550  ; in  command  of  the 
cavalry  of  North  Mississippi,  611  ; his  attack  on 
Gen.  W.  S.  Smith,  613  ; his  capture  of  Fort  Pillow, 
618  ; defeats  Gen  Sturgis,  at  Gum  town,  619  : his 
raid  upon  Memphis,  620  ; operations  of,  in  Middle 
Tennessee,  827,  828,  837,  838  ; routed  by  Gen.  Wil- 
son, near  Boyle’s  creek,  874. 

Forman,  Major,  affair  of,  with  Indians,  368. 

Fort  Alexander,  Va  , capture  of.  918. 

Fort  Anderson,  N.  C.,  siege  and  capture  of,  869. 

Fort  Blakely,  Mobile,  fall  of,  873. 

Fort  Barrancas,  Pensacola,  burned  and  abandoned  by 
the  Confederates,  141. 

Fort  Barton,  N.  C.,  bombardment  of,  by  Goldsborough, 
120  ; capture  of,  128.  * 

Fort  Beauregard,  S.  C.,  abandoned  by  the  Confeder- 
ates and  the  National  flag  raised  over,  74. 

Fort  Caswell,  N.  C. , blown  up  by  the  Confederates,  867. 

Fort  Clark,  N.  C.,  abandoned,  64. 

Fort  Clinch,  Fla.,  surrender  of,  141. 

Fort  Darling,  Va. , battle  of,  689. 

Fort  de  Russy,  La.,  in  possession  of  the  Confederates, 
597  ; capture  of.  by  Gen.  A.  J.  Smith,  624. 

Fort  Donelson,  Tenn.,  description  of,  85  ; operations 
against,  88  ; surrender  of,  94 

Fort  Esperanza,  Tex  , taken  by  Gen.  Washburne,  601. 

Fort  Fisher,  N.  C.,  unsuccessful  expedition  of  Gens. 
Butler  and  Weitzel  and  Admiral  Porter  against, 
861-863  ; capture  of,  by  Gen,  Terry  and  Admiral 
Porter,  864-867. 

Fort  Forrest,  N.  C.,  (Tirlew  steamer  beached  and 
blown  up  at,  136,  128. 

Fort  Gaines,  Ala.,  surrender  of.  by  Col.  Anderson.  648. 

Fort  Gilmer,  Va  , repulse  of  colored  brigade  at,  770, 

Fort  Gregg,  S.  C.,  abandoned  by  the  (’onfederates,  593. 

Fort  Gregg,  Va.,  assault  and  capture  of,  918. 

Fort  Hatteras,  N C. , surrender  of,  65. 

Fort  Heiman,  on  the  Tennessee  river,  steamboats  cap- 
tured  at,  by  Forrest,  837. 

Fort  Henry,  Tenn.,  in  charge  of  Gen.  Tilghman,  83  ; 
capture  of,  84. 

Fort  Hindman,  Ark.,  commanded  by  Gen,  T.  J.  Church- 
hill — surrender  of,  to  Admiral  Porter,  388, 

Fort  Huger,  Ala.,  abandoned  by  the  Confederates,  871. 

Fort  Jackson  and  Fort  St.  Philip,  La.  description  of, 
149,  surrender  of,  to  Capt.  Porter,  15). 

Fort  McAllister,  Ga.,  unsuccessful  attacks  on,  583, 
583  ; capture  of  by  Gen.,  Hazen.  822. 

Fort'  Macon,  N.  C.,  description  of,  135  ; capture  of,  137. 

Fort  McRae,  Pensacola,  silenced,  68 ; burned  and 
abandoned  by  the  Confederates,  141. 

Fort  McRae,  Va.,  capture  of,  772. 

Fort  Magruder,  Va.,  occupied  by  the  Nationals,  221. 


962 


INDEX. 


Fort  Marion,  Fla. , surrender  of,  to  commander  C.  R. 
P.  Rodgers,  141. 

Fort  Morgan,  N.  C.,  destroyed,  66. 

Fort  Morgan,  Ala.,  surrender  of,  to  the  Nationals,  649. 

Fort  Moultrie,  S.  C.,  abandoned  by  Major  Ander- 
son, 16. 

Fort  Ocracoke,  N.  C. , destroyed,  66. 

Fort  Pemberton.  Miss.,  unsuccessful  attack  on,  397. 

Fort  Pickens,  in  charge  of  Col.  Harvey  Brown,  08. 

Fort  Pillow,  Tenn. , abandoned  by  the  Confederates, 
114  ; again  deserted  by  the  Confederates,  144;  de- 
scription of,  617  ; capture  of,  by  assault  and  mas- 
sacre of  the  garrison  by  Gen.  Forrest,  618. 

Fort  Powell,  Ala.,  abandoned  and  blown  up.  647. 

Fort  Powell,  Miss , captured  by  the  Confederates, 
165  ; retaken  by  the  Nationals,  166. 

Fort  Pulaski,  Ga.,  in  the  hands  of  the  Confederates, 
76  ; capture  of,  140. 

Fort  RandoljMi,  Tenn.,  surrender  of,  145.  ' 

Fort  Richardson,  Miss.,  constructed  by  sappers  and 
miners  at  the  battle  of  Corinth,  164, 

Fort  Robinett,  Miss.,  Van  Dorn  under  fire  from  the 
guns  of,  at  the  battle  of  Corinth,  166. 

Fort  St.  Philip,  La.,  see  Fort  Jackson. 

Fort  St,  Philip,  N.  C.,  abandoned,  869. 

Fort  Sanders,  Tenn  , attacked  by  the  Confederates, 
576  ; death  of  Gen.  W.  P.  Sanders  at  {note),  578. 

Fort  Sedgwick,  Va.,  operations  in  the  neighborhood 
of,  779. 

Fort  Steadman,  Petersburg,  capture  and  recapture  of, 
907. 

Fort  Strong.  Ala.,  deserted  by  the  Confederates,  869 

Fort  Sumter,  description  of — occupied  by  Major  An- 
derson, 12  ; Gen.  Beauregard’s  demand  for  the  sur- 
render of,  26  ; surrendered,  31  ; a shapeless  mass 
of  ruins,  591  ; abortive  attempt  of  the  Nationals  to 
take  possession  of,  592. 

Fort  Thompson,  N.  C.,  attack  of  Gen.  Foster  on,  132  ; 
Confederates  driven  from,  134. 

Fort  Tracy,  Ala.,  abandoned  by  the  Confederates.  871. 

Fort  Wagner,  S.  C.,  operations  of  Gen.  Gillmore 
against,  589  ; bombardment  of,  by  Admiral  Dahl- 
gren,  590  ; evacuation  of,  by  the  Confederates,  592. 

Fort  Walker,  S.  C.,  abandoned,  74. 

Fort  Warren,  N.  C.,  captured  by  Gen.  Hoke  858. 

Fort  Wessels,  N.  C.,  captured  by  Gen  Hoke,  859. 

Fort  William,  Miss.,  Van  Dorn  under  fire  from  the 
guns  of,  at  the  battle  of  Corinth,  166. 

Fortress  Monroe,  headquarters  of  Gen.  Butler,  35  ; 
armaments  sent  to,  194. 

Foster,  Gen.  J.  G.,  part  taken  by,  in  capture  of  Roa- 
noke, 126  ; at  New  Berne,  132  ; appointed  military 
governor  of  New  Berne,  135  ; operations  of,  594  ; 
division  of,  at  Deep  Bottom,  742  ; his  movement 
against  the  Charleston  and  Savannah  railroad.  820  ; 
city  and  forts  of  Savannah  transferred  to.  by  Gen. 
Sherman,  881. 


Foster,  Major,  defeat  of,  Ijy  Coffee  and  Hughes  ai 
Lone  Jack,  Mo.'  359 

Fouke,  Col. . at  the  battle  of  Belmont  60. 

Fox,  Gustavus  G.,  plan  of,  to  relieve  Fort  Sumter,  26. 

Franklin,  Gen.  W.  B , at  Bull  Run,  43  ; operations  on 
the  York  river,  226  ; at  the  battle  of  White  Oak 
Swamp,  265  ; at  Crampton’s  gap,  316  ; at  the  battle 
of  Antietam,  322  ; at  the  battle  of  Fredericksburg, 
345  ; relieved  of  his  command,  354  ; at  Sabine  pass, 
598;  ordered^  to  Opelousas  599;  expedition  to 
Shreveport  in  charge  of,  623  ; at  the  battle  of 
Sabine  cross  roads,  628. 

Franklin,  Tenn.,  Gen.  Schofield  at,  840  ; battle  of, 
842  ; losses  at,  842. 

Frazier,  Gen.,  surrender  of  (’umberland  gap  by,  545. 

Frederick,  Md.,  Gen.  Lee’s  army  encamped  near,  308  ; 
('onfederates  driven  from,  785 

Fredericksburg,  Va.,  evacuation  of,  by  Gen.  Burnside, 
301  ; absence  of  pontoons  prevents  the  capture  of, 
339  ; demand  by  Summer  for  the  surrender  of,  340  ; 
bombardment  of,  by  order  of  Gen.  Burnside — de- 
scription of.  342  ; battle  of,  343-351. 

Fremont,  Gen.  John  C. , appointed  to  the  command  of 
the  Western  department,  55  ; relieved  of  his  com- 
mand, 56  ; in  command  of  the  Mountain  depart- 
ment, 193  ; advance  of,  attacked  by  Gen.  Jackson, 
251  ; relieved  of  his  command,  277. 

French,  Gen.,  at  the  battle  of  Fair  Oaks,  239;  at 
the  battle  of  Gaines’  mill.  260  ; at  Antietam,  324  ; 
at  the  battle  of  Fredericksburg,  348  ; at  the  battle 
of  t hancellorsville.  470 ; pursuit  of  Gen  Lee 
by,  532. 

French,  Gen.,  at  Black  water,  593  ; at  Brandon,  611  ; 
demands  the  surrender  of  Allatoona  pass,  806. 

Front  Royal,  movement  of  Gen.  Jackson  against,  248  ; 
engagement  near,  790. 

G. 

Gadsden,  Ala.,  army  of  Gen.  Hood  at,  809. 

Gaines’  Mill,  battle  of,  259-261. 

Gainesville,  (or  Groveton,)  battle  of  295  ; culpable 
absence  of  Gen.  Porter  from,  296. 

Galveston,  in  charge  of  Commodore  Renshaw',  432  ; 
recapture  of,  by  Gen.  Magruder,  432-434 

Gardiner,  ( ol.,  in  command  of  Charleston  harbor,  12. 

Gardner,  Gen.  F.  in  command  at  Port  Hudson,  441  : 
entreated  to  surrender  by  Gen.  Banks,  443  ; sur- 
render of  Port  Hudson  by,  440-447. 

Garesche,  Col  , killed  at  Murfreesboro,  186. 

Garnett,  Gen  , at  Laurel  hill,  49  ; killed  at  the  battle 
of  Carrack’s  ford,  50. 

Garnett,  Gen. , killed  at  the  battle  of  Gettysburg,  528. 

Gay,  < apt.,  operations  of,  near  Perry ville,  174. 

Gaylesville.  Ala.,  (ien.  Sherman’s  forces  at,  809. 

(Jeary,  Col.  J.  W. , skirmish  of,  at  Harper’s  ferry,  52  ; 
occupies  Harper’s  ferry,  242  ; (Gen.)  at  the  battle  of 
Gettysburg.  522  ; at  Wauhatchie,  560-566  ; at  the 


INDEX. 


963 


battle  of  Chattanooga,  568  ; appointed  military 
commander  of  Savannah,  825. 

Georgetown,  S.  C.,  evacuated  by  the  Confederates — 
taken  possession  of  by  Admiral  Dahlgren,  888. 

Georgia,  Confederate  cruiser,  captured  by  the  Na- 
tional frigate  Niagara,  off,  Lisbon,  876. 

Getty,  Gen., at  Suffolk,  594 ; wounded  at  the  battle  of 
the  Wilderness,  672. 

Gettysburg,  Pa.,  description  of,  501  ; battle  of  502-533. 

Gholson,  Gen.,  at  the  battle  of  Williamsburg,  217  ; 
killed  at  Egypt,  Miss.,  853. 

Gibbon,  Gen.,  at  the  battle  of  Warrenton  turnpike, 
293  ; at  the  battle  of  Fredericksburg,  345  ; at  the 
attack  on  Marye’s  hill,  473  ; at  the  battle  of  Gettys- 
burg, 525  ; wounded.  528. 

Gibson,  Gen.  R. , in  command  of  the  t^onfederates 
at  Spanish  fort,  Mobile,  870  ; evacuates  the 
fort,  871. 

Gilbert  Gen.,  at  the  battle  of  Perry ville,  174  ; at 
the  battle  of  Franklin,  538. 

Gillem,  Gen.,  surprise  and  capture  of  Morgan  at 
Greenville  by,  835  ; defeat  of,  by  Breckeuridge  836. 

Gill  more,  Gen.  Q.  A.,  services  of,  at  the  siege  of  Fort 
Pulaski,  138,  139  ; his.  defeat  of  Pegram.  544  ; su- 
persedes Gen.  Hunter  at  Charleston  588  ; opera- 
tions of,  against  the  defenses  of  Charleston,  589  ; 
opens  fire  on  Charleston,  591  ; secures  the  blockade 
of  Charleston,  592  ; at  Bermuda  hundred,  687  ; his 
movements  against  Petersburg,  736  ; authorized  to 
undertake  operations  in  Florida,  855  ; operations 
of,  against  Charleston,  886  ; surrender  of  the  city 
of  Charleston,  with  all  the  harbor  forts  to,  887. 

Gilmore,  Lieut.,  raid  of.  into  Maryland,  786. 

Gilpin,  Col.  C , drives  the  Confederates  from  Freder- 
ick, Md.,  785. 

Gist.  Gen.,  at  the  battle  of  Chickamauga,  550. 

Gladden,  Gen.,  killed  at  the  battle  of  Shiloh,  108. 

Glendale,  or  Frazier’s  Farm,  battle  of,  265. 

Goldsboro,  N.  C..  junction  of  Schofield’s  and  Sherman’s 
forces  at,  894. 

Goldsborough,  flag  officer,  biographical  sketch  of — 
intrusted  with  the  expedition  to  Pamlico  sound, 
123  ; operations  of,  at  Sewall’s  point.  228. 

Gooding,  Col.,  at  the  battle  of  Perry  ville,  177. 

Gordon’s  Landing,  operations  of  Farragut  at,  439. 

Gorman,  Gen. , expedition  of,  on  the  White  river,  389. 

Graham,  Gen.,  at  the  battle  of  Gettysburg,  511. 

(rrand  Coteau.  La.,  battle  of,  599. 

Grand  Gulf,  Miss  , operations  of  Gen.  Grant  at,  403  ; 
telegram  of  Gen.  Grant  to  Gen  Halleck  from,  407  ; 
batteries  at,  engaged  by  Farragut,  439. 

Granger,  Gen.  G.,  at  Corinth,  119;  operations  of, 
538,  543  ; at  the  battle  of  Chickamauga,  556  ; re- 
luctance of,  to  relieve  Burnside,  577  ; at  Mobile 
harbor,  642  ; surrender  of  Forts  Gaines  and  Morgan 
to,  648,  649  ; his  pursuit  of  Buford,  828  ; corps  of, 
at  the  final  operations  against  Mobile,  870. 


Grant,  Gen.  U.  S.,  in  command  at  Cairo — takes  pos- 
session of  Paducah,  and  attacks  Belmont,  59  ; pre- 
pares to  attack  Fort  Henry,  83  ; marches  on  Fort 
Donelson,  88  ; surrender  of  Fort  Donelson  to,  94  ; 
in  command  of  the  district  of  West  Tennessee,  98  ; 
removed  from  his  commani.  99  ; in  command  at 
Savannah,  Tenn.,  101;  at  Shiloh,  105;  becomes 
commander-in-chief  in  the  west,  159  ; Jackson, 
Tenn.,  headquarters  of,  379  ; at  La  Grange,  371  ; 
meeting  of.  and  Sherman  at  Columbus — head- 
quarters of,  at  Oxford.  Miss..  372  ; La  Grange  re- 
entered by,  374  ; operations  of,  preparatory  to 
attack  on  Vicksburg,  394-491  ; at  the  battle  of 
Champion  hills,  410  ; assault  ordered  by,  on  Vicks- 
burg, 415  ; another  assault  made  by,  417  ; report 
of,  419  ; siege  of  Vicksburg  determined  upon  by, 
420  ; surrender  of  Vicksburg  to.  424-426  ; {note) 
426  ; appointed  to  the  command  of  the  new  military 
division  of  the  Mississippi,  558  ; at  Chattanooga, 
559  ; at  the  battle  of  Chattanooga,  568  ; despatch 
of,  574  ; visit  of,  to  Gen  Banks.  597  ; appointed 
lieutenant-general  651  ; takes  command  of  the 
army  of  the  Potomac,  652  ; command  of  the  armies 
of  the  United  States  assumed  by,  653  ; staff  of, 
659  ; operations  of,  in  Virginia,  669-705  ; operations 
of,  against  Petersburg,  735-781  ; his  final  operations 
against  Petersburg  and  Richmond,  898-921  ; his 
pursuit  of  Gen.  Lee  till  the  surrender  at  xlppomat- 
tox  court  house,  922-934 , his  correspondence  with 
Lee,  relative  to  terms  of  surrender  930,  931,  933, 
934  ; his  losses  during  the  campaign,  935  ; order  of, 
on  the  disbandment  of  the  army.  951,  952. 

Gravelly  Run,  Va.,  battle  of,  913. 

Graves,  Major,  mortally  wounded  at  the  battle  of 
Chickamauga,  554. 

Green,  Gen.  T. . depredations  of,  598;  at  Wilson’s 
farm,  627  ; killed  at  Pleasant  hill  landin.g.  632 . 

Greene,  Gen.  at  the  battle  of  Gettysburg,  519. 

Gregg,  Gen.,  at  Port  Reyal  ferry,  76  ; mortally 
wounded  at  the  battle  of  Fredericksburg,  346. 

Gregg,  Col. , cavalry  exploits  of  483  ; engagement  of, 
with  Gen,  Stuart,  490  ; at  the  battle  of  Gettys- 
burg, 528  ; (Gen.)  wounded  at  the  battle  of  the 
Wilderness,  672;  at  the  battle  of  Trevillian,  703; 
his  raid  to  Stony  creek  station,  779. 

Gregg.  Gen.,  at  the  battle  of  Raymond,  Miss,  407. 

Gregory,  acting-master,  gallant  fight  of,  with  a Con- 
federate gun-boat,  144. 

Grierson,  Gen.  B.  H. , cavalry  exploit  of,  401  ; opera- 
tions of,  near  Port  Hudson,  438  ; at  Memphis,  612  ; 
at  Gum  town,  619  ; his  expedition  from  Memphis 
against  the  Mobile  and  Ohio  Railroad  852. 

Gritfin,  Gen.,  reconnoissance  of,  after  the  battle  of 
Antietam,  331  ; at  the  battle  of  Chancellorsville, 
455  ; at  the  battle  of  Jericho  ford.  694. 

Griffiths,  Serg.  T.,  daring  action  of,  at  Vicksburg,  417. 

Griswoldville,Ga.,  battle  of,  815. 


964 


INDEX. 


Grover,  Gen.,  at  the  battle  of  Williamsburg,  215; 
brigade  of,  at  the  battle  of  Gainesville,  29G  ; divi- 
sion of,  moves  up  the  Atchafalaya,  437  ; at  the  at- 
tack on  Port  Hudson,  441,  443,  444. 

Groveton,  Va,,  or  Gainesville,  battle  of,  295. 

Guerrilla  warfare,  in  Missouri,  358  ; in  Arkansas, 
359  ; in  Texas,  366. 

Guitar,  Col.,  defeats  Poindexter,  the  guerrilla,  358. 

Gum  Town,  defeat  of  Gen.  Sturgis  by  Forrest  at,  620. 

H. 

Hackelman,  Gen.,  killed  at  Corinth,  Miss.,  164. 

Hagerstown.  Md.,  stores  in,  plundered  by  Early,  784. 

Haines’  Bluff,  abandoned  by  the  Confederates,  414. 

Halleck,  Gen.  H.  W.,  takes  charge  of  the  western  de- 
partment, 56  ; in  Missouri  80  ; plan  of,  to  attack 
the  Confederates,  83  ; takes  command  of  the  army 
ocf  the  Tennessee  116  ; advance  of,  to  Corinth,  119  ; 
in  command  of  the  troops  in  the  valley  of  the  Mis- 
sissippi, 193  ; general-in-chief  of*  the  entire  army 
of  the  United  States,  273  ; appointed  chief  of  staff 
at  Washington,  653. 

Hamilton,  Gen.,  division  of,  at  the  battle  of  luka, 
161  ; at  the  battle  of  Corinth,  163. 

Hampton,  Col.  Wade,  at  the  battle  of  Bull  Run,  42  ; 
(Geti.)  at  the  battle  of  Gettysburg,  528  ; at  Hawe’s 
store  697  ; cattle  carried  off  by,  from  Sycamore 
church,  769  ; compels  Gen.  Warren  to  withdraw 
from  Hicksford,  781  ; orders  all  the  cotton  in  Colum- 
bia, S.  C.,  to  be  burned,  885  ; his  refusal  to  abide 
by  the  terms  of  .capitulation  of  Gen.  Johnston,  947. 

Hampton  Roads,  land  and  naval  armament  in,  70  ; 
fleet  in,  proceeds  to  sea,  71  ; expedition  of  Burnside 
and  Goldsborough  leaves,  124  ; naval  engagement 
between  the  Merrimac  and  the  Monitor  in,  207-211. 

Hancock,  Gen.  W.  S.,  at  the  battle  of  Williamsburg, 
218  ; biographical  sketch  of  {note),  221  ; at  the  bat- 
tle of  Savage’s  station,  263  ; at  the  battle  of  Fred- 
ericksburg, 348  : at  the  battle  of  Chancellorsville, 
469  ; at  the  battle  of  Gettysburg,  506  ; wounded, 
528  ; takes  command  of  the  Second  army  corps,  658  ; 
wounded  at  the  Wilderness,  672  ; placed  tempo- 
rarily in  charge  of  the  Middle  military  division,  903. 

Hanover  Court  House,  battle  of,  231. 

Hardee,  Gen.,  at  the  battle  of  Shiloh,  105  ; at  Chatta 
nooga,  171  ; at  the  battle  of  Murfreesboro,  183  ; at 
the  battle  of  Chattanooga,  568  ; at  the  battle  of 
Resaca,  Ga.,  709  ; at  the  battle  of  Jonesboro,  732  ; 
his  evacuation  of  Savannah,  823  ; his  evacuation  of 
Charleston,  886  : defeated  at  Averysboro,  891. 

Hardie,  Gen. , at  the  battle  of  Fredericksburg,  344. 

Harding,  Col.  A.,  his  defense  of  Fort  Donelson,  537. 

Harker,  Gen.,  killed  at  Kenesaw  mountain,  715. 

Harper’s  Ferry,  Va.,  seized  by  the  Richmond  authori- 
ties, 48  ; Johnston  evacuates,  49  ; description  of, 
813 ; siege  and  surrender  of,  314 ; Col.  Miles  mor- 
tallv  wounded  at  the  sieere  of,  314  ; fatal  effect  of 


the  surrender  of.  314,  315  ; stores  at,  in  the  posses 
sion  of  the  Confederates,  316  ; Confederates  leave, 
317  ; recapture  of,  by  the  Nationals.  332. 

Harriet  Lane,  steamer,  sent  to  the  relief  of  Fort  Sum- 
ter, 26  ; capture  of,  at  Galveston  433.- 

Harris,  Col.  I.  A.,  at  the  battle  of  Perryville,  177. 

Harrisburg,  Pa.,  excitement  at.  492. 

Harrison,  Col.,  defeats  Cabell,  at  Fayetteville.  603. 

Harrison.  Col.,  cavalry  operations  of.  against  Porter’s 
fleet,  descending  the  Red  river,  632 

Harrow,  Gen.,  at  ihe  battle  of  Gettysburg,  527. 

Hartsiift*  Gen.,  wounded  at  Antictam,  320, 

Haskell,  Col. , killed  at  Cold  harbor,  701 . 

Hatch,  G^i.  John  P.,  expedition  of,  against  the 
Charleston  and  Savannah  railroad,  829. 

Hatcher’s  Run,  battle  of,  777  ; second  battle  of,  903. 

Hatchie,  battle  of  the,  167. 

Hatteras,  expedition  of  Butler  and  Stringham  to,  63. 

Hawkins  Col.,  left  in  charge  at  Hatteras,  65. 

Hawkins,  Col.,  surrender  of  Union  city,  Tenn,  by,  616. 

Hawley,  Col.,  at  the  battle  of  Olustee,  Fla.,  857. 

Hay,  Major  John,  with  the  expedition  to  Florida,  856. 

Haycock,  Major,  killed  at  Marye’s  hill,  475. 

Hayes*  brigade,  at  the  Weldon  railroad,  763. 

Hayne,  Col. , in  the  attack  on  Fort  Donelson,  86. 

Hays,  Gen.  Alex,,  at  Gettysburg,  519  ; killed  at  tlie 
battle  of  the  Wilderness  {note),  666. 

Hazard,  Capt.,  at  the  battle  of  Fair  Oaks,  239  ; mor- 
tally wounded  at  White  Oak  swamp,  265. 

Hazard,  Commander  S.  G.,  with  expedition  of  Bum- 
side  and  Goldsboro,  123. 

Hazard,  Gen. , repulse  of,  by  Gen.  Terry.  590. 

Hazel  Grove.  Va.,  abandoned  by  Gen.  Hooker,  467. 

Hazen,  Col.,  brigade  of,  at  the  battle  of  Shiloh,  110  ; 
at  the  battle  of  Murfreesboro,  185  ; at  the  battle  of 
Chickamauga,  550  ; (Gen.)  at  Wauhatchie,  559  ; at 
Chattanooga,  572  ; captures  Fort  McAllister,  822. 

Hazlitt,  Capt.,  killed  at  Gettysburg,  513. 

Heckman,  Gen.,  made  prisoner  at  Bermuda  hundred, 
689. 

Heintzelman,  Gen.,  at  Bull  Run,  39  ; in  command  of 
a corps  in  the  army  of  the  Potomac,  193  ; at  the 
battle  of  Williamsburg,  214  ; bands  ordered  by,  to 
strike  up  national  and  martial  airs  {note),  221  ; at 
the  battle  of  Fair  Oaks,  236  ; at  the  battle  of  Sav- 
age’s station,  263  ; at  the  battle  of  Glendale,  265  ; 
at  the  battle  of  Gainesville,  295. 

Helena,  Ark  , attack  on,  by  Price  and  Marmaduke.  605. 

Henry,  Col.,  repulse  by.  of  Hoke’s  brigade,  before 
Petersburg,  745  ; at  the  battle  of  Olustee,  857. 

Herbert,  Gen.  L.,  at  the  battle  of  Corinth,  184. 

Herron,  Gen.  F.  I.,  at  the  battle  of  Prairie  grove,  362 
operations  of,  598  ; operations  of  {note),  607. 

Heth,  Gen.,  at  Gettysburg,  525  ; at  the  battle  of  the 
Wilderness,  666  ; at  the  battle  of  Jericho  ford,  994 

Hickman,  Ky. , seized  by  Gen.  Polk,  58. 

Hickman,  Miss.,  capture  of,  by  the  Confederates,  616 


INDEX. 


965 


Hicks,  Col.  S.  G.,  affair  of.  at  Fort  Anderson,  616. 

Hicksford,  Va.,  Gen.  Warren  withdraws  from,  781. 

Higgins,  Col  , in  command  of  Forts  Jackson  and  St. 
Philip,  148  ; surrenders  to  Porter,  155. 

Higginson,  Col.,  at  Edisto,  S.  C.,  589. 

Highlanders,  79th  N.  T.,  at  Bull  Run,  44;  at  Port 
Royal,  76  ; at  Chantilly,  308  ; at  Knoxville  {note),  578. 

Hildebrand’s  brigade,  at  the  battle  of  Shiloh,  106. 

Hill.  Gen.  A.  P..  at  the  battle  of  Mechanicsville,  258  ; 
at  the  battle  of  Gaines’  mill.  259  ; at  the  battle  of 
Glendale,  265  ; at  the  battle  of  Gainesville,  296  ; at 
the  battle  of  Antietam,  327 ; at  the  battle  of 
Fredericksburg,  343  ; wounded  at  battle  of  Chan- 
cellorsville,  464 ; at  battle  of  Gettysburg,  503 ; at 
battle  of  the  Wilderness,  666  ; killed  at  the  final 
assault  on  the  lines  before  Petersburg  {note),  919. 

Hill,  Gen.  D.  H.,  at  the  battle  of  Williamsburg,  219  ; 
at  the  battle  of  Fair  Oaks,  234 ; at  the  battle  of 
Gaines’  mill,  260  ; at  battle  of  Malvern  hills,  268  ; 
at  battle  of  Antietam,  318  ; ordered  to  attack  Little 
Washington,  594. 

Hilton  Head,  S.  C.,  Gen.  Thos.  W.  Sherman  makes 
improvements  at,  75  ; Gen.  W.  T.  Sherman  at,  882. 

Hindman,  Gen.,  killed  at  the  battle  of  Shiloh,  108. 

Hindman,  Gen.  T.  C.,  guerrillas  commanded  by,  359  ; 
at  the  battle  of  Prairie  grove,  363  ; retreat  of,  366. 

llinks,  Gen.,  division  of,  at  City  point,  Va.,  686 

Hobson,  Gen.,  his  pursuit  of  Gen.  Morgan,  595  ; his 
entire  command  captured  by  Morgan,  783. 

Holland,  Gen.,  at  battle  of  Springfield,  Mo.,  602. 

Hollins,  Capt.,  boast  of,  68  ; at  Fort  Pillow,  143. 

Holmes,  Gen.,  at  Bull  Run,  43. 

Hood,  Gen.  J.  B. . at  the  battle  of  Fredericksburg, 
343  ; at  the  battle  of  Gettysburg,  511  ; at  the  battle 
of  Chickamauga,  649  ; at  the  battle  of  Resaca , 709  ; 
supersedes  Johnston  on  Sherman’s  approach  to 
Atlanta,  719 ; evacuates  Atlanta,  732 ; protests 
against  Sherman’s  order  for  the  removal  of  civilians 
from  Atlanta,  734  ; reorganizes  his  forces  at  Jones- 
boro, 804  ; moves  westward  on  Sherman’s  commun- 
ications, 805  ; retreats  into  Northern  Alabama,  808; 
his  disastrous  campaign  against  Thomas,  837-851  ; 
his  total  defeat  at  Nashville,  843-847  ; pursued  by 
Wilson’s  cavalry  to  the  Tennessee  river,  847-849  ; 
pursued  by  Col.  Palmer,  849  ; his  losses  in  the  Ten- 
nessee campaign,  850;  relieved  of  his  command,  851. 

Hoke,  Gen.,  at  the  battle  of  Gettysburg,  519  ; attempts 
to  regain  possession  of  Cold  harbor,  698 ; his 
attack  upon  Forts  Warren  and  Wessels,  858  ; his 
siege  of  Plymouth,  N.  C.,  858  ; captures  Ply- 
mouth— abandons  the  siege  of  New  Berne,  859  ; 
attempts  to  relieve  Fort  Fisher,  867  ; evacuates 
Wilmington,  869. 

Hooker,  Gen.  Jos.,  at  the  battle  of  Williamsburg, 
214 ; vain  appeal  of,  to  Gen.  Sumner  for  help,  217  ; 
biographical  sketch  of  {note),  ^20  ; division  of,  sus- 
tains severe  loss,  221  ; at  the  battle  of  Fair  Oaks, 


239  ; at  the  battle  of  Glendale,  266  ; defeats  Ewell 
near  Bristow  station,  291 ; at  the  battle  of  Gaines- 
ville, 295  ; wounded  at  the  battle  of  Antietam,  321 ; 
at  the  battle  of  Fredericksburg,  344-349  ; grand 
charge  of,  350 ; assumes  command  of  the  army  of 
the  Potomac,  354  ; past  career  and  personal  appear- 
ance of,  449,  450  ; address  of,  to  the  army  of  the 
Potomac,  451  ; army  of,  takes  position  at  Chancel 
lorsville,  454  ; boast  of  {note),  455  ; fatal  blunder 
of,  456  ; struck  by  a cannon  ball,  470  ; retreats 
across  the  Rappahannock,  481  ; address  of,  to  the 
army  of  the  Potomac,  484  ; relieved  of  his  com- 
mand, 495  ; farewell  address  of,  to  the  army,  495, 
496  ; at  Nashville,  559  ; at  Wauhatchie,  559  ; at 
Lookout  mountain,  566,  567  ; at  the  battle  of  Chat- 
tanooga, 568  ; in  command  of  the  twentieth  corps 
under  Sherman,  706  ; resigns  his  command,  728. 

Houston,  Col  , at  the  battle  of  Prairie  grove,  365. 

Hovey,  Gen  A.  P , defeats  Gen.  Rust  on  the  White 
river,  356  ; at  Chickasaw  bayou.  381  ; w'ounded  at 
Arkansas  post,  387  ; at  Champion  hills,  410. 

Howe,  Gen.,  at  the  attack  on  Marye’s  hill,  473. 

Howard,  Gen.  0.  O , brigade  of,  at  the  battle  of  Bull 
Run.  43  ; at  the  battle  of  Fair  Oaks,  239  ; wounded 
at  Fair  Oaks,  240  ; at  the  battle  of  Fredericksburg, 
348  ; at  the  battle  of  Chancellorsville,  453  ; at  the 
battle  of  Gettysburg,  504;  at  Wauhatchie,  560; 
commands  the  fourth  corps  under  Sherman,  706  ; 
in  command  of  the  army  of  the  Tennessee,  727. 

Huger,  Gen.,  flight  of,  from  Norfolk,  Va,,  229;  at 
Fair  Oaks,  234^-239  ; at  White  Oak  swamp,  205. 

Hughes,  guerrilla  chief,  surprises  the  garrison  of  In- 
dependence, Mo.,  359. 

Humphrey,  Gen.  Andrew  A.,  at  the  battle  of  Chan- 
cellorsville, 455  ; at  the  battle  of  Gettysburg,  511. 

Hunter,  Gen  David,  succeeds  Gen.  T.  W.  Shetman. 
139  ; surrender  of  Fort  Pulaski  to,  140 ; at  James 
island,  580 ; superseded  by  Gen.  Mitchell,  581  ; 
resumes  command  of  the  department  of  the  South, 
582  ; ordered  to  attack  Charleston,  584  ; unable  tc 
assist  Dupont,  587  ; removed  from  command,  588 
defeats  Jones  and  McCausland  at  Piedmont,  092. 

Huntsville,  Mo.,  battle  of,  602 

Huntsville,  Tenn.,  threatened  by  Gen.  Buford,  828. 

Huntsville,  ram,  sunk  by  the  Confederates,  873, 

Hurlbut,  Gen.  Stephen  A.,  at  Pittsburg  landing,  101 
at  Corinth,  118  ; near  Pocahontas,  162  ; victory  of 
at  the  Hatchie,  161;  at  Memphis,  609 ; left  in 
charge  of  expedition,  at  Meridian,  614. 

I 

Imboden,  Gen.,  at  the  battle  of  Gettysburg,  531. 

Immel’s  battery,  at  the  battle  of  Corinth,  166. 

Independence,  Mo.,  captured  by  guerrillas,  359. 

Indian  Territory,  active  hostilities  in,  367. 

Ingalls,  Chief  Quarter  master,  at  Port  Royal,  S.C. , 684 

Ingraham,  flag-officer,  proclamation  of  584. 


966 


INDEX. 


Island  Ford,  Va.,  battle  of,  787. 

Island  No.  10,  in  charge  of  Polk,  82  ; surrender  of,  96. 
luka.  Miss.,  description  of,  159;  abandoned  by  the 
Nationals,  160  ; battle  of,  161. 

Iverson,  Gen.,  at  the  battle  of  Chancellorsville,  4G0. 


Jackson,  Gen.  J.  S.,  killed  at  Perryville,  Ky.,176. 

Jackson,  Gen.  T.  J.  (Stonewall),  at  Bull  Run,  42  ; 
operations  of,  in  the  valley  of  the  Shenandoah,  242- 
245  ; retreat  of,  before  the  forces  of  Fremont  and 
Shields,  249  ; biographical  sketch  of  {note),  253  ; at 
Hanover  court  house,  257  ; at  the  battle  of  Gaines’ 
mill,  260  ; at  the  battle  of  White  Oak  swamp,  265  ; 
retreat  of,  after  the  battle  of  Cedar  mountain,  287  ; 
at  the  battle  of  Antietam,  319  ; at  the  battle  of 
Fredericksburg.  340*  attack  of,  on  Gen.  Hooker  at 
Chancellorsville,  461  ; mortally  wounded,  463  ; re- 
marks on  the  character  of  {note),  464. 

Jackson,  Confederate  ram,  destruction  of,  874. 

Jackson,  Miss.,  capture  of,  by  Gen.  Grant’s  forces, 
409  ; evacuation  of,  by  Gen.  Johnston  {note),  427  ; 
precipitate  retreat  of  the  Confederates  from,  611. 

Jacksonville,  Fla.,  taken  possession  of  by  the  Na- 
tionals, 141  ; occupied  by  Gen.  Seymour,  856  ; stores 
at,  destroyed  by  Seymour,  858. 

James  Island,  occupied,  580  ; abandoned,  581. 

James  River,  Magruder’s  forces  on  the,  195  ; National 
gun  boats  on  the,  229  ; Butler  moves  up  the,  686  ; 
crossed  by  the  army  of  the  Potomac,  704. 

James  River  Canal,  damaged  by  Col.  Wyndham,  483; 
locks  and  banks  of,  destroyed  by  Sheridan,  905. 

Jameson,  Gen.,  at  the  battle  of  Williamsburg,  218. 

Jeffers,  Lieut  , operations  of,  at  the  mouth  of  the 
Chesapeake  and  Albemarle  canal,  130. 

Jenkins,  Gen.  A.  G.,  at  Chambersburg,  Pa.,  494; 
killed  at  the  battle  of  the  Wilderness,  672. 

Jenkins’  Ferry,  Ark.,  battle  of,  640. 

Jericho  Ford,  Va.,  battle  of,  694. 

Jettersville,  Gen.  Sheridan  at,  924. 

Johnson,  Andrew,  sworn  into  office  as  president,  940. 

Johnsonville,  Tenn.,  destruction  of  stores  at,  caused 
by  Forrest — arrival  of  Schofield  at,  838. 

Johnson,  Gen.  B.  T.,  encounters  Kilpatrick  at  Beaver 
dam  station,  656  ; his  raid  towards  Baltimore,  786. 

Johnson,  Gen  E.,  at  the  battle  of  Gettysburg,  519; 
captured  at  Spottsylvania,  681. 

Johnson.  Gen  R.  W , at  the  battle  of  Murfreesboro, 
180  ; operations  of,  542  ; at  the  battle  of  Chicka- 
mauga,  550  ; at  the  battle  of  Chattanooga,  572. 

Johnston,  Col.,  surrenders  the  fort  at  Dalton,  808. 

Johnston,  Gen.  A.  S.,  strong  position  held  by,  80  ; 
strength  of  his  army,  83  ; his  (letter  to  Jefferson 
Davis,  95  ; proclamation  of,  on  assuming  command 
of  the  Confederate  army,  103  ; killed  at  the  battle 
of  Shiloh,  108. 

Johnston,  Gen.  Jos.  E.,  in  the  valley  of  the  Shenan- 


doah, 35  ; in  command  at  Winchester,  36  ; deceives 
Patterson,  39  ; gains  the  battle  of  Bull  Run,  45  ; 
at  Harper’s  ferry,  48  ; evacuates  Harper’s  ferry,  49; 
Manassas  evacuated  by.  193  ; at  the  battle  of  Wil- 
liamsburg, 217  ; retreat  of,  222  ; at  the  battle  of 
Fair  Oaks,  234  ; instructions  of,  to  Pemberton, 
408  ; forces  of,  at  Dalton,  Ga, , 707 , evacuation  of 
Dalton  by,  709  ; retreat  of,  to  Resaca.  711  ; at  Alla- 
tooni  pass,  712  ; at  Kenesaw  mountain,  714 ; at 
the  Chattahoochee  river,  717  ; retires  to  Atlanta, 
718  ; removed  from  his  command.  719  ; defeat  of, 
by  Slocum  near  Bentonville— retreats  to  Smithfield, 
893  ; surrenders  his  army  to  Sherman,  947. 

Joinville,  PHnce  de  at  Williamsburg,  224. 

Jones,  Gen.  Sam.,  killed  in  the  Wilderness,  672. 

Jones,  Gen.  W.  E.,  killed  at  Piedmont,  692. 

Jonesboro,  Ga  , battle  of,  731. 

Jouett,  Capt.,  captures  the  Selma  in  Mobile  Bay,  645. 

Juda,  schooner,  burning  of  the,  at  Santa  Rosa,  67. 

Judah,  Gen.  his  pursuit  of  Gen.  Morgan,  595  ; at  the 
battle  of  Resaca,  Ga.,  710. 

K. 

Kautz,  Gen.  A.  V.,  operations  of,  against  the  Weldon 
railroad,  686  ; raid  of,  69 1 , movement  of,  against 
Petersburg,  737;  his  command  surprised  and  routed 
on  the  Charles  City  road.  773 

Kearney,  Gen.  Phil.,  at  the  battle  of  Williamsburg, 
214  ; at  the  battle  of  Fair  Oaks,  236  ; at  the  battle 
of  Glendale,  266  ; at  the  battle  of  Gainesville,  295  : 
killed  at  the  battle  of  Chantilly,  303  ; biographical 
sketch  of  {note),  305. 

Kearsarge,  corvette,  sinks  the  Alabama,  879. 

Kelly,  Gen.  B.  F.,  valor  of,  at  Philippi,  W.  Va,,  49  ; 
reoccupies  Martinsburg,  Va.,  788. 

Kemper,  Gen.,  at  Gettysburg,  525  ; wounded,  528. 

Kenesaw  Mountain,  situation  of,  713  ; battle  of,  715. 

Kenly,  Gen.  J.  R.,  defeat  of,  at  Front  Royal,  247  ; 
brigade  of,  panic  stricken  at  Berryville,  791. 

Kentucky,  coveted  by  the  Confederacy — legislature 
of,  refuses  to  call  a convention,  56  ; loyalty  of,  57. 

Keokuk,  iron  clad,  destruction  of  the.  587. 

Kernstown,  battle  of,  '-'43  ; skirmishing  at,  788. 

Kershaw,  Gen.,  defeat  of,  at  Strawberry  plains,  754. 

Keyes,  Gen.  E D.,  at  Bull  Run,  43  ; in  command  of 
a corps  in  the  army  of  the  Potomac,  193  ; at  the 
battle  of  Fair  Oaks,  236. 

Kilpatrick,  Gen.  Judson,  cavalry  exploits  of,  483  ; at 
the  battle  of  Gettysburg,  528  ; raid  of,  in  Virginia, 
656  ; wounded  at  Sugar  valley,  Ga.,  709  ; his  at- 
tempt on  West  Point  and  Macon  railroads,  729  ; 
defeats  Wheeler  at  Waynesboro,  818  ; skirmish  of, 
with  Wheeler  at  Aiken,  883  ; narrow  escape  of, 
from  Wade  Hampton,  at  Fayetteville,  889. 

King,  Gen.  Rufus,  joins  Pope  at  Culpepper,  284; 
at  Warrenton  turnpike,  293  ; at  Gainesville,  296. 

Kinston,  N.  C.,  battle  of,  894. 


INDEX 


9G7 


Kirksville,  Mo.,  battle  of,  358. 

Kleim,  Gen.,  at  the  battle  of  Williamsburg,  220. 

“ Knights  of  the  Golden  Circle,”  in  Missouri,  829. 

Knoxville,  Tenn.,  occupied  by  the  Nationals,  544 ; 
siege  of,  by  Longstreet,  575  ; siege  raised.  578. 

Kulp  House,  near  Marietta,  Ga.,  battle  of,  715. 

L. 

Lamb,  Col.,  captured  at  Fort  Fisher,  N.  C.,  867. 

Lamar,  G.  B.,  purchase  of  arms  by,  14. 

Lamar,  Col.  J.  G.,  in  command  at  Secession ville,  S.  C., 
580  ; his  repulse  of  Gen.  Benham,  581. 

Lancaster,  ram,  destroyed  at  Vicksburg,  439. 

Lander,  Gen.,  his  surprise  of  Jackson  at  Blooming 
gap— mortally  wounded  at  Balls’  bluff,  242 

Landrum’s  brigade  at  Sabine  cross  roads  627. 

Lanman’s  brigade  at  Fort  Donelson.  86;  at  Jackson.  427. 

Laurel  Hill,  Va.,  two  unsuccessful  attempts  on,  677. 

Lawler,  Gen.,  gallant  conduct  of,  at  the  Big  Black,  413. 

Lawton,  Gen.,  severely  wounded  at  Antietam,  320. 

Lee,  Gen.  A.  L. , in  the  expedition  to  Shreveport,  624; 
at  Wilson’s  farm,  627 ; at  Sabine  cross  roads,  628. 

Lee,  Admiral  S.  P.,  in  the  battle  below  New  Orleans, 
152 ; sends  gun-boats  up  the  Nansemond,  594 

Lee,  Gen.  Fitz  Hugh,  encounters  Gen.  Sheridan  at 
Hawe’s  store,  697  ; cavalry  of,  at  Deep  bottom,  760; 

Lee,  Gen.  R.  E.,  his  plan  of  campaign,  51  ; sent  to 
take  charge  of  the  coast  defenses  of  South  Carolina, 
52  ; pursuit  of  McClellan  by,  263  ; at  the  battle  of 
Glendale,  265  ; at  the  battle  of  Malvern  hills  268  ; 
report  of,  272  ; biographical  sketch  of  {note),  275  ; 
report  of  {note),  301  ; his  losses  in  Virginia.  304 ; 
his  proclamation  to  the  people  of  Maryland.  308 ; 
invades  Maryland — his  plan  discovered.  310  ; his 
losses  at  Antietam,  327 ; retreats  to  Virginia,  331  ; 
at  the  battle  of  Fredericksburg,  340  ; army  of,  near 
Fredericksburg,  452  ; plans  and  movements  of, 
457-459  ; congratulates  his  army,  485  ; address  of, 
to  his  army,  498  ; at  the  battle  of  Gettysburg,  508  ; 
retreat  of,  531 ; his  operations  in  Virginia,  661-705  ; 
operations  of,  in  defense  of  Petersburg,  735-781  ; 
retreats  after  the  fall  of  Petersburg,  922  ; his  cor- 
respondence with  Grant  relative  to  surrender,  930- 
934  ; bids  his  army  farewell,  935  ; his  losses,  935. 

Lee,  Gen.  S.  D.,  in  the  affair  at  Tuscumbia,  Ala.,  562. 

Lee,  Gen.  W.  H.  F.,  at  Rapidan  station,  Va.,  482; 
wounded  at  Brandy  station,  490. 

Lee,  Lieut. -Commander,  mortally  wounded,  on  board 
the  Harriet  Lane,  at  Galveston,  433. 

Lexington,  Mo.,  surrender  of,  56. 

Liddle,  Gen. , division  of,  at  Chickamauga,  550. 

Lidell,  Gen.  St.  J.,  captured  at  Blakely,  Ala,,  873. 

Life  of — 

Burnside,  Gen.  Ambrose  E.,  123. 

Craven,  Capt.  Tunis  A.  {note),  644. 

Dupont,  Commodore  Samuel  F.,  70. 

Goldsborough,  Capt.  Louis  M.,  123. 


Hancock,  Gen.  Winfield  S.  (note),  221. 

Hays,  Gen.  Alexander  {note),  666. 

Hill,  Gen.  Ambrose  P.  {note),  919. 

Hooker,  Gen.  Joseph  {note),  220. 

Jackson,  Gen.  Thomas  J.  (Stonewall),  {note)y  253 
Kearney,  Gen.  Philip  {note),  305. 

Lee,  (Jen.  Robert  E.  {note).  275. 

McPherson,  Gen  James  B.  {note),  725. 

Meade,  Gen.  George  G.,  496. 

Pope,  Gen.  John,  277. 

Read,  Gen  S.  T.  {note),  926. 

Reynolds,  Gen.  John  F.  {note),  535. 

Rice,  Gen.  James  C,  {7iote),  678. 

Sanders,  Gen.  William  P.  {note),  578. 

Sedgwick,  Gen.  John  ((note),  676. 

Sherman,  Gen.  Thomas  W.,  70. 

Shields,  Gen.  James  {note),  245. 

Smyth,  Gen.  Thomas  A.  {note),  929. 

Stringham,  Commodore  Silas  H.,  63. 

Stuart,  Gen.  James  E,  B.  {note),  685. 

Thomas,  Gen.  George  H.,  82. 

Wadsworth,  Gen  James  S.  {note),  669. 

Zollikoffer,  Gen.  Felix  K,,  81, 

Lincoln,  President  Abraham,  his  opinion  on  the  sit- 
uation, 24 ; calls  out  the  militia,  and  summons 
Congress,  33  ; calls  for  additional  troops,  46  ; mes- 
sage of,  to  Congress,  47  ; calls  for  troops  from 
Kentucky,  56  ; letter  of,  to  the  governor  of  Ken- 
tucky, 57  ; order  of,  for  forward  movement  of  land 
and  naval  forces,  80  ; proclamation  of,  announcing 
National  victories,  157  ; telegram  of,  to  Rosecrans, 
188  ; orders  the  army  to  move  towards  Manassas, 
193,  letter  of,  to  McClellan,  194  ; prophetic  words 
of,  200  ; visits  Fortress  Monroe.  228  ; visit  of,  to 
McClellan  at  Harrison’s  landing,  272  ; visit  of,  to 
the  army,  332  ; letter  of,  to  the  people  of  Missouri, 
357  ; weakness  of,  376  ; issues  his  famous  emanci- 
pation proclamation,  391  ; proclamation  of,  an- 
nouncing the  enforcement  of  the  law  of  enrolment 
and  draft,  486  ; calls  out  the  militia,  492  ; announce- 
ment of,  530  ; a call  for  militia,  784 ; visits  Rich- 
mond,  936  ; assassination  of,  937,  938. 

Little  Bethel,  attempt  to  surprise,  62. 

Little  Crow,  shot  near  Hutchinson,  Minn.  607. 

Little,  Gen.  L.  H.,  killed  at  the  battle  of  luka,  162. 
Little  Osage  Crossing,  Mo.,  battle  of,  832. 

Little  Rock,  Ark.,  head-quarters  of  the  guerrillas, 
355  ; Curtis  prepares  to  move  against,  356  ; expe- 
dition against,  389  ; surrendered  to  Gen.  Davidson, 
606  ; Steele  departs  from,  to  co  operate  with  Banka 
against  Shreveport,  638  ; return  of  Steele  to,  640. 
Lockwood’s  Maryland  Brigade,  at  Gettysburg,  518. 
Logan.Gen.  John  A.,  at  Belmont,  60  ; at  Fort  Donelson, 
90;  at  the  battle  of  Raymond,  Miss.,  407  ; at  the 
battle  of  Champion  hills,  411  ; in  command  of  the 
fifteenth  corps  under  Sherman,  706. 

Lone  Jack,  Mo.,  defeat  of  Major  Foster  at.  359. 


968 


INDEX 


Longstreet,  Gen.  Jas.,  at  Williamsburg,  216  ; at  Fair 
Oaks,  234  ; at  Mechanicsville,  258  ; at  Gaines’  mill, 
259  ; at  Gainesville,  296  : at  South  mountain,  315  ; 
at  Antietam,  318 ; at  Fredericksburg,  348  ; at 
Gettysburg,  508  , at  Chickamauga,  551  ; lays  siege 
to  Knoxville,  Tenn.  577  ; retreats  from  Knoxville, 
577;  invests  Suffolk,  Va.,  594;  at  Bean  station, 
590  ; wounded  in  the  Wilderness,  670  ; in  the  lines 
before  Richmond,  910  ; joins  Lee  at  Petersburg,  918. 

Lookout  Mountain,  (ia.,  battle  of,  566.  567. 

Loriiig,  Gen.  W.  W..  at  Champion  hills,  410  ; in  com- 
mand at  Canton.  Miss  , 611. 

Lost  Mountain,  Ga  operations  of  Schofield  at,  714. 

Louisa  Court  House.  Va  , surprise  and  capture  of 
Confederate  cavalry  at,  287. 

Lovell,  Gen.  M , Confederate  troops  at  New  Orleans  in 
command  of.  148  ; evacuates  New  Orleans,  156  ; 
joins  Price  and  Van  Dorn  near  (’orinth,  Miss.,  163. 

Lovell,  steamer,  sunk  by  the  Nationals,  145. 

Lowe,  Col.  J.  W,,  killed  at  Carnifex  ferry,  .52. 

Lynch,  Capt.  W.  F.,  in  charge  of  the  coast  defense  of 
North  Carolina,  1 25  ; flies  from  Elizabeth  city,  129 

Lyon,  Gen.  Nat  , in  command  at  Springfield,  Mo.,  55  ; 
killed  at  the  battle  of  Wilson’s  creek.  Mo.,  56. 

Lyon,  Gen.,  cavalry  raid  of.  into  Kentucky,  850. 

Lytle.  Col  W.  H.  wounded  at  Carnifex  ferry,  52 ; 
wounded  at  the  battle  of  Perry  ville,  177. 

M. 

McArthuk,  Gen.  John,  brigade  of,  at  Fort  Donelson, 
86  ; at  the  battle  of  Corinth,  164. 

McCall,  Gen.  Geo.  A.,  at  the  battle  of  Mechanicsville, 
258  ; capture  of,  at  the  battle  of  Glendale,  266. 

McCallum,  Col.  D.  C.,  superintendent  of  military 
railroads,  energy  of,  558  ; (noie),  781. 

McCausland,  Gen.,  affair  of,  with  Gen.  Crook  near 
Dublin  station,  691  ; defeated  by  Gen.  Hunter  at 
Piedmont,  692  ; sets  fire  to  Chambersburg,  Pa.,  788. 

McClellan,  Gen.  Geo.  B , in  Western  Virginia,  35  ; in 
Northeastern  Virginia.  47  ; issues  an  address  to 
the  people  and  his  soldiers,  48  ; head-quarters  of, 
at  Washington,  50  ; appointed  commander-in-chief, 
79  ; inactivity  of,  191  ; Lincoln  dissatisfied  with — 
his  army  on  the  peninsula,  194  ; at  Yorktown,  196- 
201  ; at  Williamsburg,  224  ; at  Fair  Oaks,  238  ; at 
Mechanicsville,  258  ; his  letter  to  the  secretary  of 
war,  262 ; at  Savage’s  station,  262  ; at  Malvern 
hills,  264  ; his  report  of  the  battle  of  Malvern  hills, 
269  ; at  Harrison’s  landing — his  address  to  the 
army,  270  ; his  correspondence  with  the  government, 
272  ; at  Acquia  creek,  275  ; in  command  of  the 
reconstructed  army  of  the  Potomac,  304  ; at  South 
mountain,  315  ; at  Antietam,  313-333  ; superseded 
by  Burnside,  333  ; bids  adieu  to  his  troops,  336. 

McClernand,  Gen.  John  A.,  at  Fort  Donelson,  86  ; 
at  Pittsburg  landing,  102  ; assumes  command  of  the 
army  of  the  Mississippi,  383  ; at  the  battle  of 


Champion  hills,  410 ; pursues  the  Confederates 
412 ; conduct  of,  at  the  siege  of  Vicksburg,  417 
removed  from  command  of  the  thirteenth  corps, 
420  ; at  Alexandria,  La.,  637. 

McCook,  Col.  Dan  , at  Doctor’s  creek,  175  ; at  Chick- 
amauga, 550  ; his  raid  on  the  railroad  south  of 
Atlanta,  726  ; his  movement  against  Lyon,  826. 

Mcf'ook,  Col.  R.  L,,  at  Carnifex  ferry,  52. 

McCook,  Gen.  A.  McD. . at  the  battle  of  Shiloh,  110  ; 
at  Perryville,  174-177  ; at  Murfreesboro,  180  ; at 
Liberty  gap,  542  ; at  C hickamauga,  550. 

McCown.  (ien.,  at  the  battle  of  Murfreesboro,  180. 

McCulloch  Gen.,  mortally  wounded  at  Pea  ridge,  97 

McCullough.  Col.,  murder  of,  at  Kirksville,  Mo.,  358. 

McDowell,  Gen.  Irwin,  occupies  Arlington  heights 
and  Alexandria  35 ; in  command  of  the  forces 
in  Virginia,  36  ; ordered  to  attack  the  Confed- 
erate position  at  Manassas  junction,  36  ; his 
first  plan,  37  ; his  second  plan,  38  ; defeated  at 
Bull  Run,  45,  46  ; his  removal,  46  ; in  command 
of  a corps  in  the  army  of  the  Potomac,  193 ; his 
corps  detached  and  detained  to  defend  the  capital, 
194;  at  Fredericksburg,  246  ; at  Gainesville,  296  ; 
at  Manassas,  299. 

McGilvray,  Col.  F.,  batteries  of,  at  Gettysburg,  526. 

McGinnis,  Gen.,  at  the  battle  of  Champion  hills, 
411  ; at  the  battle  of  Grand  Coteau,  599. 

McIntosh.  Gen.,  mortally  wounded  at  Pea  ridge,  97. 

McKean,  Gen.  Thos.  J.,  at  the  battle  of  Corinth,  163. 

McKee,  Major,  operations  of,  at  Yazoo  city,  615. 

McKeen,  Col.,  killed  at  Cold  harbor,  701. 

McLaws,  Gen.  Laf.,  at  Malvern  hills,  268;  at  Fre- 
dericksburg. 343  ; at  Salem  church,  479  ; at  Gettys- 
burg, 514  ; division  of,  at  Taylor’s  bridge,  694. 

McMahon,  Col.,  death  of,  at  Cold  harbor,  701. 

McMillan,  Gen.,  at  the  battle  of  Pleasant  hill  630. 

McNeil,  Gen.  John,  defeats  Porter  at  Kirksville.  Mo., 
358  ; defends  Cape  Girardeau,  603 ; commands  the 
army  of  the  frontier,  606. 

McPheeters,  Gen.,  defeat  of.  by  Gen.  Weitzel,  431. 

McPherson,  Gen.  J.  B.,  drives  the  Confederates  from 
Lamar  to  Holly  springs,  371  ; at  the  battle  of  Ray- 
mond, Miss.,  407 ; capture  of  Clinton  by,  408  ; 
Jackson  occupied  by,  409  ; at  Champion  hills,  410  ; 
at  the  Big  Black,  413  ; at  the  investment  of  Vicks- 
burg, 415  ; in  charge  of  Vicksburg,  427 ; joins 
the  expedition  to  Meridian,  6'  9 ; at  Meridian.  612  ; 
commands  the  aimy  of  the  Tennessee  under  Sher- 
man, 706  ; death  of,  722  ; biographical  notice  of 
(note),  725. 

Macomb,  Commodore,  recaptures  Plymouth,  860. 

Macon,  Ga.,  surrendered  to  Gen.  Wilson,  874. 

Magoffin,  Gov.,  cf  Kentucky,  refuses  to  raise  troops  for 
the  Union,  56  ; letter  of,  to  the  President,  57. 

Magruder,  Gen.  John,  on  the  Peninsula,  35  ; his  opin- 
ions of  McClellan’s  operations,  199  ; at  Williams- 
burg, 219  ; retreat  of,  222  ; attacks  Sedgwick  at 


INDEX. 


969 


Savage  station,  263  ; at  Glendale,  265  ; at  Malvern 
hills,  268  ; recaptures  Galveston,  432-434 

Mahone,  Gen.,  at  Fair  Oaks,  240  ; at  Gettysburg,  517. 

Malvern  Hills,  battle  of,  264-269. 

Manassas,  battle  of  (second  battle  of  Bull  Run).  299. 

Manassas  ram.  69;  at  NewOrleans.  151 ; destroyed.  153. 

Mansfield,  Gen  Joseph  K.  F , at  Ocean  view  and 
Norfolk,  Va.,  228  ; killed  at  Antietam,  321. 

?Jansura,  La.,  attack  on  the  Nationals  at.  638. 

I'iarais  des  Cygnes,  Mo. , battle  of,  832. 

Marland.  Lieut.,  bravery  of,  at  Grand  Coteau,  600. 

Marmaduke,  Gen.,  at  Corinth,  118  ; defeated  at  Bos- 
ton mountains,  362  ; at  Prairie  grove,  364 ; at 
Springfield,  Mo.,  602  ; at  Huntsville,  Mo  , 602  ; at 
Cape  Girardeau,  603  ; repulsed  at  Helena,  Ark.  605; 
repulsed  at  Pine  bluff,  607  ; operations  of,  639. 

• Martinsburg,  Banks’  forces  at.  248  ; panic  at,  caused 
by  Early’s  invasion.  784  ; Averill  abandons,  792. 

Marye’s  Hill,  Va.,  capture  of,  by  the  Nationals,  472- 
475  ; recapture  of  by  the  < onfederates,  479. 

IMaryland,  its  weakness  geographically,  48  ; Lee’s 
proclamation  to  the  people  of.  309  ; all  able-bodied 
men  ordered  out  for  the  defense  of,  309 

Massacres,  at  Fort  Pillow,  618  ; at  Snicker’s  gap,  792. 

Maury,  Gen,  Dabney,  at  the  battle  of  < orinth,  164  ; in 
charge  of  the  defenses  of  Mobile,  870  ; retreats  up 
the  Alabama  river,  873. 

Meade,  Gen  Geo.  G. , severely  wounded  at  Glendale, 
266  ; at  Antietam,  319  ; at  Fredericksburg,  345  ; at 
Chancellorsville,  453  ; takes  command  of  the  army 
of  the  Potomac.  495  ; his  address  to  the  army,  496  ; 
biographical  sketch  of,  496,  497  ; telegraphs  to  the 
war  department.  498  ; his  order  to  the  army,  500  ; 
at  Gettysburg,  507 ; his  address  to  the  army,  529, 
580  ; consolidates  the  army  of  the  Potomac,  658  ; 
his  staff,  659  ; epistle  of,  to  his  troops,  683. 

Meagher,  Gen  T.  F. , at  Fair  Oaks,  239  ; at  Gaines’ 
mill,  260  ; at  Glendale,  266  ; his  bravery  at  Antie- 
tam 324;  wounded,  325;  at  Fredericksburg,  348. 

Mechanicsville,  Va..  battle  of,  258  259. 

Meigs.  Lieut.  J.  .murdered  near  Harrisonburg  Va. , 797. 

Memphis,  Tenn.,  naval  engagement  before,  145  ; 
taken  possession  of  by  the  National  troops,  146. 

Memphis  and  Charleston  Railroad,  plant  of,  destroyed 
by  Gen.  Mitchell,  115. 

Mercedita,  steamer,  disabled  by  the  Confederate 
ram.  Palmetto  State,  off  Charleston,  584. 

Meridian,  expedition  of  Sherman  to  610;  Confeder- 
ates retreat  from,  611 ; destroyed  property  at,  612. 

Merrill,  Col.,  compels  Porter  and  Cobb  to  retreat, 
358  ; skirmish  of,  with  Marmaduke,  602. 

Merrimac,  iron-clad,  in  Hampton  Roads,  201  ; sinks 
the  Cumberland,  203  ; destroys  the  Congress,  204  ; 
her  contest  with  the  Monitor,  207-211  ; blown  up 
by  the  Confederates,  213  ; explosion  of,  229. 

Middletown,  Va. , battle  of,  800. 

Miles,  Col.  D.  S.,  at  Bull  Run,  39  ; remissness  of,  at 


Harper’s  Ferry,  313 ; mortally  wounded,  314. 

Militia,  call  of  President  Lincoln  for  75  000,  after  the 
fall  of  Fort  Sumter,  33  ; call  for  120,000,  492  ; call 
for  29,000,  from  the  states  of  New  York,  Pennsyl- 
vania and  Massachusetts,  784. 

Milledgeville.  Ga.,  occupied  by  Gen.  Sherman,  816. 

Mill  Spring,  Ky.,  battle  of,  81, 

Milroy,  (?en  R.  IL.  at  the  battle  of  Cross  keys,  251  , 
at  Gainesville,  295  ; retreats  from  Winchester,  491  ; 
defeats  the  C’onfederates  on  Wilkeson  turnpike,  844. 

Mine  at  Petersburg,  construction  of,  commenced  by 
Burnside,  751 ; description  of,  752;  explosion  of,  755. 

Mine  at  Petersburg,  sprung  by  the  Confederates,  756. 

Missionary  Ridge,  Ga.,  battle  of,  568. 

Mississippi  River,  operations  of  Foote  on  the,  143  ; 
Porter’s  services  on  the,  149  ; Farragut’s  operations 
on  the,  151-157. 

Mississippi,  steamer,  destroyed  at  Port  Hudson,  437. 

Missouri,  division  of  sentiment  in,  357 ; guerrilla 
warfare  in,  358,  359  ; Price’s  invasion  of,  829-833. 

Mitchell,  Capt.,  sets  fire  to  the  floating  battery 
Louisiana — sent  prisoner  to  the  North  155. 

Mitchell,  Gen.  0.  M.,  operations  of,  in  Tennessee, 
115;  joins  Buell’s  army,  171  ; succeeds  Gen.  Hunter 
in  the  department  of  the  South — death  of,  581. 

Mitchell,  Gen.  R.  P.,  at  the  battle  of  Perryville,  177  ; 
at  the  battle  of  Chickamauga,  556. 

Mobile.  Ala.,  description  of,  642  ; operations  of  Canby 
and  Thatcher  against,  869-873  ; surrender  of,  873. 

Mobile  and  Ohio  Railroad,  fight  by  Gen.  Smith,  with 
Confederates  on  the,  118. 

Mobile  Bay,  operations  of  Farragut  in,  641-649. 

Monitor,  contest  of  the,  with  the  Merrimac,  207-211  * 
founders  off  Cape  Hatteras,  213. 

Monocacy,  Md.,  battle  of,  786. 

Monroe,  Mayor,  refuses  to  surrender  the  city  of  New 
Orleans,  or  take  down  the  Confederate  flag,  156. 

Montauk,  iron-clad,  attacks  Fort  McAllister,  582. 

Montgomery,  Ala.,  gathering  of  Southern  delegatee 
at,  23  ; surrender  of,  to  Gen.  Wilson,  874. 

Moorefield,  Va. , Confederate  force  defeated  at  788. 

Morell,  Gen.,  at  the  battle  of  Mechanicsville,  258 

Morgan,  Gen.  J.  H.,  raids  by,  in  Kentucky  and  Ten- 
nessee, 170  ; marriage  of,  at  Murfreesboro,  179 
raids  by,  in  Tennessee  and  Kentucky,  188  ; raids 
by,  in  Kentucky,  Indiana  and  Ohio,  595,  596  ; de 
feats  Gen.  Averill,  591  ; his  raid  in  Kentucky  to 
Cynthiana,  783  ; killed  at  Greenville,  Tenn.,  835. 

Morgan,  Gen.  Geo.  W.,  at  Cumberland  gap,  171  ; 
at  Fair  Oaks.  238  ; at  Chickasaw  bayou,  378  ; at 
Arkansas  post  387  ; his  pursuit  of  Forrest,  828. 

Morning  Light,  gun-boat,  captured  off  (ialveston.  434. 

Morris,  Col.,  killed  at  the  battle  of  Cold  harbor,  701. 

Morris.  Gen.,  at  the  battle  of  Carrack’s  ford,  50. 

Morrison.  Major,  at  Port  Royal  ferry.  S.  C.,  76  ; at 
the  battle  of  Secessionville,  S.  C , 581. 

Morristown,  Tenn  , battle  of,  835. 


970 


INDEX 


Morton,  Gen.,  operations  of,  at  Chattanooga,  557. 

Mosbj,  Capt.  J.  S.,  raid  of,  at  Cheat’s  ferry,  788; 
supply  train  captured  by,  at  Berry ville,  791. 

Mower,  Gen. , distinguished  services  of,  at  the  battle 
of  Pleasant  hill,  631  ; at  Clouterville,  635 

Mullany,  Capt..  killed  in  action  at  Mobile  bay,  647. 

Mulligan  Col.,  surrender  of  Lexington,  Mo.,  by,  56  ; 
killed  at  Bunker  hill,  Va.  ; 788. 

Murfreesboro,  Tenn.,  battle  of,  180-186  ; retreat  of 
Bragg  from,  187  ; Buford’s  cavalry  threatens,  844. 

Murphy,  Col.  R.  C.,  in  charge  at  luka,  160  ; surrenders 
Holly  springs  to  Van  Dorn,  374. 

N. 

Naglee,  Gen.,  at  the  battle  of  Fair  Oaks,  235. 

Nansemond  River,  gun-boats  sent  up  the,  to  co-operate 
with  the  land  forces.  594. 

Nashville,  Tenn.,  held  by  the  Confederates,  82  ; 
abandoned  by  the  Confederates,  95  ; held  by  Gen. 
Negley,  179  ; forces  of  Gen.  Thomas  concentrated 
at,  842  ; Hood  defeated  at,  847. 

Nashville,  Confederate  steamer,  burning  of,  582. 

Navy,  United  States,  condition  of  the,  25  ; strength 
oi  the,  in  1863  and  1864.  855. 

Negley,  Gen.  Jas.  S.,  holds  Nashville,  179  ; at  Mur- 
freesboro, 180  ; letter  of,  to  Gen.  Thomas,  549  ; at 
Chickamauga,  552. 

Negro  troops,  bravery  of,  at  Port  Hudson,  441  ; mas- 
sacre of,  at  Fort  Pillow,  618  ; at  the  assault  on 
( emetery  hill,  Petersburg,  755  ; gallantry  of,  at 
New  Market  heights,  770  ; heroic  conduct  of,  at 
Olustee,  857  ; war-cry  of,  at  Blakely,  872,  873. 

Nelson,  Gen.,  at  Shiloh,  105  ; at  Richmond,  Ky.,  170. 

Newark,  Mo.,  captured  by  Porter,  the  guerrilla,  358. 

New  Berne,  N.  C.,  expedition  to,  131  ; description  of, 
132  ; capture  of,  134  ; flight  of  the  inhabitants  of, 
135  ; besieged  by  Gen.  Hoke — siege  raised,  859. 

New  Falls  City,  steamer,  sunk  at  Springfield,  La., 626. 

New  Hope  Church,  Ga.,  battle  of.  712. 

New  Madrid,  Mo.,  evacuated  by  the  Confederates,  96. 

New  Market,  Va.,  battle  of,  691. 

New  Orleans,  description  of,  147,  148  ; defenseless 
condition  of,  155  ; capture  of,  156. 

Newton,  Gen.,  at  York  river,  226  ; at  the  attack  on 
Marye’s  hill,  474  ; at  the  battle  of  Gettysburg,  508. 

Newtonia  Mo.,  Confederates  driven  out  of,  833. 

Nicholls,  Gen.,  brigade  of,  at  Chancellorsville  460. 

Nim’s  battery,  at  the  battle  of  Grand  Coteau,  599  ; at 
the  battle  of  Sabine  cross  roads,  628. 

Norfolk,  Va.,  surrendered  to  Gen.  Wool,  229. 

North  Anna,  crossed  and  recrossed  by  Grant,  693,  696. 

Noyes,  Capt  , depicts  Antietam  after  the  battle,  330. 

Ny  River,  Va.,  battle  of  the,  684. 

O. 

Oak  Gkove,  Va.,  severe  fight  at,  257. 

Ocean  View,  Va.,  landing  of  National  troops  at,  228. 


Oglesby,  Gen.  Rich  J.,  in  the  attack  on  Fort  Donel- 
SOQ,  86  ; severely  wounded  at  Corinth,  164. 

Olmstead,  Col.  C.  H.,  surrenders  Fort  Pulaski,  140 

Olustee,  Fla.,  battle  of,  858. 

Olustee,  cruiser,  depredations  of,  876. 

1 “On  to  Richmond  I ” 191,  266. 

“ On  to  Vicksburg  !”  393. 

Opdyke,  Gen.,  at  the  battle  of  Franklin.  842. 

Opelousas,  La.,  captured  by  Gen.  Banks,  438;  re- 
occupied  by  Gen.  Richard  Tavlor,  445. 

Orangeburg,  S.  C.,  occupation  of  by  Gen.  Blair,  888. 

Orchard  Knob,  Tenn.,  itaptured  by  Gen.  Wood,  565  ; 
Grant’s  lu^ad  quarters  at,  568. 

I Ord.  Gen  , ordered  to  luka.  160  ; victory  of,  at  the 
Hatchie,  167  ; in  command  of  the  thirteenth  corps 
at  Vicksburg,  420. 

“ Order  of  American  Knights,’’  secret  association,  in 
Missouri,  829. 

Osband,  Col.,  reconnoissance  of.  615  ; expedition  of, 
fromVicksburg  against  Hood’s  communications. 852. 

Osterhaus,  Gen.,  wounded  at  the  Big  Black,  413; 
at  Wauhatchie,  566  ; at  Chattanooga,  568. 

Overall’s  Creek,  Tenn.,  attack  on  blockhouse  at,  843. 

Owen,  Gen. , at  (Gettysburg,  526;  in  the  Wilderness,  672. 

Owen,  Lieut.,  with  gun  boats  at  Yazoo  city,  615. 

P. 

Page,  Gen.  R.  L.,  surrenders  Fort  Morgan,  Ala. . 649. 

I Paine,  Gen.,  at  Corinth,  118  ; wounded  at  Port  Hud- 
i son,  444  ; at  Fort  Fisher,  866. 
i Palmer,  Gen.  Innis  A , at  Corinth,  118  ; at  Murfrees- 
boro 180  ; at  Chickamauga,  530;  at  Wauhatchie, 
559  ; commands  the  fourteenth  corps  under  Sher- 
man. 706  ; resigns  his  command,  728. 

Palmer,  Col.,  cavalry  under,  captures  Hood’s  pontoon 
train  after  the  battle  of  Nashville,  849  ; captures 
Gen.  Lyon  in  camp  at  Red  hill,  850, 

Palmetto  Flag,  unfurled  over  Castle  Pinckney,  17. 

Palmetto  Ranche,  Tex.,  last  battle  of  the  war,  948. 

Pamlico  Sound,  expedition  to,  125. 

Paris,  (.’omte  de,  on  the  battle  of  Antietam,  328. 

Parke,  Gen.  J.  G , at  Roanoke  Island,  126  ; at  New 
Berne,  132  ; expedition  of,  to  Fort  Macon,  135  ; 
invests  Moorehead  City,  136  ; at  Dinwiddie  court 
house,  909  ; penetrates  the  lines  at  Petersburg.  918. 

Parkersburg,  Va.,  occupied  by  Gen.  McClellan,  48. 

Patten,  Capt. , courage  of,  at  the  Weldon  railroad,  744. 

Patterson,  Gen.,  posted  near  Harper’s  ferry.  35  ; out- 
generalled  by  Johnston,  39  ; blunder  of,  46  ; at  the 
battle  of  Williamsburg,  216  ; at  Fair  Oaks,  239. 

Pawnee,  sent  with  reinforcements  to  Fort  Sumter,  26. 

Peach  Tree  Creek,  Ga..  battle  of,  720. 

Pea  Ridge,  Mo.,  battle  .of,  97-98. 

Peck,  Gen.  J.  J.,  operations  of,  at  Suffolk,  Va.,  593. 

Pegram,  Gen  , surrenders  at  Rich  mountain,  49  ; de 
feated  at  Somerset.  Ky.,  544;  wounded  in  the 
Wilderness,  672  ; killed  at  Hatcher’s  run,  903. 


INDEX 


971 


Pemberton,  Gen.  J.  C.,  position  of,  at  the  Yallabusha 
and  Tallahatchie,  371  ; instructions  from  Gen  John- 
ston to,  408  ; his  views  on  the  situation,  409  ; at 
Champion  hills,  410  ; retreat  of,  41 1 ; shut  up  in 
Vicksburg'  421-423  ; surrenders  Vicksburg,  424- 
426  ; defeated  at  Salisbury,  N.  C.,  896. 

Pender,  Gen.,  at  Gettysburg,  503. 

Pendleton,  Gen.,  at  (’hancellorsville,  457;  advises 
Lee  to  surrender.  928 

Pennsylvania,  prepares  to  resist  invasion,  309. 

Pennybacker,  Gen.,  at  the  capture  of  Fort  Fisher, 
N.  C.,  866  ; severely  wounded  at  Fort  Fisher,  867. 

Pensacola,  Fla  , abandoned  by  Gen  T.  N.  Jones,  141. 

Perry ville,  or  Chaplin’s  Hills,  Ky.,  battle  of,  177. 

Petersburg,  description  of,  736  ; operations  of  Gen. 
Grant  against,  736-782  , assaults  upon  the  defenses 
of,  728-741  ; the  great  mine  at,  751  ; explosion  of 
the  mine  at,  754  ; disastrous  assault  at  756  ; opera- 
tions of  Grant  at.  its  downfall,  893-921. 

Pettigrew,  Col  J.  J.,  landing  of , at  Castle  Pinckney, 
17  ; taken  prisoner  at  Fair  Oaks,  238  ; (Gen.)  at 
Gettysburg.  525  ; at  Black  water,  593. 

Petrel,  privateer,  destroyed  by  the  St.  Lawrence,  875. 

Phelps,  Lieut.,  on  Tennessee  river,  85  ; in  command 
of  the  Eastport  when  blown  up,  633  ; operations  of, 
with  the  gun-boats  Juliet  and  Fort  Hindman,  634. 

Phillips,  Col.,  defeats  Col.  Taylor,  369  ; defends  Fort 
Blunt,  604  ; defeats  Quantrell  at  Fort  Gibson,  607. 

Pickett,  Gen  , at  Williamsburg.  216  ; at  Fredericks- 
burg. 343  ; at  Gettysburg,  523  ; wounded  in  the 
Wilderness,  672. 

Pillow,  Gen.  G.  J. , plan  of,  to  seize  Columbus,  Ky.,  58  ; 
at  Foi-t  Donelson,  85  ; flight  from  Fort  Donelson,  93. 

Pilot  Knob,  Mo.,  defense  of.  by  Gen.  H.  S.  Ewing,  830. 

Pittsburgh  Landing,  described,  101  ; battle  of,  105. 

Plaquemine,  La.,  attacked  by  Gen.  Taylor,  445. 

Pleasant  Hill,  La.,  battle  of,  630. 

Pleasonton,  Gen.,  cavalry  of,  at  Chancellorsville.  457  ; 
his  encounter  with  Gen  Stuart,  490  ; his  operations 
against  Price  in  Missouri.  831-834. 

Plymouth,  N.  C.,  expedition  against,  131  ; siege  of, 
858  ; surrender  of,  to  Gen.  Hoke,  859  ; recaptured 
by  the  Nationals,  860. 

Polk  Gen  , Hickman  and  Columbus,  Ky  , seized  by 
58  ; at  Belmcnt,  60  ; in  command  at  Columbus,  82  ; 
evacuates  (blumbus,  94  ; at  Shiloh,  106  ; at  Chat- 
tanooga, 171  ; at  Murfreesboro,  183  ; joins  Bragg’s 
army,  546  ; at  Chickamauga,  550  ; in  command  at 
Meridian,  611  ; retreats  to  Demopolis,  Ala.,  611  ; at 
Resaca  Ga.,  709  ; killed  at  Pine  mountain,  714. 

Pope,  Gen.  John,  operations  of,  against  Island 
No.  10,  96  ; at  Corinth,  118 ; at  Fort  Pillow. 
143  ; recalled  to  Corinth,  144  ; ordered  to  Virginia, 
159  ; biographical  sketch  of,  277  ; address  of,  to 
the  army  of  Virginia,  278 ; orders  issued  by, 
281  ; Confederate  reply  to  orders  of , 282  ; at  Gaines- 
ville, 295  ; his  charges  against  Gen.  Porter,  297  ; 


report  of  {note),  3(>1  ; his  losses  in  Virginia,  304; 
relieved  from  command,  304  ; operations  of,  against 
Sioux  Indians,  607. 

Porter.  Admiral  David  D.,  in  command  of  mortar 
boats  below  New  Orleans  147  ; at  Haines’  Bluff, 
381  ; his  attack  on  Fort  Hindman,  Ark.,  386  ; his 
fleet  in  the  Mississippi,  395  ; passes  the  batteries  at 
Vicksburg,  401  ; his  services  at  the  siege  of  Vicks- 
burg, 417  ; bombards  Vicksburg,  421  ; Arkansas 
ram  destroyed  by  {note)  481  ; on  the  Yazoo  river, 
614  ; on  the  Red  river,  G22  ; his  letter  to  the  secre- 
tary of  the  navy,  624  ; at  Springfield  landing,  627  ; 
his  perilous  return  down  the  Red  river.  632-637  ; 
his  expeditions  against  Fort  Fisher,  N.  C.,  861-8'‘'7. 

Porter,  Gen.  Fitz  John,  at  Bull  Run,  41  ; at  York 
river,  226  ; occupies  Hanover  court  house,  232  ; at 
Mechanisville.  258  ; at  Gaines’  mill,  260  ; at  Malvern 
hills,  268;  at  Manassas,  299;  at  Antietam,  319  ; 
pursues  Gen.  Lee  331, 

Porterfield,  Gen  , issues  an  address  at  Grafton,  48. 

Port  Gibson,  Miss.,  battle  of,  1C5. 

Port  Hudson,  the  Hartford  and  Albatross  pass  the 
batteries  of,  436 ; situation  and  defenses  oi . 440  ; 
bravery  of  the  garrison  of,  445  ; surrender  of,  446, 

Port  Republic,  bridge  at,  carried  by  Gen.  Jackson,  253, 

Port  Royal,  S.  C , operations  of  expedition  to,  72-75. 

Port  Roybal  Ferry,  fortified  camp  of  Confederates  at, 
76  ; result  of  expedition  to,  77. 

Posey,  Gen.,  at  the  battle  of  Gettysburg,  517. 

Potter,  Gen.,  repulse  of,  near  Fort  McRae.  Va.,  772. 

Powder  ship,  exploded  near  Fort  Fisher,  N.  C. , 862. 

Powell,  Lewis  Payne,  his  attempt  to  assassinate 
Secretary  Seward,  939. 

Prairie  Grove.  Mo  , battle  of,  363. 

Prentiss,  Gen.,  at  Pittsburg  landing,  102  ; made  pris- 
oner at  Shiloh,  107. 

Preston,  Gen.,  at  the  battle  of  Chickamauga,  551. 

Price,  Gen.  Sterling,  surrender  of  Lexington,  Mo., 
to,  56  ; retreat  of,  97  ; at  Corinth,  118  ; defeat  of, 
at  luka.  161  ; retreat  of,  162  ; at  Corinth,  163  ; re- 
pulsed at  Helena,  Ark  , 605  ; at  Prairie  D’Ann,  639. 
his  disastrous  invasion  of  Missouri,  829-833. 

Prime,  Major,  constructs  redoubts  at  Corinth,  164. 

Pryor,  Gen.  Roger  A,  conveys  proposal  to  Major 
Anderson  in  Fort  Sumter,  27  ; at  Williamsburg.  217; 
at  Fair  Oaks,  239. 

Pumpkin  Vine  Greek,  Ga.,  Gen.  Hooker’s  encounter 
with  Hood  and  Hardee’s  corps  at,  712. 

Putnam,  Gen.,  killed  at  Fort  Wagner,  S.  C.,  591. 

Q. 

Quantrell.  guerrilla,  raid  of,  on  Lawrence,  Kan. 
606  ; defeat^  by  Col.  Phillips  at  Fort  Gibson,  607 

R. 

Rains,  Gen.,  at  the  battle  of  Fair  Oaks,  235. 

Randolph’s  battery  at  Chancellorsville,  459. 


972 


INDEX. 


Ransom,  Gen.,  captures  Aransas  pass  Tex.,  601  ; at 
the  battle  of  Sabine  cross  roads.  628. 

Rappahannock,  retreat  of  Pope’s  army  over  the,  288. 

Raymond,  Miss.,  battle  of,  407. 

Read,  Gen.  S.  T.,  killed  near  Farmville  {note),  926. 

Reams’  Station,  battle  of,  766. 

Red  River  expedition,  see  Shreveport  621-638 

Reno,  Gen.  Jesse  L.,  at  Roanoke,  126  ; at  New  Berne, 
132 ; expedition  of,  to  Fort  Macon,  13o  ; at  Gaines 
ville,  295  ; gallantry  of  his  brigade,  300  ; at  Chan- 
tilly, 303  ; killed  at  South  mountain  316. 

Renshaw,  Commodore  W.  B. , in  command  at  Galves- 
ton, 432  ; killed  on  board  the  Westfield,  433. 

Resaca,  Ga. , description  of,  709  ; battle  of,  710  ; Gen. 
Johnston  retreats  from,  711  ; Hood  repulsed  at,  808. 

Reynolds,  Gen.,  atMechanicsville^  259  ; at  Gainesville, 
295  ; at  Manassas,  299  ; at  Fredericksburg,  345  ; first 
corps  of,  below  Fredericksburg,  454  ; killed  at  Get- 
tysburg, 503  ; biographical  sketch  of  {note),  535. 

Rice,  Gen,  James  C.,  at  Gettysburg,  513  ; killed  at 
the  assault  on  Laurel  hill,  Va  , {note).  678. 

Richardson,  Gen.,  at  York  river,  226  ; at  Fair  Oaks, 
237  ; killed  at  Antietam,  324, 

Richardson,  Gen.,  operations  of,  at  Yazoo  city,  615. 

Rich  Mountain,  Va.,  battle  of,  49. 

Richmond,  Ky.,  defeat  of  Gen  Nelson  at,  170. 

Richmond  Va.,  capital  of  the  Confederacy,  33  ; Gen. 
Butler’s  scheme  for  the  capture  of,  655  ; movement 
of  Gen.  Grant  against,  753,  754  ; demonstration 
against,  by  the  second  and  tenth  army  corps, 
758-761  ; movements  of  the  army  of  the  James, 
towards,  769-779  ; evacuation  of,  919-9-1. 

Ricketts.  Gen.  Jas.  B , at  Antietam,  319  ; at  Gettys- 
burg, 519  ; at  the  battle  of  Monocacy,  Md.,  785. 

Roanoke  Island,  surrender  of,  128. 

Robinson,  Gen.  J.  C.,  at  the  battle  of  Gettysburg, 
503  ; severely  wounded  near  Alsop’s  Farm,  Va.,  673. 

Rodes,  Gen.  R.  E. , at  Fair  Oaks,  235;  at  Chancel- 
lorsville,  465  ; at  Gettysburg,  504  ; in  the  Wilder- 
ness, 664  ; killed  at  Winchester,  796. 

Rodgers  Commander  C.  R.  P.,  at  Port  Royal  ferry.  76. 

Rodgers,  Commodore  John,  commands  the  gun  boats 
on  the  James  river,  264  ; at  Malvern  hills,  268. 

Rodman,  Gen.,  mortally  wounded  at  Antietam,  327. 

Rodney,  Miss.,  attack  on  the  batteries  opposite,  403. 

Rogers,  Col  , killed  at  Fort  Robinett,  Corinth,  166. 

Rome,  Ga.,  c-apture  of,  by  Gen.  Jeff.  C.  Davis,  712  ; 
Gen.  Corse  at,  with  the  fifteenth  corps,  806. 

Romney,  Va.,  occupied  by  Confederates,  48. 

iosecranz,  Gen.  W.  S.,  at  Rich  mountain,  49;  at 
Carnifex  ferry,  52  ; takes  charge  of  the  army  of 
the  Mississippi,  159  ; defeats  Price  and  Van  Dorn 
at  Corinth,  166  ; takes  command  of  the  army  of 
the  Cumberland,  167  ; at  Nashville,  179  ; at  Mur 
freesboro,  180 ; receives  the  thanks  of  the  presi- 
dent, 188  ; at  Chickamauga,  549  ; defeat  of,  555  ; 
withdraws  his  army  to  Chattanooga.  556  ; relieved 


of  his  command,  558  ; in  command  of  the  depart, 
ment  of  the  Missouri,  829  ; measures  taken  by,  to 
repel  the  invasion  of  Price,  829-834. 

Ross,  Gen  L.  F.,  operations  of  at  Yazoo  city,  615. 

Rousseau,  Gen.  L.  H.,  at  Perrjwille.  176  ; at  Mur- 
freesboro, 180  ; his  cavalry  raid  from  Decatur  to 
Marietta,  719  ; at  Tullahoma,  828. 

Rowan,  Commander  Stephen  H.,  destroys  a flotilla 
in  the  harbor  of  Elizabeth  city,  129. 

Rowley,  Gen  , at  the  battle  of  Gettysburg.  503. 

Rucker,  (ien.,  taken  prisoner  at  Nashville,  847. 

Ruger,  tien.,  at  the  battle  of  Gettysburg.  522. 

Ruggles,  G^n.,  at  Santa  Rosa,  67  ; at  Shiloh,  109  ; at 
New  Orleans,  148. 

Russel.  Lieut.  J.  H.,  exploit  of.  at  Santa  Rosa,  67. 

Russell,  Gen.  D.  A.,  killed  at  Winchester,  796. 

S. 

S^UJiNE  Pass,  capture  of,  434  ; battle  of,  598. 

Sabine  Cross  Roads,  battle  of,  629. 

St.  Augustine,  Fla.,  surrender  of,  141. 

St.  Helena  Bay,  occupied  by  the  Nationals,  75. 

Sailor’s  Creek,  Va.,  battle  of,  927. 

Salisbury,  N.  C.,  battle  at  Grant’s  creek,  near.  896. 

Salkahatchie  River,  the  passage  of,  forced  883. 

Saltworks  in  Virginia  expedition  of  Burbridge  again.^t, 
835  ; destroyed  by  Stoneman’s  troops,  837. 

Sanborn,  Gen.,  his  pursuit  of  Gen.  Price,  831-833. 

Sanders,  Gen.,  operations  of . 544  ; death  of  {note),  578. 

Santa  Rosa  Island,  night  attack  on  troops  at,  67. 

Saunders  Gen.,  killed  at  the  Weldon  railroad,  764. 

Savage  Station,  Va.,  battle  of,  263. 

Savannah.  Ga.,  Sherman’s  approach  to,  on  the 
march  from  Atlanta,  819  ; investment  of,  by  Sher- 
man, 823  ; escape  of  Gen.  Hardee  from,  823  ; 
occupation  of.  by  Sherman,  824  ; Sherman’s  despatch 
announcing  the  fall  of,  824  ; Gen.  Geary  appointed 
military  governor  of,  825  ; left  in  charge  of  Geu 
Foster,  881 

Savannah,  privateer,  surrenders  to  the  Perry,  875. 

Schenck,  Gen.  R.  C.,  at  Bull  Run,  43  ; at  Cross  keys, 
251  ; at  Gainesville,  295. 

Schimmelpfenig,  Gen.,  at  Gettysburg,  504,  505. 

Schofield,  Gen.  J.  M.,  in  command  of  the  Missouri 
military  district,  357  ; his  report  of  operations  in 
Missouri  and  Arkansas,  358  ; defeat  of  Rains  by, 
361  ; resignation  of,  362  ; commands  the  army  of 
the  Ohio,  706  ; retreats  from  Pulaski  to  Frank- 
lin, 840  ; his  repulse  of  Hood  at  Franklin,  842  ; 
falls  back  to  Nashville,  843  ; at  the  battle  of  Nash- 
ville, 845  ; sent  to  North  Carolina  with  his  corps, 
868;  occupies  Wilmington,  869;  movements  of, 
from  Wilmington  to  Goldsboro,  893,  894. 

Schurz,  Gen.  C.,  at  Gainesville,  295  ; at  Chancellors- 
ville,  461  ; at  Gettysburg,  504  ; at  Wauhatchie,  561. 

Scott,  Gen.  Winfield,  statement  of,  regarding  pur- 
chase of  arms  by  the  States,  14 ; advice  of,  to 


INDEX. 


973 


commanders  of  Southern  forts,  15 ; mistake  of,  at 
Bull  Run,  45  ; resignation  of,  79 

Seabrook,  S.  C.,  batteries  erected  at,  76. 

Sears,  Lieut. , noble  work  of,  at  the  battle  of  luka,  161. 

Secessionville,  S.  C.,  battle  of,  580  ; {note),  581. 

Sedgwick,  Gen.  John,  at  York  River,  226  ; at  Fair 
Oaks,  237  ; at  Savage  station,  263  ; wounded  at 
Antietam,  322  ; attack  of,  on  Marye’s  hill,  473 ; 
repulsed  at  Salem  church,  478  ; retreat  ot,{not6),  480; 
at  Gettysburg,  510  ; raid  of,  in  Virginia,  656  ; com- 
mands the  sixth  corps,  659;  death  of,  675;  {note),  676. 

Selma,  gun-boat,  captured  by  the  Metacomet,  645. 

Selma,  Ala.,  capture  of,  by  Gen. Wilson,  874. 

Selfridge,  Lieut.  T.  0.,  at  Pleasant  hill  landing.  633. 

Semmes,  Capt.  Raphael,  commands  the  cruiser 
Sumter,  875  ; takes  command  of  the  Alabama,  877  ; 
his  disastrous  encounter  with  the  Kearsarge,  878. 

Seward,  Secretary  W.  H.,  advice  given  by,  391  ; L. 
Payne  Powell’s  attempt  to  assassinate,  939. 

Seymour,  Gen.,  at  Mechanicsville,  259  ; at  Glendale, 
266  ; captured  in  the  Wilderness,  671  ; his  opera- 
tions in  Florida,  856-858  ; defeat  of,  at  Olustee,  858. 

Shackelford,  Gen.,  at  Cumberland  gap,  545  ; surrender 
of  Gen.  Morgan  to,  596  ; at  Bean  Station,  596. 

Shaeffer,  Gen.  J.  W.,  killed  at  Murfreesboro,  184. 

Shaler,  Gen. , at  the  capture  of  Marye’s  Hill,  474  ; 
captured  at  the  battle  of  the  Wilderness,  671. 

Shaw’s  brigade  at  the  battle  of  Pleasant  hill,  630. 

Shelby ville,  Tenn.,  taken  by  the  Nationals,  543. 

Shenandoah,  cruiser,  depredations  of,  876. 

Shenandoah  Valley,  operations  of  Gen.  Banks  in,  243  ; 
operations  of  Gen.  Jackson  in,  247  ; operations 
of  Gen.  Sheridan  in,  789-802. 

Sheridan,  Gen.  P.  H.,  at  Perryville,  Ky.,  177  ; at 
Murfreesboro,  180  ; operations  of,  538  ; at  Chatta- 
nooga, 572  ; raid  of,  in  Virginia,  685,  686  ; encounter 
of,  with  Fitz  Hugh  Lee  and  Hampton,  697 ; at 
Trevillian,  703 ; commands  the  Middle  military 
division,  789  ; operations  of,  in  the  Shenandoah  val- 
ley, 789-802;  his  great  raid  fromWinchester,  903-906; 
at  Five  forks,  910-917  ; pursues  Lee  to  Jetters ville, 
923-925 ; at  Deatonsville,  926 ; at  Appomattox 
station,  933  ; ordered  to  proceed  to  Texas,  948. 

Sherman,  Gen.  Thomas  W.,  at  Bull  Run,  41 ; with 
the  army  of  the  Cumberland,  58  ; commands  the 
land  forces  in  the  South  Carolina  expedition — bio- 
graphical sketch  of,  70  ; occupies  and  strengthens 
Hilton  head,  75. 

Sherman,  Gen.  William  T.,  gallantry  of,  at  Shiloh, 
101  ; at  College  hill,  372  ; at  Chickasaw  bayou,  376  ; 
at  Milliken’s  bend,  383  ; order  of,  to  his  army  corps, 
384 ; at  Arkansas  post,  387  ; demonstration  of,  at 
Haines’  blufE,  404  ; operations  of,  at  Jackson,  409  ; 
ordered  to  Bridgeport,  413  ; onward  march  to  Vicks- 
burg— stakes  possession  of  Haines’  bluff,  414  ; opera- 
tions of,  near  Lake  Pontchartrain,  438  ; at  Port 
Budt.on  441  ; in  command  of  the  department  of 


the  Tennessee,  558  ; at  Chattanooga,  563  ; at  the 
battle  of  Chattanooga,  568  ; relieves  Burnside  at 
Knoxville,  577  ; his  expedition  to  Meridian,  610  ; 
his  return  to  Vicksburg,  614  ; assumes  command  of 
the  military  division  of  the  Mississippi,  653  ; details 
of  his  Atlanta  campaign,  706-734  ; turns  Johnston’s 
position  at  Dalton,  709  ; attacks  Johnston  at  Resaca, 
710  ; compels  Johnston  to  evacuate  Resaca,  711  ; 
captures  Allatoona  pass,  713  ; compels  Johnston  to 
evacuate  his  positions  on  Kenesaw,  Pine  and  Lost 
mountains,  714^717 ; his  march  to  the  Chattahoochee, 
717  ; his  series  of  operations  against  Atlanta,  718- 
734 ; his  operations  against  Hood,  803-809  ; pursues 
Hood  to  Resaca,  808  ; his  new  plan  of  campaign, 

810  ; prepares  for  the  great  march  through  Georgia, 

811  ; burns  Atlanta,  812  ; his  order  of  march,  813  ; 
threatens  Macon,  815  ; his  troops  enter  Milledge- 
ville,  81 6 ; crosses  the  Oconee  817  ; his  cavalry 
defeats  Wheeler  at  Waynesboro,  818  ; cresses  the 
Ogeechee,  818  ; approaches  Savannah,  819  ; captures 
Fort  McAllister — communicates  with  the  fleet. 
822  ; invests  Savannah,  823  ; destruction  effected  by 
his  army  on  the  march  from  Atlanta  to  Savannah, 
824,  825  ; his  march  through  the  Carolinas,  881- 
894  ; detention  of,  by  floods,  882  ; crosses  the  Sal- 
kahatchie  — moves  on  Orangeburg  — drives  the 
Confederates  across  the  Congaree,  883  ; occupies 
Columbia,  884,  885  ; advances  to  Cheraw,  888  ; his 
cavalry  surprised  by  Wade  Hampton — destroys 
the  old  arsenal  at  Fayetteville,  889  ; at  Averysboro 
891  ; at  Bentonville,  893  ; joins  Schofield  at  Golds- 
boro, 893  ; his  final  operations  against  Gen.  John- 
ston in  North  Carolina,  940-943,  his  pursuit  of 
Johnston  to  Smithfield,  941  ; his  conferences  with 
Johnston,  and  basis  of  agreement  for  surrender, 
943,  944,  {note)  945  ; Johnston  surrenders  to,  947. 

Shields,  Gen.  J.,  takes  command  of  Lander’s  troops, 
242  ; operations  of,  in  the  valley  of  the  Shenan- 
doah, 243,  244  ; biographical  sketch  of  {note),  245. 

Shiloh,  first  battle  of,  105  ; second  battle  of.  111. 

Sibley,  Col.,  inflicts  punishment  on  the  Sioux,  369. 

Sickles,  Gen.  Dan.  E.,  at  Fair  Oaks,  239  ; skirmish  of, 
with  Gen.  Jackson  at  the  Furnace — at  Chancellors- 
ville,  459  ; at  Gettysburg,  507  ; wounded,  514. 

Sigel,  Gen.  Franz,  at  Dug  springs.  Mo.,  55;  retreats  to 
Rolla,  56 ; at  Pea  ridge,  97 ; at  Cedar  mountain, 
Va.,  286  ; defeated  at  New  market,  691  ; relieved 
of  his  command,  692  ; retires  from  Martinsburg,  784. 

Sill,  Gen.  J.  W.,  division  of,  sent  to  Frankfort,  176  ; 
death  of,  at  the  battle  of  Murfreesboro,  183. 

Simmons,  Col.,  mortally  wounded  at  Glendale,  Va. , 265. 

Sioux  Indians,  savage  attack  of.  on  the  village  of  New 
Ulm,  369  ; execution  of  a party  of,  607. 

Slaves,  conduct  of  the,  prior  to  the  declaration  of 
emancipation,  392  ; flocking  of,  to  Gen.  Sherman’s 
army,  in  the  Meridian  expedition,  613. 

Slocum,  CoL  J.  S.,  killed  at  the  battle  of  Bull  Run,  41. 


974 


INDEX. 


Slocum,  Gen.  Henry  W.,  at  the  battle  of  Gaines’ mill, 
260  ; at  Chancellors ville,  455,  469  ; at  Gettysburg, 
507  ; in  command  of  the  twentieth  corps,  728  ; enters 
Atlanta,  732;  defeats  Hardee  near  Averysboro,  N.  C., 
891  ; repulses  Johnston  near  Bentonville,  893. 

Smith,  Col.  O.,  gallant  charge  of,  at  Wauhatchie,  561. 

Smith,  Gen.  A J.,  at  the  battle  of  Chickasaw  bayou, 
378  ; post  of  honor  given  to,  after  the  capture  of 
Fort  Hindman,  Ark.,  388;  at  Gumtown,  619; 
expeditions  of,  against  Gen.  Forrest.  620  ; in  the 
Shreveport  expedition,  622  ; his  capture  of  Fort  de 
Kussey,  624  ; at  the  battle  of  Pleasant  hill,  630  ; at 
Clouterville,  635  ; at  the  battle  of  Nashville,  846  ; 
corps  of,  at  the  operations  against  Mobile  870. 

Smith,  Gen.  C.  F. , at  Belmont,  Mo.,  60  ; at  Fort  Don- 
elson,  86-93  ; supersedes  Grant,  99  ; death  of,  101. 

Smith,  Gen.  G.  C.,  operations  of,  538. 

Smith,  Gen.  G.  W.,  at  the  battle  of  Fair  Oaks,  234; 
brigade  of,  at  the  battle  of  Antietam,  323. 

Smith,  Gen.  J.  E. , at  the  battle  of  Chattanooga,  569. 

Smith,  Gen.  Kirby,  at  Bull  Run,  45  ; defeats  Gen. 
Nelson  at  Richmond,  Ky.,  170  ; at  the  battle  of 
Jenkins’  ferry,  639  ; surrender  of,  949. 

Smith,  Gen.  M.  L.,  division  of,  at  Fort  Donelson,  86 ; 
at  Corinth,  118  ; severely  wounded  at  Chickasaw 
bayou,  378  ; at  the  battle  of  Chattanooga,  569. 

Smith,  Gen.  T.  K.,  in  the  Shreveport  expedition,  626  ; 
at  Pleasant  hill  landing,  632  ; at  Clouterville,  635. 

Smith,  Gen.  W.  F.,  at  Williamsburg,  214  ; at  Chatta- 
nooga, 559  ; at  Bermuda  hundred,  687. 

Smith,  Gen.  W.  S.,  at  Memphis.  609  ; retreat  of , 613. 

Smyth,  Gen.  T.  A.,  killed  near  Farmville  {note),  929. 

Snake  Creek,  Va.,  affair  at,  688. 

Snake  Creek  Gap,  McPherson’s  movement  on,  708. 

Snicker’s  Gap,  Va.,  massacre  at,  792. 

“Sons  of  Liberty,”  secret  association  in  Missouri,  829. 

Southfield,  gun-boat,  sunk  by  the  Albemarle,  858. 

South  Mountain,  Md.,  battle  of,  315. 

Spanish  Fort.  Mobile,  invested,  870  ; surrenders,  871 . 

Spear,  Col. , killed  at  the  capture  of  Marye’s  hill,  474. 

Spottsylvania  Court  House,  battles  around,  675-682. 

Springfield,  Mo. , battle  of,  602. 

Stafford,  Gen.,  killed  in  the  Wilderness,  672. 

Stahl,  Gen.,  at  the  battle  of  Cross  keys,  251. 

Stanley,  Gen.  D.  S.,  at  luka,  161  ; at  Corinth,  165  ; 
operations  of,  on  the  Harpeth  river,  538  ; at  Chick- 
amauga,  554 ; in  command  of  the  fourth  corps 
under  Sherman,  728  ; wounded  at  Franltlin,  842. 

Stannard’s,  brigade  at  Gettysburg,  525. 

Stanton,  Edwin  M.,  made  secretary  of  war,  79  ; visits 
Fortress  Monroe,  228  ; his  draft  orders  of  1862,  283  ; 
his  despatch  to  the  governors  of  the  Northern 
States,  485  ; meets  Gen.  Grant  at  Indianapolis,  558  ; 
his  lamentation  at  the  death-bed  of  Lincoln,  939. 

Star  of  the  West,  attempts  to  relieve  Fort  Sumter,  21. 

Starke,  Gen. , killed  at  the  battle  of  Antietam,  320. 

Starkweather’s  brigade,  at  Perry  ville,  Ky.,  177. 


Steadman,  Gen.,  charge  of,  at  Chickamauga,  556. 

Steedman,  Gen.  James  B.,  at  Nashville,  844, 

Steele,  Gen.  F.,  his  operations  on  the  eastern  banks 
of  the  Mississippi,  372  ; at  Chickasaw  bayou,  378  ; 
at  Helena,  605  ; captures  Little  Rock,  606  ; at  Cam- 
den, 639  ; at  Jenkins’  ferry,  640  ; at  Mobile,  870. 

Stein,  Gen.,  killed  at  the  battle  of  Prairie  grove,  365. 

Steinwehr,  Gen.,  at  the  battle  of  Gainesville,  295  ; at 
Chancellorsville,  461  ; at  Wauhatchie,  561. 

Stephens,  Commander,  disastrous  enterprise  of,  to 
take  possession  of  Fort  Sumter,  592. 

Stevens,  Gen.  I.  I.,  occuxnes  Fort  Beauregard,  75; 
expedition  of,  to  Port  Royal,  76  ; raid  of,  near 
Pocotaligo — at  Secessionville,  580 ; death  of,  at 
Chantilly,  303  ; biographical  sketch  of  {note),  305. 

Stevens,  Gen,,  at  the  battle  of  Shiloh,  109. 

Stevens’  Maine  battery,  at  Gettysburg,  519. 

Stevenson,  Ala.,  seized  by  Gen.  Mitchell,  115. 

Stevenson,  Gen.  Carter  L.,  at  Champion  hills,  410. 

Stevenson,  Gen.  Thomas  G.,  killed  near  Spotteyl 
vania,  678  ; biographical  sketch  of  {note),  705. 

Stewart,  Gen.  G.  H.,  captured  by  Gen.  Hancock,  681. 

Stewart’s  brigade,  at  the  battle  of  Shiloh,  106. 

Stone,  Gen.  C.  P.,  at  Poolesville,  Md.,  at  Ball’s  Bluff, 
53  ; in  the  Shreveport  expedition,  624. 

Stoneman,  Gen.  Geo  , repulsed  at  Williamsburg,  214  ; 
in  command  of  the  four  divisions  of  cavalry,  451  ; 
expedition  of,  to  destroy  railroads — taken  prisoner, 
726  ; his  operations  against  Breckenridge  in  East 
Tennessee,  836  ; raid  of,  into  South  Carolina,  895-897, 

Stony  Creek  Station,  Gen  Gregg’s  raid  against,  779. 

Strasburg,  Va, . advance  of  Sheridan’s  army  to,  790. 

Streight,  Col.  A.  D. , expedition  of,  539  ; capture  of,  540. 

Stringham,  Commodore  S.  H.,  commands  the  fleet 
in  the  expedition  to  Hatteras,  63, 

Strong,  Gen.,  severely  wounded  at  Fort  Wagner,  590. 

Stuart,  Gen,,  at  the  battle  of  Chickasaw  bayou,  378. 

Stuart,  Gen.  J.  E,  B.,  raid  of,  at  Hanover  court 
house,  257  ; at  Catletts  station,  288  ; post  at  Man- 
assas surprised  by,  290  ; raid  of,  into  Pennsylvania, 
332  ; at  Chancellorsville,  464  ; cavalry  engagement 
with  Gregg,  490  ; at  Gettysburg,  523  ; surprised 
by  Gen.  Custer,  656  ; death  of  {note),  685. 

Sturgis,  Col.,  gallantry  of,  at  the  battle  of  Raymond, 
Miss.,  407  ; (Gen.)  defeat  of,  at  Gumtown,  620. 

Suffolk,  Va. , siege  of,  594. 

Sumner,  Gen.  E V.,  in  command  of  a corps  in  the 
army  of  the  Potomac,  193  ; at  Williamsburg,  214  ; 
at  Fair  Oaks,  237  ; at  White  Oak  swamp,  265  ; at 
Antietam,  322  ; at  Fredericksburg,  347  ; relieved  of 
his  command,  354  ; death  of  {note),  449. 

Sumter,  privateer,  blockaded  at  Gibraltar,  875. 

Surrender  of,  Gen.  Jeff.  Thomson  in  Arkansas,  948  ; 
Gen.  Joseph  Johnston  in  North  Carolina.  947  ; Gen. 
Kirby  Smith  in  Texas,  949  ; Gen.  R.  E.  Lee  in 
Virginia,  934. 

“ Swamp  Angel.”  a huge  Parrott  gun,  so  called.  591. 


INDEX. 


975 


Sweitzer  Gen.,  at  Gettysburg-,  514. 

Sweitzer’s  Texan  cavalry  at  Pleasant  hill,  630. 

Swinton,  William,  his  opinion  of  the  losses  in  the 
overland  campaign,  704. 

Sykes,  Gen.  at  Mechanicsville,  258 ; at  Gaines’  mill, 
259  ; at  Chancellorsville,  456  ; at  Gettysburg,  507. 

T. 

Tallahassee,  Confederate  cruiser,  depredations  of, 
876  ; destroyed  by  the  Confederates,  869. 

Taliaferro,  Gen.  wounded  at  Warrenton  turnpike.  293. 

Tatnall.  Commodore  Josiah,  at  Beaufort,  S.  C.,  73. 

Taylor,  Gen.  Richard  in  command  of  Confederates  in 
Louisiana,  437  ; defeat  of,  438  ; operations  of,  597  ; 
in  command  of  the  Confederate  department  of  the 
South,  870  ; surrender  of,  at  Citronella,  Ala.,  947. 

Taylor’s  Bridge,  Gen.  Hancock  at,  694. 

Tecumseh,  monitor,  strikes  a torpedo  and  sinks,  644. 

Tennessee,  t'onfederate  ram,  in  Mobile  bay,  641  ; de- 
scription of,  643  ; surrenders  to  Farragut,  647. 

Terrill,  Gen.,  battery  of.  at  Shiloh.  110  ; at  Perry ville, 
Ky.,  178  ; mortally  wounded,  177. 

Terry,  Gen. , A.  H.,  at  Stono  river,  589  ; reconnoissance 
made  by,  towards  Richmond,  773  ; his  capture  of 
Fort  Fisher,  864-867 ; joins  Sherman’s  army  near 
Goldsboro,  N.  C.,  894. 

Texan  Martyrs,  367. 

Thatcher,  Admiral,  operates  against  Mobile,  870. 

Thayer,  Col.,  at  Fort  Donelson,  91  ; at  Chickasaw 
bayou,  380  ; (Gen.)  at  Prairie  D’Ann,  639. 

Thomas,  Gen.  Geo.  H.,  defeats  Zollikotfer  at  Mill 
spring,  81  ; antecedents  of,  82  ; at  Perry  ville,  174 ; 
at  Murfreesboro,  180  ; at  Chickamauga,  550  ; firm- 
ness of,  at  Chickamauga,  555  ; in  charge  of  the 
department  of  the  Cumberland,  558  ; at  Chattanooga, 
565  ; commands  the  army  of  the  Cumberland  under 
Sherman,  706  ; sent  to  Nashville  by  Sherman,  805  ; 
left  to  cope  with  Hood  in  Tennessee,  811  ; his  avail- 
able force  when  Hood  entered  Tennessee,  838 ; his 
campaign  against  Hood,  837-851  ; favored  by  Hood’s 
delay,  839  ; fights  at  Spring  hill — evacuates  Co- 
lumbia, 840  ; takes  the  offensive  against  Hood,  844  ; 
commands  in  front  of  Nashville,  844-847 ; defeats 
Hood,  847  ; appointed  major-general  in  the  regular 
army,  851  ; his  instructions  to  Gen.  Wilson,  873. 

Thomas,  Gen.,  captured  at  Blakely,  Ala.,  872. 

Thompson,  Gen.  Jeff.,  at  Fort  Pillow,  143  ; retreat  of, 
146  ; surrenders  at  Chalk  bluff,  Ark.,  948. 

Thompson,  Gen.  A.  P , killed  at  Fort  Anderson,  617. 

tidball.  Col.,  artillery  of,  at  Taylor’s  bridge,  695. 

Tilden,  Major,  killed  at  Chantilly,  304. 

Tilghman,  Gen.,  surrenders  Fort  Henry  to  Foote,  84. 

Tilton,  Gen.,  at  Gettysburg,  514 

Tilton,  Ga.,  capture  of  a blockhouse  at,  808. 

Tolopotomy  Creek,  Va.,  Gen.  Hancock  at.  697. 

Torbert  Gen  , capture  of  Cold  harbor  by,  698  ; at 
Trevillian,  703  ; engagement  of,  at  Luray,  797. 


Totten.  Gen.,  at  the  battle  of  Prairie  grove,  363. 

Tourtellotte,  Col.,  in  charge  at  Allatoona  pass,  806. 

Towers’  brigade,  gallantry  of,  at  Manassas,  300. 

Trevillian,  Va.,  battle  of,  703. 

Tullahoma,  abandoned  by  the  Confederates,  543. 

Tupelo,  Miss.,  Gen.  Hood’s  broken  army  at.  851. 

Turchin.  Gen.,  at  W’auhatchie,  560. 

Tuscaloosa,  Ala.,  captured  by  the  Nationals,  874. 

Tuscaloosa,  ram,  sunk  by  the  Confederates,  873. 

Tuscumbia,  Mo.,  seized  by  Gen.  Mitchell,  115. 

Tyler,  Gen.  E.  B.,  at  Blackburn’s  ford,  37  ; at  Port 
Republic,  252  ; at  Monocacy,  785. 

Tyler,  Gen  R.  O.,  in  command  of  artillerists,  684  ; 
wounded  at  Cold  harbor,  701. 

Tyner’s  Station,  Tenn.,  burned  by  the  Nationals,  565. 

Tyndall’s  brigade  at  Wauhatchie,  561. 

U. 

Union  City,  Tenn.,  captured  by  Gen.  Forrest,  616. 

Underwriter,  gun  boat,  set  on  fire  at  New  Berne,  858. 

Upton,  Col.,  at  Spottsylvania  court  house,  678. 

V. 

Van  Bhren,  Ark.,  captured  by  Gen.  Blunt,  366. 

Vance,  Col.  killed  at  Sabine  cross  roads,  629. 

Van  Cleve,  Gen.,  at  Murfreesboro,  180  ; at  Chicka- 
mauga,  550. 

Vandever’s  brigade  at  Chickamauga,  554. 

Van  Dorn,  Gen.  Earl,  at  Pea  ridge,  97  ; at  Corinth, 
118  ; at  Pocahontas,  163  ; defeated  at  Corinth,  166  ; 
captures  Holly  springs,  374  ; operations  of,  538. 

Van  Pelt,  Lieut.,  killed  at  Chickamauga,  550. 

Vaughan,  Gen.,  defeat  of,  by  Gen.  Gillem,  835,  836. 

Velocity,  gun-boat,  captured  off  Galveston,  434. 

Verona,  Miss.,  destruction  of  property  at,  852. 

Vicksburg,  situation  of,  376  ; operations  previous  to 
the  attack  on,  394-401  ; assaults  on,  415-419  ; sur- 
render of,  to  Gen.  Grant,  427. 

Viele,  Gen.  Egbert  L.,  at  the  siege  of  Fort  Pulaski, 
139  ; at  Ocean  view  and  Norfolk,  Va.,  228,  229. 

Villepigue,  Gen.,  at  Fort  Pillow,  143  ; at  Corinth,  164. 

Vincent,  Gen.,  killed  at  Gettysburg,  513. 

W. 

Wadswokth,  Gen.,  at  Gettysburg,  503  ; killed  in  the 
Wilderness — biographical  sketch  of  {note),  669. 

Wainwright,  Commander,  death  of,  on  board  the  Har- 
riet Lane,  at  Galveston,  433. 

Walcott,  Gen  , his  victory  at  Griswold  ville,  Ga.,  815. 

Walker,  Gen.,  at  Raymond,  Miss.,  407  ; joins  Bragg’s 
army,  546  ; at  Chickamauga,  550. 

Wallace,  Gen.  W.  H.  L.,  at  Fort  Donelson,  90  ; mor- 
tally wounded  at  the  battle  of  Shiloh,  107. 

Wallace.  Col.  Lewis,  defeats  the  (’onfederates  gt 
Romney,  49  ; (Gen  ) at  Fort  Donelson,  87  ; noble 
conduct  of,  93  ; in  command  at  Fort  Henry,  98  ; at 
Crump’s  landing,  102  ; at  Shiloh,  105  ; at  Corinth 
118  ; defeat  of,  at  the  battle  of  Monocacy,  786. 


976 


INDEX. 


Ward,  Gen.,  at  the  battle  of  Chancellorsville,  465  ; at 
the  battle  of  Gettysburg,  511. 

Warren,  Gen.  G.  K.,  at  Manassas,  300  ; at  the  attack 
on  Marye’s  hill,  472  ; at  Gettysburg,  512  ; commands 
the  fifth  army  corps,  658  ; at  Jericho  ford,  694  ; at 
the  Weldon  railroad,  780  ; at  Five  forks,  916  ; in 
command  of  the  department  of  the  Mississippi,  917. 

Warrenton  Turnpike,  Va. , battle  of,  293 

Warrenton,  Miss.,  fleet  passes  the  batteries  of,  4')1. 

^V’'ar^ington,  near  Pensacola,  burning  of,  68. 

^Va^saw  Sound,  occupied  by  the  Nationals,  75. 

Washburne,  Gen.  C.  C. , at  Jacksonport,  Ark.,  356; 
at  Helena,  357  ; at  Grand  Coteau,  599  ; captures 
Fort  Esperanza,  601  ; pursues  Forrest,  828. 

Washington,  D.  C.,  contemplated  seizure  of,  by  the 
Confederates,  34  ; arrangements  for  the  defense  of, 
80  ; troops  left  for  the  defense  of,  192-194  ; measures 
taken  for  the  safety  of,  249  ; Gen.  Pope  charged  with 
the  protection  of,  278  ; threatened  by  Early,  786. 

Wauhatchie,  Ga.,  battle  of,  561. 

W ayuesboro,  Ga  , battle  of,  904. 

Webb,  Gen.,  at  Gettysburg,  527  ; killed  in  the  Wil- 
derness, 672. 

Weber,  Gen.,  at  the  battle  of  Antietam,  324. 

Weed,  Gen.,  killed  at  the  battle  of  Gettysburg,  513. 

Weitzel,  Gen.  G.,  his  victory  at  Labadieville,  La.,  431  ; 
at  Berwick,  La.,  437  ; at  Port  Hudson,  441  ; at 
Bermuda  hundred,  687  ; at  Fort  Fisher,  861-863. 

Weldon  Railroad,  movements  of  Grant’s  forces  against, 
741-745  ; series  of  battles  for  the  possession  of, 
712,  762-766  ; Warren’s  expedition  against,  779-781. 

Wessels,  Gen.,  his  defense  of  Plymouth,  N.  C.,  859. 

Westfield,  gun-boat,  at  Galveston,  432  ; blown  up,  433. 

West  Point,  Miss.,  battle  of,  613. 

Westport,  battle  of,  832. 

Wheeler,  Gen.,  attempts  to  recapture  Fort  Donelson, 
537  ; at  Chickamauga,  549  ; his  raid  against  Sher- 
man’s communications,  729  ; repulsed  at  Dalton, 
Ga.,  733  ; defeated  at  Waynesboro,  818. 

White,  Gen.  J.,  surrenders  Harper’s  ferry,  314 

White  House,  Va.,  Sheridan’s  cavalry  attacked  at,  745. 

White  Oak  Swamp,  Va.,  battle  of,  264. 

White  River,  expedition  of  McClernand  up,  385. 

Whiting,  Gen.  W.  H.  C.,  at  Gaines’  mill,  260  ; taken 
prisoner  at  the  capture  of  Fort  Fisher,  867. 

Whitney,  Gen.,  severely  wounded  at  Fort  Fisher,  867 

Whipple,  Gen.,  at  Chancellorsville,  459. 

Whittaker,  Gen.,  brigade  of,  at  Chickamauga,  556  ; 
at  Wauhatchie,  566. 

Wilcox,  Gen.,  repulse  of  the  Nationals  at  Salem 
heights  by,  476-478  ; at  Gettysburg,  617,  525  ; in 
the  Wilderness,  666. 

Wilcox,  Gen.  0.  B.,  brigade  of,  at  Bull  Run,  43;  at 
Fredericksburg  348. 


Wild,  Gen.,  in  command  of  colored  troops  on  the 
James  river,  686. 

Wilder,  Gen.,  operations  of,  542,  543. 

Wilderness,  Va.,  the  battles  in  the,  664-672. 

Williams,  Gen.  A.  L.,  at  Chancellorsville,  459  ; at 
Gettysburg,  518  ; at  Averysboro,  890 

Williams,  Gen.  F. , operations  of,  against  Vicksburg, 
371  ; death  of.  defending  Baton  Rouge,  430. 

Williamsburg.  Va.,  battle  of,  214-225. 

Willich,  Gen.,  operations  of,  542  ; at  Chattanooga.  572. 

W''ilmington,  N.  C..  occupied  by  Gen.  Schofield,  869. 

Wilson,  Gen.  Jas.  H.,  encounters  W^ade  Hampton’s 
cavalry  and  routs  Heth’s  infantry,  701  ; his  expedi- 
tion ag-ain.st  the  Weldon  and  Danville  railroads, 
746  ; pursues  Hood  from  Nashville,  847-849  ; hia 
raid  in  Alabama  and  Georgia,  873-875. 

Wilson,  Col.  William,  Zouaves  of,  on  Santa  Rosa 
island,  67. 

Wilson’s  Creek,  Mo.,  battle  of,  56. 

Winchester,  Va. . Banks  attacked  by  Jackson  at,  247  ; 
Early  defeated  near,  787  ; battle  of,  796. 

Winslow,  Capt.,  sinks  the  cruiser  Alabama,  877. 

Winthrop,  Major  Theo.,  killed  at  Big  Bethel,  62. 

Wistar,  Gen  .attempts  to  take  Richmond  by  surprise, 
655  ; at  Bermuda  hundred,  687. 

Withers,  Gen.,  at  Shiloh,  109  ; at  Murfreesboro,  180. 

Wood,  Gen.,  at  Murfreesboro,  180  ; at  Orchard  knob, 
563  ; at  Chattanooga,  572  ; at  Nashville,  845. 

Wool,  Gen.  J.  E.,  in  command  at  Fortress  Monroe. 
63  , at  Ocean  View  and  Norfolk,  Va, , 228,  229. 

Wh^rden,  Lieut.  J.  L , in  command  of  the  Monitor, 
206  ; operations  of,  at  Fort  McAllister,  582. 

Wright,  Gen.  G H.,  captures  Fort  Wa  ker,  75  ; his 
expedition  to  Florida,  141  ; at  Secession ville,  580 ; 
commands  first  division  of  sixth  corps,  659  ; suc- 
ceeds Sedgwick  in  command  of  sixth  corps,  676  ; 
at  Spottsylvania.  682  ; at  Cold  harbor,  699  ; moves 
on  the  Weldon  railroad,  743  ; in  command  of  the 
troops  around  W'^ashington  and  pursues  Early.  786  ; 
his  successful  attack  on  the  Confederate  lines,  918  ; 
at  Sailor’s  creek,  927. 

Wytheville,  Va.,  Stoneman’s  great  raid  on,  836. 

Y. 

Yazoo  City,  Miss.,  failure  of  operations  at,  615. 

Yazoo  Pass  experiment,  396,  397. 

Yazoo  River,  situation  of  377  ; Porter’s  fleet  in,  414. 

York,  Pa. , exactions  of  the  Confederates  at,  499. 

Yorktown,  Va.,  operations  at,  195-199. 

Z. 

ZOLLIKOFFER,  Gen.  Felix  K.,  enters  Kentucky  from 
the  east,  58  ; killed  at  Mill  spring,  Ky.,  81. 

Zook,  Gen.,  mortally  wounded  at  Gettysburg,  515. 


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UNIVERSITY  OF  ILLINOIS-URBANA 


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